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- fix included in 1.9

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This commit is contained in:
Nalin Dahyabhai 2010-11-05 15:06:39 -04:00
parent 7bf6313a47
commit 01711b78ff
1 changed files with 0 additions and 25 deletions
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25
krb5-trunk-key_usage.patch
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@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
Reading the NID_key_usage extension doesn't ensure that the ex_flags and
ex_kusage fields that the ku_reject() macro checks. It'd probably be
better to check the usage string directly, but calling X509_check_ca()
makes the right things happen. RT#6775, part of #629022.
Index: src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
===================================================================
--- src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c (revision 24312)
+++ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c (revision 24313)
@@ -2005,6 +2005,7 @@
pkiDebug("%s: found acceptable EKU, checking for digitalSignature\n", __FUNCTION__);
/* check that digitalSignature KeyUsage is present */
+ X509_check_ca(reqctx->received_cert);
if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(reqctx->received_cert,
NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
@@ -4551,6 +4552,7 @@
}
/* Make sure usage exists before checking bits */
+ X509_check_ca(x);
usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
if (usage) {
if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))