import httpd-2.4.53-7.el9_1.1

This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources 2023-02-28 07:54:55 +00:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent 755d5ac75e
commit 16c5eec196
6 changed files with 192 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
diff --git a/modules/dav/main/util.c b/modules/dav/main/util.c
index 1ae5914027c..3f7822fc931 100644
--- a/modules/dav/main/util.c
+++ b/modules/dav/main/util.c
@@ -801,8 +801,14 @@ static dav_error * dav_process_if_header(request_rec *r, dav_if_header **p_ih)
"for the same state.");
}
condition = DAV_IF_COND_NOT;
+ list += 2;
+ }
+ else {
+ return dav_new_error(r->pool, HTTP_BAD_REQUEST,
+ DAV_ERR_IF_UNK_CHAR, 0,
+ "Invalid \"If:\" header: "
+ "Unexpected character in List");
}
- list += 2;
break;
case ' ':

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@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
From 5efc9507c487c37dfe2a279a4a0335cad701cd5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:19:07 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] cleanup on error
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1906540 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
---
modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
index 9cd7adbcbbf..07f37392d88 100644
--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
+++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
@@ -255,6 +255,8 @@ static int ap_proxy_ajp_request(apr_pool_t *p, request_rec *r,
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10396)
"%s Transfer-Encoding is not supported",
tenc);
+ /* We had a failure: Close connection to backend */
+ conn->close = 1;
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
} else {

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@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
From 8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:09 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1906539 from trunk:
fail on bad header
Submitted By: covener
Reviewed By: covener, rpluem, gbechis
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906541 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
---
modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
server/protocol.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
index d74ae054ac9..ec4e7fb06b5 100644
--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
+++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ static void process_proxy_header(request_rec *r, proxy_dir_conf *c,
* any sense at all, since we depend on buffer still containing
* what was read by ap_getline() upon return.
*/
-static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+static apr_status_t ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
char *buffer, int size,
conn_rec *c, int *pread_len)
{
@@ -820,19 +820,26 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
rc = ap_proxygetline(tmp_bb, buffer, size, rr,
AP_GETLINE_FOLD | AP_GETLINE_NOSPC_EOL, &len);
- if (len <= 0)
- break;
- if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
- /* The header could not fit in the provided buffer, warn.
- * XXX: falls through with the truncated header, 5xx instead?
- */
- int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
- "header size is over the limit allowed by "
- "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
- "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
- size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
+ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
+ int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
+ "header size is over the limit allowed by "
+ "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
+ "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
+ size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
+ }
+ else {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10404)
+ "Error reading headers from backend");
+ }
+ r->headers_out = NULL;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ break;
}
else {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, r, "%s", buffer);
@@ -855,7 +862,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
if (psc->badopt == bad_error) {
/* Nope, it wasn't even an extra HTTP header. Give up. */
r->headers_out = NULL;
- return;
+ return APR_EINVAL;
}
else if (psc->badopt == bad_body) {
/* if we've already started loading headers_out, then
@@ -869,13 +876,13 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
"in headers returned by %s (%s)",
r->uri, r->method);
*pread_len = len;
- return;
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
}
else {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01099)
"No HTTP headers returned by %s (%s)",
r->uri, r->method);
- return;
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
}
}
}
@@ -905,6 +912,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
process_proxy_header(r, dconf, buffer, value);
saw_headers = 1;
}
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
}
@@ -1218,10 +1226,10 @@ int ap_proxy_http_process_response(proxy_http_req_t *req)
"Set-Cookie", NULL);
/* shove the headers direct into r->headers_out */
- ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size,
- origin, &pread_len);
+ rc = ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size,
+ origin, &pread_len);
- if (r->headers_out == NULL) {
+ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS || r->headers_out == NULL) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01106)
"bad HTTP/%d.%d header returned by %s (%s)",
major, minor, r->uri, r->method);
diff --git a/server/protocol.c b/server/protocol.c
index 7adc7f75c10..6f9540ad1de 100644
--- a/server/protocol.c
+++ b/server/protocol.c
@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s, apr_size_t n,
/* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */
bytes_handled = strlen(*s);
if (bytes_handled < *read) {
+ ap_log_data(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, ap_server_conf,
+ "NULL bytes in header", *s, *read, 0);
*read = bytes_handled;
if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
rv = APR_EINVAL;

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@ -8,5 +8,6 @@ ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key
[Service]
Type=oneshot
RemainAfterExit=no
PrivateTmp=true
ExecStart=/usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-gencerts

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@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ sscg -q \
--cert-file /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt \
--cert-key-file /etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key \
--ca-file /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt \
--dhparams-file /tmp/dhparams.pem \
--lifetime 365 \
--hostname $FQDN \
--email root@$FQDN

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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
Summary: Apache HTTP Server
Name: httpd
Version: 2.4.53
Release: 7%{?dist}
Release: 7%{?dist}.1
URL: https://httpd.apache.org/
Source0: https://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-%{version}.tar.bz2
Source1: https://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-%{version}.tar.bz2.asc
@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ Patch204: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-29404.patch
Patch205: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-30522.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2095018
Patch206: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-30556.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161773
Patch207: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-37436.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161774
Patch208: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2006-20001.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161777
Patch209: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-36760.patch
License: ASL 2.0
BuildRequires: gcc, autoconf, pkgconfig, findutils, xmlto
@ -304,6 +310,9 @@ written in the Lua programming language.
%patch204 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-29404
%patch205 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-30522
%patch206 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-30556
%patch207 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-37436
%patch208 -p1 -b .CVE-2006-20001
%patch209 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-36760
# Patch in the vendor string
sed -i '/^#define PLATFORM/s/Unix/%{vstring}/' os/unix/os.h
@ -863,6 +872,14 @@ exit $rv
%{_rpmconfigdir}/macros.d/macros.httpd
%changelog
* Tue Jan 31 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 2.4.53-7.1
- Resolves: #2165975 - prevent sscg creating /dhparams.pem
- Resolves: #2165970 - CVE-2006-20001 httpd: mod_dav: out-of-bounds read/write
of zero byte
- Resolves: #2165973 - CVE-2022-37436 httpd: mod_proxy: HTTP response splitting
- Resolves: #2165974 - CVE-2022-36760 httpd: mod_proxy_ajp: Possible request
smuggling
* Wed Jul 20 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 2.4.53-7
- Resolves: #2094997 - CVE-2022-26377 httpd: mod_proxy_ajp: Possible request
smuggling