Resolves: RHEL-151876 - authentication no longer works with the new openssl
This commit is contained in:
Michal Ruprich
parent
0963d13846
commit
5e284a3231
242
0003-openssl-authentication.patch
Normal file
242
0003-openssl-authentication.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
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From aab262afe1770b55bb865fd4dad2d5e737c758a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Michael Lowman <michael.d.lowman@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2025 22:40:07 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 1/5] Set output buffer size prior to encrypt operation
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When calling EVP_PKEY_encrypt with a non-null output buffer,
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the output buffer length must be provided. Attempts to write
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beyond this length will fail.
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---
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src/iperf_auth.c | 1 +
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
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diff --git a/src/iperf_auth.c b/src/iperf_auth.c
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index eda015099..774e1b701 100644
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--- a/src/iperf_auth.c
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+++ b/src/iperf_auth.c
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@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ int encrypt_rsa_message(const char *plaintext, EVP_PKEY *public_key, unsigned ch
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#endif
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rsa_buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(keysize * 2);
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*encryptedtext = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(keysize);
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+ encryptedtext_len = keysize;
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BIO *bioBuff = BIO_new_mem_buf((void*)plaintext, (int)strlen(plaintext));
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rsa_buffer_len = BIO_read(bioBuff, rsa_buffer, keysize * 2);
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From 00840604c85c598f7aaeffd21db0c62472d8ab34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Michael Lowman <michael.d.lowman@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2025 22:29:12 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Rename keysize to output_buffer_len
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This more accurately represents the meaning; it is the minimum
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buffer allocation necessary for an encrypt or decrypt operation
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to succeed. This is the same size for both ciphertext and
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cleartext, as padding is applied.
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---
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src/iperf_auth.c | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
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1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/iperf_auth.c b/src/iperf_auth.c
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index 774e1b701..ea516904f 100644
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--- a/src/iperf_auth.c
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+++ b/src/iperf_auth.c
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@@ -236,26 +236,26 @@ int encrypt_rsa_message(const char *plaintext, EVP_PKEY *public_key, unsigned ch
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#endif
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unsigned char *rsa_buffer = NULL;
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size_t encryptedtext_len = 0;
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- int rsa_buffer_len, keysize;
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+ int rsa_buffer_len, output_buffer_len;
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#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
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int rc;
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ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, public_key, "");
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/* See evp_pkey_rsa(7) and provider-keymgmt(7) */
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- rc = EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(public_key, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MAX_SIZE, &keysize); /* XXX not really keysize */
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+ rc = EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(public_key, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MAX_SIZE, &output_buffer_len);
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if (!rc) {
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goto errreturn;
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}
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#else
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rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(public_key);
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- keysize = RSA_size(rsa);
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+ output_buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa);
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#endif
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- rsa_buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(keysize * 2);
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- *encryptedtext = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(keysize);
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- encryptedtext_len = keysize;
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+ rsa_buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len * 2);
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+ *encryptedtext = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len);
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+ encryptedtext_len = output_buffer_len;
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BIO *bioBuff = BIO_new_mem_buf((void*)plaintext, (int)strlen(plaintext));
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- rsa_buffer_len = BIO_read(bioBuff, rsa_buffer, keysize * 2);
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+ rsa_buffer_len = BIO_read(bioBuff, rsa_buffer, output_buffer_len * 2);
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int padding = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
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if (use_pkcs1_padding){
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@@ -295,26 +295,26 @@ int decrypt_rsa_message(const unsigned char *encryptedtext, const int encryptedt
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#endif
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unsigned char *rsa_buffer = NULL;
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size_t plaintext_len = 0;
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- int rsa_buffer_len, keysize;
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+ int rsa_buffer_len, output_buffer_len;
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#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
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int rc;
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ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, private_key, "");
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/* See evp_pkey_rsa(7) and provider-keymgmt(7) */
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- rc = EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(private_key, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MAX_SIZE, &keysize); /* XXX not really keysize */
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+ rc = EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(private_key, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MAX_SIZE, &output_buffer_len);
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if (!rc) {
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goto errreturn;
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}
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#else
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rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(private_key);
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- keysize = RSA_size(rsa);
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+ output_buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa);
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#endif
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- rsa_buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(keysize * 2);
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+ rsa_buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len * 2);
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// Note: +1 for NULL
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- *plaintext = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(keysize + 1);
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+ *plaintext = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len + 1);
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BIO *bioBuff = BIO_new_mem_buf((void*)encryptedtext, encryptedtext_len);
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- rsa_buffer_len = BIO_read(bioBuff, rsa_buffer, keysize * 2);
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+ rsa_buffer_len = BIO_read(bioBuff, rsa_buffer, output_buffer_len * 2);
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int padding = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
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if (use_pkcs1_padding){
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@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ int decrypt_rsa_message(const unsigned char *encryptedtext, const int encryptedt
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}
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#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
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- plaintext_len = keysize;
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+ plaintext_len = output_buffer_len;
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EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx);
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ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding);
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From f30aaa3be199313c079d585f7eaf20a0745186b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Michael Lowman <michael.d.lowman@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2025 16:46:20 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Avoid out-of-bounds access when base64 decoding short
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strings
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Check the length before reading memory.
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---
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src/iperf_auth.c | 4 ++--
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/iperf_auth.c b/src/iperf_auth.c
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index ea516904f..eddc5a85f 100644
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--- a/src/iperf_auth.c
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+++ b/src/iperf_auth.c
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@@ -130,9 +130,9 @@ int Base64Encode(const unsigned char* buffer, const size_t length, char** b64tex
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size_t calcDecodeLength(const char* b64input) { //Calculates the length of a decoded string
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size_t len = strlen(b64input), padding = 0;
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- if (b64input[len-1] == '=' && b64input[len-2] == '=') //last two chars are =
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+ if (len >= 2 && b64input[len-1] == '=' && b64input[len-2] == '=') //last two chars are =
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padding = 2;
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- else if (b64input[len-1] == '=') //last char is =
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+ else if (len >= 1 && b64input[len-1] == '=') //last char is =
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padding = 1;
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return (len*3)/4 - padding;
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From 1cca42a1e77df8fba83ef6340388cad34625087c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Michael Lowman <michael.d.lowman@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2025 17:57:37 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Don't over-allocate followed by partial reads
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We know how much we expect to read; the input buffer
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has a defined size. Allocate the exact buffer expected
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instead of a larger one with a read expected to return
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only partial data. This makes it simpler to follow the
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logic and to avoid off-by-one errors.
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---
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src/iperf_auth.c | 13 +++++++------
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/iperf_auth.c b/src/iperf_auth.c
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index eddc5a85f..d582c615a 100644
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--- a/src/iperf_auth.c
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+++ b/src/iperf_auth.c
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@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int encrypt_rsa_message(const char *plaintext, EVP_PKEY *public_key, unsigned ch
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RSA *rsa = NULL;
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#endif
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unsigned char *rsa_buffer = NULL;
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- size_t encryptedtext_len = 0;
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+ size_t encryptedtext_len = 0, plaintext_len = 0;
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int rsa_buffer_len, output_buffer_len;
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#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
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@@ -250,12 +250,13 @@ int encrypt_rsa_message(const char *plaintext, EVP_PKEY *public_key, unsigned ch
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rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(public_key);
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output_buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa);
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#endif
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- rsa_buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len * 2);
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+ plaintext_len = strlen(plaintext);
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+ rsa_buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len);
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*encryptedtext = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len);
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encryptedtext_len = output_buffer_len;
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- BIO *bioBuff = BIO_new_mem_buf((void*)plaintext, (int)strlen(plaintext));
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- rsa_buffer_len = BIO_read(bioBuff, rsa_buffer, output_buffer_len * 2);
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+ BIO *bioBuff = BIO_new_mem_buf((void*)plaintext, (int)plaintext_len);
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+ rsa_buffer_len = BIO_read(bioBuff, rsa_buffer, plaintext_len);
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int padding = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
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if (use_pkcs1_padding){
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@@ -309,12 +310,12 @@ int decrypt_rsa_message(const unsigned char *encryptedtext, const int encryptedt
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rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(private_key);
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output_buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa);
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#endif
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- rsa_buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len * 2);
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+ rsa_buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len);
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// Note: +1 for NULL
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*plaintext = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len + 1);
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BIO *bioBuff = BIO_new_mem_buf((void*)encryptedtext, encryptedtext_len);
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- rsa_buffer_len = BIO_read(bioBuff, rsa_buffer, output_buffer_len * 2);
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+ rsa_buffer_len = BIO_read(bioBuff, rsa_buffer, encryptedtext_len);
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int padding = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
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if (use_pkcs1_padding){
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From 92f288ff6230dbe186e95688c910268f6942e214 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Michael Lowman <michael.d.lowman@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2025 17:58:52 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Add warnings on silent truncation
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Input should not be this long, but makes the expectations
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of the code clearer.
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---
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src/iperf_auth.c | 6 ++++++
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/iperf_auth.c b/src/iperf_auth.c
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index d582c615a..4c38fa938 100644
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--- a/src/iperf_auth.c
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+++ b/src/iperf_auth.c
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@@ -251,6 +251,9 @@ int encrypt_rsa_message(const char *plaintext, EVP_PKEY *public_key, unsigned ch
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output_buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa);
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#endif
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plaintext_len = strlen(plaintext);
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+ if (plaintext_len > output_buffer_len) {
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+ fprintf(stderr, "Plaintext of size %zd truncated to %d; data is lost.\n", plaintext_len, output_buffer_len);
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+ }
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rsa_buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len);
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*encryptedtext = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len);
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encryptedtext_len = output_buffer_len;
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@@ -310,6 +313,9 @@ int decrypt_rsa_message(const unsigned char *encryptedtext, const int encryptedt
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rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(private_key);
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output_buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa);
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#endif
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+ if (encryptedtext_len > output_buffer_len) {
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+ fprintf(stderr, "Encrypted text of size %d truncated to %d; likely invalid input.\n", encryptedtext_len, output_buffer_len);
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+ }
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rsa_buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len);
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// Note: +1 for NULL
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*plaintext = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(output_buffer_len + 1);
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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Name: iperf3
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Version: 3.17.1
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Release: 5%{?dist}
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Release: 6%{?dist}
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Summary: Measurement tool for TCP/UDP bandwidth performance
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License: BSD-3-Clause-LBNL AND MIT AND dtoa AND BSD-3-Clause AND NCSA AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain
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@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ BuildRequires: git-core
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Patch0000: 1278-rebase.patch
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Patch0001: 0001-cve-2024-53580.patch
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Patch0002: 0002-cve-2025-54349.patch
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Patch0003: 0003-openssl-authentication.patch
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%description
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Iperf is a tool to measure maximum TCP bandwidth, allowing the tuning of
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@ -58,6 +59,9 @@ rm -f %{buildroot}%{_libdir}/libiperf.la
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%{_libdir}/*.so
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%changelog
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* Mon Apr 13 2026 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.17.1-6
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- Resolves: RHEL-151876 - authentication no longer works with the new openssl
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* Tue Jan 20 2026 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.17.1-5
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- Resolves: RHEL-136170 - iperf Heap Buffer Overflow (CVE-2025-54349)
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