From 0909e944829e44c895ca74e55751b8c55a004bfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adam Samalik Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2023 13:46:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] re-import sources as agreed with the maintainer --- .gitignore | 2 +- ...re-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch | 73 +++++++++ ...er-Fix-failure-when-using-session-ti.patch | 110 +++++++++++++ ...stemwide-secpolicy-overrides-for-TLS.patch | 66 ++++++++ ...allow-event-subscriptions-with-URLs-.patch | 150 ++++++++++++++++++ ...padding-after-initializing-the-ciphe.patch | 58 +++++++ ...eprecated-functions-from-des_encrypt.patch | 68 ++++++++ ...nt-message-generation-using-a-long-U.patch | 59 +++++++ ...HTTP-initiation-failures-for-events-.patch | 47 ++++++ 9 files changed, 632 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch create mode 100644 0001-EAP-TTLS-PEAP-peer-Fix-failure-when-using-session-ti.patch create mode 100644 0001-OpenSSL-Allow-systemwide-secpolicy-overrides-for-TLS.patch create mode 100644 0001-WPS-UPnP-Do-not-allow-event-subscriptions-with-URLs-.patch create mode 100644 0001-openssl-Disable-padding-after-initializing-the-ciphe.patch create mode 100644 0001-openssl-Remove-deprecated-functions-from-des_encrypt.patch create mode 100644 0002-WPS-UPnP-Fix-event-message-generation-using-a-long-U.patch create mode 100644 0003-WPS-UPnP-Handle-HTTP-initiation-failures-for-events-.patch diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index b49de63..0a73483 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ -SOURCES/hostapd-2.10.tar.gz +/hostapd-2.9.tar.gz /hostapd-2.10.tar.gz diff --git a/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch b/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d764a9d --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From 8c07fa9eda13e835f3f968b2e1c9a8be3a851ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:04 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] AP: Silently ignore management frame from unexpected source + address + +Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA +so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up +sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected +sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send +out a response to another device and that other device processing the +unexpected response. + +In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases +where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a +connected station dropping its association. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/ap/drv_callbacks.c | 13 +++++++++++++ + src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c +index 31587685fe3b..34ca379edc3d 100644 +--- a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c ++++ b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c +@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ int hostapd_notif_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr, + "hostapd_notif_assoc: Skip event with no address"); + return -1; + } ++ ++ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr) || ++ is_zero_ether_addr(addr) || ++ os_memcmp(addr, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) { ++ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that ++ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end ++ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Invalid SA=" MACSTR ++ " in received indication - ignore this indication silently", ++ __func__, MAC2STR(addr)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + random_add_randomness(addr, ETH_ALEN); + + hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, +diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +index c85a28db44b7..e7065372e158 100644 +--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c ++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +@@ -4626,6 +4626,18 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *buf, size_t len, + fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control); + stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc); + ++ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) || ++ is_zero_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) || ++ os_memcmp(mgmt->sa, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) { ++ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that ++ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end ++ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MGMT: Invalid SA=" MACSTR ++ " in received frame - ignore this frame silently", ++ MAC2STR(mgmt->sa)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON) { + handle_beacon(hapd, mgmt, len, fi); + return 1; +-- +2.20.1 + diff --git a/0001-EAP-TTLS-PEAP-peer-Fix-failure-when-using-session-ti.patch b/0001-EAP-TTLS-PEAP-peer-Fix-failure-when-using-session-ti.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e94b20 --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-EAP-TTLS-PEAP-peer-Fix-failure-when-using-session-ti.patch @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +From 872609c15110d32ee2d306aeeeffdd4e42ef6fc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <872609c15110d32ee2d306aeeeffdd4e42ef6fc6.1627507211.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Alexander Clouter +Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2020 09:49:36 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-TTLS/PEAP peer: Fix failure when using session tickets + under TLS 1.3 + +EAP peer does not expect data present when beginning the Phase 2 in +EAP-{TTLS,PEAP} but in TLS 1.3 session tickets are sent after the +handshake completes. + +There are several strategies that can be used to handle this, but this +patch picks up from the discussion[1] and implements the proposed use of +SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY. SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY has already been enabled by +default in OpenSSL 1.1.1, but it needs to be enabled for older versions. + +The main OpenSSL wrapper change in tls_connection_decrypt() takes care +of the new possible case with SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY for +SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ to indicate that a non-application_data was +processed. That is not really an error case with TLS 1.3, so allow it to +complete and return an empty decrypted application data buffer. +EAP-PEAP/TTLS processing can then use this to move ahead with starting +Phase 2. + +[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/hostap/msg05376.html + +Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter +--- + src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- + src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c | 4 ++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c | 5 +++++ + 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +index ef872c50e..345a35ee1 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +@@ -1045,6 +1045,8 @@ void * tls_init(const struct tls_config *conf) + SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); + SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3); + ++ SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); ++ + #ifdef SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN + /* Number of deployed use cases assume the default OpenSSL behavior of + * auto chaining the local certificate is in use. BoringSSL removed this +@@ -4543,10 +4545,18 @@ struct wpabuf * tls_connection_decrypt(void *tls_ctx, + return NULL; + res = SSL_read(conn->ssl, wpabuf_mhead(buf), wpabuf_size(buf)); + if (res < 0) { +- tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, +- "Decryption failed - SSL_read"); +- wpabuf_free(buf); +- return NULL; ++ int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl, res); ++ ++ if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "SSL: SSL_connect - want more data"); ++ res = 0; ++ } else { ++ tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, ++ "Decryption failed - SSL_read"); ++ wpabuf_free(buf); ++ return NULL; ++ } + } + wpabuf_put(buf, res); + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +index 7c3704369..a13428d37 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +@@ -803,6 +803,10 @@ static int eap_peap_decrypt(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data, + res = eap_peer_tls_decrypt(sm, &data->ssl, in_data, &in_decrypted); + if (res) + return res; ++ if (wpabuf_len(in_decrypted) == 0) { ++ wpabuf_free(in_decrypted); ++ return 1; ++ } + + continue_req: + wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Decrypted Phase 2 EAP", +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c +index 642d179c6..3bf1e97e6 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_ttls.c +@@ -1441,6 +1441,7 @@ static int eap_ttls_decrypt(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_ttls_data *data, + + if ((in_data == NULL || wpabuf_len(in_data) == 0) && + data->phase2_start) { ++start: + return eap_ttls_phase2_start(sm, data, ret, identifier, + out_data); + } +@@ -1455,6 +1456,10 @@ static int eap_ttls_decrypt(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_ttls_data *data, + retval = eap_peer_tls_decrypt(sm, &data->ssl, in_data, &in_decrypted); + if (retval) + goto done; ++ if (wpabuf_len(in_decrypted) == 0) { ++ wpabuf_free(in_decrypted); ++ goto start; ++ } + + continue_req: + data->phase2_start = 0; +-- +2.31.1 + diff --git a/0001-OpenSSL-Allow-systemwide-secpolicy-overrides-for-TLS.patch b/0001-OpenSSL-Allow-systemwide-secpolicy-overrides-for-TLS.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fafabbd --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-OpenSSL-Allow-systemwide-secpolicy-overrides-for-TLS.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From 9afb68b03976d019bb450e5e33b0d8e48867691c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <9afb68b03976d019bb450e5e33b0d8e48867691c.1626202922.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 17:55:36 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] OpenSSL: Allow systemwide secpolicy overrides for TLS version + +Explicit configuration to enable TLS v1.0 and/or v1.1 did not work with +systemwide OpenSSL secpolicy=2 cases (e.g., Ubuntu 20.04). Allow such +systemwide configuration to be overridden if the older TLS versions have +been explicitly enabled in the network profile. The default behavior +follows the systemwide policy, but this allows compatibility with old +authentication servers without having to touch the systemwide policy. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +index e73dd7f5b..f7dfecbbf 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +@@ -2995,16 +2995,12 @@ static int tls_set_conn_flags(struct tls_connection *conn, unsigned int flags, + + /* Explicit request to enable TLS versions even if needing to + * override systemwide policies. */ +- if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0) { ++ if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0) + version = TLS1_VERSION; +- } else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1) { +- if (!(flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_0)) +- version = TLS1_1_VERSION; +- } else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_2) { +- if (!(flags & (TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_0 | +- TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_1))) +- version = TLS1_2_VERSION; +- } ++ else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1) ++ version = TLS1_1_VERSION; ++ else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_2) ++ version = TLS1_2_VERSION; + if (!version) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, + "OpenSSL: Invalid TLS version configuration"); +@@ -3018,6 +3014,18 @@ static int tls_set_conn_flags(struct tls_connection *conn, unsigned int flags, + } + } + #endif /* >= 1.1.0 */ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && \ ++ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ ++ !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) ++ if ((flags & (TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0 | TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1)) && ++ SSL_get_security_level(ssl) >= 2) { ++ /* ++ * Need to drop to security level 1 to allow TLS versions older ++ * than 1.2 to be used when explicitly enabled in configuration. ++ */ ++ SSL_set_security_level(conn->ssl, 1); ++ } ++#endif + + #ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB + #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL +-- +2.31.1 + diff --git a/0001-WPS-UPnP-Do-not-allow-event-subscriptions-with-URLs-.patch b/0001-WPS-UPnP-Do-not-allow-event-subscriptions-with-URLs-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0aa8a5e --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-WPS-UPnP-Do-not-allow-event-subscriptions-with-URLs-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +From 5b78c8f961f25f4dc22d6f2b77ddd06d712cec63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2020 23:17:35 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] WPS UPnP: Do not allow event subscriptions with URLs to + other networks + +The UPnP Device Architecture 2.0 specification errata ("UDA errata +16-04-2020.docx") addresses a problem with notifications being allowed +to go out to other domains by disallowing such cases. Do such filtering +for the notification callback URLs to avoid undesired connections to +external networks based on subscriptions that any device in the local +network could request when WPS support for external registrars is +enabled (the upnp_iface parameter in hostapd configuration). + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/wps/wps_er.c | 2 +- + src/wps/wps_upnp.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h | 3 ++- + 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/wps/wps_er.c b/src/wps/wps_er.c +index 6bded14327f8..31d2e50e4cff 100644 +--- a/src/wps/wps_er.c ++++ b/src/wps/wps_er.c +@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@ wps_er_init(struct wps_context *wps, const char *ifname, const char *filter) + "with %s", filter); + } + if (get_netif_info(er->ifname, &er->ip_addr, &er->ip_addr_text, +- er->mac_addr)) { ++ NULL, er->mac_addr)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS UPnP: Could not get IP/MAC address " + "for %s. Does it have IP address?", er->ifname); + wps_er_deinit(er, NULL, NULL); +diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c +index 6e10e4bc0c3f..7d4b7439940e 100644 +--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c ++++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c +@@ -303,6 +303,14 @@ static void subscr_addr_free_all(struct subscription *s) + } + + ++static int local_network_addr(struct upnp_wps_device_sm *sm, ++ struct sockaddr_in *addr) ++{ ++ return (addr->sin_addr.s_addr & sm->netmask.s_addr) == ++ (sm->ip_addr & sm->netmask.s_addr); ++} ++ ++ + /* subscr_addr_add_url -- add address(es) for one url to subscription */ + static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url, + size_t url_len) +@@ -381,6 +389,7 @@ static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url, + + for (rp = result; rp; rp = rp->ai_next) { + struct subscr_addr *a; ++ struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) rp->ai_addr; + + /* Limit no. of address to avoid denial of service attack */ + if (dl_list_len(&s->addr_list) >= MAX_ADDR_PER_SUBSCRIPTION) { +@@ -389,6 +398,13 @@ static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url, + break; + } + ++ if (!local_network_addr(s->sm, addr)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "WPS UPnP: Ignore a delivery URL that points to another network %s", ++ inet_ntoa(addr->sin_addr)); ++ continue; ++ } ++ + a = os_zalloc(sizeof(*a) + alloc_len); + if (a == NULL) + break; +@@ -890,11 +906,12 @@ static int eth_get(const char *device, u8 ea[ETH_ALEN]) + * @net_if: Selected network interface name + * @ip_addr: Buffer for returning IP address in network byte order + * @ip_addr_text: Buffer for returning a pointer to allocated IP address text ++ * @netmask: Buffer for returning netmask or %NULL if not needed + * @mac: Buffer for returning MAC address + * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure + */ + int get_netif_info(const char *net_if, unsigned *ip_addr, char **ip_addr_text, +- u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]) ++ struct in_addr *netmask, u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]) + { + struct ifreq req; + int sock = -1; +@@ -920,6 +937,19 @@ int get_netif_info(const char *net_if, unsigned *ip_addr, char **ip_addr_text, + in_addr.s_addr = *ip_addr; + os_snprintf(*ip_addr_text, 16, "%s", inet_ntoa(in_addr)); + ++ if (netmask) { ++ os_memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req)); ++ os_strlcpy(req.ifr_name, net_if, sizeof(req.ifr_name)); ++ if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFNETMASK, &req) < 0) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "WPS UPnP: SIOCGIFNETMASK failed: %d (%s)", ++ errno, strerror(errno)); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) &req.ifr_netmask; ++ netmask->s_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr; ++ } ++ + #ifdef __linux__ + os_strlcpy(req.ifr_name, net_if, sizeof(req.ifr_name)); + if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &req) < 0) { +@@ -1026,11 +1056,15 @@ static int upnp_wps_device_start(struct upnp_wps_device_sm *sm, char *net_if) + + /* Determine which IP and mac address we're using */ + if (get_netif_info(net_if, &sm->ip_addr, &sm->ip_addr_text, +- sm->mac_addr)) { ++ &sm->netmask, sm->mac_addr)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS UPnP: Could not get IP/MAC address " + "for %s. Does it have IP address?", net_if); + goto fail; + } ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPS UPnP: Local IP address %s netmask %s hwaddr " ++ MACSTR, ++ sm->ip_addr_text, inet_ntoa(sm->netmask), ++ MAC2STR(sm->mac_addr)); + + /* Listen for incoming TCP connections so that others + * can fetch our "xml files" from us. +diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h b/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h +index e87a93232df1..6ead7b4e9a30 100644 +--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h ++++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h +@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct upnp_wps_device_sm { + u8 mac_addr[ETH_ALEN]; /* mac addr of network i.f. we use */ + char *ip_addr_text; /* IP address of network i.f. we use */ + unsigned ip_addr; /* IP address of network i.f. we use (host order) */ ++ struct in_addr netmask; + int multicast_sd; /* send multicast messages over this socket */ + int ssdp_sd; /* receive discovery UPD packets on socket */ + int ssdp_sd_registered; /* nonzero if we must unregister */ +@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ struct subscription * subscription_find(struct upnp_wps_device_sm *sm, + const u8 uuid[UUID_LEN]); + void subscr_addr_delete(struct subscr_addr *a); + int get_netif_info(const char *net_if, unsigned *ip_addr, char **ip_addr_text, +- u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]); ++ struct in_addr *netmask, u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]); + + /* wps_upnp_ssdp.c */ + void msearchreply_state_machine_stop(struct advertisement_state_machine *a); +-- +2.20.1 + diff --git a/0001-openssl-Disable-padding-after-initializing-the-ciphe.patch b/0001-openssl-Disable-padding-after-initializing-the-ciphe.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c1329d --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-openssl-Disable-padding-after-initializing-the-ciphe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From e2e9adc3d9b6bb9c433ebb6404ee439b42e91746 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: +From: Davide Caratti +Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 10:58:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] openssl: Disable padding after initializing the cipher suite + +according to OpenSSL documentation [1], EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() +should be called after EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), or +EVP_CipherInit_ex(). Not doing this causes EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() +to return false on OpenSSL-3.0.0, resulting in the impossibility to +connect in many scenarios. Fix this changing the order of function calls +where needed. + +[1] https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding.html + +Reported-by: Vladimir Benes +Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti +--- + src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c +index 9411cb9cf..4b87702e4 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c +@@ -248,8 +248,8 @@ int rc4_skip(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, size_t skip, + + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (!ctx || +- !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) || + !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) || ++ !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) || + !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, keylen) || + !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, 1)) + goto out; +@@ -709,8 +709,8 @@ struct crypto_cipher * crypto_cipher_init(enum crypto_cipher_alg alg, + } + + if (!(ctx->enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) || +- !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->enc, 0) || + !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->enc, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) || ++ !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->enc, 0) || + !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx->enc, key_len) || + !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->enc, NULL, NULL, key, iv)) { + if (ctx->enc) +@@ -720,8 +720,8 @@ struct crypto_cipher * crypto_cipher_init(enum crypto_cipher_alg alg, + } + + if (!(ctx->dec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) || +- !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->dec, 0) || + !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx->dec, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) || ++ !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->dec, 0) || + !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx->dec, key_len) || + !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx->dec, NULL, NULL, key, iv)) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->enc); +-- +2.31.1 + diff --git a/0001-openssl-Remove-deprecated-functions-from-des_encrypt.patch b/0001-openssl-Remove-deprecated-functions-from-des_encrypt.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85f1a0a --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-openssl-Remove-deprecated-functions-from-des_encrypt.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From d265dd2d965db3669d07caa69539beb8def0edb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: +From: Davide Caratti +Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 10:58:54 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] openssl: Remove deprecated functions from des_encrypt() + +NetworkManager-CI detected systematic failures on test scenarios using +MSCHAPv2 when wpa_supplicant uses OpenSSL-3.0.0. +The 'test_module_tests.py' script also fails, and the following log is +shown: + + 1627404013.761569: generate_nt_response failed + 1627404013.761582: ms_funcs: 1 error + +It seems that either DES_set_key() or DES_ecb_encrypt() changed their +semantic, but it doesn't make sense to fix them since their use has been +deprecated. Converting des_encrypt() to avoid use of deprecated +functions proved to fix the problem, and removed a couple of build +warnings at the same time. + +Reported-by: Vladimir Benes +Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti +--- + src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c +index a4b1083bb..9411cb9cf 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c +@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int md4_vector(size_t num_elem, const u8 *addr[], const size_t *len, u8 *mac) + int des_encrypt(const u8 *clear, const u8 *key, u8 *cypher) + { + u8 pkey[8], next, tmp; +- int i; +- DES_key_schedule ks; ++ int i, plen, ret = -1; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + + /* Add parity bits to the key */ + next = 0; +@@ -218,10 +218,19 @@ int des_encrypt(const u8 *clear, const u8 *key, u8 *cypher) + } + pkey[i] = next | 1; + +- DES_set_key((DES_cblock *) &pkey, &ks); +- DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *) clear, (DES_cblock *) cypher, &ks, +- DES_ENCRYPT); +- return 0; ++ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ if (ctx && ++ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ecb(), NULL, pkey, NULL) == 1 && ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) == 1 && ++ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, cypher, &plen, clear, 8) == 1 && ++ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, &cypher[plen], &plen) == 1) ++ ret = 0; ++ else ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "OpenSSL: DES encrypt failed"); ++ ++ if (ctx) ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); ++ return ret; + } + + +-- +2.31.1 + diff --git a/0002-WPS-UPnP-Fix-event-message-generation-using-a-long-U.patch b/0002-WPS-UPnP-Fix-event-message-generation-using-a-long-U.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c7a449e --- /dev/null +++ b/0002-WPS-UPnP-Fix-event-message-generation-using-a-long-U.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From f7d268864a2660b7239b9a8ff5ad37faeeb751ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2020 22:41:02 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] WPS UPnP: Fix event message generation using a long URL + path + +More than about 700 character URL ended up overflowing the wpabuf used +for building the event notification and this resulted in the wpabuf +buffer overflow checks terminating the hostapd process. Fix this by +allocating the buffer to be large enough to contain the full URL path. +However, since that around 700 character limit has been the practical +limit for more than ten years, start explicitly enforcing that as the +limit or the callback URLs since any longer ones had not worked before +and there is no need to enable them now either. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/wps/wps_upnp.c | 9 +++++++-- + src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c | 3 ++- + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c +index 7d4b7439940e..ab685d52ecab 100644 +--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp.c ++++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c +@@ -328,9 +328,14 @@ static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url, + int rerr; + size_t host_len, path_len; + +- /* url MUST begin with http: */ +- if (url_len < 7 || os_strncasecmp(url, "http://", 7)) ++ /* URL MUST begin with HTTP scheme. In addition, limit the length of ++ * the URL to 700 characters which is around the limit that was ++ * implicitly enforced for more than 10 years due to a bug in ++ * generating the event messages. */ ++ if (url_len < 7 || os_strncasecmp(url, "http://", 7) || url_len > 700) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPS UPnP: Reject an unacceptable URL"); + goto fail; ++ } + url += 7; + url_len -= 7; + +diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c +index d7e6edcc6503..08a23612f338 100644 +--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c ++++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c +@@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ static struct wpabuf * event_build_message(struct wps_event_ *e) + struct wpabuf *buf; + char *b; + +- buf = wpabuf_alloc(1000 + wpabuf_len(e->data)); ++ buf = wpabuf_alloc(1000 + os_strlen(e->addr->path) + ++ wpabuf_len(e->data)); + if (buf == NULL) + return NULL; + wpabuf_printf(buf, "NOTIFY %s HTTP/1.1\r\n", e->addr->path); +-- +2.20.1 + diff --git a/0003-WPS-UPnP-Handle-HTTP-initiation-failures-for-events-.patch b/0003-WPS-UPnP-Handle-HTTP-initiation-failures-for-events-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d03760 --- /dev/null +++ b/0003-WPS-UPnP-Handle-HTTP-initiation-failures-for-events-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 85aac526af8612c21b3117dadc8ef5944985b476 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 21:24:04 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] WPS UPnP: Handle HTTP initiation failures for events more + properly + +While it is appropriate to try to retransmit the event to another +callback URL on a failure to initiate the HTTP client connection, there +is no point in trying the exact same operation multiple times in a row. +Replve the event_retry() calls with event_addr_failure() for these cases +to avoid busy loops trying to repeat the same failing operation. + +These potential busy loops would go through eloop callbacks, so the +process is not completely stuck on handling them, but unnecessary CPU +would be used to process the continues retries that will keep failing +for the same reason. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c +index 08a23612f338..c0d9e41d9a38 100644 +--- a/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c ++++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c +@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static int event_send_start(struct subscription *s) + + buf = event_build_message(e); + if (buf == NULL) { +- event_retry(e, 0); ++ event_addr_failure(e); + return -1; + } + +@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int event_send_start(struct subscription *s) + event_http_cb, e); + if (e->http_event == NULL) { + wpabuf_free(buf); +- event_retry(e, 0); ++ event_addr_failure(e); + return -1; + } + +-- +2.20.1 +