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Add Several CVE fixes

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Resolves: CVE-2024-45781 CVE-2024-45783 CVE-2024-45778
Resolves: CVE-2024-45775 CVE-2024-45780 CVE-2024-45774
Resolves: CVE-2025-0690 CVE-2025-1118 CVE-2024-45782
Resolves: CVE-2025-0624 CVE-2024-45779 CVE-2024-45776
Resolves: CVE-2025-0622 CVE-2025-0677
Resolves: #RHEL-80691
Resolves: #RHEL-80690
Resolves: #RHEL-80689
Resolves: #RHEL-80687
Resolves: #RHEL-80686

Signed-off-by: Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Leo Sandoval 2025-02-13 11:44:50 -06:00
parent c17ad7254d
commit b9f070c2f2
76 changed files with 6918 additions and 2 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

65
0287-misc-Implement-grub_strlcpy.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2024 02:33:08 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] misc: Implement grub_strlcpy()
grub_strlcpy() acts the same way as strlcpy() does on most *NIX,
returning the length of src and ensuring dest is always NUL
terminated except when size is 0.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
include/grub/misc.h | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/grub/misc.h b/include/grub/misc.h
index db517acd5..6b1e084af 100644
--- a/include/grub/misc.h
+++ b/include/grub/misc.h
@@ -72,6 +72,45 @@ grub_stpcpy (char *dest, const char *src)
return d - 1;
}
+static inline grub_size_t
+grub_strlcpy (char *dest, const char *src, grub_size_t size)
+{
+ char *d = dest;
+ grub_size_t res = 0;
+ /*
+ * We do not subtract one from size here to avoid dealing with underflowing
+ * the value, which is why to_copy is always checked to be greater than one
+ * throughout this function.
+ */
+ grub_size_t to_copy = size;
+
+ /* Copy size - 1 bytes to dest. */
+ if (to_copy > 1)
+ while ((*d++ = *src++) != '\0' && ++res && --to_copy > 1)
+ ;
+
+ /*
+ * NUL terminate if size != 0. The previous step may have copied a NUL byte
+ * if it reached the end of the string, but we know dest[size - 1] must always
+ * be a NUL byte.
+ */
+ if (size != 0)
+ dest[size - 1] = '\0';
+
+ /* If there is still space in dest, but are here, we reached the end of src. */
+ if (to_copy > 1)
+ return res;
+
+ /*
+ * If we haven't reached the end of the string, iterate through to determine
+ * the strings total length.
+ */
+ while (*src++ != '\0' && ++res)
+ ;
+
+ return res;
+}
+
/* XXX: If grub_memmove is too slow, we must implement grub_memcpy. */
static inline void *
grub_memcpy (void *dest, const void *src, grub_size_t n)

29
0287-term-ns8250-return-in-case-of-a-null-SPCR-base-addre.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2025 10:24:26 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] term/ns8250: return in case of a null SPCR base addresses
Serial SPCR MMIO null address are invalid, so return from function, otherwise
invalid 'mmio,0' port names are generated halting the system when running
terminal_input|output commands.
Resolves: #RHEL-68622
Signed-off-by: Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com>
---
grub-core/term/ns8250.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/term/ns8250.c b/grub-core/term/ns8250.c
index 23e8e0904..4ac0bc06a 100644
--- a/grub-core/term/ns8250.c
+++ b/grub-core/term/ns8250.c
@@ -407,6 +407,9 @@ grub_serial_ns8250_add_mmio (grub_addr_t addr, unsigned int acc_size,
struct grub_serial_port *p;
unsigned i;
+ if (addr == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
for (i = 0; i < GRUB_SERIAL_PORT_NUM; i++)
if (com_ports[i].use_mmio == true && com_ports[i].mmio.base == addr)
{

31
0288-fs-ufs-Fix-a-heap-OOB-write.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 02:03:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/ufs: Fix a heap OOB write
grub_strcpy() was used to copy a symlink name from the filesystem
image to a heap allocated buffer. This led to a OOB write to adjacent
heap allocations. Fix by using grub_strlcpy().
Fixes: CVE-2024-45781
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/ufs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c
index a354c92d9..01235101b 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ grub_ufs_lookup_symlink (struct grub_ufs_data *data, int ino)
/* Check against zero is paylindromic, no need to swap. */
if (data->inode.nblocks == 0
&& INODE_SIZE (data) <= sizeof (data->inode.symlink))
- grub_strcpy (symlink, (char *) data->inode.symlink);
+ grub_strlcpy (symlink, (char *) data->inode.symlink, sz);
else
{
if (grub_ufs_read_file (data, 0, 0, 0, sz, symlink) < 0)

31
0289-fs-hfs-Fix-stack-OOB-write-with-grub_strcpy.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 02:48:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/hfs: Fix stack OOB write with grub_strcpy()
Replaced with grub_strlcpy().
Fixes: CVE-2024-45782
Fixes: CVE-2024-56737
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?66599
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/hfs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfs.c b/grub-core/fs/hfs.c
index 91dc0e69c..920112b03 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/hfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/hfs.c
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ grub_hfs_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
volume name. */
key.parent_dir = grub_cpu_to_be32_compile_time (1);
key.strlen = data->sblock.volname[0];
- grub_strcpy ((char *) key.str, (char *) (data->sblock.volname + 1));
+ grub_strlcpy ((char *) key.str, (char *) (data->sblock.volname + 1), sizeof (key.str));
if (grub_hfs_find_node (data, (char *) &key, data->cat_root,
0, (char *) &dir, sizeof (dir)) == 0)

40
0290-fs-tar-Initialize-name-in-grub_cpio_find_file.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 02:47:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/tar: Initialize name in grub_cpio_find_file()
It was possible to iterate through grub_cpio_find_file() without
allocating name and not setting mode to GRUB_ARCHELP_ATTR_END, which
would cause the uninitialized value for name to be used as an argument
for canonicalize() in grub_archelp_dir().
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/tar.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/tar.c b/grub-core/fs/tar.c
index c551ed6b5..646bce5eb 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/tar.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/tar.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
int reread = 0, have_longname = 0, have_longlink = 0;
data->hofs = data->next_hofs;
+ *name = NULL;
for (reread = 0; reread < 3; reread++)
{
@@ -202,6 +203,10 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
}
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
+
+ if (*name == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "invalid tar archive");
+
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}

89
0291-fs-tar-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:27:58 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs/tar: Integer overflow leads to heap OOB write
Both namesize and linksize are derived from hd.size, a 12-digit octal
number parsed by read_number(). Later direct arithmetic calculation like
"namesize + 1" and "linksize + 1" may exceed the maximum value of
grub_size_t leading to heap OOB write. This patch fixes the issue by
using grub_add() and checking for an overflow.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45780
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/tar.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/tar.c b/grub-core/fs/tar.c
index 646bce5eb..386c09022 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/tar.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/tar.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/dl.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
{
struct head hd;
int reread = 0, have_longname = 0, have_longlink = 0;
+ grub_size_t sz;
data->hofs = data->next_hofs;
*name = NULL;
@@ -98,7 +100,11 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
{
grub_err_t err;
grub_size_t namesize = read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size));
- *name = grub_malloc (namesize + 1);
+
+ if (grub_add (namesize, 1, &sz))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("name size overflow"));
+
+ *name = grub_malloc (sz);
if (*name == NULL)
return grub_errno;
err = grub_disk_read (data->disk, 0,
@@ -118,15 +124,19 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
{
grub_err_t err;
grub_size_t linksize = read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size));
- if (data->linkname_alloc < linksize + 1)
+
+ if (grub_add (linksize, 1, &sz))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("link size overflow"));
+
+ if (data->linkname_alloc < sz)
{
char *n;
- n = grub_calloc (2, linksize + 1);
+ n = grub_calloc (2, sz);
if (!n)
return grub_errno;
grub_free (data->linkname);
data->linkname = n;
- data->linkname_alloc = 2 * (linksize + 1);
+ data->linkname_alloc = 2 * (sz);
}
err = grub_disk_read (data->disk, 0,
@@ -149,7 +159,10 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
while (extra_size < sizeof (hd.prefix)
&& hd.prefix[extra_size])
extra_size++;
- *name = grub_malloc (sizeof (hd.name) + extra_size + 2);
+
+ if (grub_add (sizeof (hd.name) + 2, extra_size, &sz))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("long name size overflow"));
+ *name = grub_malloc (sz);
if (*name == NULL)
return grub_errno;
if (hd.prefix[0])

31
0292-fs-f2fs-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 06:15:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/f2fs: Set a grub_errno if mount fails
It was previously possible for grub_errno to not be set when
grub_f2fs_mount() failed if nat_bitmap_ptr() returned NULL.
This issue is solved by ensuring a grub_errno is set in the fail case.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/f2fs.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
index 855e24618..db8a65f8d 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
@@ -872,6 +872,9 @@ grub_f2fs_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
return data;
fail:
+ if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "not a F2FS filesystem");
+
grub_free (data);
return NULL;

35
0293-fs-hfsplus-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 06:22:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/hfsplus: Set a grub_errno if mount fails
It was possible for mount to fail but not set grub_errno. This led to
a possible double decrement of the module reference count if the NULL
page was mapped.
Fixing in general as a similar bug was fixed in commit 61b13c187
(fs/hfsplus: Set grub_errno to prevent NULL pointer access) and there
are likely more variants around.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45783
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
index 295822f69..de71fd486 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ grub_hfsplus_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
fail:
- if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE)
+ if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE || grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "not a HFS+ filesystem");
grub_free (data);

33
0294-fs-iso9660-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 06:37:08 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/iso9660: Set a grub_errno if mount fails
It was possible for a grub_errno to not be set if mount of an ISO 9660
filesystem failed when set_rockridge() returned 0.
This isn't known to be exploitable as the other filesystems due to
filesystem helper checking the requested file type. Though fixing
as a precaution.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/iso9660.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c
index 8c348b59a..8d480e602 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c
@@ -551,6 +551,9 @@ grub_iso9660_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
return data;
fail:
+ if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "not a ISO9660 filesystem");
+
grub_free (data);
return 0;
}

50
0295-fs-iso9660-Fix-invalid-free.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 15:14:42 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] fs/iso9660: Fix invalid free
The ctx->filename can point to either a string literal or a dynamically
allocated string. The ctx->filename_alloc field is used to indicate the
type of allocation.
An issue has been identified where ctx->filename is reassigned to
a string literal in susp_iterate_dir() but ctx->filename_alloc is not
correctly handled. This oversight causes a memory leak and an invalid
free operation later.
The fix involves checking ctx->filename_alloc, freeing the allocated
string if necessary and clearing ctx->filename_alloc for string literals.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/iso9660.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c
index 8d480e602..8e3c95c4f 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c
@@ -628,9 +628,19 @@ susp_iterate_dir (struct grub_iso9660_susp_entry *entry,
filename type is stored. */
/* FIXME: Fix this slightly improper cast. */
if (entry->data[0] & GRUB_ISO9660_RR_DOT)
- ctx->filename = (char *) ".";
+ {
+ if (ctx->filename_alloc)
+ grub_free (ctx->filename);
+ ctx->filename_alloc = 0;
+ ctx->filename = (char *) ".";
+ }
else if (entry->data[0] & GRUB_ISO9660_RR_DOTDOT)
- ctx->filename = (char *) "..";
+ {
+ if (ctx->filename_alloc)
+ grub_free (ctx->filename);
+ ctx->filename_alloc = 0;
+ ctx->filename = (char *) "..";
+ }
else if (entry->len >= 5)
{
grub_size_t off = 0, csize = 1;

63
0296-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-in-jfs_getent.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:27:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs/jfs: Fix OOB read in jfs_getent()
The JFS fuzzing revealed an OOB read in grub_jfs_getent(). The crash
was caused by an invalid leaf nodes count, diro->dirpage->header.count,
which was larger than the maximum number of leaf nodes allowed in an
inode. This fix is to ensure that the leaf nodes count is validated in
grub_jfs_opendir() before calling grub_jfs_getent().
On the occasion replace existing raw numbers with newly defined constant.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
index 6f7c43904..32dec7fb7 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
#define GRUB_JFS_TREE_LEAF 2
+/*
+ * Define max entries stored in-line in an inode.
+ * https://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf
+ */
+#define GRUB_JFS_INODE_INLINE_ENTRIES 8
+
struct grub_jfs_sblock
{
/* The magic for JFS. It should contain the string "JFS1". */
@@ -203,9 +209,9 @@ struct grub_jfs_inode
grub_uint8_t freecnt;
grub_uint8_t freelist;
grub_uint32_t idotdot;
- grub_uint8_t sorted[8];
+ grub_uint8_t sorted[GRUB_JFS_INODE_INLINE_ENTRIES];
} header;
- struct grub_jfs_leaf_dirent dirents[8];
+ struct grub_jfs_leaf_dirent dirents[GRUB_JFS_INODE_INLINE_ENTRIES];
} GRUB_PACKED dir;
/* Fast symlink. */
struct
@@ -453,6 +459,13 @@ grub_jfs_opendir (struct grub_jfs_data *data, struct grub_jfs_inode *inode)
/* Check if the entire tree is contained within the inode. */
if (inode->file.tree.flags & GRUB_JFS_TREE_LEAF)
{
+ if (inode->dir.header.count > GRUB_JFS_INODE_INLINE_ENTRIES)
+ {
+ grub_free (diro);
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("invalid JFS inode"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
diro->leaf = inode->dir.dirents;
diro->next_leaf = (struct grub_jfs_leaf_next_dirent *) de;
diro->sorted = inode->dir.header.sorted;

64
0297-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-caused-by-invalid-dir-slot-index.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:28:00 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs/jfs: Fix OOB read caused by invalid dir slot index
While fuzz testing JFS with ASAN enabled an OOB read was detected in
grub_jfs_opendir(). The issue occurred due to an invalid directory slot
index in the first entry of the sorted directory slot array in the inode
directory header. The fix ensures the slot index is validated before
accessing it. Given that an internal or a leaf node in a directory B+
tree is a 4 KiB in size and each directory slot is always 32 bytes, the
max number of slots in a node is 128. The validation ensures that the
slot index doesn't exceed this limit.
[1] https://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf
JFS will allocate 4K of disk space for an internal node of the B+ tree.
An internal node looks the same as a leaf node.
- page 10
Fixed number of Directory Slots depending on the size of the node. These are
the slots to be used for storing the directory slot array and the directory
entries or router entries. A directory slot is always 32 bytes.
...
A Directory Slot Array which is a sorted array of indices to the directory
slots that are currently in use.
...
An internal or a leaf node in the directory B+ tree is a 4K page.
- page 25
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
index 32dec7fb7..88fb884df 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
* https://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf
*/
#define GRUB_JFS_INODE_INLINE_ENTRIES 8
+#define GRUB_JFS_DIR_MAX_SLOTS 128
struct grub_jfs_sblock
{
@@ -481,6 +482,14 @@ grub_jfs_opendir (struct grub_jfs_data *data, struct grub_jfs_inode *inode)
return 0;
}
+ if (inode->dir.header.sorted[0] >= GRUB_JFS_DIR_MAX_SLOTS)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("invalid directory slot index"));
+ grub_free (diro->dirpage);
+ grub_free (diro);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
blk = grub_le_to_cpu32 (de[inode->dir.header.sorted[0]].ex.blk2);
blk <<= (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz) - GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);

128
0298-fs-jfs-Use-full-40-bits-offset-and-address-for-a-dat.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 20:22:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs/jfs: Use full 40 bits offset and address for a data extent
An extent's logical offset and address are represented as a 40-bit value
split into two parts: the most significant 8 bits and the least
significant 32 bits. Currently the JFS code uses only the least
significant 32 bits value for offsets and addresses assuming the data
size will never exceed the 32-bit range. This approach ignores the most
significant 8 bits potentially leading to incorrect offsets and
addresses for larger values. The patch fixes it by incorporating the
most significant 8 bits into the calculation to get the full 40-bits
value for offsets and addresses.
https://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf
"off1,off2 is a 40-bit field, containing the logical offset of the first
block in the extent.
...
addr1,addr2 is a 40-bit field, containing the address of the extent."
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
index 88fb884df..2bde48d45 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
@@ -265,6 +265,20 @@ static grub_dl_t my_mod;
static grub_err_t grub_jfs_lookup_symlink (struct grub_jfs_data *data, grub_uint32_t ino);
+/*
+ * An extent's offset, physical and logical, is represented as a 40-bit value.
+ * This 40-bit value is split into two parts:
+ * - offset1: the most signficant 8 bits of the offset,
+ * - offset2: the least significant 32 bits of the offset.
+ *
+ * This function calculates and returns the 64-bit offset of an extent.
+ */
+static grub_uint64_t
+get_ext_offset (grub_uint8_t offset1, grub_uint32_t offset2)
+{
+ return (((grub_uint64_t) offset1 << 32) | grub_le_to_cpu32 (offset2));
+}
+
static grub_int64_t
getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead,
struct grub_jfs_tree_extent *extents,
@@ -274,22 +288,25 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead,
{
int found = -1;
int i;
+ grub_uint64_t ext_offset, ext_blk;
for (i = 0; i < grub_le_to_cpu16 (treehead->count) - 2 &&
i < max_extents; i++)
{
+ ext_offset = get_ext_offset (extents[i].offset1, extents[i].offset2);
+ ext_blk = get_ext_offset (extents[i].extent.blk1, extents[i].extent.blk2);
+
if (treehead->flags & GRUB_JFS_TREE_LEAF)
{
/* Read the leafnode. */
- if (grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[i].offset2) <= blk
+ if (ext_offset <= blk
&& ((grub_le_to_cpu16 (extents[i].extent.length))
+ (extents[i].extent.length2 << 16)
- + grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[i].offset2)) > blk)
- return (blk - grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[i].offset2)
- + grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[i].extent.blk2));
+ + ext_offset) > blk)
+ return (blk - ext_offset + ext_blk);
}
else
- if (blk >= grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[i].offset2))
+ if (blk >= ext_offset)
found = i;
}
@@ -307,10 +324,9 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead,
return -1;
if (!grub_disk_read (data->disk,
- ((grub_disk_addr_t) grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[found].extent.blk2))
- << (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz)
- - GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS), 0,
- sizeof (*tree), (char *) tree))
+ (grub_disk_addr_t) ext_blk
+ << (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz) - GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS),
+ 0, sizeof (*tree), (char *) tree))
{
if (grub_memcmp (&tree->treehead, treehead, sizeof (struct grub_jfs_treehead)) ||
grub_memcmp (&tree->extents, extents, 254 * sizeof (struct grub_jfs_tree_extent)))
@@ -361,7 +377,7 @@ grub_jfs_read_inode (struct grub_jfs_data *data, grub_uint32_t ino,
sizeof (iag_inodes), &iag_inodes))
return grub_errno;
- inoblk = grub_le_to_cpu32 (iag_inodes[inoext].blk2);
+ inoblk = get_ext_offset (iag_inodes[inoext].blk1, iag_inodes[inoext].blk2);
inoblk <<= (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz)
- GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
inoblk += inonum;
@@ -490,7 +506,8 @@ grub_jfs_opendir (struct grub_jfs_data *data, struct grub_jfs_inode *inode)
return 0;
}
- blk = grub_le_to_cpu32 (de[inode->dir.header.sorted[0]].ex.blk2);
+ blk = get_ext_offset (de[inode->dir.header.sorted[0]].ex.blk1,
+ de[inode->dir.header.sorted[0]].ex.blk2);
blk <<= (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz) - GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
/* Read in the nodes until we are on the leaf node level. */
@@ -508,7 +525,7 @@ grub_jfs_opendir (struct grub_jfs_data *data, struct grub_jfs_inode *inode)
de = (struct grub_jfs_internal_dirent *) diro->dirpage->dirent;
index = diro->dirpage->sorted[diro->dirpage->header.sindex * 32];
- blk = (grub_le_to_cpu32 (de[index].ex.blk2)
+ blk = (get_ext_offset (de[index].ex.blk1, de[index].ex.blk2)
<< (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz)
- GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS));
} while (!(diro->dirpage->header.flags & GRUB_JFS_TREE_LEAF));

85
0299-fs-jfs-Inconsistent-signed-unsigned-types-usage-in-r.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 20:22:40 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs/jfs: Inconsistent signed/unsigned types usage in return
values
The getblk() returns a value of type grub_int64_t which is assigned to
iagblk and inoblk, both of type grub_uint64_t, in grub_jfs_read_inode()
via grub_jfs_blkno(). This patch fixes the type mismatch in the
functions. Additionally, the getblk() will return 0 instead of -1 on
failure cases. This change is safe because grub_errno is always set in
getblk() to indicate errors and it is later checked in the callers.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 15 +++++++++------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
index 2bde48d45..70a2f4947 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ get_ext_offset (grub_uint8_t offset1, grub_uint32_t offset2)
return (((grub_uint64_t) offset1 << 32) | grub_le_to_cpu32 (offset2));
}
-static grub_int64_t
+static grub_uint64_t
getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead,
struct grub_jfs_tree_extent *extents,
int max_extents,
@@ -290,6 +290,8 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead,
int i;
grub_uint64_t ext_offset, ext_blk;
+ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
for (i = 0; i < grub_le_to_cpu16 (treehead->count) - 2 &&
i < max_extents; i++)
{
@@ -312,7 +314,7 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead,
if (found != -1)
{
- grub_int64_t ret = -1;
+ grub_uint64_t ret = 0;
struct
{
struct grub_jfs_treehead treehead;
@@ -321,7 +323,7 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead,
tree = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*tree));
if (!tree)
- return -1;
+ return 0;
if (!grub_disk_read (data->disk,
(grub_disk_addr_t) ext_blk
@@ -334,19 +336,20 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead,
else
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "jfs: infinite recursion detected");
- ret = -1;
+ ret = 0;
}
}
grub_free (tree);
return ret;
}
- return -1;
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "jfs: block %" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T " not found", blk);
+ return 0;
}
/* Get the block number for the block BLK in the node INODE in the
mounted filesystem DATA. */
-static grub_int64_t
+static grub_uint64_t
grub_jfs_blkno (struct grub_jfs_data *data, struct grub_jfs_inode *inode,
grub_uint64_t blk)
{

46
0300-fs-ext2-Fix-out-of-bounds-read-for-inline-extents.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 15:14:23 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] fs/ext2: Fix out-of-bounds read for inline extents
When inline extents are used, i.e. the extent tree depth equals zero,
a maximum of four entries can fit into the inode's data block. If the
extent header states a number of entries greater than four the current
ext2 implementation causes an out-of-bounds read. Fix this issue by
capping the number of extents to four when reading inline extents.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/ext2.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ext2.c b/grub-core/fs/ext2.c
index e1cc5e62a..3f9f6b208 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ext2.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ext2.c
@@ -495,6 +495,8 @@ grub_ext2_read_block (grub_fshelp_node_t node, grub_disk_addr_t fileblock)
struct grub_ext4_extent *ext;
int i;
grub_disk_addr_t ret;
+ grub_uint16_t nent;
+ const grub_uint16_t max_inline_ext = sizeof (inode->blocks) / sizeof (*ext) - 1; /* Minus 1 extent header. */
if (grub_ext4_find_leaf (data, (struct grub_ext4_extent_header *) inode->blocks.dir_blocks,
fileblock, &leaf) != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
@@ -508,7 +510,13 @@ grub_ext2_read_block (grub_fshelp_node_t node, grub_disk_addr_t fileblock)
return 0;
ext = (struct grub_ext4_extent *) (leaf + 1);
- for (i = 0; i < grub_le_to_cpu16 (leaf->entries); i++)
+
+ nent = grub_le_to_cpu16 (leaf->entries);
+
+ if (leaf->depth == 0)
+ nent = grub_min (nent, max_inline_ext);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nent; i++)
{
if (fileblock < grub_le_to_cpu32 (ext[i].block))
break;

47
0301-fs-ntfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2024 12:12:06 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] fs/ntfs: Fix out-of-bounds read
When parsing NTFS file records the presence of the 0xFF marker indicates
the end of the attribute list. This value signifies that there are no
more attributes to process.
However, when the end marker is missing due to corrupted metadata the
loop continues to read beyond the attribute list resulting in out-of-bounds
reads and potentially entering an infinite loop.
This patch adds a check to provide a stop condition for the loop ensuring
it stops at the end of the attribute list or at the end of the Master File
Table. This guards against out-of-bounds reads and prevents infinite loops.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
index de435aa14..8a5384247 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ free_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at)
static grub_uint8_t *
find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
{
+ grub_uint8_t *mft_end;
+
if (at->flags & GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST)
{
retry:
@@ -191,7 +193,8 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
return NULL;
}
at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt;
- while (*at->attr_cur != 0xFF)
+ mft_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+ while (at->attr_cur < mft_end && *at->attr_cur != 0xFF)
{
at->attr_nxt += u16at (at->attr_cur, 4);
if (*at->attr_cur == GRUB_NTFS_AT_ATTRIBUTE_LIST)

141
0302-fs-ntfs-Track-the-end-of-the-MFT-attribute-buffer.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2025 11:38:34 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs/ntfs: Track the end of the MFT attribute buffer
The end of the attribute buffer should be stored alongside the rest of
the attribute struct as right now it is not possible to implement bounds
checking when accessing attributes sequentially.
This is done via:
- updating init_attr() to set at->end and check is is not initially out of bounds,
- implementing checks as init_attr() had its type change in its callers,
- updating the value of at->end when needed.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
include/grub/ntfs.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
index 8a5384247..dbda720e1 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
@@ -119,13 +119,20 @@ static grub_err_t read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa,
grub_disk_read_hook_t read_hook,
void *read_hook_data);
-static void
+static grub_err_t
init_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft)
{
at->mft = mft;
at->flags = (mft == &mft->data->mmft) ? GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT : 0;
at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + first_attr_off (mft->buf);
+ at->end = mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+
+ if (at->attr_nxt > at->end)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "attributes start outside the MFT");
+
at->attr_end = at->emft_buf = at->edat_buf = at->sbuf = NULL;
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
static void
@@ -239,6 +246,10 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
}
at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST;
+
+ /* From this point on pa_end is the end of the buffer */
+ at->end = pa_end;
+
while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
{
if ((*at->attr_nxt == attr) || (attr == 0))
@@ -298,7 +309,9 @@ locate_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft,
{
grub_uint8_t *pa;
- init_attr (at, mft);
+ if (init_attr (at, mft) != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return NULL;
+
pa = find_attr (at, attr);
if (pa == NULL)
return NULL;
@@ -314,7 +327,8 @@ locate_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft,
}
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
free_attr (at);
- init_attr (at, mft);
+ if (init_attr (at, mft) != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return NULL;
pa = find_attr (at, attr);
}
return pa;
@@ -585,7 +599,7 @@ init_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *mft, grub_uint64_t mftno)
mft->attr.attr_end = 0; /* Don't jump to attribute list */
}
else
- init_attr (&mft->attr, mft);
+ return init_attr (&mft->attr, mft);
return 0;
}
@@ -811,7 +825,9 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
bmp = NULL;
at = &attr;
- init_attr (at, mft);
+ if (init_attr (at, mft) != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return 0;
+
while (1)
{
cur_pos = find_attr (at, GRUB_NTFS_AT_INDEX_ROOT);
@@ -842,7 +858,9 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
bitmap = NULL;
bitmap_len = 0;
free_attr (at);
+ /* No need to check errors here, as it will already be fine */
init_attr (at, mft);
+
while ((cur_pos = find_attr (at, GRUB_NTFS_AT_BITMAP)) != NULL)
{
int ofs;
@@ -1207,6 +1225,7 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
struct grub_ntfs_data *data = 0;
struct grub_fshelp_node *mft = 0;
grub_uint8_t *pa;
+ grub_err_t err;
grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
@@ -1232,7 +1251,10 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
goto fail;
}
- init_attr (&mft->attr, mft);
+ err = init_attr (&mft->attr, mft);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return err;
+
pa = find_attr (&mft->attr, GRUB_NTFS_AT_VOLUME_NAME);
if (pa >= mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
diff --git a/include/grub/ntfs.h b/include/grub/ntfs.h
index d1a6af696..ec1c4db38 100644
--- a/include/grub/ntfs.h
+++ b/include/grub/ntfs.h
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ struct grub_ntfs_attr
grub_uint8_t *attr_cur, *attr_nxt, *attr_end;
grub_uint32_t save_pos;
grub_uint8_t *sbuf;
+ grub_uint8_t *end;
struct grub_ntfs_file *mft;
};

183
0303-fs-ntfs-Use-a-helper-function-to-access-attributes.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 12:39:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/ntfs: Use a helper function to access attributes
Right now to access the next attribute the code reads the length of the
current attribute and adds that to the current pointer. This is error
prone as bounds checking needs to be performed all over the place. So,
implement a helper and ensure its used across find_attr() and read_attr().
This commit does *not* implement full bounds checking. It is just the
preparation work for this to be added into the helper.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
include/grub/ntfs.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
index dbda720e1..1c678f3d0 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
@@ -70,6 +70,25 @@ res_attr_data_len (void *res_attr_ptr)
return u32at (res_attr_ptr, 0x10);
}
+/* Return the next attribute if it exists, otherwise return NULL. */
+static grub_uint8_t *
+next_attribute (grub_uint8_t *curr_attribute, void *end)
+{
+ grub_uint8_t *next = curr_attribute;
+
+ /*
+ * Need to verify we aren't exceeding the end of the buffer by reading the
+ * header for the current attribute
+ */
+ if (curr_attribute + GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_HEADER_SIZE >= (grub_uint8_t *) end)
+ return NULL;
+
+ next += u16at (curr_attribute, 4);
+
+ return next;
+}
+
+
grub_ntfscomp_func_t grub_ntfscomp_func;
static grub_err_t
@@ -151,13 +170,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
if (at->flags & GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST)
{
retry:
- while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
+ while (at->attr_nxt)
{
at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt;
- at->attr_nxt += u16at (at->attr_cur, 4);
+ at->attr_nxt = next_attribute (at->attr_cur, at->attr_end);
if ((*at->attr_cur == attr) || (attr == 0))
{
- grub_uint8_t *new_pos;
+ grub_uint8_t *new_pos, *end;
if (at->flags & GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT)
{
@@ -181,15 +200,36 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
return NULL;
}
+ /*
+ * Only time emft_bufs is defined is in this function, with this
+ * size.
+ */
+ grub_size_t emft_buf_size =
+ at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR;
+
+ /*
+ * Needs to be enough space for the successful case to even
+ * bother.
+ */
+ if (first_attr_off (at->emft_buf) >= (emft_buf_size - 0x18 - 2))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
+ "can\'t find 0x%X in attribute list",
+ (unsigned char) *at->attr_cur);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
new_pos = &at->emft_buf[first_attr_off (at->emft_buf)];
- while (*new_pos != 0xFF)
+ end = &at->emft_buf[emft_buf_size];
+
+ while (new_pos && *new_pos != 0xFF)
{
if ((*new_pos == *at->attr_cur)
&& (u16at (new_pos, 0xE) == u16at (at->attr_cur, 0x18)))
{
return new_pos;
}
- new_pos += u16at (new_pos, 4);
+ new_pos = next_attribute (new_pos, end);
}
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
"can\'t find 0x%X in attribute list",
@@ -203,7 +243,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
mft_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
while (at->attr_cur < mft_end && *at->attr_cur != 0xFF)
{
- at->attr_nxt += u16at (at->attr_cur, 4);
+ at->attr_nxt = next_attribute (at->attr_cur, at->end);
if (*at->attr_cur == GRUB_NTFS_AT_ATTRIBUTE_LIST)
at->attr_end = at->attr_cur;
if ((*at->attr_cur == attr) || (attr == 0))
@@ -250,13 +290,14 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
/* From this point on pa_end is the end of the buffer */
at->end = pa_end;
- while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
+ while (at->attr_nxt)
{
if ((*at->attr_nxt == attr) || (attr == 0))
break;
- at->attr_nxt += u16at (at->attr_nxt, 4);
+ at->attr_nxt = next_attribute (at->attr_nxt, pa_end);
}
- if (at->attr_nxt >= at->attr_end)
+
+ if (at->attr_nxt >= at->attr_end || at->attr_nxt == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((at->flags & GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT) && (attr == GRUB_NTFS_AT_DATA))
@@ -277,7 +318,8 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start
+ 1));
pa = at->attr_nxt + u16at (pa, 4);
- while (pa < at->attr_end)
+
+ while (pa)
{
if (*pa != attr)
break;
@@ -293,7 +335,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR, 0, 0, 0))
return NULL;
- pa += u16at (pa, 4);
+ pa = next_attribute (pa, pa_end);
}
at->attr_nxt = at->attr_cur;
at->flags &= ~GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS;
@@ -530,14 +572,15 @@ read_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *dest, grub_disk_addr_t ofs,
else
vcn = ofs >> (at->mft->data->log_spc + GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
pa = at->attr_nxt + u16at (at->attr_nxt, 4);
- while (pa < at->attr_end)
+
+ while (pa)
{
if (*pa != attr)
break;
if (u32at (pa, 8) > vcn)
break;
at->attr_nxt = pa;
- pa += u16at (pa, 4);
+ pa = next_attribute (pa, at->attr_end);
}
}
pp = find_attr (at, attr);
diff --git a/include/grub/ntfs.h b/include/grub/ntfs.h
index ec1c4db38..2c8078403 100644
--- a/include/grub/ntfs.h
+++ b/include/grub/ntfs.h
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ enum
#define GRUB_NTFS_COM_SEC (GRUB_NTFS_COM_LEN >> GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR)
#define GRUB_NTFS_LOG_COM_SEC (GRUB_NTFS_COM_LOG_LEN - GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR)
+#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_HEADER_SIZE 16
+
enum
{
GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST = 1,

245
0304-fs-ntfs-Implement-attribute-verification.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 12:39:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/ntfs: Implement attribute verification
It was possible to read OOB when an attribute had a size that exceeded
the allocated buffer. This resolves that by making sure all attributes
that get read are fully in the allocated space by implementing
a function to validate them.
Defining the offsets in include/grub/ntfs.h but they are only used in
the validation function and not across the rest of the NTFS code.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/ntfs.h | 22 ++++++++
2 files changed, 175 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
index 1c678f3d0..64f4f2221 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
@@ -70,6 +70,149 @@ res_attr_data_len (void *res_attr_ptr)
return u32at (res_attr_ptr, 0x10);
}
+/*
+ * Check if the attribute is valid and doesn't exceed the allocated region.
+ * This accounts for resident and non-resident data.
+ *
+ * This is based off the documentation from the linux-ntfs project:
+ * https://flatcap.github.io/linux-ntfs/ntfs/concepts/attribute_header.html
+ */
+static bool
+validate_attribute (grub_uint8_t *attr, void *end)
+{
+ grub_size_t attr_size = 0;
+ grub_size_t min_size = 0;
+ grub_size_t spare = (grub_uint8_t *) end - attr;
+ /*
+ * Just used as a temporary variable to try and deal with cases where someone
+ * tries to overlap fields.
+ */
+ grub_size_t curr = 0;
+
+ /* Need verify we can entirely read the attributes header. */
+ if (attr + GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_HEADER_SIZE >= (grub_uint8_t *) end)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /*
+ * So, the rest of this code uses a 16bit int for the attribute length but
+ * from reading the all the documentation I could find it says this field is
+ * actually 32bit. But let's be consistent with the rest of the code.
+ *
+ * https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.10.7/source/fs/ntfs3/ntfs.h#L370
+ */
+ attr_size = u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_LENGTH);
+
+ if (attr_size > spare)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* Not an error case, just reached the end of the attributes. */
+ if (attr_size == 0)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Extra validation by trying to calculate a minimum possible size for this
+ * attribute. +8 from the size of the resident data struct which is the
+ * minimum that can be added.
+ */
+ min_size = GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_HEADER_SIZE + 8;
+
+ if (min_size > attr_size)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* Is the data is resident (0) or not (1). */
+ if (attr[GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RESIDENT] == 0)
+ {
+ /* Read the offset and size of the attribute. */
+ curr = u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RES_OFFSET);
+ curr += u32at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RES_LENGTH);
+ if (curr > min_size)
+ min_size = curr;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * If the data is non-resident, the minimum size is 64 which is where
+ * the data runs start. We already have a minimum size of 24. So, just
+ * adding 40 to get to the real value.
+ */
+ min_size += 40;
+ if (min_size > attr_size)
+ goto fail;
+ /* If the compression unit size is > 0, +8 bytes*/
+ if (u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_COMPRESSION_UNIT_SIZE) > 0)
+ min_size += 8;
+
+ /*
+ * Need to consider the data runs now. Each member of the run has byte
+ * that describes the size of the data length and offset. Each being
+ * 4 bits in the byte.
+ */
+ curr = u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_DATA_RUNS);
+
+ if (curr + 1 > min_size)
+ min_size = curr + 1;
+
+ if (min_size > attr_size)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /*
+ * Each attribute can store multiple data runs which are stored
+ * continuously in the attribute. They exist as one header byte
+ * with up to 14 bytes following it depending on the lengths.
+ * We stop when we hit a header that is just a NUL byte.
+ *
+ * https://flatcap.github.io/linux-ntfs/ntfs/concepts/data_runs.html
+ */
+ while (attr[curr] != 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We stop when we hit a header that is just a NUL byte. The data
+ * run header is stored as a single byte where the top 4 bits refer
+ * to the number of bytes used to store the total length of the
+ * data run, and the number of bytes used to store the offset.
+ * These directly follow the header byte, so we use them to update
+ * the minimum size.
+ */
+ min_size += (attr[curr] & 0x7) + ((attr[curr] >> 4) & 0x7);
+ curr += min_size;
+ min_size++;
+ if (min_size > attr_size)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Name offset, doing this after data residence checks. */
+ if (u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_NAME_OFFSET) != 0)
+ {
+ curr = u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_NAME_OFFSET);
+ /*
+ * Multiple the name length by 2 as its UTF-16. Can be zero if this in an
+ * unamed attribute.
+ */
+ curr += attr[GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_NAME_LENGTH] * 2;
+ if (curr > min_size)
+ min_size = curr;
+ }
+
+ /* Padded to 8 bytes. */
+ if (min_size % 8 != 0)
+ min_size += 8 - (min_size % 8);
+
+ /*
+ * At this point min_size should be exactly attr_size but being flexible
+ * here to avoid any issues.
+ */
+ if (min_size > attr_size)
+ goto fail;
+
+ return true;
+
+ fail:
+ grub_dprintf ("ntfs", "spare=%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " min_size=%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " attr_size=%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n",
+ spare, min_size, attr_size);
+ return false;
+}
+
/* Return the next attribute if it exists, otherwise return NULL. */
static grub_uint8_t *
next_attribute (grub_uint8_t *curr_attribute, void *end)
@@ -84,6 +227,8 @@ next_attribute (grub_uint8_t *curr_attribute, void *end)
return NULL;
next += u16at (curr_attribute, 4);
+ if (validate_attribute (next, end) == false)
+ return NULL;
return next;
}
@@ -290,6 +435,9 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
/* From this point on pa_end is the end of the buffer */
at->end = pa_end;
+ if (validate_attribute (at->attr_nxt, pa_end) == false)
+ return NULL;
+
while (at->attr_nxt)
{
if ((*at->attr_nxt == attr) || (attr == 0))
@@ -319,6 +467,9 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 1));
pa = at->attr_nxt + u16at (pa, 4);
+ if (validate_attribute (pa, pa_end) == true)
+ pa = NULL;
+
while (pa)
{
if (*pa != attr)
@@ -572,6 +723,8 @@ read_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *dest, grub_disk_addr_t ofs,
else
vcn = ofs >> (at->mft->data->log_spc + GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
pa = at->attr_nxt + u16at (at->attr_nxt, 4);
+ if (validate_attribute (pa, at->attr_end) == false)
+ pa = NULL;
while (pa)
{
diff --git a/include/grub/ntfs.h b/include/grub/ntfs.h
index 2c8078403..77b182acf 100644
--- a/include/grub/ntfs.h
+++ b/include/grub/ntfs.h
@@ -91,6 +91,28 @@ enum
#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_HEADER_SIZE 16
+/*
+ * To make attribute validation clearer the offsets for each value in the
+ * attribute headers are defined as macros.
+ *
+ * These offsets are all from:
+ * https://flatcap.github.io/linux-ntfs/ntfs/concepts/attribute_header.html
+ */
+
+/* These offsets are part of the attribute header. */
+#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_LENGTH 4
+#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RESIDENT 8
+#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_NAME_LENGTH 9
+#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_NAME_OFFSET 10
+
+/* Offsets for values needed for resident data. */
+#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RES_LENGTH 16
+#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RES_OFFSET 20
+
+/* Offsets for values needed for non-resident data. */
+#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_DATA_RUNS 32
+#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_COMPRESSION_UNIT_SIZE 34
+
enum
{
GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST = 1,

43
0305-fs-xfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 15:14:57 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] fs/xfs: Fix out-of-bounds read
The number of records in the root key array read from disk was not being
validated against the size of the root node. This could lead to an
out-of-bounds read.
This patch adds a check to ensure that the number of records in the root
key array does not exceed the expected size of a root node read from
disk. If this check detects an out-of-bounds condition the operation is
aborted to prevent random errors due to metadata corruption.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/xfs.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
index 92046f9bd..96f62c5a4 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
@@ -595,6 +595,17 @@ grub_xfs_read_block (grub_fshelp_node_t node, grub_disk_addr_t fileblock)
do
{
grub_uint64_t i;
+ grub_addr_t keys_end, data_end;
+
+ if (grub_mul (sizeof (grub_uint64_t), nrec, &keys_end) ||
+ grub_add ((grub_addr_t) keys, keys_end, &keys_end) ||
+ grub_add ((grub_addr_t) node->data, node->data->data_size, &data_end) ||
+ keys_end > data_end)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "invalid number of XFS root keys");
+ grub_free (leaf);
+ return 0;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < nrec; i++)
{

42
0306-fs-xfs-Ensuring-failing-to-mount-sets-a-grub_errno.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 06:03:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/xfs: Ensuring failing to mount sets a grub_errno
It was previously possible for grub_xfs_mount() to return NULL without
setting grub_errno if the XFS version was invalid. This resulted in it
being possible for grub_dl_unref() to be called twice allowing the XFS
module to be unloaded while there were still references to it.
Fixing this problem in general by ensuring a grub_errno is set if the
fail label is reached.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/xfs.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
index 96f62c5a4..a837f9824 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
@@ -327,6 +327,8 @@ static int grub_xfs_sb_valid(struct grub_xfs_data *data)
}
return 1;
}
+
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "unsupported XFS filesystem version");
return 0;
}
@@ -1068,7 +1070,7 @@ grub_xfs_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
return data;
fail:
- if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE)
+ if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE || grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "not an XFS filesystem");
grub_free (data);

32
0307-kern-file-Ensure-file-data-is-set.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 03:01:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] kern/file: Ensure file->data is set
This is to avoid a generic issue were some filesystems would not set
data and also not set a grub_errno. This meant it was possible for many
filesystems to grub_dl_unref() themselves multiple times resulting in
it being possible to unload the filesystems while there were still
references to them, e.g., via a loopback.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/kern/file.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/file.c b/grub-core/kern/file.c
index 75510df7c..85e832bd8 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/file.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/file.c
@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ grub_file_open (const char *name, enum grub_file_type type)
if ((file->fs->fs_open) (file, file_name) != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
goto fail;
+ if (file->data == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+
file->name = grub_strdup (name);
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;

440
0308-kern-file-Implement-filesystem-reference-counting.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 13:44:25 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] kern/file: Implement filesystem reference counting
The grub_file_open() and grub_file_close() should be the only places
that allow a reference to a filesystem to stay open. So, add grub_dl_t
to grub_fs_t and set this in the GRUB_MOD_INIT() for each filesystem to
avoid issues when filesystems forget to do it themselves or do not track
their own references, e.g. squash4.
The fs_label(), fs_uuid(), fs_mtime() and fs_read() should all ref and
unref in the same function but it is essentially redundant in GRUB
single threaded model.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/affs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/bfs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/btrfs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/cbfs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/cpio.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/cpio_be.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/ext2.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/f2fs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/fat.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/hfs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/iso9660.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/minix.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/newc.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/odc.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/proc.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/romfs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/sfs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/squash4.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/tar.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/udf.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/ufs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/xfs.c | 1 +
grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 1 +
grub-core/kern/file.c | 7 +++++++
include/grub/fs.h | 4 ++++
30 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/affs.c b/grub-core/fs/affs.c
index ed606b3f1..9b0afb954 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/affs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/affs.c
@@ -703,6 +703,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_affs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(affs)
{
+ grub_affs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_affs_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/bfs.c b/grub-core/fs/bfs.c
index 07cb3e3ac..f37b16895 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/bfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/bfs.c
@@ -1106,6 +1106,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (bfs)
{
COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (1 << LOG_EXTENT_SIZE ==
sizeof (struct grub_bfs_extent));
+ grub_bfs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_bfs_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
index ad35e7575..6593f5175 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
@@ -3402,6 +3402,7 @@ subvol_get_env (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
GRUB_MOD_INIT (btrfs)
{
+ grub_btrfs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_btrfs_fs);
cmd_info = grub_register_command("btrfs-info", grub_cmd_btrfs_info,
"DEVICE",
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c b/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c
index 8ab7106af..2332745fe 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c
@@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (cbfs)
#if (defined (__i386__) || defined (__x86_64__)) && !defined (GRUB_UTIL) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_EMU) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_XEN)
init_cbfsdisk ();
#endif
+ grub_cbfs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_cbfs_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cpio.c b/grub-core/fs/cpio.c
index dab5f9898..1799f7ff5 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/cpio.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/cpio.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ read_number (const grub_uint16_t *arr, grub_size_t size)
GRUB_MOD_INIT (cpio)
{
+ grub_cpio_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_cpio_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cpio_be.c b/grub-core/fs/cpio_be.c
index 846548892..7bed1b848 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/cpio_be.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/cpio_be.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ read_number (const grub_uint16_t *arr, grub_size_t size)
GRUB_MOD_INIT (cpio_be)
{
+ grub_cpio_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_cpio_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ext2.c b/grub-core/fs/ext2.c
index 3f9f6b208..c3058f7e7 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ext2.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ext2.c
@@ -1131,6 +1131,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_ext2_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(ext2)
{
+ grub_ext2_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_ext2_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
index db8a65f8d..f6d6beaa5 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
@@ -1353,6 +1353,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_f2fs_fs = {
GRUB_MOD_INIT (f2fs)
{
+ grub_f2fs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_f2fs_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/fat.c b/grub-core/fs/fat.c
index c5efed724..6e62b915d 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/fat.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/fat.c
@@ -1312,6 +1312,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(fat)
#endif
{
COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (sizeof (struct grub_fat_dir_entry) == 32);
+ grub_fat_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_fat_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfs.c b/grub-core/fs/hfs.c
index 920112b03..ce7581dd5 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/hfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/hfs.c
@@ -1434,6 +1434,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_hfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(hfs)
{
+ grub_hfs_fs.mod = mod;
if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
grub_fs_register (&grub_hfs_fs);
my_mod = mod;
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
index de71fd486..3f203abcc 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
@@ -1176,6 +1176,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_hfsplus_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(hfsplus)
{
+ grub_hfsplus_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_hfsplus_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c
index 8e3c95c4f..c73cb9ce0 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c
@@ -1260,6 +1260,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_iso9660_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(iso9660)
{
+ grub_iso9660_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_iso9660_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
index 70a2f4947..b0283ac00 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_jfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(jfs)
{
+ grub_jfs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_jfs_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/minix.c b/grub-core/fs/minix.c
index 5354951d1..b7679c3e2 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/minix.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/minix.c
@@ -734,6 +734,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(minix)
#endif
#endif
{
+ grub_minix_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_minix_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/newc.c b/grub-core/fs/newc.c
index 4fb8b2e3d..43b7f8b64 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/newc.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/newc.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ read_number (const char *str, grub_size_t size)
GRUB_MOD_INIT (newc)
{
+ grub_cpio_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_cpio_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
index fc7374ead..4e1e71738 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
@@ -1231,6 +1231,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (nilfs2)
grub_nilfs2_dat_entry));
COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (1 << LOG_INODE_SIZE
== sizeof (struct grub_nilfs2_inode));
+ grub_nilfs2_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_nilfs2_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
index 64f4f2221..4e144cc3c 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
@@ -1541,6 +1541,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_ntfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT (ntfs)
{
+ grub_ntfs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_ntfs_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/odc.c b/grub-core/fs/odc.c
index 790000622..8e4e8aeac 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/odc.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/odc.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ read_number (const char *str, grub_size_t size)
GRUB_MOD_INIT (odc)
{
+ grub_cpio_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_cpio_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/proc.c b/grub-core/fs/proc.c
index 5f516502d..bcde43349 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/proc.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/proc.c
@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_procfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT (procfs)
{
+ grub_procfs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_disk_dev_register (&grub_procfs_dev);
grub_fs_register (&grub_procfs_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c b/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c
index 42818c376..e8b0b6383 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c
@@ -1407,6 +1407,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_reiserfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(reiserfs)
{
+ grub_reiserfs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_reiserfs_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/romfs.c b/grub-core/fs/romfs.c
index 1f7dcfca1..56b0b2b2f 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/romfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/romfs.c
@@ -475,6 +475,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_romfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(romfs)
{
+ grub_romfs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_romfs_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
index 983e88008..f0d7cac43 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
@@ -779,6 +779,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_sfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(sfs)
{
+ grub_sfs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_sfs_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c
index a30e6ebe1..6e9d63874 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c
@@ -1044,6 +1044,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_squash_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(squash4)
{
+ grub_squash_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_squash_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/tar.c b/grub-core/fs/tar.c
index 386c09022..fd2ec1f74 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/tar.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/tar.c
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_cpio_fs = {
GRUB_MOD_INIT (tar)
{
+ grub_cpio_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_cpio_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/udf.c b/grub-core/fs/udf.c
index b836e6107..8765c633c 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/udf.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/udf.c
@@ -1455,6 +1455,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_udf_fs = {
GRUB_MOD_INIT (udf)
{
+ grub_udf_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_udf_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c
index 01235101b..e82d9356d 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c
@@ -899,6 +899,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(ufs1)
#endif
#endif
{
+ grub_ufs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_ufs_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
index a837f9824..6c952aef1 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
@@ -1304,6 +1304,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_xfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(xfs)
{
+ grub_xfs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_xfs_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
index b5453e006..a497b1869 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
@@ -4424,6 +4424,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_zfs_fs = {
GRUB_MOD_INIT (zfs)
{
COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (sizeof (zap_leaf_chunk_t) == ZAP_LEAF_CHUNKSIZE);
+ grub_zfs_fs.mod = mod;
grub_fs_register (&grub_zfs_fs);
#ifndef GRUB_UTIL
my_mod = mod;
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/file.c b/grub-core/kern/file.c
index 85e832bd8..ec90a26ba 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/file.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/file.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <grub/fs.h>
#include <grub/device.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/dl.h>
void (*EXPORT_VAR (grub_grubnet_fini)) (void);
@@ -127,6 +128,9 @@ grub_file_open (const char *name, enum grub_file_type type)
if (file->data == NULL)
goto fail;
+ if (file->fs->mod)
+ grub_dl_ref (file->fs->mod);
+
file->name = grub_strdup (name);
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
@@ -219,6 +223,9 @@ grub_file_read (grub_file_t file, void *buf, grub_size_t len)
grub_err_t
grub_file_close (grub_file_t file)
{
+ if (file->fs->mod)
+ grub_dl_unref (file->fs->mod);
+
grub_dprintf ("file", "Closing `%s' ...\n", file->name);
if (file->fs->fs_close)
(file->fs->fs_close) (file);
diff --git a/include/grub/fs.h b/include/grub/fs.h
index 026bc3bb8..df4c93b16 100644
--- a/include/grub/fs.h
+++ b/include/grub/fs.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <grub/device.h>
#include <grub/symbol.h>
#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/dl.h>
#include <grub/list.h>
/* For embedding types. */
@@ -57,6 +58,9 @@ struct grub_fs
/* My name. */
const char *name;
+ /* My module */
+ grub_dl_t mod;
+
/* Call HOOK with each file under DIR. */
grub_err_t (*fs_dir) (grub_device_t device, const char *path,
grub_fs_dir_hook_t hook, void *hook_data);

366
0309-cli_lock-Add-build-option-to-block-command-line-inte.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 06:26:37 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] cli_lock: Add build option to block command line interface
Add functionality to disable command line interface access and editing of GRUB
menu entries if GRUB image is built with --disable-cli.
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 6 ++++--
grub-core/kern/main.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
grub-core/kern/rescue_reader.c | 13 +++++++++++++
grub-core/normal/auth.c | 3 +++
grub-core/normal/menu_text.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
include/grub/kernel.h | 1 +
include/grub/misc.h | 2 ++
include/grub/util/install.h | 8 ++++++--
util/grub-install-common.c | 10 ++++++++--
util/grub-mkimage.c | 9 ++++++++-
util/mkimage.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
11 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index 096a3cde0..9ce9c5b82 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -6520,8 +6520,10 @@ the GRUB command line, edit menu entries, and execute any menu entry. If
@samp{superusers} is set, then use of the command line and editing of menu
entries are automatically restricted to superusers. Setting @samp{superusers}
to empty string effectively disables both access to CLI and editing of menu
-entries. Note: The environment variable needs to be exported to also affect
-the section defined by the @samp{submenu} command (@pxref{submenu}).
+entries. Building a grub image with @samp{--disable-cli} option will also
+disable access to CLI and editing of menu entries, as well as disabling rescue
+mode. Note: The environment variable needs to be exported to also affect the
+section defined by the @samp{submenu} command (@pxref{submenu}).
Other users may be allowed to execute specific menu entries by giving a list of
usernames (as above) using the @option{--users} option to the
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/main.c b/grub-core/kern/main.c
index 8e89763f4..0d6b8138d 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/main.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/main.c
@@ -30,11 +30,14 @@
#include <grub/reader.h>
#include <grub/parser.h>
#include <grub/verify.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_PCBIOS
#include <grub/machine/memory.h>
#endif
+static bool cli_disabled = false;
+
grub_addr_t
grub_modules_get_end (void)
{
@@ -299,6 +302,28 @@ grub_load_normal_mode (void)
grub_command_execute ("normal", 0, 0);
}
+bool
+grub_is_cli_disabled (void)
+{
+ return cli_disabled;
+}
+
+static void
+check_is_cli_disabled (void)
+{
+ struct grub_module_header *header;
+ header = 0;
+
+ FOR_MODULES (header)
+ {
+ if (header->type == OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI)
+ {
+ cli_disabled = true;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static void
reclaim_module_space (void)
{
@@ -356,6 +381,9 @@ grub_main (void)
grub_boot_time ("After loading embedded modules.");
+ /* Check if the CLI should be disabled */
+ check_is_cli_disabled ();
+
/* It is better to set the root device as soon as possible,
for convenience. */
grub_set_prefix_and_root ();
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/rescue_reader.c b/grub-core/kern/rescue_reader.c
index dcd7d4439..4259857ba 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/rescue_reader.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/rescue_reader.c
@@ -78,6 +78,19 @@ grub_rescue_read_line (char **line, int cont,
void __attribute__ ((noreturn))
grub_rescue_run (void)
{
+ /* Stall if the CLI has been disabled */
+ if (grub_is_cli_disabled ())
+ {
+ grub_printf ("Rescue mode has been disabled...\n");
+
+ do
+ {
+ /* Do not optimize out the loop. */
+ asm volatile ("");
+ }
+ while (1);
+ }
+
grub_printf ("Entering rescue mode...\n");
while (1)
diff --git a/grub-core/normal/auth.c b/grub-core/normal/auth.c
index 517fc623f..d94020186 100644
--- a/grub-core/normal/auth.c
+++ b/grub-core/normal/auth.c
@@ -209,6 +209,9 @@ grub_auth_check_authentication (const char *userlist)
char entered[GRUB_AUTH_MAX_PASSLEN];
struct grub_auth_user *user;
+ if (grub_is_cli_disabled ())
+ return GRUB_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
grub_memset (login, 0, sizeof (login));
if (is_authenticated (userlist))
diff --git a/grub-core/normal/menu_text.c b/grub-core/normal/menu_text.c
index b1321eb26..9c383e64a 100644
--- a/grub-core/normal/menu_text.c
+++ b/grub-core/normal/menu_text.c
@@ -178,21 +178,24 @@ command-line or ESC to discard edits and return to the GRUB menu."),
grub_free (msg_translated);
- if (nested)
+ if (!grub_is_cli_disabled ())
{
- ret += grub_print_message_indented_real
- (_("Press enter to boot the selected OS, "
- "`e' to edit the commands before booting "
- "or `c' for a command-line. ESC to return previous menu."),
- STANDARD_MARGIN, STANDARD_MARGIN, term, dry_run);
- }
- else
- {
- ret += grub_print_message_indented_real
- (_("Press enter to boot the selected OS, "
- "`e' to edit the commands before booting "
- "or `c' for a command-line."),
- STANDARD_MARGIN, STANDARD_MARGIN, term, dry_run);
+ if (nested)
+ {
+ ret += grub_print_message_indented_real
+ (_("Press enter to boot the selected OS, "
+ "`e' to edit the commands before booting "
+ "or `c' for a command-line. ESC to return previous menu."),
+ STANDARD_MARGIN, STANDARD_MARGIN, term, dry_run);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ret += grub_print_message_indented_real
+ (_("Press enter to boot the selected OS, "
+ "`e' to edit the commands before booting "
+ "or `c' for a command-line."),
+ STANDARD_MARGIN, STANDARD_MARGIN, term, dry_run);
+ }
}
}
return ret;
diff --git a/include/grub/kernel.h b/include/grub/kernel.h
index 98edc0863..f98a780da 100644
--- a/include/grub/kernel.h
+++ b/include/grub/kernel.h
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ enum
OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK,
OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY,
OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY,
+ OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI
};
/* The module header. */
diff --git a/include/grub/misc.h b/include/grub/misc.h
index 6b1e084af..d6e9bae8e 100644
--- a/include/grub/misc.h
+++ b/include/grub/misc.h
@@ -442,6 +442,8 @@ grub_uint64_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_divmod64) (grub_uint64_t n,
grub_uint64_t d,
grub_uint64_t *r);
+extern bool EXPORT_FUNC(grub_is_cli_disabled) (void);
+
/* Must match softdiv group in gentpl.py. */
#if !defined(GRUB_MACHINE_EMU) && (defined(__arm__) || defined(__ia64__) || \
(defined(__riscv) && (__riscv_xlen == 32)))
diff --git a/include/grub/util/install.h b/include/grub/util/install.h
index 59eabb9bb..dbf3c216d 100644
--- a/include/grub/util/install.h
+++ b/include/grub/util/install.h
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
{ "appended-signature-size", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE,\
"SIZE", 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), \
1}, \
+ { "disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0, \
+ N_("disabled command line interface access"), 0 }, \
{ "verbose", 'v', 0, 0, \
N_("print verbose messages."), 1 }
@@ -135,7 +137,8 @@ enum grub_install_options {
GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DTB,
GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_SBAT,
GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK,
- GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE
+ GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
+ GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI
};
extern char *grub_install_source_directory;
@@ -198,7 +201,8 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
int note, size_t appsig_size,
grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_file,
- const char *sbat_path, const int disable_shim_lock);
+ const char *sbat_path, const int disable_shim_lock,
+ const int disable_cli);
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *
grub_install_get_image_target (const char *arg);
diff --git a/util/grub-install-common.c b/util/grub-install-common.c
index 67afc2eed..42aec141e 100644
--- a/util/grub-install-common.c
+++ b/util/grub-install-common.c
@@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ static char **x509keys;
static size_t nx509keys;
static grub_compression_t compression;
static size_t appsig_size;
+static int disable_cli;
int
grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
@@ -514,6 +515,9 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
* (nx509keys + 1));
x509keys[nx509keys++] = xstrdup (arg);
return 1;
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI:
+ disable_cli = 1;
+ return 1;
case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_VERBOSITY:
verbosity++;
@@ -708,11 +712,13 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
grub_util_info ("grub-mkimage --directory '%s' --prefix '%s' --output '%s'"
" --format '%s' --compression '%s'"
" --appended-signture-size %zu %s%s%s\n",
+ " --format '%s' --compression '%s'%s%s%s%s\n",
dir, prefix, outname,
mkimage_target, compnames[compression],
appsig_size,
note ? " --note" : "",
- disable_shim_lock ? " --disable-shim-lock" : "", s);
+ disable_shim_lock ? " --disable-shim-lock" : "",
+ disable_cli ? " --disable-cli" : "", s);
free (s);
tgt = grub_install_get_image_target (mkimage_target);
@@ -725,7 +731,7 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
x509keys, nx509keys,
config_path, tgt,
note, appsig_size, compression, dtb, sbat,
- disable_shim_lock);
+ disable_shim_lock, disable_cli);
while (dc--)
grub_install_pop_module ();
}
diff --git a/util/grub-mkimage.c b/util/grub-mkimage.c
index e1f111278..13bdc6cf0 100644
--- a/util/grub-mkimage.c
+++ b/util/grub-mkimage.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {
{"compression", 'C', "(xz|none|auto)", 0, N_("choose the compression to use for core image"), 0},
{"sbat", 's', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("SBAT metadata"), 0},
{"disable-shim-lock", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK, 0, 0, N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0},
+ {"disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0, N_("disable command line interface access"), 0},
{"verbose", 'v', 0, 0, N_("print verbose messages."), 0},
{"appended-signature-size", 'S', N_("SIZE"), 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 0},
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
@@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ struct arguments
int note;
int disable_shim_lock;
size_t appsig_size;
+ int disable_cli;
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target;
grub_compression_t comp;
};
@@ -259,6 +261,10 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
arguments->disable_shim_lock = 1;
break;
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI:
+ arguments->disable_cli = 1;
+ break;
+
case 'v':
verbosity++;
break;
@@ -347,7 +353,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
arguments.image_target, arguments.note,
arguments.appsig_size, arguments.comp,
arguments.dtb, arguments.sbat,
- arguments.disable_shim_lock);
+ arguments.disable_shim_lock,
+ arguments.disable_cli);
if (grub_util_file_sync (fp) < 0)
grub_util_error (_("cannot sync `%s': %s"), arguments.output ? : "stdout",
diff --git a/util/mkimage.c b/util/mkimage.c
index 425d920ff..f31fdefa8 100644
--- a/util/mkimage.c
+++ b/util/mkimage.c
@@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp,
const char *dtb_path, const char *sbat_path,
- int disable_shim_lock)
+ int disable_shim_lock, int disable_cli)
{
char *kernel_img, *core_img;
size_t total_module_size, core_size;
@@ -963,6 +963,9 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
if (disable_shim_lock)
total_module_size += sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+ if (disable_cli)
+ total_module_size += sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+
if (config_path)
{
config_size = ALIGN_ADDR (grub_util_get_image_size (config_path) + 1);
@@ -1129,6 +1132,16 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
offset += sizeof (*header);
}
+ if (disable_cli)
+ {
+ struct grub_module_header *header;
+
+ header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset);
+ header->type = grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI);
+ header->size = grub_host_to_target32 (sizeof (*header));
+ offset += sizeof (*header);
+ }
+
if (config_path)
{
struct grub_module_header *header;

337
0310-disk-cryptodisk-Require-authentication-after-TPM-unl.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 15:08:06 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] disk/cryptodisk: Require authentication after TPM unlock for
CLI access
The GRUB may use TPM to verify the integrity of boot components and the
result can determine whether a previously sealed key can be released. If
everything checks out, showing nothing has been tampered with, the key
is released and GRUB unlocks the encrypted root partition for the next
stage of booting.
However, the liberal Command Line Interface (CLI) can be misused by
anyone in this case to access files in the encrypted partition one way
or another. Despite efforts to keep the CLI secure by preventing utility
command output from leaking file content, many techniques in the wild
could still be used to exploit the CLI, enabling attacks or learning
methods to attack. It's nearly impossible to account for all scenarios
where a hack could be applied.
Therefore, to mitigate potential misuse of the CLI after the root device
has been successfully unlocked via TPM, the user should be required to
authenticate using the LUKS password. This added layer of security
ensures that only authorized users can access the CLI reducing the risk
of exploitation or unauthorized access to the encrypted partition.
Fixes: CVE-2024-49504
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 29 +++++++++++++++
grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
grub-core/kern/main.c | 12 ++++++
grub-core/normal/auth.c | 30 +++++++++++++++
grub-core/normal/main.c | 4 ++
grub-core/normal/menu_entry.c | 4 ++
include/grub/auth.h | 1 +
include/grub/cryptodisk.h | 3 ++
include/grub/misc.h | 2 +
9 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index 9ce9c5b82..2d6d73a78 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -6882,6 +6882,35 @@ sign-file SHA256 grub.key certificate.der core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
As with UEFI secure boot, it is necessary to build in the required modules,
or sign them separately.
+@subsection Command line and menuentry editor protection
+
+The TPM key protector provides full disk encryption support on servers or
+virtual machine images, meanwhile keeping the boot process unattended. This
+prevents service disruptions by eliminating the need for manual password input
+during startup, improving system uptime and continuity. It is achieved by TPM,
+which verifies the integrity of boot components by checking cryptographic
+hashes against securely stored values, to confirm the disks are unlocked in a
+trusted state.
+
+However, for users to access the system interactively, some form of
+authentication is still required, as the disks are not unlocked by an
+authorized user. This raised concerns about using an unprotected
+@samp{command-line interface} (@pxref{Command-line interface}), as anyone could
+execute commands to access decrypted data. To address this issue, the LUKS
+password is used to ensure that only authorized users are granted access to the
+interface. Additionally, the @samp{menu entry editor} (@pxref{Menu entry
+editor}) is also safeguarded by the LUKS password, as modifying a boot entry is
+effectively the same as altering the @file{grub.cfg} file read from encrypted
+files.
+
+It is worth mentioning that the built-in password support, as described in
+@samp{Authentication and Authorization in GRUB} (@pxref{Authentication and
+authorisation}), can also be used to protect the command-line interface from
+unauthorized access. However, it is not recommended to rely on this approach as
+it is an optional step. Setting it up requires additional manual intervention,
+which increases the risk of password leakage during the process. Moreover, the
+superuser list must be well maintained, and the password used cannot be
+synchronized with LUKS key rotation.
@node Platform limitations
@chapter Platform limitations
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
index 98e176a13..06a42b2d7 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
@@ -1144,7 +1144,9 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name,
ret = grub_cryptodisk_insert (dev, name, source);
if (ret != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
goto error;
-
+#ifndef GRUB_UTIL
+ grub_cli_set_auth_needed ();
+#endif
goto cleanup;
}
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE, "no cryptodisk module can handle this device");
@@ -1576,6 +1578,89 @@ luks_script_get (grub_size_t *sz)
return ret;
}
+#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+grub_err_t
+grub_cryptodisk_challenge_password (void)
+{
+ grub_cryptodisk_t cr_dev;
+
+ for (cr_dev = cryptodisk_list; cr_dev != NULL; cr_dev = cr_dev->next)
+ {
+ grub_cryptodisk_dev_t cr;
+ grub_disk_t source = NULL;
+ grub_err_t ret = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ grub_cryptodisk_t dev = NULL;
+ char *part = NULL;
+ struct grub_cryptomount_args cargs = {0};
+
+ cargs.check_boot = 0;
+ cargs.search_uuid = cr_dev->uuid;
+
+ source = grub_disk_open (cr_dev->source);
+
+ if (source == NULL)
+ {
+ ret = grub_errno;
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+
+ FOR_CRYPTODISK_DEVS (cr)
+ {
+ dev = cr->scan (source, &cargs);
+ if (grub_errno)
+ {
+ ret = grub_errno;
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+ if (dev == NULL)
+ continue;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (dev == NULL)
+ {
+ ret = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE, "no cryptodisk module can handle this device");
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+
+ part = grub_partition_get_name (source->partition);
+ grub_printf_ (N_("Enter passphrase for %s%s%s (%s): "), source->name,
+ source->partition != NULL ? "," : "",
+ part != NULL ? part : N_("UNKNOWN"), cr_dev->uuid);
+ grub_free (part);
+
+ cargs.key_data = grub_malloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE);
+ if (cargs.key_data == NULL)
+ {
+ ret = grub_errno;
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+
+ if (!grub_password_get ((char *) cargs.key_data, GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE))
+ {
+ ret = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "passphrase not supplied");
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+ cargs.key_len = grub_strlen ((char *) cargs.key_data);
+ ret = cr->recover_key (source, dev, &cargs);
+
+ error_out:
+ grub_disk_close (source);
+ if (dev != NULL)
+ cryptodisk_close (dev);
+ if (cargs.key_data)
+ {
+ grub_memset (cargs.key_data, 0, cargs.key_len);
+ grub_free (cargs.key_data);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+#endif /* GRUB_MACHINE_EFI */
+
struct grub_procfs_entry luks_script =
{
.name = "luks_script",
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/main.c b/grub-core/kern/main.c
index 0d6b8138d..2e6b79ee3 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/main.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/main.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#endif
static bool cli_disabled = false;
+static bool cli_need_auth = false;
grub_addr_t
grub_modules_get_end (void)
@@ -308,6 +309,17 @@ grub_is_cli_disabled (void)
return cli_disabled;
}
+bool
+grub_is_cli_need_auth (void)
+{
+ return cli_need_auth;
+}
+
+void grub_cli_set_auth_needed (void)
+{
+ cli_need_auth = true;
+}
+
static void
check_is_cli_disabled (void)
{
diff --git a/grub-core/normal/auth.c b/grub-core/normal/auth.c
index d94020186..71b361bc0 100644
--- a/grub-core/normal/auth.c
+++ b/grub-core/normal/auth.c
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@
#include <grub/time.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+#include <grub/cryptodisk.h>
+#endif
+
struct grub_auth_user
{
struct grub_auth_user *next;
@@ -200,6 +204,32 @@ grub_username_get (char buf[], unsigned buf_size)
return (key != GRUB_TERM_ESC);
}
+grub_err_t
+grub_auth_check_cli_access (void)
+{
+ if (grub_is_cli_need_auth () == true)
+ {
+#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+ static bool authenticated = false;
+
+ if (authenticated == false)
+ {
+ grub_err_t ret;
+
+ ret = grub_cryptodisk_challenge_password ();
+ if (ret == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ authenticated = true;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+#else
+ return GRUB_ACCESS_DENIED;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
grub_err_t
grub_auth_check_authentication (const char *userlist)
{
diff --git a/grub-core/normal/main.c b/grub-core/normal/main.c
index 26872ce94..86ffb388d 100644
--- a/grub-core/normal/main.c
+++ b/grub-core/normal/main.c
@@ -557,9 +557,13 @@ grub_cmdline_run (int nested, int force_auth)
}
while (err && force_auth);
+ if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ err = grub_auth_check_cli_access ();
+
if (err)
{
grub_print_error ();
+ grub_wait_after_message ();
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
return;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/normal/menu_entry.c b/grub-core/normal/menu_entry.c
index ade56be2b..8b0d17e3f 100644
--- a/grub-core/normal/menu_entry.c
+++ b/grub-core/normal/menu_entry.c
@@ -1255,9 +1255,13 @@ grub_menu_entry_run (grub_menu_entry_t entry)
err = grub_auth_check_authentication (NULL);
+ if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ err = grub_auth_check_cli_access ();
+
if (err)
{
grub_print_error ();
+ grub_wait_after_message ();
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
return;
}
diff --git a/include/grub/auth.h b/include/grub/auth.h
index 747334451..21d5190f0 100644
--- a/include/grub/auth.h
+++ b/include/grub/auth.h
@@ -33,5 +33,6 @@ grub_err_t grub_auth_unregister_authentication (const char *user);
grub_err_t grub_auth_authenticate (const char *user);
grub_err_t grub_auth_deauthenticate (const char *user);
grub_err_t grub_auth_check_authentication (const char *userlist);
+grub_err_t grub_auth_check_cli_access (void);
#endif /* ! GRUB_AUTH_HEADER */
diff --git a/include/grub/cryptodisk.h b/include/grub/cryptodisk.h
index d94df68b6..d2572f8b0 100644
--- a/include/grub/cryptodisk.h
+++ b/include/grub/cryptodisk.h
@@ -187,4 +187,7 @@ grub_util_get_geli_uuid (const char *dev);
grub_cryptodisk_t grub_cryptodisk_get_by_uuid (const char *uuid);
grub_cryptodisk_t grub_cryptodisk_get_by_source_disk (grub_disk_t disk);
+#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+grub_err_t grub_cryptodisk_challenge_password (void);
+#endif
#endif
diff --git a/include/grub/misc.h b/include/grub/misc.h
index d6e9bae8e..0429339ef 100644
--- a/include/grub/misc.h
+++ b/include/grub/misc.h
@@ -443,6 +443,8 @@ grub_uint64_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_divmod64) (grub_uint64_t n,
grub_uint64_t *r);
extern bool EXPORT_FUNC(grub_is_cli_disabled) (void);
+extern bool EXPORT_FUNC(grub_is_cli_need_auth) (void);
+extern void EXPORT_FUNC(grub_cli_set_auth_needed) (void);
/* Must match softdiv group in gentpl.py. */
#if !defined(GRUB_MACHINE_EMU) && (defined(__arm__) || defined(__ia64__) || \

108
0311-disk-loopback-Reference-tracking-for-the-loopback.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 15:22:28 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] disk/loopback: Reference tracking for the loopback
It was possible to delete a loopback while there were still references
to it. This led to an exploitable use-after-free.
Fixed by implementing a reference counting in the grub_loopback struct.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/disk/loopback.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
include/grub/err.h | 3 ++-
include/grub/loopback.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/loopback.c b/grub-core/disk/loopback.c
index 11a5e0cbd..f39281323 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/loopback.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/loopback.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/extcmd.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -57,6 +58,8 @@ delete_loopback (const char *name)
if (! dev)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE, "device not found");
+ if (dev->refcnt > 0)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED, "device still referenced");
/* Remove the device from the list. */
*prev = dev->next;
@@ -113,6 +116,7 @@ grub_cmd_loopback (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args)
newdev->file = file;
newdev->id = last_id++;
+ newdev->refcnt = 0;
/* Add the new entry to the list. */
newdev->next = loopback_list;
@@ -154,6 +158,9 @@ grub_loopback_open (const char *name, grub_disk_t disk)
if (! dev)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE, "can't open device");
+ if (grub_add (dev->refcnt, 1, &dev->refcnt))
+ grub_fatal ("Reference count overflow");
+
/* Use the filesize for the disk size, round up to a complete sector. */
if (dev->file->size != GRUB_FILE_SIZE_UNKNOWN)
disk->total_sectors = ((dev->file->size + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE - 1)
@@ -171,6 +178,15 @@ grub_loopback_open (const char *name, grub_disk_t disk)
return 0;
}
+static void
+grub_loopback_close (grub_disk_t disk)
+{
+ struct grub_loopback *dev = disk->data;
+
+ if (grub_sub (dev->refcnt, 1, &dev->refcnt))
+ grub_fatal ("Reference count underflow");
+}
+
static grub_err_t
grub_loopback_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector,
grub_size_t size, char *buf)
@@ -213,6 +229,7 @@ static struct grub_disk_dev grub_loopback_dev =
.id = GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_LOOPBACK_ID,
.disk_iterate = grub_loopback_iterate,
.disk_open = grub_loopback_open,
+ .disk_close = grub_loopback_close,
.disk_read = grub_loopback_read,
.disk_write = grub_loopback_write,
.next = 0
diff --git a/include/grub/err.h b/include/grub/err.h
index 3c587b9b8..29f1a73c5 100644
--- a/include/grub/err.h
+++ b/include/grub/err.h
@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ typedef enum
GRUB_ERR_NET_NO_DOMAIN,
GRUB_ERR_EOF,
GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
- GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE
+ GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE,
+ GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED
}
grub_err_t;
diff --git a/include/grub/loopback.h b/include/grub/loopback.h
index 3b9a9e32e..915ef65fc 100644
--- a/include/grub/loopback.h
+++ b/include/grub/loopback.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct grub_loopback
grub_file_t file;
struct grub_loopback *next;
unsigned long id;
+ grub_uint64_t refcnt;
};
#endif /* ! GRUB_LOOPBACK_HEADER */

120
0312-kern-disk-Limit-recursion-depth.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 04:09:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] kern/disk: Limit recursion depth
The grub_disk_read() may trigger other disk reads, e.g. via loopbacks.
This may lead to very deep recursion which can corrupt the heap. So, fix
the issue by limiting reads depth.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/kern/disk.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
include/grub/err.h | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/disk.c b/grub-core/kern/disk.c
index 355b6579d..5747ad85c 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/disk.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/disk.c
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@
#define GRUB_CACHE_TIMEOUT 2
+/* Disk reads may trigger other disk reads. So, limit recursion depth. */
+#define MAX_READ_RECURSION_DEPTH 16
+static unsigned int read_recursion_depth = 0;
+
/* The last time the disk was used. */
static grub_uint64_t grub_last_time = 0;
@@ -421,6 +425,8 @@ grub_err_t
grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector,
grub_off_t offset, grub_size_t size, void *buf)
{
+ grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
/* First of all, check if the region is within the disk. */
if (grub_disk_adjust_range (disk, &sector, &offset, size) != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
{
@@ -431,12 +437,17 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector,
return grub_errno;
}
+ if (++read_recursion_depth >= MAX_READ_RECURSION_DEPTH)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH, "grub_disk_read(): Maximum recursion depth exceeded");
+ goto error;
+ }
+
/* First read until first cache boundary. */
if (offset || (sector & (GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE - 1)))
{
grub_disk_addr_t start_sector;
grub_size_t pos;
- grub_err_t err;
grub_size_t len;
start_sector = sector & ~((grub_disk_addr_t) GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
@@ -448,7 +459,7 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector,
err = grub_disk_read_small (disk, start_sector,
offset + pos, len, buf);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto error;
buf = (char *) buf + len;
size -= len;
offset += len;
@@ -461,7 +472,6 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector,
{
char *data = NULL;
grub_disk_addr_t agglomerate;
- grub_err_t err;
/* agglomerate read until we find a first cached entry. */
for (agglomerate = 0; agglomerate
@@ -497,7 +507,7 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector,
- disk->log_sector_size),
buf);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto error;
for (i = 0; i < agglomerate; i ++)
grub_disk_cache_store (disk->dev->id, disk->id,
@@ -531,13 +541,16 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector,
/* And now read the last part. */
if (size)
{
- grub_err_t err;
err = grub_disk_read_small (disk, sector, 0, size, buf);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto error;
}
- return grub_errno;
+ err = grub_errno;
+
+ error:
+ read_recursion_depth--;
+ return err;
}
grub_uint64_t
diff --git a/include/grub/err.h b/include/grub/err.h
index 29f1a73c5..7530f58b2 100644
--- a/include/grub/err.h
+++ b/include/grub/err.h
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ typedef enum
GRUB_ERR_EOF,
GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE,
- GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED
+ GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED,
+ GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH
}
grub_err_t;

44
0313-kern-partition-Limit-recursion-in-part_iterate.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2024 21:24:19 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] kern/partition: Limit recursion in part_iterate()
The part_iterate() is used by grub_partition_iterate() as a callback in
the partition iterate functions. However, part_iterate() may also call
the partition iterate functions which may lead to recursion. Fix potential
issue by limiting the recursion depth.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/kern/partition.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/partition.c b/grub-core/kern/partition.c
index edad9f9e4..704512a20 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/partition.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/partition.c
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
grub_partition_map_t grub_partition_map_list;
+#define MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH 32
+static unsigned int recursion_depth = 0;
+
/*
* Checks that disk->partition contains part. This function assumes that the
* start of part is relative to the start of disk->partition. Returns 1 if
@@ -208,7 +211,12 @@ part_iterate (grub_disk_t dsk, const grub_partition_t partition, void *data)
FOR_PARTITION_MAPS(partmap)
{
grub_err_t err;
- err = partmap->iterate (dsk, part_iterate, ctx);
+ recursion_depth++;
+ if (recursion_depth <= MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH)
+ err = partmap->iterate (dsk, part_iterate, ctx);
+ else
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH, "maximum recursion depth exceeded");
+ recursion_depth--;
if (err)
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
if (ctx->ret)

55
0314-script-execute-Limit-the-recursion-depth.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 19:04:13 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] script/execute: Limit the recursion depth
If unbounded recursion is allowed it becomes possible to collide the
stack with the heap. As UEFI firmware often lacks guard pages this
becomes an exploitable issue as it is possible in some cases to do
a controlled overwrite of a section of this heap region with
arbitrary data.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/script/execute.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c
index c19b4bf70..7ed3a1a03 100644
--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c
+++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c
@@ -36,10 +36,18 @@
is sizeof (int) * 3, and one extra for a possible -ve sign. */
#define ERRNO_DIGITS_MAX (sizeof (int) * 3 + 1)
+/*
+ * A limit on recursion, to avoid colliding with the heap. UEFI defines a baseline
+ * stack size of 128 KiB. So, assuming at most 1-2 KiB per iteration this should
+ * keep us safe.
+ */
+#define MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH 64
+
static unsigned long is_continue;
static unsigned long active_loops;
static unsigned long active_breaks;
static unsigned long function_return;
+static unsigned long recursion_depth;
#define GRUB_SCRIPT_SCOPE_MALLOCED 1
#define GRUB_SCRIPT_SCOPE_ARGS_MALLOCED 2
@@ -850,7 +858,13 @@ grub_script_execute_cmd (struct grub_script_cmd *cmd)
if (cmd == 0)
return 0;
+ recursion_depth++;
+
+ if (recursion_depth >= MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH, N_("maximum recursion depth exceeded"));
+
ret = cmd->exec (cmd);
+ recursion_depth--;
grub_snprintf (errnobuf, sizeof (errnobuf), "%d", ret);
grub_env_set ("?", errnobuf);

29
0315-net-Unregister-net_default_ip-and-net_default_mac-va.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 15:27:10 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] net: Unregister net_default_ip and net_default_mac variables
hooks on unload
The net module is a dependency of normal. So, it shouldn't be possible
to unload the net. Though unregister variables hooks as a precaution.
It also gets in line with unregistering the other net module hooks.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/net/net.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c
index fdec64d55..9959a2ae8 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/net.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/net.c
@@ -2221,6 +2221,8 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI(net)
grub_register_variable_hook ("net_default_server", 0, 0);
grub_register_variable_hook ("pxe_default_server", 0, 0);
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("net_default_ip", 0, 0);
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("net_default_mac", 0, 0);
grub_bootp_fini ();
grub_dns_fini ();

84
0316-net-Remove-variables-hooks-when-interface-is-unregis.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 15:42:44 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] net: Remove variables hooks when interface is unregisted
The grub_net_network_level_interface_unregister(), previously
implemented in a header, did not remove the variables hooks that
were registered in grub_net_network_level_interface_register().
Fix this by implementing the same logic used to register the
variables and move the function into the grub-core/net/net.c.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/net/net.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/net.h | 11 +----------
2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c
index 9959a2ae8..22d5cc3ba 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/net.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/net.c
@@ -1066,6 +1066,39 @@ grub_net_add_ipv6_local (struct grub_net_network_level_interface *inter,
return 0;
}
+void
+grub_net_network_level_interface_unregister (struct grub_net_network_level_interface *inter)
+{
+ char *name;
+
+ {
+ char buf[GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_HWADDR_LEN];
+
+ grub_net_hwaddr_to_str (&inter->hwaddress, buf);
+ name = grub_xasprintf ("net_%s_mac", inter->name);
+ if (name != NULL)
+ grub_register_variable_hook (name, NULL, NULL);
+ grub_free (name);
+ }
+
+ {
+ char buf[GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_ADDR_LEN];
+
+ grub_net_addr_to_str (&inter->address, buf);
+ name = grub_xasprintf ("net_%s_ip", inter->name);
+ if (name != NULL)
+ grub_register_variable_hook (name, NULL, NULL);
+ grub_free (name);
+ }
+
+ inter->card->num_ifaces--;
+ *inter->prev = inter->next;
+ if (inter->next)
+ inter->next->prev = inter->prev;
+ inter->next = 0;
+ inter->prev = 0;
+}
+
grub_err_t
grub_net_add_ipv4_local (struct grub_net_network_level_interface *inter,
int mask)
diff --git a/include/grub/net.h b/include/grub/net.h
index 868c9a2ef..273afbddf 100644
--- a/include/grub/net.h
+++ b/include/grub/net.h
@@ -625,16 +625,7 @@ void grub_bootp_fini (void);
void grub_dns_init (void);
void grub_dns_fini (void);
-static inline void
-grub_net_network_level_interface_unregister (struct grub_net_network_level_interface *inter)
-{
- inter->card->num_ifaces--;
- *inter->prev = inter->next;
- if (inter->next)
- inter->next->prev = inter->prev;
- inter->next = 0;
- inter->prev = 0;
-}
+void grub_net_network_level_interface_unregister (struct grub_net_network_level_interface *inter);
void
grub_net_tcp_retransmit (void);

79
0317-net-Fix-OOB-write-in-grub_net_search_config_file.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 16:38:44 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] net: Fix OOB write in grub_net_search_config_file()
The function included a call to grub_strcpy() which copied data from an
environment variable to a buffer allocated in grub_cmd_normal(). The
grub_cmd_normal() didn't consider the length of the environment variable.
So, the copy operation could exceed the allocation and lead to an OOB
write. Fix the issue by replacing grub_strcpy() with grub_strlcpy() and
pass the underlying buffers size to the grub_net_search_config_file().
Fixes: CVE-2025-0624
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/net/net.c | 7 ++++---
grub-core/normal/main.c | 2 +-
include/grub/net.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c
index 22d5cc3ba..6c8dfcba2 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/net.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/net.c
@@ -2023,14 +2023,15 @@ grub_config_search_through (char *config, char *suffix,
}
grub_err_t
-grub_net_search_config_file (char *config)
+grub_net_search_config_file (char *config, grub_size_t config_buf_len)
{
- grub_size_t config_len;
+ grub_size_t config_len, suffix_len;
char *suffix;
config_len = grub_strlen (config);
config[config_len] = '-';
suffix = config + config_len + 1;
+ suffix_len = config_buf_len - (config_len + 1);
struct grub_net_network_level_interface *inf;
FOR_NET_NETWORK_LEVEL_INTERFACES (inf)
@@ -2056,7 +2057,7 @@ grub_net_search_config_file (char *config)
if (client_uuid)
{
- grub_strcpy (suffix, client_uuid);
+ grub_strlcpy (suffix, client_uuid, suffix_len);
if (grub_config_search_through (config, suffix, 1, 0) == 0)
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/normal/main.c b/grub-core/normal/main.c
index 86ffb388d..cad840e06 100644
--- a/grub-core/normal/main.c
+++ b/grub-core/normal/main.c
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ grub_try_normal_prefix (const char *prefix)
return err;
grub_snprintf (config, config_len, "%s/grub.cfg", prefix);
- err = grub_net_search_config_file (config);
+ err = grub_net_search_config_file (config, config_len);
}
if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
diff --git a/include/grub/net.h b/include/grub/net.h
index 273afbddf..d280acd72 100644
--- a/include/grub/net.h
+++ b/include/grub/net.h
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ void
grub_net_remove_dns_server (const struct grub_net_network_level_address *s);
grub_err_t
-grub_net_search_config_file (char *config);
+grub_net_search_config_file (char *config, grub_size_t config_buf_len);
extern char *grub_net_default_server;

115
0318-net-tftp-Fix-stack-buffer-overflow-in-tftp_open.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 17:32:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] net/tftp: Fix stack buffer overflow in tftp_open()
An overly long filename can be passed to tftp_open() which would cause
grub_normalize_filename() to write out of bounds.
Fixed by adding an extra argument to grub_normalize_filename() for the
space available, making it act closer to a strlcpy(). As several fixed
strings are strcpy()'d after into the same buffer, their total length is
checked to see if they exceed the remaining space in the buffer. If so,
return an error.
On the occasion simplify code a bit by removing unneeded rrqlen zeroing.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/net/tftp.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/net/tftp.c b/grub-core/net/tftp.c
index f300a9d40..3d96e50f4 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/tftp.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/tftp.c
@@ -266,17 +266,19 @@ tftp_receive (grub_net_udp_socket_t sock __attribute__ ((unused)),
* forward slashes to a single forward slash.
*/
static void
-grub_normalize_filename (char *normalized, const char *filename)
+grub_normalize_filename (char *normalized, const char *filename, int c)
{
char *dest = normalized;
const char *src = filename;
- while (*src != '\0')
+ while (*src != '\0' && c > 0)
{
if (src[0] == '/' && src[1] == '/')
src++;
- else
+ else {
+ c--;
*dest++ = *src++;
+ }
}
*dest = '\0';
}
@@ -287,7 +289,7 @@ tftp_open (struct grub_file *file, const char *filename)
struct tftphdr *tftph;
char *rrq;
int i;
- int rrqlen;
+ int rrqlen, rrqsize;
int hdrlen;
grub_uint8_t open_data[1500];
struct grub_net_buff nb;
@@ -315,37 +317,45 @@ tftp_open (struct grub_file *file, const char *filename)
tftph = (struct tftphdr *) nb.data;
- rrq = (char *) tftph->u.rrq;
- rrqlen = 0;
-
tftph->opcode = grub_cpu_to_be16_compile_time (TFTP_RRQ);
+ rrq = (char *) tftph->u.rrq;
+ rrqsize = sizeof (tftph->u.rrq);
+
/*
* Copy and normalize the filename to work-around issues on some TFTP
* servers when file names are being matched for remapping.
*/
- grub_normalize_filename (rrq, filename);
- rrqlen += grub_strlen (rrq) + 1;
+ grub_normalize_filename (rrq, filename, rrqsize);
+
+ rrqlen = grub_strlen (rrq) + 1;
rrq += grub_strlen (rrq) + 1;
- grub_strcpy (rrq, "octet");
+ /* Verify there is enough space for the remaining components. */
rrqlen += grub_strlen ("octet") + 1;
+ rrqlen += grub_strlen ("blksize") + 1;
+ rrqlen += grub_strlen ("1024") + 1;
+ rrqlen += grub_strlen ("tsize") + 1;
+ rrqlen += grub_strlen ("0") + 1;
+
+ if (rrqlen >= rrqsize) {
+ grub_free (data);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, N_("filename too long"));
+ }
+
+ grub_strcpy (rrq, "octet");
rrq += grub_strlen ("octet") + 1;
grub_strcpy (rrq, "blksize");
- rrqlen += grub_strlen ("blksize") + 1;
rrq += grub_strlen ("blksize") + 1;
grub_strcpy (rrq, "1024");
- rrqlen += grub_strlen ("1024") + 1;
rrq += grub_strlen ("1024") + 1;
grub_strcpy (rrq, "tsize");
- rrqlen += grub_strlen ("tsize") + 1;
rrq += grub_strlen ("tsize") + 1;
grub_strcpy (rrq, "0");
- rrqlen += grub_strlen ("0") + 1;
rrq += grub_strlen ("0") + 1;
hdrlen = sizeof (tftph->opcode) + rrqlen;

33
0319-video-readers-jpeg-Do-not-permit-duplicate-SOF0-mark.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2024 22:47:20 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Do not permit duplicate SOF0 markers in
JPEG
Otherwise a subsequent header could change the height and width
allowing future OOB writes.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45774
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
index ae634fd41..631a89356 100644
--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
@@ -339,6 +339,10 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_sof (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
return grub_errno;
+ if (data->image_height != 0 || data->image_width != 0)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "jpeg: cannot have duplicate SOF0 markers");
+
if (grub_jpeg_get_byte (data) != 8)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
"jpeg: only 8-bit precision is supported");

138
0320-kern-dl-Fix-for-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_dl_ref.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 16:41:57 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] kern/dl: Fix for an integer overflow in grub_dl_ref()
It was possible to overflow the value of mod->ref_count, a signed
integer, by repeatedly invoking insmod on an already loaded module.
This led to a use-after-free. As once ref_count was overflowed it became
possible to unload the module while there was still references to it.
This resolves the issue by using grub_add() to check if the ref_count
will overflow and then stops further increments. Further changes were
also made to grub_dl_unref() to check for the underflow condition and
the reference count was changed to an unsigned 64-bit integer.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/minicmd.c | 2 +-
grub-core/kern/dl.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
include/grub/dl.h | 8 ++++----
util/misc.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c
index 2bd3ac76f..2001043cf 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ grub_mini_cmd_lsmod (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
{
grub_dl_dep_t dep;
- grub_printf ("%s\t%d\t\t", mod->name, mod->ref_count);
+ grub_printf ("%s\t%" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T "\t\t", mod->name, mod->ref_count);
for (dep = mod->dep; dep; dep = dep->next)
{
if (dep != mod->dep)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
index 2eaef7150..fe7c3b940 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <grub/env.h>
#include <grub/cache.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
/* Platforms where modules are in a readonly area of memory. */
@@ -613,7 +614,7 @@ grub_dl_resolve_dependencies (grub_dl_t mod, Elf_Ehdr *e)
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
-int
+grub_uint64_t
grub_dl_ref (grub_dl_t mod)
{
grub_dl_dep_t dep;
@@ -624,10 +625,13 @@ grub_dl_ref (grub_dl_t mod)
for (dep = mod->dep; dep; dep = dep->next)
grub_dl_ref (dep->mod);
- return ++mod->ref_count;
+ if (grub_add (mod->ref_count, 1, &mod->ref_count))
+ grub_fatal ("Module reference count overflow");
+
+ return mod->ref_count;
}
-int
+grub_uint64_t
grub_dl_unref (grub_dl_t mod)
{
grub_dl_dep_t dep;
@@ -638,10 +642,13 @@ grub_dl_unref (grub_dl_t mod)
for (dep = mod->dep; dep; dep = dep->next)
grub_dl_unref (dep->mod);
- return --mod->ref_count;
+ if (grub_sub (mod->ref_count, 1, &mod->ref_count))
+ grub_fatal ("Module reference count underflow");
+
+ return mod->ref_count;
}
-int
+grub_uint64_t
grub_dl_ref_count (grub_dl_t mod)
{
if (mod == NULL)
diff --git a/include/grub/dl.h b/include/grub/dl.h
index 1e1262a28..055bb564e 100644
--- a/include/grub/dl.h
+++ b/include/grub/dl.h
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ typedef struct grub_dl_dep *grub_dl_dep_t;
struct grub_dl
{
char *name;
- int ref_count;
+ grub_uint64_t ref_count;
int persistent;
grub_dl_dep_t dep;
grub_dl_segment_t segment;
@@ -206,9 +206,9 @@ grub_dl_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_load) (const char *name);
grub_dl_t grub_dl_load_core (void *addr, grub_size_t size);
grub_dl_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_load_core_noinit) (void *addr, grub_size_t size);
int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unload) (grub_dl_t mod);
-extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref) (grub_dl_t mod);
-extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unref) (grub_dl_t mod);
-extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref_count) (grub_dl_t mod);
+extern grub_uint64_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref) (grub_dl_t mod);
+extern grub_uint64_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unref) (grub_dl_t mod);
+extern grub_uint64_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref_count) (grub_dl_t mod);
extern grub_dl_t EXPORT_VAR(grub_dl_head);
diff --git a/util/misc.c b/util/misc.c
index d545212d9..0f928e5b4 100644
--- a/util/misc.c
+++ b/util/misc.c
@@ -190,14 +190,14 @@ grub_xputs_real (const char *str)
void (*grub_xputs) (const char *str) = grub_xputs_real;
-int
+grub_uint64_t
grub_dl_ref (grub_dl_t mod)
{
(void) mod;
return 0;
}
-int
+grub_uint64_t
grub_dl_unref (grub_dl_t mod)
{
(void) mod;

34
0321-kern-dl-Check-for-the-SHF_INFO_LINK-flag-in-grub_dl_.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 17:01:26 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] kern/dl: Check for the SHF_INFO_LINK flag in
grub_dl_relocate_symbols()
The grub_dl_relocate_symbols() iterates through the sections in
an ELF looking for relocation sections. According to the spec [1]
the SHF_INFO_LINK flag should be set if the sh_info field is meant
to be a section index.
[1] https://refspecs.linuxbase.org/elf/gabi4+/ch4.sheader.html
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/kern/dl.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
index fe7c3b940..cb49bdc4b 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
@@ -681,6 +681,9 @@ grub_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr)
grub_dl_segment_t seg;
grub_err_t err;
+ if (!(s->sh_flags & SHF_INFO_LINK))
+ continue;
+
seg = grub_dl_find_segment(mod, s->sh_info);
if (!seg)
continue;

34
0322-commands-extcmd-Missing-check-for-failed-allocation.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:27:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] commands/extcmd: Missing check for failed allocation
The grub_extcmd_dispatcher() calls grub_arg_list_alloc() to allocate
a grub_arg_list struct but it does not verify the allocation was successful.
In case of failed allocation the NULL state pointer can be accessed in
parse_option() through grub_arg_parse() which may lead to a security issue.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45775
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/extcmd.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c b/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c
index 90a5ca24a..c236be13a 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ grub_extcmd_dispatcher (struct grub_command *cmd, int argc, char **args,
}
state = grub_arg_list_alloc (ext, argc, args);
+ if (state == NULL)
+ return grub_errno;
+
if (grub_arg_parse (ext, argc, args, state, &new_args, &new_argc))
{
context.state = state;

32
0323-commands-ls-Fix-NULL-dereference.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 11:08:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] commands/ls: Fix NULL dereference
The grub_strrchr() may return NULL when the dirname do not contain "/".
This can happen on broken filesystems.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/ls.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/ls.c b/grub-core/commands/ls.c
index 6a1c7f5d3..f660946a2 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/ls.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/ls.c
@@ -241,7 +241,11 @@ grub_ls_list_files (char *dirname, int longlist, int all, int human)
grub_file_close (file);
- p = grub_strrchr (dirname, '/') + 1;
+ p = grub_strrchr (dirname, '/');
+ if (p == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ ++p;
+
ctx.dirname = grub_strndup (dirname, p - dirname);
if (ctx.dirname == NULL)
goto fail;

31
0324-commands-pgp-Unregister-the-check_signatures-hooks-o.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2024 19:24:29 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] commands/pgp: Unregister the "check_signatures" hooks on
module unload
If the hooks are not removed they can be called after the module has
been unloaded leading to an use-after-free.
Fixes: CVE-2025-0622
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/pgp.c b/grub-core/commands/pgp.c
index 847a5046a..fa3ef5c75 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/pgp.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/pgp.c
@@ -982,6 +982,8 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(pgp)
GRUB_MOD_FINI(pgp)
{
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("check_signatures", NULL, NULL);
+ grub_env_unset ("check_signatures");
grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_pubkey_verifier);
grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd);
grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd_trust);

37
0325-normal-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2024 23:46:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] normal: Remove variables hooks on module unload
The normal module does not entirely cleanup after itself in
its GRUB_MOD_FINI() leaving a few variables hooks in place.
It is not possible to unload normal module now but fix the
issues for completeness.
On the occasion replace 0s with NULLs for "pager" variable
hooks unregister.
Fixes: CVE-2025-0622
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/normal/main.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/normal/main.c b/grub-core/normal/main.c
index cad840e06..dd20e5129 100644
--- a/grub-core/normal/main.c
+++ b/grub-core/normal/main.c
@@ -690,7 +690,9 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI(normal)
grub_xputs = grub_xputs_saved;
grub_set_history (0);
- grub_register_variable_hook ("pager", 0, 0);
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("pager", NULL, NULL);
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("color_normal", NULL, NULL);
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("color_highlight", NULL, NULL);
grub_fs_autoload_hook = 0;
grub_unregister_command (cmd_clear);
}

34
0326-gettext-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2024 23:52:06 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gettext: Remove variables hooks on module unload
The gettext module does not entirely cleanup after itself in
its GRUB_MOD_FINI() leaving a few variables hooks in place.
It is not possible to unload gettext module because normal
module depends on it. Though fix the issues for completeness.
Fixes: CVE-2025-0622
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/gettext/gettext.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
index 631af7a94..465143cb6 100644
--- a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
+++ b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
@@ -542,6 +542,10 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (gettext)
GRUB_MOD_FINI (gettext)
{
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("locale_dir", NULL, NULL);
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("secondary_locale_dir", NULL, NULL);
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("lang", NULL, NULL);
+
grub_gettext_delete_list (&main_context);
grub_gettext_delete_list (&secondary_context);

35
0327-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write-or-.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:27:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gettext: Integer overflow leads to heap OOB write or read
Calculation of ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list size in grub_mofile_open() may
overflow leading to subsequent OOB write or read. This patch fixes the
issue by replacing grub_zalloc() and explicit multiplication with
grub_calloc() which does the same thing in safe manner.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45776
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/gettext/gettext.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
index 465143cb6..c17040269 100644
--- a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
+++ b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
@@ -323,8 +323,8 @@ grub_mofile_open (struct grub_gettext_context *ctx,
for (ctx->grub_gettext_max_log = 0; ctx->grub_gettext_max >> ctx->grub_gettext_max_log;
ctx->grub_gettext_max_log++);
- ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list = grub_zalloc (ctx->grub_gettext_max
- * sizeof (ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list[0]));
+ ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list = grub_calloc (ctx->grub_gettext_max,
+ sizeof (ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list[0]));
if (!ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list)
{
grub_file_close (fd);

53
0328-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:27:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gettext: Integer overflow leads to heap OOB write
The size calculation of the translation buffer in
grub_gettext_getstr_from_position() may overflow
to 0 leading to heap OOB write. This patch fixes
the issue by using grub_add() and checking for
an overflow.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45777
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/gettext/gettext.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
index c17040269..fffe3a054 100644
--- a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
+++ b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <grub/file.h>
#include <grub/kernel.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ grub_gettext_getstr_from_position (struct grub_gettext_context *ctx,
char *translation;
struct string_descriptor desc;
grub_err_t err;
+ grub_size_t alloc_sz;
internal_position = (off + position * sizeof (desc));
@@ -109,7 +111,10 @@ grub_gettext_getstr_from_position (struct grub_gettext_context *ctx,
length = grub_cpu_to_le32 (desc.length);
offset = grub_cpu_to_le32 (desc.offset);
- translation = grub_malloc (length + 1);
+ if (grub_add (length, 1, &alloc_sz))
+ return NULL;
+
+ translation = grub_malloc (alloc_sz);
if (!translation)
return NULL;

69
0329-commands-read-Fix-an-integer-overflow-when-supplying.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jonathan Bar Or <jonathanbaror@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 19:17:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] commands/read: Fix an integer overflow when supplying more
than 2^31 characters
The grub_getline() function currently has a signed integer variable "i"
that can be overflown when user supplies more than 2^31 characters.
It results in a memory corruption of the allocated line buffer as well
as supplying large negative values to grub_realloc().
Fixes: CVE-2025-0690
Reported-by: Jonathan Bar Or <jonathanbaror@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Bar Or <jonathanbaror@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/read.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/read.c b/grub-core/commands/read.c
index 597c90706..8d72e45c9 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/read.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/read.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/extcmd.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -37,13 +38,14 @@ static const struct grub_arg_option options[] =
static char *
grub_getline (int silent)
{
- int i;
+ grub_size_t i;
char *line;
char *tmp;
int c;
+ grub_size_t alloc_size;
i = 0;
- line = grub_malloc (1 + i + sizeof('\0'));
+ line = grub_malloc (1 + sizeof('\0'));
if (! line)
return NULL;
@@ -59,8 +61,17 @@ grub_getline (int silent)
line[i] = (char) c;
if (!silent)
grub_printf ("%c", c);
- i++;
- tmp = grub_realloc (line, 1 + i + sizeof('\0'));
+ if (grub_add (i, 1, &i))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow is detected"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (grub_add (i, 1 + sizeof('\0'), &alloc_size))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow is detected"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ tmp = grub_realloc (line, alloc_size);
if (! tmp)
{
grub_free (line);

83
0330-commands-test-Stack-overflow-due-to-unlimited-recurs.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 20:22:41 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] commands/test: Stack overflow due to unlimited recursion
depth
The test_parse() evaluates test expression recursively. Due to lack of
recursion depth check a specially crafted expression may cause a stack
overflow. The recursion is only triggered by the parentheses usage and
it can be unlimited. However, sensible expressions are unlikely to
contain more than a few parentheses. So, this patch limits the recursion
depth to 100, which should be sufficient.
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/test.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/test.c b/grub-core/commands/test.c
index 62d3fb398..b585c3d70 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/test.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/test.c
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+/* Set a limit on recursion to avoid stack overflow. */
+#define MAX_TEST_RECURSION_DEPTH 100
+
/* A simple implementation for signed numbers. */
static int
grub_strtosl (char *arg, const char ** const end, int base)
@@ -150,7 +153,7 @@ get_fileinfo (char *path, struct test_parse_ctx *ctx)
/* Parse a test expression starting from *argn. */
static int
-test_parse (char **args, int *argn, int argc)
+test_parse (char **args, int *argn, int argc, int *depth)
{
struct test_parse_ctx ctx = {
.and = 1,
@@ -387,13 +390,24 @@ test_parse (char **args, int *argn, int argc)
if (grub_strcmp (args[*argn], ")") == 0)
{
(*argn)++;
+ if (*depth > 0)
+ (*depth)--;
+
return ctx.or || ctx.and;
}
/* Recursively invoke if parenthesis. */
if (grub_strcmp (args[*argn], "(") == 0)
{
(*argn)++;
- update_val (test_parse (args, argn, argc), &ctx);
+
+ if (++(*depth) > MAX_TEST_RECURSION_DEPTH)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("max recursion depth exceeded"));
+ depth--;
+ return ctx.or || ctx.and;
+ }
+
+ update_val (test_parse (args, argn, argc, depth), &ctx);
continue;
}
@@ -428,11 +442,12 @@ grub_cmd_test (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
int argc, char **args)
{
int argn = 0;
+ int depth = 0;
if (argc >= 1 && grub_strcmp (args[argc - 1], "]") == 0)
argc--;
- return test_parse (args, &argn, argc) ? GRUB_ERR_NONE
+ return test_parse (args, &argn, argc, &depth) ? GRUB_ERR_NONE
: grub_error (GRUB_ERR_TEST_FAILURE, N_("false"));
}

33
0331-commands-minicmd-Block-the-dump-command-in-lockdown-.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 20:29:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] commands/minicmd: Block the dump command in lockdown mode
The dump enables a user to read memory which should not be possible
in lockdown mode.
Fixes: CVE-2025-1118
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reported-by: Jonathan Bar Or <jonathanbaror@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/minicmd.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c
index 2001043cf..9efb7718c 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c
@@ -215,8 +215,8 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(minicmd)
grub_register_command ("help", grub_mini_cmd_help,
0, N_("Show this message."));
cmd_dump =
- grub_register_command ("dump", grub_mini_cmd_dump,
- N_("ADDR [SIZE]"), N_("Show memory contents."));
+ grub_register_command_lockdown ("dump", grub_mini_cmd_dump,
+ N_("ADDR [SIZE]"), N_("Show memory contents."));
cmd_rmmod =
grub_register_command ("rmmod", grub_mini_cmd_rmmod,
N_("MODULE"), N_("Remove a module."));

50
0332-commands-memrw-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-mo.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 17:12:29 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] commands/memrw: Disable memory reading in lockdown mode
With the rest of module being blocked in lockdown mode it does not make
a lot of sense to leave memory reading enabled. This also goes in par
with disabling the dump command.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/memrw.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/memrw.c b/grub-core/commands/memrw.c
index 39cf3a06d..9d8a54a4b 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/memrw.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/memrw.c
@@ -126,17 +126,20 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(memrw)
return;
cmd_read_byte =
- grub_register_extcmd ("read_byte", grub_cmd_read, 0,
- N_("ADDR"), N_("Read 8-bit value from ADDR."),
- options);
+ grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("read_byte", grub_cmd_read, 0,
+ N_("ADDR"),
+ N_("Read 8-bit value from ADDR."),
+ options);
cmd_read_word =
- grub_register_extcmd ("read_word", grub_cmd_read, 0,
- N_("ADDR"), N_("Read 16-bit value from ADDR."),
- options);
+ grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("read_word", grub_cmd_read, 0,
+ N_("ADDR"),
+ N_("Read 16-bit value from ADDR."),
+ options);
cmd_read_dword =
- grub_register_extcmd ("read_dword", grub_cmd_read, 0,
- N_("ADDR"), N_("Read 32-bit value from ADDR."),
- options);
+ grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("read_dword", grub_cmd_read, 0,
+ N_("ADDR"),
+ N_("Read 32-bit value from ADDR."),
+ options);
cmd_write_byte =
grub_register_command_lockdown ("write_byte", grub_cmd_write,
N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"),

37
0333-commands-hexdump-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2024 22:31:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] commands/hexdump: Disable memory reading in lockdown mode
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/hexdump.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/hexdump.c b/grub-core/commands/hexdump.c
index eaa12465b..d6f61d98a 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/hexdump.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/hexdump.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <grub/lib/hexdump.h>
#include <grub/extcmd.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -51,7 +52,11 @@ grub_cmd_hexdump (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args)
length = (state[1].set) ? grub_strtoul (state[1].arg, 0, 0) : 256;
if (!grub_strcmp (args[0], "(mem)"))
- hexdump (skip, (char *) (grub_addr_t) skip, length);
+ {
+ if (grub_is_lockdown() == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, N_("memory reading is disabled in lockdown mode"));
+ hexdump (skip, (char *) (grub_addr_t) skip, length);
+ }
else if ((args[0][0] == '(') && (args[0][namelen - 1] == ')'))
{
grub_disk_t disk;

52
0334-fs-bfs-Disable-under-lockdown.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2024 15:59:43 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/bfs: Disable under lockdown
The BFS is not fuzz-clean. Don't allow it to be loaded under lockdown.
This will also disable the AFS.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45778
Fixes: CVE-2024-45779
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/bfs.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/bfs.c b/grub-core/fs/bfs.c
index f37b16895..c92fd7916 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/bfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/bfs.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
#include <grub/fshelp.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -1106,8 +1107,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (bfs)
{
COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (1 << LOG_EXTENT_SIZE ==
sizeof (struct grub_bfs_extent));
- grub_bfs_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_bfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_bfs_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_bfs_fs);
+ }
}
#ifdef MODE_AFS
@@ -1116,5 +1120,6 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (afs)
GRUB_MOD_FINI (bfs)
#endif
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_bfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_bfs_fs);
}

391
0335-fs-Disable-many-filesystems-under-lockdown.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2024 16:20:45 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs: Disable many filesystems under lockdown
The idea is to permit the following: btrfs, cpio, exfat, ext, f2fs, fat,
hfsplus, iso9660, squash4, tar, xfs and zfs.
The JFS, ReiserFS, romfs, UDF and UFS security vulnerabilities were
reported by Jonathan Bar Or <jonathanbaror@gmail.com>.
Fixes: CVE-2025-0677
Fixes: CVE-2025-0684
Fixes: CVE-2025-0685
Fixes: CVE-2025-0686
Fixes: CVE-2025-0689
Suggested-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/affs.c | 11 ++++++++---
grub-core/fs/cbfs.c | 11 ++++++++---
grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 11 ++++++++---
grub-core/fs/minix.c | 11 ++++++++---
grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c | 11 ++++++++---
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 11 ++++++++---
grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c | 11 ++++++++---
grub-core/fs/romfs.c | 11 ++++++++---
grub-core/fs/sfs.c | 11 ++++++++---
grub-core/fs/udf.c | 11 ++++++++---
grub-core/fs/ufs.c | 11 ++++++++---
11 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/affs.c b/grub-core/fs/affs.c
index 9b0afb954..520a001c7 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/affs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/affs.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/fshelp.h>
#include <grub/charset.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -703,12 +704,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_affs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(affs)
{
- grub_affs_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_affs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_affs_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_affs_fs);
+ }
my_mod = mod;
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(affs)
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_affs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_affs_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c b/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c
index 2332745fe..b62c8777c 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <grub/dl.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
#include <grub/cbfs_core.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -390,13 +391,17 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (cbfs)
#if (defined (__i386__) || defined (__x86_64__)) && !defined (GRUB_UTIL) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_EMU) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_XEN)
init_cbfsdisk ();
#endif
- grub_cbfs_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_cbfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_cbfs_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_cbfs_fs);
+ }
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI (cbfs)
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_cbfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_cbfs_fs);
#if (defined (__i386__) || defined (__x86_64__)) && !defined (GRUB_UTIL) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_EMU) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_XEN)
fini_cbfsdisk ();
#endif
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
index b0283ac00..ab175c7f1 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/charset.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -1005,12 +1006,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_jfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(jfs)
{
- grub_jfs_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_jfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_jfs_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_jfs_fs);
+ }
my_mod = mod;
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(jfs)
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_jfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_jfs_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/minix.c b/grub-core/fs/minix.c
index b7679c3e2..4440fcca8 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/minix.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/minix.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <grub/dl.h>
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -734,8 +735,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(minix)
#endif
#endif
{
- grub_minix_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_minix_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_minix_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_minix_fs);
+ }
my_mod = mod;
}
@@ -757,5 +761,6 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI(minix)
#endif
#endif
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_minix_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_minix_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
index 4e1e71738..26e6077ff 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <grub/dl.h>
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/fshelp.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -1231,12 +1232,16 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (nilfs2)
grub_nilfs2_dat_entry));
COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (1 << LOG_INODE_SIZE
== sizeof (struct grub_nilfs2_inode));
- grub_nilfs2_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_nilfs2_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_nilfs2_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_nilfs2_fs);
+ }
my_mod = mod;
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI (nilfs2)
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_nilfs2_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_nilfs2_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
index 4e144cc3c..e00349b1d 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <grub/fshelp.h>
#include <grub/ntfs.h>
#include <grub/charset.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -1541,12 +1542,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_ntfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT (ntfs)
{
- grub_ntfs_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_ntfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_ntfs_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_ntfs_fs);
+ }
my_mod = mod;
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI (ntfs)
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_ntfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_ntfs_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c b/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c
index e8b0b6383..ca47e0a43 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/fshelp.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -1407,12 +1408,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_reiserfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(reiserfs)
{
- grub_reiserfs_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_reiserfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_reiserfs_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_reiserfs_fs);
+ }
my_mod = mod;
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(reiserfs)
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_reiserfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_reiserfs_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/romfs.c b/grub-core/fs/romfs.c
index 56b0b2b2f..eafab03b2 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/romfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/romfs.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <grub/disk.h>
#include <grub/fs.h>
#include <grub/fshelp.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -475,11 +476,15 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_romfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(romfs)
{
- grub_romfs_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_romfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_romfs_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_romfs_fs);
+ }
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(romfs)
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_romfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_romfs_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
index f0d7cac43..88705b3a2 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/fshelp.h>
#include <grub/charset.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -779,12 +780,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_sfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(sfs)
{
- grub_sfs_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_sfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_sfs_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_sfs_fs);
+ }
my_mod = mod;
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(sfs)
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_sfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_sfs_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/udf.c b/grub-core/fs/udf.c
index 8765c633c..3d5ee5af5 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/udf.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/udf.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <grub/fshelp.h>
#include <grub/charset.h>
#include <grub/datetime.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
#include <grub/udf.h>
#include <grub/safemath.h>
@@ -1455,12 +1456,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_udf_fs = {
GRUB_MOD_INIT (udf)
{
- grub_udf_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_udf_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_udf_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_udf_fs);
+ }
my_mod = mod;
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI (udf)
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_udf_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_udf_fs);
}
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c
index e82d9356d..8b5adbd48 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <grub/dl.h>
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -899,8 +900,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(ufs1)
#endif
#endif
{
- grub_ufs_fs.mod = mod;
- grub_fs_register (&grub_ufs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ {
+ grub_ufs_fs.mod = mod;
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_ufs_fs);
+ }
my_mod = mod;
}
@@ -914,6 +918,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI(ufs1)
#endif
#endif
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_ufs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_ufs_fs);
}

543
0336-disk-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,543 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 17:59:04 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] disk: Use safe math macros to prevent overflows
Replace direct arithmetic operations with macros from include/grub/safemath.h
to prevent potential overflow issues when calculating the memory sizes.
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------
grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c | 9 ++++--
grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++----
grub-core/disk/luks2.c | 7 ++++-
grub-core/disk/memdisk.c | 7 ++++-
grub-core/disk/plainmount.c | 9 ++++--
8 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
index 06a42b2d7..872776010 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <grub/file.h>
#include <grub/procfs.h>
#include <grub/partition.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
#ifdef GRUB_UTIL
#include <grub/emu/hostdisk.h>
@@ -1475,7 +1476,7 @@ static char *
luks_script_get (grub_size_t *sz)
{
grub_cryptodisk_t i;
- grub_size_t size = 0;
+ grub_size_t size = 0, mul;
char *ptr, *ret;
*sz = 0;
@@ -1484,10 +1485,6 @@ luks_script_get (grub_size_t *sz)
if (grub_strcmp (i->modname, "luks") == 0 ||
grub_strcmp (i->modname, "luks2") == 0)
{
- size += grub_strlen (i->modname);
- size += sizeof ("_mount");
- size += grub_strlen (i->uuid);
- size += grub_strlen (i->cipher->cipher->name);
/*
* Add space in the line for (in order) spaces, cipher mode, cipher IV
* mode, sector offset, sector size and the trailing newline. This is
@@ -1495,14 +1492,35 @@ luks_script_get (grub_size_t *sz)
* in an earlier version of this code that are unaccounted for. It is
* left in the calculations in case it is needed. At worst, its short-
* lived wasted space.
+ *
+ * 60 = 5 + 5 + 8 + 20 + 6 + 1 + 15
*/
- size += 5 + 5 + 8 + 20 + 6 + 1 + 15;
+ if (grub_add (size, grub_strlen (i->modname), &size) ||
+ grub_add (size, sizeof ("_mount") + 60, &size) ||
+ grub_add (size, grub_strlen (i->uuid), &size) ||
+ grub_add (size, grub_strlen (i->cipher->cipher->name), &size) ||
+ grub_mul (i->keysize, 2, &mul) ||
+ grub_add (size, mul, &size))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "overflow detected while obtaining size of luks script");
+ return 0;
+ }
if (i->essiv_hash)
- size += grub_strlen (i->essiv_hash->name);
- size += i->keysize * 2;
+ {
+ if (grub_add (size, grub_strlen (i->essiv_hash->name), &size))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "overflow detected while obtaining size of luks script");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
}
+ if (grub_add (size, 1, &size))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "overflow detected while obtaining size of luks script");
+ return 0;
+ }
- ret = grub_malloc (size + 1);
+ ret = grub_malloc (size);
if (!ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c b/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c
index c35ce8915..fef0b815a 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <grub/misc.h>
#include <grub/diskfilter.h>
#include <grub/partition.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
#ifdef GRUB_UTIL
#include <grub/i18n.h>
#include <grub/util/misc.h>
@@ -1041,7 +1042,7 @@ grub_diskfilter_make_raid (grub_size_t uuidlen, char *uuid, int nmemb,
{
struct grub_diskfilter_vg *array;
int i;
- grub_size_t j;
+ grub_size_t j, sz;
grub_uint64_t totsize;
struct grub_diskfilter_pv *pv;
grub_err_t err;
@@ -1142,7 +1143,11 @@ grub_diskfilter_make_raid (grub_size_t uuidlen, char *uuid, int nmemb,
}
array->lvs->vg = array;
- array->lvs->idname = grub_malloc (sizeof ("mduuid/") + 2 * uuidlen);
+ if (grub_mul (uuidlen, 2, &sz) ||
+ grub_add (sz, sizeof ("mduuid/"), &sz))
+ goto fail;
+
+ array->lvs->idname = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!array->lvs->idname)
goto fail;
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c
index cd923b90f..9d4c42665 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/scsicmd.h>
#include <grub/time.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
#include <grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
#include <grub/ieee1275/obdisk.h>
@@ -128,9 +129,17 @@ count_commas (const char *src)
static char *
decode_grub_devname (const char *name)
{
- char *devpath = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (name) + 1);
+ char *devpath;
char *p, c;
+ grub_size_t sz;
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (name), 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obtaining size of device name"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ devpath = grub_malloc (sz);
if (devpath == NULL)
return NULL;
@@ -156,12 +165,20 @@ static char *
encode_grub_devname (const char *path)
{
char *encoding, *optr;
+ grub_size_t sz;
if (path == NULL)
return NULL;
- encoding = grub_malloc (sizeof (IEEE1275_DEV) + count_commas (path) +
- grub_strlen (path) + 1);
+ if (grub_add (sizeof (IEEE1275_DEV) + 1, count_commas (path), &sz) ||
+ grub_add (sz, grub_strlen (path), &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obtaining encoding size"));
+ grub_print_error ();
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ encoding = grub_malloc (sz);
if (encoding == NULL)
{
@@ -396,6 +413,14 @@ canonicalise_disk (const char *devname)
real_unit_str_len = grub_strlen (op->name) + sizeof (IEEE1275_DISK_ALIAS)
+ grub_strlen (real_unit_address);
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (op->name), sizeof (IEEE1275_DISK_ALIAS), &real_unit_str_len) ||
+ grub_add (real_unit_str_len, grub_strlen (real_unit_address), &real_unit_str_len))
+ {
+ grub_free (parent);
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obtaining size of canonical name"));
+ grub_print_error ();
+ return NULL;
+ }
real_canon = grub_malloc (real_unit_str_len);
@@ -413,6 +438,7 @@ canonicalise_disk (const char *devname)
static struct disk_dev *
add_canon_disk (const char *cname)
{
+ grub_size_t sz;
struct disk_dev *dev;
dev = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct disk_dev));
@@ -428,13 +454,18 @@ add_canon_disk (const char *cname)
* arguments and allows a client program to open
* the entire (raw) disk. Any disk label is ignored.
*/
- dev->raw_name = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (cname) + sizeof (":nolabel"));
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (cname), sizeof (":nolabel"), &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "overflow detected while appending :nolabel to end of canonical name");
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ dev->raw_name = grub_malloc (sz);
if (dev->raw_name == NULL)
goto failed;
- grub_snprintf (dev->raw_name, grub_strlen (cname) + sizeof (":nolabel"),
- "%s:nolabel", cname);
+ grub_snprintf (dev->raw_name, sz, "%s:nolabel", cname);
}
/*
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c
index 57624fde5..6c628635f 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <grub/i18n.h>
#include <grub/time.h>
#include <grub/env.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
static char *last_devpath;
static grub_ieee1275_ihandle_t last_ihandle;
@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ ofdisk_hash_add_real (char *devpath)
struct ofdisk_hash_ent **head = &ofdisk_hash[ofdisk_hash_fn(devpath)];
const char *iptr;
char *optr;
+ grub_size_t sz;
p = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*p));
if (!p)
@@ -88,8 +90,14 @@ ofdisk_hash_add_real (char *devpath)
p->devpath = devpath;
- p->grub_devpath = grub_malloc (sizeof ("ieee1275/")
- + 2 * grub_strlen (p->devpath));
+ if (grub_mul (grub_strlen (p->devpath), 2, &sz) ||
+ grub_add (sz, sizeof ("ieee1275/"), &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obtaining size of device path"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ p->grub_devpath = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!p->grub_devpath)
{
@@ -99,7 +107,13 @@ ofdisk_hash_add_real (char *devpath)
if (! grub_ieee1275_test_flag (GRUB_IEEE1275_FLAG_NO_PARTITION_0))
{
- p->open_path = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (p->devpath) + 3);
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (p->devpath), 3, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obtaining size of an open path"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ p->open_path = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!p->open_path)
{
grub_free (p->grub_devpath);
@@ -225,7 +239,7 @@ dev_iterate (const struct grub_ieee1275_devalias *alias)
args;
char *buf, *bufptr;
unsigned i;
-
+ grub_size_t sz;
RETRY_IEEE1275_OFDISK_OPEN(alias->path, &ihandle)
if (! ihandle)
@@ -246,7 +260,14 @@ dev_iterate (const struct grub_ieee1275_devalias *alias)
return;
}
- buf = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (alias->path) + 32);
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (alias->path), 32, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "overflow detected while creating buffer for vscsi");
+ grub_ieee1275_close (ihandle);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ buf = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!buf)
return;
bufptr = grub_stpcpy (buf, alias->path);
@@ -290,9 +311,15 @@ dev_iterate (const struct grub_ieee1275_devalias *alias)
grub_uint64_t *table;
grub_uint16_t table_size;
grub_ieee1275_ihandle_t ihandle;
+ grub_size_t sz;
- buf = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (alias->path) +
- sizeof ("/disk@7766554433221100"));
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (alias->path), sizeof ("/disk@7766554433221100"), &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "overflow detected while creating buffer for sas_ioa");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ buf = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!buf)
return;
bufptr = grub_stpcpy (buf, alias->path);
@@ -432,9 +459,17 @@ grub_ofdisk_iterate (grub_disk_dev_iterate_hook_t hook, void *hook_data,
static char *
compute_dev_path (const char *name)
{
- char *devpath = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (name) + 3);
+ char *devpath;
char *p, c;
+ grub_size_t sz;
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (name), 3, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obtaining size of device path"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ devpath = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!devpath)
return NULL;
@@ -657,6 +692,7 @@ insert_bootpath (void)
char *bootpath;
grub_ssize_t bootpath_size;
char *type;
+ grub_size_t sz;
if (grub_ieee1275_get_property_length (grub_ieee1275_chosen, "bootpath",
&bootpath_size)
@@ -667,7 +703,13 @@ insert_bootpath (void)
return;
}
- bootpath = (char *) grub_malloc ((grub_size_t) bootpath_size + 64);
+ if (grub_add (bootpath_size, 64, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obtaining bootpath size"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ bootpath = (char *) grub_malloc (sz);
if (! bootpath)
{
grub_print_error ();
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
index 34bfe6bd1..4101b15d8 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
struct grub_ldm_vblk vblk[GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE
/ sizeof (struct grub_ldm_vblk)];
unsigned i;
+ grub_size_t sz;
err = grub_disk_read (disk, cursec, 0,
sizeof(vblk), &vblk);
if (err)
@@ -251,7 +252,13 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
grub_free (pv);
goto fail2;
}
- pv->internal_id = grub_malloc (ptr[0] + 2);
+ if (grub_add (ptr[0], 2, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_free (pv);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+
+ pv->internal_id = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!pv->internal_id)
{
grub_free (pv);
@@ -276,7 +283,15 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
goto fail2;
}
pv->id.uuidlen = *ptr;
- pv->id.uuid = grub_malloc (pv->id.uuidlen + 1);
+
+ if (grub_add (pv->id.uuidlen, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_free (pv->internal_id);
+ grub_free (pv);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+
+ pv->id.uuid = grub_malloc (sz);
grub_memcpy (pv->id.uuid, ptr + 1, pv->id.uuidlen);
pv->id.uuid[pv->id.uuidlen] = 0;
@@ -343,7 +358,13 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
grub_free (lv);
goto fail2;
}
- lv->internal_id = grub_malloc ((grub_size_t) ptr[0] + 2);
+ if (grub_add (ptr[0], 2, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_free (lv->segments);
+ grub_free (lv);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+ lv->internal_id = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!lv->internal_id)
{
grub_free (lv);
@@ -455,6 +476,7 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
struct grub_ldm_vblk vblk[GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE
/ sizeof (struct grub_ldm_vblk)];
unsigned i;
+ grub_size_t sz;
err = grub_disk_read (disk, cursec, 0,
sizeof(vblk), &vblk);
if (err)
@@ -490,7 +512,12 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
grub_free (comp);
goto fail2;
}
- comp->internal_id = grub_malloc ((grub_size_t) ptr[0] + 2);
+ if (grub_add (ptr[0], 2, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_free (comp);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+ comp->internal_id = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!comp->internal_id)
{
grub_free (comp);
@@ -640,7 +667,6 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
if (lv->segments->node_alloc == lv->segments->node_count)
{
void *t;
- grub_size_t sz;
if (grub_mul (lv->segments->node_alloc, 2, &lv->segments->node_alloc) ||
grub_mul (lv->segments->node_alloc, sizeof (*lv->segments->nodes), &sz))
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/luks2.c b/grub-core/disk/luks2.c
index d5106402f..8036d76ff 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/luks2.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/luks2.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <grub/crypto.h>
#include <grub/partition.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
#include <base64.h>
#include <json.h>
@@ -569,6 +570,7 @@ luks2_recover_key (grub_disk_t source,
gcry_err_code_t gcry_ret;
grub_json_t *json = NULL, keyslots;
grub_err_t ret;
+ grub_size_t sz;
if (cargs->key_data == NULL || cargs->key_len == 0)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "no key data");
@@ -577,7 +579,10 @@ luks2_recover_key (grub_disk_t source,
if (ret)
return ret;
- json_header = grub_zalloc (grub_be_to_cpu64 (header.hdr_size) - sizeof (header));
+ if (grub_sub (grub_be_to_cpu64 (header.hdr_size), sizeof (header), &sz))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "underflow detected while calculating json header size");
+
+ json_header = grub_zalloc (sz);
if (!json_header)
return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c b/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c
index 613779cf3..36de3bfab 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <grub/misc.h>
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -96,7 +97,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(memdisk)
grub_dprintf ("memdisk", "Found memdisk image at %p\n", memdisk_orig_addr);
- memdisk_size = header->size - sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+ if (grub_sub (header->size, sizeof (struct grub_module_header), &memdisk_size))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "underflow detected while obtaining memdisk size");
+ return;
+ }
memdisk_addr = grub_malloc (memdisk_size);
grub_dprintf ("memdisk", "Copying memdisk image to dynamic memory\n");
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
index 47e64805f..21ec4072c 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <grub/extcmd.h>
#include <grub/partition.h>
#include <grub/file.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ plainmount_configure_password (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const char *hash,
grub_uint8_t *derived_hash, *dh;
char *p;
unsigned int round, i, len, size;
- grub_size_t alloc_size;
+ grub_size_t alloc_size, sz;
grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
/* Support none (plain) hash */
@@ -145,7 +146,11 @@ plainmount_configure_password (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const char *hash,
* Allocate buffer for the password and for an added prefix character
* for each hash round ('alloc_size' may not be a multiple of 'len').
*/
- p = grub_zalloc (alloc_size + (alloc_size / len) + 1);
+ if (grub_add (alloc_size, (alloc_size / len), &sz) ||
+ grub_add (sz, 1, &sz))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while allocating size of password buffer"));
+
+ p = grub_zalloc (sz);
derived_hash = grub_zalloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * 2);
if (p == NULL || derived_hash == NULL)
{

38
0337-disk-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-ar.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2025 10:26:44 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] disk: Prevent overflows when allocating memory for arrays
Use grub_calloc() when allocating memory for arrays to ensure proper
overflow checks are in place.
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
index 794248540..a395b200d 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
@@ -671,8 +671,7 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
goto lvs_segment_fail;
}
- seg->nodes = grub_zalloc (sizeof (seg->nodes[0])
- * seg->node_count);
+ seg->nodes = grub_calloc (seg->node_count, sizeof (seg->nodes[0]));
p = grub_strstr (p, "mirrors = [");
if (p == NULL)
@@ -760,8 +759,7 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
}
}
- seg->nodes = grub_zalloc (sizeof (seg->nodes[0])
- * seg->node_count);
+ seg->nodes = grub_calloc (seg->node_count, sizeof (seg->nodes[0]));
p = grub_strstr (p, "raids = [");
if (p == NULL)

152
0338-disk-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 02:55:11 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] disk: Check if returned pointer for allocated memory is NULL
When using grub_malloc(), grub_zalloc() or grub_calloc(), these functions can
fail if we are out of memory. After allocating memory we should check if these
functions returned NULL and handle this error if they did.
On the occasion make a NULL check in ATA code more obvious.
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/disk/ata.c | 4 ++--
grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c | 6 ++++++
grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 6 ++++++
grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
grub-core/disk/memdisk.c | 2 ++
5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ata.c b/grub-core/disk/ata.c
index 7b6ac7bfc..a2433e29e 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/ata.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/ata.c
@@ -112,10 +112,10 @@ grub_ata_identify (struct grub_ata *dev)
return grub_atapi_identify (dev);
info64 = grub_malloc (GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE);
+ if (info64 == NULL)
+ return grub_errno;
info32 = (grub_uint32_t *) info64;
info16 = (grub_uint16_t *) info64;
- if (! info16)
- return grub_errno;
grub_memset (&parms, 0, sizeof (parms));
parms.buffer = info16;
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c
index 9d4c42665..fcc39e0a2 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c
@@ -423,6 +423,12 @@ canonicalise_disk (const char *devname)
}
real_canon = grub_malloc (real_unit_str_len);
+ if (real_canon == NULL)
+ {
+ grub_free (parent);
+ grub_print_error ();
+ return NULL;
+ }
grub_snprintf (real_canon, real_unit_str_len, "%s/disk@%s",
op->name, real_unit_address);
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
index 4101b15d8..048e29cd0 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
@@ -292,6 +292,12 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
}
pv->id.uuid = grub_malloc (sz);
+ if (pv->id.uuid == NULL)
+ {
+ grub_free (pv->internal_id);
+ grub_free (pv);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
grub_memcpy (pv->id.uuid, ptr + 1, pv->id.uuidlen);
pv->id.uuid[pv->id.uuidlen] = 0;
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
index a395b200d..b2dff76d1 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
@@ -370,6 +370,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
break;
pv = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*pv));
+ if (pv == NULL)
+ goto fail4;
q = p;
while (*q != ' ' && q < mda_end)
q++;
@@ -379,6 +381,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
s = q - p;
pv->name = grub_malloc (s + 1);
+ if (pv->name == NULL)
+ goto pvs_fail_noname;
grub_memcpy (pv->name, p, s);
pv->name[s] = '\0';
@@ -451,6 +455,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
break;
lv = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*lv));
+ if (lv == NULL)
+ goto fail4;
q = p;
while (*q != ' ' && q < mda_end)
@@ -545,6 +551,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
goto lvs_fail;
}
lv->segments = grub_calloc (lv->segment_count, sizeof (*seg));
+ if (lv->segments == NULL)
+ goto lvs_fail;
seg = lv->segments;
for (i = 0; i < lv->segment_count; i++)
@@ -612,6 +620,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
seg->nodes = grub_calloc (seg->node_count,
sizeof (*stripe));
+ if (seg->nodes == NULL)
+ goto lvs_segment_fail;
stripe = seg->nodes;
p = grub_strstr (p, "stripes = [");
@@ -672,6 +682,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
}
seg->nodes = grub_calloc (seg->node_count, sizeof (seg->nodes[0]));
+ if (seg->nodes == NULL)
+ goto lvs_segment_fail;
p = grub_strstr (p, "mirrors = [");
if (p == NULL)
@@ -760,6 +772,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
}
seg->nodes = grub_calloc (seg->node_count, sizeof (seg->nodes[0]));
+ if (seg->nodes == NULL)
+ goto lvs_segment_fail;
p = grub_strstr (p, "raids = [");
if (p == NULL)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c b/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c
index 36de3bfab..2d7afaea3 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(memdisk)
return;
}
memdisk_addr = grub_malloc (memdisk_size);
+ if (memdisk_addr == NULL)
+ return;
grub_dprintf ("memdisk", "Copying memdisk image to dynamic memory\n");
grub_memmove (memdisk_addr, memdisk_orig_addr, memdisk_size);

31
0339-disk-ieee1275-ofdisk-Call-grub_ieee1275_close-when-g.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 02:55:12 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] disk/ieee1275/ofdisk: Call grub_ieee1275_close() when
grub_malloc() fails
In the dev_iterate() function a handle is opened but isn't closed when
grub_malloc() returns NULL. We should fix this by closing it on error.
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c
index 6c628635f..71237b256 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c
@@ -269,7 +269,10 @@ dev_iterate (const struct grub_ieee1275_devalias *alias)
buf = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!buf)
- return;
+ {
+ grub_ieee1275_close (ihandle);
+ return;
+ }
bufptr = grub_stpcpy (buf, alias->path);
for (i = 0; i < args.nentries; i++)

353
0340-fs-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2025 10:33:31 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] fs: Use safe math macros to prevent overflows
Replace direct arithmetic operations with macros from include/grub/safemath.h
to prevent potential overflow issues when calculating the memory sizes.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/archelp.c | 9 ++++++++-
grub-core/fs/btrfs.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
grub-core/fs/f2fs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c | 9 ++++++++-
grub-core/fs/squash4.c | 12 +++++++++---
grub-core/fs/xfs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
7 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/archelp.c b/grub-core/fs/archelp.c
index c1dcc6285..0816b28de 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/archelp.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/archelp.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <grub/fs.h>
#include <grub/disk.h>
#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ handle_symlink (struct grub_archelp_data *data,
char *rest;
char *linktarget;
grub_size_t linktarget_len;
+ grub_size_t sz;
*restart = 0;
@@ -98,7 +100,12 @@ handle_symlink (struct grub_archelp_data *data,
if (linktarget[0] == '\0')
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
linktarget_len = grub_strlen (linktarget);
- target = grub_malloc (linktarget_len + grub_strlen (*name) + 2);
+
+ if (grub_add (linktarget_len, grub_strlen (*name), &sz) ||
+ grub_add (sz, 2, &sz))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("link target length overflow"));
+
+ target = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!target)
return grub_errno;
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
index 6593f5175..3e4924b65 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
@@ -2031,6 +2031,7 @@ find_path (struct grub_btrfs_data *data,
char *origpath = NULL;
unsigned symlinks_max = 32;
const char *relpath = grub_env_get ("btrfs_relative_path");
+ grub_size_t sz;
follow_default = 0;
origpath = grub_strdup (path);
@@ -2157,9 +2158,15 @@ find_path (struct grub_btrfs_data *data,
struct grub_btrfs_dir_item *cdirel;
if (elemsize > allocated)
{
- allocated = 2 * elemsize;
+ if (grub_mul (2, elemsize, &allocated) ||
+ grub_add (allocated, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_free (path_alloc);
+ grub_free (origpath);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("directory item size overflow"));
+ }
grub_free (direl);
- direl = grub_malloc (allocated + 1);
+ direl = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!direl)
{
grub_free (path_alloc);
@@ -2223,8 +2230,16 @@ find_path (struct grub_btrfs_data *data,
grub_free (origpath);
return err;
}
- tmp = grub_malloc (grub_le_to_cpu64 (inode.size)
- + grub_strlen (path) + 1);
+
+ if (grub_add (grub_le_to_cpu64 (inode.size), grub_strlen (path), &sz) ||
+ grub_add (sz, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_free (direl);
+ grub_free (path_alloc);
+ grub_free (origpath);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("buffer size overflow"));
+ }
+ tmp = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!tmp)
{
grub_free (direl);
@@ -2371,6 +2386,7 @@ grub_btrfs_dir (grub_device_t device, const char *path,
grub_uint8_t type;
grub_size_t est_size = 0;
char *new_path = NULL;
+ grub_size_t sz;
if (!data)
return grub_errno;
@@ -2420,9 +2436,15 @@ grub_btrfs_dir (grub_device_t device, const char *path,
}
if (elemsize > allocated)
{
- allocated = 2 * elemsize;
+ if (grub_mul (2, elemsize, &allocated) ||
+ grub_add (allocated, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("directory element size overflow"));
+ r = -grub_errno;
+ break;
+ }
grub_free (direl);
- direl = grub_malloc (allocated + 1);
+ direl = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!direl)
{
r = -grub_errno;
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c b/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c
index 5d41b6fdb..6ba58b354 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <grub/dl.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
#include <grub/archelp.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
struct head hd;
grub_size_t namesize;
grub_uint32_t modeval;
+ grub_size_t sz;
data->hofs = data->next_hofs;
@@ -76,7 +78,10 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
*mode = modeval;
- *name = grub_malloc (namesize + 1);
+ if (grub_add (namesize, 1, &sz))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("file name size overflow"));
+
+ *name = grub_malloc (sz);
if (*name == NULL)
return grub_errno;
@@ -110,10 +115,17 @@ grub_cpio_get_link_target (struct grub_archelp_data *data)
{
char *ret;
grub_err_t err;
+ grub_size_t sz;
if (data->size == 0)
return grub_strdup ("");
- ret = grub_malloc (data->size + 1);
+
+ if (grub_add (data->size, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("target data size overflow"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
index f6d6beaa5..72b4aa1e6 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/charset.h>
#include <grub/fshelp.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -958,6 +959,7 @@ grub_f2fs_read_symlink (grub_fshelp_node_t node)
char *symlink;
struct grub_fshelp_node *diro = node;
grub_uint64_t filesize;
+ grub_size_t sz;
if (!diro->inode_read)
{
@@ -968,7 +970,12 @@ grub_f2fs_read_symlink (grub_fshelp_node_t node)
filesize = grub_f2fs_file_size(&diro->inode.i);
- symlink = grub_malloc (filesize + 1);
+ if (grub_add (filesize, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("symlink size overflow"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ symlink = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!symlink)
return 0;
@@ -997,6 +1004,7 @@ grub_f2fs_check_dentries (struct grub_f2fs_dir_iter_ctx *ctx)
enum FILE_TYPE ftype;
int name_len;
int ret;
+ int sz;
if (grub_f2fs_test_bit_le (i, ctx->bitmap) == 0)
{
@@ -1010,7 +1018,12 @@ grub_f2fs_check_dentries (struct grub_f2fs_dir_iter_ctx *ctx)
if (name_len >= F2FS_NAME_LEN)
return 0;
- filename = grub_malloc (name_len + 1);
+ if (grub_add (name_len, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("directory entry name length overflow"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ filename = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!filename)
return 0;
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c
index a009f2c2d..f168a318e 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <grub/disk.h>
#include <grub/dl.h>
#include <grub/ntfs.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ ntfscomp (grub_uint8_t *dest, grub_disk_addr_t ofs,
{
grub_err_t ret;
grub_disk_addr_t vcn;
+ int log_sz;
if (ctx->attr->sbuf)
{
@@ -349,7 +351,12 @@ ntfscomp (grub_uint8_t *dest, grub_disk_addr_t ofs,
}
ctx->comp.comp_head = ctx->comp.comp_tail = 0;
- ctx->comp.cbuf = grub_malloc (1 << (ctx->comp.log_spc + GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR));
+ if (grub_add (ctx->comp.log_spc, GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR, &log_sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("compression buffer size overflow"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->comp.cbuf = grub_malloc (1 << log_sz);
if (!ctx->comp.cbuf)
return 0;
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c
index 6e9d63874..f91ff3bfa 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c
@@ -460,11 +460,11 @@ grub_squash_read_symlink (grub_fshelp_node_t node)
{
char *ret;
grub_err_t err;
- grub_size_t sz;
+ grub_uint32_t sz;
if (grub_add (grub_le_to_cpu32 (node->ino.symlink.namelen), 1, &sz))
{
- grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow is detected"));
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("symlink name length overflow"));
return NULL;
}
@@ -580,6 +580,7 @@ grub_squash_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
struct grub_squash_dirent di;
struct grub_squash_inode ino;
grub_size_t sz;
+ grub_uint16_t nlen;
err = read_chunk (dir->data, &di, sizeof (di),
grub_le_to_cpu64 (dir->data->sb.diroffset)
@@ -595,7 +596,12 @@ grub_squash_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
if (err)
return 0;
- buf = grub_malloc (grub_le_to_cpu16 (di.namelen) + 2);
+ if (grub_add (grub_le_to_cpu16 (di.namelen), 2, &nlen))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("name length overflow"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ buf = grub_malloc (nlen);
if (!buf)
return 0;
err = read_chunk (dir->data, buf,
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
index 6c952aef1..c60db7361 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c
@@ -718,6 +718,7 @@ static char *
grub_xfs_read_symlink (grub_fshelp_node_t node)
{
grub_ssize_t size = grub_be_to_cpu64 (node->inode.size);
+ grub_size_t sz;
if (size < 0)
{
@@ -739,7 +740,12 @@ grub_xfs_read_symlink (grub_fshelp_node_t node)
if (node->data->hascrc)
off = 56;
- symlink = grub_malloc (size + 1);
+ if (grub_add (size, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("symlink size overflow"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ symlink = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!symlink)
return 0;
@@ -789,8 +795,15 @@ static int iterate_dir_call_hook (grub_uint64_t ino, const char *filename,
{
struct grub_fshelp_node *fdiro;
grub_err_t err;
+ grub_size_t sz;
- fdiro = grub_malloc (grub_xfs_fshelp_size(ctx->diro->data) + 1);
+ if (grub_add (grub_xfs_fshelp_size(ctx->diro->data), 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("directory data size overflow"));
+ grub_print_error ();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fdiro = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!fdiro)
{
grub_print_error ();

82
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@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 19:02:37 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs: Prevent overflows when allocating memory for arrays
Use grub_calloc() when allocating memory for arrays to ensure proper
overflow checks are in place.
The HFS+ and squash4 security vulnerabilities were reported by
Jonathan Bar Or <jonathanbaror@gmail.com>.
Fixes: CVE-2025-0678
Fixes: CVE-2025-1125
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/btrfs.c | 4 ++--
grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c | 9 +++++++--
grub-core/fs/squash4.c | 8 ++++----
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
index 3e4924b65..3228e1788 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
@@ -1409,8 +1409,8 @@ grub_btrfs_mount (grub_device_t dev)
}
data->n_devices_allocated = 16;
- data->devices_attached = grub_malloc (sizeof (data->devices_attached[0])
- * data->n_devices_allocated);
+ data->devices_attached = grub_calloc (data->n_devices_allocated,
+ sizeof (data->devices_attached[0]));
if (!data->devices_attached)
{
grub_free (data);
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c b/grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c
index 48ae438d8..a80954ee6 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c
@@ -244,14 +244,19 @@ hfsplus_open_compressed_real (struct grub_hfsplus_file *node)
return 0;
}
node->compress_index_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (index_size);
- node->compress_index = grub_malloc (node->compress_index_size
- * sizeof (node->compress_index[0]));
+ node->compress_index = grub_calloc (node->compress_index_size,
+ sizeof (node->compress_index[0]));
if (!node->compress_index)
{
node->compressed = 0;
grub_free (attr_node);
return grub_errno;
}
+
+ /*
+ * The node->compress_index_size * sizeof (node->compress_index[0]) is safe here
+ * due to relevant checks done in grub_calloc() above.
+ */
if (grub_hfsplus_read_file (node, 0, 0,
0x104 + sizeof (index_size),
node->compress_index_size
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c
index f91ff3bfa..cf2bca822 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c
@@ -822,10 +822,10 @@ direct_read (struct grub_squash_data *data,
break;
}
total_blocks = ((total_size + data->blksz - 1) >> data->log2_blksz);
- ino->block_sizes = grub_malloc (total_blocks
- * sizeof (ino->block_sizes[0]));
- ino->cumulated_block_sizes = grub_malloc (total_blocks
- * sizeof (ino->cumulated_block_sizes[0]));
+ ino->block_sizes = grub_calloc (total_blocks,
+ sizeof (ino->block_sizes[0]));
+ ino->cumulated_block_sizes = grub_calloc (total_blocks,
+ sizeof (ino->cumulated_block_sizes[0]));
if (!ino->block_sizes || !ino->cumulated_block_sizes)
{
grub_free (ino->block_sizes);

105
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@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 19:02:38 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs: Prevent overflows when assigning returned values from
read_number()
The direct assignment of the unsigned long long value returned by
read_number() can potentially lead to an overflow on a 32-bit systems.
The fix replaces the direct assignments with calls to grub_cast()
which detects the overflows and safely assigns the values if no
overflow is detected.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
grub-core/fs/tar.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c b/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c
index 6ba58b354..45ac119a8 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c
@@ -62,11 +62,21 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
#endif
)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "invalid cpio archive");
- data->size = read_number (hd.filesize, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.filesize));
+
+ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.filesize, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.filesize)), &data->size))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("data size overflow"));
+
if (mtime)
- *mtime = read_number (hd.mtime, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.mtime));
- modeval = read_number (hd.mode, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.mode));
- namesize = read_number (hd.namesize, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.namesize));
+ {
+ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.mtime, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.mtime)), mtime))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("mtime overflow"));
+ }
+
+ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.mode, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.mode)), &modeval))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("mode overflow"));
+
+ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.namesize, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.namesize)), &namesize))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("namesize overflow"));
/* Don't allow negative numbers. */
if (namesize >= 0x80000000)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/tar.c b/grub-core/fs/tar.c
index fd2ec1f74..1eaa5349f 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/tar.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/tar.c
@@ -99,9 +99,10 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
if (hd.typeflag == 'L')
{
grub_err_t err;
- grub_size_t namesize = read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size));
+ grub_size_t namesize;
- if (grub_add (namesize, 1, &sz))
+ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size)), &namesize) ||
+ grub_add (namesize, 1, &sz))
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("name size overflow"));
*name = grub_malloc (sz);
@@ -123,9 +124,10 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
if (hd.typeflag == 'K')
{
grub_err_t err;
- grub_size_t linksize = read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size));
+ grub_size_t linksize;
- if (grub_add (linksize, 1, &sz))
+ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size)), &linksize) ||
+ grub_add (linksize, 1, &sz))
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("link size overflow"));
if (data->linkname_alloc < sz)
@@ -174,15 +176,22 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name,
(*name)[extra_size + sizeof (hd.name)] = 0;
}
- data->size = read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size));
+ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size)), &data->size))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("data size overflow"));
+
data->dofs = data->hofs + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE;
data->next_hofs = data->dofs + ((data->size + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE - 1) &
~(GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE - 1));
if (mtime)
- *mtime = read_number (hd.mtime, sizeof (hd.mtime));
+ {
+ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.mtime, sizeof (hd.mtime)), mtime))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("mtime overflow"));
+ }
if (mode)
{
- *mode = read_number (hd.mode, sizeof (hd.mode));
+ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.mode, sizeof (hd.mode)), mode))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("mode overflow"));
+
switch (hd.typeflag)
{
/* Hardlink. */

138
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@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 07:17:02 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs/zfs: Use safe math macros to prevent overflows
Replace direct arithmetic operations with macros from include/grub/safemath.h
to prevent potential overflow issues when calculating the memory sizes.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
index a497b1869..2f303d655 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
@@ -2387,6 +2387,7 @@ fzap_iterate (dnode_end_t * zap_dnode, zap_phys_t * zap,
zap_dnode->endian) << DNODE_SHIFT);
grub_err_t err;
grub_zfs_endian_t endian;
+ grub_size_t sz;
if (zap_verify (zap, zap_dnode->endian))
return 0;
@@ -2448,8 +2449,14 @@ fzap_iterate (dnode_end_t * zap_dnode, zap_phys_t * zap,
if (le->le_type != ZAP_CHUNK_ENTRY)
continue;
- buf = grub_malloc (grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (le->le_name_length, endian)
- * name_elem_length + 1);
+ if (grub_mul (grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (le->le_name_length, endian), name_elem_length, &sz) ||
+ grub_add (sz, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("buffer size overflow"));
+ grub_free (l);
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
+ buf = grub_malloc (sz);
if (zap_leaf_array_get (l, endian, blksft,
grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (le->le_name_chunk,
endian),
@@ -2872,6 +2879,7 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
&& ((grub_zfs_to_cpu64(((znode_phys_t *) DN_BONUS (&dnode_path->dn.dn))->zp_mode, dnode_path->dn.endian) >> 12) & 0xf) == 0xa)
{
char *sym_value;
+ grub_size_t sz;
grub_size_t sym_sz;
int free_symval = 0;
char *oldpath = path, *oldpathbuf = path_buf;
@@ -2923,7 +2931,18 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
break;
free_symval = 1;
}
- path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sym_sz + grub_strlen (oldpath) + 1);
+
+ if (grub_add (sym_sz, grub_strlen (oldpath), &sz) ||
+ grub_add (sz, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("path buffer size overflow"));
+ grub_free (oldpathbuf);
+ if (free_symval)
+ grub_free (sym_value);
+ err = grub_errno;
+ break;
+ }
+ path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!path_buf)
{
grub_free (oldpathbuf);
@@ -2960,6 +2979,7 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
{
void *sahdrp;
int hdrsize;
+ grub_size_t sz;
if (dnode_path->dn.dn.dn_bonuslen != 0)
{
@@ -2993,7 +3013,15 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
+ SA_SIZE_OFFSET),
dnode_path->dn.endian);
char *oldpath = path, *oldpathbuf = path_buf;
- path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sym_sz + grub_strlen (oldpath) + 1);
+ if (grub_add (sym_sz, grub_strlen (oldpath), &sz) ||
+ grub_add (sz, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("path buffer size overflow"));
+ grub_free (oldpathbuf);
+ err = grub_errno;
+ break;
+ }
+ path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!path_buf)
{
grub_free (oldpathbuf);
@@ -3568,6 +3596,7 @@ grub_zfs_nvlist_lookup_nvlist_array (const char *nvlist, const char *name,
unsigned i;
grub_size_t nelm;
int elemsize = 0;
+ int sz;
found = nvlist_find_value (nvlist, name, DATA_TYPE_NVLIST_ARRAY, &nvpair,
&size, &nelm);
@@ -3602,7 +3631,12 @@ grub_zfs_nvlist_lookup_nvlist_array (const char *nvlist, const char *name,
return 0;
}
- ret = grub_zalloc (elemsize + sizeof (grub_uint32_t));
+ if (grub_add (elemsize, sizeof (grub_uint32_t), &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("elemsize overflow"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = grub_zalloc (sz);
if (!ret)
return 0;
grub_memcpy (ret, nvlist, sizeof (grub_uint32_t));
@@ -4193,6 +4227,7 @@ iterate_zap_snap (const char *name, grub_uint64_t val,
struct grub_dirhook_info info;
char *name2;
int ret;
+ grub_size_t sz;
dnode_end_t mdn;
@@ -4213,7 +4248,10 @@ iterate_zap_snap (const char *name, grub_uint64_t val,
return 0;
}
- name2 = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (name) + 2);
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (name), 2, &sz))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("name length overflow"));
+
+ name2 = grub_malloc (sz);
name2[0] = '@';
grub_memcpy (name2 + 1, name, grub_strlen (name) + 1);
ret = ctx->hook (name2, &info, ctx->hook_data);

40
0344-fs-zfs-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 07:17:03 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs/zfs: Prevent overflows when allocating memory for arrays
Use grub_calloc() when allocating memory for arrays to ensure proper
overflow checks are in place.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
index 2f303d655..9ab7bf319 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
@@ -723,8 +723,8 @@ fill_vdev_info_real (struct grub_zfs_data *data,
{
fill->n_children = nelm;
- fill->children = grub_zalloc (fill->n_children
- * sizeof (fill->children[0]));
+ fill->children = grub_calloc (fill->n_children,
+ sizeof (fill->children[0]));
}
for (i = 0; i < nelm; i++)
@@ -3712,8 +3712,8 @@ zfs_mount (grub_device_t dev)
#endif
data->n_devices_allocated = 16;
- data->devices_attached = grub_malloc (sizeof (data->devices_attached[0])
- * data->n_devices_allocated);
+ data->devices_attached = grub_calloc (data->n_devices_allocated,
+ sizeof (data->devices_attached[0]));
data->n_devices_attached = 0;
err = scan_disk (dev, data, 1, &inserted);
if (err)

88
0345-fs-zfs-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memor.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 07:17:01 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs/zfs: Check if returned pointer for allocated memory is
NULL
When using grub_malloc() or grub_zalloc(), these functions can fail if
we are out of memory. After allocating memory we should check if these
functions returned NULL and handle this error if they did.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
index 9ab7bf319..6e6d1c921 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
@@ -614,6 +614,8 @@ zfs_fetch_nvlist (struct grub_zfs_device_desc *diskdesc, char **nvlist)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "member drive unknown");
*nvlist = grub_malloc (VDEV_PHYS_SIZE);
+ if (!*nvlist)
+ return grub_errno;
/* Read in the vdev name-value pair list (112K). */
err = grub_disk_read (diskdesc->dev->disk, diskdesc->vdev_phys_sector, 0,
@@ -725,6 +727,11 @@ fill_vdev_info_real (struct grub_zfs_data *data,
fill->children = grub_calloc (fill->n_children,
sizeof (fill->children[0]));
+ if (!fill->children)
+ {
+ grub_free (type);
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
}
for (i = 0; i < nelm; i++)
@@ -2457,6 +2464,11 @@ fzap_iterate (dnode_end_t * zap_dnode, zap_phys_t * zap,
return grub_errno;
}
buf = grub_malloc (sz);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ grub_free (l);
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
if (zap_leaf_array_get (l, endian, blksft,
grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (le->le_name_chunk,
endian),
@@ -2472,6 +2484,12 @@ fzap_iterate (dnode_end_t * zap_dnode, zap_phys_t * zap,
val_length = ((int) le->le_value_length
* (int) le->le_int_size);
val = grub_malloc (grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (val_length, endian));
+ if (!val)
+ {
+ grub_free (l);
+ grub_free (buf);
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
if (zap_leaf_array_get (l, endian, blksft,
grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (le->le_value_chunk,
endian),
@@ -3714,6 +3732,11 @@ zfs_mount (grub_device_t dev)
data->n_devices_allocated = 16;
data->devices_attached = grub_calloc (data->n_devices_allocated,
sizeof (data->devices_attached[0]));
+ if (!data->devices_attached)
+ {
+ grub_free (data);
+ return NULL;
+ }
data->n_devices_attached = 0;
err = scan_disk (dev, data, 1, &inserted);
if (err)
@@ -4252,6 +4275,9 @@ iterate_zap_snap (const char *name, grub_uint64_t val,
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("name length overflow"));
name2 = grub_malloc (sz);
+ if (!name2)
+ return grub_errno;
+
name2[0] = '@';
grub_memcpy (name2 + 1, name, grub_strlen (name) + 1);
ret = ctx->hook (name2, &info, ctx->hook_data);

24
0346-fs-zfs-Add-missing-NULL-check-after-grub_strdup-call.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 07:17:04 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs/zfs: Add missing NULL check after grub_strdup() call
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
index 6e6d1c921..5ff647ffb 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
@@ -3309,6 +3309,8 @@ dnode_get_fullpath (const char *fullpath, struct subvolume *subvol,
filename = 0;
snapname = 0;
fsname = grub_strdup (fullpath);
+ if (!fsname)
+ return grub_errno;
}
else
{

240
0347-net-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2025 10:38:17 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] net: Use safe math macros to prevent overflows
Replace direct arithmetic operations with macros from include/grub/safemath.h
to prevent potential overflow issues when calculating the memory sizes.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/net/bootp.c | 16 +++++++++++--
grub-core/net/dns.c | 9 ++++++-
grub-core/net/drivers/ieee1275/ofnet.c | 20 ++++++++++++++--
grub-core/net/net.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/net/bootp.c b/grub-core/net/bootp.c
index 9cbdc2264..bed70c0b2 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/bootp.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/bootp.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <grub/datetime.h>
#include <grub/time.h>
#include <grub/list.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
static int
dissect_url (const char *url, char **proto, char **host, char **path)
@@ -1479,6 +1480,7 @@ grub_cmd_dhcpopt (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
unsigned num;
const grub_uint8_t *ptr;
grub_uint8_t taglength;
+ grub_uint8_t len;
if (argc < 4)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
@@ -1520,7 +1522,12 @@ grub_cmd_dhcpopt (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
if (grub_strcmp (args[3], "string") == 0)
{
grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
- char *val = grub_malloc (taglength + 1);
+ char *val;
+
+ if (grub_add (taglength, 1, &len))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("tag length overflow"));
+
+ val = grub_malloc (len);
if (!val)
return grub_errno;
grub_memcpy (val, ptr, taglength);
@@ -1553,7 +1560,12 @@ grub_cmd_dhcpopt (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
if (grub_strcmp (args[3], "hex") == 0)
{
grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
- char *val = grub_malloc (2 * taglength + 1);
+ char *val;
+
+ if (grub_mul (taglength, 2, &len) || grub_add (len, 1, &len))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("tag length overflow"));
+
+ val = grub_malloc (len);
int i;
if (!val)
return grub_errno;
diff --git a/grub-core/net/dns.c b/grub-core/net/dns.c
index fcc09aa65..39b0c46cf 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/dns.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/dns.c
@@ -224,10 +224,17 @@ get_name (const grub_uint8_t *name_at, const grub_uint8_t *head,
{
int length;
char *ret;
+ int len;
if (!check_name_real (name_at, head, tail, NULL, &length, NULL))
return NULL;
- ret = grub_malloc (length + 1);
+
+ if (grub_add (length, 1, &len))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("name length overflow"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = grub_malloc (len);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
if (!check_name_real (name_at, head, tail, NULL, NULL, ret))
diff --git a/grub-core/net/drivers/ieee1275/ofnet.c b/grub-core/net/drivers/ieee1275/ofnet.c
index c56461ff1..b5336dfbb 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/drivers/ieee1275/ofnet.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/drivers/ieee1275/ofnet.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <grub/net.h>
#include <grub/time.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -392,6 +393,7 @@ search_net_devices (struct grub_ieee1275_devalias *alias)
grub_uint8_t *pprop;
char *shortname;
char need_suffix = 1;
+ grub_size_t sz;
if (grub_strcmp (alias->type, "network") != 0)
return 0;
@@ -449,9 +451,23 @@ search_net_devices (struct grub_ieee1275_devalias *alias)
}
if (need_suffix)
- ofdata->path = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (alias->path) + sizeof (SUFFIX));
+ {
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (alias->path), sizeof (SUFFIX), &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obatining size of ofdata path"));
+ grub_print_error ();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
else
- ofdata->path = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (alias->path) + 1);
+ {
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (alias->path), 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obatining size of ofdata path"));
+ grub_print_error ();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
if (!ofdata->path)
{
grub_print_error ();
diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c
index 6c8dfcba2..22224453f 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/net.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/net.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <grub/loader.h>
#include <grub/bufio.h>
#include <grub/kernel.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
#include <grub/net/efi.h>
#endif
@@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ grub_net_ipv6_get_slaac (struct grub_net_card *card,
{
struct grub_net_slaac_mac_list *slaac;
char *ptr;
+ grub_size_t sz;
for (slaac = card->slaac_list; slaac; slaac = slaac->next)
if (grub_net_hwaddr_cmp (&slaac->address, hwaddr) == 0)
@@ -220,9 +222,16 @@ grub_net_ipv6_get_slaac (struct grub_net_card *card,
if (!slaac)
return NULL;
- slaac->name = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (card->name)
- + GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_HWADDR_LEN
- + sizeof (":slaac"));
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (card->name),
+ (GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_HWADDR_LEN + sizeof (":slaac")), &sz))
+ {
+ grub_free (slaac);
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+ "overflow detected while obtaining size of slaac name");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ slaac->name = grub_malloc (sz);
ptr = grub_stpcpy (slaac->name, card->name);
if (grub_net_hwaddr_cmp (&card->default_address, hwaddr) != 0)
{
@@ -293,6 +302,7 @@ grub_net_ipv6_get_link_local (struct grub_net_card *card,
char *name;
char *ptr;
grub_net_network_level_address_t addr;
+ grub_size_t sz;
addr.type = GRUB_NET_NETWORK_LEVEL_PROTOCOL_IPV6;
addr.ipv6[0] = grub_cpu_to_be64_compile_time (0xfe80ULL << 48);
@@ -307,9 +317,14 @@ grub_net_ipv6_get_link_local (struct grub_net_card *card,
return inf;
}
- name = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (card->name)
- + GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_HWADDR_LEN
- + sizeof (":link"));
+ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (card->name),
+ (GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_HWADDR_LEN + sizeof (":link")), &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+ "overflow detected while obtaining size of link name");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ name = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!name)
return NULL;
@@ -1516,9 +1531,15 @@ grub_net_open_real (const char *name)
if (grub_strchr (port_start + 1, ':'))
{
int iplen = grub_strlen (server);
+ grub_size_t sz;
/* Bracket bare IPv6 addr. */
- host = grub_malloc (iplen + 3);
+ if (grub_add (iplen, 3, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obtaining length of host"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ host = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!host)
return NULL;
@@ -1773,6 +1794,7 @@ grub_env_set_net_property (const char *intername, const char *suffix,
{
char *varname, *varvalue;
char *ptr;
+ grub_size_t sz;
varname = grub_xasprintf ("net_%s_%s", intername, suffix);
if (!varname)
@@ -1780,7 +1802,12 @@ grub_env_set_net_property (const char *intername, const char *suffix,
for (ptr = varname; *ptr; ptr++)
if (*ptr == ':')
*ptr = '_';
- varvalue = grub_malloc (len + 1);
+ if (grub_add (len, 1, &sz))
+ {
+ grub_free (varname);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "overflow detected while obtaining the size of an env variable");
+ }
+ varvalue = grub_malloc (sz);
if (!varvalue)
{
grub_free (varname);

45
0348-net-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-arr.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 18:04:43 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] net: Prevent overflows when allocating memory for arrays
Use grub_calloc() when allocating memory for arrays to ensure proper
overflow checks are in place.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/net/dns.c | 4 ++--
grub-core/net/net.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/net/dns.c b/grub-core/net/dns.c
index 39b0c46cf..f20cd6f83 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/dns.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/dns.c
@@ -470,8 +470,8 @@ grub_net_dns_lookup (const char *name,
&& grub_get_time_ms () < dns_cache[h].limit_time)
{
grub_dprintf ("dns", "retrieved from cache\n");
- *addresses = grub_malloc (dns_cache[h].naddresses
- * sizeof ((*addresses)[0]));
+ *addresses = grub_calloc (dns_cache[h].naddresses,
+ sizeof ((*addresses)[0]));
if (!*addresses)
return grub_errno;
*naddresses = dns_cache[h].naddresses;
diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c
index 22224453f..d426ad2c4 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/net.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/net.c
@@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ grub_net_link_layer_add_address (struct grub_net_card *card,
/* Add sender to cache table. */
if (card->link_layer_table == NULL)
{
- card->link_layer_table = grub_zalloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE
- * sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0]));
+ card->link_layer_table = grub_calloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE,
+ sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0]));
if (card->link_layer_table == NULL)
return;
}

31
0349-net-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-i.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 18:04:44 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] net: Check if returned pointer for allocated memory is NULL
When using grub_malloc(), the function can fail if we are out of memory.
After allocating memory we should check if this function returned NULL
and handle this error if it did.
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/net/net.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c
index d426ad2c4..bec297cb6 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/net.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/net.c
@@ -232,6 +232,11 @@ grub_net_ipv6_get_slaac (struct grub_net_card *card,
}
slaac->name = grub_malloc (sz);
+ if (slaac->name == NULL)
+ {
+ grub_free (slaac);
+ return NULL;
+ }
ptr = grub_stpcpy (slaac->name, card->name);
if (grub_net_hwaddr_cmp (&card->default_address, hwaddr) != 0)
{

32
0350-fs-sfs-Check-if-allocated-memory-is-NULL.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 05:15:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fs/sfs: Check if allocated memory is NULL
When using grub_zalloc(), if we are out of memory, this function can fail.
After allocating memory, we should check if grub_zalloc() returns NULL.
If so, we should handle this error.
Fixes: CID 473856
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/sfs.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
index 88705b3a2..bad4ae8d1 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
@@ -429,6 +429,9 @@ grub_sfs_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
- 24 /* offsetof (struct grub_sfs_objc, objects) */
- 25); /* offsetof (struct grub_sfs_obj, filename) */
data->label = grub_zalloc (max_len + 1);
+ if (data->label == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+
grub_strncpy (data->label, (char *) rootobjc->objects[0].filename, max_len);
grub_free (rootobjc_data);

32
0351-script-execute-Fix-potential-underflow-and-NULL-dere.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2025 06:48:37 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] script/execute: Fix potential underflow and NULL dereference
The result is initialized to 0 in grub_script_arglist_to_argv().
If the for loop condition is not met both result.args and result.argc
remain 0 causing result.argc - 1 to underflow and/or result.args NULL
dereference. Fix the issues by adding relevant checks.
Fixes: CID 473880
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/script/execute.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c
index 7ed3a1a03..014132703 100644
--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c
+++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c
@@ -794,6 +794,9 @@ cleanup:
}
}
+ if (result.args == NULL || result.argc == 0)
+ goto fail;
+
if (! result.args[result.argc - 1])
result.argc--;

35
0352-osdep-unix-getroot-Fix-potential-underflow.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2025 06:48:38 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] osdep/unix/getroot: Fix potential underflow
The entry_len is initialized in grub_find_root_devices_from_mountinfo()
to 0 before the while loop iterates through /proc/self/mountinfo. If the
file is empty or contains only invalid entries entry_len remains
0 causing entry_len - 1 in the subsequent for loop initialization
to underflow. To prevent this add a check to ensure entry_len > 0 before
entering the for loop.
Fixes: CID 473877
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/osdep/linux/getroot.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/osdep/linux/getroot.c b/grub-core/osdep/linux/getroot.c
index b32582eb3..b83259321 100644
--- a/grub-core/osdep/linux/getroot.c
+++ b/grub-core/osdep/linux/getroot.c
@@ -596,6 +596,9 @@ again:
}
}
+ if (!entry_len)
+ goto out;
+
/* Now scan visible mounts for the ones we're interested in. */
for (i = entry_len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{

55
0353-misc-Ensure-consistent-overflow-error-messages.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 19:02:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] misc: Ensure consistent overflow error messages
Update the overflow error messages to make them consistent
across the GRUB code.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 2 +-
grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c | 2 +-
grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
index e00349b1d..960833a34 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ retry:
goto retry;
}
}
- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "run list overflown");
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "run list overflow");
}
ctx->curr_vcn = ctx->next_vcn;
ctx->next_vcn += read_run_data (run, c1, 0); /* length of current VCN */
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c
index f168a318e..b68bf5e40 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static grub_err_t
decomp_nextvcn (struct grub_ntfs_comp *cc)
{
if (cc->comp_head >= cc->comp_tail)
- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "compression block overflown");
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "compression block overflow");
if (grub_disk_read
(cc->disk,
(cc->comp_table[cc->comp_head].next_lcn -
diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
index 3163e97bf..aa7524b7d 100644
--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ static grub_err_t
grub_png_output_byte (struct grub_png_data *data, grub_uint8_t n)
{
if (--data->raw_bytes < 0)
- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "image size overflown");
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "image size overflow");
if (data->cur_column == 0)
{

30
0354-bus-usb-ehci-Define-GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE-as-grub_uint32_.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2025 15:11:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] bus/usb/ehci: Define GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE as grub_uint32_t
The Coverity indicates that GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE is an int that contains
a negative value and we are using it for the variable token which is
grub_uint32_t. To remedy this we can cast the definition to grub_uint32_t.
Fixes: CID 473851
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/bus/usb/ehci.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/bus/usb/ehci.c b/grub-core/bus/usb/ehci.c
index 9abebc6bd..2db07c7c0 100644
--- a/grub-core/bus/usb/ehci.c
+++ b/grub-core/bus/usb/ehci.c
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ enum
#define GRUB_EHCI_TERMINATE (1<<0)
-#define GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE (1<<31)
+#define GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE ((grub_uint32_t) 1<<31)
enum
{

41
0355-normal-menu-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-an-integer-overfl.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2025 15:11:11 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] normal/menu: Use safe math to avoid an integer overflow
The Coverity indicates that the variable current_entry might overflow.
To prevent this use safe math when adding GRUB_MENU_PAGE_SIZE to current_entry.
On the occasion fix limiting condition which was broken.
Fixes: CID 473853
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/normal/menu.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/normal/menu.c b/grub-core/normal/menu.c
index cda10fa8b..97687013c 100644
--- a/grub-core/normal/menu.c
+++ b/grub-core/normal/menu.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <grub/script_sh.h>
#include <grub/gfxterm.h>
#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
/* Time to delay after displaying an error message about a default/fallback
entry failing to boot. */
@@ -784,9 +785,7 @@ run_menu (grub_menu_t menu, int nested, int *auto_boot, int *notify_boot)
case GRUB_TERM_CTRL | 'c':
case GRUB_TERM_KEY_NPAGE:
- if (current_entry + GRUB_MENU_PAGE_SIZE < menu->size)
- current_entry += GRUB_MENU_PAGE_SIZE;
- else
+ if (grub_add (current_entry, GRUB_MENU_PAGE_SIZE, &current_entry) || current_entry >= menu->size)
current_entry = menu->size - 1;
menu_set_chosen_entry (current_entry);
break;

46
0356-kern-partition-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-c.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2025 18:16:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] kern/partition: Add sanity check after grub_strtoul() call
The current code incorrectly assumes that both the input and the values
returned by grub_strtoul() are always valid which can lead to potential
errors. This fix ensures proper validation to prevent any unintended issues.
Fixes: CID 473843
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/kern/partition.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/partition.c b/grub-core/kern/partition.c
index 704512a20..c6a578cf4 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/partition.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/partition.c
@@ -125,14 +125,22 @@ grub_partition_probe (struct grub_disk *disk, const char *str)
for (ptr = str; *ptr;)
{
grub_partition_map_t partmap;
- int num;
+ unsigned long num;
const char *partname, *partname_end;
partname = ptr;
while (*ptr && grub_isalpha (*ptr))
ptr++;
partname_end = ptr;
- num = grub_strtoul (ptr, &ptr, 0) - 1;
+
+ num = grub_strtoul (ptr, &ptr, 0);
+ if (*ptr != '\0' || num == 0 || num > GRUB_INT_MAX)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, N_("invalid partition number"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ num -= 1;
curpart = 0;
/* Use the first partition map type found. */

57
0357-kern-misc-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-call.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2025 18:16:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] kern/misc: Add sanity check after grub_strtoul() call
When the format string, fmt0, includes a positional argument
grub_strtoul() or grub_strtoull() is called to extract the argument
position. However, the returned argument position isn't fully validated.
If the format is something like "%0$x" then these functions return
0 which leads to an underflow in the calculation of the args index, curn.
The fix is to add a check to ensure the extracted argument position is
greater than 0 before computing curn. Additionally, replace one
grub_strtoull() with grub_strtoul() and change curn type to make code
more correct.
Fixes: CID 473841
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/kern/misc.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/misc.c b/grub-core/kern/misc.c
index 98700423d..69bd655f3 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/misc.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/misc.c
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ parse_printf_arg_fmt (const char *fmt0, struct printf_args *args,
while ((c = *fmt++) != 0)
{
int longfmt = 0;
- grub_size_t curn;
+ unsigned long curn;
const char *p;
if (c != '%')
@@ -930,7 +930,10 @@ parse_printf_arg_fmt (const char *fmt0, struct printf_args *args,
if (*fmt == '$')
{
- curn = grub_strtoull (p, 0, 10) - 1;
+ curn = grub_strtoul (p, 0, 10);
+ if (curn == 0)
+ continue;
+ curn--;
fmt++;
}
@@ -1116,6 +1119,8 @@ grub_vsnprintf_real (char *str, grub_size_t max_len, const char *fmt0,
if (*fmt == '$')
{
+ if (format1 == 0)
+ continue;
curn = format1 - 1;
fmt++;
format1 = 0;

30
0358-loader-i386-linux-Cast-left-shift-to-grub_uint32_t.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2025 10:56:13 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] loader/i386/linux: Cast left shift to grub_uint32_t
The Coverity complains that we might overflow into a negative value when
setting linux_params.kernel_alignment to (1 << align). We can remedy
this by casting it to grub_uint32_t.
Fixes: CID 473876
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c
index 90121e9bc..33a852197 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R|GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W, GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X);
linux_params.code32_start = prot_mode_target + lh.code32_start - GRUB_LINUX_BZIMAGE_ADDR;
- linux_params.kernel_alignment = (1 << align);
+ linux_params.kernel_alignment = ((grub_uint32_t)1 << align);
linux_params.ps_mouse = linux_params.padding11 = 0;
linux_params.type_of_loader = GRUB_LINUX_BOOT_LOADER_TYPE;

56
0359-loader-i386-bsd-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-underflow.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 22:04:08 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] loader/i386/bsd: Use safe math to avoid underflow
The operation kern_end - kern_start may underflow when we input it into
grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_addr() call. To avoid this we can use safe
math for this subtraction.
Fixes: CID 73845
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c
index 8075ac9b0..50f96ea7a 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c
@@ -1341,6 +1341,7 @@ static grub_err_t
grub_bsd_load_elf (grub_elf_t elf, const char *filename)
{
grub_err_t err;
+ grub_size_t sz;
kern_end = 0;
kern_start = ~0;
@@ -1371,8 +1372,11 @@ grub_bsd_load_elf (grub_elf_t elf, const char *filename)
if (grub_errno)
return grub_errno;
- err = grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_addr (relocator, &ch,
- kern_start, kern_end - kern_start);
+
+ if (grub_sub (kern_end, kern_start, &sz))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "underflow detected while determining size of kernel for relocator");
+
+ err = grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_addr (relocator, &ch, kern_start, sz);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -1432,8 +1436,10 @@ grub_bsd_load_elf (grub_elf_t elf, const char *filename)
{
grub_relocator_chunk_t ch;
- err = grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_addr (relocator, &ch, kern_start,
- kern_end - kern_start);
+ if (grub_sub (kern_end, kern_start, &sz))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "underflow detected while determining size of kernel for relocator");
+
+ err = grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_addr (relocator, &ch, kern_start, sz);
if (err)
return err;
kern_chunk_src = get_virtual_current_address (ch);

75
grub.patches
View File

@ -283,4 +283,77 @@ Patch0282: 0282-acpi-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-grub_acpi_xsdt_find.patch
Patch0283: 0283-fs-xfs-Fix-large-extent-counters-incompat-feature-su.patch
Patch0284: 0284-term-ns8250-spcr-return-if-redirection-is-disabled.patch
Patch0285: 0285-commands-legacycfg-Avoid-closing-file-twice.patch
Patch0286: 0286-disk-ahci.c-remove-conditional-operator-for-endtime.patch
Patch0286: 0286-disk-ahci.c-remove-conditional-operator-for-endtime.patch
Patch0287: 0287-misc-Implement-grub_strlcpy.patch
Patch0288: 0288-fs-ufs-Fix-a-heap-OOB-write.patch
Patch0289: 0289-fs-hfs-Fix-stack-OOB-write-with-grub_strcpy.patch
Patch0290: 0290-fs-tar-Initialize-name-in-grub_cpio_find_file.patch
Patch0291: 0291-fs-tar-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch
Patch0292: 0292-fs-f2fs-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch
Patch0293: 0293-fs-hfsplus-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch
Patch0294: 0294-fs-iso9660-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch
Patch0295: 0295-fs-iso9660-Fix-invalid-free.patch
Patch0296: 0296-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-in-jfs_getent.patch
Patch0297: 0297-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-caused-by-invalid-dir-slot-index.patch
Patch0298: 0298-fs-jfs-Use-full-40-bits-offset-and-address-for-a-dat.patch
Patch0299: 0299-fs-jfs-Inconsistent-signed-unsigned-types-usage-in-r.patch
Patch0300: 0300-fs-ext2-Fix-out-of-bounds-read-for-inline-extents.patch
Patch0301: 0301-fs-ntfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch
Patch0302: 0302-fs-ntfs-Track-the-end-of-the-MFT-attribute-buffer.patch
Patch0303: 0303-fs-ntfs-Use-a-helper-function-to-access-attributes.patch
Patch0304: 0304-fs-ntfs-Implement-attribute-verification.patch
Patch0305: 0305-fs-xfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch
Patch0306: 0306-fs-xfs-Ensuring-failing-to-mount-sets-a-grub_errno.patch
Patch0307: 0307-kern-file-Ensure-file-data-is-set.patch
Patch0308: 0308-kern-file-Implement-filesystem-reference-counting.patch
Patch0309: 0309-cli_lock-Add-build-option-to-block-command-line-inte.patch
Patch0310: 0310-disk-cryptodisk-Require-authentication-after-TPM-unl.patch
Patch0311: 0311-disk-loopback-Reference-tracking-for-the-loopback.patch
Patch0312: 0312-kern-disk-Limit-recursion-depth.patch
Patch0313: 0313-kern-partition-Limit-recursion-in-part_iterate.patch
Patch0314: 0314-script-execute-Limit-the-recursion-depth.patch
Patch0315: 0315-net-Unregister-net_default_ip-and-net_default_mac-va.patch
Patch0316: 0316-net-Remove-variables-hooks-when-interface-is-unregis.patch
Patch0317: 0317-net-Fix-OOB-write-in-grub_net_search_config_file.patch
Patch0318: 0318-net-tftp-Fix-stack-buffer-overflow-in-tftp_open.patch
Patch0319: 0319-video-readers-jpeg-Do-not-permit-duplicate-SOF0-mark.patch
Patch0320: 0320-kern-dl-Fix-for-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_dl_ref.patch
Patch0321: 0321-kern-dl-Check-for-the-SHF_INFO_LINK-flag-in-grub_dl_.patch
Patch0322: 0322-commands-extcmd-Missing-check-for-failed-allocation.patch
Patch0323: 0323-commands-ls-Fix-NULL-dereference.patch
Patch0324: 0324-commands-pgp-Unregister-the-check_signatures-hooks-o.patch
Patch0325: 0325-normal-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch
Patch0326: 0326-gettext-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch
Patch0327: 0327-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write-or-.patch
Patch0328: 0328-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch
Patch0329: 0329-commands-read-Fix-an-integer-overflow-when-supplying.patch
Patch0330: 0330-commands-test-Stack-overflow-due-to-unlimited-recurs.patch
Patch0331: 0331-commands-minicmd-Block-the-dump-command-in-lockdown-.patch
Patch0332: 0332-commands-memrw-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-mo.patch
Patch0333: 0333-commands-hexdump-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-.patch
Patch0334: 0334-fs-bfs-Disable-under-lockdown.patch
Patch0335: 0335-fs-Disable-many-filesystems-under-lockdown.patch
Patch0336: 0336-disk-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch
Patch0337: 0337-disk-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-ar.patch
Patch0338: 0338-disk-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-.patch
Patch0339: 0339-disk-ieee1275-ofdisk-Call-grub_ieee1275_close-when-g.patch
Patch0340: 0340-fs-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch
Patch0341: 0341-fs-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-arra.patch
Patch0342: 0342-fs-Prevent-overflows-when-assigning-returned-values-.patch
Patch0343: 0343-fs-zfs-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch
Patch0344: 0344-fs-zfs-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-.patch
Patch0345: 0345-fs-zfs-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memor.patch
Patch0346: 0346-fs-zfs-Add-missing-NULL-check-after-grub_strdup-call.patch
Patch0347: 0347-net-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch
Patch0348: 0348-net-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-arr.patch
Patch0349: 0349-net-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-i.patch
Patch0350: 0350-fs-sfs-Check-if-allocated-memory-is-NULL.patch
Patch0351: 0351-script-execute-Fix-potential-underflow-and-NULL-dere.patch
Patch0352: 0352-osdep-unix-getroot-Fix-potential-underflow.patch
Patch0353: 0353-misc-Ensure-consistent-overflow-error-messages.patch
Patch0354: 0354-bus-usb-ehci-Define-GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE-as-grub_uint32_.patch
Patch0355: 0355-normal-menu-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-an-integer-overfl.patch
Patch0356: 0356-kern-partition-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-c.patch
Patch0357: 0357-kern-misc-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-call.patch
Patch0358: 0358-loader-i386-linux-Cast-left-shift-to-grub_uint32_t.patch
Patch0359: 0359-loader-i386-bsd-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-underflow.patch

15
grub2.spec
View File

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
Name: grub2
Epoch: 1
Version: 2.12
Release: 8%{?dist}
Release: 9%{?dist}
Summary: Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more
License: GPL-3.0-or-later
URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/grub/
@ -583,6 +583,19 @@ mv ${EFI_HOME}/grub.cfg.stb ${EFI_HOME}/grub.cfg
%endif
%changelog
* Tue Feb 18 2025 Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com> - 2.02-9
- Add Several CVE fixes
- Resolves: CVE-2024-45781 CVE-2024-45783 CVE-2024-45778
- Resolves: CVE-2024-45775 CVE-2024-45780 CVE-2024-45774
- Resolves: CVE-2025-0690 CVE-2025-1118 CVE-2024-45782
- Resolves: CVE-2025-0624 CVE-2024-45779 CVE-2024-45776
- Resolves: CVE-2025-0622 CVE-2025-0677
- Resolves: #RHEL-80691
- Resolves: #RHEL-80690
- Resolves: #RHEL-80689
- Resolves: #RHEL-80687
- Resolves: #RHEL-80686
* Wed Jan 22 2025 Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com> 2.12-8
- fix pending SAST issues
- Resolves: #RHEL-50504