kbd/kbd-2.4.0-CVE-2026-72693.patch
RHEL Packaging Agent cc45dbedc6 Fix CVE-2026-72693: openvt -u process matching made more conservative
Backport upstream commit 78d5ae119742e87baa7dbe0f5c4107e7533fd698
to make openvt -u process matching more conservative. The patch
adds a proc_pid_stat() helper that reads /proc/<pid>/stat to
obtain the process owner UID and controlling terminal device
number, replacing the old fd/0 ownership check. The
authenticate_user() function now requires both a matching process
owner and controlling terminal, and refuses to pre-authenticate
root. The openvt.1 man page is updated to document the tighter
-u behavior.

CVE: CVE-2026-72693
Upstream patches:
 - 78d5ae1197.patch
Resolves: RHEL-235988

This commit was backported by Ymir, a Red Hat Enterprise Linux software maintenance AI agent.

Assisted-by: Ymir
2026-08-11 09:36:10 +00:00

149 lines
4.3 KiB
Diff

From 434ac149060519b7b891020c00eec653d95379d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2026 10:20:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] openvt: make -u process matching more conservative
The -u mode relies on the current VT owner to decide which user should
be used for the new login session. Make that check stricter by requiring
a matching process owner and controlling terminal instead of relying on
the ownership of an inherited file descriptor.
Also reject root as a pre-authenticated target and document the tighter
behavior in the man page.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
---
docs/man/man1/openvt.1 | 10 +++++++
src/openvt.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/man/man1/openvt.1 b/docs/man/man1/openvt.1
index 79bfe3f..074de96 100644
--- a/docs/man/man1/openvt.1
+++ b/docs/man/man1/openvt.1
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ will be made the new current VT.
.I "\-u, \-\-user"
Figure out the owner of the current VT, and run login as that user.
Suitable to be called by init. Shouldn't be used with \fI\-c\fR or \fI\-l\fR.
+This option refuses to pre-authenticate root and requires a process owned by
+the VT owner whose controlling terminal is the current VT.
.TP
.I "\-l, \-\-login"
Make the command a login shell. A \- is prepended to the name of the command
@@ -64,6 +66,14 @@ If
is compiled with a getopt_long() and you wish to set
options to the command to be run, then you must supply
the end of options \-\- flag before the command.
+.PP
+The
+.B \-u
+option uses
+.BR "login -f"
+and therefore bypasses normal password authentication for the detected user.
+It is intended only for controlled init or keyboard-request configurations.
+Use a normal authenticated login command when authentication is required.
.SH EXAMPLES
.B openvt
can be used to start a shell on the next free VT, by using the command:
diff --git a/src/openvt.c b/src/openvt.c
index dd244b5..211dbae 100644
--- a/src/openvt.c
+++ b/src/openvt.c
@@ -78,6 +78,51 @@ usage(int rc, const struct kbd_help *options)
exit(rc);
}
+static int
+proc_pid_stat(const char *pid, uid_t *uid, dev_t *tty)
+{
+ char filename[NAME_MAX + 12];
+ char line[BUFSIZ];
+ char *lp, *rp;
+ FILE *fp;
+ struct stat st;
+ long tty_nr;
+
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "/proc/%s/stat", pid);
+ fp = fopen(filename, "r");
+ if (!fp)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st)) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ rp = strrchr(line, ')');
+ if (!rp)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * /proc/<pid>/stat fields after comm are:
+ * state ppid pgrp session tty_nr ...
+ */
+ if (!rp || sscanf(rp + 1, " %*c %*d %*d %*d %ld", &tty_nr) != 1)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (tty_nr <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ *uid = st.st_uid;
+ *tty = (dev_t) tty_nr;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Support for Spawn_Console: openvt running from init
* added by Joshua Spoerri, Thu Jul 18 21:13:16 EDT 1996
@@ -109,8 +154,7 @@ authenticate_user(int curvt)
DIR *dp;
struct dirent *dentp;
struct stat buf;
- dev_t console_dev;
- ino_t console_ino;
+ dev_t console_rdev;
uid_t console_uid;
char filename[NAME_MAX + 12];
struct passwd *pwnam;
@@ -130,10 +174,12 @@ authenticate_user(int curvt)
kbd_error(EXIT_FAILURE, errsv, "%s", filename);
}
}
- console_dev = buf.st_dev;
- console_ino = buf.st_ino;
+ console_rdev = buf.st_rdev;
console_uid = buf.st_uid;
+ if (console_uid == 0)
+ kbd_error(EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("Refusing to pre-authenticate root on current tty."));
+
/* get the owner of current tty */
if (!(pwnam = getpwuid(console_uid)))
kbd_error(EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "getpwuid");
@@ -141,12 +187,16 @@ authenticate_user(int curvt)
/* check to make sure that user has a process on that tty */
/* this will fail for example when X is running on the tty */
while ((dentp = readdir(dp))) {
- sprintf(filename, "/proc/%s/fd/0", dentp->d_name);
+ uid_t proc_uid;
+ dev_t proc_tty;
+
+ if (dentp->d_name[0] < '0' || dentp->d_name[0] > '9')
+ continue;
- if (stat(filename, &buf))
+ if (proc_pid_stat(dentp->d_name, &proc_uid, &proc_tty) < 0)
continue;
- if (buf.st_dev == console_dev && buf.st_ino == console_ino && buf.st_uid == console_uid)
+ if (proc_uid == console_uid && proc_tty == console_rdev)
goto got_a_process;
}