81 lines
3.1 KiB
Diff
81 lines
3.1 KiB
Diff
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
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Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2022 09:31:43 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c: do not validate
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chainloader twice
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On secureboot systems, with shimlock verifier, call to
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grub_file_open(, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_EFI_CHAINLOADED_IMAGE) will already
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pass the chainloader target through shim-lock protocol verify
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call. And create a TPM measurement. If verification fails,
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grub_cmd_chainloader will fail at file open time.
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This makes previous code paths for negative, and zero return codes
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from grub_linuxefi_secure_validate unreachable under secureboot. But
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also breaking measurements compatibility with 2.04+linuxefi codebases,
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as the chainloader file is passed through shim_lock->verify() twice
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(via verifier & direct call to grub_linuxefi_secure_validate)
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extending the PCRs twice.
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This reduces grub_loader options to perform
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grub_secureboot_chainloader when secureboot is on, and otherwise
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attempt grub_chainloader_boot.
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It means that booting with secureboot off, yet still with shim (which
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always verifies things successfully), will stop choosing
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grub_secureboot_chainloader, and opting for a more regular
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loadimage/startimage codepath. If we want to use the
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grub_secureboot_chainloader codepath in such scenarios we should adapt
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the code to simply check for shim_lock protocol presence /
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shim_lock->context() success?! But I am not sure if that is necessary.
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This patch must not be ported to older editions of grub code bases
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that do not have verifiers framework, or it is not builtin, or
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shim-lock-verifier is an optional module.
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Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
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---
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grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c | 8 ++------
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
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index 3af6b12292..644cd2e56f 100644
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--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
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+++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
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@@ -906,7 +906,6 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
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grub_efi_device_path_t *dp = 0;
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char *filename;
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void *boot_image = 0;
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- int rc;
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if (argc == 0)
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return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("filename expected"));
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@@ -1082,9 +1081,7 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
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orig_dev = 0;
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}
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- rc = grub_linuxefi_secure_validate((void *)(unsigned long)address, fsize);
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- grub_dprintf ("chain", "linuxefi_secure_validate: %d\n", rc);
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- if (rc > 0)
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+ if (grub_efi_get_secureboot () == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
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{
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grub_file_close (file);
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grub_device_close (dev);
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@@ -1092,7 +1089,7 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
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grub_secureboot_chainloader_unload, 0);
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return 0;
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}
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- else if (rc == 0)
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+ else
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{
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grub_load_and_start_image(boot_image);
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grub_file_close (file);
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@@ -1101,7 +1098,6 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
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return 0;
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}
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- // -1 fall-through to fail
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fail:
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if (orig_dev)
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