From fe912c5dba49dcecbd5c32bf8184e60a949af452 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daiki Ueno Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 19:13:17 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] rsa-psk: minimize branching after decryption This moves any non-trivial code between gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2 and the function return in _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx up until the decryption. This also avoids an extra memcpy to session->key.key. Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno --- lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c index 93c2dc9998..8f3fe5a4bd 100644 --- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c +++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c @@ -269,7 +269,6 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, int ret, dsize; ssize_t data_size = _data_size; gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred; - gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 }; volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min; cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t) @@ -329,24 +328,48 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session); ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session); - premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE); - if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) { + /* Find the key of this username. A random value will be + * filled in if the key is not found. + */ + ret = + _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk); + if (ret < 0) + return gnutls_assert_val(ret); + + /* Allocate memory for premaster secret, and fill in the + * fields except the decryption result. + */ + session->key.key.size = 2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2 + pwd_psk.size; + session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(session->key.key.size); + if (session->key.key.data == NULL) { gnutls_assert(); + _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk); + /* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */ + _gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key); return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR; } - premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE; /* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */ - ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data, - premaster_secret.size); + ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, session->key.key.data + 2, + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE); if (ret < 0) { gnutls_assert(); - goto cleanup; + _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk); + /* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */ + _gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key); + return ret; } + _gnutls_write_uint16(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE, session->key.key.data); + _gnutls_write_uint16(pwd_psk.size, + &session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE]); + memcpy(&session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2], + pwd_psk.data, pwd_psk.size); + _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk); + gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0, - &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data, - premaster_secret.size); + &ciphertext, session->key.key.data + 2, + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE); /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */ @@ -365,31 +388,10 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, /* This is here to avoid the version check attack * discussed above. */ - premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj; - premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min; - - /* find the key of this username - */ - ret = - _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk); - if (ret < 0) { - gnutls_assert(); - goto cleanup; - } - - ret = - set_rsa_psk_session_key(session, &pwd_psk, &premaster_secret); - if (ret < 0) { - gnutls_assert(); - goto cleanup; - } + session->key.key.data[2] = ver_maj; + session->key.key.data[3] = ver_min; - ret = 0; - cleanup: - _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk); - _gnutls_free_temp_key_datum(&premaster_secret); - - return ret; + return 0; } static int -- 2.43.0