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import httpd-2.4.37-51.module+el8.7.0+18499+2e106f0b.5

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CentOS Sources 2023-04-06 16:02:42 +00:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent 7e7354bff1
commit 203fa9fde1
2 changed files with 304 additions and 2 deletions
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296
SOURCES/httpd-2.4.37-CVE-2023-25690.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
diff --git a/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en b/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en
index 80d0759..9673094 100644
--- a/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en
+++ b/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en
@@ -85,10 +85,6 @@ of how you might use them.</p>
<h2><a name="flag_b" id="flag_b">B (escape backreferences)</a></h2>
<p>The [B] flag instructs <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mod_rewrite.html#rewriterule">RewriteRule</a></code> to escape non-alphanumeric
characters before applying the transformation.</p>
-<p>In 2.4.26 and later, you can limit the escaping to specific characters
-in backreferences by listing them: <code>[B=#?;]</code>. Note: The space
-character can be used in the list of characters to escape, but it cannot be
-the last character in the list.</p>
<p><code>mod_rewrite</code> has to unescape URLs before mapping them,
so backreferences are unescaped at the time they are applied.
@@ -120,6 +116,16 @@ when the backend may break if presented with an unescaped URL.</p>
<p>An alternative to this flag is using a <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mod_rewrite.html#rewritecond">RewriteCond</a></code> to capture against %{THE_REQUEST} which will capture
strings in the encoded form.</p>
+
+<p>In 2.4.26 and later, you can limit the escaping to specific characters
+in backreferences by listing them: <code>[B=#?;]</code>. Note: The space
+character can be used in the list of characters to escape, but you must quote
+the entire third argument of <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mod_rewrite.html#rewriterule">RewriteRule</a></code>
+and the space must not be the last character in the list.</p>
+
+<pre class="prettyprint lang-config"># Escape spaces and question marks.
+RewriteRule "^search/(.*)$" "/search.php?term=$1" "[B= ?]"</pre>
+
</div><div class="top"><a href="#page-header"><img alt="top" src="../images/up.gif" /></a></div>
<div class="section">
<h2><a name="flag_bnp" id="flag_bnp">BNP|backrefnoplus (don't escape space to +)</a></h2>
diff --git a/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c b/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c
index 38dbb24..c3937ad 100644
--- a/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c
+++ b/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ static const char* really_last_key = "rewrite_really_last";
#define RULEFLAG_END (1<<17)
#define RULEFLAG_ESCAPENOPLUS (1<<18)
#define RULEFLAG_QSLAST (1<<19)
+#define RULEFLAG_QSNONE (1<<20) /* programattic only */
/* return code of the rewrite rule
* the result may be escaped - or not
@@ -761,15 +762,24 @@ static char *escape_absolute_uri(apr_pool_t *p, char *uri, unsigned scheme)
ap_escape_uri(p, cp), NULL);
}
+
/*
* split out a QUERY_STRING part from
* the current URI string
*/
-static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int qsappend, int qsdiscard,
- int qslast)
+static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int flags)
{
char *q;
int split;
+ int qsappend = flags & RULEFLAG_QSAPPEND;
+ int qsdiscard = flags & RULEFLAG_QSDISCARD;
+ int qslast = flags & RULEFLAG_QSLAST;
+
+ if (flags & RULEFLAG_QSNONE) {
+ rewritelog((r, 2, NULL, "discarding query string, no parse from substitution"));
+ r->args = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
/* don't touch, unless it's a scheme for which a query string makes sense.
* See RFC 1738 and RFC 2368.
@@ -794,7 +804,7 @@ static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int qsappend, int qsdiscard,
olduri = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, r->filename);
*q++ = '\0';
if (qsappend) {
- if (*q) {
+ if (*q) {
r->args = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, q, "&" , r->args, NULL);
}
}
@@ -802,9 +812,9 @@ static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int qsappend, int qsdiscard,
r->args = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, q);
}
- if (r->args) {
+ if (r->args) {
len = strlen(r->args);
-
+
if (!len) {
r->args = NULL;
}
@@ -2733,7 +2743,7 @@ static apr_status_t rewritelock_remove(void *data)
* XXX: what an inclined parser. Seems we have to leave it so
* for backwards compat. *sigh*
*/
-static int parseargline(char *str, char **a1, char **a2, char **a3)
+static int parseargline(char *str, char **a1, char **a2, char **a2_end, char **a3)
{
char quote;
@@ -2784,8 +2794,10 @@ static int parseargline(char *str, char **a1, char **a2, char **a3)
if (!*str) {
*a3 = NULL; /* 3rd argument is optional */
+ *a2_end = str;
return 0;
}
+ *a2_end = str;
*str++ = '\0';
while (apr_isspace(*str)) {
@@ -3323,7 +3335,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewritecond(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf,
rewrite_server_conf *sconf;
rewritecond_entry *newcond;
ap_regex_t *regexp;
- char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a3 = NULL;
+ char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a2_end, *a3 = NULL;
const char *err;
sconf = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config, &rewrite_module);
@@ -3341,7 +3353,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewritecond(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf,
* of the argument line. So we can use a1 .. a3 without
* copying them again.
*/
- if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a3)) {
+ if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a2_end, &a3)) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "RewriteCond: bad argument line '", str,
"'", NULL);
}
@@ -3749,7 +3761,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewriterule(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf,
rewrite_server_conf *sconf;
rewriterule_entry *newrule;
ap_regex_t *regexp;
- char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a3 = NULL;
+ char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a2_end, *a3 = NULL;
const char *err;
sconf = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config, &rewrite_module);
@@ -3763,7 +3775,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewriterule(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf,
}
/* parse the argument line ourself */
- if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a3)) {
+ if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a2_end, &a3)) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "RewriteRule: bad argument line '", str,
"'", NULL);
}
@@ -3810,6 +3822,16 @@ static const char *cmd_rewriterule(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf,
newrule->flags |= RULEFLAG_NOSUB;
}
+ if (*(a2_end-1) == '?') {
+ /* a literal ? at the end of the unsubstituted rewrite rule */
+ newrule->flags |= RULEFLAG_QSNONE;
+ }
+ else if (newrule->flags & RULEFLAG_QSDISCARD) {
+ if (NULL == ap_strchr(newrule->output, '?')) {
+ newrule->flags |= RULEFLAG_QSNONE;
+ }
+ }
+
/* now, if the server or per-dir config holds an
* array of RewriteCond entries, we take it for us
* and clear the array
@@ -4215,9 +4237,7 @@ static int apply_rewrite_rule(rewriterule_entry *p, rewrite_ctx *ctx)
r->path_info = NULL;
}
- splitout_queryargs(r, p->flags & RULEFLAG_QSAPPEND,
- p->flags & RULEFLAG_QSDISCARD,
- p->flags & RULEFLAG_QSLAST);
+ splitout_queryargs(r, p->flags);
/* Add the previously stripped per-directory location prefix, unless
* (1) it's an absolute URL path and
@@ -4699,6 +4719,17 @@ static int hook_uri2file(request_rec *r)
unsigned skip;
apr_size_t flen;
+ if (r->args && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(r->args))) {
+ /*
+ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args.
+ * Correct encoding was missed.
+ */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10410)
+ "Rewritten query string contains control "
+ "characters or spaces");
+ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
+ }
+
if (ACTION_STATUS == rulestatus) {
int n = r->status;
@@ -4983,6 +5014,17 @@ static int hook_fixup(request_rec *r)
if (rulestatus) {
unsigned skip;
+ if (r->args && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(r->args))) {
+ /*
+ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args.
+ * Correct encoding was missed.
+ */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10411)
+ "Rewritten query string contains control "
+ "characters or spaces");
+ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
+ }
+
if (ACTION_STATUS == rulestatus) {
int n = r->status;
diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
index 058b03f..a529c02 100644
--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
+++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
@@ -69,6 +69,16 @@ static int proxy_ajp_canon(request_rec *r, char *url)
path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0,
r->proxyreq);
search = r->args;
+ if (search && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search))) {
+ /*
+ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args.
+ * Correct encoding was missed.
+ */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10406)
+ "To be forwarded query string contains control "
+ "characters or spaces");
+ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
+ }
}
if (path == NULL)
return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c
index 3a28038..c599e1a 100644
--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c
+++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c
@@ -106,6 +106,16 @@ static int proxy_balancer_canon(request_rec *r, char *url)
path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0,
r->proxyreq);
search = r->args;
+ if (search && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search))) {
+ /*
+ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args.
+ * Correct encoding was missed.
+ */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10407)
+ "To be forwarded query string contains control "
+ "characters or spaces");
+ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
+ }
}
if (path == NULL)
return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
index c1c591a..58a8c86 100644
--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
+++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
@@ -90,6 +90,16 @@ static int proxy_http_canon(request_rec *r, char *url)
path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url),
enc_path, 0, r->proxyreq);
search = r->args;
+ if (search && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search))) {
+ /*
+ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args.
+ * Correct encoding was missed.
+ */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10408)
+ "To be forwarded query string contains control "
+ "characters or spaces");
+ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
+ }
}
break;
case PROXYREQ_PROXY:
diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c
index e005a94..f5e27d9 100644
--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c
+++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c
@@ -77,6 +77,16 @@ static int proxy_wstunnel_canon(request_rec *r, char *url)
path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0,
r->proxyreq);
search = r->args;
+ if (search && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search))) {
+ /*
+ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args.
+ * Correct encoding was missed.
+ */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10409)
+ "To be forwarded query string contains control "
+ "characters or spaces");
+ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
+ }
}
if (path == NULL)
return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;

10
SPECS/httpd.spec
View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
Summary: Apache HTTP Server
Name: httpd
Version: 2.4.37
Release: 51%{?dist}.1
Release: 51%{?dist}.5
URL: https://httpd.apache.org/
Source0: https://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-%{version}.tar.bz2
Source2: httpd.logrotate
@ -244,7 +244,8 @@ Patch235: httpd-2.4.37-CVE-2022-37436.patch
Patch236: httpd-2.4.37-CVE-2006-20001.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161777
Patch237: httpd-2.4.37-CVE-2022-36760.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2176209
Patch238: httpd-2.4.37-CVE-2023-25690.patch
License: ASL 2.0
Group: System Environment/Daemons
@ -464,6 +465,7 @@ interface for storing and accessing per-user session data.
%patch235 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-37436
%patch236 -p1 -b .CVE-2006-20001
%patch237 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-36760
%patch238 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-25690
# Patch in the vendor string
sed -i '/^#define PLATFORM/s/Unix/%{vstring}/' os/unix/os.h
@ -969,6 +971,10 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%{_rpmconfigdir}/macros.d/macros.httpd
%changelog
* Sat Mar 18 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 2.4.37-51.5
- Resolves: #2177747 - CVE-2023-25690 httpd:2.4/httpd: HTTP request splitting
with mod_rewrite and mod_proxy
* Tue Jan 31 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 2.4.37-51.1
- Resolves: #2165967 - prevent sscg creating /dhparams.pem
- Resolves: #2165976 - CVE-2006-20001 httpd: mod_dav: out-of-bounds read/write