import from CS git grub2-2.02-158.el8

Import from AlmaLinux stable repository
import grub2-2.02-148.el8
2024-11-05 09:04:39 +00:00 · 2024-05-31 17:42:19 +00:00 · 2023-05-17 01:36:51 +00:00 · 2023-02-21 10:05:24 +00:00
30 changed files with 1756 additions and 17 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
 SOURCES/grub-2.02.tar.xz
+SOURCES/redhatsecureboot301.cer
+SOURCES/redhatsecureboot502.cer
+SOURCES/redhatsecureboot601.cer
+SOURCES/redhatsecureboot701.cer
+SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca3.cer
+SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca5.cer
 SOURCES/theme.tar.bz2
-SOURCES/unifont-5.1.20080820.pcf.gz
+SOURCES/unifont-5.1.20080820.pcf.gz
--- a/.grub2.metadata
+++ b/.grub2.metadata
@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
 3d7eb6eaab28b88cb969ba9ab24af959f4d1b178 SOURCES/grub-2.02.tar.xz
+4a07b56e28741884b86da6ac91f8f9929541a1e4 SOURCES/redhatsecureboot301.cer
+3f94c47f1d08bacc7cb29bdd912e286b8d2f6fcf SOURCES/redhatsecureboot502.cer
+039357ef97aab3e484d1119edd4528156f5859e6 SOURCES/redhatsecureboot601.cer
+e89890ca0ded2f9058651cc5fa838b78db2e6cc2 SOURCES/redhatsecureboot701.cer
+cf9230e69000076727e5b784ec871d22716dc5da SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca3.cer
+e6f506462069aa17d2e8610503635c20f3a995c3 SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca5.cer
 cf0b7763c528902da7e8b05cfa248f20c8825ce5 SOURCES/theme.tar.bz2
 87f8600ba24e521b5d20bdf6c4b71af8ae861e3a SOURCES/unifont-5.1.20080820.pcf.gz
--- a/SOURCES/0574-Enable-TDX-measurement-to-RTMR-register.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0574-Enable-TDX-measurement-to-RTMR-register.patch
@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
+Date: Sat, 3 Jul 2021 10:50:37 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Enable TDX measurement to RTMR register
+
+Intel Trust Domain Extensions(Intel TDX) refers to an Intel technology
+that extends Virtual Machine Extensions(VMX) and Multi-Key Total Memory
+Encryption(MK-TME) with a new kind of virtual machine guest called a
+Trust Domain(TD)[1]. A TD runs in a CPU mode that protects the confidentiality
+of its memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including
+the hosting Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM).
+
+Trust Domain Virtual Firmware (TDVF) is required to provide TD services to
+the TD guest OS.[2] Its reference code is available at https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF.
+
+To support TD measurement/attestation, TDs provide 4 RTMR registers like
+TPM/TPM2 PCR as below:
+- RTMR[0] is for TDVF configuration
+- RTMR[1] is for the TD OS loader and kernel
+- RTMR[2] is for the OS application
+- RTMR[3] is reserved for special usage only
+
+This patch adds TD Measurement protocol support along with TPM/TPM2 protocol.
+
+References:
+[1] https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-whitepaper-v4.pdf
+[2] https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.pdf
+
+Signed-off-by: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 841a0977397cf12a5498d439b8aaf8bf28ff8544)
+---
+ grub-core/Makefile.core.def |  1 +
+ grub-core/kern/efi/tdx.c    | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/tpm.c        |  4 +++
+ include/grub/efi/tdx.h      | 26 +++++++++++++++++
+ include/grub/tdx.h          | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 5 files changed, 137 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/efi/tdx.c
+ create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/tdx.h
+ create mode 100644 include/grub/tdx.h
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+index 637d7203e3..2787d59c52 100644
+--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ kernel = {
+   efi = kern/efi/acpi.c;
+   efi = kern/lockdown.c;
+   efi = lib/envblk.c;
+  efi = kern/efi/tdx.c;
+   efi = kern/efi/tpm.c;
+   i386_coreboot = kern/i386/pc/acpi.c;
+   i386_multiboot = kern/i386/pc/acpi.c;
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/tdx.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/tdx.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..3a49f8d117
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/tdx.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/efi/api.h>
+#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
+#include <grub/efi/tpm.h>
+#include <grub/efi/tdx.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/tpm.h>
+#include <grub/tdx.h>
+
+static grub_efi_guid_t tdx_guid = EFI_TDX_GUID;
+
+static inline grub_err_t grub_tdx_dprintf(grub_efi_status_t status)
+{
+  switch (status) {
+  case GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS:
+    return 0;
+  case GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
+    grub_dprintf ("tdx", "Command failed: 0x%"PRIxGRUB_EFI_STATUS"\n",
+                  status);
+    return GRUB_ERR_IO;
+  case GRUB_EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
+    grub_dprintf ("tdx", "Invalid parameter: 0x%"PRIxGRUB_EFI_STATUS"\n",
+                  status);
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+  case GRUB_EFI_VOLUME_FULL:
+    grub_dprintf ("tdx", "Volume is full: 0x%"PRIxGRUB_EFI_STATUS"\n",
+                  status);
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+  case GRUB_EFI_UNSUPPORTED:
+    grub_dprintf ("tdx", "TDX unavailable: 0x%"PRIxGRUB_EFI_STATUS"\n",
+                  status);
+    return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE;
+  default:
+    grub_dprintf ("tdx", "Unknown TDX error: 0x%"PRIxGRUB_EFI_STATUS"\n",
+                  status);
+    return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE;
+  }
+}
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tdx_log_event(unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size, grub_uint8_t pcr,
+		   const char *description)
+{
+  EFI_TCG2_EVENT *event;
+  grub_efi_status_t status;
+  grub_efi_tdx_protocol_t *tdx;
+
+  tdx = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&tdx_guid, NULL);
+
+  if (!tdx)
+    return 0;
+
+  event = grub_zalloc(sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) + grub_strlen(description) + 1);
+  if (!event)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+		       N_("cannot allocate TCG2 event buffer"));
+
+  event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof(EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER);
+  event->Header.HeaderVersion = 1;
+  event->Header.PCRIndex = pcr;
+  event->Header.EventType = EV_IPL;
+  event->Size = sizeof(*event) - sizeof(event->Event) + grub_strlen(description) + 1;
+  grub_memcpy(event->Event, description, grub_strlen(description) + 1);
+
+  status = efi_call_5 (tdx->hash_log_extend_event, tdx, 0, (unsigned long) buf,
+		       (grub_uint64_t) size, event);
+
+  return grub_tdx_dprintf(status);
+}
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/tpm.c b/grub-core/kern/tpm.c
+index e5e8fced62..71cc4252c1 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/tpm.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/tpm.c
+@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
+ #include <grub/mm.h>
+ #include <grub/tpm.h>
+ #include <grub/term.h>
+#include <grub/tdx.h>
+ 
+ grub_err_t
+ grub_tpm_measure (unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size, grub_uint8_t pcr,
+@@ -13,6 +14,9 @@ grub_tpm_measure (unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size, grub_uint8_t pcr,
+   char *desc = grub_xasprintf("%s %s", kind, description);
+   if (!desc)
+     return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+  grub_tdx_log_event(buf, size, pcr, desc);
+
+   ret = grub_tpm_log_event(buf, size, pcr, desc);
+   grub_free(desc);
+   return ret;
+diff --git a/include/grub/efi/tdx.h b/include/grub/efi/tdx.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..9bdac2a275
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/grub/efi/tdx.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2015  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GRUB_EFI_TDX_HEADER
+#define GRUB_EFI_TDX_HEADER 1
+
+#define EFI_TDX_GUID {0x96751a3d, 0x72f4, 0x41a6, {0xa7, 0x94, 0xed, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x67, 0xae, 0x6b}};
+
+typedef grub_efi_tpm2_protocol_t grub_efi_tdx_protocol_t;
+
+#endif
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/include/grub/tdx.h b/include/grub/tdx.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..4a98008e39
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/grub/tdx.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2015  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GRUB_TDX_HEADER
+#define GRUB_TDX_HEADER 1
+
+#if defined (GRUB_MACHINE_EFI)
+grub_err_t grub_tdx_log_event(unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size,
+			      grub_uint8_t pcr, const char *description);
+#else
+static inline grub_err_t grub_tdx_log_event(
+	unsigned char *buf __attribute__ ((unused)),
+	grub_size_t size __attribute__ ((unused)),
+	grub_uint8_t pcr __attribute__ ((unused)),
+	const char *description __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+	return 0;
+};
+#endif
+
+#endif
--- a/SOURCES/0575-Enable-shared-processor-mode-in-vector-5.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0575-Enable-shared-processor-mode-in-vector-5.patch
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 08:01:47 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Enable shared processor mode in vector 5
+
+This patch is to update the vector 5 which is troubling some
+machines to bootup properly in shared processor mode.
+
+Signed-off-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 30d2ee836649386a336f9437c8a149c8e642a46b)
+(cherry picked from commit 7e309d139c5eca1f03659e612a14499213e79c95)
+---
+ grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+index 37f3098c39..3ea9b73b2a 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
+     .vec4 = 0x0001, // set required minimum capacity % to the lowest value
+     .vec5_size = 1 + sizeof(struct option_vector5) - 2,
+     .vec5 = {
+-	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 256
+	0, 192, 0, 128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 256
+     }
+   };
+ 
--- a/SOURCES/0576-efi-http-change-uint32_t-to-uintn_t-for-grub_efi_htt.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0576-efi-http-change-uint32_t-to-uintn_t-for-grub_efi_htt.patch
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Hsiao <matt.hsiao@hpe.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2023 13:39:05 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] efi/http: change uint32_t to uintn_t for
+ grub_efi_http_message_t
+
+Modify UINT32 to UINTN in EFI_HTTP_MESSAGE to be UEFI 2.9 compliant.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matt Hsiao <matt.hsiao@hpe.com>
+Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
+---
+ include/grub/efi/http.h | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/grub/efi/http.h b/include/grub/efi/http.h
+index c5e9a89f5050..ad164ba1913d 100644
+--- a/include/grub/efi/http.h
+++ b/include/grub/efi/http.h
+@@ -171,9 +171,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     grub_efi_http_request_data_t *request;
+     grub_efi_http_response_data_t *response;
+   } data;
+-  grub_efi_uint32_t header_count;
+  grub_efi_uintn_t header_count;
+   grub_efi_http_header_t *headers;
+-  grub_efi_uint32_t body_length;
+  grub_efi_uintn_t body_length;
+   void *body;
+ } grub_efi_http_message_t;
+ 
--- a/SOURCES/0577-ieee1275-Converting-plain-numbers-to-constants-in-Ve.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0577-ieee1275-Converting-plain-numbers-to-constants-in-Ve.patch
@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 08:16:25 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] ieee1275 : Converting plain numbers to constants in Vec5
+
+This patch converts the plain numbers used in Vec5 properties to
+constants.
+
+1. LPAR : Client program supports logical partitioning and
+   associated hcall()s.
+2. SPLPAR : Client program supports the Shared
+   Processor LPAR Option.
+3. CMO : Enables the Cooperative Memory Over-commitment Option.
+4. MAX_CPU : Defines maximum number of CPUs supported.
+
+Signed-off-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+index 3ea9b73b2a59..2516e02091cb 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@ extern char _end[];
+ grub_addr_t grub_ieee1275_original_stack;
+ #endif
+ 
+#define LPAR     0x80
+#define SPLPAR   0x40
+#define BYTE2    (LPAR | SPLPAR)
+#define CMO      0x80
+#define MAX_CPU  256
+
+ void
+ grub_exit (int rc __attribute__((unused)))
+ {
+@@ -372,7 +378,7 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
+     .vec4 = 0x0001, // set required minimum capacity % to the lowest value
+     .vec5_size = 1 + sizeof(struct option_vector5) - 2,
+     .vec5 = {
+-	0, 192, 0, 128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 256
+        0, BYTE2, 0, CMO, 0, 0, 0, 0, MAX_CPU	
+     }
+   };
+ 
--- a/SOURCES/0578-ieee1275-extended-support-in-options-vector5.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0578-ieee1275-extended-support-in-options-vector5.patch
@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 08:33:12 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] ieee1275 : extended support in options vector5
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This patch enables the multiple options in Options Vector5 which are
+required and solves the boot issue seen on some machines which are looking for these specific options.
+
+1. LPAR : Client program supports logical partitioning and
+   associated hcall()s.
+2. SPLPAR : Client program supports the Shared
+   Processor LPAR Option.
+3. DYN_RCON_MEM : Client program supports the
+   “ibm,dynamic-reconfiguration-memory” property and it may be
+   presented in the device tree.
+4. LARGE_PAGES : Client supports pages larger than 4 KB.
+5. DONATE_DCPU_CLS : Client supports donating dedicated processor cycles.
+6. PCI_EXP : Client supports PCI Express implementations
+   utilizing Message Signaled Interrupts (MSIs).
+
+7. CMOC : Enables the Cooperative Memory Over-commitment Option.
+8. EXT_CMO : Enables the Extended Cooperative Memory Over-commit
+   Option.
+
+9. ASSOC_REF : Enables “ibm,associativity” and
+   “ibm,associativity-reference-points” properties.
+10. AFFINITY : Enables Platform Resource Reassignment Notification.
+11. NUMA : Supports NUMA Distance Lookup Table Option.
+
+12. HOTPLUG_INTRPT : Supports Hotplug Interrupts.
+13. HPT_RESIZE : Enable Hash Page Table Resize Option.
+
+14. MAX_CPU : Defines maximum number of CPUs supported.
+
+15. PFO_HWRNG : Supports Random Number Generator.
+16. PFO_HW_COMP : Supports Compression Engine.
+17. PFO_ENCRYPT : Supports Encryption Engine.
+
+18. SUB_PROCESSORS : Supports Sub-Processors.
+
+19. DY_MEM_V2 : Client program supports the “ibm,dynamic-memory-v2” property in the
+    “ibm,dynamic-reconfiguration-memory” node and it may be presented in the device tree.
+20. DRC_INFO : Client program supports the “ibm,drc-info” property definition and it may be
+    presented in the device tree.
+
+Signed-off-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+index 2516e02091cb..1fae84440403 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+@@ -56,11 +56,41 @@ extern char _end[];
+ grub_addr_t grub_ieee1275_original_stack;
+ #endif
+ 
+-#define LPAR     0x80
+-#define SPLPAR   0x40
+-#define BYTE2    (LPAR | SPLPAR)
+-#define CMO      0x80
+-#define MAX_CPU  256
+/* Options vector5 properties */
+
+#define LPAR                0x80
+#define SPLPAR              0x40
+#define DYN_RCON_MEM        0x20
+#define LARGE_PAGES         0x10
+#define DONATE_DCPU_CLS     0x02
+#define PCI_EXP             0x01
+#define BYTE2               (LPAR | SPLPAR | DYN_RCON_MEM | LARGE_PAGES | DONATE_DCPU_CLS | PCI_EXP)
+
+#define CMOC                0x80
+#define EXT_CMO             0x40
+#define CMO                 (CMOC | EXT_CMO)
+
+#define ASSOC_REF           0x80
+#define AFFINITY            0x40
+#define NUMA                0x20
+#define ASSOCIATIVITY       (ASSOC_REF | AFFINITY | NUMA)
+
+#define HOTPLUG_INTRPT      0x04
+#define HPT_RESIZE          0x01
+#define BIN_OPTS            (HOTPLUG_INTRPT | HPT_RESIZE)
+
+#define MAX_CPU             256
+
+#define PFO_HWRNG           0x80000000
+#define PFO_HW_COMP         0x40000000
+#define PFO_ENCRYPT         0x20000000
+#define PLATFORM_FACILITIES (PFO_HWRNG | PFO_HW_COMP | PFO_ENCRYPT)
+
+#define SUB_PROCESSORS      1
+
+#define DY_MEM_V2           0x80
+#define DRC_INFO            0x40
+#define BYTE22              (DY_MEM_V2 | DRC_INFO)
+ 
+ void
+ grub_exit (int rc __attribute__((unused)))
+@@ -323,6 +353,11 @@ struct option_vector5 {
+         grub_uint8_t micro_checkpoint;
+         grub_uint8_t reserved0;
+         grub_uint32_t max_cpus;
+        grub_uint16_t base_PAPR;
+        grub_uint16_t mem_reference;
+        grub_uint32_t platform_facilities;
+        grub_uint8_t sub_processors;
+        grub_uint8_t byte22;
+ } __attribute__((packed));
+ 
+ struct pvr_entry {
+@@ -378,7 +413,7 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
+     .vec4 = 0x0001, // set required minimum capacity % to the lowest value
+     .vec5_size = 1 + sizeof(struct option_vector5) - 2,
+     .vec5 = {
+-        0, BYTE2, 0, CMO, 0, 0, 0, 0, MAX_CPU	
+        0, BYTE2, 0, CMO, ASSOCIATIVITY, BIN_OPTS, 0, 0, MAX_CPU, 0, 0, PLATFORM_FACILITIES, SUB_PROCESSORS, BYTE22
+     }
+   };
+ 
--- a/SOURCES/0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 8c74431327e0c7d7fe47462b0e69fcbe3bbac56e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 09:14:29 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Regenerate kernelopts if missing on ppc
+
+Signed-off-by: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
+---
+ util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in b/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
+index 855dbdd..f2281bc 100644
+--- a/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
+++ b/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
+@@ -117,6 +117,18 @@ cat <<EOF
+ # This section was generated by a script. Do not modify the generated file - all changes
+ # will be lost the next time file is regenerated. Instead edit the BootLoaderSpec files.
+ 
+# The kernelopts variable should be defined in the grubenv file. But to ensure that menu
+# entries populated from BootLoaderSpec files that use this variable work correctly even
+# without a grubenv file, define a fallback kernelopts variable if this has not been set.
+#
+# The kernelopts variable in the grubenv file can be modified using the grubby tool or by
+# executing the grub2-mkconfig tool. For the latter, the values of the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX
+# and GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT options from /etc/default/grub file are used to set both
+# the kernelopts variable in the grubenv file and the fallback kernelopts variable.
+if [ -z "\${kernelopts}" ]; then
+  set kernelopts="root=${linux_root_device_thisversion} ro ${args}"
+fi
+
+ EOF
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
--- a/SOURCES/0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch
@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 12:21:55 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] kern/ieee1275/init: ppc64: Restrict high memory in presence
+ of fadump
+
+This is a backport of the patch with the same name to grub 2.02.
+
+When a kernel dump is present then restrict the high memory regions to
+avoid allocating memory where the kernel dump resides. Use the
+ibm,kernel-dump node under /rtas to determine whether a kernel dump exists
+and up to which limit grub can use available memory. Set the
+upper_mem_limit to the size of the kernel dump section of type
+'REAL_MODE_REGION' and therefore only allow grub's memory usage for high
+addresses from 768MB to 'upper_mem_limit'. This means that grub can
+use high memory in the range of 768MB to upper_mem_limit and
+the kernel-dump memory regions above 'upper_mem_limit' remain untouched.
+This change has no effect on memory allocations below 640MB.
+
+Also, fall back to allocating below 640MB in case the chunk of
+memory there would be larger than the chunk of memory above 768MB.
+This can for example occur if a free memory area is found starting at 300MB
+extending up to 1GB but a kernel dump is located at 768MB and therefore
+does not allow the allocation of the high memory area but requiring to use
+the chunk starting at 300MB to avoid an unnecessary out-of-memory
+condition.
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
+Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
+Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
+Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
+Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
+Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 139 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+index 1fae84440403..31843ab70a62 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
+  *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+  */
+ 
+#include <stddef.h> /* offsetof() */
+
+ #include <grub/kernel.h>
+ #include <grub/dl.h>
+ #include <grub/disk.h>
+@@ -180,6 +182,97 @@ grub_claim_heap (void)
+ 				 + GRUB_KERNEL_MACHINE_STACK_SIZE), 0x200000);
+ }
+ #else
+
+/* ibm,kernel-dump data structures */
+struct kd_section
+{
+  grub_uint32_t flags;
+  grub_uint16_t src_datatype;
+#define KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION  0x0011
+  grub_uint16_t error_flags;
+  grub_uint64_t src_address;
+  grub_uint64_t num_bytes;
+  grub_uint64_t act_bytes;
+  grub_uint64_t dst_address;
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+
+#define MAX_KD_SECTIONS 10
+
+struct kernel_dump
+{
+  grub_uint32_t format;
+  grub_uint16_t num_sections;
+  grub_uint16_t status_flags;
+  grub_uint32_t offset_1st_section;
+  grub_uint32_t num_blocks;
+  grub_uint64_t start_block;
+  grub_uint64_t num_blocks_avail;
+  grub_uint32_t offet_path_string;
+  grub_uint32_t max_time_allowed;
+  struct kd_section kds[MAX_KD_SECTIONS]; /* offset_1st_section should point to kds[0] */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+
+/*
+ * Determine if a kernel dump exists and if it does, then determine the highest
+ * address that grub can use for memory allocations.
+ * The caller must have initialized *highest to ~0. *highest will not
+ * be modified if no kernel dump is found.
+ */
+static int
+check_kernel_dump (grub_uint64_t *highest)
+{
+  struct kernel_dump kernel_dump;
+  grub_ssize_t kernel_dump_size;
+  grub_ieee1275_phandle_t rtas;
+  struct kd_section *kds;
+  grub_size_t i;
+
+  /* If there's a kernel-dump it must have at least one section */
+  if (grub_ieee1275_finddevice ("/rtas", &rtas) ||
+      grub_ieee1275_get_property (rtas, "ibm,kernel-dump", &kernel_dump,
+                                  sizeof (kernel_dump), &kernel_dump_size) ||
+      kernel_dump_size <= (grub_ssize_t) offsetof (struct kernel_dump, kds[1]))
+    return 0;
+
+  kernel_dump_size = grub_min (kernel_dump_size, (grub_ssize_t) sizeof (kernel_dump));
+
+  if (grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format) != 1)
+    {
+      grub_printf (_("Error: ibm,kernel-dump has an unexpected format version '%u'\n"),
+                   grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format));
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+  if (grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections) > MAX_KD_SECTIONS)
+    {
+      grub_printf (_("Error: Too many kernel dump sections: %d\n"),
+                   grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.num_sections));
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections); i++)
+    {
+      kds = (struct kd_section *) ((grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump +
+                                   grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.offset_1st_section) +
+                                   i * sizeof (struct kd_section));
+      /* sanity check the address is within the 'kernel_dump' struct */
+      if ((grub_addr_t) kds > (grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump + kernel_dump_size + sizeof (*kds))
+        {
+          grub_printf (_("Error: 'kds' address beyond last available section\n"));
+          return 0;
+        }
+
+      if ((grub_be_to_cpu16 (kds->src_datatype) == KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION) &&
+          (grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->src_address) == 0))
+        {
+          *highest = grub_min (*highest, grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->num_bytes));
+          break;
+        }
+    }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+ /* Helper for grub_claim_heap on powerpc. */
+ static int
+ heap_size (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
+@@ -207,7 +300,9 @@ static int
+ heap_init (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
+ 	   void *data)
+ {
+  grub_uint64_t upper_mem_limit = ~0;
+   grub_uint32_t total = *(grub_uint32_t *)data;
+  int has_kernel_dump;
+ 
+   if (type != GRUB_MEMORY_AVAILABLE)
+     return 0;
+@@ -243,6 +338,50 @@ heap_init (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
+       len = 0;
+     }
+ 
+  has_kernel_dump = check_kernel_dump (&upper_mem_limit);
+  if (has_kernel_dump)
+    {
+      grub_uint64_t lo_len = 0, hi_len = 0;
+
+      if (addr > upper_mem_limit || upper_mem_limit == (grub_uint64_t)~0)
+        return 0;
+
+      /* limit len to stay below upper_mem_limit */
+      if (addr < upper_mem_limit && (addr + len) > upper_mem_limit)
+        {
+           len = grub_min (len, upper_mem_limit - addr);
+        }
+
+      /* We can allocate below 640MB or above 768MB.
+       * Choose the bigger chunk below 640MB or above 768MB.
+       */
+      if (addr < 0x28000000)
+        {
+           lo_len = grub_min (len, 0x28000000 - addr);
+        }
+      if (addr + len > 0x30000000)
+        {
+           if (addr < 0x30000000)
+             hi_len = len - (0x30000000 - addr);
+           else
+             hi_len = len;
+        }
+
+      if (hi_len > lo_len)
+        {
+           len = hi_len;
+           if (addr < 0x30000000)
+             addr = 0x30000000;
+        }
+      else
+        {
+           len = lo_len;
+        }
+
+      if (len == 0)
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+   /* If this block contains 0x30000000 (768MB), do not claim below that.
+      Linux likes to claim memory at min(RMO top, 768MB) and works down
+      without reference to /memory/available. */
--- a/SOURCES/0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 May 2023 11:22:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] util: Enable default kernel for updates
+
+Several kernel variants can be installed on a system in parallel.
+In order to allow the user to choose which kernel will be set to
+default after an update, re-enable grub's usage of DEFAULTKERNEL as
+set in /etc/sysconfig/kernel
+
+Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
+---
+ util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in b/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
+index 7e87dfccc0e4..f71bc64360b0 100644
+--- a/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
+++ b/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
+@@ -68,6 +68,14 @@ if test -f /etc/sysconfig/kernel ; then
+     . /etc/sysconfig/kernel
+ fi
+ 
+GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=${DEFAULTKERNEL/-core/}
+if [ "$GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE" != "kernel" ]; then
+    echo GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL=true
+    echo export GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL
+    GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=${GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE/kernel-/}
+fi
+echo GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=$GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE
+echo export GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE
+ if [ "$MAKEDEBUG" = "yes" ]; then
+     echo GRUB_LINUX_MAKE_DEBUG=true
+     echo export GRUB_LINUX_MAKE_DEBUG
--- a/SOURCES/0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch
@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+From 9ca4c3fe1c7dbd62e8ad6a23cb1b1fda695fdb44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:39:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] grub-set-bootflag: Conservative partial fix for
+ CVE-2024-1048
+
+Following up on CVE-2019-14865 and taking a fresh look at
+grub2-set-bootflag now (through my work at CIQ on Rocky Linux), I saw some
+other ways in which users could still abuse this little program:
+
+1. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag no longer rewrites the
+grubenv file in-place, but writes into a temporary file and renames it
+over the original, checking for error returns from each call first.
+This prevents the original file truncation vulnerability, but it can
+leave the temporary file around if the program is killed before it can
+rename or remove the file.  There are still many ways to get the program
+killed, such as through RLIMIT_FSIZE triggering SIGXFSZ (tested,
+reliable) or by careful timing (tricky) of signals sent by process group
+leader, pty, pre-scheduled timers, SIGXCPU (probably not an exhaustive
+list).  Invoking the program multiple times fills up /boot (or if /boot
+is not separate, then it can fill up the root filesystem).  Since the
+files are tiny, the filesystem is likely to run out of free inodes
+before it'd run out of blocks, but the effect is similar - can't create
+new files after this point (but still can add data to existing files,
+such as logs).
+
+2. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag naively tries to protect
+itself from signals by becoming full root.  (This does protect it from
+signals sent by the user directly to the PID, but e.g. "kill -9 -1" by
+the user still works.)  A side effect of such "protection" is that it's
+possible to invoke more concurrent instances of grub2-set-bootflag than
+the user's RLIMIT_NPROC would normally permit (as specified e.g. in
+/etc/security/limits.conf, or say in Apache httpd's RLimitNPROC if
+grub2-set-bootflag would be abused by a website script), thereby
+exhausting system resources (e.g., bypassing RAM usage limit if
+RLIMIT_AS was also set).
+
+3. umask is inherited.  Again, due to how the CVE-2019-14865 fix creates
+a new file, and due to how mkstemp() works, this affects grubenv's new
+file permissions.  Luckily, mkstemp() forces them to be no more relaxed
+than 0600, but the user ends up being able to set them e.g. to 0.
+Luckily, at least in my testing GRUB still works fine even when the file
+has such (lack of) permissions.
+
+This commit deals with the abuses above as follows:
+
+1. RLIMIT_FSIZE is pre-checked, so this specific way to get the process
+killed should no longer work.  However, this isn't a complete fix
+because there are other ways to get the process killed after it has
+created the temporary file.
+
+The commit also fixes bug 1975892 ("RFE: grub2-set-bootflag should not
+write the grubenv when the flag being written is already set") and
+similar for "menu_show_once", which further reduces the abuse potential.
+
+2. RLIMIT_NPROC bypass should be avoided by not becoming full root (aka
+dropping the partial "kill protection").
+
+3. A safe umask is set.
+
+This is a partial fix (temporary files can still accumulate, but this is
+harder to trigger).
+
+While at it, this commit also fixes potential 1- or 2-byte over-read of
+env[] if its content is malformed - this was not a security issue since the
+grubenv file is trusted input, and the fix is just for robustness.
+
+Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+---
+ util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+index a85f11fceacb..5b932f76b6f4 100644
+--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+ 
+ #define GRUBENV "/" GRUB_BOOT_DIR_NAME "/" GRUB_DIR_NAME "/" GRUB_ENVBLK_DEFCFG
+ #define GRUBENV_SIZE 1024
+@@ -54,12 +56,17 @@ static void usage(void)
+ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+   /* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
+-  char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1], buf[64], *s;
+  char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
+   /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
+   char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
+   const char *bootflag;
+   int i, fd, len, ret;
+   FILE *f;
+  struct rlimit rlim;
+
+  if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
+    return 1;
+  umask(077);
+ 
+   if (argc != 2)
+     {
+@@ -81,20 +88,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+   len = strlen (bootflag);
+ 
+   /*
+-   * Really become root. setuid avoids an user killing us, possibly leaking
+-   * the tmpfile. setgid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
+   * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
+    */
+-  ret = setuid(0);
+-  if (ret)
+-    {
+-      perror ("Error setuid(0) failed");
+-      return 1;
+-    }
+-
+-  ret = setgid(0);
+-  if (ret)
+  if (setegid(0))
+     {
+-      perror ("Error setgid(0) failed");
+      perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -123,6 +121,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ 
+   /* 0 terminate env */
+   env[GRUBENV_SIZE] = 0;
+  /* not a valid flag value */
+  env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1] = 0;
+  env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 2] = 0;
+ 
+   if (strncmp (env, GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE, strlen (GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE)))
+     {
+@@ -158,6 +159,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ 
+   /* The grubenv is not 0 terminated, so memcpy the name + '=' , '1', '\n' */
+   snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s=1\n", bootflag);
+  if (!memcmp(s, buf, len + 3))
+    return 0; /* nothing to do */
+   memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch
@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From f4c7783c2b695794938748a6567e86456ed2314a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:56:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] grub-set-bootflag: More complete fix for CVE-2024-1048
+
+Switch to per-user fixed temporary filenames along with a weird locking
+mechanism, which is explained in source code comments.  This is a more
+complete fix than the previous commit (temporary files can't accumulate).
+Unfortunately, it introduces new risks (by working on a temporary file
+shared between the user's invocations), which are _hopefully_ avoided by
+the patch's elaborate logic.  I actually got it wrong at first, which
+suggests that this logic is hard to reason about, and more errors or
+omissions are possible.  It also relies on the kernel's primitives' exact
+semantics to a greater extent (nothing out of the ordinary, though).
+
+Remaining issues that I think cannot reasonably be fixed without a
+redesign (e.g., having per-flag files with nothing else in them) and
+without introducing new issues:
+
+A. A user can still revert a concurrent user's attempt of setting the
+other flag - or of making other changes to grubenv by means other than
+this program.
+
+B. One leftover temporary file per user is still possible.
+
+Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+---
+ util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+index 5b932f76b6f4..698b55a1ab93 100644
+--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/file.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <sys/resource.h>
+ 
+@@ -57,15 +58,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+   /* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
+   char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
+-  /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
+-  char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
+  /* +1 for 0 termination, +11 for ".%u" in tmp filename */
+  char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 11 + 1];
+   const char *bootflag;
+   int i, fd, len, ret;
+   FILE *f;
+-  struct rlimit rlim;
+ 
+-  if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
+-    return 1;
+   umask(077);
+ 
+   if (argc != 2)
+@@ -92,7 +90,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+    */
+   if (setegid(0))
+     {
+-      perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
+      perror ("setegid(0) failed");
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -163,19 +161,82 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+     return 0; /* nothing to do */
+   memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
+ 
+  struct rlimit rlim;
+  if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
+    {
+      fprintf (stderr, "Resource limits undetermined or too low\n");
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+  /*
+   * Here we work under the premise that we shouldn't write into the target
+   * file directly because we might not be able to have all of our changes
+   * written completely and atomically.  That was CVE-2019-14865, known to
+   * have been triggerable via RLIMIT_FSIZE.  While we've dealt with that
+   * specific attack via the check above, there may be other possibilities.
+   */
+ 
+   /*
+    * Create a tempfile for writing the new env.  Use the canonicalized filename
+    * for the template so that the tmpfile is in the same dir / on same fs.
+   *
+   * We now use per-user fixed temporary filenames, so that a user cannot cause
+   * multiple files to accumulate.
+   *
+   * We don't use O_EXCL so that a stale temporary file doesn't prevent further
+   * usage of the program by the user.
+    */
+-  snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%sXXXXXX", env_filename);
+-  fd = mkstemp(tmp_filename);
+  snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%s.%u", env_filename, getuid());
+  fd = open(tmp_filename, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600);
+   if (fd == -1)
+     {
+       perror ("Creating tmpfile failed");
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 
+  /*
+   * The lock prevents the same user from reaching further steps ending in
+   * rename() concurrently, in which case the temporary file only partially
+   * written by one invocation could be renamed to the target file by another.
+   *
+   * The lock also guards the slow fsync() from concurrent calls.  After the
+   * first time that and the rename() complete, further invocations for the
+   * same flag become no-ops.
+   *
+   * We lock the temporary file rather than the target file because locking the
+   * latter would allow any user having SIGSTOP'ed their process to make all
+   * other users' invocations fail (or lock up if we'd use blocking mode).
+   *
+   * We use non-blocking mode (LOCK_NB) because the lock having been taken by
+   * another process implies that the other process would normally have already
+   * renamed the file to target by the time it releases the lock (and we could
+   * acquire it), so we'd be working directly on the target if we proceeded,
+   * which is undesirable, and we'd kind of fail on the already-done rename.
+   */
+  if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB))
+    {
+      perror ("Locking tmpfile failed");
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+  /*
+   * Deal with the potential that another invocation proceeded all the way to
+   * rename() and process exit while we were between open() and flock().
+   */
+  {
+    struct stat st1, st2;
+    if (fstat(fd, &st1) || stat(tmp_filename, &st2))
+      {
+        perror ("stat of tmpfile failed");
+        return 1;
+      }
+    if (st1.st_dev != st2.st_dev || st1.st_ino != st2.st_ino)
+      {
+        fprintf (stderr, "Another invocation won race\n");
+        return 1;
+      }
+  }
+
+   f = fdopen (fd, "w");
+   if (!f)
+     {
+@@ -200,23 +261,25 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+       return 1;     
+     }
+ 
+-  ret = fsync (fileno (f));
+  ret = ftruncate (fileno (f), GRUBENV_SIZE);
+   if (ret)
+     {
+-      perror ("Error syncing tmpfile");
+      perror ("Error truncating tmpfile");
+       unlink(tmp_filename);
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 
+-  ret = fclose (f);
+  ret = fsync (fileno (f));
+   if (ret)
+     {
+-      perror ("Error closing tmpfile");
+      perror ("Error syncing tmpfile");
+       unlink(tmp_filename);
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 
+   /*
+   * We must not close the file before rename() as that would remove the lock.
+   *
+    * And finally rename the tmpfile with the new env over the old env, the
+    * linux kernel guarantees that this is atomic (from a syscall pov).
+    */
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch
@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From a7192a650c1e94221a86b49f5132fb47a4dda6ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 22:05:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] grub-set-bootflag: Exit calmly when not running as root
+
+Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root.  This
+allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
+supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
+
+Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+---
+ util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+index 698b55a1ab93..a51805fa8cec 100644
+--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+   bootflag = bootflags[i];
+   len = strlen (bootflag);
+ 
+  /*
+   * Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root.  This
+   * allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
+   * supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
+   */
+  if (geteuid())
+    {
+      printf ("grub-set-bootflag not running as root, no action taken\n");
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+   /*
+    * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
+    */
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch
@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+From 43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:31:57 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the
+ $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute for the $MFT file
+
+When parsing an extremely fragmented $MFT file, i.e., the file described
+using the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute, current NTFS code will reuse a buffer
+containing bytes read from the underlying drive to store sector numbers,
+which are consumed later to read data from these sectors into another buffer.
+
+These sectors numbers, two 32-bit integers, are always stored at predefined
+offsets, 0x10 and 0x14, relative to first byte of the selected entry within
+the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute. Usually, this won't cause any problem.
+
+However, when parsing a specially-crafted file system image, this may cause
+the NTFS code to write these integers beyond the buffer boundary, likely
+causing the GRUB memory allocator to misbehave or fail. These integers contain
+values which are controlled by on-disk structures of the NTFS file system.
+
+Such modification and resulting misbehavior may touch a memory range not
+assigned to the GRUB and owned by firmware or another EFI application/driver.
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that these sector numbers are never
+written beyond the boundary.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-4692
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index bbdbe24ada83..c3c4db117bba 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+     }
+   if (at->attr_end)
+     {
+-      grub_uint8_t *pa;
+      grub_uint8_t *pa, *pa_end;
+ 
+       at->emft_buf = grub_malloc (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+       if (at->emft_buf == NULL)
+@@ -209,11 +209,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 	    }
+ 	  at->attr_nxt = at->edat_buf;
+ 	  at->attr_end = at->edat_buf + u32at (pa, 0x30);
+	  pa_end = at->edat_buf + n;
+ 	}
+       else
+ 	{
+ 	  at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
+ 	  at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
+	  pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+ 	}
+       at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST;
+       while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
+@@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 	  at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS;
+ 	  at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt;
+ 	  pa = at->attr_cur;
+
+	  if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
+	    {
+	      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
+	      return NULL;
+	    }
+
+ 	  grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x10,
+ 				grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start));
+ 	  grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x14,
+@@ -240,6 +249,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (*pa != attr)
+ 		break;
+
+              if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
+                {
+	          grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
+	          return NULL;
+	        }
+
+ 	      if (read_attr
+ 		  (at, pa + 0x10,
+ 		   u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the
+ resident $DATA attribute
+
+When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in
+the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters,
+there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding
+file record segment.
+
+When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will
+read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of
+arbitrary, attacker-chosen length.
+
+This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could
+contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text,
+obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables.
+
+This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the
+corresponding file record segment only.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-4693
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index c3c4db117bba..a68e173d8285 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
+     {
+       if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
+-      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
+
+      if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
+
+      if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
+
+      if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
+	  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
+	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
+
+      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
+       return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch
@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 7e5f031a6a6a3decc2360a7b0c71abbe598e7354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:17 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing directory entries
+ from resident and non-resident index attributes
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that index entries are never read
+beyond the corresponding directory index.
+
+The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 +++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index a68e173d8285..2d78b96e19fb 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ get_utf8 (grub_uint8_t *in, grub_size_t len)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
+list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos, grub_uint8_t *end_pos,
+ 	   grub_fshelp_iterate_dir_hook_t hook, void *hook_data)
+ {
+   grub_uint8_t *np;
+@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
+       grub_uint8_t namespace;
+       char *ustr;
+ 
+      if ((pos >= end_pos) || (end_pos - pos < 0x52))
+        break;
+
+       if (pos[0xC] & 2)		/* end signature */
+ 	break;
+ 
+@@ -617,6 +620,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
+       ns = *(np++);
+       namespace = *(np++);
+ 
+      if (2 * ns > end_pos - pos - 0x52)
+        break;
+
+       /*
+        *  Ignore files in DOS namespace, as they will reappear as Win32
+        *  names.
+@@ -806,7 +812,9 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+     }
+ 
+   cur_pos += 0x10;		/* Skip index root */
+-  ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0), hook, hook_data);
+  ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0),
+                   at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
+                   hook, hook_data);
+   if (ret)
+     goto done;
+ 
+@@ -893,6 +901,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ 			     (const grub_uint8_t *) "INDX")))
+ 		goto done;
+ 	      ret = list_file (mft, &indx[0x18 + u16at (indx, 0x18)],
+			       indx + (mft->data->idx_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
+ 			       hook, hook_data);
+ 	      if (ret)
+ 		goto done;
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 7a5a116739fa6d8a625da7d6b9272c9a2462f967 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing bitmaps for index
+ attributes
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that bitmaps for directory indices
+are never read beyond their actual sizes.
+
+The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index 2d78b96e19fb..bb70c89fb803 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -843,6 +843,25 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ 
+ 	  if (is_resident)
+ 	    {
+              if (bitmap_len > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+		{
+		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap too large");
+		  goto done;
+		}
+
+              if (cur_pos >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+		{
+		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
+		  goto done;
+		}
+
+              if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
+		  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
+		{
+		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
+		  goto done;
+		}
+
+               grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
+                            bitmap_len);
+ 	    }
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch
@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 1fe82c41e070385e273d7bb1cfb482627a3c28e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:38:19 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing a volume label
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that an NTFS volume label is always
+read from the corresponding file record segment.
+
+The current NTFS code allows the volume label string to be read from an
+arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory location. However, the bytes read are
+always treated as UTF-16LE. So, the final string displayed is mostly
+unreadable and it can't be easily converted back to raw bytes.
+
+The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not causing a significant
+data leak.
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index bb70c89fb803..ff5e3740f0dd 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -1213,13 +1213,29 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
+ 
+   init_attr (&mft->attr, mft);
+   pa = find_attr (&mft->attr, GRUB_NTFS_AT_VOLUME_NAME);
+
+  if (pa >= mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+    {
+      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
+      goto fail;
+    }
+
+  if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa < 0x16)
+    {
+      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
+      goto fail;
+    }
+
+   if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
+     {
+       int len;
+ 
+       len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
+       pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
+-      *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
+      if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
+        *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
+      else
+        grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
+     }
+ 
+ fail:
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch
@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+From e58b870ff926415e23fc386af41ff81b2f588763 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:40:07 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fs/ntfs: Make code more readable
+
+Move some calls used to access NTFS attribute header fields into
+functions with human-readable names.
+
+Suggested-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index ff5e3740f0dd..de435aa14d85 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,24 @@ u64at (void *ptr, grub_size_t ofs)
+   return grub_le_to_cpu64 (grub_get_unaligned64 ((char *) ptr + ofs));
+ }
+ 
+static grub_uint16_t
+first_attr_off (void *mft_buf_ptr)
+{
+  return u16at (mft_buf_ptr, 0x14);
+}
+
+static grub_uint16_t
+res_attr_data_off (void *res_attr_ptr)
+{
+  return u16at (res_attr_ptr, 0x14);
+}
+
+static grub_uint32_t
+res_attr_data_len (void *res_attr_ptr)
+{
+  return u32at (res_attr_ptr, 0x10);
+}
+
+ grub_ntfscomp_func_t grub_ntfscomp_func;
+ 
+ static grub_err_t
+@@ -106,7 +124,7 @@ init_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft)
+ {
+   at->mft = mft;
+   at->flags = (mft == &mft->data->mmft) ? GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT : 0;
+-  at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + u16at (mft->buf, 0x14);
+  at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + first_attr_off (mft->buf);
+   at->attr_end = at->emft_buf = at->edat_buf = at->sbuf = NULL;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -154,7 +172,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 		    return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 
+-	      new_pos = &at->emft_buf[u16at (at->emft_buf, 0x14)];
+	      new_pos = &at->emft_buf[first_attr_off (at->emft_buf)];
+ 	      while (*new_pos != 0xFF)
+ 		{
+ 		  if ((*new_pos == *at->attr_cur)
+@@ -213,7 +231,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 	}
+       else
+ 	{
+-	  at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
+	  at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + res_attr_data_off (pa);
+ 	  at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
+ 	  pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+ 	}
+@@ -399,20 +417,20 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
+ 
+   if (pa[8] == 0)
+     {
+-      if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
+      if (ofs + len > res_attr_data_len (pa))
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
+ 
+-      if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+      if (res_attr_data_len (pa) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
+ 
+       if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
+ 
+-      if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
+      if (res_attr_data_off (pa) + res_attr_data_len (pa) >
+ 	  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
+ 
+-      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
+      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + res_attr_data_off (pa) + ofs, len);
+       return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -556,7 +574,7 @@ init_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *mft, grub_uint64_t mftno)
+ 			   (unsigned long long) mftno);
+ 
+       if (!pa[8])
+-	mft->size = u32at (pa, 0x10);
+	mft->size = res_attr_data_len (pa);
+       else
+ 	mft->size = u64at (pa, 0x30);
+ 
+@@ -805,7 +823,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ 	  (u32at (cur_pos, 0x18) != 0x490024) ||
+ 	  (u32at (cur_pos, 0x1C) != 0x300033))
+ 	continue;
+-      cur_pos += u16at (cur_pos, 0x14);
+      cur_pos += res_attr_data_off (cur_pos);
+       if (*cur_pos != 0x30)	/* Not filename index */
+ 	continue;
+       break;
+@@ -834,7 +852,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ 	{
+           int is_resident = (cur_pos[8] == 0);
+ 
+-          bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) :
+          bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) :
+                         u32at (cur_pos, 0x28));
+ 
+           bmp = grub_malloc (bitmap_len);
+@@ -855,14 +873,14 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ 		  goto done;
+ 		}
+ 
+-              if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
+              if (res_attr_data_off (cur_pos) + res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) >
+ 		  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
+ 		{
+ 		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
+ 		  goto done;
+ 		}
+ 
+-              grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
+              grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + res_attr_data_off (cur_pos),
+                            bitmap_len);
+ 	    }
+           else
+@@ -1226,12 +1244,12 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
+       goto fail;
+     }
+ 
+-  if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
+  if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (res_attr_data_len (pa)))
+     {
+       int len;
+ 
+-      len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
+-      pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
+      len = res_attr_data_len (pa) / 2;
+      pa += res_attr_data_off (pa);
+       if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
+         *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
+       else
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/0591-grub-mkconfig.in-turn-off-executable-owner-bit.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0591-grub-mkconfig.in-turn-off-executable-owner-bit.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 10:15:13 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] grub-mkconfig.in: turn off executable owner bit
+
+Stricker permissions are required on the grub.cfg file, resulting in
+at most 0600 owner's file permissions. This resolves conflicting
+requirement permissions on grub2-pc package's grub2.cfg file.
+
+Signed-off-by: Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com>
+---
+ util/grub-mkconfig.in | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-mkconfig.in b/util/grub-mkconfig.in
+index a1c00776d..573004915 100644
+--- a/util/grub-mkconfig.in
+++ b/util/grub-mkconfig.in
+@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ and /etc/grub.d/* files or please file a bug report with
+     exit 1
+   else
+     # none of the children aborted with error, install the new grub.cfg
+-    oldumask=$(umask); umask 077
+    oldumask=$(umask); umask 177
+     cat ${grub_cfg}.new > ${grub_cfg}
+     umask $oldumask
+     rm -f ${grub_cfg}.new
--- a/SOURCES/20-grub.install
+++ b/SOURCES/20-grub.install
@ -90,13 +90,10 @@ case "$COMMAND" in
            [[ -d "$BLS_DIR" ]] || mkdir -m 0700 -p "$BLS_DIR"
            BLS_ID="${MACHINE_ID}-${KERNEL_VERSION}"
            BLS_TARGET="${BLS_DIR}/${BLS_ID}.conf"
-            if [[ -f "${KERNEL_DIR}/bls.conf" ]]; then
-                cp -aT "${KERNEL_DIR}/bls.conf" "${BLS_TARGET}" || exit $?
-            else
-                mkbls "${KERNEL_VERSION}" \
-                    "$(date -u +%Y%m%d%H%M%S -d "$(stat -c '%y' "${KERNEL_DIR}")")" \
-                    >"${BLS_TARGET}"
-            fi
+            mkbls "${KERNEL_VERSION}" \
+                "$(date -u +%Y%m%d%H%M%S -d "$(stat -c '%y' "${KERNEL_DIR}")")" \
+                >"${BLS_TARGET}"
+            command -v restorecon &>/dev/null && restorecon -R "${BLS_TARGET}"

            LINUX="$(grep '^linux[ \t]' "${BLS_TARGET}" | sed -e 's,^linux[ \t]*,,')"
            INITRD="$(grep '^initrd[ \t]' "${BLS_TARGET}" | sed -e 's,^initrd[ \t]*,,')"
@ -109,7 +106,11 @@ case "$COMMAND" in
                sed -i -e "s,^initrd.*,initrd ${BOOTPREFIX}${INITRD},g" "${BLS_TARGET}"
            fi

-            if [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" == *\+* ]] && [ "x$GRUB_DEFAULT_TO_DEBUG" != "xtrue" ]; then
+            if ( [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" != *${GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE}* ]] && \
+                     [ "x$GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL" == "xtrue" ] ) || \
+                   ( echo "$KERNEL_VERSION" | grep -E -q "64k|auto|rt|uki" && \
+                    	[ "x$GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL" != "xtrue" ] ) || \
+                   ( [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" == *debug* ]] && [ "x$GRUB_DEFAULT_TO_DEBUG" != "xtrue" ] ); then
                GRUB_UPDATE_DEFAULT_KERNEL=false
            fi

--- a/SOURCES/grub.macros
+++ b/SOURCES/grub.macros
@ -589,14 +589,15 @@ install -d -m 0700 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig	\
 touch ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}%{_sysconfdir}/default/grub		\
 ln -sf ../default/grub						\\\
 	${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/grub		\
-touch ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/boot/%{name}/grub.cfg			\
+touch grub.cfg							\
+install -m 0600 grub.cfg ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/boot/%{name}/	\
 %{nil}

 %define define_legacy_variant_files()				\
 %{expand:%%files %{1}}						\
 %defattr(-,root,root,-)						\
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}.cfg			\
-%ghost %config(noreplace) %attr(0700,root,root)/boot/%{name}/grub.cfg	\
+%ghost %config(noreplace) %attr(0600,root,root)/boot/%{name}/grub.cfg	\
 %dir %attr(0700,root,root)/boot/loader/entries			\
 %ifarch ppc64le						\
 %dir %{_libdir}/grub/%{2}/					\
--- a/SOURCES/grub.patches
+++ b/SOURCES/grub.patches
@ -571,3 +571,21 @@ Patch0570: 0570-font-Fix-an-integer-underflow-in-blit_comb.patch
 Patch0571: 0571-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch
 Patch0572: 0572-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch
 Patch0573: 0573-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch
+Patch0574: 0574-Enable-TDX-measurement-to-RTMR-register.patch
+Patch0575: 0575-Enable-shared-processor-mode-in-vector-5.patch
+Patch0576: 0576-efi-http-change-uint32_t-to-uintn_t-for-grub_efi_htt.patch
+Patch0577: 0577-ieee1275-Converting-plain-numbers-to-constants-in-Ve.patch
+Patch0578: 0578-ieee1275-extended-support-in-options-vector5.patch
+Patch0579: 0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch
+Patch0580: 0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch
+Patch0581: 0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch
+Patch0582: 0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch
+Patch0583: 0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch
+Patch0584: 0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch
+Patch0585: 0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch
+Patch0586: 0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch
+Patch0587: 0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch
+Patch0588: 0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch
+Patch0589: 0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch
+Patch0590: 0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch
+Patch0591: 0591-grub-mkconfig.in-turn-off-executable-owner-bit.patch
--- a/SOURCES/redhatsecureboot301.cer
+++ b/SOURCES/redhatsecureboot301.cer
--- a/SOURCES/redhatsecureboot502.cer
+++ b/SOURCES/redhatsecureboot502.cer
--- a/SOURCES/redhatsecureboot601.cer
+++ b/SOURCES/redhatsecureboot601.cer
--- a/SOURCES/redhatsecureboot701.cer
+++ b/SOURCES/redhatsecureboot701.cer
--- a/SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca3.cer
+++ b/SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca3.cer
--- a/SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca5.cer
+++ b/SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca5.cer
--- a/SPECS/grub2.spec
+++ b/SPECS/grub2.spec
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 Name:		grub2
 Epoch:		1
 Version:	2.02
-Release:	142%{?dist}.1
+Release:	158%{?dist}
 Summary:	Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more
 Group:		System Environment/Base
 License:	GPLv3+
@ -310,6 +310,19 @@ if [ "$1" = 2 ]; then
 	/sbin/grub2-switch-to-blscfg --backup-suffix=.rpmsave &>/dev/null || :
 fi

+%posttrans common
+set -eu
+
+GRUB_HOME=/boot/%{name}
+
+if test  -f ${GRUB_HOME}/grub.cfg; then
+    # make sure GRUB_HOME/grub.cfg has 600 permissions
+    GRUB_CFG_MODE=$(stat --format="%a" ${GRUB_HOME}/grub.cfg)
+    if ! test "${GRUB_CFG_MODE}" = "600"; then
+        chmod 0600 ${GRUB_HOME}/grub.cfg
+    fi
+fi
+
 %triggerun -- grub2 < 1:1.99-4
 # grub2 < 1.99-4 removed a number of essential files in postun. To fix upgrades
 # from the affected grub2 packages, we first back up the files in triggerun and
@ -510,13 +523,73 @@ fi
 %endif

 %changelog
-* Thu Nov 08 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-142.el8_7.1
- Sync with 8.8 (actually 2.02-145)
+* Thu Sep 19 2024 Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com> - 2.02-158
+- grub-mkconfig.in: turn off executable owner bit
+- Resolves: #RHEL-58835
+
+* Wed Aug 14 2024 Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com> - 2.02-157
+- 20-grub-install: fix SELinux security type context for BLS
+- Resolves: #RHEL-4395
+
+* Tue Feb 20 2024 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-156
+- fs/ntfs: OOB write fix
+- (CVE-2023-4692)
+- Resolves: #RHEL-11566
+
+* Thu Feb 8 2024 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.06-155
+- grub-set-bootflag: Fix for CVE-2024-1048
+- (CVE-2024-1048)
+- Resolves: #RHEL-20746
+
+* Mon Nov 27 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-154
+- Missing install script for previous commit
+- Related: #RHEL-4343
+
+* Fri Nov 24 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-153
+- util: Enable default kernel for updates
+- Resolves: #RHEL-4343
+
+* Fri Oct 20 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-152
+- kern/ieee1275/init: ppc64: Restrict high memory in presence
+  of fadump
+- Resolves: #RHEL-14283
+
+* Mon Aug 28 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-151
+- util: Regenerate kernelopts if missing on ppc
+- Resolves: #2051889
+
+* Fri Jun 16 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-150
+- kern/ieee1275/init: sync vec5 patchset with upstream
+- Resolves: #2172111
+
+* Wed Jun 14 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-149
+- efi/http: change uint32_t to uintn_t for grub_efi_http_message_t
+- Resolves: #2178388
+
+* Mon Feb 06 2023 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-148
+- ppc64le: cas5, take 3
+- Resolves: #2139508
+
+* Tue Jan 10 2023 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-147
+- Enable TDX measurement to RTMR register
+- Resolves: #1981485
+
+* Wed Dec 14 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-146
+- ppc64le: fix lpar cas5
+- Resolves: #2139508
+
+* Tue Nov 08 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 1:2.02-145
+- Font CVE fixes
 - Resolves: CVE-2022-2601

-* Thu Sep 08 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-142
- Drop the arena size changes
- Resolves: #2118896
+* Tue Oct 18 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-144
+- blscfg: don't assume newline at end of cfg
+- Resolves: #2121132
+
+* Wed Oct 12 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-143
+- x86-efi: Fix an incorrect array size in kernel allocation
+- Also merge with 8.7
+- Resolves: #2031288

 * Thu Aug 25 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-141
 - Implement vec5 for cas negotiation
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
eabdullin	64acfa274a	import from CS git grub2-2.02-158.el8	2024-11-05 09:04:39 +00:00
eabdullin	2f014da5e0	Import from AlmaLinux stable repository	2024-05-31 17:42:19 +00:00
CentOS Sources	af7d0b5667	import grub2-2.02-148.el8	2023-05-17 01:36:51 +00:00
CentOS Sources	a68fea488e	import grub2-2.02-142.el8_7.3	2023-02-21 10:05:24 +00:00