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krb5/0026-Generate-and-verify-message-MACs-in-libkrad.patch

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krb5 1.21.1-4 - libkrad: implement support for Message-Authenticator (CVE-2024-3596) Resolves: RHEL-55423 - Fix various issues detected by static analysis Resolves: RHEL-58216 - Remove RSA protocol for PKINIT Resolves: RHEL-15323 Signed-off-by: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
2024-09-10 13:21:50 +00:00
From 023dcf87d34e29649dd76d33ce7d896c2b6f61d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 17:15:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Generate and verify message MACs in libkrad
Implement some of the measures specified in
draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 for mitigating the BlastRADIUS
attack (CVE-2024-3596):
* Include a Message-Authenticator MAC as the first attribute when
generating a packet of type Access-Request, Access-Reject,
Access-Accept, or Access-Challenge (sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4), if
the secret is non-empty. (An empty secret indicates the use of Unix
domain socket transport.)
* Validate the Message-Authenticator MAC in received packets, if
present.
FreeRADIUS enforces Message-Authenticator as of versions 3.2.5 and
3.0.27. libkrad must generate Message-Authenticator attributes in
order to remain compatible with these implementations.
[ghudson@mit.edu: adjusted style and naming; simplified some
functions; edited commit message]
ticket: 9142 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.21-next
(cherry picked from commit 871125fea8ce0370a972bf65f7d1de63f619b06c)
---
src/include/k5-int.h | 5 +
src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c | 28 ++++
src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports | 1 +
src/lib/krad/attr.c | 17 ++
src/lib/krad/attrset.c | 59 +++++--
src/lib/krad/internal.h | 7 +-
src/lib/krad/packet.c | 206 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c | 2 +-
src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py | 3 +-
src/lib/krad/t_packet.c | 11 ++
src/tests/t_otp.py | 3 +
11 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
index 69d6a6f569..b7789a2dd8 100644
--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
@@ -2403,4 +2403,9 @@ krb5_boolean
k5_sname_compare(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal sname,
krb5_const_principal princ);
+/* Generate an HMAC-MD5 keyed checksum as specified by RFC 2104. */
+krb5_error_code
+k5_hmac_md5(const krb5_data *key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+ krb5_data *output);
+
#endif /* _KRB5_INT_H */
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
index ec024f3966..a809388549 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
@@ -92,3 +92,31 @@ cleanup:
free(hash_iov);
return ret;
}
+
+krb5_error_code
+k5_hmac_md5(const krb5_data *key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+ krb5_data *output)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash = &krb5int_hash_md5;
+ krb5_keyblock keyblock = { 0 };
+ krb5_data hashed_key;
+ uint8_t hkeybuf[16];
+ krb5_crypto_iov iov;
+
+ /* Hash the key if it is longer than the block size. */
+ if (key->length > hash->blocksize) {
+ hashed_key = make_data(hkeybuf, sizeof(hkeybuf));
+ iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ iov.data = *key;
+ ret = hash->hash(&iov, 1, &hashed_key);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ key = &hashed_key;
+ }
+
+ keyblock.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ keyblock.length = key->length;
+ keyblock.contents = (uint8_t *)key->data;
+ return krb5int_hmac_keyblock(hash, &keyblock, data, num_data, output);
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports b/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
index d8ffa63304..00e0ce1812 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
@@ -102,3 +102,4 @@ krb5_c_prfplus
krb5_c_derive_prfplus
k5_enctype_to_ssf
krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype
+k5_hmac_md5
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attr.c b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
index 42d354a3b5..65ed1d35e7 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/attr.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
@@ -125,6 +125,23 @@ static const attribute_record attributes[UCHAR_MAX] = {
{"NAS-Port-Type", 4, 4, NULL, NULL},
{"Port-Limit", 4, 4, NULL, NULL},
{"Login-LAT-Port", 1, MAX_ATTRSIZE, NULL, NULL},
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Password-Retry */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Prompt */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Connect-Info */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Configuration-Token */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* EAP-Message */
+ {"Message-Authenticator", MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL, NULL},
};
/* Encode User-Password attribute. */
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
index 6ec031e320..e5457ebfd7 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
@@ -164,15 +164,44 @@ krad_attrset_copy(const krad_attrset *set, krad_attrset **copy)
return 0;
}
+/* Place an encoded attributes into outbuf at position *i. Increment *i by the
+ * length of the encoding. */
+static krb5_error_code
+append_attr(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
+ const uint8_t *auth, krad_attr type, const krb5_data *data,
+ uint8_t outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *i, krb5_boolean *is_fips)
+{
+ uint8_t buffer[MAX_ATTRSIZE];
+ size_t attrlen;
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+
+ retval = kr_attr_encode(ctx, secret, auth, type, data, buffer, &attrlen,
+ is_fips);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (attrlen > MAX_ATTRSETSIZE - *i - 2)
+ return EMSGSIZE;
+
+ outbuf[(*i)++] = type;
+ outbuf[(*i)++] = attrlen + 2;
+ memcpy(outbuf + *i, buffer, attrlen);
+ *i += attrlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
krb5_error_code
kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
- const unsigned char *auth,
+ const uint8_t *auth, krb5_boolean add_msgauth,
unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
krb5_boolean *is_fips)
{
- unsigned char buffer[MAX_ATTRSIZE];
krb5_error_code retval;
- size_t i = 0, attrlen;
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ const uint8_t zeroes[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
+ krb5_data zerodata;
+ size_t i = 0;
attr *a;
if (set == NULL) {
@@ -180,19 +209,21 @@ kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
return 0;
}
- K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(a, &set->list, list) {
- retval = kr_attr_encode(set->ctx, secret, auth, a->type, &a->attr,
- buffer, &attrlen, is_fips);
- if (retval != 0)
+ if (add_msgauth) {
+ /* Encode Message-Authenticator as the first attribute, per
+ * draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 section 5.2. */
+ zerodata = make_data((uint8_t *)zeroes, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ retval = append_attr(set->ctx, secret, auth, msgauth_type, &zerodata,
+ outbuf, &i, is_fips);
+ if (retval)
return retval;
+ }
- if (i + attrlen + 2 > MAX_ATTRSETSIZE)
- return EMSGSIZE;
-
- outbuf[i++] = a->type;
- outbuf[i++] = attrlen + 2;
- memcpy(&outbuf[i], buffer, attrlen);
- i += attrlen;
+ K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(a, &set->list, list) {
+ retval = append_attr(set->ctx, secret, auth, a->type, &a->attr,
+ outbuf, &i, is_fips);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
}
*outlen = i;
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/internal.h b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
index a17b6f39b1..ca66f3ec68 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/internal.h
+++ b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@
#define UCHAR_MAX 255
#endif
+#define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE 16
+
/* RFC 2865 */
#define MAX_ATTRSIZE (UCHAR_MAX - 2)
#define MAX_ATTRSETSIZE (KRAD_PACKET_SIZE_MAX - 20)
@@ -79,10 +81,11 @@ kr_attr_decode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const unsigned char *auth,
krad_attr type, const krb5_data *in,
unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen);
-/* Encode the attributes into the buffer. */
+/* Encode set into outbuf. If add_msgauth is true, include a zeroed
+ * Message-Authenticator as the first attribute. */
krb5_error_code
kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
- const unsigned char *auth,
+ const uint8_t *auth, krb5_boolean add_msgauth,
unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
krb5_boolean *is_fips);
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/packet.c b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
index c5446b890c..3c1a4d507e 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/packet.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
typedef unsigned char uchar;
/* RFC 2865 */
+#define MSGAUTH_SIZE (2 + MD5_DIGEST_SIZE)
#define OFFSET_CODE 0
#define OFFSET_ID 1
#define OFFSET_LENGTH 2
@@ -222,6 +223,106 @@ packet_set_attrset(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_packet *pkt)
return kr_attrset_decode(ctx, &tmp, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), &pkt->attrset);
}
+/* Determine if a packet requires a Message-Authenticator attribute. */
+static inline krb5_boolean
+requires_msgauth(const char *secret, krad_code code)
+{
+ /* If no secret is provided, assume that the transport is a UNIX socket.
+ * Message-Authenticator is required only on UDP and TCP connections. */
+ if (*secret == '\0')
+ return FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * Per draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4,
+ * Message-Authenticator is required in Access-Request packets and all
+ * potential responses when UDP or TCP transport is used.
+ */
+ return code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Request") ||
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Reject") ||
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Accept") ||
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Challenge");
+}
+
+/* Check if the packet has a Message-Authenticator attribute. */
+static inline krb5_boolean
+has_pkt_msgauth(const krad_packet *pkt)
+{
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+
+ return krad_attrset_get(pkt->attrset, msgauth_type, 0) != NULL;
+}
+
+/* Return the beginning of the Message-Authenticator attribute in pkt, or NULL
+ * if no such attribute is present. */
+static const uint8_t *
+lookup_msgauth_addr(const krad_packet *pkt)
+{
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ size_t i;
+ uint8_t *p;
+
+ i = OFFSET_ATTR;
+ while (i + 2 < pkt->pkt.length) {
+ p = (uint8_t *)offset(&pkt->pkt, i);
+ if (msgauth_type == *p)
+ return p;
+ i += p[1];
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the message authenticator MAC for pkt as specified in RFC 2869
+ * section 5.14, placing the result in mac_out. Use the provided authenticator
+ * auth, which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code
+calculate_mac(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+ const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE],
+ uint8_t mac_out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE])
+{
+ uint8_t zeroed_msgauth[MSGAUTH_SIZE];
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ const uint8_t *msgauth_attr, *msgauth_end, *pkt_end;
+ krb5_crypto_iov input[5];
+ krb5_data ksecr, mac;
+
+ msgauth_attr = lookup_msgauth_addr(pkt);
+ if (msgauth_attr == NULL)
+ return EINVAL;
+ msgauth_end = msgauth_attr + MSGAUTH_SIZE;
+ pkt_end = (const uint8_t *)pkt->pkt.data + pkt->pkt.length;
+
+ /* Read code, id, and length from the packet. */
+ input[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[0].data = make_data(pkt->pkt.data, OFFSET_AUTH);
+
+ /* Read the provided authenticator. */
+ input[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[1].data = make_data((uint8_t *)auth, AUTH_FIELD_SIZE);
+
+ /* Read any attributes before Message-Authenticator. */
+ input[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[2].data = make_data(pkt_attr(pkt), msgauth_attr - pkt_attr(pkt));
+
+ /* Read Message-Authenticator with the data bytes all set to zero, per RFC
+ * 2869 section 5.14. */
+ zeroed_msgauth[0] = msgauth_type;
+ zeroed_msgauth[1] = MSGAUTH_SIZE;
+ memset(zeroed_msgauth + 2, 0, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ input[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[3].data = make_data(zeroed_msgauth, MSGAUTH_SIZE);
+
+ /* Read any attributes after Message-Authenticator. */
+ input[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[4].data = make_data((uint8_t *)msgauth_end, pkt_end - msgauth_end);
+
+ mac = make_data(mac_out, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ ksecr = string2data((char *)secret);
+ return k5_hmac_md5(&ksecr, input, 5, &mac);
+}
+
ssize_t
krad_packet_bytes_needed(const krb5_data *buffer)
{
@@ -255,6 +356,7 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
krad_packet *pkt;
uchar id;
size_t attrset_len;
+ krb5_boolean msgauth_required;
pkt = packet_new();
if (pkt == NULL) {
@@ -274,9 +376,13 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
+ /* Determine if Message-Authenticator is required. */
+ msgauth_required = (*secret != '\0' &&
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Request"));
+
/* Encode the attributes. */
- retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt),
- &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
+ retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), msgauth_required,
+ pkt_attr(pkt), &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
@@ -285,6 +391,13 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
pkt_code_set(pkt, code);
pkt_len_set(pkt, pkt->pkt.length);
+ if (msgauth_required) {
+ /* Calculate and set the Message-Authenticator MAC. */
+ retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
/* Copy the attrset for future use. */
retval = packet_set_attrset(ctx, secret, pkt);
if (retval != 0)
@@ -307,14 +420,19 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
krb5_error_code retval;
krad_packet *pkt;
size_t attrset_len;
+ krb5_boolean msgauth_required;
pkt = packet_new();
if (pkt == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
+ /* Determine if Message-Authenticator is required. */
+ msgauth_required = requires_msgauth(secret, code);
+
/* Encode the attributes. */
- retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(request), pkt_attr(pkt),
- &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
+ retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(request),
+ msgauth_required, pkt_attr(pkt), &attrset_len,
+ &pkt->is_fips);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
@@ -330,6 +448,18 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
+ if (msgauth_required) {
+ /*
+ * Calculate and replace the Message-Authenticator MAC. Per RFC 2869
+ * section 5.14, use the authenticator from the request, not from the
+ * response.
+ */
+ retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(request),
+ pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
/* Copy the attrset for future use. */
retval = packet_set_attrset(ctx, secret, pkt);
if (retval != 0)
@@ -343,6 +473,34 @@ error:
return retval;
}
+/* Verify the Message-Authenticator value in pkt, using the provided
+ * authenticator (which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request). */
+static krb5_error_code
+verify_msgauth(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+ const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE])
+{
+ uint8_t mac[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ const krb5_data *msgauth;
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+
+ msgauth = krad_packet_get_attr(pkt, msgauth_type, 0);
+ if (msgauth == NULL)
+ return ENODATA;
+
+ retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, auth, mac);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (msgauth->length != MD5_DIGEST_SIZE)
+ return EMSGSIZE;
+
+ if (k5_bcmp(mac, msgauth->data, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0)
+ return EBADMSG;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Decode a packet. */
static krb5_error_code
decode_packet(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const krb5_data *buffer,
@@ -394,21 +552,35 @@ krad_packet_decode_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
krad_packet **reqpkt)
{
const krad_packet *tmp = NULL;
+ krad_packet *req;
krb5_error_code retval;
- retval = decode_packet(ctx, secret, buffer, reqpkt);
- if (cb != NULL && retval == 0) {
+ retval = decode_packet(ctx, secret, buffer, &req);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
+ if (has_pkt_msgauth(req)) {
+ retval = verify_msgauth(secret, req, pkt_auth(req));
+ if (retval) {
+ krad_packet_free(req);
+ return retval;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
for (tmp = (*cb)(data, FALSE); tmp != NULL; tmp = (*cb)(data, FALSE)) {
if (pkt_id_get(*reqpkt) == pkt_id_get(tmp))
break;
}
- }
- if (cb != NULL && (retval != 0 || tmp != NULL))
- (*cb)(data, TRUE);
+ if (tmp != NULL)
+ (*cb)(data, TRUE);
+ }
+ *reqpkt = req;
*duppkt = tmp;
- return retval;
+ return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
@@ -435,9 +607,17 @@ krad_packet_decode_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
break;
}
- /* If the authenticator matches, then the response is valid. */
- if (memcmp(pkt_auth(*rsppkt), auth, sizeof(auth)) == 0)
- break;
+ /* Verify the response authenticator. */
+ if (k5_bcmp(pkt_auth(*rsppkt), auth, sizeof(auth)) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
+ if (has_pkt_msgauth(*rsppkt)) {
+ if (verify_msgauth(secret, *rsppkt, pkt_auth(tmp)) != 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ break;
}
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
index 4cdb8b7d8e..f9c66509bd 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ main(void)
noerror(krad_attrset_add(set, krad_attr_name2num("User-Password"), &tmp));
/* Encode attrset. */
- noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, buffer, &encode_len,
+ noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, FALSE, buffer, &encode_len,
&is_fips));
krad_attrset_free(set);
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py b/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
index 4a3de079c7..647d4894eb 100755
--- a/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ DICTIONARY = """
ATTRIBUTE\tUser-Name\t1\tstring
ATTRIBUTE\tUser-Password\t2\toctets
ATTRIBUTE\tNAS-Identifier\t32\tstring
+ATTRIBUTE\tMessage-Authenticator\t80\toctets
"""
class TestServer(server.Server):
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ class TestServer(server.Server):
if key == "User-Password":
passwd = [pkt.PwDecrypt(x) for x in pkt[key]]
- reply = self.CreateReplyPacket(pkt)
+ reply = self.CreateReplyPacket(pkt, message_authenticator=True)
if passwd == ['accept']:
reply.code = packet.AccessAccept
else:
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c b/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
index c22489144f..104b6507a2 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
krb5_data username, password;
krb5_boolean auth = FALSE;
krb5_context ctx;
+ const krad_packet *dupreq;
+ const krb5_data *encpkt;
+ krad_packet *decreq;
username = string2data("testUser");
@@ -184,9 +187,17 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
password = string2data("accept");
noerror(make_packet(ctx, &username, &password, &packets[ACCEPT_PACKET]));
+ encpkt = krad_packet_encode(packets[ACCEPT_PACKET]);
+ noerror(krad_packet_decode_request(ctx, "foo", encpkt, NULL, NULL,
+ &dupreq, &decreq));
+ krad_packet_free(decreq);
password = string2data("reject");
noerror(make_packet(ctx, &username, &password, &packets[REJECT_PACKET]));
+ encpkt = krad_packet_encode(packets[REJECT_PACKET]);
+ noerror(krad_packet_decode_request(ctx, "foo", encpkt, NULL, NULL,
+ &dupreq, &decreq));
+ krad_packet_free(decreq);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
diff --git a/src/tests/t_otp.py b/src/tests/t_otp.py
index c3b820a411..dd5cdc5c26 100755
--- a/src/tests/t_otp.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_otp.py
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ ATTRIBUTE User-Name 1 string
ATTRIBUTE User-Password 2 octets
ATTRIBUTE Service-Type 6 integer
ATTRIBUTE NAS-Identifier 32 string
+ATTRIBUTE Message-Authenticator 80 octets
'''
class RadiusDaemon(Process):
@@ -97,6 +98,8 @@ class RadiusDaemon(Process):
reply.code = packet.AccessReject
replyq['reply'] = False
+ reply.add_message_authenticator()
+
outq.put(replyq)
if addr is None:
sock.send(reply.ReplyPacket())
--
2.46.0
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