Update to version 2.10 from upstream

Enable support for IEEE802.11ax
This commit is contained in:
John W. Linville 2022-01-17 13:30:34 -05:00
parent 9f60fca033
commit 29bb7b10bc
11 changed files with 11 additions and 657 deletions

2
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1 +1 @@
/hostapd-2.9.tar.gz
/hostapd-2.10.tar.gz

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@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
From 8c07fa9eda13e835f3f968b2e1c9a8be3a851ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:04 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] AP: Silently ignore management frame from unexpected source
address
Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA
so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up
sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected
sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send
out a response to another device and that other device processing the
unexpected response.
In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases
where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a
connected station dropping its association.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/ap/drv_callbacks.c | 13 +++++++++++++
src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
index 31587685fe3b..34ca379edc3d 100644
--- a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+++ b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ int hostapd_notif_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr,
"hostapd_notif_assoc: Skip event with no address");
return -1;
}
+
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr) ||
+ is_zero_ether_addr(addr) ||
+ os_memcmp(addr, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
+ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
+ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
+ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
+ " in received indication - ignore this indication silently",
+ __func__, MAC2STR(addr));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
random_add_randomness(addr, ETH_ALEN);
hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
index c85a28db44b7..e7065372e158 100644
--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
@@ -4626,6 +4626,18 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control);
stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
+ is_zero_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
+ os_memcmp(mgmt->sa, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
+ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
+ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
+ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MGMT: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
+ " in received frame - ignore this frame silently",
+ MAC2STR(mgmt->sa));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON) {
handle_beacon(hapd, mgmt, len, fi);
return 1;
--
2.20.1

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@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
From 872609c15110d32ee2d306aeeeffdd4e42ef6fc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <872609c15110d32ee2d306aeeeffdd4e42ef6fc6.1627507211.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
From: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2020 09:49:36 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] EAP-TTLS/PEAP peer: Fix failure when using session tickets
under TLS 1.3
EAP peer does not expect data present when beginning the Phase 2 in
EAP-{TTLS,PEAP} but in TLS 1.3 session tickets are sent after the
handshake completes.
There are several strategies that can be used to handle this, but this
patch picks up from the discussion[1] and implements the proposed use of
SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY. SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY has already been enabled by
default in OpenSSL 1.1.1, but it needs to be enabled for older versions.
The main OpenSSL wrapper change in tls_connection_decrypt() takes care
of the new possible case with SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY for
SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ to indicate that a non-application_data was
processed. That is not really an error case with TLS 1.3, so allow it to
complete and return an empty decrypted application data buffer.
EAP-PEAP/TTLS processing can then use this to move ahead with starting
Phase 2.
[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/hostap/msg05376.html
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
---
src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c | 4 ++++
src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
index ef872c50e..345a35ee1 100644
--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
@@ -1045,6 +1045,8 @@ void * tls_init(const struct tls_config *conf)
SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+
#ifdef SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
/* Number of deployed use cases assume the default OpenSSL behavior of
* auto chaining the local certificate is in use. BoringSSL removed this
@@ -4543,10 +4545,18 @@ struct wpabuf * tls_connection_decrypt(void *tls_ctx,
return NULL;
res = SSL_read(conn->ssl, wpabuf_mhead(buf), wpabuf_size(buf));
if (res < 0) {
- tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
- "Decryption failed - SSL_read");
- wpabuf_free(buf);
- return NULL;
+ int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl, res);
+
+ if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "SSL: SSL_connect - want more data");
+ res = 0;
+ } else {
+ tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
+ "Decryption failed - SSL_read");
+ wpabuf_free(buf);
+ return NULL;
+ }
}
wpabuf_put(buf, res);
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
index 7c3704369..a13428d37 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
@@ -803,6 +803,10 @@ static int eap_peap_decrypt(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data,
res = eap_peer_tls_decrypt(sm, &data->ssl, in_data, &in_decrypted);
if (res)
return res;
+ if (wpabuf_len(in_decrypted) == 0) {
+ wpabuf_free(in_decrypted);
+ return 1;
+ }
continue_req:
wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Decrypted Phase 2 EAP",
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c
index 642d179c6..3bf1e97e6 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c
@@ -1441,6 +1441,7 @@ static int eap_ttls_decrypt(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_ttls_data *data,
if ((in_data == NULL || wpabuf_len(in_data) == 0) &&
data->phase2_start) {
+start:
return eap_ttls_phase2_start(sm, data, ret, identifier,
out_data);
}
@@ -1455,6 +1456,10 @@ static int eap_ttls_decrypt(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_ttls_data *data,
retval = eap_peer_tls_decrypt(sm, &data->ssl, in_data, &in_decrypted);
if (retval)
goto done;
+ if (wpabuf_len(in_decrypted) == 0) {
+ wpabuf_free(in_decrypted);
+ goto start;
+ }
continue_req:
data->phase2_start = 0;
--
2.31.1

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@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
From 9afb68b03976d019bb450e5e33b0d8e48867691c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <9afb68b03976d019bb450e5e33b0d8e48867691c.1626202922.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 17:55:36 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] OpenSSL: Allow systemwide secpolicy overrides for TLS version
Explicit configuration to enable TLS v1.0 and/or v1.1 did not work with
systemwide OpenSSL secpolicy=2 cases (e.g., Ubuntu 20.04). Allow such
systemwide configuration to be overridden if the older TLS versions have
been explicitly enabled in the network profile. The default behavior
follows the systemwide policy, but this allows compatibility with old
authentication servers without having to touch the systemwide policy.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
index e73dd7f5b..f7dfecbbf 100644
--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
@@ -2995,16 +2995,12 @@ static int tls_set_conn_flags(struct tls_connection *conn, unsigned int flags,
/* Explicit request to enable TLS versions even if needing to
* override systemwide policies. */
- if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0) {
+ if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0)
version = TLS1_VERSION;
- } else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1) {
- if (!(flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_0))
- version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- } else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_2) {
- if (!(flags & (TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_0 |
- TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_1)))
- version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
- }
+ else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1)
+ version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_2)
+ version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
if (!version) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Invalid TLS version configuration");
@@ -3018,6 +3014,18 @@ static int tls_set_conn_flags(struct tls_connection *conn, unsigned int flags,
}
}
#endif /* >= 1.1.0 */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+ if ((flags & (TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0 | TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1)) &&
+ SSL_get_security_level(ssl) >= 2) {
+ /*
+ * Need to drop to security level 1 to allow TLS versions older
+ * than 1.2 to be used when explicitly enabled in configuration.
+ */
+ SSL_set_security_level(conn->ssl, 1);
+ }
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
--
2.31.1

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@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
From 5b78c8f961f25f4dc22d6f2b77ddd06d712cec63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2020 23:17:35 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] WPS UPnP: Do not allow event subscriptions with URLs to
other networks
The UPnP Device Architecture 2.0 specification errata ("UDA errata
16-04-2020.docx") addresses a problem with notifications being allowed
to go out to other domains by disallowing such cases. Do such filtering
for the notification callback URLs to avoid undesired connections to
external networks based on subscriptions that any device in the local
network could request when WPS support for external registrars is
enabled (the upnp_iface parameter in hostapd configuration).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/wps/wps_er.c | 2 +-
src/wps/wps_upnp.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/wps/wps_er.c b/src/wps/wps_er.c
index 6bded14327f8..31d2e50e4cff 100644
--- a/src/wps/wps_er.c
+++ b/src/wps/wps_er.c
@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@ wps_er_init(struct wps_context *wps, const char *ifname, const char *filter)
"with %s", filter);
}
if (get_netif_info(er->ifname, &er->ip_addr, &er->ip_addr_text,
- er->mac_addr)) {
+ NULL, er->mac_addr)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS UPnP: Could not get IP/MAC address "
"for %s. Does it have IP address?", er->ifname);
wps_er_deinit(er, NULL, NULL);
diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
index 6e10e4bc0c3f..7d4b7439940e 100644
--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
+++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
@@ -303,6 +303,14 @@ static void subscr_addr_free_all(struct subscription *s)
}
+static int local_network_addr(struct upnp_wps_device_sm *sm,
+ struct sockaddr_in *addr)
+{
+ return (addr->sin_addr.s_addr & sm->netmask.s_addr) ==
+ (sm->ip_addr & sm->netmask.s_addr);
+}
+
+
/* subscr_addr_add_url -- add address(es) for one url to subscription */
static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url,
size_t url_len)
@@ -381,6 +389,7 @@ static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url,
for (rp = result; rp; rp = rp->ai_next) {
struct subscr_addr *a;
+ struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) rp->ai_addr;
/* Limit no. of address to avoid denial of service attack */
if (dl_list_len(&s->addr_list) >= MAX_ADDR_PER_SUBSCRIPTION) {
@@ -389,6 +398,13 @@ static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url,
break;
}
+ if (!local_network_addr(s->sm, addr)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "WPS UPnP: Ignore a delivery URL that points to another network %s",
+ inet_ntoa(addr->sin_addr));
+ continue;
+ }
+
a = os_zalloc(sizeof(*a) + alloc_len);
if (a == NULL)
break;
@@ -890,11 +906,12 @@ static int eth_get(const char *device, u8 ea[ETH_ALEN])
* @net_if: Selected network interface name
* @ip_addr: Buffer for returning IP address in network byte order
* @ip_addr_text: Buffer for returning a pointer to allocated IP address text
+ * @netmask: Buffer for returning netmask or %NULL if not needed
* @mac: Buffer for returning MAC address
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
int get_netif_info(const char *net_if, unsigned *ip_addr, char **ip_addr_text,
- u8 mac[ETH_ALEN])
+ struct in_addr *netmask, u8 mac[ETH_ALEN])
{
struct ifreq req;
int sock = -1;
@@ -920,6 +937,19 @@ int get_netif_info(const char *net_if, unsigned *ip_addr, char **ip_addr_text,
in_addr.s_addr = *ip_addr;
os_snprintf(*ip_addr_text, 16, "%s", inet_ntoa(in_addr));
+ if (netmask) {
+ os_memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+ os_strlcpy(req.ifr_name, net_if, sizeof(req.ifr_name));
+ if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFNETMASK, &req) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
+ "WPS UPnP: SIOCGIFNETMASK failed: %d (%s)",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) &req.ifr_netmask;
+ netmask->s_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ }
+
#ifdef __linux__
os_strlcpy(req.ifr_name, net_if, sizeof(req.ifr_name));
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &req) < 0) {
@@ -1026,11 +1056,15 @@ static int upnp_wps_device_start(struct upnp_wps_device_sm *sm, char *net_if)
/* Determine which IP and mac address we're using */
if (get_netif_info(net_if, &sm->ip_addr, &sm->ip_addr_text,
- sm->mac_addr)) {
+ &sm->netmask, sm->mac_addr)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS UPnP: Could not get IP/MAC address "
"for %s. Does it have IP address?", net_if);
goto fail;
}
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPS UPnP: Local IP address %s netmask %s hwaddr "
+ MACSTR,
+ sm->ip_addr_text, inet_ntoa(sm->netmask),
+ MAC2STR(sm->mac_addr));
/* Listen for incoming TCP connections so that others
* can fetch our "xml files" from us.
diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h b/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h
index e87a93232df1..6ead7b4e9a30 100644
--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h
+++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct upnp_wps_device_sm {
u8 mac_addr[ETH_ALEN]; /* mac addr of network i.f. we use */
char *ip_addr_text; /* IP address of network i.f. we use */
unsigned ip_addr; /* IP address of network i.f. we use (host order) */
+ struct in_addr netmask;
int multicast_sd; /* send multicast messages over this socket */
int ssdp_sd; /* receive discovery UPD packets on socket */
int ssdp_sd_registered; /* nonzero if we must unregister */
@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ struct subscription * subscription_find(struct upnp_wps_device_sm *sm,
const u8 uuid[UUID_LEN]);
void subscr_addr_delete(struct subscr_addr *a);
int get_netif_info(const char *net_if, unsigned *ip_addr, char **ip_addr_text,
- u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]);
+ struct in_addr *netmask, u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]);
/* wps_upnp_ssdp.c */
void msearchreply_state_machine_stop(struct advertisement_state_machine *a);
--
2.20.1

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@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
From e2e9adc3d9b6bb9c433ebb6404ee439b42e91746 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <e2e9adc3d9b6bb9c433ebb6404ee439b42e91746.1629375427.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
From: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 10:58:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] openssl: Disable padding after initializing the cipher suite
according to OpenSSL documentation [1], EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding()
should be called after EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), or
EVP_CipherInit_ex(). Not doing this causes EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding()
to return false on OpenSSL-3.0.0, resulting in the impossibility to
connect in many scenarios. Fix this changing the order of function calls
where needed.
[1] https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding.html
Reported-by: Vladimir Benes <vbenes@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
---
src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
index 9411cb9cf..4b87702e4 100644
--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
@@ -248,8 +248,8 @@ int rc4_skip(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, size_t skip,
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (!ctx ||
- !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) ||
!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) ||
+ !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) ||
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, keylen) ||
!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, 1))
goto out;
@@ -709,8 +709,8 @@ struct crypto_cipher * crypto_cipher_init(enum crypto_cipher_alg alg,
}
if (!(ctx->enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) ||
- !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->enc, 0) ||
!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->enc, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) ||
+ !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->enc, 0) ||
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx->enc, key_len) ||
!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->enc, NULL, NULL, key, iv)) {
if (ctx->enc)
@@ -720,8 +720,8 @@ struct crypto_cipher * crypto_cipher_init(enum crypto_cipher_alg alg,
}
if (!(ctx->dec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) ||
- !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->dec, 0) ||
!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx->dec, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) ||
+ !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->dec, 0) ||
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx->dec, key_len) ||
!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx->dec, NULL, NULL, key, iv)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->enc);
--
2.31.1

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@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
From d265dd2d965db3669d07caa69539beb8def0edb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <d265dd2d965db3669d07caa69539beb8def0edb2.1629375437.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
From: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 10:58:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] openssl: Remove deprecated functions from des_encrypt()
NetworkManager-CI detected systematic failures on test scenarios using
MSCHAPv2 when wpa_supplicant uses OpenSSL-3.0.0.
The 'test_module_tests.py' script also fails, and the following log is
shown:
1627404013.761569: generate_nt_response failed
1627404013.761582: ms_funcs: 1 error
It seems that either DES_set_key() or DES_ecb_encrypt() changed their
semantic, but it doesn't make sense to fix them since their use has been
deprecated. Converting des_encrypt() to avoid use of deprecated
functions proved to fix the problem, and removed a couple of build
warnings at the same time.
Reported-by: Vladimir Benes <vbenes@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
---
src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
index a4b1083bb..9411cb9cf 100644
--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int md4_vector(size_t num_elem, const u8 *addr[], const size_t *len, u8 *mac)
int des_encrypt(const u8 *clear, const u8 *key, u8 *cypher)
{
u8 pkey[8], next, tmp;
- int i;
- DES_key_schedule ks;
+ int i, plen, ret = -1;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
/* Add parity bits to the key */
next = 0;
@@ -218,10 +218,19 @@ int des_encrypt(const u8 *clear, const u8 *key, u8 *cypher)
}
pkey[i] = next | 1;
- DES_set_key((DES_cblock *) &pkey, &ks);
- DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *) clear, (DES_cblock *) cypher, &ks,
- DES_ENCRYPT);
- return 0;
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx &&
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ecb(), NULL, pkey, NULL) == 1 &&
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) == 1 &&
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, cypher, &plen, clear, 8) == 1 &&
+ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, &cypher[plen], &plen) == 1)
+ ret = 0;
+ else
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "OpenSSL: DES encrypt failed");
+
+ if (ctx)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
}
--
2.31.1

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@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
From f7d268864a2660b7239b9a8ff5ad37faeeb751ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2020 22:41:02 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] WPS UPnP: Fix event message generation using a long URL
path
More than about 700 character URL ended up overflowing the wpabuf used
for building the event notification and this resulted in the wpabuf
buffer overflow checks terminating the hostapd process. Fix this by
allocating the buffer to be large enough to contain the full URL path.
However, since that around 700 character limit has been the practical
limit for more than ten years, start explicitly enforcing that as the
limit or the callback URLs since any longer ones had not worked before
and there is no need to enable them now either.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/wps/wps_upnp.c | 9 +++++++--
src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
index 7d4b7439940e..ab685d52ecab 100644
--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
+++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c
@@ -328,9 +328,14 @@ static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url,
int rerr;
size_t host_len, path_len;
- /* url MUST begin with http: */
- if (url_len < 7 || os_strncasecmp(url, "http://", 7))
+ /* URL MUST begin with HTTP scheme. In addition, limit the length of
+ * the URL to 700 characters which is around the limit that was
+ * implicitly enforced for more than 10 years due to a bug in
+ * generating the event messages. */
+ if (url_len < 7 || os_strncasecmp(url, "http://", 7) || url_len > 700) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPS UPnP: Reject an unacceptable URL");
goto fail;
+ }
url += 7;
url_len -= 7;
diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
index d7e6edcc6503..08a23612f338 100644
--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
+++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
@@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ static struct wpabuf * event_build_message(struct wps_event_ *e)
struct wpabuf *buf;
char *b;
- buf = wpabuf_alloc(1000 + wpabuf_len(e->data));
+ buf = wpabuf_alloc(1000 + os_strlen(e->addr->path) +
+ wpabuf_len(e->data));
if (buf == NULL)
return NULL;
wpabuf_printf(buf, "NOTIFY %s HTTP/1.1\r\n", e->addr->path);
--
2.20.1

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@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From 85aac526af8612c21b3117dadc8ef5944985b476 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 21:24:04 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] WPS UPnP: Handle HTTP initiation failures for events more
properly
While it is appropriate to try to retransmit the event to another
callback URL on a failure to initiate the HTTP client connection, there
is no point in trying the exact same operation multiple times in a row.
Replve the event_retry() calls with event_addr_failure() for these cases
to avoid busy loops trying to repeat the same failing operation.
These potential busy loops would go through eloop callbacks, so the
process is not completely stuck on handling them, but unnecessary CPU
would be used to process the continues retries that will keep failing
for the same reason.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
index 08a23612f338..c0d9e41d9a38 100644
--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
+++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static int event_send_start(struct subscription *s)
buf = event_build_message(e);
if (buf == NULL) {
- event_retry(e, 0);
+ event_addr_failure(e);
return -1;
}
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int event_send_start(struct subscription *s)
event_http_cb, e);
if (e->http_event == NULL) {
wpabuf_free(buf);
- event_retry(e, 0);
+ event_addr_failure(e);
return -1;
}
--
2.20.1

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@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
%global _hardened_build 1
Name: hostapd
Version: 2.9
Release: 13%{?dist}
Version: 2.10
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: IEEE 802.11 AP, IEEE 802.1X/WPA/WPA2/EAP/RADIUS Authenticator
License: BSD
URL: http://w1.fi/hostapd
@ -14,18 +14,6 @@ Source3: %{name}.conf.5
Source4: %{name}.sysconfig
Source5: %{name}.init
# https://w1.fi/security/2019-7/ap-mode-pmf-disconnection-protection-bypass.txt
Patch1: https://w1.fi/security/2019-7/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
# https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/upnp-subscribe-misbehavior-wps-ap.txt
Patch2: https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/0001-WPS-UPnP-Do-not-allow-event-subscriptions-with-URLs-.patch
Patch3: https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/0002-WPS-UPnP-Fix-event-message-generation-using-a-long-U.patch
Patch4: https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/0003-WPS-UPnP-Handle-HTTP-initiation-failures-for-events-.patch
Patch5: 0001-OpenSSL-Allow-systemwide-secpolicy-overrides-for-TLS.patch
Patch6: 0001-EAP-TTLS-PEAP-peer-Fix-failure-when-using-session-ti.patch
Patch7: 0001-openssl-Disable-padding-after-initializing-the-ciphe.patch
Patch8: 0001-openssl-Remove-deprecated-functions-from-des_encrypt.patch
BuildRequires: libnl3-devel
BuildRequires: openssl-devel
@ -73,15 +61,6 @@ Logwatch scripts for hostapd.
%prep
%setup -q
%patch1 -p1
%patch2 -p1
%patch3 -p1
%patch4 -p1
%patch5 -p1
%patch6 -p1
%patch7 -p1
%patch8 -p1
%build
cd hostapd
@ -94,6 +73,7 @@ cat defconfig | sed \
-e '/^#CONFIG_IEEE80211N=y/s/^#//' \
-e '/^#CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y/s/^#//' \
-e '/^#CONFIG_IEEE80211AC=y/s/^#//' \
-e '/^#CONFIG_IEEE80211AX=y/s/^#//' \
-e '/^#CONFIG_FULL_DYNAMIC_VLAN=y/s/^#//' \
-e '/^#CONFIG_LIBNL32=y/s/^#//' \
-e '/^#CONFIG_ACS=y/s/^#//' \
@ -103,6 +83,7 @@ echo "CFLAGS += -I%{_includedir}/libnl3" >> .config
echo "LIBS += -L%{_libdir}" >> .config
make %{?_smp_mflags} EXTRA_CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS"
%install
%if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 7
@ -205,10 +186,14 @@ fi
%{_sysconfdir}/logwatch/scripts/services/%{name}
%changelog
* Mon Jan 17 2022 John W. Linville <linville@redhat.com> - 2.10-1
- Update to version 2.10 from upstream
- Enable support for IEEE802.11ax
* Tue Sep 14 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 2.9-13
- Rebuilt with OpenSSL 3.0.0
* Fri Sep 9 2021 Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> - 2.9.12
* Fri Sep 10 2021 Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> - 2.9-12
- backport fix for NetworkManager-ci failures with openssl-3.0.0
* Thu Jul 22 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.9-11

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@ -1 +1 @@
SHA512 (hostapd-2.9.tar.gz) = 66c729380152db18b64520bda55dfa00af3b0264f97b5de100b81a46e2593571626c4bdcf900f0988ea2131e30bc8788f75d8489dd1f57e37fd56e8098e48a9c
SHA512 (hostapd-2.10.tar.gz) = 243baa82d621f859d2507d8d5beb0ebda15a75548a62451dc9bca42717dcc8607adac49b354919a41d8257d16d07ac7268203a79750db0cfb34b51f80ff1ce8f