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* Thu Mar 19 2015 Roland Mainz <rmainz@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-2

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- fix for CVE-2014-5355 (#1193939) "krb5: unauthenticated
  denial of service in recvauth_common() and others"
This commit is contained in:
Roland Mainz 2015-03-20 13:23:20 +01:00
parent 2a8abfedf0
commit 54e60b1162
2 changed files with 117 additions and 1 deletions
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110
krb5-1.12.1-CVE_2014_5355_fix_krb5_read_message_handling.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
From 21e4e653d8258d525f4b6ca87797d42a8bccc282 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 12:37:44 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fix krb5_read_message handling [CVE-2014-5355]
In recvauth_common, do not use strcmp against the data fields of
krb5_data objects populated by krb5_read_message(), as there is no
guarantee that they are C strings. Instead, create an expected
krb5_data value and use data_eq().
In the sample user-to-user server application, check that the received
client principal name is null-terminated before using it with printf
and krb5_parse_name.
CVE-2014-5355:
In MIT krb5, when a server process uses the krb5_recvauth function, an
unauthenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference by
sending a zero-byte version string, or a read beyond the end of
allocated storage by sending a non-null-terminated version string.
The example user-to-user server application (uuserver) is similarly
vulnerable to a zero-length or non-null-terminated principal name
string.
The krb5_recvauth function reads two version strings from the client
using krb5_read_message(), which produces a krb5_data structure
containing a length and a pointer to an octet sequence. krb5_recvauth
assumes that the data pointer is a valid C string and passes it to
strcmp() to verify the versions. If the client sends an empty octet
sequence, the data pointer will be NULL and strcmp() will dereference
a NULL pointer, causing the process to crash. If the client sends a
non-null-terminated octet sequence, strcmp() will read beyond the end
of the allocated storage, possibly causing the process to crash.
uuserver similarly uses krb5_read_message() to read a client principal
name, and then passes it to printf() and krb5_parse_name() without
verifying that it is a valid C string.
The krb5_recvauth function is used by kpropd and the Kerberized
versions of the BSD rlogin and rsh daemons. These daemons are usually
run out of inetd or in a mode which forks before processing incoming
connections, so a process crash will generally not result in a
complete denial of service.
Thanks to Tim Uglow for discovering this issue.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: CVSS score]
(cherry picked from commit 102bb6ebf20f9174130c85c3b052ae104e5073ec)
ticket: 8050
version_fixed: 1.13.2
status: resolved
---
src/appl/user_user/server.c | 4 +++-
src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c | 9 ++++++---
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/appl/user_user/server.c b/src/appl/user_user/server.c
index 09ea4e0..f2b5b61 100644
--- a/src/appl/user_user/server.c
+++ b/src/appl/user_user/server.c
@@ -111,8 +111,10 @@ int main(argc, argv)
}
#endif
+ /* principal name must be sent null-terminated. */
retval = krb5_read_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &pname_data);
- if (retval) {
+ if (retval || pname_data.length == 0 ||
+ pname_data.data[pname_data.length - 1] != '\0') {
com_err ("uu-server", retval, "reading pname");
return 2;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c
index da836283..5adc6dd 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ recvauth_common(krb5_context context,
krb5_rcache rcache = 0;
krb5_octet response;
krb5_data null_server;
+ krb5_data d;
int need_error_free = 0;
int local_rcache = 0, local_authcon = 0;
@@ -77,7 +78,8 @@ recvauth_common(krb5_context context,
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
- if (strcmp(inbuf.data, sendauth_version)) {
+ d = make_data((char *)sendauth_version, strlen(sendauth_version) + 1);
+ if (!data_eq(inbuf, d)) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS;
response = 1;
}
@@ -93,8 +95,9 @@ recvauth_common(krb5_context context,
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
- if (appl_version && strcmp(inbuf.data, appl_version)) {
- if (!problem) {
+ if (appl_version != NULL && !problem) {
+ d = make_data(appl_version, strlen(appl_version) + 1);
+ if (!data_eq(inbuf, d)) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS;
response = 2;
}

8
krb5.spec
View File

@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
Summary: The Kerberos network authentication system
Name: krb5
Version: 1.13.1
Release: 1%{?dist}
Release: 2%{?dist}
# - Maybe we should explode from the now-available-to-everybody tarball instead?
# http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/1.13/krb5-1.13.1-signed.tar
# - The sources below are stored in a lookaside cache. Upload with
@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ Patch129: krb5-1.11-run_user_0.patch
Patch134: krb5-1.11-kpasswdtest.patch
Patch136: krb5-socket_wrapper_eventfd_prototype_mismatch.patch
Patch140: krb5-1.14-Support-KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED.patch
Patch141: krb5-1.12.1-CVE_2014_5355_fix_krb5_read_message_handling.patch
License: MIT
URL: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
@ -317,6 +318,7 @@ ln NOTICE LICENSE
%endif
%patch140 -p1 -b .krb5-1.14-support-kdc_err_more_preauth_data_required
%patch141 -p1 -b .krb5-1.12.1-cve_2014_5355_fix_krb5_read_message_handling
# Take the execute bit off of documentation.
chmod -x doc/krb5-protocol/*.txt doc/ccapi/*.html
@ -989,6 +991,10 @@ exit 0
%changelog
* Thu Mar 20 2015 Roland Mainz <rmainz@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-2
- fix for CVE-2014-5355 (#1193939) "krb5: unauthenticated
denial of service in recvauth_common() and others"
* Fri Feb 13 2015 Roland Mainz <rmainz@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-1
- Update to krb5-1.13.1
- drop patch for CVE_2014_5353_fix_LDAP_misused_policy_name_crash, fixed in krb5-1.13.1