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ipa/0019-Do-not-let-user-with-an-expired-OTP-token-to-log-in-.patch
Florence Blanc-Renaud 66cc1eaeec ipa-4.12.2-4 
- Related: RHEL-59777 Rebase Samba to the latest 4.21.x release
- Resolves: RHEL-59659 ipa dns-zone --allow-query '!198.18.2.0/24;any;' fails with Unrecognized IPAddress flags
- Resolves: RHEL-61636 Uninstall ACME separately during PKI uninstallation
- Resolves: RHEL-61723 Include latest fixes in python3-ipatests packages
- Resolves: RHEL-63325 Last expired OTP token would be considered as still assigned to the user

Signed-off-by: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
2024-10-21 17:45:24 +02:00

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From 18303b94bea4e08a0c889fc357df6ba2f308fa0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Reynolds <mreynolds@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2024 21:26:34 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Do not let user with an expired OTP token to log in if only
OTP is allowed
If only OTP authentication is allowed, and a user tries to login with an
expired token, do not let them log in with their password. Forcing the
admin to intervene. If the user does not have an OTP token then allow
them to log in with a password until an OTP token is configured
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9387
Signed-off-by: Mark Reynolds <mreynolds@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
---
daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c | 63 +++++++++++--
.../ipa-slapi-plugins/ipa-pwd-extop/prepost.c | 3 +-
ipatests/test_integration/test_otp.py | 94 ++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
index 14603e528b43acb29234c425e97ad297ac6724a7..114957b884786dd3ca3b01c47f6bb82e8a040beb 100644
--- a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
+++ b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
@@ -107,7 +107,6 @@ static char *std_principal_obj_classes[] = {
"krbprincipal",
"krbprincipalaux",
"krbTicketPolicyAux",
-
NULL
};
@@ -338,14 +337,16 @@ static void ipadb_validate_otp(struct ipadb_context *ipactx,
if (dn == NULL)
return;
count = asprintf(&filter, ftmpl, dn, datetime, datetime);
- ldap_memfree(dn);
- if (count < 0)
+ if (count < 0) {
+ ldap_memfree(dn);
return;
+ }
/* Fetch the active token list. */
kerr = ipadb_simple_search(ipactx, ipactx->base, LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
filter, (char**) attrs, &res);
free(filter);
+ filter = NULL;
if (kerr != 0 || res == NULL)
return;
@@ -353,10 +354,60 @@ static void ipadb_validate_otp(struct ipadb_context *ipactx,
count = ldap_count_entries(ipactx->lcontext, res);
ldap_msgfree(res);
- /* If the user is configured for OTP, but has no active tokens, remove
- * OTP from the list since the user obviously can't log in this way. */
- if (count == 0)
+ /*
+ * If there are no valid tokens then we need to remove the OTP flag,
+ * unless OTP is the only auth type allowed...
+ */
+ if (count == 0) {
+ /* Remove the OTP flag for now */
*ua &= ~IPADB_USER_AUTH_OTP;
+
+ if (*ua == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Ok, we "only" allow OTP, so if there is an expired/disabled
+ * token then add back the OTP flag as the server will double
+ * check the validity and reject the entire bind. Otherwise, this
+ * is the first time the user is authenticating and the user
+ * should be allowed to bind using its password
+ */
+ static const char *expired_ftmpl = "(&"
+ "(objectClass=ipaToken)(ipatokenOwner=%s)"
+ "(|(ipatokenNotAfter<=%s)(!(ipatokenNotAfter=*))"
+ "(ipatokenDisabled=True))"
+ ")";
+ if (asprintf(&filter, expired_ftmpl, dn, datetime) < 0) {
+ ldap_memfree(dn);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
+ "Entry (%s) does not have a valid token and only OTP "
+ "authentication is supported, checking for expired tokens...",
+ dn);
+
+ kerr = ipadb_simple_search(ipactx, ipactx->base, LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+ filter, (char**) attrs, &res);
+ free(filter);
+ if (kerr != 0 || res == NULL) {
+ ldap_memfree(dn);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ldap_count_entries(ipactx->lcontext, res) > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Ok we only allow OTP, and there are expired/disabled tokens
+ * so add the OTP flag back, and the server will reject the
+ * bind
+ */
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
+ "Entry (%s) does have an expired/disabled token so this "
+ "user can not fall through to password auth", dn);
+ *ua |= IPADB_USER_AUTH_OTP;
+ }
+ ldap_msgfree(res);
+ }
+ }
+ ldap_memfree(dn);
}
static void ipadb_validate_radius(struct ipadb_context *ipactx,
diff --git a/daemons/ipa-slapi-plugins/ipa-pwd-extop/prepost.c b/daemons/ipa-slapi-plugins/ipa-pwd-extop/prepost.c
index c967e2cfffbd920280639f3188783ec150523b47..1c1340e31ac30cb01412a7065ea339cb5461e839 100644
--- a/daemons/ipa-slapi-plugins/ipa-pwd-extop/prepost.c
+++ b/daemons/ipa-slapi-plugins/ipa-pwd-extop/prepost.c
@@ -1528,7 +1528,8 @@ static int ipapwd_pre_bind(Slapi_PBlock *pb)
if (!syncreq && (otpreq == OTP_IS_NOT_REQUIRED)) {
ret = ipapwd_gen_checks(pb, &errMesg, &krbcfg, IPAPWD_CHECK_ONLY_CONFIG);
if (ret != 0) {
- LOG_FATAL("ipapwd_gen_checks failed!?\n");
+ LOG_FATAL("ipapwd_gen_checks failed for '%s': %s\n",
+ slapi_sdn_get_dn(sdn), errMesg);
slapi_entry_free(entry);
slapi_sdn_free(&sdn);
return 0;
diff --git a/ipatests/test_integration/test_otp.py b/ipatests/test_integration/test_otp.py
index 350371bfe1e4c1cc6dcc89f6584f813fcb0d32a0..878b4fb560ba8d7768ead54b065656462545babd 100644
--- a/ipatests/test_integration/test_otp.py
+++ b/ipatests/test_integration/test_otp.py
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import re
import time
import textwrap
from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
+from paramiko import AuthenticationException
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
@@ -83,7 +84,7 @@ def kinit_otp(host, user, *, password, otp, success=True):
)
-def ssh_2f(hostname, username, answers_dict, port=22):
+def ssh_2f(hostname, username, answers_dict, port=22, unwanted_prompt=""):
"""
:param hostname: hostname
:param username: username
@@ -103,6 +104,10 @@ def ssh_2f(hostname, username, answers_dict, port=22):
logger.info("Prompt is: '%s'", prmpt_str)
logger.info(
"Answer to ssh prompt is: '%s'", answers_dict[prmpt_str])
+ if unwanted_prompt and prmpt_str == unwanted_prompt:
+ # We should not see this prompt
+ raise ValueError("We got an unwanted prompt: "
+ + answers_dict[prmpt_str])
return resp
import paramiko
@@ -193,7 +198,8 @@ class TestOTPToken(IntegrationTest):
# skipping too many OTP fails
otp1 = hotp.generate(10).decode("ascii")
- kinit_otp(self.master, USER, password=PASSWORD, otp=otp1, success=False)
+ kinit_otp(self.master, USER, password=PASSWORD, otp=otp1,
+ success=False)
# Now the token is desynchronized
yield (otpuid, hotp)
@@ -536,3 +542,87 @@ class TestOTPToken(IntegrationTest):
finally:
master.run_command(['ipa', 'pwpolicy-mod', '--minlife', '1'])
master.run_command(['ipa', 'user-del', USER1])
+
+ def test_totp_expired_ldap(self):
+ master = self.master
+ basedn = master.domain.basedn
+ USER1 = 'user-expired-otp'
+ TMP_PASSWORD = 'Secret1234509'
+ binddn = DN(f"uid={USER1},cn=users,cn=accounts,{basedn}")
+ controls = [
+ BooleanControl(
+ controlType="2.16.840.1.113730.3.8.10.7",
+ booleanValue=True)
+ ]
+
+ tasks.kinit_admin(master)
+ master.run_command(['ipa', 'pwpolicy-mod', '--minlife', '0'])
+ tasks.user_add(master, USER1, password=TMP_PASSWORD)
+ # Enforce use of OTP token for this user
+ master.run_command(['ipa', 'user-mod', USER1,
+ '--user-auth-type=otp'])
+ try:
+ # Change initial password through the IPA endpoint
+ url = f'https://{master.hostname}/ipa/session/change_password'
+ master.run_command(['curl', '-d', f'user={USER1}',
+ '-d', f'old_password={TMP_PASSWORD}',
+ '-d', f'new_password={PASSWORD}',
+ '--referer', f'https://{master.hostname}/ipa',
+ url])
+ conn = master.ldap_connect()
+ # First, attempt authenticating with a password but without LDAP
+ # control to enforce OTP presence and without server-side
+ # enforcement of the OTP presence check.
+ conn.simple_bind(binddn, f"{PASSWORD}")
+
+ # Add an OTP token and then modify it to be expired
+ otpuid, totp = add_otptoken(master, USER1, otptype="totp")
+
+ # Make sure OTP auth is working
+ otpvalue = totp.generate(int(time.time())).decode("ascii")
+ conn = master.ldap_connect()
+ conn.simple_bind(binddn, f"{PASSWORD}{otpvalue}",
+ client_controls=controls)
+ conn.unbind()
+
+ # Modfy token so that is now expired
+ args = [
+ "ipa",
+ "otptoken-mod",
+ otpuid,
+ "--not-after",
+ "20241001010000Z",
+ ]
+ master.run_command(args)
+
+ # Next, authenticate with Password+OTP again and with the LDAP
+ # control this operation should now fail
+ time.sleep(45)
+ otpvalue = totp.generate(int(time.time())).decode("ascii")
+
+ conn = master.ldap_connect()
+ with pytest.raises(errors.ACIError):
+ conn.simple_bind(binddn, f"{PASSWORD}{otpvalue}",
+ client_controls=controls)
+
+ # Sleep to make sure we are going to use a different token value
+ time.sleep(45)
+
+ # Use OTP token again but authenticate over ssh and make sure it
+ # doesn't fallthrough to asking for a password
+ otpvalue = totp.generate(int(time.time())).decode("ascii")
+ answers = {
+ 'Enter first factor:': PASSWORD,
+ 'Enter second factor:': otpvalue
+ }
+ with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+ # ssh should fail and NOT ask for a password
+ ssh_2f(master.hostname, USER1, answers,
+ unwanted_prompt="Password:")
+
+ # Remove token
+ del_otptoken(self.master, otpuid)
+
+ finally:
+ master.run_command(['ipa', 'pwpolicy-mod', '--minlife', '1'])
+ master.run_command(['ipa', 'user-del', USER1])
--
2.46.2
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