.gitignore

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
 SOURCES/grub-2.02.tar.xz
-SOURCES/redhatsecureboot301.cer
-SOURCES/redhatsecureboot502.cer
-SOURCES/redhatsecureboot601.cer
-SOURCES/redhatsecureboot701.cer
-SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca3.cer
-SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca5.cer
 SOURCES/theme.tar.bz2
 SOURCES/unifont-5.1.20080820.pcf.gz

.grub2.metadata

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
 3d7eb6eaab28b88cb969ba9ab24af959f4d1b178 SOURCES/grub-2.02.tar.xz
-4a07b56e28741884b86da6ac91f8f9929541a1e4 SOURCES/redhatsecureboot301.cer
-3f94c47f1d08bacc7cb29bdd912e286b8d2f6fcf SOURCES/redhatsecureboot502.cer
-039357ef97aab3e484d1119edd4528156f5859e6 SOURCES/redhatsecureboot601.cer
-e89890ca0ded2f9058651cc5fa838b78db2e6cc2 SOURCES/redhatsecureboot701.cer
-cf9230e69000076727e5b784ec871d22716dc5da SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca3.cer
-e6f506462069aa17d2e8610503635c20f3a995c3 SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca5.cer
 cf0b7763c528902da7e8b05cfa248f20c8825ce5 SOURCES/theme.tar.bz2
 87f8600ba24e521b5d20bdf6c4b71af8ae861e3a SOURCES/unifont-5.1.20080820.pcf.gz

SOURCES/0555-Make-debug-file-show-which-file-filters-get-run.patch

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2022 15:56:00 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Make debug=file show which file filters get run.
-
-If one of the file filters breaks things, it's hard to figure out where
-it has happened.
-
-This makes grub log which filter is being run, which makes it easier to
-figure out where you are in the sequence of events.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit d3d6518a13b5440a3be6c66b0ae47447182f2891)
-(cherry picked from commit d197e70761b1383827e9008e21ee41c6c7015776)
----
- grub-core/kern/file.c | 11 +++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/kern/file.c b/grub-core/kern/file.c
-index f062fc21e7..5e1f29d0dd 100644
---- a/grub-core/kern/file.c
-+++ b/grub-core/kern/file.c
-@@ -30,6 +30,14 @@ void (*EXPORT_VAR (grub_grubnet_fini)) (void);
- 
- grub_file_filter_t grub_file_filters[GRUB_FILE_FILTER_MAX];
- 
-+static char *filter_names[] = {
-+    [GRUB_FILE_FILTER_VERIFY] = "GRUB_FILE_FILTER_VERIFY",
-+    [GRUB_FILE_FILTER_GZIO] = "GRUB_FILE_FILTER_GZIO",
-+    [GRUB_FILE_FILTER_XZIO] = "GRUB_FILE_FILTER_XZIO",
-+    [GRUB_FILE_FILTER_LZOPIO] = "GRUB_FILE_FILTER_LZOPIO",
-+    [GRUB_FILE_FILTER_MAX] = "GRUB_FILE_FILTER_MAX"
-+};
-+
- /* Get the device part of the filename NAME. It is enclosed by parentheses.  */
- char *
- grub_file_get_device_name (const char *name)
-@@ -121,6 +129,9 @@ grub_file_open (const char *name, enum grub_file_type type)
-     if (grub_file_filters[filter])
-       {
- 	last_file = file;
-+	if (filter < GRUB_FILE_FILTER_MAX)
-+	  grub_dprintf ("file", "Running %s file filter\n",
-+			filter_names[filter]);
- 	file = grub_file_filters[filter] (file, type);
- 	if (file && file != last_file)
- 	  {

SOURCES/0556-efi-use-enumerated-array-positions-for-our-allocatio.patch

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2022 14:06:30 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] efi: use enumerated array positions for our allocation
- choices
-
-In our kernel allocator on EFI systems, we currently have a growing
-amount of code that references the various allocation policies by
-position in the array, and of course maintenance of this code scales
-very poorly.
-
-This patch changes them to be enumerated, so they're easier to refer to
-farther along in the code without confusion.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 6768026270cca015d7fef0ecc8a4119e9b3d3923)
-(cherry picked from commit 50b2ca3274b6950393a4ffc7edde04a1a3de594e)
----
- grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-index d80d6ec312..23b27f6507 100644
---- a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-+++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-@@ -60,17 +60,26 @@ struct allocation_choice {
-     grub_efi_allocate_type_t alloc_type;
- };
- 
--static struct allocation_choice max_addresses[4] =
-+enum {
-+    KERNEL_PREF_ADDRESS,
-+    KERNEL_4G_LIMIT,
-+    KERNEL_NO_LIMIT,
-+};
-+
-+static struct allocation_choice max_addresses[] =
-   {
-     /* the kernel overrides this one with pref_address and
-      * GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_ADDRESS */
--    { GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-+    [KERNEL_PREF_ADDRESS] =
-+      { GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-+    /* If the flag in params is set, this one gets changed to be above 4GB. */
-+    [KERNEL_4G_LIMIT] =
-+      { GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-     /* this one is always below 4GB, which we still *prefer* even if the flag
-      * is set. */
--    { GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
--    /* If the flag in params is set, this one gets changed to be above 4GB. */
--    { GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
--    { 0, 0 }
-+    [KERNEL_NO_LIMIT] =
-+      { GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-+    { NO_MEM, 0, 0 }
-   };
- static struct allocation_choice saved_addresses[4];
- 
-@@ -423,7 +432,7 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
-   if (lh->xloadflags & LINUX_XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G)
-     {
-       grub_dprintf ("linux", "Loading kernel above 4GB is supported; enabling.\n");
--      max_addresses[2].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_USABLE_ADDRESS;
-+      max_addresses[KERNEL_NO_LIMIT].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_USABLE_ADDRESS;
-     }
-   else
-     {
-@@ -495,11 +504,11 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
-   grub_dprintf ("linux", "lh->pref_address: %p\n", (void *)(grub_addr_t)lh->pref_address);
-   if (lh->pref_address < (grub_uint64_t)GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS)
-     {
--      max_addresses[0].addr = lh->pref_address;
--      max_addresses[0].alloc_type = GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_ADDRESS;
-+      max_addresses[KERNEL_PREF_ADDRESS].addr = lh->pref_address;
-+      max_addresses[KERNEL_PREF_ADDRESS].alloc_type = GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_ADDRESS;
-     }
--  max_addresses[1].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS;
--  max_addresses[2].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS;
-+  max_addresses[KERNEL_4G_LIMIT].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS;
-+  max_addresses[KERNEL_NO_LIMIT].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS;
-   kernel_size = lh->init_size;
-   kernel_mem = kernel_alloc (kernel_size, GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE,
- 			     N_("can't allocate kernel"));

SOURCES/0557-efi-split-allocation-policy-for-kernel-vs-initrd-mem.patch

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2022 14:24:39 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] efi: split allocation policy for kernel vs initrd memories.
-
-Currently in our kernel allocator, we use the same set of choices for
-all of our various kernel and initramfs allocations, though they do not
-have exactly the same constraints.
-
-This patch adds the concept of an allocation purpose, which currently
-can be KERNEL_MEM or INITRD_MEM, and updates kernel_alloc() calls
-appropriately, but does not change any current policy decision.  It
-also adds a few debug prints.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 36307bed28cd838116fc4af26a30719660d62d4c)
-(cherry picked from commit dc1196350b0cbe89582832f44df0fce67e0c9fb2)
----
- grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-index 23b27f6507..09e7596064 100644
---- a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-+++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-@@ -55,7 +55,14 @@ struct grub_linuxefi_context {
- 
- #define BYTES_TO_PAGES(bytes)   (((bytes) + 0xfff) >> 12)
- 
-+typedef enum {
-+    NO_MEM,
-+    KERNEL_MEM,
-+    INITRD_MEM,
-+} kernel_alloc_purpose_t;
-+
- struct allocation_choice {
-+    kernel_alloc_purpose_t purpose;
-     grub_efi_physical_address_t addr;
-     grub_efi_allocate_type_t alloc_type;
- };
-@@ -64,6 +71,7 @@ enum {
-     KERNEL_PREF_ADDRESS,
-     KERNEL_4G_LIMIT,
-     KERNEL_NO_LIMIT,
-+    INITRD_MAX_ADDRESS,
- };
- 
- static struct allocation_choice max_addresses[] =
-@@ -71,14 +79,17 @@ static struct allocation_choice max_addresses[] =
-     /* the kernel overrides this one with pref_address and
-      * GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_ADDRESS */
-     [KERNEL_PREF_ADDRESS] =
--      { GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-+      { KERNEL_MEM, GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-     /* If the flag in params is set, this one gets changed to be above 4GB. */
-     [KERNEL_4G_LIMIT] =
--      { GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-+      { KERNEL_MEM, GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-     /* this one is always below 4GB, which we still *prefer* even if the flag
-      * is set. */
-     [KERNEL_NO_LIMIT] =
--      { GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-+      { KERNEL_MEM, GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-+    /* this is for the initrd */
-+    [INITRD_MAX_ADDRESS] =
-+      { INITRD_MEM, GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-     { NO_MEM, 0, 0 }
-   };
- static struct allocation_choice saved_addresses[4];
-@@ -95,7 +106,8 @@ kernel_free(void *addr, grub_efi_uintn_t size)
- }
- 
- static void *
--kernel_alloc(grub_efi_uintn_t size,
-+kernel_alloc(kernel_alloc_purpose_t purpose,
-+	     grub_efi_uintn_t size,
- 	     grub_efi_memory_type_t memtype,
- 	     const char * const errmsg)
- {
-@@ -108,6 +120,9 @@ kernel_alloc(grub_efi_uintn_t size,
-       grub_uint64_t max = max_addresses[i].addr;
-       grub_efi_uintn_t pages;
- 
-+      if (purpose != max_addresses[i].purpose)
-+	continue;
-+
-       /*
-        * When we're *not* loading the kernel, or >4GB allocations aren't
-        * supported, these entries are basically all the same, so don't re-try
-@@ -262,7 +277,8 @@ grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd, int argc, char *argv[])
- 	}
-     }
- 
--  initrd_mem = kernel_alloc(size, GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
-+  grub_dprintf ("linux", "Trying to allocate initrd mem\n");
-+  initrd_mem = kernel_alloc(INITRD_MEM, size, GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
- 			    N_("can't allocate initrd"));
-   if (initrd_mem == NULL)
-     goto fail;
-@@ -440,7 +456,8 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
-     }
- #endif
- 
--  params = kernel_alloc (sizeof(*params), GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
-+  params = kernel_alloc (KERNEL_MEM, sizeof(*params),
-+			 GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
- 			 "cannot allocate kernel parameters");
-   if (!params)
-     goto fail;
-@@ -462,7 +479,7 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
-   grub_dprintf ("linux", "new lh is at %p\n", lh);
- 
-   grub_dprintf ("linux", "setting up cmdline\n");
--  cmdline = kernel_alloc (lh->cmdline_size + 1,
-+  cmdline = kernel_alloc (KERNEL_MEM, lh->cmdline_size + 1,
- 			  GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
- 			  N_("can't allocate cmdline"));
-   if (!cmdline)
-@@ -510,7 +527,9 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
-   max_addresses[KERNEL_4G_LIMIT].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS;
-   max_addresses[KERNEL_NO_LIMIT].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS;
-   kernel_size = lh->init_size;
--  kernel_mem = kernel_alloc (kernel_size, GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE,
-+  grub_dprintf ("linux", "Trying to allocate kernel mem\n");
-+  kernel_mem = kernel_alloc (KERNEL_MEM, kernel_size,
-+			     GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE,
- 			     N_("can't allocate kernel"));
-   restore_addresses();
-   if (!kernel_mem)

SOURCES/0558-efi-use-EFI_LOADER_-CODE-DATA-for-kernel-and-initrd-.patch

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2022 13:04:43 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] efi: use EFI_LOADER_(CODE|DATA) for kernel and initrd
- allocations
-
-At some point due to an erroneous kernel warning, we switched kernel and
-initramfs to being loaded in EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE and
-EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA memory pools.  This doesn't appear to be
-correct according to the spec, and that kernel warning has gone away.
-
-This patch puts them back in EFI_LOADER_CODE and EFI_LOADER_DATA
-allocations, respectively.
-
-Resolves: rhbz#2108456
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 35b5d5fa47bc394c76022e6595b173e68f53225e)
-(cherry picked from commit 66e1c922b40957fca488435e06a2f875a219844b)
----
- grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-index 09e7596064..4d39023792 100644
---- a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-+++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd, int argc, char *argv[])
-     }
- 
-   grub_dprintf ("linux", "Trying to allocate initrd mem\n");
--  initrd_mem = kernel_alloc(INITRD_MEM, size, GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
-+  initrd_mem = kernel_alloc(INITRD_MEM, size, GRUB_EFI_LOADER_DATA,
- 			    N_("can't allocate initrd"));
-   if (initrd_mem == NULL)
-     goto fail;
-@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
- #endif
- 
-   params = kernel_alloc (KERNEL_MEM, sizeof(*params),
--			 GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
-+			 GRUB_EFI_LOADER_DATA,
- 			 "cannot allocate kernel parameters");
-   if (!params)
-     goto fail;
-@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
- 
-   grub_dprintf ("linux", "setting up cmdline\n");
-   cmdline = kernel_alloc (KERNEL_MEM, lh->cmdline_size + 1,
--			  GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
-+			  GRUB_EFI_LOADER_DATA,
- 			  N_("can't allocate cmdline"));
-   if (!cmdline)
-     goto fail;
-@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
-   kernel_size = lh->init_size;
-   grub_dprintf ("linux", "Trying to allocate kernel mem\n");
-   kernel_mem = kernel_alloc (KERNEL_MEM, kernel_size,
--			     GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE,
-+			     GRUB_EFI_LOADER_CODE,
- 			     N_("can't allocate kernel"));
-   restore_addresses();
-   if (!kernel_mem)

SOURCES/0559-ieee1275-implement-vec5-for-cas-negotiation.patch

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Diego Domingos <diegodo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 11:37:56 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] ieee1275: implement vec5 for cas negotiation
-
-As a legacy support, if the vector 5 is not implemented, Power
-Hypervisor will consider the max CPUs as 64 instead 256 currently
-supported during client-architecture-support negotiation.
-
-This patch implements the vector 5 and set the MAX CPUs to 256 while
-setting the others values to 0 (default).
-
-Signed-off-by: Diego Domingos <diegodo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit f735c65b6da8a9d4251242b37774e1a517511253)
-(cherry picked from commit 1639f43b2db4ac405ac2a92e50ed4cff351c3baa)
----
- grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-index 1414695cc6..37f3098c39 100644
---- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-@@ -307,6 +307,18 @@ struct option_vector2 {
-   grub_uint8_t max_pft_size;
- } __attribute__((packed));
- 
-+struct option_vector5 {
-+        grub_uint8_t byte1;
-+        grub_uint8_t byte2;
-+        grub_uint8_t byte3;
-+        grub_uint8_t cmo;
-+        grub_uint8_t associativity;
-+        grub_uint8_t bin_opts;
-+        grub_uint8_t micro_checkpoint;
-+        grub_uint8_t reserved0;
-+        grub_uint32_t max_cpus;
-+} __attribute__((packed));
-+
- struct pvr_entry {
-   grub_uint32_t mask;
-   grub_uint32_t entry;
-@@ -325,6 +337,8 @@ struct cas_vector {
-   grub_uint16_t vec3;
-   grub_uint8_t vec4_size;
-   grub_uint16_t vec4;
-+  grub_uint8_t vec5_size;
-+  struct option_vector5 vec5;
- } __attribute__((packed));
- 
- /* Call ibm,client-architecture-support to try to get more RMA.
-@@ -345,7 +359,7 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
-   } args;
-   struct cas_vector vector = {
-     .pvr_list = { { 0x00000000, 0xffffffff } }, /* any processor */
--    .num_vecs = 4 - 1,
-+    .num_vecs = 5 - 1,
-     .vec1_size = 0,
-     .vec1 = 0x80, /* ignore */
-     .vec2_size = 1 + sizeof(struct option_vector2) - 2,
-@@ -356,6 +370,10 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
-     .vec3 = 0x00e0, // ask for FP + VMX + DFP but don't halt if unsatisfied
-     .vec4_size = 2 - 1,
-     .vec4 = 0x0001, // set required minimum capacity % to the lowest value
-+    .vec5_size = 1 + sizeof(struct option_vector5) - 2,
-+    .vec5 = {
-+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 256
-+    }
-   };
- 
-   INIT_IEEE1275_COMMON (&args.common, "call-method", 3, 2);

SOURCES/0560-x86-efi-Fix-an-incorrect-array-size-in-kernel-alloca.patch

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 17:00:50 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] x86-efi: Fix an incorrect array size in kernel allocation
-
-In 81a6ebf62bbe166ddc968463df2e8bd481bf697c ("efi: split allocation
-policy for kernel vs initrd memories."), I introduced a split in the
-kernel allocator to allow for different dynamic policies for the kernel
-and the initrd allocations.
-
-Unfortunately, that change increased the size of the policy data used to
-make decisions, but did not change the size of the temporary storage we
-use to back it up and restore.  This results in some of .data getting
-clobbered at runtime, and hilarity ensues.
-
-This patch makes the size of the backup storage be based on the size of
-the initial policy data.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 37747b22342499a798ca3a8895770cd93b6e1258)
-(cherry picked from commit 72713ce761720235c86bbda412480c97b2892e00)
----
- grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-index 4d39023792..3d55f8b8d2 100644
---- a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-+++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
-@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static struct allocation_choice max_addresses[] =
-       { INITRD_MEM, GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
-     { NO_MEM, 0, 0 }
-   };
--static struct allocation_choice saved_addresses[4];
-+static struct allocation_choice saved_addresses[sizeof(max_addresses) / sizeof(max_addresses[0])];
- 
- #define save_addresses() grub_memcpy(saved_addresses, max_addresses, sizeof(max_addresses))
- #define restore_addresses() grub_memcpy(max_addresses, saved_addresses, sizeof(max_addresses))

SOURCES/0561-switch-to-blscfg-don-t-assume-newline-at-end-of-cfg.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2022 14:15:28 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] switch-to-blscfg: don't assume newline at end of cfg
-
-Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
----
- util/grub-switch-to-blscfg.in | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/util/grub-switch-to-blscfg.in b/util/grub-switch-to-blscfg.in
-index eeea130770..5a97954c39 100644
---- a/util/grub-switch-to-blscfg.in
-+++ b/util/grub-switch-to-blscfg.in
-@@ -277,7 +277,9 @@ if grep '^GRUB_ENABLE_BLSCFG=.*' "${etcdefaultgrub}" \
-     fi
-     GENERATE=1
- elif ! grep -q '^GRUB_ENABLE_BLSCFG=.*' "${etcdefaultgrub}" ; then
--    if ! echo 'GRUB_ENABLE_BLSCFG=true' >> "${etcdefaultgrub}" ; then
-+    # prepend in case admins have been bad at newlines
-+    sed -i '1iGRUB_ENABLE_BLSCFG=true' "${etcdefaultgrub}"
-+    if ! grep -q '^GRUB_ENABLE_BLSCFG=true' "${etcdefaultgrub}" ; then
-         gettext_printf "Updating %s failed\n" "${etcdefaultgrub}"
-         exit 1
-     fi

SOURCES/0562-font-Reject-glyphs-exceeds-font-max_glyph_width-or-f.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 19:45:33 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] font: Reject glyphs exceeds font->max_glyph_width or
- font->max_glyph_height
-
-Check glyph's width and height against limits specified in font's
-metadata. Reject the glyph (and font) if such limits are exceeded.
-
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 5760fcfd466cc757540ea0d591bad6a08caeaa16)
-(cherry picked from commit 3b410ef4bb95e607cadeba2193fa90ae9bddb98d)
-(cherry picked from commit 8ebe587def61af7893ebcae87d45c883f3cfb713)
----
- grub-core/font/font.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
-index b67507fcc8..8d1a990401 100644
---- a/grub-core/font/font.c
-+++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
-@@ -760,7 +760,9 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
- 	  || read_be_uint16 (font->file, &height) != 0
- 	  || read_be_int16 (font->file, &xoff) != 0
- 	  || read_be_int16 (font->file, &yoff) != 0
--	  || read_be_int16 (font->file, &dwidth) != 0)
-+	  || read_be_int16 (font->file, &dwidth) != 0
-+	  || width > font->max_char_width
-+	  || height > font->max_char_height)
- 	{
- 	  remove_font (font);
- 	  return 0;

SOURCES/0563-font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 00:51:20 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix size overflow in grub_font_get_glyph_internal()
-
-The length of memory allocation and file read may overflow. This patch
-fixes the problem by using safemath macros.
-
-There is a lot of code repetition like "(x * y + 7) / 8". It is unsafe
-if overflow happens. This patch introduces grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz().
-It is safe replacement for such code. It has safemath-like prototype.
-
-This patch also introduces grub_cast(value, pointer), it casts value to
-typeof(*pointer) then store the value to *pointer. It returns true when
-overflow occurs or false if there is no overflow. The semantics of arguments
-and return value are designed to be consistent with other safemath macros.
-
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 941d10ad6f1dcbd12fb613002249e29ba035f985)
-(cherry picked from commit 6bca9693878bdf61dd62b8c784862a48e75f569a)
-(cherry picked from commit edbbda5486cf8c3dc2b68fbd3dead822ab448022)
----
- grub-core/font/font.c   | 17 +++++++++++++----
- include/grub/bitmap.h   | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
- include/grub/safemath.h |  2 ++
- 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
-index 8d1a990401..d6df79602d 100644
---- a/grub-core/font/font.c
-+++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
-@@ -739,7 +739,8 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
-       grub_int16_t xoff;
-       grub_int16_t yoff;
-       grub_int16_t dwidth;
--      int len;
-+      grub_ssize_t len;
-+      grub_size_t sz;
- 
-       if (index_entry->glyph)
- 	/* Return cached glyph.  */
-@@ -768,9 +769,17 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
- 	  return 0;
- 	}
- 
--      len = (width * height + 7) / 8;
--      glyph = grub_malloc (sizeof (struct grub_font_glyph) + len);
--      if (!glyph)
-+      /* Calculate real struct size of current glyph. */
-+      if (grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz (width, height, &len) ||
-+	  grub_add (sizeof (struct grub_font_glyph), len, &sz))
-+	{
-+	  remove_font (font);
-+	  return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+      /* Allocate and initialize the glyph struct. */
-+      glyph = grub_malloc (sz);
-+      if (glyph == NULL)
- 	{
- 	  remove_font (font);
- 	  return 0;
-diff --git a/include/grub/bitmap.h b/include/grub/bitmap.h
-index 5728f8ca3a..0d9603f619 100644
---- a/include/grub/bitmap.h
-+++ b/include/grub/bitmap.h
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
- #include <grub/symbol.h>
- #include <grub/types.h>
- #include <grub/video.h>
-+#include <grub/safemath.h>
- 
- struct grub_video_bitmap
- {
-@@ -79,6 +80,23 @@ grub_video_bitmap_get_height (struct grub_video_bitmap *bitmap)
-   return bitmap->mode_info.height;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Calculate and store the size of data buffer of 1bit bitmap in result.
-+ * Equivalent to "*result = (width * height + 7) / 8" if no overflow occurs.
-+ * Return true when overflow occurs or false if there is no overflow.
-+ * This function is intentionally implemented as a macro instead of
-+ * an inline function. Although a bit awkward, it preserves data types for
-+ * safemath macros and reduces macro side effects as much as possible.
-+ *
-+ * XXX: Will report false overflow if width * height > UINT64_MAX.
-+ */
-+#define grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz(width, height, result) \
-+({ \
-+  grub_uint64_t _bitmap_pixels; \
-+  grub_mul ((width), (height), &_bitmap_pixels) ? 1 : \
-+    grub_cast (_bitmap_pixels / GRUB_CHAR_BIT + !!(_bitmap_pixels % GRUB_CHAR_BIT), (result)); \
-+})
-+
- void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_video_bitmap_get_mode_info) (struct grub_video_bitmap *bitmap,
- 						    struct grub_video_mode_info *mode_info);
- 
-diff --git a/include/grub/safemath.h b/include/grub/safemath.h
-index 1ccac276b5..30800ad6a1 100644
---- a/include/grub/safemath.h
-+++ b/include/grub/safemath.h
-@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
- #define grub_sub(a, b, res)	__builtin_sub_overflow(a, b, res)
- #define grub_mul(a, b, res)	__builtin_mul_overflow(a, b, res)
- 
-+#define grub_cast(a, res)	grub_add ((a), 0, (res))
-+
- #else
- /*
-  * Copyright 2020 Rasmus Villemoes

SOURCES/0564-font-Fix-several-integer-overflows-in-grub_font_cons.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 01:58:27 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix several integer overflows in
- grub_font_construct_glyph()
-
-This patch fixes several integer overflows in grub_font_construct_glyph().
-Glyphs of invalid size, zero or leading to an overflow, are rejected.
-The inconsistency between "glyph" and "max_glyph_size" when grub_malloc()
-returns NULL is fixed too.
-
-Fixes: CVE-2022-2601
-
-Reported-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit b1805f251b31a9d3cfae5c3572ddfa630145dbbf)
-(cherry picked from commit b91eb9bd6c724339b7d7bb4765b9d36f1ee88b84)
-(cherry picked from commit 1ebafd82dd19e522f0d753fd9828553fe8bcac78)
----
- grub-core/font/font.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
-index d6df79602d..129aaa3838 100644
---- a/grub-core/font/font.c
-+++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
-@@ -1517,6 +1517,7 @@ grub_font_construct_glyph (grub_font_t hinted_font,
-   struct grub_video_signed_rect bounds;
-   static struct grub_font_glyph *glyph = 0;
-   static grub_size_t max_glyph_size = 0;
-+  grub_size_t cur_glyph_size;
- 
-   ensure_comb_space (glyph_id);
- 
-@@ -1533,29 +1534,33 @@ grub_font_construct_glyph (grub_font_t hinted_font,
-   if (!glyph_id->ncomb && !glyph_id->attributes)
-     return main_glyph;
- 
--  if (max_glyph_size < sizeof (*glyph) + (bounds.width * bounds.height + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT)
-+  if (grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz (bounds.width, bounds.height, &cur_glyph_size) ||
-+      grub_add (sizeof (*glyph), cur_glyph_size, &cur_glyph_size))
-+    return main_glyph;
-+
-+  if (max_glyph_size < cur_glyph_size)
-     {
-       grub_free (glyph);
--      max_glyph_size = (sizeof (*glyph) + (bounds.width * bounds.height + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT) * 2;
--      if (max_glyph_size < 8)
--	max_glyph_size = 8;
--      glyph = grub_malloc (max_glyph_size);
-+      if (grub_mul (cur_glyph_size, 2, &max_glyph_size))
-+	max_glyph_size = 0;
-+      glyph = max_glyph_size > 0 ? grub_malloc (max_glyph_size) : NULL;
-     }
-   if (!glyph)
-     {
-+      max_glyph_size = 0;
-       grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
-       return main_glyph;
-     }
- 
--  grub_memset (glyph, 0, sizeof (*glyph)
--	       + (bounds.width * bounds.height
--		  + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT);
-+  grub_memset (glyph, 0, cur_glyph_size);
- 
-   glyph->font = main_glyph->font;
--  glyph->width = bounds.width;
--  glyph->height = bounds.height;
--  glyph->offset_x = bounds.x;
--  glyph->offset_y = bounds.y;
-+  if (bounds.width == 0 || bounds.height == 0 ||
-+      grub_cast (bounds.width, &glyph->width) ||
-+      grub_cast (bounds.height, &glyph->height) ||
-+      grub_cast (bounds.x, &glyph->offset_x) ||
-+      grub_cast (bounds.y, &glyph->offset_y))
-+    return main_glyph;
- 
-   if (glyph_id->attributes & GRUB_UNICODE_GLYPH_ATTRIBUTE_MIRROR)
-     grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror (glyph, main_glyph,

SOURCES/0565-font-Remove-grub_font_dup_glyph.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 02:13:29 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] font: Remove grub_font_dup_glyph()
-
-Remove grub_font_dup_glyph() since nobody is using it since 2013, and
-I'm too lazy to fix the integer overflow problem in it.
-
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 25ad31c19c331aaa2dbd9bd2b2e2655de5766a9d)
-(cherry picked from commit ad950e1e033318bb50222ed268a6dcfb97389035)
-(cherry picked from commit 71644fccc1d43309f0a379dcfe9341ec3bd9657d)
----
- grub-core/font/font.c | 14 --------------
- 1 file changed, 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
-index 129aaa3838..347e9dfa29 100644
---- a/grub-core/font/font.c
-+++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
-@@ -1055,20 +1055,6 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_with_fallback (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
-   return best_glyph;
- }
- 
--#if 0
--static struct grub_font_glyph *
--grub_font_dup_glyph (struct grub_font_glyph *glyph)
--{
--  static struct grub_font_glyph *ret;
--  ret = grub_malloc (sizeof (*ret) + (glyph->width * glyph->height + 7) / 8);
--  if (!ret)
--    return NULL;
--  grub_memcpy (ret, glyph, sizeof (*ret)
--	       + (glyph->width * glyph->height + 7) / 8);
--  return ret;
--}
--#endif
--
- /* FIXME: suboptimal.  */
- static void
- grub_font_blit_glyph (struct grub_font_glyph *target,

SOURCES/0566-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-ensure_comb_space.patch

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 02:27:05 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix integer overflow in ensure_comb_space()
-
-In fact it can't overflow at all because glyph_id->ncomb is only 8-bit
-wide. But let's keep safe if somebody changes the width of glyph_id->ncomb
-in the future. This patch also fixes the inconsistency between
-render_max_comb_glyphs and render_combining_glyphs when grub_malloc()
-returns NULL.
-
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit b2740b7e4a03bb8331d48b54b119afea76bb9d5f)
-(cherry picked from commit f66ea1e60c347408e92b6695d5105c7e0f24d568)
-(cherry picked from commit 0e07159c24cdbb62a9d19fba8199065b049e03c7)
----
- grub-core/font/font.c | 14 +++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
-index 347e9dfa29..1367e44743 100644
---- a/grub-core/font/font.c
-+++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
-@@ -1468,14 +1468,18 @@ ensure_comb_space (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id)
-   if (glyph_id->ncomb <= render_max_comb_glyphs)
-     return;
- 
--  render_max_comb_glyphs = 2 * glyph_id->ncomb;
--  if (render_max_comb_glyphs < 8)
-+  if (grub_mul (glyph_id->ncomb, 2, &render_max_comb_glyphs))
-+    render_max_comb_glyphs = 0;
-+  if (render_max_comb_glyphs > 0 && render_max_comb_glyphs < 8)
-     render_max_comb_glyphs = 8;
-   grub_free (render_combining_glyphs);
--  render_combining_glyphs = grub_malloc (render_max_comb_glyphs
--					 * sizeof (render_combining_glyphs[0]));
-+  render_combining_glyphs = (render_max_comb_glyphs > 0) ?
-+    grub_calloc (render_max_comb_glyphs, sizeof (render_combining_glyphs[0])) : NULL;
-   if (!render_combining_glyphs)
--    grub_errno = 0;
-+    {
-+      render_max_comb_glyphs = 0;
-+      grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
-+    }
- }
- 
- int

SOURCES/0567-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-BMP-index.patch

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 02:04:58 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix integer overflow in BMP index
-
-The BMP index (font->bmp_idx) is designed as a reverse lookup table of
-char entries (font->char_index), in order to speed up lookups for BMP
-chars (i.e. code < 0x10000). The values in BMP index are the subscripts
-of the corresponding char entries, stored in grub_uint16_t, while 0xffff
-means not found.
-
-This patch fixes the problem of large subscript truncated to grub_uint16_t,
-leading BMP index to return wrong char entry or report false miss. The
-code now checks for bounds and uses BMP index as a hint, and fallbacks
-to binary-search if necessary.
-
-On the occasion add a comment about BMP index is initialized to 0xffff.
-
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit afda8b60ba0712abe01ae1e64c5f7a067a0e6492)
-(cherry picked from commit 6d90568929e11739b56f09ebbce9185ca9c23519)
-(cherry picked from commit b8c47c3dd6894b3135db861e3e563f661efad5c3)
----
- grub-core/font/font.c | 13 +++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
-index 1367e44743..059c23dff7 100644
---- a/grub-core/font/font.c
-+++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
-@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ load_font_index (grub_file_t file, grub_uint32_t sect_length, struct
-   font->bmp_idx = grub_malloc (0x10000 * sizeof (grub_uint16_t));
-   if (!font->bmp_idx)
-     return 1;
-+
-+  /* Init the BMP index array to 0xffff. */
-   grub_memset (font->bmp_idx, 0xff, 0x10000 * sizeof (grub_uint16_t));
- 
- 
-@@ -328,7 +330,7 @@ load_font_index (grub_file_t file, grub_uint32_t sect_length, struct
- 	  return 1;
- 	}
- 
--      if (entry->code < 0x10000)
-+      if (entry->code < 0x10000 && i < 0xffff)
- 	font->bmp_idx[entry->code] = i;
- 
-       last_code = entry->code;
-@@ -696,9 +698,12 @@ find_glyph (const grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
-   /* Use BMP index if possible.  */
-   if (code < 0x10000 && font->bmp_idx)
-     {
--      if (font->bmp_idx[code] == 0xffff)
--	return 0;
--      return &table[font->bmp_idx[code]];
-+      if (font->bmp_idx[code] < 0xffff)
-+	return &table[font->bmp_idx[code]];
-+      /*
-+       * When we are here then lookup in BMP index result in miss,
-+       * fallthough to binary-search.
-+       */
-     }
- 
-   /* Do a binary search in `char_index', which is ordered by code point.  */

SOURCES/0568-font-Fix-integer-underflow-in-binary-search-of-char-.patch

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2022 18:09:38 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix integer underflow in binary search of char index
-
-If search target is less than all entries in font->index then "hi"
-variable is set to -1, which translates to SIZE_MAX and leads to errors.
-
-This patch fixes the problem by replacing the entire binary search code
-with the libstdc++'s std::lower_bound() implementation.
-
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit c140a086838e7c9af87842036f891b8393a8c4bc)
-(cherry picked from commit e110997335b1744464ea232d57a7d86e16ca8dee)
-(cherry picked from commit 403053a5116ae945f9515a82c37ff8cfb927362c)
----
- grub-core/font/font.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
-index 059c23dff7..31786ab339 100644
---- a/grub-core/font/font.c
-+++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
-@@ -688,12 +688,12 @@ read_be_int16 (grub_file_t file, grub_int16_t * value)
- static inline struct char_index_entry *
- find_glyph (const grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
- {
--  struct char_index_entry *table;
--  grub_size_t lo;
--  grub_size_t hi;
--  grub_size_t mid;
-+  struct char_index_entry *table, *first, *end;
-+  grub_size_t len;
- 
-   table = font->char_index;
-+  if (table == NULL)
-+    return NULL;
- 
-   /* Use BMP index if possible.  */
-   if (code < 0x10000 && font->bmp_idx)
-@@ -706,25 +706,29 @@ find_glyph (const grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
-        */
-     }
- 
--  /* Do a binary search in `char_index', which is ordered by code point.  */
--  lo = 0;
--  hi = font->num_chars - 1;
-+  /*
-+   * Do a binary search in char_index which is ordered by code point.
-+   * The code below is the same as libstdc++'s std::lower_bound().
-+   */
-+  first = table;
-+  len = font->num_chars;
-+  end = first + len;
- 
--  if (!table)
--    return 0;
--
--  while (lo <= hi)
-+  while (len > 0)
-     {
--      mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2;
--      if (code < table[mid].code)
--	hi = mid - 1;
--      else if (code > table[mid].code)
--	lo = mid + 1;
-+      grub_size_t half = len >> 1;
-+      struct char_index_entry *middle = first + half;
-+
-+      if (middle->code < code)
-+	{
-+	  first = middle + 1;
-+	  len = len - half - 1;
-+	}
-       else
--	return &table[mid];
-+	len = half;
-     }
- 
--  return 0;
-+  return (first < end && first->code == code) ? first : NULL;
- }
- 
- /* Get a glyph for the Unicode character CODE in FONT.  The glyph is loaded

SOURCES/0569-fbutil-Fix-integer-overflow.patch

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2022 03:03:21 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] fbutil: Fix integer overflow
-
-Expressions like u64 = u32 * u32 are unsafe because their products are
-truncated to u32 even if left hand side is u64. This patch fixes all
-problems like that one in fbutil.
-
-To get right result not only left hand side have to be u64 but it's also
-necessary to cast at least one of the operands of all leaf operators of
-right hand side to u64, e.g. u64 = u32 * u32 + u32 * u32 should be
-u64 = (u64)u32 * u32 + (u64)u32 * u32.
-
-For 1-bit bitmaps grub_uint64_t have to be used. It's safe because any
-combination of values in (grub_uint64_t)u32 * u32 + u32 expression will
-not overflow grub_uint64_t.
-
-Other expressions like ptr + u32 * u32 + u32 * u32 are also vulnerable.
-They should be ptr + (grub_addr_t)u32 * u32 + (grub_addr_t)u32 * u32.
-
-This patch also adds a comment to grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr() which
-says it's arguments must be valid and no sanity check is performed
-(like its siblings in grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c).
-
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 50a11a81bc842c58962244a2dc86bbd31a426e12)
-(cherry picked from commit 8fa75d647362c938c4cc302cf5945b31fb92c078)
-(cherry picked from commit 91005e39b3c8b6ca8dcc84ecb19ac9328966aaea)
----
- grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c |  4 ++--
- include/grub/fbutil.h       | 13 +++++++++----
- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c b/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c
-index b98bb51fe8..25ef39f47d 100644
---- a/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c
-+++ b/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c
-@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ get_pixel (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *source,
-     case 1:
-       if (source->mode_info->blit_format == GRUB_VIDEO_BLIT_FORMAT_1BIT_PACKED)
-         {
--          int bit_index = y * source->mode_info->width + x;
-+          grub_uint64_t bit_index = (grub_uint64_t) y * source->mode_info->width + x;
-           grub_uint8_t *ptr = source->data + bit_index / 8;
-           int bit_pos = 7 - bit_index % 8;
-           color = (*ptr >> bit_pos) & 0x01;
-@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ set_pixel (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *source,
-     case 1:
-       if (source->mode_info->blit_format == GRUB_VIDEO_BLIT_FORMAT_1BIT_PACKED)
-         {
--          int bit_index = y * source->mode_info->width + x;
-+          grub_uint64_t bit_index = (grub_uint64_t) y * source->mode_info->width + x;
-           grub_uint8_t *ptr = source->data + bit_index / 8;
-           int bit_pos = 7 - bit_index % 8;
-           *ptr = (*ptr & ~(1 << bit_pos)) | ((color & 0x01) << bit_pos);
-diff --git a/include/grub/fbutil.h b/include/grub/fbutil.h
-index 4205eb917f..78a1ab3b45 100644
---- a/include/grub/fbutil.h
-+++ b/include/grub/fbutil.h
-@@ -31,14 +31,19 @@ struct grub_video_fbblit_info
-   grub_uint8_t *data;
- };
- 
--/* Don't use for 1-bit bitmaps, addressing needs to be done at the bit level
--   and it doesn't make sense, in general, to ask for a pointer
--   to a particular pixel's data.  */
-+/*
-+ * Don't use for 1-bit bitmaps, addressing needs to be done at the bit level
-+ * and it doesn't make sense, in general, to ask for a pointer
-+ * to a particular pixel's data.
-+ *
-+ * This function assumes that bounds checking has been done in previous phase
-+ * and they are opted out in here.
-+ */
- static inline void *
- grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *source,
-               unsigned int x, unsigned int y)
- {
--  return source->data + y * source->mode_info->pitch + x * source->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel;
-+  return source->data + (grub_addr_t) y * source->mode_info->pitch + (grub_addr_t) x * source->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel;
- }
- 
- /* Advance pointer by VAL bytes. If there is no unaligned access available,

SOURCES/0570-font-Fix-an-integer-underflow-in-blit_comb.patch

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 08:05:35 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix an integer underflow in blit_comb()
-
-The expression (ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2 may
-evaluate to a very big invalid value even if both ctx.bounds.height and
-combining_glyphs[i]->height are small integers. For example, if
-ctx.bounds.height is 10 and combining_glyphs[i]->height is 12, this
-expression evaluates to 2147483647 (expected -1). This is because
-coordinates are allowed to be negative but ctx.bounds.height is an
-unsigned int. So, the subtraction operates on unsigned ints and
-underflows to a very big value. The division makes things even worse.
-The quotient is still an invalid value even if converted back to int.
-
-This patch fixes the problem by casting ctx.bounds.height to int. As
-a result the subtraction will operate on int and grub_uint16_t which
-will be promoted to an int. So, the underflow will no longer happen. Other
-uses of ctx.bounds.height (and ctx.bounds.width) are also casted to int,
-to ensure coordinates are always calculated on signed integers.
-
-Fixes: CVE-2022-3775
-
-Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 6d2668dea3774ed74c4cd1eadd146f1b846bc3d4)
-(cherry picked from commit 05e532fb707bbf79aa4e1efbde4d208d7da89d6b)
-(cherry picked from commit 0b2592fbb245d53c5c42885d695ece03ddb0eb12)
----
- grub-core/font/font.c | 16 ++++++++--------
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
-index 31786ab339..fc9d92fce4 100644
---- a/grub-core/font/font.c
-+++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
-@@ -1203,12 +1203,12 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
-   ctx.bounds.height = main_glyph->height;
- 
-   above_rightx = main_glyph->offset_x + main_glyph->width;
--  above_righty = ctx.bounds.y + ctx.bounds.height;
-+  above_righty = ctx.bounds.y + (int) ctx.bounds.height;
- 
-   above_leftx = main_glyph->offset_x;
--  above_lefty = ctx.bounds.y + ctx.bounds.height;
-+  above_lefty = ctx.bounds.y + (int) ctx.bounds.height;
- 
--  below_rightx = ctx.bounds.x + ctx.bounds.width;
-+  below_rightx = ctx.bounds.x + (int) ctx.bounds.width;
-   below_righty = ctx.bounds.y;
- 
-   comb = grub_unicode_get_comb (glyph_id);
-@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
- 
-       if (!combining_glyphs[i])
- 	continue;
--      targetx = (ctx.bounds.width - combining_glyphs[i]->width) / 2 + ctx.bounds.x;
-+      targetx = ((int) ctx.bounds.width - combining_glyphs[i]->width) / 2 + ctx.bounds.x;
-       /* CGJ is to avoid diacritics reordering. */
-       if (comb[i].code
- 	  == GRUB_UNICODE_COMBINING_GRAPHEME_JOINER)
-@@ -1231,8 +1231,8 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
- 	case GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_OVERLAY:
- 	  do_blit (combining_glyphs[i],
- 		   targetx,
--		   (ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2
--		   - (ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y), &ctx);
-+		   ((int) ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2
-+		   - ((int) ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y), &ctx);
- 	  if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
- 	    min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;
- 	  break;
-@@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
- 	  /* Fallthrough.  */
- 	case GRUB_UNICODE_STACK_ATTACHED_ABOVE:
- 	  do_blit (combining_glyphs[i], targetx,
--		   -(ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y + space
-+		   -((int) ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y + space
- 		     + combining_glyphs[i]->height), &ctx);
- 	  if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
- 	    min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;
-@@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
- 
- 	case GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_HEBREW_DAGESH:
- 	  do_blit (combining_glyphs[i], targetx,
--		   -(ctx.bounds.height / 2 + ctx.bounds.y
-+		   -((int) ctx.bounds.height / 2 + ctx.bounds.y
- 		     + combining_glyphs[i]->height / 2), &ctx);
- 	  if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
- 	    min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;

SOURCES/0571-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 07:15:41 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] font: Harden grub_font_blit_glyph() and
- grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror()
-
-As a mitigation and hardening measure add sanity checks to
-grub_font_blit_glyph() and grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror(). This patch
-makes these two functions do nothing if target blitting area isn't fully
-contained in target bitmap. Therefore, if complex calculations in caller
-overflows and malicious coordinates are given, we are still safe because
-any coordinates which result in out-of-bound-write are rejected. However,
-this patch only checks for invalid coordinates, and doesn't provide any
-protection against invalid source glyph or destination glyph, e.g.
-mismatch between glyph size and buffer size.
-
-This hardening measure is designed to mitigate possible overflows in
-blit_comb(). If overflow occurs, it may return invalid bounding box
-during dry run and call grub_font_blit_glyph() with malicious
-coordinates during actual blitting. However, we are still safe because
-the scratch glyph itself is valid, although its size makes no sense, and
-any invalid coordinates are rejected.
-
-It would be better to call grub_fatal() if illegal parameter is detected.
-However, doing this may end up in a dangerous recursion because grub_fatal()
-would print messages to the screen and we are in the progress of drawing
-characters on the screen.
-
-Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit fcd7aa0c278f7cf3fb9f93f1a3966e1792339eb6)
-(cherry picked from commit 1d37ec63a1c76a14fdf70f548eada92667b42ddb)
-(cherry picked from commit 686c72ea0a841343b7d8ab64e815751aa36e24b5)
----
- grub-core/font/font.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
-index fc9d92fce4..cfa4bd5096 100644
---- a/grub-core/font/font.c
-+++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
-@@ -1069,8 +1069,15 @@ static void
- grub_font_blit_glyph (struct grub_font_glyph *target,
- 		      struct grub_font_glyph *src, unsigned dx, unsigned dy)
- {
-+  grub_uint16_t max_x, max_y;
-   unsigned src_bit, tgt_bit, src_byte, tgt_byte;
-   unsigned i, j;
-+
-+  /* Harden against out-of-bound writes. */
-+  if ((grub_add (dx, src->width, &max_x) || max_x > target->width) ||
-+      (grub_add (dy, src->height, &max_y) || max_y > target->height))
-+    return;
-+
-   for (i = 0; i < src->height; i++)
-     {
-       src_bit = (src->width * i) % 8;
-@@ -1102,9 +1109,16 @@ grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror (struct grub_font_glyph *target,
- 			     struct grub_font_glyph *src,
- 			     unsigned dx, unsigned dy)
- {
-+  grub_uint16_t max_x, max_y;
-   unsigned tgt_bit, src_byte, tgt_byte;
-   signed src_bit;
-   unsigned i, j;
-+
-+  /* Harden against out-of-bound writes. */
-+  if ((grub_add (dx, src->width, &max_x) || max_x > target->width) ||
-+      (grub_add (dy, src->height, &max_y) || max_y > target->height))
-+    return;
-+
-   for (i = 0; i < src->height; i++)
-     {
-       src_bit = (src->width * i + src->width - 1) % 8;

SOURCES/0572-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 17:29:16 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] font: Assign null_font to glyphs in ascii_font_glyph[]
-
-The calculations in blit_comb() need information from glyph's font, e.g.
-grub_font_get_xheight(main_glyph->font). However, main_glyph->font is
-NULL if main_glyph comes from ascii_font_glyph[]. Therefore
-grub_font_get_*() crashes because of NULL pointer.
-
-There is already a solution, the null_font. So, assign it to those glyphs
-in ascii_font_glyph[].
-
-Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit dd539d695482069d28b40f2d3821f710cdcf6ee6)
-(cherry picked from commit 87526376857eaceae474c9797e3cee5b50597332)
-(cherry picked from commit b4807bbb09d9adf82fe9ae12a3af1c852dc4e32d)
----
- grub-core/font/font.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
-index cfa4bd5096..30cd1fe07f 100644
---- a/grub-core/font/font.c
-+++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
-@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ ascii_glyph_lookup (grub_uint32_t code)
- 	  ascii_font_glyph[current]->offset_x = 0;
- 	  ascii_font_glyph[current]->offset_y = -2;
- 	  ascii_font_glyph[current]->device_width = 8;
--	  ascii_font_glyph[current]->font = NULL;
-+	  ascii_font_glyph[current]->font = &null_font;
- 
- 	  grub_memcpy (ascii_font_glyph[current]->bitmap,
- 		       &ascii_bitmaps[current * ASCII_BITMAP_SIZE],

SOURCES/0573-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 21:31:39 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] normal/charset: Fix an integer overflow in
- grub_unicode_aglomerate_comb()
-
-The out->ncomb is a bit-field of 8 bits. So, the max possible value is 255.
-However, code in grub_unicode_aglomerate_comb() doesn't check for an
-overflow when incrementing out->ncomb. If out->ncomb is already 255,
-after incrementing it will get 0 instead of 256, and cause illegal
-memory access in subsequent processing.
-
-This patch introduces GRUB_UNICODE_NCOMB_MAX to represent the max
-acceptable value of ncomb. The code now checks for this limit and
-ignores additional combining characters when limit is reached.
-
-Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
-Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit da90d62316a3b105d2fbd7334d6521936bd6dcf6)
-(cherry picked from commit 26fafec86000b5322837722a115279ef03922ca6)
-(cherry picked from commit 872fba1c44dee2ab5cb36b2c7a883847f91ed907)
----
- grub-core/normal/charset.c | 3 +++
- include/grub/unicode.h     | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/normal/charset.c b/grub-core/normal/charset.c
-index 7b2de12001..4849cf06f7 100644
---- a/grub-core/normal/charset.c
-+++ b/grub-core/normal/charset.c
-@@ -472,6 +472,9 @@ grub_unicode_aglomerate_comb (const grub_uint32_t *in, grub_size_t inlen,
- 	  if (!haveout)
- 	    continue;
- 
-+	  if (out->ncomb == GRUB_UNICODE_NCOMB_MAX)
-+	    continue;
-+
- 	  if (comb_type == GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_MC
- 	      || comb_type == GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_ME
- 	      || comb_type == GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_MN)
-diff --git a/include/grub/unicode.h b/include/grub/unicode.h
-index 4de986a857..c4f6fca043 100644
---- a/include/grub/unicode.h
-+++ b/include/grub/unicode.h
-@@ -147,7 +147,9 @@ struct grub_unicode_glyph
-   grub_uint8_t bidi_level:6; /* minimum: 6 */
-   enum grub_bidi_type bidi_type:5; /* minimum: :5 */
- 
-+#define GRUB_UNICODE_NCOMB_MAX ((1 << 8) - 1)
-   unsigned ncomb:8;
-+
-   /* Hint by unicode subsystem how wide this character usually is.
-      Real width is determined by font. Set only in UTF-8 stream.  */
-   int estimated_width:8;

SOURCES/0574-Enable-TDX-measurement-to-RTMR-register.patch

@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
-Date: Sat, 3 Jul 2021 10:50:37 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Enable TDX measurement to RTMR register
-
-Intel Trust Domain Extensions(Intel TDX) refers to an Intel technology
-that extends Virtual Machine Extensions(VMX) and Multi-Key Total Memory
-Encryption(MK-TME) with a new kind of virtual machine guest called a
-Trust Domain(TD)[1]. A TD runs in a CPU mode that protects the confidentiality
-of its memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including
-the hosting Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM).
-
-Trust Domain Virtual Firmware (TDVF) is required to provide TD services to
-the TD guest OS.[2] Its reference code is available at https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF.
-
-To support TD measurement/attestation, TDs provide 4 RTMR registers like
-TPM/TPM2 PCR as below:
-- RTMR[0] is for TDVF configuration
-- RTMR[1] is for the TD OS loader and kernel
-- RTMR[2] is for the OS application
-- RTMR[3] is reserved for special usage only
-
-This patch adds TD Measurement protocol support along with TPM/TPM2 protocol.
-
-References:
-[1] https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-whitepaper-v4.pdf
-[2] https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.pdf
-
-Signed-off-by: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 841a0977397cf12a5498d439b8aaf8bf28ff8544)
----
- grub-core/Makefile.core.def |  1 +
- grub-core/kern/efi/tdx.c    | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- grub-core/kern/tpm.c        |  4 +++
- include/grub/efi/tdx.h      | 26 +++++++++++++++++
- include/grub/tdx.h          | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++
- 5 files changed, 137 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/efi/tdx.c
- create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/tdx.h
- create mode 100644 include/grub/tdx.h
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
-index 637d7203e3..2787d59c52 100644
---- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
-+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
-@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ kernel = {
-   efi = kern/efi/acpi.c;
-   efi = kern/lockdown.c;
-   efi = lib/envblk.c;
-+  efi = kern/efi/tdx.c;
-   efi = kern/efi/tpm.c;
-   i386_coreboot = kern/i386/pc/acpi.c;
-   i386_multiboot = kern/i386/pc/acpi.c;
-diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/tdx.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/tdx.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..3a49f8d117
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/tdx.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
-+#include <grub/err.h>
-+#include <grub/i18n.h>
-+#include <grub/efi/api.h>
-+#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
-+#include <grub/efi/tpm.h>
-+#include <grub/efi/tdx.h>
-+#include <grub/mm.h>
-+#include <grub/tpm.h>
-+#include <grub/tdx.h>
-+
-+static grub_efi_guid_t tdx_guid = EFI_TDX_GUID;
-+
-+static inline grub_err_t grub_tdx_dprintf(grub_efi_status_t status)
-+{
-+  switch (status) {
-+  case GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS:
-+    return 0;
-+  case GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
-+    grub_dprintf ("tdx", "Command failed: 0x%"PRIxGRUB_EFI_STATUS"\n",
-+                  status);
-+    return GRUB_ERR_IO;
-+  case GRUB_EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
-+    grub_dprintf ("tdx", "Invalid parameter: 0x%"PRIxGRUB_EFI_STATUS"\n",
-+                  status);
-+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
-+  case GRUB_EFI_VOLUME_FULL:
-+    grub_dprintf ("tdx", "Volume is full: 0x%"PRIxGRUB_EFI_STATUS"\n",
-+                  status);
-+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
-+  case GRUB_EFI_UNSUPPORTED:
-+    grub_dprintf ("tdx", "TDX unavailable: 0x%"PRIxGRUB_EFI_STATUS"\n",
-+                  status);
-+    return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE;
-+  default:
-+    grub_dprintf ("tdx", "Unknown TDX error: 0x%"PRIxGRUB_EFI_STATUS"\n",
-+                  status);
-+    return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE;
-+  }
-+}
-+
-+grub_err_t
-+grub_tdx_log_event(unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size, grub_uint8_t pcr,
-+		   const char *description)
-+{
-+  EFI_TCG2_EVENT *event;
-+  grub_efi_status_t status;
-+  grub_efi_tdx_protocol_t *tdx;
-+
-+  tdx = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&tdx_guid, NULL);
-+
-+  if (!tdx)
-+    return 0;
-+
-+  event = grub_zalloc(sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) + grub_strlen(description) + 1);
-+  if (!event)
-+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
-+		       N_("cannot allocate TCG2 event buffer"));
-+
-+  event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof(EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER);
-+  event->Header.HeaderVersion = 1;
-+  event->Header.PCRIndex = pcr;
-+  event->Header.EventType = EV_IPL;
-+  event->Size = sizeof(*event) - sizeof(event->Event) + grub_strlen(description) + 1;
-+  grub_memcpy(event->Event, description, grub_strlen(description) + 1);
-+
-+  status = efi_call_5 (tdx->hash_log_extend_event, tdx, 0, (unsigned long) buf,
-+		       (grub_uint64_t) size, event);
-+
-+  return grub_tdx_dprintf(status);
-+}
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/grub-core/kern/tpm.c b/grub-core/kern/tpm.c
-index e5e8fced62..71cc4252c1 100644
---- a/grub-core/kern/tpm.c
-+++ b/grub-core/kern/tpm.c
-@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
- #include <grub/mm.h>
- #include <grub/tpm.h>
- #include <grub/term.h>
-+#include <grub/tdx.h>
- 
- grub_err_t
- grub_tpm_measure (unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size, grub_uint8_t pcr,
-@@ -13,6 +14,9 @@ grub_tpm_measure (unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size, grub_uint8_t pcr,
-   char *desc = grub_xasprintf("%s %s", kind, description);
-   if (!desc)
-     return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-+
-+  grub_tdx_log_event(buf, size, pcr, desc);
-+
-   ret = grub_tpm_log_event(buf, size, pcr, desc);
-   grub_free(desc);
-   return ret;
-diff --git a/include/grub/efi/tdx.h b/include/grub/efi/tdx.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..9bdac2a275
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/include/grub/efi/tdx.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
-+/*
-+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
-+ *  Copyright (C) 2015  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-+ *
-+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
-+ *  (at your option) any later version.
-+ *
-+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
-+ *
-+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef GRUB_EFI_TDX_HEADER
-+#define GRUB_EFI_TDX_HEADER 1
-+
-+#define EFI_TDX_GUID {0x96751a3d, 0x72f4, 0x41a6, {0xa7, 0x94, 0xed, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x67, 0xae, 0x6b}};
-+
-+typedef grub_efi_tpm2_protocol_t grub_efi_tdx_protocol_t;
-+
-+#endif
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/include/grub/tdx.h b/include/grub/tdx.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..4a98008e39
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/include/grub/tdx.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
-+/*
-+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
-+ *  Copyright (C) 2015  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-+ *
-+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
-+ *  (at your option) any later version.
-+ *
-+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
-+ *
-+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef GRUB_TDX_HEADER
-+#define GRUB_TDX_HEADER 1
-+
-+#if defined (GRUB_MACHINE_EFI)
-+grub_err_t grub_tdx_log_event(unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size,
-+			      grub_uint8_t pcr, const char *description);
-+#else
-+static inline grub_err_t grub_tdx_log_event(
-+	unsigned char *buf __attribute__ ((unused)),
-+	grub_size_t size __attribute__ ((unused)),
-+	grub_uint8_t pcr __attribute__ ((unused)),
-+	const char *description __attribute__ ((unused)))
-+{
-+	return 0;
-+};
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif

SOURCES/0575-Enable-shared-processor-mode-in-vector-5.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 08:01:47 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Enable shared processor mode in vector 5
-
-This patch is to update the vector 5 which is troubling some
-machines to bootup properly in shared processor mode.
-
-Signed-off-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 30d2ee836649386a336f9437c8a149c8e642a46b)
-(cherry picked from commit 7e309d139c5eca1f03659e612a14499213e79c95)
----
- grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-index 37f3098c39..3ea9b73b2a 100644
---- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
-     .vec4 = 0x0001, // set required minimum capacity % to the lowest value
-     .vec5_size = 1 + sizeof(struct option_vector5) - 2,
-     .vec5 = {
--	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 256
-+	0, 192, 0, 128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 256
-     }
-   };
- 

SOURCES/0576-efi-http-change-uint32_t-to-uintn_t-for-grub_efi_htt.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Hsiao <matt.hsiao@hpe.com>
-Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2023 13:39:05 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] efi/http: change uint32_t to uintn_t for
- grub_efi_http_message_t
-
-Modify UINT32 to UINTN in EFI_HTTP_MESSAGE to be UEFI 2.9 compliant.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matt Hsiao <matt.hsiao@hpe.com>
-Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
----
- include/grub/efi/http.h | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/grub/efi/http.h b/include/grub/efi/http.h
-index c5e9a89f5050..ad164ba1913d 100644
---- a/include/grub/efi/http.h
-+++ b/include/grub/efi/http.h
-@@ -171,9 +171,9 @@ typedef struct {
-     grub_efi_http_request_data_t *request;
-     grub_efi_http_response_data_t *response;
-   } data;
--  grub_efi_uint32_t header_count;
-+  grub_efi_uintn_t header_count;
-   grub_efi_http_header_t *headers;
--  grub_efi_uint32_t body_length;
-+  grub_efi_uintn_t body_length;
-   void *body;
- } grub_efi_http_message_t;
- 

SOURCES/0577-ieee1275-Converting-plain-numbers-to-constants-in-Ve.patch

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 08:16:25 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] ieee1275 : Converting plain numbers to constants in Vec5
-
-This patch converts the plain numbers used in Vec5 properties to
-constants.
-
-1. LPAR : Client program supports logical partitioning and
-   associated hcall()s.
-2. SPLPAR : Client program supports the Shared
-   Processor LPAR Option.
-3. CMO : Enables the Cooperative Memory Over-commitment Option.
-4. MAX_CPU : Defines maximum number of CPUs supported.
-
-Signed-off-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
----
- grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 8 +++++++-
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-index 3ea9b73b2a59..2516e02091cb 100644
---- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@ extern char _end[];
- grub_addr_t grub_ieee1275_original_stack;
- #endif
- 
-+#define LPAR     0x80
-+#define SPLPAR   0x40
-+#define BYTE2    (LPAR | SPLPAR)
-+#define CMO      0x80
-+#define MAX_CPU  256
-+
- void
- grub_exit (int rc __attribute__((unused)))
- {
-@@ -372,7 +378,7 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
-     .vec4 = 0x0001, // set required minimum capacity % to the lowest value
-     .vec5_size = 1 + sizeof(struct option_vector5) - 2,
-     .vec5 = {
--	0, 192, 0, 128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 256
-+        0, BYTE2, 0, CMO, 0, 0, 0, 0, MAX_CPU	
-     }
-   };
- 

SOURCES/0578-ieee1275-extended-support-in-options-vector5.patch

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 08:33:12 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] ieee1275 : extended support in options vector5
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-This patch enables the multiple options in Options Vector5 which are
-required and solves the boot issue seen on some machines which are looking for these specific options.
-
-1. LPAR : Client program supports logical partitioning and
-   associated hcall()s.
-2. SPLPAR : Client program supports the Shared
-   Processor LPAR Option.
-3. DYN_RCON_MEM : Client program supports the
-   “ibm,dynamic-reconfiguration-memory” property and it may be
-   presented in the device tree.
-4. LARGE_PAGES : Client supports pages larger than 4 KB.
-5. DONATE_DCPU_CLS : Client supports donating dedicated processor cycles.
-6. PCI_EXP : Client supports PCI Express implementations
-   utilizing Message Signaled Interrupts (MSIs).
-
-7. CMOC : Enables the Cooperative Memory Over-commitment Option.
-8. EXT_CMO : Enables the Extended Cooperative Memory Over-commit
-   Option.
-
-9. ASSOC_REF : Enables “ibm,associativity” and
-   “ibm,associativity-reference-points” properties.
-10. AFFINITY : Enables Platform Resource Reassignment Notification.
-11. NUMA : Supports NUMA Distance Lookup Table Option.
-
-12. HOTPLUG_INTRPT : Supports Hotplug Interrupts.
-13. HPT_RESIZE : Enable Hash Page Table Resize Option.
-
-14. MAX_CPU : Defines maximum number of CPUs supported.
-
-15. PFO_HWRNG : Supports Random Number Generator.
-16. PFO_HW_COMP : Supports Compression Engine.
-17. PFO_ENCRYPT : Supports Encryption Engine.
-
-18. SUB_PROCESSORS : Supports Sub-Processors.
-
-19. DY_MEM_V2 : Client program supports the “ibm,dynamic-memory-v2” property in the
-    “ibm,dynamic-reconfiguration-memory” node and it may be presented in the device tree.
-20. DRC_INFO : Client program supports the “ibm,drc-info” property definition and it may be
-    presented in the device tree.
-
-Signed-off-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
----
- grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-index 2516e02091cb..1fae84440403 100644
---- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-@@ -56,11 +56,41 @@ extern char _end[];
- grub_addr_t grub_ieee1275_original_stack;
- #endif
- 
--#define LPAR     0x80
--#define SPLPAR   0x40
--#define BYTE2    (LPAR | SPLPAR)
--#define CMO      0x80
--#define MAX_CPU  256
-+/* Options vector5 properties */
-+
-+#define LPAR                0x80
-+#define SPLPAR              0x40
-+#define DYN_RCON_MEM        0x20
-+#define LARGE_PAGES         0x10
-+#define DONATE_DCPU_CLS     0x02
-+#define PCI_EXP             0x01
-+#define BYTE2               (LPAR | SPLPAR | DYN_RCON_MEM | LARGE_PAGES | DONATE_DCPU_CLS | PCI_EXP)
-+
-+#define CMOC                0x80
-+#define EXT_CMO             0x40
-+#define CMO                 (CMOC | EXT_CMO)
-+
-+#define ASSOC_REF           0x80
-+#define AFFINITY            0x40
-+#define NUMA                0x20
-+#define ASSOCIATIVITY       (ASSOC_REF | AFFINITY | NUMA)
-+
-+#define HOTPLUG_INTRPT      0x04
-+#define HPT_RESIZE          0x01
-+#define BIN_OPTS            (HOTPLUG_INTRPT | HPT_RESIZE)
-+
-+#define MAX_CPU             256
-+
-+#define PFO_HWRNG           0x80000000
-+#define PFO_HW_COMP         0x40000000
-+#define PFO_ENCRYPT         0x20000000
-+#define PLATFORM_FACILITIES (PFO_HWRNG | PFO_HW_COMP | PFO_ENCRYPT)
-+
-+#define SUB_PROCESSORS      1
-+
-+#define DY_MEM_V2           0x80
-+#define DRC_INFO            0x40
-+#define BYTE22              (DY_MEM_V2 | DRC_INFO)
- 
- void
- grub_exit (int rc __attribute__((unused)))
-@@ -323,6 +353,11 @@ struct option_vector5 {
-         grub_uint8_t micro_checkpoint;
-         grub_uint8_t reserved0;
-         grub_uint32_t max_cpus;
-+        grub_uint16_t base_PAPR;
-+        grub_uint16_t mem_reference;
-+        grub_uint32_t platform_facilities;
-+        grub_uint8_t sub_processors;
-+        grub_uint8_t byte22;
- } __attribute__((packed));
- 
- struct pvr_entry {
-@@ -378,7 +413,7 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
-     .vec4 = 0x0001, // set required minimum capacity % to the lowest value
-     .vec5_size = 1 + sizeof(struct option_vector5) - 2,
-     .vec5 = {
--        0, BYTE2, 0, CMO, 0, 0, 0, 0, MAX_CPU	
-+        0, BYTE2, 0, CMO, ASSOCIATIVITY, BIN_OPTS, 0, 0, MAX_CPU, 0, 0, PLATFORM_FACILITIES, SUB_PROCESSORS, BYTE22
-     }
-   };
- 

SOURCES/0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From 8c74431327e0c7d7fe47462b0e69fcbe3bbac56e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 09:14:29 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Regenerate kernelopts if missing on ppc
-
-Signed-off-by: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
----
- util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in b/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
-index 855dbdd..f2281bc 100644
---- a/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
-+++ b/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
-@@ -117,6 +117,18 @@ cat <<EOF
- # This section was generated by a script. Do not modify the generated file - all changes
- # will be lost the next time file is regenerated. Instead edit the BootLoaderSpec files.
- 
-+# The kernelopts variable should be defined in the grubenv file. But to ensure that menu
-+# entries populated from BootLoaderSpec files that use this variable work correctly even
-+# without a grubenv file, define a fallback kernelopts variable if this has not been set.
-+#
-+# The kernelopts variable in the grubenv file can be modified using the grubby tool or by
-+# executing the grub2-mkconfig tool. For the latter, the values of the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX
-+# and GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT options from /etc/default/grub file are used to set both
-+# the kernelopts variable in the grubenv file and the fallback kernelopts variable.
-+if [ -z "\${kernelopts}" ]; then
-+  set kernelopts="root=${linux_root_device_thisversion} ro ${args}"
-+fi
-+
- EOF
- }
- 
--- 
-2.39.1
-

SOURCES/0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch

@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
-Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 12:21:55 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] kern/ieee1275/init: ppc64: Restrict high memory in presence
- of fadump
-
-This is a backport of the patch with the same name to grub 2.02.
-
-When a kernel dump is present then restrict the high memory regions to
-avoid allocating memory where the kernel dump resides. Use the
-ibm,kernel-dump node under /rtas to determine whether a kernel dump exists
-and up to which limit grub can use available memory. Set the
-upper_mem_limit to the size of the kernel dump section of type
-'REAL_MODE_REGION' and therefore only allow grub's memory usage for high
-addresses from 768MB to 'upper_mem_limit'. This means that grub can
-use high memory in the range of 768MB to upper_mem_limit and
-the kernel-dump memory regions above 'upper_mem_limit' remain untouched.
-This change has no effect on memory allocations below 640MB.
-
-Also, fall back to allocating below 640MB in case the chunk of
-memory there would be larger than the chunk of memory above 768MB.
-This can for example occur if a free memory area is found starting at 300MB
-extending up to 1GB but a kernel dump is located at 768MB and therefore
-does not allow the allocation of the high memory area but requiring to use
-the chunk starting at 300MB to avoid an unnecessary out-of-memory
-condition.
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
-Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
-Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
-Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
-Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
-Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
-Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
----
- grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 139 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-index 1fae84440403..31843ab70a62 100644
---- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
-@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
-  *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-  */
- 
-+#include <stddef.h> /* offsetof() */
-+
- #include <grub/kernel.h>
- #include <grub/dl.h>
- #include <grub/disk.h>
-@@ -180,6 +182,97 @@ grub_claim_heap (void)
- 				 + GRUB_KERNEL_MACHINE_STACK_SIZE), 0x200000);
- }
- #else
-+
-+/* ibm,kernel-dump data structures */
-+struct kd_section
-+{
-+  grub_uint32_t flags;
-+  grub_uint16_t src_datatype;
-+#define KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION  0x0011
-+  grub_uint16_t error_flags;
-+  grub_uint64_t src_address;
-+  grub_uint64_t num_bytes;
-+  grub_uint64_t act_bytes;
-+  grub_uint64_t dst_address;
-+} GRUB_PACKED;
-+
-+#define MAX_KD_SECTIONS 10
-+
-+struct kernel_dump
-+{
-+  grub_uint32_t format;
-+  grub_uint16_t num_sections;
-+  grub_uint16_t status_flags;
-+  grub_uint32_t offset_1st_section;
-+  grub_uint32_t num_blocks;
-+  grub_uint64_t start_block;
-+  grub_uint64_t num_blocks_avail;
-+  grub_uint32_t offet_path_string;
-+  grub_uint32_t max_time_allowed;
-+  struct kd_section kds[MAX_KD_SECTIONS]; /* offset_1st_section should point to kds[0] */
-+} GRUB_PACKED;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Determine if a kernel dump exists and if it does, then determine the highest
-+ * address that grub can use for memory allocations.
-+ * The caller must have initialized *highest to ~0. *highest will not
-+ * be modified if no kernel dump is found.
-+ */
-+static int
-+check_kernel_dump (grub_uint64_t *highest)
-+{
-+  struct kernel_dump kernel_dump;
-+  grub_ssize_t kernel_dump_size;
-+  grub_ieee1275_phandle_t rtas;
-+  struct kd_section *kds;
-+  grub_size_t i;
-+
-+  /* If there's a kernel-dump it must have at least one section */
-+  if (grub_ieee1275_finddevice ("/rtas", &rtas) ||
-+      grub_ieee1275_get_property (rtas, "ibm,kernel-dump", &kernel_dump,
-+                                  sizeof (kernel_dump), &kernel_dump_size) ||
-+      kernel_dump_size <= (grub_ssize_t) offsetof (struct kernel_dump, kds[1]))
-+    return 0;
-+
-+  kernel_dump_size = grub_min (kernel_dump_size, (grub_ssize_t) sizeof (kernel_dump));
-+
-+  if (grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format) != 1)
-+    {
-+      grub_printf (_("Error: ibm,kernel-dump has an unexpected format version '%u'\n"),
-+                   grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format));
-+      return 0;
-+    }
-+
-+  if (grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections) > MAX_KD_SECTIONS)
-+    {
-+      grub_printf (_("Error: Too many kernel dump sections: %d\n"),
-+                   grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.num_sections));
-+      return 0;
-+    }
-+
-+  for (i = 0; i < grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections); i++)
-+    {
-+      kds = (struct kd_section *) ((grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump +
-+                                   grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.offset_1st_section) +
-+                                   i * sizeof (struct kd_section));
-+      /* sanity check the address is within the 'kernel_dump' struct */
-+      if ((grub_addr_t) kds > (grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump + kernel_dump_size + sizeof (*kds))
-+        {
-+          grub_printf (_("Error: 'kds' address beyond last available section\n"));
-+          return 0;
-+        }
-+
-+      if ((grub_be_to_cpu16 (kds->src_datatype) == KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION) &&
-+          (grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->src_address) == 0))
-+        {
-+          *highest = grub_min (*highest, grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->num_bytes));
-+          break;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+  return 1;
-+}
-+
- /* Helper for grub_claim_heap on powerpc. */
- static int
- heap_size (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
-@@ -207,7 +300,9 @@ static int
- heap_init (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
- 	   void *data)
- {
-+  grub_uint64_t upper_mem_limit = ~0;
-   grub_uint32_t total = *(grub_uint32_t *)data;
-+  int has_kernel_dump;
- 
-   if (type != GRUB_MEMORY_AVAILABLE)
-     return 0;
-@@ -243,6 +338,50 @@ heap_init (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
-       len = 0;
-     }
- 
-+  has_kernel_dump = check_kernel_dump (&upper_mem_limit);
-+  if (has_kernel_dump)
-+    {
-+      grub_uint64_t lo_len = 0, hi_len = 0;
-+
-+      if (addr > upper_mem_limit || upper_mem_limit == (grub_uint64_t)~0)
-+        return 0;
-+
-+      /* limit len to stay below upper_mem_limit */
-+      if (addr < upper_mem_limit && (addr + len) > upper_mem_limit)
-+        {
-+           len = grub_min (len, upper_mem_limit - addr);
-+        }
-+
-+      /* We can allocate below 640MB or above 768MB.
-+       * Choose the bigger chunk below 640MB or above 768MB.
-+       */
-+      if (addr < 0x28000000)
-+        {
-+           lo_len = grub_min (len, 0x28000000 - addr);
-+        }
-+      if (addr + len > 0x30000000)
-+        {
-+           if (addr < 0x30000000)
-+             hi_len = len - (0x30000000 - addr);
-+           else
-+             hi_len = len;
-+        }
-+
-+      if (hi_len > lo_len)
-+        {
-+           len = hi_len;
-+           if (addr < 0x30000000)
-+             addr = 0x30000000;
-+        }
-+      else
-+        {
-+           len = lo_len;
-+        }
-+
-+      if (len == 0)
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-   /* If this block contains 0x30000000 (768MB), do not claim below that.
-      Linux likes to claim memory at min(RMO top, 768MB) and works down
-      without reference to /memory/available. */

SOURCES/0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 24 May 2023 11:22:47 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] util: Enable default kernel for updates
-
-Several kernel variants can be installed on a system in parallel.
-In order to allow the user to choose which kernel will be set to
-default after an update, re-enable grub's usage of DEFAULTKERNEL as
-set in /etc/sysconfig/kernel
-
-Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
----
- util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in | 8 ++++++++
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in b/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
-index 7e87dfccc0e4..f71bc64360b0 100644
---- a/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
-+++ b/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
-@@ -68,6 +68,14 @@ if test -f /etc/sysconfig/kernel ; then
-     . /etc/sysconfig/kernel
- fi
- 
-+GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=${DEFAULTKERNEL/-core/}
-+if [ "$GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE" != "kernel" ]; then
-+    echo GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL=true
-+    echo export GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL
-+    GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=${GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE/kernel-/}
-+fi
-+echo GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=$GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE
-+echo export GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE
- if [ "$MAKEDEBUG" = "yes" ]; then
-     echo GRUB_LINUX_MAKE_DEBUG=true
-     echo export GRUB_LINUX_MAKE_DEBUG

SOURCES/0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch

@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-From 9ca4c3fe1c7dbd62e8ad6a23cb1b1fda695fdb44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
-Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:39:41 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] grub-set-bootflag: Conservative partial fix for
- CVE-2024-1048
-
-Following up on CVE-2019-14865 and taking a fresh look at
-grub2-set-bootflag now (through my work at CIQ on Rocky Linux), I saw some
-other ways in which users could still abuse this little program:
-
-1. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag no longer rewrites the
-grubenv file in-place, but writes into a temporary file and renames it
-over the original, checking for error returns from each call first.
-This prevents the original file truncation vulnerability, but it can
-leave the temporary file around if the program is killed before it can
-rename or remove the file.  There are still many ways to get the program
-killed, such as through RLIMIT_FSIZE triggering SIGXFSZ (tested,
-reliable) or by careful timing (tricky) of signals sent by process group
-leader, pty, pre-scheduled timers, SIGXCPU (probably not an exhaustive
-list).  Invoking the program multiple times fills up /boot (or if /boot
-is not separate, then it can fill up the root filesystem).  Since the
-files are tiny, the filesystem is likely to run out of free inodes
-before it'd run out of blocks, but the effect is similar - can't create
-new files after this point (but still can add data to existing files,
-such as logs).
-
-2. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag naively tries to protect
-itself from signals by becoming full root.  (This does protect it from
-signals sent by the user directly to the PID, but e.g. "kill -9 -1" by
-the user still works.)  A side effect of such "protection" is that it's
-possible to invoke more concurrent instances of grub2-set-bootflag than
-the user's RLIMIT_NPROC would normally permit (as specified e.g. in
-/etc/security/limits.conf, or say in Apache httpd's RLimitNPROC if
-grub2-set-bootflag would be abused by a website script), thereby
-exhausting system resources (e.g., bypassing RAM usage limit if
-RLIMIT_AS was also set).
-
-3. umask is inherited.  Again, due to how the CVE-2019-14865 fix creates
-a new file, and due to how mkstemp() works, this affects grubenv's new
-file permissions.  Luckily, mkstemp() forces them to be no more relaxed
-than 0600, but the user ends up being able to set them e.g. to 0.
-Luckily, at least in my testing GRUB still works fine even when the file
-has such (lack of) permissions.
-
-This commit deals with the abuses above as follows:
-
-1. RLIMIT_FSIZE is pre-checked, so this specific way to get the process
-killed should no longer work.  However, this isn't a complete fix
-because there are other ways to get the process killed after it has
-created the temporary file.
-
-The commit also fixes bug 1975892 ("RFE: grub2-set-bootflag should not
-write the grubenv when the flag being written is already set") and
-similar for "menu_show_once", which further reduces the abuse potential.
-
-2. RLIMIT_NPROC bypass should be avoided by not becoming full root (aka
-dropping the partial "kill protection").
-
-3. A safe umask is set.
-
-This is a partial fix (temporary files can still accumulate, but this is
-harder to trigger).
-
-While at it, this commit also fixes potential 1- or 2-byte over-read of
-env[] if its content is malformed - this was not a security issue since the
-grubenv file is trusted input, and the fix is just for robustness.
-
-Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
----
- util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
-index a85f11fceacb..5b932f76b6f4 100644
---- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
-+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/resource.h>
- 
- #define GRUBENV "/" GRUB_BOOT_DIR_NAME "/" GRUB_DIR_NAME "/" GRUB_ENVBLK_DEFCFG
- #define GRUBENV_SIZE 1024
-@@ -54,12 +56,17 @@ static void usage(void)
- int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- {
-   /* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
--  char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1], buf[64], *s;
-+  char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
-   /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
-   char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
-   const char *bootflag;
-   int i, fd, len, ret;
-   FILE *f;
-+  struct rlimit rlim;
-+
-+  if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
-+    return 1;
-+  umask(077);
- 
-   if (argc != 2)
-     {
-@@ -81,20 +88,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-   len = strlen (bootflag);
- 
-   /*
--   * Really become root. setuid avoids an user killing us, possibly leaking
--   * the tmpfile. setgid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
-+   * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
-    */
--  ret = setuid(0);
--  if (ret)
--    {
--      perror ("Error setuid(0) failed");
--      return 1;
--    }
--
--  ret = setgid(0);
--  if (ret)
-+  if (setegid(0))
-     {
--      perror ("Error setgid(0) failed");
-+      perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
-       return 1;
-     }
- 
-@@ -123,6 +121,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 
-   /* 0 terminate env */
-   env[GRUBENV_SIZE] = 0;
-+  /* not a valid flag value */
-+  env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1] = 0;
-+  env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 2] = 0;
- 
-   if (strncmp (env, GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE, strlen (GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE)))
-     {
-@@ -158,6 +159,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 
-   /* The grubenv is not 0 terminated, so memcpy the name + '=' , '1', '\n' */
-   snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s=1\n", bootflag);
-+  if (!memcmp(s, buf, len + 3))
-+    return 0; /* nothing to do */
-   memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
- 
- 
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch

@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
-From f4c7783c2b695794938748a6567e86456ed2314a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
-Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:56:21 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] grub-set-bootflag: More complete fix for CVE-2024-1048
-
-Switch to per-user fixed temporary filenames along with a weird locking
-mechanism, which is explained in source code comments.  This is a more
-complete fix than the previous commit (temporary files can't accumulate).
-Unfortunately, it introduces new risks (by working on a temporary file
-shared between the user's invocations), which are _hopefully_ avoided by
-the patch's elaborate logic.  I actually got it wrong at first, which
-suggests that this logic is hard to reason about, and more errors or
-omissions are possible.  It also relies on the kernel's primitives' exact
-semantics to a greater extent (nothing out of the ordinary, though).
-
-Remaining issues that I think cannot reasonably be fixed without a
-redesign (e.g., having per-flag files with nothing else in them) and
-without introducing new issues:
-
-A. A user can still revert a concurrent user's attempt of setting the
-other flag - or of making other changes to grubenv by means other than
-this program.
-
-B. One leftover temporary file per user is still possible.
-
-Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
----
- util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
-index 5b932f76b6f4..698b55a1ab93 100644
---- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
-+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-+#include <sys/file.h>
- #include <sys/stat.h>
- #include <sys/resource.h>
- 
-@@ -57,15 +58,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- {
-   /* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
-   char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
--  /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
--  char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
-+  /* +1 for 0 termination, +11 for ".%u" in tmp filename */
-+  char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 11 + 1];
-   const char *bootflag;
-   int i, fd, len, ret;
-   FILE *f;
--  struct rlimit rlim;
- 
--  if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
--    return 1;
-   umask(077);
- 
-   if (argc != 2)
-@@ -92,7 +90,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-    */
-   if (setegid(0))
-     {
--      perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
-+      perror ("setegid(0) failed");
-       return 1;
-     }
- 
-@@ -163,19 +161,82 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-     return 0; /* nothing to do */
-   memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
- 
-+  struct rlimit rlim;
-+  if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
-+    {
-+      fprintf (stderr, "Resource limits undetermined or too low\n");
-+      return 1;
-+    }
-+
-+  /*
-+   * Here we work under the premise that we shouldn't write into the target
-+   * file directly because we might not be able to have all of our changes
-+   * written completely and atomically.  That was CVE-2019-14865, known to
-+   * have been triggerable via RLIMIT_FSIZE.  While we've dealt with that
-+   * specific attack via the check above, there may be other possibilities.
-+   */
- 
-   /*
-    * Create a tempfile for writing the new env.  Use the canonicalized filename
-    * for the template so that the tmpfile is in the same dir / on same fs.
-+   *
-+   * We now use per-user fixed temporary filenames, so that a user cannot cause
-+   * multiple files to accumulate.
-+   *
-+   * We don't use O_EXCL so that a stale temporary file doesn't prevent further
-+   * usage of the program by the user.
-    */
--  snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%sXXXXXX", env_filename);
--  fd = mkstemp(tmp_filename);
-+  snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%s.%u", env_filename, getuid());
-+  fd = open(tmp_filename, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600);
-   if (fd == -1)
-     {
-       perror ("Creating tmpfile failed");
-       return 1;
-     }
- 
-+  /*
-+   * The lock prevents the same user from reaching further steps ending in
-+   * rename() concurrently, in which case the temporary file only partially
-+   * written by one invocation could be renamed to the target file by another.
-+   *
-+   * The lock also guards the slow fsync() from concurrent calls.  After the
-+   * first time that and the rename() complete, further invocations for the
-+   * same flag become no-ops.
-+   *
-+   * We lock the temporary file rather than the target file because locking the
-+   * latter would allow any user having SIGSTOP'ed their process to make all
-+   * other users' invocations fail (or lock up if we'd use blocking mode).
-+   *
-+   * We use non-blocking mode (LOCK_NB) because the lock having been taken by
-+   * another process implies that the other process would normally have already
-+   * renamed the file to target by the time it releases the lock (and we could
-+   * acquire it), so we'd be working directly on the target if we proceeded,
-+   * which is undesirable, and we'd kind of fail on the already-done rename.
-+   */
-+  if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB))
-+    {
-+      perror ("Locking tmpfile failed");
-+      return 1;
-+    }
-+
-+  /*
-+   * Deal with the potential that another invocation proceeded all the way to
-+   * rename() and process exit while we were between open() and flock().
-+   */
-+  {
-+    struct stat st1, st2;
-+    if (fstat(fd, &st1) || stat(tmp_filename, &st2))
-+      {
-+        perror ("stat of tmpfile failed");
-+        return 1;
-+      }
-+    if (st1.st_dev != st2.st_dev || st1.st_ino != st2.st_ino)
-+      {
-+        fprintf (stderr, "Another invocation won race\n");
-+        return 1;
-+      }
-+  }
-+
-   f = fdopen (fd, "w");
-   if (!f)
-     {
-@@ -200,23 +261,25 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-       return 1;     
-     }
- 
--  ret = fsync (fileno (f));
-+  ret = ftruncate (fileno (f), GRUBENV_SIZE);
-   if (ret)
-     {
--      perror ("Error syncing tmpfile");
-+      perror ("Error truncating tmpfile");
-       unlink(tmp_filename);
-       return 1;
-     }
- 
--  ret = fclose (f);
-+  ret = fsync (fileno (f));
-   if (ret)
-     {
--      perror ("Error closing tmpfile");
-+      perror ("Error syncing tmpfile");
-       unlink(tmp_filename);
-       return 1;
-     }
- 
-   /*
-+   * We must not close the file before rename() as that would remove the lock.
-+   *
-    * And finally rename the tmpfile with the new env over the old env, the
-    * linux kernel guarantees that this is atomic (from a syscall pov).
-    */
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From a7192a650c1e94221a86b49f5132fb47a4dda6ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
-Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 22:05:45 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] grub-set-bootflag: Exit calmly when not running as root
-
-Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root.  This
-allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
-supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
-
-Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
----
- util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 11 +++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
-index 698b55a1ab93..a51805fa8cec 100644
---- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
-+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
-@@ -85,6 +85,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-   bootflag = bootflags[i];
-   len = strlen (bootflag);
- 
-+  /*
-+   * Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root.  This
-+   * allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
-+   * supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
-+   */
-+  if (geteuid())
-+    {
-+      printf ("grub-set-bootflag not running as root, no action taken\n");
-+      return 0;
-+    }
-+
-   /*
-    * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
-    */
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-From 43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:31:57 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the
- $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute for the $MFT file
-
-When parsing an extremely fragmented $MFT file, i.e., the file described
-using the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute, current NTFS code will reuse a buffer
-containing bytes read from the underlying drive to store sector numbers,
-which are consumed later to read data from these sectors into another buffer.
-
-These sectors numbers, two 32-bit integers, are always stored at predefined
-offsets, 0x10 and 0x14, relative to first byte of the selected entry within
-the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute. Usually, this won't cause any problem.
-
-However, when parsing a specially-crafted file system image, this may cause
-the NTFS code to write these integers beyond the buffer boundary, likely
-causing the GRUB memory allocator to misbehave or fail. These integers contain
-values which are controlled by on-disk structures of the NTFS file system.
-
-Such modification and resulting misbehavior may touch a memory range not
-assigned to the GRUB and owned by firmware or another EFI application/driver.
-
-This fix introduces checks to ensure that these sector numbers are never
-written beyond the boundary.
-
-Fixes: CVE-2023-4692
-
-Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
----
- grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-index bbdbe24ada83..c3c4db117bba 100644
---- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
-     }
-   if (at->attr_end)
-     {
--      grub_uint8_t *pa;
-+      grub_uint8_t *pa, *pa_end;
- 
-       at->emft_buf = grub_malloc (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
-       if (at->emft_buf == NULL)
-@@ -209,11 +209,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
- 	    }
- 	  at->attr_nxt = at->edat_buf;
- 	  at->attr_end = at->edat_buf + u32at (pa, 0x30);
-+	  pa_end = at->edat_buf + n;
- 	}
-       else
- 	{
- 	  at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
- 	  at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
-+	  pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
- 	}
-       at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST;
-       while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
-@@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
- 	  at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS;
- 	  at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt;
- 	  pa = at->attr_cur;
-+
-+	  if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
-+	    {
-+	      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
-+	      return NULL;
-+	    }
-+
- 	  grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x10,
- 				grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start));
- 	  grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x14,
-@@ -240,6 +249,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
- 	    {
- 	      if (*pa != attr)
- 		break;
-+
-+              if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
-+                {
-+	          grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
-+	          return NULL;
-+	        }
-+
- 	      if (read_attr
- 		  (at, pa + 0x10,
- 		   u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From 0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 2/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the
- resident $DATA attribute
-
-When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in
-the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters,
-there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding
-file record segment.
-
-When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will
-read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of
-arbitrary, attacker-chosen length.
-
-This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could
-contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text,
-obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables.
-
-This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the
-corresponding file record segment only.
-
-Fixes: CVE-2023-4693
-
-Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
----
- grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-index c3c4db117bba..a68e173d8285 100644
---- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-@@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
-     {
-       if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
- 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
--      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
-+
-+      if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
-+	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
-+
-+      if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
-+	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
-+
-+      if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
-+	  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
-+	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
-+
-+      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
-       return 0;
-     }
- 
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From 7e5f031a6a6a3decc2360a7b0c71abbe598e7354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:17 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 3/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing directory entries
- from resident and non-resident index attributes
-
-This fix introduces checks to ensure that index entries are never read
-beyond the corresponding directory index.
-
-The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
-
-Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
----
- grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 +++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-index a68e173d8285..2d78b96e19fb 100644
---- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ get_utf8 (grub_uint8_t *in, grub_size_t len)
- }
- 
- static int
--list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
-+list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos, grub_uint8_t *end_pos,
- 	   grub_fshelp_iterate_dir_hook_t hook, void *hook_data)
- {
-   grub_uint8_t *np;
-@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
-       grub_uint8_t namespace;
-       char *ustr;
- 
-+      if ((pos >= end_pos) || (end_pos - pos < 0x52))
-+        break;
-+
-       if (pos[0xC] & 2)		/* end signature */
- 	break;
- 
-@@ -617,6 +620,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
-       ns = *(np++);
-       namespace = *(np++);
- 
-+      if (2 * ns > end_pos - pos - 0x52)
-+        break;
-+
-       /*
-        *  Ignore files in DOS namespace, as they will reappear as Win32
-        *  names.
-@@ -806,7 +812,9 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
-     }
- 
-   cur_pos += 0x10;		/* Skip index root */
--  ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0), hook, hook_data);
-+  ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0),
-+                   at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
-+                   hook, hook_data);
-   if (ret)
-     goto done;
- 
-@@ -893,6 +901,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
- 			     (const grub_uint8_t *) "INDX")))
- 		goto done;
- 	      ret = list_file (mft, &indx[0x18 + u16at (indx, 0x18)],
-+			       indx + (mft->data->idx_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
- 			       hook, hook_data);
- 	      if (ret)
- 		goto done;
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 7a5a116739fa6d8a625da7d6b9272c9a2462f967 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:44 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 4/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing bitmaps for index
- attributes
-
-This fix introduces checks to ensure that bitmaps for directory indices
-are never read beyond their actual sizes.
-
-The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
-
-Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
----
- grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-index 2d78b96e19fb..bb70c89fb803 100644
---- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-@@ -843,6 +843,25 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
- 
- 	  if (is_resident)
- 	    {
-+              if (bitmap_len > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
-+		{
-+		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap too large");
-+		  goto done;
-+		}
-+
-+              if (cur_pos >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
-+		{
-+		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
-+		  goto done;
-+		}
-+
-+              if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
-+		  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
-+		{
-+		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
-+		  goto done;
-+		}
-+
-               grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
-                            bitmap_len);
- 	    }
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From 1fe82c41e070385e273d7bb1cfb482627a3c28e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:38:19 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing a volume label
-
-This fix introduces checks to ensure that an NTFS volume label is always
-read from the corresponding file record segment.
-
-The current NTFS code allows the volume label string to be read from an
-arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory location. However, the bytes read are
-always treated as UTF-16LE. So, the final string displayed is mostly
-unreadable and it can't be easily converted back to raw bytes.
-
-The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not causing a significant
-data leak.
-
-Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
----
- grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-index bb70c89fb803..ff5e3740f0dd 100644
---- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-@@ -1213,13 +1213,29 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
- 
-   init_attr (&mft->attr, mft);
-   pa = find_attr (&mft->attr, GRUB_NTFS_AT_VOLUME_NAME);
-+
-+  if (pa >= mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
-+    {
-+      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
-+      goto fail;
-+    }
-+
-+  if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa < 0x16)
-+    {
-+      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
-+      goto fail;
-+    }
-+
-   if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
-     {
-       int len;
- 
-       len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
-       pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
--      *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
-+      if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
-+        *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
-+      else
-+        grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
-     }
- 
- fail:
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch

@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
-From e58b870ff926415e23fc386af41ff81b2f588763 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:40:07 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fs/ntfs: Make code more readable
-
-Move some calls used to access NTFS attribute header fields into
-functions with human-readable names.
-
-Suggested-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
----
- grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-index ff5e3740f0dd..de435aa14d85 100644
---- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
-@@ -52,6 +52,24 @@ u64at (void *ptr, grub_size_t ofs)
-   return grub_le_to_cpu64 (grub_get_unaligned64 ((char *) ptr + ofs));
- }
- 
-+static grub_uint16_t
-+first_attr_off (void *mft_buf_ptr)
-+{
-+  return u16at (mft_buf_ptr, 0x14);
-+}
-+
-+static grub_uint16_t
-+res_attr_data_off (void *res_attr_ptr)
-+{
-+  return u16at (res_attr_ptr, 0x14);
-+}
-+
-+static grub_uint32_t
-+res_attr_data_len (void *res_attr_ptr)
-+{
-+  return u32at (res_attr_ptr, 0x10);
-+}
-+
- grub_ntfscomp_func_t grub_ntfscomp_func;
- 
- static grub_err_t
-@@ -106,7 +124,7 @@ init_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft)
- {
-   at->mft = mft;
-   at->flags = (mft == &mft->data->mmft) ? GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT : 0;
--  at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + u16at (mft->buf, 0x14);
-+  at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + first_attr_off (mft->buf);
-   at->attr_end = at->emft_buf = at->edat_buf = at->sbuf = NULL;
- }
- 
-@@ -154,7 +172,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
- 		    return NULL;
- 		}
- 
--	      new_pos = &at->emft_buf[u16at (at->emft_buf, 0x14)];
-+	      new_pos = &at->emft_buf[first_attr_off (at->emft_buf)];
- 	      while (*new_pos != 0xFF)
- 		{
- 		  if ((*new_pos == *at->attr_cur)
-@@ -213,7 +231,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
- 	}
-       else
- 	{
--	  at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
-+	  at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + res_attr_data_off (pa);
- 	  at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
- 	  pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
- 	}
-@@ -399,20 +417,20 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
- 
-   if (pa[8] == 0)
-     {
--      if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
-+      if (ofs + len > res_attr_data_len (pa))
- 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
- 
--      if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
-+      if (res_attr_data_len (pa) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
- 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
- 
-       if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
- 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
- 
--      if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
-+      if (res_attr_data_off (pa) + res_attr_data_len (pa) >
- 	  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
- 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
- 
--      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
-+      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + res_attr_data_off (pa) + ofs, len);
-       return 0;
-     }
- 
-@@ -556,7 +574,7 @@ init_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *mft, grub_uint64_t mftno)
- 			   (unsigned long long) mftno);
- 
-       if (!pa[8])
--	mft->size = u32at (pa, 0x10);
-+	mft->size = res_attr_data_len (pa);
-       else
- 	mft->size = u64at (pa, 0x30);
- 
-@@ -805,7 +823,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
- 	  (u32at (cur_pos, 0x18) != 0x490024) ||
- 	  (u32at (cur_pos, 0x1C) != 0x300033))
- 	continue;
--      cur_pos += u16at (cur_pos, 0x14);
-+      cur_pos += res_attr_data_off (cur_pos);
-       if (*cur_pos != 0x30)	/* Not filename index */
- 	continue;
-       break;
-@@ -834,7 +852,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
- 	{
-           int is_resident = (cur_pos[8] == 0);
- 
--          bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) :
-+          bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) :
-                         u32at (cur_pos, 0x28));
- 
-           bmp = grub_malloc (bitmap_len);
-@@ -855,14 +873,14 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
- 		  goto done;
- 		}
- 
--              if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
-+              if (res_attr_data_off (cur_pos) + res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) >
- 		  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
- 		{
- 		  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
- 		  goto done;
- 		}
- 
--              grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
-+              grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + res_attr_data_off (cur_pos),
-                            bitmap_len);
- 	    }
-           else
-@@ -1226,12 +1244,12 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
-       goto fail;
-     }
- 
--  if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
-+  if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (res_attr_data_len (pa)))
-     {
-       int len;
- 
--      len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
--      pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
-+      len = res_attr_data_len (pa) / 2;
-+      pa += res_attr_data_off (pa);
-       if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
-         *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
-       else
--- 
-2.43.0
-

SOURCES/0591-grub-mkconfig.in-turn-off-executable-owner-bit.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 10:15:13 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH] grub-mkconfig.in: turn off executable owner bit
-
-Stricker permissions are required on the grub.cfg file, resulting in
-at most 0600 owner's file permissions. This resolves conflicting
-requirement permissions on grub2-pc package's grub2.cfg file.
-
-Signed-off-by: Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com>
----
- util/grub-mkconfig.in | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/util/grub-mkconfig.in b/util/grub-mkconfig.in
-index a1c00776d..573004915 100644
---- a/util/grub-mkconfig.in
-+++ b/util/grub-mkconfig.in
-@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ and /etc/grub.d/* files or please file a bug report with
-     exit 1
-   else
-     # none of the children aborted with error, install the new grub.cfg
--    oldumask=$(umask); umask 077
-+    oldumask=$(umask); umask 177
-     cat ${grub_cfg}.new > ${grub_cfg}
-     umask $oldumask
-     rm -f ${grub_cfg}.new

SOURCES/20-grub.install

@@ -90,10 +90,13 @@ case "$COMMAND" in
             [[ -d "$BLS_DIR" ]] || mkdir -m 0700 -p "$BLS_DIR"
             BLS_ID="${MACHINE_ID}-${KERNEL_VERSION}"
             BLS_TARGET="${BLS_DIR}/${BLS_ID}.conf"
-            mkbls "${KERNEL_VERSION}" \
+            if [[ -f "${KERNEL_DIR}/bls.conf" ]]; then
-                "$(date -u +%Y%m%d%H%M%S -d "$(stat -c '%y' "${KERNEL_DIR}")")" \
+                cp -aT "${KERNEL_DIR}/bls.conf" "${BLS_TARGET}" || exit $?
-                >"${BLS_TARGET}"
+            else
-            command -v restorecon &>/dev/null && restorecon -R "${BLS_TARGET}"
+                mkbls "${KERNEL_VERSION}" \
+                    "$(date -u +%Y%m%d%H%M%S -d "$(stat -c '%y' "${KERNEL_DIR}")")" \
+                    >"${BLS_TARGET}"
+            fi
 
             LINUX="$(grep '^linux[ \t]' "${BLS_TARGET}" | sed -e 's,^linux[ \t]*,,')"
             INITRD="$(grep '^initrd[ \t]' "${BLS_TARGET}" | sed -e 's,^initrd[ \t]*,,')"
@@ -106,11 +109,7 @@ case "$COMMAND" in
                 sed -i -e "s,^initrd.*,initrd ${BOOTPREFIX}${INITRD},g" "${BLS_TARGET}"
             fi
 
-            if ( [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" != *${GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE}* ]] && \
+            if [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" == *\+* ]] && [ "x$GRUB_DEFAULT_TO_DEBUG" != "xtrue" ]; then
-                     [ "x$GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL" == "xtrue" ] ) || \
-                   ( echo "$KERNEL_VERSION" | grep -E -q "64k|auto|rt|uki" && \
-                    	[ "x$GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL" != "xtrue" ] ) || \
-                   ( [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" == *debug* ]] && [ "x$GRUB_DEFAULT_TO_DEBUG" != "xtrue" ] ); then
                 GRUB_UPDATE_DEFAULT_KERNEL=false
             fi
 

SOURCES/grub.macros

@@ -589,15 +589,14 @@ install -d -m 0700 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig	\
 touch ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}%{_sysconfdir}/default/grub		\
 ln -sf ../default/grub						\\\
 	${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/grub		\
-touch grub.cfg							\
+touch ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/boot/%{name}/grub.cfg			\
-install -m 0600 grub.cfg ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/boot/%{name}/	\
 %{nil}
 
 %define define_legacy_variant_files()				\
 %{expand:%%files %{1}}						\
 %defattr(-,root,root,-)						\
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}.cfg			\
-%ghost %config(noreplace) %attr(0600,root,root)/boot/%{name}/grub.cfg	\
+%ghost %config(noreplace) %attr(0700,root,root)/boot/%{name}/grub.cfg	\
 %dir %attr(0700,root,root)/boot/loader/entries			\
 %ifarch ppc64le						\
 %dir %{_libdir}/grub/%{2}/					\

SOURCES/grub.patches

@@ -552,40 +552,3 @@ Patch0551: 0551-nx-set-page-permissions-for-loaded-modules.patch
 Patch0552: 0552-nx-set-attrs-in-our-kernel-loaders.patch
 Patch0553: 0553-nx-set-the-nx-compatible-flag-in-EFI-grub-images.patch
 Patch0554: 0554-Fixup-grub_efi_get_variable-type-in-our-loaders.patch
-Patch0555: 0555-Make-debug-file-show-which-file-filters-get-run.patch
-Patch0556: 0556-efi-use-enumerated-array-positions-for-our-allocatio.patch
-Patch0557: 0557-efi-split-allocation-policy-for-kernel-vs-initrd-mem.patch
-Patch0558: 0558-efi-use-EFI_LOADER_-CODE-DATA-for-kernel-and-initrd-.patch
-Patch0559: 0559-ieee1275-implement-vec5-for-cas-negotiation.patch
-Patch0560: 0560-x86-efi-Fix-an-incorrect-array-size-in-kernel-alloca.patch
-Patch0561: 0561-switch-to-blscfg-don-t-assume-newline-at-end-of-cfg.patch
-Patch0562: 0562-font-Reject-glyphs-exceeds-font-max_glyph_width-or-f.patch
-Patch0563: 0563-font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch
-Patch0564: 0564-font-Fix-several-integer-overflows-in-grub_font_cons.patch
-Patch0565: 0565-font-Remove-grub_font_dup_glyph.patch
-Patch0566: 0566-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-ensure_comb_space.patch
-Patch0567: 0567-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-BMP-index.patch
-Patch0568: 0568-font-Fix-integer-underflow-in-binary-search-of-char-.patch
-Patch0569: 0569-fbutil-Fix-integer-overflow.patch
-Patch0570: 0570-font-Fix-an-integer-underflow-in-blit_comb.patch
-Patch0571: 0571-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch
-Patch0572: 0572-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch
-Patch0573: 0573-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch
-Patch0574: 0574-Enable-TDX-measurement-to-RTMR-register.patch
-Patch0575: 0575-Enable-shared-processor-mode-in-vector-5.patch
-Patch0576: 0576-efi-http-change-uint32_t-to-uintn_t-for-grub_efi_htt.patch
-Patch0577: 0577-ieee1275-Converting-plain-numbers-to-constants-in-Ve.patch
-Patch0578: 0578-ieee1275-extended-support-in-options-vector5.patch
-Patch0579: 0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch
-Patch0580: 0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch
-Patch0581: 0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch
-Patch0582: 0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch
-Patch0583: 0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch
-Patch0584: 0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch
-Patch0585: 0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch
-Patch0586: 0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch
-Patch0587: 0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch
-Patch0588: 0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch
-Patch0589: 0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch
-Patch0590: 0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch
-Patch0591: 0591-grub-mkconfig.in-turn-off-executable-owner-bit.patch

SOURCES/sbat.csv.in

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md
-grub,3,Free Software Foundation,grub,@@VERSION@@,https//www.gnu.org/software/grub/
+grub,2,Free Software Foundation,grub,@@VERSION@@,https//www.gnu.org/software/grub/
 grub.rh,2,Red Hat,grub2,@@VERSION_RELEASE@@,mailto:secalert@redhat.com

SPECS/grub2.spec

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 Name:		grub2
 Epoch:		1
 Version:	2.02
-Release:	158%{?dist}
+Release:	138%{?dist}
 Summary:	Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more
 Group:		System Environment/Base
 License:	GPLv3+
@@ -310,19 +310,6 @@ if [ "$1" = 2 ]; then
 	/sbin/grub2-switch-to-blscfg --backup-suffix=.rpmsave &>/dev/null || :
 fi
 
-%posttrans common
-set -eu
-
-GRUB_HOME=/boot/%{name}
-
-if test  -f ${GRUB_HOME}/grub.cfg; then
-    # make sure GRUB_HOME/grub.cfg has 600 permissions
-    GRUB_CFG_MODE=$(stat --format="%a" ${GRUB_HOME}/grub.cfg)
-    if ! test "${GRUB_CFG_MODE}" = "600"; then
-        chmod 0600 ${GRUB_HOME}/grub.cfg
-    fi
-fi
-
 %triggerun -- grub2 < 1:1.99-4
 # grub2 < 1.99-4 removed a number of essential files in postun. To fix upgrades
 # from the affected grub2 packages, we first back up the files in triggerun and
@@ -523,128 +510,48 @@ fi
 %endif
 
 %changelog
-* Thu Sep 19 2024 Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com> - 2.02-158
+* Wed Jul 20 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-138
-- grub-mkconfig.in: turn off executable owner bit
-- Resolves: #RHEL-58835
-
-* Wed Aug 14 2024 Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com> - 2.02-157
-- 20-grub-install: fix SELinux security type context for BLS
-- Resolves: #RHEL-4395
-
-* Tue Feb 20 2024 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-156
-- fs/ntfs: OOB write fix
-- (CVE-2023-4692)
-- Resolves: #RHEL-11566
-
-* Thu Feb 8 2024 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.06-155
-- grub-set-bootflag: Fix for CVE-2024-1048
-- (CVE-2024-1048)
-- Resolves: #RHEL-20746
-
-* Mon Nov 27 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-154
-- Missing install script for previous commit
-- Related: #RHEL-4343
-
-* Fri Nov 24 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-153
-- util: Enable default kernel for updates
-- Resolves: #RHEL-4343
-
-* Fri Oct 20 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-152
-- kern/ieee1275/init: ppc64: Restrict high memory in presence
-  of fadump
-- Resolves: #RHEL-14283
-
-* Mon Aug 28 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-151
-- util: Regenerate kernelopts if missing on ppc
-- Resolves: #2051889
-
-* Fri Jun 16 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-150
-- kern/ieee1275/init: sync vec5 patchset with upstream
-- Resolves: #2172111
-
-* Wed Jun 14 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-149
-- efi/http: change uint32_t to uintn_t for grub_efi_http_message_t
-- Resolves: #2178388
-
-* Mon Feb 06 2023 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-148
-- ppc64le: cas5, take 3
-- Resolves: #2139508
-
-* Tue Jan 10 2023 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-147
-- Enable TDX measurement to RTMR register
-- Resolves: #1981485
-
-* Wed Dec 14 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-146
-- ppc64le: fix lpar cas5
-- Resolves: #2139508
-
-* Tue Nov 08 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 1:2.02-145
-- Font CVE fixes
-- Resolves: CVE-2022-2601
-
-* Tue Oct 18 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-144
-- blscfg: don't assume newline at end of cfg
-- Resolves: #2121132
-
-* Wed Oct 12 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-143
-- x86-efi: Fix an incorrect array size in kernel allocation
-- Also merge with 8.7
-- Resolves: #2031288
-
-* Thu Aug 25 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-141
-- Implement vec5 for cas negotiation
-- Resolves: #2117914
-
-* Wed Aug 24 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-140
-- Or two, because I forgot the debug patch
-- Resolves: #2118896
-
-* Thu Aug 18 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-139
-- Kernel allocator fixups (in one pass)
-- Resolves: #2118896
-
-* Wed Jul 20 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-138
 - Rotate signing keys on ppc64le
 - Resolves: #2074762
 
-* Fri Jun 03 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-137
+* Fri Jun 03 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-137
 - CVE fixes for 2022-06-07
 - CVE-2022-28736 CVE-2022-28735 CVE-2022-28734 CVE-2022-28733
 - CVE-2021-3697 CVE-2021-3696 CVE-2021-3695
 - Resolves: #2070687
 
-* Mon May 16 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-129
+* Mon May 16 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-129
 - ppc64le: Slow boot after LPM
 - Resolves: #2070347
 
-* Wed May 04 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-127
+* Wed May 04 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-127
 - ppc64le: CAS improvements, prefix detection, and vTPM support
 - Resolves: #2076795
 - Resolves: #2026568
 - Resolves: #2051331
 
-* Wed May 04 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-126
+* Wed May 04 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-126
 - Fix rpm verification error on grub.cfg permissions
 - Resolves: #2071643
 
-* Wed Apr 20 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-125
+* Wed Apr 20 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-125
 - RHEL 8.6.0 import; no code changes
 - Resolves: #2062892
 
-* Mon Mar 28 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-123
+* Mon Mar 28 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-123
 - Bump for signing
 
-* Wed Mar 09 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-122
+* Wed Mar 09 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-122
 - Fix initialization on efidisk patch
 
-* Tue Mar 08 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-121
+* Tue Mar 08 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-121
 - Backport support for loading initrd above 4GB
 
-* Mon Feb 28 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-120
+* Mon Feb 28 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-120
 - Bump signing
 - Resolves: #2032294
 
-* Mon Feb 28 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.02-119
+* Mon Feb 28 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-119
 - Enable connectefi module
 - Resolves: #2032294