Ryan O'Hara
parent
c9ad76e1f2
commit
473988d9ab
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@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
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From 2c681c6f30fb90adab4701e287ff7a7db669b2e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
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Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2022 09:47:01 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h2: Refuse interim responses with end-stream
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flag set
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As state in RFC9113#8.1, HEADERS frame with the ES flag set that carries an
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informational status code is malformed. However, there is no test on this
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condition.
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On 2.4 and higher, it is hard to predict consequences of this bug because
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end of the message is only reported with a flag. But on 2.2 and lower, it
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leads to a crash because there is an unexpected extra EOM block at the end
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of an interim response.
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Now, when a ES flag is detected on a HEADERS frame for an interim message, a
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stream error is sent (RST_STREAM/PROTOCOL_ERROR).
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This patch should solve the issue #1972. It should be backported as far as
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2.0.
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(cherry picked from commit 827a6299e6995c5c3ba620d8b7cbacdaef67f2c4)
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Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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(cherry picked from commit ebfae006c6b5de1d1fe0cdd51847ec1e39d5cf59)
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Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
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(cherry picked from commit 84f5cba24f59b1c8339bb38323fcb01f434ba8e5)
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Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
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(cherry picked from commit f5748a98c34bc889cae9386ca4f7073ab3f4c6b1)
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Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
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---
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src/mux_h2.c | 5 +++++
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1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c
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index 7d23e5abd..7dbbfefec 100644
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--- a/src/mux_h2.c
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+++ b/src/mux_h2.c
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@@ -4942,6 +4942,11 @@ static int h2c_decode_headers(struct h2c *h2c, struct buffer *rxbuf, uint32_t *f
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*flags |= H2_SF_HEADERS_RCVD;
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if (h2c->dff & H2_F_HEADERS_END_STREAM) {
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+ if (msgf & H2_MSGF_RSP_1XX) {
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+ /* RFC9113#8.1 : HEADERS frame with the ES flag set that carries an informational status code is malformed */
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+ TRACE_STATE("invalid interim response with ES flag!", H2_EV_RX_FRAME|H2_EV_RX_HDR|H2_EV_H2C_ERR|H2_EV_PROTO_ERR, h2c->conn);
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+ goto fail;
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+ }
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/* no more data are expected for this message */
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htx->flags |= HTX_FL_EOM;
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}
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--
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2.37.3
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@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
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From 486cd730485c8a119ef65b3f792134b56e7941b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2023 21:36:54 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] BUG/CRITICAL: http: properly reject empty http header field
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names
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The HTTP header parsers surprizingly accepts empty header field names,
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and this is a leftover from the original code that was agnostic to this.
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When muxes were introduced, for H2 first, the HPACK decompressor needed
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to feed headers lists, and since empty header names were strictly
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forbidden by the protocol, the lists of headers were purposely designed
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to be terminated by an empty header field name (a principle that is
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similar to H1's empty line termination). This principle was preserved
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and generalized to other protocols migrated to muxes (H1/FCGI/H3 etc)
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without anyone ever noticing that the H1 parser was still able to deliver
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empty header field names to this list. In addition to this it turns out
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that the HPACK decompressor, despite a comment in the code, may
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successfully decompress an empty header field name, and this mistake
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was propagated to the QPACK decompressor as well.
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The impact is that an empty header field name may be used to truncate
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the list of headers and thus make some headers disappear. While for
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H2/H3 the impact is limited as haproxy sees a request with missing
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headers, and headers are not used to delimit messages, in the case of
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HTTP/1, the impact is significant because the presence (and sometimes
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contents) of certain sensitive headers is detected during the parsing.
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Thus, some of these headers may be seen, marked as present, their value
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extracted, but never delivered to upper layers and obviously not
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forwarded to the other side either. This can have for consequence that
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certain important header fields such as Connection, Upgrade, Host,
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Content-length, Transfer-Encoding etc are possibly seen as different
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between what haproxy uses to parse/forward/route and what is observed
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in http-request rules and of course, forwarded. One direct consequence
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is that it is possible to exploit this property in HTTP/1 to make
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affected versions of haproxy forward more data than is advertised on
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the other side, and bypass some access controls or routing rules by
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crafting extraneous requests. Note, however, that responses to such
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requests will normally not be passed back to the client, but this can
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still cause some harm.
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This specific risk can be mostly worked around in configuration using
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the following rule that will rely on the bug's impact to precisely
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detect the inconsistency between the known body size and the one
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expected to be advertised to the server (the rule works from 2.0 to
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2.8-dev):
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http-request deny if { fc_http_major 1 } !{ req.body_size 0 } !{ req.hdr(content-length) -m found } !{ req.hdr(transfer-encoding) -m found } !{ method CONNECT }
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This will exclusively block such carefully crafted requests delivered
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over HTTP/1. HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 do not need content-length, and a body
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that arrives without being announced with a content-length will be
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forwarded using transfer-encoding, hence will not cause discrepancies.
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In HAProxy 2.0 in legacy mode ("no option http-use-htx"), this rule will
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simply have no effect but will not cause trouble either.
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A clean solution would consist in modifying the loops iterating over
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these headers lists to check the header name's pointer instead of its
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length (since both are zero at the end of the list), but this requires
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to touch tens of places and it's very easy to miss one. Functions such
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as htx_add_header(), htx_add_trailer(), htx_add_all_headers() would be
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good starting points for such a possible future change.
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Instead the current fix focuses on blocking empty headers where they
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are first inserted, hence in the H1/HPACK/QPACK decoders. One benefit
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of the current solution (for H1) is that it allows "show errors" to
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report a precise diagnostic when facing such invalid HTTP/1 requests,
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with the exact location of the problem and the originating address:
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$ printf "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\n:empty header\r\n\r\n" | nc 0 8001
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HTTP/1.1 400 Bad request
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Content-length: 90
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Cache-Control: no-cache
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Connection: close
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Content-Type: text/html
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<html><body><h1>400 Bad request</h1>
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Your browser sent an invalid request.
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</body></html>
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$ socat /var/run/haproxy.stat <<< "show errors"
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Total events captured on [10/Feb/2023:16:29:37.530] : 1
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[10/Feb/2023:16:29:34.155] frontend decrypt (#2): invalid request
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backend <NONE> (#-1), server <NONE> (#-1), event #0, src 127.0.0.1:31092
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buffer starts at 0 (including 0 out), 16334 free,
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len 50, wraps at 16336, error at position 33
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H1 connection flags 0x00000000, H1 stream flags 0x00000810
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H1 msg state MSG_HDR_NAME(17), H1 msg flags 0x00001410
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H1 chunk len 0 bytes, H1 body len 0 bytes :
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00000 GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
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00016 Host: localhost\r\n
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00033 :empty header\r\n
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00048 \r\n
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I want to address sincere and warm thanks for their great work to the
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team composed of the following security researchers who found the issue
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together and reported it: Bahruz Jabiyev, Anthony Gavazzi, and Engin
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Kirda from Northeastern University, Kaan Onarlioglu from Akamai
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Technologies, Adi Peleg and Harvey Tuch from Google. And kudos to Amaury
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Denoyelle from HAProxy Technologies for spotting that the HPACK and
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QPACK decoders would let this pass despite the comment explicitly
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saying otherwise.
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This fix must be backported as far as 2.0. The QPACK changes can be
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dropped before 2.6. In 2.0 there is also the equivalent code for legacy
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mode, which doesn't suffer from the list truncation, but it would better
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be fixed regardless.
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CVE-2023-25725 was assigned to this issue.
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(cherry picked from commit a8598a2eb11b6c989e81f0dbf10be361782e8d32)
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Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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(cherry picked from commit a0e561ad7f29ed50c473f5a9da664267b60d1112)
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Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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(cherry picked from commit 73be199c4f5f1ed468161a4c5e10ca77cd5989d8)
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[wt: dropped QPACK changes for 2.5]
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Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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(cherry picked from commit f8b2b88aeae15dc3b261cd3749277ae75caf9db8)
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Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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---
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src/h1.c | 4 ++++
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src/hpack-dec.c | 9 +++++++++
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2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/h1.c b/src/h1.c
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index 4c2e234c5..73de48be0 100644
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--- a/src/h1.c
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+++ b/src/h1.c
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@@ -750,6 +750,10 @@ int h1_headers_to_hdr_list(char *start, const char *stop,
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if (likely(*ptr == ':')) {
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col = ptr - start;
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+ if (col <= sol) {
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+ state = H1_MSG_HDR_NAME;
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+ goto http_msg_invalid;
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+ }
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EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_l1_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L1_SP);
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}
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diff --git a/src/hpack-dec.c b/src/hpack-dec.c
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index 04f3d9ffa..ed39007d1 100644
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--- a/src/hpack-dec.c
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+++ b/src/hpack-dec.c
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@@ -420,6 +420,15 @@ int hpack_decode_frame(struct hpack_dht *dht, const uint8_t *raw, uint32_t len,
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/* <name> and <value> are correctly filled here */
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}
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+ /* We must not accept empty header names (forbidden by the spec and used
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+ * as a list termination).
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+ */
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+ if (!name.len) {
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+ hpack_debug_printf("##ERR@%d##\n", __LINE__);
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+ ret = -HPACK_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
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+ goto leave;
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+ }
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+
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/* here's what we have here :
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* - name.len > 0
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* - value is filled with either const data or data allocated from tmp
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--
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2.37.3
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@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
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From 0c86fce8028d409de4181e82eec967cfb1e6268e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Youfu Zhang <zhangyoufu@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 19:15:48 +0800
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Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MAJOR: fcgi: Fix uninitialized reserved bytes
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The output buffer is not zero-initialized. If we don't clear reserved
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bytes, fcgi requests sent to backend will leak sensitive data.
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This patch must be backported as far as 2.2.
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(cherry picked from commit 2e6bf0a2722866ae0128a4392fa2375bd1f03ff8)
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Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
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(cherry picked from commit db03179fee55c60a92ce6b86a0f04dbb9ba0328b)
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Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
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(cherry picked from commit f988992d16f45ef03d5bbb024a1042ed8123e4c5)
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Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
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(cherry picked from commit 0dc4cdc276d4a0e3347b7c3c4aedca2a2e0ab428)
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Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
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---
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src/fcgi.c | 8 ++++++--
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/fcgi.c b/src/fcgi.c
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index 1c2543def..778ce9e25 100644
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--- a/src/fcgi.c
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+++ b/src/fcgi.c
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@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ int fcgi_encode_record_hdr(struct buffer *out, const struct fcgi_header *h)
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out->area[len++] = ((h->len >> 8) & 0xff);
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out->area[len++] = (h->len & 0xff);
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out->area[len++] = h->padding;
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- len++; /* rsv */
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+ out->area[len++] = 0; /* rsv */
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out->data = len;
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return 1;
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@@ -94,7 +94,11 @@ int fcgi_encode_begin_request(struct buffer *out, const struct fcgi_begin_reques
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out->area[len++] = ((r->role >> 8) & 0xff);
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out->area[len++] = (r->role & 0xff);
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out->area[len++] = r->flags;
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- len += 5; /* rsv */
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+ out->area[len++] = 0; /* rsv */
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+ out->area[len++] = 0;
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+ out->area[len++] = 0;
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+ out->area[len++] = 0;
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+ out->area[len++] = 0;
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out->data = len;
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return 1;
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--
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2.39.2
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14
haproxy.spec
14
haproxy.spec
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|
@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
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%global _hardened_build 1
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Name: haproxy
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Version: 2.4.17
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Release: 7%{?dist}
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Version: 2.4.22
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Release: 1%{?dist}
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Summary: HAProxy reverse proxy for high availability environments
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License: GPLv2+
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|
@ -22,10 +22,6 @@ Source4: %{name}.sysconfig
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Source5: %{name}.sysusers
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Source6: halog.1
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Patch0: bz2161140-refuse-response-end-stream-flag.patch
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Patch1: bz2169510-reject-empty-http-header-fields.patch
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Patch2: bz2180861-fcgi-fix-uninitialized-reserved-bytes.patch
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BuildRequires: gcc
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BuildRequires: lua-devel
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BuildRequires: pcre2-devel
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|
@ -54,9 +50,6 @@ availability environments. Indeed, it can:
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%prep
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%setup -q
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%patch0 -p1
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%patch1 -p1
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%patch2 -p1
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%build
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regparm_opts=
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@ -139,6 +132,9 @@ done
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%{_sysusersdir}/%{name}.conf
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%changelog
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* Tue Jun 06 2023 Ryan O'Hara <rohara@redhat.com> - 2.4.22-1
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- Update to 2.4.22 (#2196530)
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* Tue May 02 2023 Ryan O'Hara <rohara@redhat.com> - 2.4.17-7
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- Fix uninitizalized resevered bytes (CVE-2023-0836, #2180861)
|
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|
|
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2
sources
2
sources
|
|
@ -1 +1 @@
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SHA512 (haproxy-2.4.17.tar.gz) = 98d46b6dbafd95977a32a6479266f3b9fe6e6ed57e39182a3d031add60dabfdaa7494083109a75eaa3e4b15d0293b11081f9b06556eee1777ede40ed6c002a7f
|
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SHA512 (haproxy-2.4.22.tar.gz) = c22ad38046e3c70beb3bf57a62e4e74db329559059e2f36d2f801768c26b1f1222631702e83e9839fab4396c1b78089a807750ff743b4192da06c751cf9f0779
|
||||
|
|
|
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Loading…
Reference in New Issue