342 lines
12 KiB
Diff
342 lines
12 KiB
Diff
From 0a48726e104282fb40d8f471ebb306bc9134cb0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2024 12:24:40 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] kdb: fix vulnerability in GCD rules handling
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The initial implementation of MS-SFU by MIT Kerberos was missing some
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a condition for granting the "forwardable" flag on S4U2Self tickets.
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Fixing this mistake required to add a special case for the
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check_allowed_to_delegate() function: if the target service argument is
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NULL, then it means the KDC is probing for general constrained
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delegation rules, not actually checking a specific S4U2Proxy request.
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In commit e86807b5, the behavior of ipadb_match_acl() was modified to
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match the changes from upstream MIT Kerberos a441fbe3. However, a
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mistake resulted in this mechanism to apply in cases where target
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service argument is set AND unset. This results in S4U2Proxy requests to
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be accepted regardless of the fact there is a matching service
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delegation rule or not.
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This vulnerability does not affect services having RBCD (resource-based
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constrained delegation) rules.
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This fixes CVE-2024-2698
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Signed-off-by: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
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---
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daemons/ipa-kdb/README.s4u2proxy.txt | 19 ++-
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daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_delegation.c | 191 +++++++++++++++------------
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2 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/daemons/ipa-kdb/README.s4u2proxy.txt b/daemons/ipa-kdb/README.s4u2proxy.txt
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index 254fcc4d1..ab34aff36 100644
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--- a/daemons/ipa-kdb/README.s4u2proxy.txt
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+++ b/daemons/ipa-kdb/README.s4u2proxy.txt
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@@ -12,9 +12,7 @@ much more easily managed.
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The grouping mechanism has been built so that lookup is highly optimized
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and is basically reduced to a single search that uses the derefernce
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-control. Speed is very important in this case because KDC operations
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-time out very quickly and unless we add a caching layer in ipa-kdb we
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-must keep the number of searches down to avoid client timeouts.
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+control.
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The grouping mechanism is very simple a groupOfPrincipals object is
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introduced, this Auxiliary class have a single optional attribute called
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@@ -112,8 +110,7 @@ kinit -kt /etc/httpd/conf/ipa.keytab HTTP/ipaserver.example.com
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kvno -U admin HTTP/ipaserver.example.com
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# Perform S4U2Proxy
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-kvno -k /etc/httpd/conf/ipa.keytab -U admin -P HTTP/ipaserver.example.com
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-ldap/ipaserver.example.com
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+kvno -U admin -P ldap/ipaserver.example.com
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If this works it means you successfully impersonated the admin user with
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@@ -125,6 +122,18 @@ modprinc -ok_to_auth_as_delegate HTTP/ipaserver.example.com
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Simo.
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+If IPA is compiled with krb5 1.20 and newer (KDB DAL >= 9), then the
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+behavior of S4U2Self changes: S4U2Self TGS-REQs produce forwardable
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+tickets for all requesters, except if the requester principal is set as
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+the proxy (impersonating service) in at least one `servicedelegation`
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+rule. In this case, even if the rule has no target, the KDC will
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+response to S4U2Self requests with a non-forwardable ticket. Hence,
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+granting the `ok_to_auth_as_delegate` permission to the proxy service
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+remains the only way for this service to obtain the evidence ticket
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+required for general constrained delegation requests if this ticket is
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+not provided by the client.
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+
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+
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[1]
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Note that here I use the term proxy in a different way than it is used in
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the krb interfaces. It may seem a bit confusing but I think people will
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diff --git a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_delegation.c b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_delegation.c
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index de82174ad..3581f3c79 100644
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--- a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_delegation.c
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+++ b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_delegation.c
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@@ -91,120 +91,110 @@ static bool ipadb_match_member(char *princ, LDAPDerefRes *dres)
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return false;
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}
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-static krb5_error_code ipadb_match_acl(krb5_context kcontext,
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- LDAPMessage *results,
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- krb5_const_principal client,
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- krb5_const_principal target)
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+#if KRB5_KDB_DAL_MAJOR_VERSION >= 9
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+static krb5_error_code
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+ipadb_has_acl(krb5_context kcontext, LDAPMessage *ldap_acl, bool *res)
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{
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struct ipadb_context *ipactx;
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- krb5_error_code kerr;
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- LDAPMessage *lentry;
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- LDAPDerefRes *deref_results;
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- LDAPDerefRes *dres;
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- char *client_princ = NULL;
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- char *target_princ = NULL;
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- bool client_missing;
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- bool client_found;
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- bool target_found;
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- bool is_constraint_delegation = false;
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- size_t nrules = 0;
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- int ret;
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+ bool in_res = false;
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+ krb5_error_code kerr = 0;
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ipactx = ipadb_get_context(kcontext);
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- if (!ipactx) {
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+ if (!ipactx)
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return KRB5_KDB_DBNOTINITED;
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- }
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- if ((client != NULL) && (target != NULL)) {
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- kerr = krb5_unparse_name(kcontext, client, &client_princ);
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- if (kerr != 0) {
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- goto done;
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- }
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- kerr = krb5_unparse_name(kcontext, target, &target_princ);
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- if (kerr != 0) {
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- goto done;
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- }
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- } else {
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- is_constraint_delegation = true;
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+ switch (ldap_count_entries(ipactx->lcontext, ldap_acl)) {
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+ case 0:
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+ break;
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+ case -1:
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+ kerr = EINVAL;
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+ goto end;
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+ default:
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+ in_res = true;
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+ goto end;
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}
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- lentry = ldap_first_entry(ipactx->lcontext, results);
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- if (!lentry) {
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- kerr = ENOENT;
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- goto done;
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- }
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+end:
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+ if (res)
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+ *res = in_res;
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+
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+ return kerr;
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+}
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+#endif
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+
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+static krb5_error_code
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+ipadb_match_acl(krb5_context kcontext, LDAPMessage *ldap_acl,
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+ krb5_const_principal client, krb5_const_principal target)
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+{
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+ struct ipadb_context *ipactx;
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+ LDAPMessage *rule;
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+ LDAPDerefRes *acis, *aci;
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+ char *client_princ = NULL, *target_princ= NULL;
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+ bool client_missing, client_found, target_found;
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+ int lerr;
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+ krb5_error_code kerr;
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+
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+ ipactx = ipadb_get_context(kcontext);
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+ if (!ipactx)
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+ return KRB5_KDB_DBNOTINITED;
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+
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+ kerr = krb5_unparse_name(kcontext, client, &client_princ);
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+ if (kerr)
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+ goto end;
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+
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+ kerr = krb5_unparse_name(kcontext, target, &target_princ);
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+ if (kerr)
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+ goto end;
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/* the default is that we fail */
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- kerr = ENOENT;
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+ kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
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- while (lentry) {
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+ for (rule = ldap_first_entry(ipactx->lcontext, ldap_acl);
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+ rule;
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+ rule = ldap_next_entry(ipactx->lcontext, rule))
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+ {
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/* both client and target must be found in the same ACI */
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client_missing = true;
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client_found = false;
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target_found = false;
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- ret = ipadb_ldap_deref_results(ipactx->lcontext, lentry,
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- &deref_results);
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- switch (ret) {
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+ lerr = ipadb_ldap_deref_results(ipactx->lcontext, rule, &acis);
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+ switch (lerr) {
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case 0:
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- for (dres = deref_results; dres; dres = dres->next) {
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- nrules++;
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- if (is_constraint_delegation) {
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- /*
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- Microsoft revised the S4U2Proxy rules for forwardable
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- tickets. All S4U2Proxy operations require forwardable
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- evidence tickets, but S4U2Self should issue a
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- forwardable ticket if the requesting service has no
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- ok-to-auth-as-delegate bit but also no constrained
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- delegation privileges for traditional S4U2Proxy.
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- Implement these rules, extending the
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- check_allowed_to_delegate() DAL method so that the KDC
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- can ask if a principal has any delegation privileges.
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-
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- Since target principal is NULL and client principal is
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- NULL in this case, we simply calculate number of rules associated
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- with the server principal to decide whether to deny forwardable bit
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- */
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- continue;
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- }
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- if (client_found == false &&
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- strcasecmp(dres->derefAttr, "ipaAllowToImpersonate") == 0) {
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+ for (aci = acis; aci; aci = aci->next) {
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+ if (!client_found &&
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+ 0 == strcasecmp(aci->derefAttr, "ipaAllowToImpersonate"))
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+ {
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/* NOTE: client_missing is used to signal that the
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* attribute was completely missing. This signals that
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* ANY client is allowed to be impersonated.
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* This logic is valid only for clients, not for targets */
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client_missing = false;
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- client_found = ipadb_match_member(client_princ, dres);
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+ client_found = ipadb_match_member(client_princ, aci);
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}
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- if (target_found == false &&
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- strcasecmp(dres->derefAttr, "ipaAllowedTarget") == 0) {
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- target_found = ipadb_match_member(target_princ, dres);
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+ if (!target_found &&
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+ 0 == strcasecmp(aci->derefAttr, "ipaAllowedTarget"))
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+ {
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+ target_found = ipadb_match_member(target_princ, aci);
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}
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}
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- ldap_derefresponse_free(deref_results);
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+ ldap_derefresponse_free(acis);
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break;
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case ENOENT:
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break;
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default:
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- kerr = ret;
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- goto done;
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+ kerr = lerr;
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+ goto end;
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}
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- if ((client_found == true || client_missing == true) &&
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- target_found == true) {
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+ if ((client_found || client_missing) && target_found) {
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kerr = 0;
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- goto done;
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+ goto end;
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}
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-
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- lentry = ldap_next_entry(ipactx->lcontext, lentry);
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- }
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-
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- if (nrules > 0) {
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- kerr = 0;
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}
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-done:
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+end:
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krb5_free_unparsed_name(kcontext, client_princ);
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krb5_free_unparsed_name(kcontext, target_princ);
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return kerr;
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@@ -223,7 +213,7 @@ krb5_error_code ipadb_check_allowed_to_delegate(krb5_context kcontext,
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char *srv_principal = NULL;
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krb5_db_entry *proxy_entry = NULL;
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struct ipadb_e_data *ied_server, *ied_proxy;
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- LDAPMessage *res = NULL;
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+ LDAPMessage *ldap_gcd_acl = NULL;
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if (proxy != NULL) {
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/* Handle the case where server == proxy, this is allowed in S4U */
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@@ -261,26 +251,53 @@ krb5_error_code ipadb_check_allowed_to_delegate(krb5_context kcontext,
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goto done;
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}
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- kerr = ipadb_get_delegation_acl(kcontext, srv_principal, &res);
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+ /* Load general constrained delegation rules */
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+ kerr = ipadb_get_delegation_acl(kcontext, srv_principal, &ldap_gcd_acl);
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if (kerr) {
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goto done;
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}
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- kerr = ipadb_match_acl(kcontext, res, client, proxy);
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- if (kerr) {
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- goto done;
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+#if KRB5_KDB_DAL_MAJOR_VERSION >= 9
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+ /*
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+ * Microsoft revised the S4U2Proxy rules for forwardable tickets. All
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+ * S4U2Proxy operations require forwardable evidence tickets, but
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+ * S4U2Self should issue a forwardable ticket if the requesting service
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+ * has no ok-to-auth-as-delegate bit but also no constrained delegation
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+ * privileges for traditional S4U2Proxy. Implement these rules,
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+ * extending the check_allowed_to_delegate() DAL method so that the KDC
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+ * can ask if a principal has any delegation privileges.
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+ *
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+ * If target service principal is NULL, and the impersonating service has
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+ * at least one GCD rule, then succeed.
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+ */
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+ if (!proxy) {
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+ bool has_gcd_rules;
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+
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+ kerr = ipadb_has_acl(kcontext, ldap_gcd_acl, &has_gcd_rules);
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+ if (!kerr)
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+ kerr = has_gcd_rules ? 0 : KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
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+ } else if (client) {
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+#else
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+ if (client && proxy) {
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+#endif
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+ kerr = ipadb_match_acl(kcontext, ldap_gcd_acl, client, proxy);
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+ } else {
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+ /* client and/or proxy is missing */
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+ kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
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}
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+ if (kerr)
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+ goto done;
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done:
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if (kerr) {
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-#if KRB5_KDB_DAL_MAJOR_VERSION < 9
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- kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
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-#else
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+#if KRB5_KDB_DAL_MAJOR_VERSION >= 9
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kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
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+#else
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+ kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
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#endif
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}
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ipadb_free_principal(kcontext, proxy_entry);
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krb5_free_unparsed_name(kcontext, srv_principal);
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- ldap_msgfree(res);
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+ ldap_msgfree(ldap_gcd_acl);
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return kerr;
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}
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--
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2.44.0
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