ipa-4.12.2-24

- Resolves: RHEL-118448
  ipa: Privilege escalation from host to domain admin in FreeIPA

Signed-off-by: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Florence Blanc-Renaud 2025-09-30 18:00:36 +02:00
parent 1e96b90394
commit 6d0d7136f5
4 changed files with 436 additions and 3 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
From 943032c9491df751d230132d6aa881ff9284cf21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 11:44:36 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Enforce uniqueness across krbprincipalname and
krbcanonicalname
This relies on a fix in 389-ds that extends the uniqueness plugin
to be able to compare attributes with different matching syntax.
This will prevent privilege escalation attacks if one of the
attributes is not set on an entry if it is set elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
---
install/share/unique-attributes.ldif | 28 +++++-----------------------
install/updates/10-uniqueness.update | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/install/share/unique-attributes.ldif b/install/share/unique-attributes.ldif
index 60f2c3470b3f2be7860c2bcc20babb07904f9b0c..b28d981b574d84e24509c07195526e25eddc0b75 100644
--- a/install/share/unique-attributes.ldif
+++ b/install/share/unique-attributes.ldif
@@ -1,34 +1,16 @@
-dn: cn=krbPrincipalName uniqueness,cn=plugins,cn=config
+dn: cn=kerberos name uniqueness,cn=plugins,cn=config
changetype: add
objectClass: top
objectClass: nsSlapdPlugin
objectClass: extensibleObject
-cn: krbPrincipalName uniqueness
+cn: kerberos name uniqueness
nsslapd-pluginPath: libattr-unique-plugin
nsslapd-pluginInitfunc: NSUniqueAttr_Init
nsslapd-pluginType: preoperation
nsslapd-pluginEnabled: on
-uniqueness-attribute-name: krbPrincipalName
-nsslapd-plugin-depends-on-type: database
-nsslapd-pluginId: NSUniqueAttr
-nsslapd-pluginVersion: 1.1.0
-nsslapd-pluginVendor: Fedora Project
-nsslapd-pluginDescription: Enforce unique attribute values
-uniqueness-subtrees: $SUFFIX
-uniqueness-exclude-subtrees: cn=staged users,cn=accounts,cn=provisioning,$SUFFIX
-uniqueness-across-all-subtrees: on
-
-dn: cn=krbCanonicalName uniqueness,cn=plugins,cn=config
-changetype: add
-objectClass: top
-objectClass: nsSlapdPlugin
-objectClass: extensibleObject
-cn: krbCanonicalName uniqueness
-nsslapd-pluginPath: libattr-unique-plugin
-nsslapd-pluginInitfunc: NSUniqueAttr_Init
-nsslapd-pluginType: preoperation
-nsslapd-pluginEnabled: on
-uniqueness-attribute-name: krbCanonicalName
+uniqueness-attribute-name: krbPrincipalName:CaseIgnoreMatch:
+uniqueness-attribute-name: krbPrincipalAlias:CaseIgnoreMatch:
+uniqueness-attribute-name: krbCanonicalName:CaseIgnoreMatch:
nsslapd-plugin-depends-on-type: database
nsslapd-pluginId: NSUniqueAttr
nsslapd-pluginVersion: 1.1.0
diff --git a/install/updates/10-uniqueness.update b/install/updates/10-uniqueness.update
index fa17911f2ed9c7bcaa851de0f0a4790a550e1c91..5c5bfd3e0f4f7b65fffe47844f778d6909181181 100644
--- a/install/updates/10-uniqueness.update
+++ b/install/updates/10-uniqueness.update
@@ -63,13 +63,32 @@ add:uniqueness-subtree-entries-oc: posixAccount
# krbPrincipalName uniqueness scopes Active/Delete containers
dn: cn=krbPrincipalName uniqueness,cn=plugins,cn=config
-add:uniqueness-exclude-subtrees: cn=staged users,cn=accounts,cn=provisioning,$SUFFIX
-add:uniqueness-across-all-subtrees: on
+deleteentry: cn=krbPrincipalName uniqueness,cn=plugins,cn=config
# krbCanonicalName uniqueness scopes Active/Delete containers
dn: cn=krbCanonicalName uniqueness,cn=plugins,cn=config
-add:uniqueness-exclude-subtrees: cn=staged users,cn=accounts,cn=provisioning,$SUFFIX
-add:uniqueness-across-all-subtrees: on
+deleteentry: dn: cn=krbCanonicalName uniqueness,cn=plugins,cn=config
+
+dn: cn=kerberos name uniqueness,cn=plugins,cn=config
+default:objectClass: top
+default:objectClass: nsSlapdPlugin
+default:objectClass: extensibleObject
+default:cn: kerberos name uniqueness
+default:nsslapd-pluginPath: libattr-unique-plugin
+default:nsslapd-pluginInitfunc: NSUniqueAttr_Init
+default:nsslapd-pluginType: preoperation
+default:nsslapd-pluginEnabled: on
+default:uniqueness-attribute-name: krbPrincipalName:CaseIgnoreMatch:
+default:uniqueness-attribute-name: krbPrincipalAlias:CaseIgnoreMatch:
+default:uniqueness-attribute-name: krbCanonicalName:CaseIgnoreMatch:
+default:nsslapd-plugin-depends-on-type: database
+default:nsslapd-pluginId: NSUniqueAttr
+default:nsslapd-pluginVersion: 1.1.0
+default:nsslapd-pluginVendor: Fedora Project
+default:nsslapd-pluginDescription: Enforce unique attribute values
+default:uniqueness-subtrees: $SUFFIX
+default:uniqueness-exclude-subtrees: cn=staged users,cn=accounts,cn=provisioning,$SUFFIX
+default:uniqueness-across-all-subtrees: on
# ipaUniqueID uniqueness scopes Active/Delete containers
dn: cn=ipaUniqueID uniqueness,cn=plugins,cn=config
--
2.51.0

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@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
From ee838b21200a7e61398bd6a60be848bc1fa96985 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2025 10:26:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ipa-kdb: enforce PAC presence on TGT for TGS-REQ
MS-KILE's PA-PAC-REQUEST sequence allows the Kerberos client to request
a TGT without a PAC. At the moment, there is no way to configure the MIT
KDC to reject such request.
This commit enforces the presence of the PAC when processing TGTs
provided by TGS-REQ. It ensures the server principal of the TGT is the
same as the one in PAC_CLIENT_INFO (i.e. enforces client principal
canonicalization) with integrity check.
Only one exception is applied: this check is skipped for local TGTs on
domain where the MS-PAC generator is not initialized (i.e. domains where
SID generation was not executed yet).
Signed-off-by: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
---
daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb.h | 9 +++
daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_common.c | 18 ++++++
daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_kdcpolicy.c | 2 +-
daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_mspac.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c | 21 +------
5 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb.h b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb.h
index 58a0339fc984c9b421aed23c6c1e6084f132421b..8fa0509956dfc1d0f2ba0c5363da463ba1189199 100644
--- a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb.h
+++ b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb.h
@@ -431,6 +431,14 @@ krb5_error_code ipadb_is_princ_from_trusted_realm(krb5_context kcontext,
const char *test_realm, size_t size,
char **trusted_realm);
+/* Check the ticket provided in a TGS-REQ. In some situations, the ticket is
+ * expected to contain a PAC. If it is not the case, or if the function is
+ * enable to decode an authorization-data element, it fails.
+ * Any failure should result in the TGS-REQ to be rejected. */
+krb5_error_code ipadb_enforce_pac(krb5_context kcontext,
+ const krb5_ticket *ticket,
+ const char **status);
+
/* DELEGATION CHECKS */
krb5_error_code ipadb_check_allowed_to_delegate(krb5_context kcontext,
@@ -475,3 +483,4 @@ int ipadb_string_to_sid(const char *str, struct dom_sid *sid);
void alloc_sid(struct dom_sid **sid);
void free_sid(struct dom_sid **sid);
bool dom_sid_check(const struct dom_sid *sid1, const struct dom_sid *sid2, bool exact_check);
+bool ipadb_is_tgs_princ(krb5_context kcontext, krb5_const_principal princ);
diff --git a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_common.c b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_common.c
index ae7742a320ed714b703bf12a32811c0fd9eb75aa..fc603cbe2957f43698936e74a40fcbc0912f95bc 100644
--- a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_common.c
+++ b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_common.c
@@ -767,3 +767,21 @@ krb5_error_code ipadb_multibase_search(struct ipadb_context *ipactx,
return ipadb_simple_ldap_to_kerr(ret);
}
+bool
+ipadb_is_tgs_princ(krb5_context kcontext, krb5_const_principal princ)
+{
+ krb5_data *primary;
+ size_t l_tgs_name;
+
+ if (2 != krb5_princ_size(kcontext, princ))
+ return false;
+
+ primary = krb5_princ_component(kcontext, princ, 0);
+
+ l_tgs_name = strlen(KRB5_TGS_NAME);
+
+ if (l_tgs_name != primary->length)
+ return false;
+
+ return 0 == memcmp(primary->data, KRB5_TGS_NAME, l_tgs_name);
+}
diff --git a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_kdcpolicy.c b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_kdcpolicy.c
index 2802221c79fe63ab4bd33bfbe4859517f3d91ec5..aa8de3edac279ecf822af2b807e9378e28b125d0 100644
--- a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_kdcpolicy.c
+++ b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_kdcpolicy.c
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ ipa_kdcpolicy_check_tgs(krb5_context context, krb5_kdcpolicy_moddata moddata,
*lifetime_out = 0;
*renew_lifetime_out = 0;
- return 0;
+ return ipadb_enforce_pac(context, ticket, status);
}
krb5_error_code kdcpolicy_ipakdb_initvt(krb5_context context,
diff --git a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_mspac.c b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_mspac.c
index 9723103d8a77294ed7457d9b48bfc0d98b9ccef1..9a7aedd84850ac4b51ba97415bad9d6c071d0d0b 100644
--- a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_mspac.c
+++ b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_mspac.c
@@ -3346,3 +3346,90 @@ krb5_error_code ipadb_is_princ_from_trusted_realm(krb5_context kcontext,
return KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+check_for_pac(krb5_context kcontext, krb5_authdata **authdata, bool *pac_present)
+{
+ krb5_error_code kerr = ENOENT;
+ size_t i, j;
+ krb5_authdata **ifrel = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; authdata && authdata[i]; ++i) {
+ if (authdata[i]->ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ kerr = krb5_decode_authdata_container(kcontext,
+ KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT,
+ authdata[i], &ifrel);
+ if (kerr) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; ifrel[j]; ++j) {
+ if (ifrel[j]->ad_type == KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ifrel[j]) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ krb5_free_authdata(kcontext, ifrel);
+ ifrel = NULL;
+ }
+
+ *pac_present = ifrel;
+ kerr = 0;
+
+end:
+ krb5_free_authdata(kcontext, ifrel);
+ return kerr;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+ipadb_enforce_pac(krb5_context kcontext, const krb5_ticket *ticket,
+ const char **status)
+{
+ struct ipadb_context *ipactx;
+ bool pac_present;
+ krb5_error_code kerr;
+
+ /* Filter TGTs only */
+ if (!ipadb_is_tgs_princ(kcontext, ticket->server)) {
+ kerr = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Get IPA context */
+ ipactx = ipadb_get_context(kcontext);
+ if (!ipactx) {
+ kerr = KRB5_KDB_DBNOTINITED;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* If local TGT but PAC generator not initialized, skip PAC enforcement */
+ if (krb5_realm_compare(kcontext, ipactx->local_tgs, ticket->server) &&
+ !ipactx->mspac)
+ {
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_WARNING, "MS-PAC not available. This makes "
+ "FreeIPA vulnerable to privilege escalation exploit "
+ "(CVE-2025-7493). Please generate SIDs to enable PAC "
+ "support.");
+ kerr = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Search for the PAC, fail if it cannot be found */
+ kerr = check_for_pac(kcontext, ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data,
+ &pac_present);
+ if (kerr) {
+ *status = "PAC_ENFORCEMENT_CANNOT_DECODE_TGT_AUTHDATA";
+ } else if (!pac_present) {
+ kerr = ENOENT;
+ *status = "PAC_ENFORCEMENT_TGT_WITHOUT_PAC";
+ }
+
+end:
+ return kerr;
+}
diff --git a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
index a7e77e940ab61b27407076a834f3804b0e69c122..bb9e039923e821e8a20d01fbc42d92b402d3f961 100644
--- a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
+++ b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
@@ -188,25 +188,6 @@ done:
return ret;
}
-static bool
-is_tgs_princ(krb5_context kcontext, krb5_const_principal princ)
-{
- krb5_data *primary;
- size_t l_tgs_name;
-
- if (2 != krb5_princ_size(kcontext, princ))
- return false;
-
- primary = krb5_princ_component(kcontext, princ, 0);
-
- l_tgs_name = strlen(KRB5_TGS_NAME);
-
- if (l_tgs_name != primary->length)
- return false;
-
- return 0 == memcmp(primary->data, KRB5_TGS_NAME, l_tgs_name);
-}
-
static krb5_error_code
cmp_local_tgs_princ(krb5_context kcontext, const char *local_realm,
krb5_const_principal princ, bool *result)
@@ -2080,7 +2061,7 @@ krb5_error_code ipadb_get_principal(krb5_context kcontext,
return kerr;
/* If TGS principal, some virtual attributes may be added */
- if (is_tgs_princ(kcontext, (*entry)->princ)) {
+ if (ipadb_is_tgs_princ(kcontext, (*entry)->princ)) {
kerr = cmp_local_tgs_princ(kcontext, ipactx->realm, (*entry)->princ,
&is_local_tgs_princ);
if (kerr)
--
2.51.0

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@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
From 9f15d21bc0673696757406885e90647c3c7ad9a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 15:31:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ipatests: extend test for unique krbcanonicalname
Add a test ensuring that root@REALM cannot be added as
krbcanonicalname
Add a test for PAC enforcement:
try to access a service using a TGT obtained without PAC.
Should fail as PAC is now enforced.
Signed-off-by: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
---
ipatests/test_integration/test_commands.py | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ipatests/test_integration/test_commands.py b/ipatests/test_integration/test_commands.py
index 6aaf4f2995b61c538a9f99eed4a5a63b4df7cea7..dcffa6a8a00b5c9a7d41b8e131454666ef7eda85 100644
--- a/ipatests/test_integration/test_commands.py
+++ b/ipatests/test_integration/test_commands.py
@@ -2239,7 +2239,7 @@ class TestIPACommandWithoutReplica(IntegrationTest):
hostname = master.hostname
realm = master.domain.realm
principal = f'test/{hostname}@{realm}'
- entry_ldif = textwrap.dedent("""
+ entry_ldif_template = textwrap.dedent("""
dn: krbprincipalname={principal},cn=services,cn=accounts,{base_dn}
changetype: add
ipakrbprincipalalias: test/{hostname}@{realm}
@@ -2250,13 +2250,15 @@ class TestIPACommandWithoutReplica(IntegrationTest):
objectclass: krbprincipal
objectclass: krbprincipalaux
objectclass: top
- krbcanonicalname: admin@{realm}
+ krbcanonicalname: {user}@{realm}
managedby: fqdn={hostname},cn=computers,cn=accounts,{base_dn}
- """).format(
+ """)
+ entry_ldif = entry_ldif_template.format(
base_dn=base_dn,
hostname=hostname,
principal=principal,
- realm=realm)
+ realm=realm,
+ user='admin')
tasks.kdestroy_all(master)
master.run_command(
['kinit', '-kt', '/etc/krb5.keytab', f'host/{hostname}@{realm}'])
@@ -2269,6 +2271,40 @@ class TestIPACommandWithoutReplica(IntegrationTest):
raiseonerr=False)
assert "entry with the same attribute value" in result.stderr_text
+ # Now try with root@realm instead of admin@realm
+ entry_ldif = entry_ldif_template.format(
+ base_dn=base_dn,
+ hostname=hostname,
+ principal=principal,
+ realm=realm,
+ user='root')
+ args = [
+ 'ldapmodify',
+ '-Y',
+ 'GSSAPI'
+ ]
+ result = master.run_command(args, stdin_text=entry_ldif,
+ raiseonerr=False)
+ assert "entry with the same attribute value" in result.stderr_text
+ tasks.kdestroy_all(master)
+
+ def test_no_request_pac(self):
+ # Try to use a TGT obtained without PAC
+ # Should fail as the presence of the PAC when processing TGTs
+ # provided by TGS-REQ is now enforced.
+ hostname = self.master.hostname
+ realm = self.master.domain.realm
+ self.master.run_command([
+ 'kinit', '-kt', '/etc/krb5.keytab', f'host/{hostname}@{realm}',
+ '--no-request-pac'
+ ])
+ result = self.master.run_command(
+ ['kvno', f'ldap/{hostname}@{realm}'],
+ raiseonerr=False
+ )
+ assert result.returncode == 1
+ assert "PAC_ENFORCEMENT_TGT_WITHOUT_PAC" in result.stderr_text
+
class TestIPAautomount(IntegrationTest):
@classmethod
--
2.51.0

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@ -77,8 +77,9 @@
%global ds_version 1.4.3.16-12
%global selinux_policy_version 3.14.3-107
%else
# version supporting LMDB and lib389.cli_ctl.dblib.run_dbscan utility
%global ds_version 2.1.0
# version for Allow Uniqueness plugin to search uniqueness attributes
# using custom matching rules
%global ds_version 2.7.0-7
%global selinux_policy_version 38.1.1-1
%endif
@ -231,7 +232,7 @@
Name: %{package_name}
Version: %{IPA_VERSION}
Release: 23%{?rc_version:.%rc_version}%{?dist}
Release: 24%{?rc_version:.%rc_version}%{?dist}
Summary: The Identity, Policy and Audit system
License: GPL-3.0-or-later
@ -369,6 +370,9 @@ Patch0111: 0111-ipasam-simplify-error-handling-in-fill_pdb_trusted_d.patch
Patch0112: 0112-ipasam-address-signedness-warnings.patch
Patch0113: 0113-ipasam-define-prototypes.patch
Patch0114: 0114-ipasam-remove-definitions-which-included-from-ndr_dr.patch
Patch0115: 0115-Enforce-uniqueness-across-krbprincipalname-and-krbca.patch
Patch0116: 0116-ipa-kdb-enforce-PAC-presence-on-TGT-for-TGS-REQ.patch
Patch0117: 0117-ipatests-extend-test-for-unique-krbcanonicalname.patch
Patch1001: 1001-Change-branding-to-IPA-and-Identity-Management.patch
%endif
%endif
@ -2022,6 +2026,9 @@ fi
%endif
%changelog
* Tue Sep 30 2025 Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com> - 4.12.2-24
- Resolves: RHEL-118448 CVE-2025-7493 ipa: Privilege escalation from host to domain admin in FreeIPA
* Thu Sep 18 2025 Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com> - 4.12.2-23
- Related: RHEL-114548 Rebase Samba to the latest 4.23.x release