ipa/SOURCES/0004-ipa-kdb-do-not-remove-keys-for-hardened-auth-enabled-users_rhbz#2033342.patch

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From 6d70421f57d0eca066a922e09416ef7195ee96d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 16:43:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ipa-kdb: do not remove keys for hardened auth-enabled users
Since 5d51ae5, principal keys were dropped in case user auth indicator
was not including password. Thereafter, the key removal behavior was
removed by 15ff9c8 in the context of the kdcpolicy plugin introduction.
Support for hardened pre-auth methods (FAST and SPAKE) was added in
d057040, and the removal of principal keys was restored afterwards by
f0d12b7, but not taking the new hardened auth indicator into account.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9065
Related to: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8001
Signed-off-by: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Francisco Trivino <ftrivino@redhat.com>
---
daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
index 15f3df4fe..0d0d3748c 100644
--- a/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
+++ b/daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_principals.c
@@ -788,17 +788,18 @@ static krb5_error_code ipadb_parse_ldap_entry(krb5_context kcontext,
&res_key_data, &result, &mkvno);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
- /* Only set a principal's key if password auth can be used. Otherwise
- * the KDC would add pre-authentication methods to the NEEDED_PREAUTH
- * reply for AS-REQs which indicate the password authentication is
- * available. This might confuse applications like e.g. SSSD which try
- * to determine suitable authentication methods and corresponding
- * prompts with the help of MIT Kerberos' responder interface which
- * acts on the returned pre-authentication methods. A typical example
- * is enforced OTP authentication where of course keys are available
- * for the first factor but password authentication should not be
- * advertised by the KDC. */
- if (!(ua & IPADB_USER_AUTH_PASSWORD) && (ua != IPADB_USER_AUTH_NONE)) {
+ /* Only set a principal's key if password or hardened auth can be used.
+ * Otherwise the KDC would add pre-authentication methods to the
+ * NEEDED_PREAUTH reply for AS-REQs which indicate the password
+ * authentication is available. This might confuse applications like
+ * e.g. SSSD which try to determine suitable authentication methods and
+ * corresponding prompts with the help of MIT Kerberos' responder
+ * interface which acts on the returned pre-authentication methods. A
+ * typical example is enforced OTP authentication where of course keys
+ * are available for the first factor but password authentication
+ * should not be advertised by the KDC. */
+ if (!(ua & (IPADB_USER_AUTH_PASSWORD | IPADB_USER_AUTH_HARDENED)) &&
+ (ua != IPADB_USER_AUTH_NONE)) {
/* This is the same behavior as ENOENT below. */
ipa_krb5_free_key_data(res_key_data, result);
break;
--
2.34.1
From 294ae35a61e6ca8816b261c57508e4be21221864 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 19:38:29 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ipatests: add case for hardened-only ticket policy
Signed-off-by: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Francisco Trivino <ftrivino@redhat.com>
---
ipatests/test_integration/test_krbtpolicy.py | 30 ++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ipatests/test_integration/test_krbtpolicy.py b/ipatests/test_integration/test_krbtpolicy.py
index 63e75ae67..9489fbc97 100644
--- a/ipatests/test_integration/test_krbtpolicy.py
+++ b/ipatests/test_integration/test_krbtpolicy.py
@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ class TestPWPolicy(IntegrationTest):
result = master.run_command('klist | grep krbtgt')
assert maxlife_within_policy(result.stdout_text, MAXLIFE) is True
- def test_krbtpolicy_hardended(self):
- """Test a hardened kerberos ticket policy with 10 min tickets"""
+ def test_krbtpolicy_password_and_hardended(self):
+ """Test a pwd and hardened kerberos ticket policy with 10min tickets"""
master = self.master
master.run_command(['ipa', 'user-mod', USER1,
'--user-auth-type', 'password',
@@ -131,6 +131,32 @@ class TestPWPolicy(IntegrationTest):
result = master.run_command('klist | grep krbtgt')
assert maxlife_within_policy(result.stdout_text, MAXLIFE) is True
+ def test_krbtpolicy_hardended(self):
+ """Test a hardened kerberos ticket policy with 30min tickets"""
+ master = self.master
+ master.run_command(['ipa', 'user-mod', USER1,
+ '--user-auth-type', 'hardened'])
+ master.run_command(['ipa', 'config-mod',
+ '--user-auth-type', 'hardened'])
+ master.run_command(['ipa', 'krbtpolicy-mod', USER1,
+ '--hardened-maxlife', '1800'])
+
+ tasks.kdestroy_all(master)
+
+ master.run_command(['kinit', USER1],
+ stdin_text=PASSWORD + '\n')
+ result = master.run_command('klist | grep krbtgt')
+ assert maxlife_within_policy(result.stdout_text, 1800,
+ slush=1800) is True
+
+ tasks.kdestroy_all(master)
+
+ # Verify that the short policy only applies to USER1
+ master.run_command(['kinit', USER2],
+ stdin_text=PASSWORD + '\n')
+ result = master.run_command('klist | grep krbtgt')
+ assert maxlife_within_policy(result.stdout_text, MAXLIFE) is True
+
def test_krbtpolicy_password(self):
"""Test the kerberos ticket policy which issues 20 min tickets"""
master = self.master
--
2.34.1