118 lines
4.1 KiB
Diff
118 lines
4.1 KiB
Diff
# ./pullrev.sh 1870095 1870097
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http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1870095
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http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1870097
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--- httpd-2.4.37/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
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+++ httpd-2.4.37/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
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@@ -114,6 +114,45 @@
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return result;
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}
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+/* If a renegotiation is required for the location, and the request
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+ * includes a message body (and the client has not requested a "100
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+ * Continue" response), then the client will be streaming the request
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+ * body over the wire already. In that case, it is not possible to
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+ * stop and perform a new SSL handshake immediately; once the SSL
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+ * library moves to the "accept" state, it will reject the SSL packets
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+ * which the client is sending for the request body.
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+ *
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+ * To allow authentication to complete in the hook, the solution used
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+ * here is to fill a (bounded) buffer with the request body, and then
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+ * to reinject that request body later.
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+ *
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+ * This function is called to fill the renegotiation buffer for the
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+ * location as required, or fail. Returns zero on success or HTTP_
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+ * error code on failure.
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+ */
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+static int fill_reneg_buffer(request_rec *r, SSLDirConfigRec *dc)
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+{
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+ int rv;
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+ apr_size_t rsize;
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+
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+ /* ### this is HTTP/1.1 specific, special case for protocol? */
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+ if (r->expecting_100 || !ap_request_has_body(r)) {
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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+ rsize = dc->nRenegBufferSize == UNSET ? DEFAULT_RENEG_BUFFER_SIZE : dc->nRenegBufferSize;
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+ if (rsize > 0) {
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+ /* Fill the I/O buffer with the request body if possible. */
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+ rv = ssl_io_buffer_fill(r, rsize);
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+ }
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+ else {
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+ /* If the reneg buffer size is set to zero, just fail. */
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+ rv = HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE;
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+ }
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+
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+ return rv;
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+}
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+
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#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT
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static int ap_array_same_str_set(apr_array_header_t *s1, apr_array_header_t *s2)
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{
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@@ -814,41 +853,14 @@
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}
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}
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- /* If a renegotiation is now required for this location, and the
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- * request includes a message body (and the client has not
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- * requested a "100 Continue" response), then the client will be
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- * streaming the request body over the wire already. In that
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- * case, it is not possible to stop and perform a new SSL
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- * handshake immediately; once the SSL library moves to the
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- * "accept" state, it will reject the SSL packets which the client
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- * is sending for the request body.
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- *
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- * To allow authentication to complete in this auth hook, the
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- * solution used here is to fill a (bounded) buffer with the
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- * request body, and then to reinject that request body later.
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- */
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- if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick
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- && !r->expecting_100
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- && ap_request_has_body(r)) {
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- int rv;
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- apr_size_t rsize;
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-
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- rsize = dc->nRenegBufferSize == UNSET ? DEFAULT_RENEG_BUFFER_SIZE :
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- dc->nRenegBufferSize;
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- if (rsize > 0) {
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- /* Fill the I/O buffer with the request body if possible. */
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- rv = ssl_io_buffer_fill(r, rsize);
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- }
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- else {
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- /* If the reneg buffer size is set to zero, just fail. */
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- rv = HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE;
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- }
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-
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- if (rv) {
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+ /* Fill reneg buffer if required. */
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+ if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick) {
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+ rc = fill_reneg_buffer(r, dc);
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+ if (rc) {
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ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02257)
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"could not buffer message body to allow "
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"SSL renegotiation to proceed");
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- return rv;
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+ return rc;
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}
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}
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@@ -1132,6 +1144,17 @@
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}
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}
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+ /* Fill reneg buffer if required. */
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+ if (change_vmode) {
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+ rc = fill_reneg_buffer(r, dc);
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+ if (rc) {
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+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10228)
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+ "could not buffer message body to allow "
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+ "TLS Post-Handshake Authentication to proceed");
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+ return rc;
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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if (change_vmode) {
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char peekbuf[1];
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