60 lines
3.3 KiB
Diff
60 lines
3.3 KiB
Diff
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From 6d70421f57d0eca066a922e09416ef7195ee96d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 16:43:09 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] ipa-kdb: do not remove keys for hardened auth-enabled users
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Since 5d51ae5, principal keys were dropped in case user auth indicator
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was not including password. Thereafter, the key removal behavior was
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removed by 15ff9c8 in the context of the kdcpolicy plugin introduction.
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Support for hardened pre-auth methods (FAST and SPAKE) was added in
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d057040, and the removal of principal keys was restored afterwards by
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f0d12b7, but not taking the new hardened auth indicator into account.
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Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9065
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Related to: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8001
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Signed-off-by: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-By: Francisco Trivino <ftrivino@redhat.com>
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---
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daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
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1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
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index 15f3df4fee8bdfadf60a4b1d9a5115407d1bb294..0d0d3748ce63a8252e84220d036140818ffdfb6e 100644
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--- a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
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+++ b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
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@@ -788,17 +788,18 @@ static krb5_error_code ipadb_parse_ldap_entry(krb5_context kcontext,
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&res_key_data, &result, &mkvno);
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switch (ret) {
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case 0:
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- /* Only set a principal's key if password auth can be used. Otherwise
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- * the KDC would add pre-authentication methods to the NEEDED_PREAUTH
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- * reply for AS-REQs which indicate the password authentication is
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- * available. This might confuse applications like e.g. SSSD which try
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- * to determine suitable authentication methods and corresponding
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- * prompts with the help of MIT Kerberos' responder interface which
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- * acts on the returned pre-authentication methods. A typical example
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- * is enforced OTP authentication where of course keys are available
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- * for the first factor but password authentication should not be
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- * advertised by the KDC. */
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- if (!(ua & IPADB_USER_AUTH_PASSWORD) && (ua != IPADB_USER_AUTH_NONE)) {
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+ /* Only set a principal's key if password or hardened auth can be used.
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+ * Otherwise the KDC would add pre-authentication methods to the
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+ * NEEDED_PREAUTH reply for AS-REQs which indicate the password
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+ * authentication is available. This might confuse applications like
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+ * e.g. SSSD which try to determine suitable authentication methods and
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+ * corresponding prompts with the help of MIT Kerberos' responder
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+ * interface which acts on the returned pre-authentication methods. A
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+ * typical example is enforced OTP authentication where of course keys
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+ * are available for the first factor but password authentication
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+ * should not be advertised by the KDC. */
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+ if (!(ua & (IPADB_USER_AUTH_PASSWORD | IPADB_USER_AUTH_HARDENED)) &&
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+ (ua != IPADB_USER_AUTH_NONE)) {
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/* This is the same behavior as ENOENT below. */
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ipa_krb5_free_key_data(res_key_data, result);
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break;
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--
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2.34.1
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