aeb7fa69dd
Remove obsolete patches for NL80211_ATTR_SMPS_MODE encoding and KRACK Fix CVE-2019-9494 (cache attack against SAE) Fix CVE-2019-9495 (cache attack against EAP-pwd) Fix CVE-2019-9496 (SAE confirm missing state validation in hostapd/AP) Fix CVE-2019-9497 (EAP-pwd server not checking for reflection attack) Fix CVE-2019-9498 (EAP-pwd server missing commit validation for scalar/element) Fix CVE-2019-9499 (EAP-pwd peer missing commit validation for scalar/element)
145 lines
4.8 KiB
Diff
145 lines
4.8 KiB
Diff
From 362704dda04507e7ebb8035122e83d9f0ae7c320 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
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Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 19:34:38 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 06/14] SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind()
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Make the non-failure path in the function proceed without branches based
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on r_odd and in constant time to minimize risk of observable differences
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in timing or cache use. (CVE-2019-9494)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
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---
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src/common/sae.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
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1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
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index d55323b..5df9b95 100644
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--- a/src/common/sae.c
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+++ b/src/common/sae.c
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@@ -232,12 +232,14 @@ get_rand_1_to_p_1(const u8 *prime, size_t prime_len, size_t prime_bits,
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static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(struct sae_data *sae,
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const u8 *prime, size_t bits,
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- const struct crypto_bignum *qr,
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- const struct crypto_bignum *qnr,
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+ const u8 *qr, const u8 *qnr,
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const struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr)
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{
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- struct crypto_bignum *r, *num;
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+ struct crypto_bignum *r, *num, *qr_or_qnr = NULL;
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int r_odd, check, res = -1;
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+ u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
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+ size_t prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len;
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+ unsigned int mask;
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/*
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* Use the blinding technique to mask y_sqr while determining
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@@ -248,7 +250,7 @@ static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(struct sae_data *sae,
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* r = a random number between 1 and p-1, inclusive
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* num = (v * r * r) modulo p
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*/
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- r = get_rand_1_to_p_1(prime, sae->tmp->prime_len, bits, &r_odd);
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+ r = get_rand_1_to_p_1(prime, prime_len, bits, &r_odd);
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if (!r)
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return -1;
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@@ -258,41 +260,45 @@ static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(struct sae_data *sae,
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crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, r, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
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goto fail;
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- if (r_odd) {
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- /*
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- * num = (num * qr) module p
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- * LGR(num, p) = 1 ==> quadratic residue
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- */
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- if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
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- goto fail;
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- check = 1;
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- } else {
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- /*
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- * num = (num * qnr) module p
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- * LGR(num, p) = -1 ==> quadratic residue
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- */
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- if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qnr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
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- goto fail;
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- check = -1;
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- }
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+ /*
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+ * Need to minimize differences in handling different cases, so try to
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+ * avoid branches and timing differences.
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+ *
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+ * If r_odd:
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+ * num = (num * qr) module p
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+ * LGR(num, p) = 1 ==> quadratic residue
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+ * else:
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+ * num = (num * qnr) module p
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+ * LGR(num, p) = -1 ==> quadratic residue
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+ */
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+ mask = const_time_is_zero(r_odd);
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+ const_time_select_bin(mask, qnr, qr, prime_len, qr_or_qnr_bin);
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+ qr_or_qnr = crypto_bignum_init_set(qr_or_qnr_bin, prime_len);
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+ if (!qr_or_qnr ||
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+ crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qr_or_qnr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
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+ goto fail;
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+ /* r_odd is 0 or 1; branchless version of check = r_odd ? 1 : -1, */
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+ check = const_time_select_int(mask, -1, 1);
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res = crypto_bignum_legendre(num, sae->tmp->prime);
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if (res == -2) {
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res = -1;
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goto fail;
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}
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- res = res == check;
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+ /* branchless version of res = res == check
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+ * (res is -1, 0, or 1; check is -1 or 1) */
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+ mask = const_time_eq(res, check);
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+ res = const_time_select_int(mask, 1, 0);
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fail:
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crypto_bignum_deinit(num, 1);
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crypto_bignum_deinit(r, 1);
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+ crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
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return res;
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}
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static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
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- const u8 *prime,
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- const struct crypto_bignum *qr,
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- const struct crypto_bignum *qnr,
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+ const u8 *prime, const u8 *qr, const u8 *qnr,
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u8 *pwd_value)
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{
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struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand;
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@@ -452,6 +458,8 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
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struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL;
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u8 x_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
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u8 x_cand_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
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+ u8 qr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
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+ u8 qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
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size_t bits;
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int res = -1;
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u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
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@@ -476,7 +484,9 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
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* (qnr) modulo p for blinding purposes during the loop.
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*/
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if (get_random_qr_qnr(prime, prime_len, sae->tmp->prime, bits,
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- &qr, &qnr) < 0)
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+ &qr, &qnr) < 0 ||
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+ crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin), prime_len) < 0 ||
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+ crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin), prime_len) < 0)
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goto fail;
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wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
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@@ -527,7 +537,7 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
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break;
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res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(sae, pwd_seed,
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- prime, qr, qnr, x_cand_bin);
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+ prime, qr_bin, qnr_bin, x_cand_bin);
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const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, x_cand_bin, prime_len,
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x_bin);
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pwd_seed_odd = const_time_select_u8(
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--
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2.7.4
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