krb5/Fix-integer-overflows-in-PAC-parsing.patch

From d2477aa606ad590ca4097941bb6c2e1955b2a8c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 20:25:11 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflows in PAC parsing

In krb5_parse_pac(), check for buffer counts large enough to threaten
integer overflow in the header length and memory length calculations.
Avoid potential integer overflows when checking the length of each
buffer.

CVE-2022-42898:

In MIT krb5 releases 1.8 and later, an authenticated attacker may be
able to cause a KDC or kadmind process to crash by reading beyond the
bounds of allocated memory, creating a denial of service.  A
privileged attacker may similarly be able to cause a Kerberos or GSS
application service to crash.  On 32-bit platforms, an attacker can
also cause insufficient memory to be allocated for the result,
potentially leading to remote code execution in a KDC, kadmind, or GSS
or Kerberos application server process.  An attacker with the
privileges of a cross-realm KDC may be able to extract secrets from
the KDC process's memory by having them copied into the PAC of a new
ticket.

ticket: 9074 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.20-next
target_version: 1.19-next
---
 src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c   |  9 +++++++--
 src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
index 950beda657..1b9ef12276 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
 #include "k5-int.h"
 #include "authdata.h"
 
+#define MAX_BUFFERS 4096
+
 /* draft-brezak-win2k-krb-authz-00 */
 
 /*
@@ -316,6 +318,9 @@ krb5_pac_parse(krb5_context context,
     if (version != 0)
         return EINVAL;
 
+    if (cbuffers < 1 || cbuffers > MAX_BUFFERS)
+        return ERANGE;
+
     header_len = PACTYPE_LENGTH + (cbuffers * PAC_INFO_BUFFER_LENGTH);
     if (len < header_len)
         return ERANGE;
@@ -348,8 +353,8 @@ krb5_pac_parse(krb5_context context,
             krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
             return EINVAL;
         }
-        if (buffer->Offset < header_len ||
-            buffer->Offset + buffer->cbBufferSize > len) {
+        if (buffer->Offset < header_len || buffer->Offset > len ||
+            buffer->cbBufferSize > len - buffer->Offset) {
             krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
             return ERANGE;
         }
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
index ee47152ee4..ccd165380d 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
@@ -431,6 +431,16 @@ static const unsigned char s4u_pac_ent_xrealm[] = {
     0x8a, 0x81, 0x9c, 0x9c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
 };
 
+static const unsigned char fuzz1[] = {
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+    0x06, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf5
+};
+
+static const unsigned char fuzz2[] = {
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+    0x20, 0x20
+};
+
 static const char *s4u_principal = "w2k8u@ACME.COM";
 static const char *s4u_enterprise = "w2k8u@abc@ACME.COM";
 
@@ -646,6 +656,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
         krb5_free_principal(context, sep);
     }
 
+    /* Check problematic PACs found by fuzzing. */
+    ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, fuzz1, sizeof(fuzz1), &pac);
+    if (!ret)
+        err(context, ret, "krb5_pac_parse should have failed");
+    ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, fuzz2, sizeof(fuzz2), &pac);
+    if (!ret)
+        err(context, ret, "krb5_pac_parse should have failed");
+
     /*
      * Test empty free
      */
-- 
2.37.3