import httpd-2.4.53-7.el9_1.1

SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2006-20001.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff --git a/modules/dav/main/util.c b/modules/dav/main/util.c
+index 1ae5914027c..3f7822fc931 100644
+--- a/modules/dav/main/util.c
++++ b/modules/dav/main/util.c
+@@ -801,8 +801,14 @@ static dav_error * dav_process_if_header(request_rec *r, dav_if_header **p_ih)
+                                                  "for the same state.");
+                         }
+                         condition = DAV_IF_COND_NOT;
++                        list += 2;
++                    }
++                    else {
++                        return dav_new_error(r->pool, HTTP_BAD_REQUEST,
++                                             DAV_ERR_IF_UNK_CHAR, 0,
++                                             "Invalid \"If:\" header: "
++                                             "Unexpected character in List");
+                     }
+-                    list += 2;
+                     break;
+ 
+                 case ' ':

SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-36760.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+From 5efc9507c487c37dfe2a279a4a0335cad701cd5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org>
+Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:19:07 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] cleanup on error
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1906540 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+---
+ modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
+index 9cd7adbcbbf..07f37392d88 100644
+--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
+@@ -255,6 +255,8 @@ static int ap_proxy_ajp_request(apr_pool_t *p, request_rec *r,
+             ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10396)
+                           "%s Transfer-Encoding is not supported",
+                           tenc);
++            /* We had a failure: Close connection to backend */
++            conn->close = 1;
+             return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+         }
+     } else {

SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-37436.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+From 8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org>
+Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:09 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1906539 from trunk:
+
+fail on bad header
+
+Submitted By: covener
+Reviewed By: covener, rpluem, gbechis
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906541 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+---
+ modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ server/protocol.c              |  2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
+index d74ae054ac9..ec4e7fb06b5 100644
+--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
+@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ static void process_proxy_header(request_rec *r, proxy_dir_conf *c,
+  * any sense at all, since we depend on buffer still containing
+  * what was read by ap_getline() upon return.
+  */
+-static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
++static apr_status_t ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+                                   char *buffer, int size,
+                                   conn_rec *c, int *pread_len)
+ {
+@@ -820,19 +820,26 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+         rc = ap_proxygetline(tmp_bb, buffer, size, rr,
+                              AP_GETLINE_FOLD | AP_GETLINE_NOSPC_EOL, &len);
+ 
+-        if (len <= 0)
+-            break;
+ 
+-        if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
+-            /* The header could not fit in the provided buffer, warn.
+-             * XXX: falls through with the truncated header, 5xx instead?
+-             */
+-            int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
+-            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
+-                    "header size is over the limit allowed by "
+-                    "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
+-                    "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
+-                    size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
++        if (rc != APR_SUCCESS) {
++            if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
++                int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
++                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
++                        "header size is over the limit allowed by "
++                        "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
++                        "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
++                        size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
++            }
++            else {
++                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10404) 
++                              "Error reading headers from backend");
++            }
++            r->headers_out = NULL;
++            return rc;
++        }
++
++        if (len <= 0) {
++            break;
+         }
+         else {
+             ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, r, "%s", buffer);
+@@ -855,7 +862,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+                 if (psc->badopt == bad_error) {
+                     /* Nope, it wasn't even an extra HTTP header. Give up. */
+                     r->headers_out = NULL;
+-                    return;
++                    return APR_EINVAL;
+                 }
+                 else if (psc->badopt == bad_body) {
+                     /* if we've already started loading headers_out, then
+@@ -869,13 +876,13 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+                                       "in headers returned by %s (%s)",
+                                       r->uri, r->method);
+                         *pread_len = len;
+-                        return;
++                        return APR_SUCCESS;
+                     }
+                     else {
+                         ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01099)
+                                       "No HTTP headers returned by %s (%s)",
+                                       r->uri, r->method);
+-                        return;
++                        return APR_SUCCESS;
+                     }
+                 }
+             }
+@@ -905,6 +912,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+         process_proxy_header(r, dconf, buffer, value);
+         saw_headers = 1;
+     }
++    return APR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1218,10 +1226,10 @@ int ap_proxy_http_process_response(proxy_http_req_t *req)
+                          "Set-Cookie", NULL);
+ 
+             /* shove the headers direct into r->headers_out */
+-            ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size,
+-                                  origin, &pread_len);
++            rc = ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size,
++                                       origin, &pread_len);
+ 
+-            if (r->headers_out == NULL) {
++            if (rc != APR_SUCCESS || r->headers_out == NULL) {
+                 ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01106)
+                               "bad HTTP/%d.%d header returned by %s (%s)",
+                               major, minor, r->uri, r->method);
+diff --git a/server/protocol.c b/server/protocol.c
+index 7adc7f75c10..6f9540ad1de 100644
+--- a/server/protocol.c
++++ b/server/protocol.c
+@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s, apr_size_t n,
+         /* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */
+         bytes_handled = strlen(*s);
+         if (bytes_handled < *read) {
++            ap_log_data(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, ap_server_conf,
++                        "NULL bytes in header", *s, *read, 0);
+             *read = bytes_handled;
+             if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
+                 rv = APR_EINVAL;

SOURCES/httpd-init.service

@@ -8,5 +8,6 @@ ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
 RemainAfterExit=no
+PrivateTmp=true
 
 ExecStart=/usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-gencerts

SOURCES/httpd-ssl-gencerts

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ sscg -q                                                             \
      --cert-file           /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt         \
      --cert-key-file       /etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key       \
      --ca-file             /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt         \
+     --dhparams-file       /tmp/dhparams.pem                        \
      --lifetime            365                                      \
      --hostname            $FQDN                                    \
      --email               root@$FQDN

SPECS/httpd.spec

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 Summary: Apache HTTP Server
 Name: httpd
 Version: 2.4.53
-Release: 7%{?dist}
+Release: 7%{?dist}.1
 URL: https://httpd.apache.org/
 Source0: https://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-%{version}.tar.bz2
 Source1: https://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-%{version}.tar.bz2.asc
@@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ Patch204: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-29404.patch
 Patch205: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-30522.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2095018
 Patch206: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-30556.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161773
+Patch207: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-37436.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161774
+Patch208: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2006-20001.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161777
+Patch209: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-36760.patch
 
 License: ASL 2.0
 BuildRequires: gcc, autoconf, pkgconfig, findutils, xmlto
@@ -304,6 +310,9 @@ written in the Lua programming language.
 %patch204 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-29404
 %patch205 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-30522
 %patch206 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-30556
+%patch207 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-37436
+%patch208 -p1 -b .CVE-2006-20001
+%patch209 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-36760
 
 # Patch in the vendor string
 sed -i '/^#define PLATFORM/s/Unix/%{vstring}/' os/unix/os.h
@@ -863,6 +872,14 @@ exit $rv
 %{_rpmconfigdir}/macros.d/macros.httpd
 
 %changelog
+* Tue Jan 31 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 2.4.53-7.1
+- Resolves: #2165975 - prevent sscg creating /dhparams.pem
+- Resolves: #2165970 - CVE-2006-20001 httpd: mod_dav: out-of-bounds read/write
+  of zero byte
+- Resolves: #2165973 - CVE-2022-37436 httpd: mod_proxy: HTTP response splitting
+- Resolves: #2165974 - CVE-2022-36760 httpd: mod_proxy_ajp: Possible request
+  smuggling
+
 * Wed Jul 20 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 2.4.53-7
 - Resolves: #2094997 - CVE-2022-26377 httpd: mod_proxy_ajp: Possible request
   smuggling