.gitignore

@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-SOURCES/hostapd-2.10.tar.gz
+/hostapd-2.9.tar.gz
+/hostapd-2.10.tar.gz

.hostapd.metadata

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-1012a46ed74d7760aec3cfe435eb8bac23f5dde9 SOURCES/hostapd-2.10.tar.gz

0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 8c07fa9eda13e835f3f968b2e1c9a8be3a851ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] AP: Silently ignore management frame from unexpected source
+ address
+
+Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA
+so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up
+sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected
+sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send
+out a response to another device and that other device processing the
+unexpected response.
+
+In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases
+where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a
+connected station dropping its association.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/ap/drv_callbacks.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ src/ap/ieee802_11.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+index 31587685fe3b..34ca379edc3d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
++++ b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ int hostapd_notif_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr,
+ 			   "hostapd_notif_assoc: Skip event with no address");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++
++	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr) ||
++	    is_zero_ether_addr(addr) ||
++	    os_memcmp(addr, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
++		/* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
++		 * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
++		 * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
++			   " in received indication - ignore this indication silently",
++			   __func__, MAC2STR(addr));
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	random_add_randomness(addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ 
+ 	hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
+diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+index c85a28db44b7..e7065372e158 100644
+--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+@@ -4626,6 +4626,18 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
+ 	fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control);
+ 	stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
+ 
++	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
++	    is_zero_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
++	    os_memcmp(mgmt->sa, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
++		/* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
++		 * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
++		 * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MGMT: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
++			   " in received frame - ignore this frame silently",
++			   MAC2STR(mgmt->sa));
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON) {
+ 		handle_beacon(hapd, mgmt, len, fi);
+ 		return 1;
+-- 
+2.20.1
+

0001-EAP-TTLS-PEAP-peer-Fix-failure-when-using-session-ti.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+From 872609c15110d32ee2d306aeeeffdd4e42ef6fc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id: <872609c15110d32ee2d306aeeeffdd4e42ef6fc6.1627507211.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
+From: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
+Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2020 09:49:36 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-TTLS/PEAP peer: Fix failure when using session tickets
+ under TLS 1.3
+
+EAP peer does not expect data present when beginning the Phase 2 in
+EAP-{TTLS,PEAP} but in TLS 1.3 session tickets are sent after the
+handshake completes.
+
+There are several strategies that can be used to handle this, but this
+patch picks up from the discussion[1] and implements the proposed use of
+SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY. SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY has already been enabled by
+default in OpenSSL 1.1.1, but it needs to be enabled for older versions.
+
+The main OpenSSL wrapper change in tls_connection_decrypt() takes care
+of the new possible case with SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY for
+SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ to indicate that a non-application_data was
+processed. That is not really an error case with TLS 1.3, so allow it to
+complete and return an empty decrypted application data buffer.
+EAP-PEAP/TTLS processing can then use this to move ahead with starting
+Phase 2.
+
+[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/hostap/msg05376.html
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
+---
+ src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
+ src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c  |  4 ++++
+ src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c  |  5 +++++
+ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
+index ef872c50e..345a35ee1 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
+@@ -1045,6 +1045,8 @@ void * tls_init(const struct tls_config *conf)
+ 	SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ 	SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
+ 
++	SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
++
+ #ifdef SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
+ 	/* Number of deployed use cases assume the default OpenSSL behavior of
+ 	 * auto chaining the local certificate is in use. BoringSSL removed this
+@@ -4543,10 +4545,18 @@ struct wpabuf * tls_connection_decrypt(void *tls_ctx,
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	res = SSL_read(conn->ssl, wpabuf_mhead(buf), wpabuf_size(buf));
+ 	if (res < 0) {
+-		tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
+-				"Decryption failed - SSL_read");
+-		wpabuf_free(buf);
+-		return NULL;
++		int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl, res);
++
++		if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "SSL: SSL_connect - want more data");
++			res = 0;
++		} else {
++			tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
++					"Decryption failed - SSL_read");
++			wpabuf_free(buf);
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	wpabuf_put(buf, res);
+ 
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
+index 7c3704369..a13428d37 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
+@@ -803,6 +803,10 @@ static int eap_peap_decrypt(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data,
+ 	res = eap_peer_tls_decrypt(sm, &data->ssl, in_data, &in_decrypted);
+ 	if (res)
+ 		return res;
++	if (wpabuf_len(in_decrypted) == 0) {
++		wpabuf_free(in_decrypted);
++		return 1;
++	}
+ 
+ continue_req:
+ 	wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Decrypted Phase 2 EAP",
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c
+index 642d179c6..3bf1e97e6 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c
+@@ -1441,6 +1441,7 @@ static int eap_ttls_decrypt(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_ttls_data *data,
+ 
+ 	if ((in_data == NULL || wpabuf_len(in_data) == 0) &&
+ 	    data->phase2_start) {
++start:
+ 		return eap_ttls_phase2_start(sm, data, ret, identifier,
+ 					     out_data);
+ 	}
+@@ -1455,6 +1456,10 @@ static int eap_ttls_decrypt(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_ttls_data *data,
+ 	retval = eap_peer_tls_decrypt(sm, &data->ssl, in_data, &in_decrypted);
+ 	if (retval)
+ 		goto done;
++	if (wpabuf_len(in_decrypted) == 0) {
++		wpabuf_free(in_decrypted);
++		goto start;
++	}
+ 
+ continue_req:
+ 	data->phase2_start = 0;
+-- 
+2.31.1
+

0001-OpenSSL-Allow-systemwide-secpolicy-overrides-for-TLS.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From 9afb68b03976d019bb450e5e33b0d8e48867691c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id: <9afb68b03976d019bb450e5e33b0d8e48867691c.1626202922.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 17:55:36 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] OpenSSL: Allow systemwide secpolicy overrides for TLS version
+
+Explicit configuration to enable TLS v1.0 and/or v1.1 did not work with
+systemwide OpenSSL secpolicy=2 cases (e.g., Ubuntu 20.04). Allow such
+systemwide configuration to be overridden if the older TLS versions have
+been explicitly enabled in the network profile. The default behavior
+follows the systemwide policy, but this allows compatibility with old
+authentication servers without having to touch the systemwide policy.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+---
+ src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
+index e73dd7f5b..f7dfecbbf 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
+@@ -2995,16 +2995,12 @@ static int tls_set_conn_flags(struct tls_connection *conn, unsigned int flags,
+ 
+ 		/* Explicit request to enable TLS versions even if needing to
+ 		 * override systemwide policies. */
+-		if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0) {
++		if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0)
+ 			version = TLS1_VERSION;
+-		} else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1) {
+-			if (!(flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_0))
+-				version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+-		} else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_2) {
+-			if (!(flags & (TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_0 |
+-				       TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_1)))
+-				version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+-		}
++		else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1)
++			version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
++		else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_2)
++			version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ 		if (!version) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 				   "OpenSSL: Invalid TLS version configuration");
+@@ -3018,6 +3014,18 @@ static int tls_set_conn_flags(struct tls_connection *conn, unsigned int flags,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif /* >= 1.1.0 */
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && \
++	!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
++	!defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
++	if ((flags & (TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0 | TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1)) &&
++	    SSL_get_security_level(ssl) >= 2) {
++		/*
++		 * Need to drop to security level 1 to allow TLS versions older
++		 * than 1.2 to be used when explicitly enabled in configuration.
++		 */
++		SSL_set_security_level(conn->ssl, 1);
++	}
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+-- 
+2.31.1
+

0001-WPS-UPnP-Do-not-allow-event-subscriptions-with-URLs-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+From 5b78c8f961f25f4dc22d6f2b77ddd06d712cec63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2020 23:17:35 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] WPS UPnP: Do not allow event subscriptions with URLs to
+ other networks
+
+The UPnP Device Architecture 2.0 specification errata ("UDA errata
+16-04-2020.docx") addresses a problem with notifications being allowed
+to go out to other domains by disallowing such cases. Do such filtering
+for the notification callback URLs to avoid undesired connections to
+external networks based on subscriptions that any device in the local
+network could request when WPS support for external registrars is
+enabled (the upnp_iface parameter in hostapd configuration).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+---
+ src/wps/wps_er.c     |  2 +-
+ src/wps/wps_upnp.c   | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h |  3 ++-
+ 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/wps_er.c b/src/wps/wps_er.c
+index 6bded14327f8..31d2e50e4cff 100644
+--- a/src/wps/wps_er.c
++++ b/src/wps/wps_er.c
+@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@ wps_er_init(struct wps_context *wps, const char *ifname, const char *filter)
+ 			   "with %s", filter);
+ 	}
+ 	if (get_netif_info(er->ifname, &er->ip_addr, &er->ip_addr_text,
+-			   er->mac_addr)) {
++			   NULL, er->mac_addr)) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS UPnP: Could not get IP/MAC address "
+ 			   "for %s. Does it have IP address?", er->ifname);
+ 		wps_er_deinit(er, NULL, NULL);
+diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
+index 6e10e4bc0c3f..7d4b7439940e 100644
+--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
++++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
+@@ -303,6 +303,14 @@ static void subscr_addr_free_all(struct subscription *s)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int local_network_addr(struct upnp_wps_device_sm *sm,
++			      struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return (addr->sin_addr.s_addr & sm->netmask.s_addr) ==
++		(sm->ip_addr & sm->netmask.s_addr);
++}
++
++
+ /* subscr_addr_add_url -- add address(es) for one url to subscription */
+ static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url,
+ 				size_t url_len)
+@@ -381,6 +389,7 @@ static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url,
+ 
+ 	for (rp = result; rp; rp = rp->ai_next) {
+ 		struct subscr_addr *a;
++		struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) rp->ai_addr;
+ 
+ 		/* Limit no. of address to avoid denial of service attack */
+ 		if (dl_list_len(&s->addr_list) >= MAX_ADDR_PER_SUBSCRIPTION) {
+@@ -389,6 +398,13 @@ static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url,
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 
++		if (!local_network_addr(s->sm, addr)) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++				   "WPS UPnP: Ignore a delivery URL that points to another network %s",
++				   inet_ntoa(addr->sin_addr));
++			continue;
++		}
++
+ 		a = os_zalloc(sizeof(*a) + alloc_len);
+ 		if (a == NULL)
+ 			break;
+@@ -890,11 +906,12 @@ static int eth_get(const char *device, u8 ea[ETH_ALEN])
+  * @net_if: Selected network interface name
+  * @ip_addr: Buffer for returning IP address in network byte order
+  * @ip_addr_text: Buffer for returning a pointer to allocated IP address text
++ * @netmask: Buffer for returning netmask or %NULL if not needed
+  * @mac: Buffer for returning MAC address
+  * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
+  */
+ int get_netif_info(const char *net_if, unsigned *ip_addr, char **ip_addr_text,
+-		   u8 mac[ETH_ALEN])
++		   struct in_addr *netmask, u8 mac[ETH_ALEN])
+ {
+ 	struct ifreq req;
+ 	int sock = -1;
+@@ -920,6 +937,19 @@ int get_netif_info(const char *net_if, unsigned *ip_addr, char **ip_addr_text,
+ 	in_addr.s_addr = *ip_addr;
+ 	os_snprintf(*ip_addr_text, 16, "%s", inet_ntoa(in_addr));
+ 
++	if (netmask) {
++		os_memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
++		os_strlcpy(req.ifr_name, net_if, sizeof(req.ifr_name));
++		if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFNETMASK, &req) < 0) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++				   "WPS UPnP: SIOCGIFNETMASK failed: %d (%s)",
++				   errno, strerror(errno));
++			goto fail;
++		}
++		addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) &req.ifr_netmask;
++		netmask->s_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
++	}
++
+ #ifdef __linux__
+ 	os_strlcpy(req.ifr_name, net_if, sizeof(req.ifr_name));
+ 	if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &req) < 0) {
+@@ -1026,11 +1056,15 @@ static int upnp_wps_device_start(struct upnp_wps_device_sm *sm, char *net_if)
+ 
+ 	/* Determine which IP and mac address we're using */
+ 	if (get_netif_info(net_if, &sm->ip_addr, &sm->ip_addr_text,
+-			   sm->mac_addr)) {
++			   &sm->netmask, sm->mac_addr)) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS UPnP: Could not get IP/MAC address "
+ 			   "for %s. Does it have IP address?", net_if);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPS UPnP: Local IP address %s netmask %s hwaddr "
++		   MACSTR,
++		   sm->ip_addr_text, inet_ntoa(sm->netmask),
++		   MAC2STR(sm->mac_addr));
+ 
+ 	/* Listen for incoming TCP connections so that others
+ 	 * can fetch our "xml files" from us.
+diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h b/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h
+index e87a93232df1..6ead7b4e9a30 100644
+--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h
++++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h
+@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct upnp_wps_device_sm {
+ 	u8 mac_addr[ETH_ALEN]; /* mac addr of network i.f. we use */
+ 	char *ip_addr_text; /* IP address of network i.f. we use */
+ 	unsigned ip_addr; /* IP address of network i.f. we use (host order) */
++	struct in_addr netmask;
+ 	int multicast_sd; /* send multicast messages over this socket */
+ 	int ssdp_sd; /* receive discovery UPD packets on socket */
+ 	int ssdp_sd_registered; /* nonzero if we must unregister */
+@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ struct subscription * subscription_find(struct upnp_wps_device_sm *sm,
+ 					const u8 uuid[UUID_LEN]);
+ void subscr_addr_delete(struct subscr_addr *a);
+ int get_netif_info(const char *net_if, unsigned *ip_addr, char **ip_addr_text,
+-		   u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]);
++		   struct in_addr *netmask, u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]);
+ 
+ /* wps_upnp_ssdp.c */
+ void msearchreply_state_machine_stop(struct advertisement_state_machine *a);
+-- 
+2.20.1
+

0001-openssl-Disable-padding-after-initializing-the-ciphe.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From e2e9adc3d9b6bb9c433ebb6404ee439b42e91746 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id: <e2e9adc3d9b6bb9c433ebb6404ee439b42e91746.1629375427.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
+From: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 10:58:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] openssl: Disable padding after initializing the cipher suite
+
+according to OpenSSL documentation [1], EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding()
+should be called after EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), or
+EVP_CipherInit_ex(). Not doing this causes EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding()
+to return false on OpenSSL-3.0.0, resulting in the impossibility to
+connect in many scenarios. Fix this changing the order of function calls
+where needed.
+
+[1] https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding.html
+
+Reported-by: Vladimir Benes <vbenes@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+index 9411cb9cf..4b87702e4 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -248,8 +248,8 @@ int rc4_skip(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, size_t skip,
+ 
+ 	ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ 	if (!ctx ||
+-	    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) ||
+ 	    !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) ||
++	    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) ||
+ 	    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, keylen) ||
+ 	    !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, 1))
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -709,8 +709,8 @@ struct crypto_cipher * crypto_cipher_init(enum crypto_cipher_alg alg,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (!(ctx->enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) ||
+-	    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->enc, 0) ||
+ 	    !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->enc, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) ||
++	    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->enc, 0) ||
+ 	    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx->enc, key_len) ||
+ 	    !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->enc, NULL, NULL, key, iv)) {
+ 		if (ctx->enc)
+@@ -720,8 +720,8 @@ struct crypto_cipher * crypto_cipher_init(enum crypto_cipher_alg alg,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (!(ctx->dec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) ||
+-	    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->dec, 0) ||
+ 	    !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx->dec, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) ||
++	    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->dec, 0) ||
+ 	    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx->dec, key_len) ||
+ 	    !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx->dec, NULL, NULL, key, iv)) {
+ 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->enc);
+-- 
+2.31.1
+

0001-openssl-Remove-deprecated-functions-from-des_encrypt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From d265dd2d965db3669d07caa69539beb8def0edb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id: <d265dd2d965db3669d07caa69539beb8def0edb2.1629375437.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
+From: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 10:58:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] openssl: Remove deprecated functions from des_encrypt()
+
+NetworkManager-CI detected systematic failures on test scenarios using
+MSCHAPv2 when wpa_supplicant uses OpenSSL-3.0.0.
+The 'test_module_tests.py' script also fails, and the following log is
+shown:
+
+ 1627404013.761569: generate_nt_response failed
+ 1627404013.761582: ms_funcs: 1 error
+
+It seems that either DES_set_key() or DES_ecb_encrypt() changed their
+semantic, but it doesn't make sense to fix them since their use has been
+deprecated. Converting des_encrypt() to avoid use of deprecated
+functions proved to fix the problem, and removed a couple of build
+warnings at the same time.
+
+Reported-by: Vladimir Benes <vbenes@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+index a4b1083bb..9411cb9cf 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int md4_vector(size_t num_elem, const u8 *addr[], const size_t *len, u8 *mac)
+ int des_encrypt(const u8 *clear, const u8 *key, u8 *cypher)
+ {
+ 	u8 pkey[8], next, tmp;
+-	int i;
+-	DES_key_schedule ks;
++	int i, plen, ret = -1;
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ 
+ 	/* Add parity bits to the key */
+ 	next = 0;
+@@ -218,10 +218,19 @@ int des_encrypt(const u8 *clear, const u8 *key, u8 *cypher)
+ 	}
+ 	pkey[i] = next | 1;
+ 
+-	DES_set_key((DES_cblock *) &pkey, &ks);
+-	DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *) clear, (DES_cblock *) cypher, &ks,
+-			DES_ENCRYPT);
+-	return 0;
++	ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++	if (ctx &&
++	    EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ecb(), NULL, pkey, NULL) == 1 &&
++	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) == 1 &&
++	    EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, cypher, &plen, clear, 8) == 1 &&
++	    EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, &cypher[plen], &plen) == 1)
++		ret = 0;
++	else
++		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "OpenSSL: DES encrypt failed");
++
++	if (ctx)
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.31.1
+

0002-WPS-UPnP-Fix-event-message-generation-using-a-long-U.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From f7d268864a2660b7239b9a8ff5ad37faeeb751ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2020 22:41:02 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] WPS UPnP: Fix event message generation using a long URL
+ path
+
+More than about 700 character URL ended up overflowing the wpabuf used
+for building the event notification and this resulted in the wpabuf
+buffer overflow checks terminating the hostapd process. Fix this by
+allocating the buffer to be large enough to contain the full URL path.
+However, since that around 700 character limit has been the practical
+limit for more than ten years, start explicitly enforcing that as the
+limit or the callback URLs since any longer ones had not worked before
+and there is no need to enable them now either.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+---
+ src/wps/wps_upnp.c       | 9 +++++++--
+ src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c | 3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
+index 7d4b7439940e..ab685d52ecab 100644
+--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
++++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
+@@ -328,9 +328,14 @@ static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url,
+ 	int rerr;
+ 	size_t host_len, path_len;
+ 
+-	/* url MUST begin with http: */
+-	if (url_len < 7 || os_strncasecmp(url, "http://", 7))
++	/* URL MUST begin with HTTP scheme. In addition, limit the length of
++	 * the URL to 700 characters which is around the limit that was
++	 * implicitly enforced for more than 10 years due to a bug in
++	 * generating the event messages. */
++	if (url_len < 7 || os_strncasecmp(url, "http://", 7) || url_len > 700) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPS UPnP: Reject an unacceptable URL");
+ 		goto fail;
++	}
+ 	url += 7;
+ 	url_len -= 7;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
+index d7e6edcc6503..08a23612f338 100644
+--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
++++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
+@@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ static struct wpabuf * event_build_message(struct wps_event_ *e)
+ 	struct wpabuf *buf;
+ 	char *b;
+ 
+-	buf = wpabuf_alloc(1000 + wpabuf_len(e->data));
++	buf = wpabuf_alloc(1000 + os_strlen(e->addr->path) +
++			   wpabuf_len(e->data));
+ 	if (buf == NULL)
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	wpabuf_printf(buf, "NOTIFY %s HTTP/1.1\r\n", e->addr->path);
+-- 
+2.20.1
+

0003-WPS-UPnP-Handle-HTTP-initiation-failures-for-events-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 85aac526af8612c21b3117dadc8ef5944985b476 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 21:24:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] WPS UPnP: Handle HTTP initiation failures for events more
+ properly
+
+While it is appropriate to try to retransmit the event to another
+callback URL on a failure to initiate the HTTP client connection, there
+is no point in trying the exact same operation multiple times in a row.
+Replve the event_retry() calls with event_addr_failure() for these cases
+to avoid busy loops trying to repeat the same failing operation.
+
+These potential busy loops would go through eloop callbacks, so the
+process is not completely stuck on handling them, but unnecessary CPU
+would be used to process the continues retries that will keep failing
+for the same reason.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+---
+ src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
+index 08a23612f338..c0d9e41d9a38 100644
+--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
++++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
+@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static int event_send_start(struct subscription *s)
+ 
+ 	buf = event_build_message(e);
+ 	if (buf == NULL) {
+-		event_retry(e, 0);
++		event_addr_failure(e);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int event_send_start(struct subscription *s)
+ 					 event_http_cb, e);
+ 	if (e->http_event == NULL) {
+ 		wpabuf_free(buf);
+-		event_retry(e, 0);
++		event_addr_failure(e);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-- 
+2.20.1
+

gating.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+--- !Policy
+product_versions:
+  - rhel-8
+decision_context: osci_compose_gate
+rules:
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: desktop-qe.desktop-ci.tier1-gating.functional}
+#  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build.tier0.functional}

rpminspect.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+---
+inspections:
+    badfuncs: off

sources

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA512 (hostapd-2.10.tar.gz) = 243baa82d621f859d2507d8d5beb0ebda15a75548a62451dc9bca42717dcc8607adac49b354919a41d8257d16d07ac7268203a79750db0cfb34b51f80ff1ce8f