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20 changed files with 10981 additions and 1179 deletions

5
.gitignore vendored
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SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.8.tar.xz
SOURCES/gpgkey-1F42418905D8206AA754CCDC29EE58B996865171.gpg
SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz
SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz.sig
SOURCES/gpgkey-462225C3B46F34879FC8496CD605848ED7E69871.gpg

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e1243188791af409bca118d31faf3ec3d5f0a5ab SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.8.tar.xz
e6f8a1400839ce7b4021cdd0f8d08d71b0693486 SOURCES/gpgkey-1F42418905D8206AA754CCDC29EE58B996865171.gpg
6ba8fb898dcf4b4046b60662ba97df835593e687 SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz
b41ac56ff6cca4539c8b084db2c84e8bc21d60ac SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz.sig
648ec46f9539fe756fb90131b85ae4759ed2ed21 SOURCES/gpgkey-462225C3B46F34879FC8496CD605848ED7E69871.gpg

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From f09b7627a63defb1c55e9965fb05e0bbddb90247 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 11:54:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] fips: use larger prime for DH self-tests
According to FIPS140-2 IG 7.5, the minimum key size of FFC through
2030 is defined as 2048 bits. This updates the relevant self-test
using ffdhe3072 defined in RFC 7919.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
lib/dh-primes.c | 4 --
2 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
index 70b0f618f..9b7c692a8 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
@@ -620,32 +620,150 @@ static int test_dh(void)
gnutls_pk_params_st priv;
gnutls_pk_params_st pub;
gnutls_datum_t out = {NULL, 0};
+
+ /* FFDHE 3072 test vector provided by Stephan Mueller in:
+ * https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/merge_requests/1342#note_424430996
+ */
static const uint8_t known_dh_k[] = {
- 0x10, 0x25, 0x04, 0xb5, 0xc6, 0xc2, 0xcb,
- 0x0c, 0xe9, 0xc5, 0x58, 0x0d, 0x22, 0x62};
- static const uint8_t test_p[] = {
- 0x24, 0x85, 0xdd, 0x3a, 0x74, 0x42, 0xe4,
- 0xb3, 0xf1, 0x0b, 0x13, 0xf9, 0x17, 0x4d };
- static const uint8_t test_g[] = { 0x02 };
+ 0xec, 0xb3, 0x85, 0x0c, 0x72, 0x55, 0x55, 0xc2, 0x98, 0x36,
+ 0xbe, 0x75, 0x9e, 0xc9, 0x9d, 0x8b, 0x16, 0xa6, 0xe6, 0x84,
+ 0x33, 0x12, 0x80, 0x1d, 0xac, 0xde, 0x6a, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0x1e,
+ 0x15, 0xca, 0x5d, 0x26, 0xb3, 0x0a, 0x35, 0xf4, 0xbb, 0xad,
+ 0x71, 0xcb, 0x03, 0x1a, 0xcb, 0xfb, 0x83, 0xf0, 0xa8, 0xde,
+ 0xed, 0x5e, 0x3d, 0x98, 0xd2, 0xb0, 0xef, 0xad, 0xdf, 0x32,
+ 0xa0, 0x16, 0x7d, 0x0e, 0x29, 0xd8, 0x85, 0xca, 0x12, 0x97,
+ 0x56, 0xab, 0x6a, 0x26, 0xa4, 0x46, 0x3d, 0x87, 0xd7, 0xe0,
+ 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x28, 0x75, 0xac, 0x59, 0xc5, 0x71, 0x3a, 0x24,
+ 0x15, 0x76, 0x98, 0x72, 0x94, 0x2d, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xbc, 0x9a,
+ 0x77, 0xd4, 0xe2, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x54, 0x4a, 0x56, 0xbe, 0x0b,
+ 0x43, 0xf8, 0x21, 0x6f, 0x54, 0x32, 0xde, 0xb7, 0xd5, 0xb7,
+ 0x08, 0x00, 0xd2, 0x57, 0x8c, 0x0b, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x3e, 0xdb,
+ 0x72, 0x54, 0x3a, 0xc0, 0x50, 0x66, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0x67, 0xf5,
+ 0x22, 0x28, 0xf2, 0x3c, 0x51, 0x94, 0x61, 0x26, 0x9a, 0xc6,
+ 0x42, 0x0e, 0x8b, 0x42, 0xad, 0x79, 0x40, 0xa9, 0x0b, 0xdc,
+ 0x84, 0xd5, 0x71, 0x83, 0x94, 0xd9, 0x83, 0x2f, 0x08, 0x74,
+ 0xbc, 0x37, 0x6a, 0x3e, 0x1e, 0xbc, 0xcc, 0x09, 0x23, 0x30,
+ 0x79, 0x01, 0x39, 0xf6, 0xe3, 0xa8, 0xc0, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0xdb,
+ 0x0b, 0x71, 0x3e, 0x4f, 0x1f, 0x69, 0x84, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x6c,
+ 0x36, 0x2c, 0xcc, 0xb4, 0x7c, 0x94, 0xec, 0x06, 0x0b, 0x11,
+ 0x53, 0x95, 0xe6, 0x05, 0x43, 0xa4, 0xe4, 0xea, 0x1d, 0x4f,
+ 0xdc, 0xd0, 0x38, 0x0e, 0x32, 0xa1, 0xde, 0xd9, 0x8d, 0xd8,
+ 0x20, 0xac, 0x04, 0x83, 0xf8, 0x1b, 0x55, 0x52, 0x16, 0x20,
+ 0xe3, 0x2e, 0x6d, 0x11, 0x15, 0x29, 0x2f, 0x3a, 0x7c, 0x80,
+ 0x0a, 0x71, 0x3d, 0x31, 0x9c, 0x1b, 0x73, 0x59, 0xe1, 0x0d,
+ 0x27, 0xc5, 0xc0, 0x6a, 0x72, 0x3a, 0x5b, 0xd6, 0xf6, 0x50,
+ 0xe6, 0x69, 0x48, 0x1e, 0xfd, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x47, 0x73, 0xfb,
+ 0x88, 0x14, 0xea, 0x6d, 0x36, 0xe1, 0x4c, 0x2c, 0xf9, 0x04,
+ 0xc1, 0xb7, 0x29, 0xfc, 0x5d, 0x02, 0x5d, 0x1c, 0x4d, 0x31,
+ 0x4a, 0x51, 0x3f, 0xa4, 0x45, 0x19, 0x29, 0xc4, 0x32, 0xa6,
+ 0x45, 0xdb, 0x94, 0x3a, 0xbd, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xd6, 0x1a, 0xb1,
+ 0xff, 0xe7, 0x62, 0x75, 0x16, 0xe5, 0x0b, 0xa3, 0x3a, 0x93,
+ 0x84, 0xd6, 0xad, 0xc2, 0x24, 0x68, 0x3d, 0xd6, 0x07, 0xe4,
+ 0xbe, 0x5a, 0x49, 0x31, 0x06, 0xad, 0x3f, 0x31, 0x4a, 0x1c,
+ 0xf7, 0x58, 0xdf, 0x34, 0xcb, 0xc8, 0xa9, 0x07, 0x24, 0x42,
+ 0x63, 0xa5, 0x8e, 0xdd, 0x37, 0x78, 0x92, 0x68, 0x3f, 0xd8,
+ 0x2f, 0xea, 0x8c, 0xf1, 0x8e, 0xd4, 0x8b, 0xa7, 0x3f, 0xa0,
+ 0xfa, 0xaf, 0xf0, 0x35,
+ };
static const uint8_t test_x[] = {
- 0x06, 0x2c, 0x96, 0xae, 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x9b,
- 0xbb, 0x41, 0x51, 0x7a, 0xa7, 0xc5, 0xfe };
+ 0x16, 0x5c, 0xa6, 0xe0, 0x9b, 0x87, 0xfa, 0x2d, 0xbc, 0x13,
+ 0x20, 0xcd, 0xac, 0x4e, 0xcc, 0x60, 0x1e, 0x48, 0xec, 0xbe,
+ 0x73, 0x0c, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0x6e, 0x2a, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xd8, 0xf3,
+ 0x2d, 0x5f, 0x75, 0xf3, 0x07, 0x94, 0x88, 0x3d, 0xb1, 0x38,
+ 0xcf, 0xae, 0x4a, 0xcc, 0xcb, 0x6a, 0x80, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x3b,
+ 0xaa, 0x0b, 0x18, 0x74, 0x58, 0x7c, 0x3e, 0x74, 0xef, 0xb6,
+ 0xd3, 0x15, 0xee, 0x73, 0x29, 0x88, 0x7b, 0x65, 0x02, 0x39,
+ 0x33, 0xec, 0x22, 0x06, 0x8c, 0x5b, 0xd6, 0x2f, 0x4c, 0xf7,
+ 0xe0, 0x97, 0x6d, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x36, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x44, 0x4d,
+ 0x9d, 0x41, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0xec, 0x25, 0xf4, 0xc3, 0xa5, 0x91,
+ 0xd0, 0x90, 0xc9, 0x34, 0x7b, 0xba, 0x27, 0x30, 0x5a, 0xa2,
+ 0x21, 0x58, 0xce, 0x88, 0x25, 0x39, 0xaf, 0xf1, 0x17, 0x02,
+ 0x12, 0xf8, 0x55, 0xdc, 0xd2, 0x08, 0x5b, 0xd3, 0xc7, 0x8e,
+ 0xcf, 0x29, 0x85, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x5c, 0x08, 0xc2, 0xd7, 0xb0,
+ 0x33, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0xb9, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0xe5, 0x76,
+ 0x8f, 0xd3, 0x14, 0xb6, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0x9a, 0xe8, 0x15, 0x60,
+ 0x60, 0x5e, 0xaa, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xa6, 0xb2, 0x4f, 0xff, 0x46,
+ 0xc1, 0x5e, 0x93, 0x50, 0x90, 0x7e, 0x4c, 0x26, 0xd7, 0xbb,
+ 0x21, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x27, 0xc5, 0x9b, 0x0d, 0x46, 0x69, 0xe4,
+ 0x74, 0x87, 0x74, 0x55, 0xee, 0x5f, 0xe5, 0x72, 0x04, 0x46,
+ 0x1f, 0x2e, 0x55, 0xc7, 0xcc, 0x2b, 0x2b, 0x39, 0x6d, 0x90,
+ 0x60, 0x31, 0x37, 0x5b, 0x44, 0xde, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0xd1, 0xc6,
+ 0x9c, 0x12, 0x82, 0xcc, 0x7c, 0xb1, 0x0e, 0xa9, 0x95, 0x9d,
+ 0xe0, 0xa8, 0x3e, 0xc1, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0x6a, 0x37, 0x59, 0x17,
+ 0x93, 0x63, 0x1e, 0xbf, 0x04, 0xa3, 0xaa, 0xc0, 0x1d, 0xc4,
+ 0x6d, 0x7a, 0xdc, 0x69, 0x9c, 0xb0, 0x22, 0x56, 0xd9, 0x76,
+ 0x92, 0x2d, 0x1e, 0x62, 0xae, 0xfd, 0xd6, 0x9b, 0xfd, 0x08,
+ 0x2c, 0x95, 0xec, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x43, 0x62, 0x68, 0x1a, 0xaf,
+ 0x46, 0x59, 0xb7, 0xce, 0x8e, 0x42, 0x24, 0xae, 0xf7, 0x0e,
+ 0x9a, 0x3b, 0xf8, 0x77, 0xdf, 0x26, 0x85, 0x9f, 0x45, 0xad,
+ 0x8c, 0xa9, 0x54, 0x9c, 0x46, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x8a, 0xe9, 0xcc,
+ 0x34, 0x5e, 0xc5, 0xd1, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x44, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0x90,
+ 0x3a, 0x32, 0x1a, 0x9c, 0x2a, 0x63, 0xec, 0x21, 0xb4, 0xfc,
+ 0xfa, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x43, 0xc7, 0x49, 0x56, 0xbc,
+ 0x50, 0xc5, 0x84, 0xf0, 0x42, 0xc8, 0x6a, 0xf1, 0x78, 0xe4,
+ 0xaa, 0x06, 0x37, 0xe1, 0x30, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x97, 0xca, 0xfd,
+ 0x35, 0xfa, 0xeb, 0x48, 0x6d, 0xaa, 0x45, 0x46, 0x9d, 0xbc,
+ 0x1d, 0x98, 0x17, 0x45, 0xa3, 0xee, 0x21, 0xa0, 0x97, 0x38,
+ 0x80, 0xc5, 0x28, 0x1f,
+ };
static const uint8_t test_y[] = { /* y=g^x mod p */
- 0x1e, 0xca, 0x23, 0x2a, 0xfd, 0x34, 0xe1,
- 0x10, 0x7a, 0xff, 0xaf, 0x2d, 0xaa, 0x53 };
+ 0x93, 0xeb, 0x5c, 0x37, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x6f, 0xbf, 0xbe,
+ 0x96, 0x51, 0x26, 0x58, 0x81, 0x36, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0x9a, 0x34,
+ 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xa8, 0xa3, 0x2c, 0x41, 0x76, 0xa8, 0xc6, 0xc0,
+ 0xa0, 0xc8, 0x51, 0x36, 0xc4, 0x40, 0x4e, 0x2c, 0x69, 0xf7,
+ 0x51, 0xbb, 0xb0, 0xd6, 0xf5, 0xdb, 0x40, 0x29, 0x50, 0x3b,
+ 0x8a, 0xf9, 0xf3, 0x53, 0x78, 0xfc, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xe9,
+ 0xac, 0x85, 0x13, 0x65, 0x62, 0x22, 0x04, 0x1b, 0x14, 0x2a,
+ 0xf4, 0x8f, 0x2f, 0xf1, 0x2f, 0x81, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x0e, 0x76,
+ 0x91, 0x43, 0xb2, 0xfc, 0x7c, 0x6f, 0x0c, 0x45, 0x37, 0x31,
+ 0x31, 0x58, 0x5c, 0xdf, 0x42, 0x24, 0x7a, 0xba, 0x8b, 0x7f,
+ 0x79, 0x06, 0x07, 0xef, 0xd6, 0x06, 0xeb, 0xcb, 0x3c, 0xbd,
+ 0xbc, 0xe5, 0xff, 0xfd, 0x62, 0x15, 0x0c, 0x40, 0x46, 0x37,
+ 0xef, 0xd0, 0xa1, 0xde, 0x63, 0x4f, 0x20, 0x0b, 0x45, 0x7d,
+ 0x06, 0x77, 0xfd, 0x23, 0xc1, 0x32, 0x8a, 0x89, 0x65, 0x16,
+ 0xe8, 0x48, 0x12, 0x1c, 0x25, 0x33, 0x2d, 0xbd, 0xd8, 0x9f,
+ 0x1c, 0x9d, 0xbc, 0xe3, 0x08, 0x60, 0x87, 0x1a, 0xc6, 0x06,
+ 0x36, 0xd2, 0xac, 0x09, 0x6d, 0x99, 0x02, 0x89, 0xc6, 0x12,
+ 0x93, 0x8c, 0x4b, 0xd0, 0x7e, 0x36, 0x8a, 0xd6, 0xa0, 0x97,
+ 0x4f, 0x97, 0x3f, 0x97, 0x0b, 0xfe, 0x05, 0xfc, 0xc8, 0xef,
+ 0x21, 0x4d, 0x4a, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xb4, 0xa6, 0x4f, 0xe1, 0xdd,
+ 0x44, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x54, 0xf5, 0x54, 0x3e, 0x8c,
+ 0xb9, 0x85, 0x86, 0x00, 0x40, 0x98, 0xe7, 0x01, 0xdd, 0x93,
+ 0x9d, 0x95, 0xea, 0xf0, 0xd3, 0x99, 0x4b, 0xeb, 0xd5, 0x79,
+ 0x47, 0xa4, 0xad, 0x2a, 0xe0, 0x4d, 0x36, 0x3b, 0x46, 0x10,
+ 0x96, 0xbb, 0x48, 0xe9, 0xa1, 0x78, 0x01, 0x35, 0x0a, 0x5c,
+ 0x7b, 0x3f, 0xf5, 0xf7, 0xb1, 0xe3, 0x97, 0x17, 0x4d, 0x76,
+ 0x10, 0x8d, 0x68, 0x4c, 0x94, 0x7d, 0xee, 0x0e, 0x20, 0x8b,
+ 0xce, 0x7d, 0x0a, 0xa3, 0x51, 0xfb, 0xe6, 0xcf, 0xf0, 0x0e,
+ 0x7f, 0x3c, 0xd4, 0xef, 0x56, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x95, 0xf0, 0x5f,
+ 0x4b, 0x9c, 0x03, 0x9e, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xc1, 0x46, 0xd7, 0xc0,
+ 0x4f, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x6c, 0xe1, 0xe9, 0x2a, 0x97, 0xe0, 0x3f,
+ 0x3a, 0x93, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x41, 0x7d, 0x45, 0x03, 0xb3, 0x40,
+ 0x20, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x2d, 0xd3, 0xf7, 0x32, 0x7b, 0xcc, 0x4f,
+ 0x81, 0x18, 0x4c, 0x50, 0x77, 0xc4, 0xb7, 0x6a, 0x4d, 0x05,
+ 0xd8, 0x6d, 0xbf, 0x6f, 0xba, 0x1d, 0x38, 0x78, 0x87, 0xd2,
+ 0x8e, 0xc2, 0x6d, 0xb6, 0xed, 0x66, 0x61, 0xa8, 0xb9, 0x19,
+ 0x0e, 0x93, 0xd1, 0xcd, 0x5b, 0xbe, 0x19, 0x05, 0x52, 0x43,
+ 0xd6, 0xc1, 0x07, 0x3c, 0x6a, 0x62, 0xbd, 0x33, 0x9b, 0x1b,
+ 0x02, 0x42, 0x61, 0x14,
+ };
gnutls_pk_params_init(&priv);
gnutls_pk_params_init(&pub);
priv.algo = pub.algo = GNUTLS_PK_DH;
- ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_P], test_p, sizeof(test_p));
+ ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_P],
+ gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_prime.data,
+ gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_prime.size);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
goto cleanup;
}
- ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_G], test_g, sizeof(test_g));
+ ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_G],
+ gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_generator.data,
+ gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_generator.size);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
goto cleanup;
diff --git a/lib/dh-primes.c b/lib/dh-primes.c
index a440b5b98..94b69e345 100644
--- a/lib/dh-primes.c
+++ b/lib/dh-primes.c
@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@
#include "gnutls_int.h"
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
-#if defined(ENABLE_DHE) || defined(ENABLE_ANON)
-
#include "dh.h"
static const unsigned char ffdhe_generator = 0x02;
@@ -1934,5 +1932,3 @@ _gnutls_dh_prime_match_fips_approved(const uint8_t *prime,
return 0;
}
-
-#endif
--
2.26.2

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@ -0,0 +1,713 @@
From 93c0e3ba4d2cfee86b32f28f33303a2193c4133c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 16:12:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] fips: add self-tests for HKDF
FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-test on approved KDF algorithms. As
the guidance only requires running a single instance of each KDF
mechanism, this only exercises HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand operations
with HMAC-SHA-256 as the underlying MAC.
Although HKDF is non-approved, it would be sensible to do that as it
will be approved in FIPS140-3.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
devel/libgnutls-latest-x86_64.abi | 1 +
lib/crypto-selftests.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/fips.c | 7 ++
lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h | 1 +
lib/libgnutls.map | 1 +
5 files changed, 169 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests.c b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
index 7a1c7729c..bd148b6af 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
@@ -2917,3 +2917,162 @@ int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest)
return 0;
}
+
+struct hkdf_vectors_st {
+ const uint8_t *ikm;
+ unsigned int ikm_size;
+ const uint8_t *salt;
+ unsigned int salt_size;
+ const uint8_t *prk;
+ unsigned int prk_size;
+ const uint8_t *info;
+ unsigned int info_size;
+ const uint8_t *okm;
+ unsigned int okm_size;
+};
+
+const struct hkdf_vectors_st hkdf_sha256_vectors[] = {
+ /* RFC 5869: A.1. Test Case 1: Basic test case with SHA-256 */
+ {
+ STR(ikm, ikm_size,
+ "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"
+ "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"),
+ STR(salt, salt_size,
+ "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c"),
+ STR(prk, prk_size,
+ "\x07\x77\x09\x36\x2c\x2e\x32\xdf\x0d\xdc\x3f\x0d\xc4\x7b"
+ "\xba\x63\x90\xb6\xc7\x3b\xb5\x0f\x9c\x31\x22\xec\x84\x4a"
+ "\xd7\xc2\xb3\xe5"),
+ STR(info, info_size,
+ "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9"),
+ STR(okm, okm_size,
+ "\x3c\xb2\x5f\x25\xfa\xac\xd5\x7a\x90\x43\x4f\x64\xd0\x36"
+ "\x2f\x2a\x2d\x2d\x0a\x90\xcf\x1a\x5a\x4c\x5d\xb0\x2d\x56"
+ "\xec\xc4\xc5\xbf\x34\x00\x72\x08\xd5\xb8\x87\x18\x58\x65"),
+ },
+ /* RFC 5869: A.2. Test Case 2: Test with SHA-256 and longer inputs/outputs */
+ {
+ STR(ikm, ikm_size,
+ "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d"
+ "\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b"
+ "\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27\x28\x29"
+ "\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+ "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45"
+ "\x46\x47\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f"),
+ STR(salt, salt_size,
+ "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d"
+ "\x6e\x6f\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78\x79\x7a\x7b"
+ "\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88\x89"
+ "\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97"
+ "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5"
+ "\xa6\xa7\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf"),
+ STR(prk, prk_size,
+ "\x06\xa6\xb8\x8c\x58\x53\x36\x1a\x06\x10\x4c\x9c\xeb\x35"
+ "\xb4\x5c\xef\x76\x00\x14\x90\x46\x71\x01\x4a\x19\x3f\x40"
+ "\xc1\x5f\xc2\x44"),
+ STR(info, info_size,
+ "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd"
+ "\xbe\xbf\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb"
+ "\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7\xd8\xd9"
+ "\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7"
+ "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5"
+ "\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff"),
+ STR(okm, okm_size,
+ "\xb1\x1e\x39\x8d\xc8\x03\x27\xa1\xc8\xe7\xf7\x8c\x59\x6a"
+ "\x49\x34\x4f\x01\x2e\xda\x2d\x4e\xfa\xd8\xa0\x50\xcc\x4c"
+ "\x19\xaf\xa9\x7c\x59\x04\x5a\x99\xca\xc7\x82\x72\x71\xcb"
+ "\x41\xc6\x5e\x59\x0e\x09\xda\x32\x75\x60\x0c\x2f\x09\xb8"
+ "\x36\x77\x93\xa9\xac\xa3\xdb\x71\xcc\x30\xc5\x81\x79\xec"
+ "\x3e\x87\xc1\x4c\x01\xd5\xc1\xf3\x43\x4f\x1d\x87"),
+ },
+};
+
+static int test_hkdf(gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
+ const struct hkdf_vectors_st *vectors,
+ size_t vectors_size, unsigned flags)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < vectors_size; i++) {
+ gnutls_datum_t ikm, prk, salt, info;
+ uint8_t output[4096];
+ int ret;
+
+ ikm.data = (void *) vectors[i].ikm;
+ ikm.size = vectors[i].ikm_size;
+ salt.data = (void *) vectors[i].salt;
+ salt.size = vectors[i].salt_size;
+
+ ret = gnutls_hkdf_extract(mac, &ikm, &salt, output);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log("error extracting HKDF: MAC-%s\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].prk, vectors[i].prk_size) != 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("HKDF extract: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ prk.data = (void *) vectors[i].prk;
+ prk.size = vectors[i].prk_size;
+ info.data = (void *) vectors[i].info;
+ info.size = vectors[i].info_size;
+
+ ret = gnutls_hkdf_expand(mac, &prk, &info,
+ output, vectors[i].okm_size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log("error extracting HKDF: MAC-%s\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].okm, vectors[i].okm_size) != 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("HKDF expand: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
+
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("HKDF: MAC-%s self check succeeded\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * gnutls_hkdf_self_test:
+ * @flags: GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG flags
+ * @mac: the message authentication algorithm to use
+ *
+ * This function will run self tests on HKDF with the provided mac.
+ *
+ * Returns: Zero or a negative error code on error.
+ *
+ * Since: 3.3.0-FIPS140
+ -*/
+int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL)
+ mac = GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN;
+
+ switch (mac) {
+ case GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN:
+ CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256, test_hkdf, hkdf_sha256_vectors);
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_NO_SELF_TEST);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
index f8b10f750..48891ed57 100644
--- a/lib/fips.c
+++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -423,6 +423,13 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
goto error;
}
+ /* HKDF */
+ ret = gnutls_hkdf_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (_gnutls_rnd_ops.self_test == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
goto error;
diff --git a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
index aacbe94ca..9b7be8159 100644
--- a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
+++ b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
@@ -34,5 +34,6 @@ int gnutls_cipher_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher);
int gnutls_mac_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest);
int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk);
+int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
#endif
diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
index 61276e534..386b66f83 100644
--- a/lib/libgnutls.map
+++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1347,6 +1347,7 @@ GNUTLS_FIPS140_3_4 {
gnutls_pk_self_test;
gnutls_mac_self_test;
gnutls_digest_self_test;
+ gnutls_hkdf_self_test;
#for FIPS140-2 validation
drbg_aes_reseed;
drbg_aes_init;
--
2.26.2
From 31cc94275cd267f4e0db60999cc932fd76d43d5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 16:59:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] fips: add self-tests for PBKDF2
FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-tests on approved KDF algorithms. As
the guidance only requires running a single instance of each KDF
mechanism, this only exercises PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 as the
underlying MAC algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
devel/libgnutls-latest-x86_64.abi | 1 +
lib/crypto-selftests.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/fips.c | 7 ++
lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h | 1 +
lib/libgnutls.map | 1 +
5 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests.c b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
index bd148b6af..c4b0bd207 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
@@ -3076,3 +3076,110 @@ int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
return 0;
}
+
+struct pbkdf2_vectors_st {
+ const uint8_t *key;
+ size_t key_size;
+ const uint8_t *salt;
+ size_t salt_size;
+ unsigned iter_count;
+ const uint8_t *output;
+ size_t output_size;
+};
+
+const struct pbkdf2_vectors_st pbkdf2_sha256_vectors[] = {
+ /* RFC 7914: 11. Test Vectors for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size, "passwd"),
+ STR(salt, salt_size, "salt"),
+ .iter_count = 1,
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x55\xac\x04\x6e\x56\xe3\x08\x9f\xec\x16\x91\xc2\x25\x44"
+ "\xb6\x05\xf9\x41\x85\x21\x6d\xde\x04\x65\xe6\x8b\x9d\x57"
+ "\xc2\x0d\xac\xbc\x49\xca\x9c\xcc\xf1\x79\xb6\x45\x99\x16"
+ "\x64\xb3\x9d\x77\xef\x31\x7c\x71\xb8\x45\xb1\xe3\x0b\xd5"
+ "\x09\x11\x20\x41\xd3\xa1\x97\x83"),
+ },
+ /* RFC 7914: 11. Test Vectors for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size, "Password"),
+ STR(salt, salt_size, "NaCl"),
+ .iter_count = 80000,
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x4d\xdc\xd8\xf6\x0b\x98\xbe\x21\x83\x0c\xee\x5e\xf2\x27"
+ "\x01\xf9\x64\x1a\x44\x18\xd0\x4c\x04\x14\xae\xff\x08\x87"
+ "\x6b\x34\xab\x56\xa1\xd4\x25\xa1\x22\x58\x33\x54\x9a\xdb"
+ "\x84\x1b\x51\xc9\xb3\x17\x6a\x27\x2b\xde\xbb\xa1\xd0\x78"
+ "\x47\x8f\x62\xb3\x97\xf3\x3c\x8d"),
+ },
+};
+
+static int test_pbkdf2(gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
+ const struct pbkdf2_vectors_st *vectors,
+ size_t vectors_size, unsigned flags)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < vectors_size; i++) {
+ gnutls_datum_t key, salt;
+ uint8_t output[4096];
+ int ret;
+
+ key.data = (void *) vectors[i].key;
+ key.size = vectors[i].key_size;
+ salt.data = (void *) vectors[i].salt;
+ salt.size = vectors[i].salt_size;
+
+ ret = gnutls_pbkdf2(mac, &key, &salt, vectors[i].iter_count,
+ output, vectors[i].output_size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log("error calculating PBKDF2: MAC-%s\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].output, vectors[i].output_size) != 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("PBKDF2: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
+
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("PBKDF2: MAC-%s self check succeeded\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test:
+ * @flags: GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG flags
+ * @mac: the message authentication algorithm to use
+ *
+ * This function will run self tests on PBKDF2 with the provided mac.
+ *
+ * Returns: Zero or a negative error code on error.
+ *
+ * Since: 3.3.0-FIPS140
+ -*/
+int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL)
+ mac = GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN;
+
+ switch (mac) {
+ case GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN:
+ CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256, test_pbkdf2, pbkdf2_sha256_vectors);
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_NO_SELF_TEST);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
index 48891ed57..7cfab1049 100644
--- a/lib/fips.c
+++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -430,6 +430,13 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
goto error;
}
+ /* PBKDF2 */
+ ret = gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (_gnutls_rnd_ops.self_test == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
goto error;
diff --git a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
index 9b7be8159..958c0da8f 100644
--- a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
+++ b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
@@ -35,5 +35,6 @@ int gnutls_mac_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest);
int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk);
int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
+int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
#endif
diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
index 386b66f83..f5537a386 100644
--- a/lib/libgnutls.map
+++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1348,6 +1348,7 @@ GNUTLS_FIPS140_3_4 {
gnutls_mac_self_test;
gnutls_digest_self_test;
gnutls_hkdf_self_test;
+ gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test;
#for FIPS140-2 validation
drbg_aes_reseed;
drbg_aes_init;
--
2.26.2
From d1a3235e8c829855969d00364d8b5456fce2c78c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 17:44:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] fips: add self-tests for TLS-PRF
FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-tests on approved KDF algorithms. As
the guidance only requires to run a single instance of each KDF
mechanism, this only exercises TLS1.2 PRF with HMAC-SHA-256 as the
underlying MAC algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
devel/libgnutls-latest-x86_64.abi | 1 +
lib/crypto-selftests.c | 196 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/fips.c | 7 ++
lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h | 1 +
lib/libgnutls.map | 1 +
5 files changed, 206 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests.c b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
index c4b0bd207..b740936d6 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
@@ -3183,3 +3183,199 @@ int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
return 0;
}
+
+struct tlsprf_vectors_st {
+ const uint8_t *key;
+ size_t key_size;
+ const uint8_t *label;
+ size_t label_size;
+ const uint8_t *seed;
+ size_t seed_size;
+ const uint8_t *output;
+ size_t output_size;
+};
+
+const struct tlsprf_vectors_st tls10prf_vectors[] = {
+ /* tests/tls10-prf.c: test1 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\x26\x3b\xdb\xbb\x6f\x6d\x4c\x66\x4e\x05\x8d\x0a\xa9\xd3"
+ "\x21\xbe"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\xb9\x20\x57\x3b\x19\x96\x01\x02\x4f\x04\xd6\xdc\x61\x96"
+ "\x6e\x65"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x66\x17\x99\x37\x65\xfa\x6c\xa7\x03\xd1\x9e\xc7\x0d\xd5"
+ "\xdd\x16\x0f\xfc\xc0\x77\x25\xfa\xfb\x71\x4a\x9f\x81\x5a"
+ "\x2a\x30\xbf\xb7\xe3\xbb\xfb\x7e\xee\x57\x4b\x3b\x61\x3e"
+ "\xb7\xfe\x80\xee\xc9\x69\x1d\x8c\x1b\x0e\x2d\x9b\x3c\x8b"
+ "\x4b\x02\xb6\xb6\xd6\xdb\x88\xe2\x09\x46\x23\xef\x62\x40"
+ "\x60\x7e\xda\x7a\xbe\x3c\x84\x6e\x82\xa3"),
+ },
+};
+
+const struct tlsprf_vectors_st tls12prf_sha256_vectors[] = {
+ /* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test1 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\x04\x50\xb0\xea\x9e\xcd\x36\x02\xee\x0d\x76\xc5\xc3\xc8"
+ "\x6f\x4a"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\x20\x7a\xcc\x02\x54\xb8\x67\xf5\xb9\x25\xb4\x5a\x33\x60"
+ "\x1d\x8b"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\xae\x67\x9e\x0e\x71\x4f\x59\x75\x76\x37\x68\xb1\x66\x97"
+ "\x9e\x1d"),
+ },
+ /* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test2 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\x34\x20\x4a\x9d\xf0\xbe\x6e\xb4\xe9\x25\xa8\x02\x7c\xf6"
+ "\xc6\x02"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\x98\xb2\xc4\x0b\xcd\x66\x4c\x83\xbb\x92\x0c\x18\x20\x1a"
+ "\x63\x95"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\xaf\xa9\x31\x24\x53\xc2\x2f\xa8\x3d\x2b\x51\x1b\x37\x2d"
+ "\x73\xa4\x02\xa2\xa6\x28\x73\x23\x9a\x51\xfa\xde\x45\x08"
+ "\x2f\xaf\x3f\xd2\xbb\x7f\xfb\x3e\x9b\xf3\x6e\x28\xb3\x14"
+ "\x1a\xab\xa4\x84\x00\x53\x32\xa9\xf9\xe3\x88\xa4\xd3\x29"
+ "\xf1\x58\x7a\x4b\x31\x7d\xa0\x77\x08\xea\x1b\xa9\x5a\x53"
+ "\xf8\x78\x67\x24\xbd\x83\xce\x4b\x03\xaf"),
+ },
+ /* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test3 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\xa3\x69\x1a\xa1\xf6\x81\x4b\x80\x59\x2b\xf1\xcf\x2a\xcf"
+ "\x16\x97"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\x55\x23\xd4\x1e\x32\x0e\x69\x4d\x0c\x1f\xf5\x73\x4d\x83"
+ "\x0b\x93\x3e\x46\x92\x70\x71\xc9\x26\x21"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x6a\xd0\x98\x4f\xa0\x6f\x78\xfe\x16\x1b\xd4\x6d\x7c\x26"
+ "\x1d\xe4\x33\x40\xd7\x28\xdd\xdc\x3d\x0f\xf0\xdd\x7e\x0d"),
+ },
+ /* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test4 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\x21\x0e\xc9\x37\x06\x97\x07\xe5\x46\x5b\xc4\x6b\xf7\x79"
+ "\xe1\x04\x10\x8b\x18\xfd\xb7\x93\xbe\x7b\x21\x8d\xbf\x14"
+ "\x5c\x86\x41\xf3"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\x1e\x35\x1a\x0b\xaf\x35\xc7\x99\x45\x92\x43\x94\xb8\x81"
+ "\xcf\xe3\x1d\xae\x8f\x1c\x1e\xd5\x4d\x3b"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x76\x53\xfa\x80\x9c\xde\x3b\x55\x3c\x4a\x17\xe2\xcd\xbc"
+ "\xc9\x18\xf3\x65\x27\xf2\x22\x19\xa7\xd7\xf9\x5d\x97\x24"
+ "\x3f\xf2\xd5\xde\xe8\x26\x5e\xf0\xaf\x03"),
+ },
+};
+
+const struct tlsprf_vectors_st tls12prf_sha384_vectors[] = {
+ /* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha384_test1
+ * https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg03416.html
+ */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\xb8\x0b\x73\x3d\x6c\xee\xfc\xdc\x71\x56\x6e\xa4\x8e\x55"
+ "\x67\xdf"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\xcd\x66\x5c\xf6\xa8\x44\x7d\xd6\xff\x8b\x27\x55\x5e\xdb"
+ "\x74\x65"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x7b\x0c\x18\xe9\xce\xd4\x10\xed\x18\x04\xf2\xcf\xa3\x4a"
+ "\x33\x6a\x1c\x14\xdf\xfb\x49\x00\xbb\x5f\xd7\x94\x21\x07"
+ "\xe8\x1c\x83\xcd\xe9\xca\x0f\xaa\x60\xbe\x9f\xe3\x4f\x82"
+ "\xb1\x23\x3c\x91\x46\xa0\xe5\x34\xcb\x40\x0f\xed\x27\x00"
+ "\x88\x4f\x9d\xc2\x36\xf8\x0e\xdd\x8b\xfa\x96\x11\x44\xc9"
+ "\xe8\xd7\x92\xec\xa7\x22\xa7\xb3\x2f\xc3\xd4\x16\xd4\x73"
+ "\xeb\xc2\xc5\xfd\x4a\xbf\xda\xd0\x5d\x91\x84\x25\x9b\x5b"
+ "\xf8\xcd\x4d\x90\xfa\x0d\x31\xe2\xde\xc4\x79\xe4\xf1\xa2"
+ "\x60\x66\xf2\xee\xa9\xa6\x92\x36\xa3\xe5\x26\x55\xc9\xe9"
+ "\xae\xe6\x91\xc8\xf3\xa2\x68\x54\x30\x8d\x5e\xaa\x3b\xe8"
+ "\x5e\x09\x90\x70\x3d\x73\xe5\x6f"),
+ },
+};
+
+static int test_tlsprf(gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
+ const struct tlsprf_vectors_st *vectors,
+ size_t vectors_size, unsigned flags)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < vectors_size; i++) {
+ char output[4096];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = _gnutls_prf_raw(mac,
+ vectors[i].key_size, vectors[i].key,
+ vectors[i].label_size, (const char *)vectors[i].label,
+ vectors[i].seed_size, vectors[i].seed,
+ vectors[i].output_size, output);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log("error calculating TLS-PRF: MAC-%s\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].output, vectors[i].output_size) != 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("TLS-PRF: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
+
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("TLS-PRF: MAC-%s self check succeeded\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * gnutls_tlsprf_self_test:
+ * @flags: GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG flags
+ * @mac: the message authentication algorithm to use
+ *
+ * This function will run self tests on TLS-PRF with the provided mac.
+ *
+ * Returns: Zero or a negative error code on error.
+ *
+ * Since: 3.3.0-FIPS140
+ -*/
+int gnutls_tlsprf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL)
+ mac = GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN;
+
+ switch (mac) {
+ case GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN:
+ NON_FIPS_CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_MD5_SHA1, test_tlsprf, tls10prf_vectors);
+ FALLTHROUGH;
+ CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256, test_tlsprf, tls12prf_sha256_vectors);
+ FALLTHROUGH;
+ CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA384, test_tlsprf, tls12prf_sha384_vectors);
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_NO_SELF_TEST);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
index 7cfab1049..30d396b2c 100644
--- a/lib/fips.c
+++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -437,6 +437,13 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
goto error;
}
+ /* TLS-PRF */
+ ret = gnutls_tlsprf_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (_gnutls_rnd_ops.self_test == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
goto error;
diff --git a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
index 958c0da8f..88b5a8dbf 100644
--- a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
+++ b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
@@ -36,5 +36,6 @@ int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest);
int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk);
int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
+int gnutls_tlsprf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
#endif
diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
index f5537a386..643d400a1 100644
--- a/lib/libgnutls.map
+++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1349,6 +1349,7 @@ GNUTLS_FIPS140_3_4 {
gnutls_digest_self_test;
gnutls_hkdf_self_test;
gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test;
+ gnutls_tlsprf_self_test;
#for FIPS140-2 validation
drbg_aes_reseed;
drbg_aes_init;
--
2.26.2
From af3df0102fc377591a6de3112b034d4a492fc92c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 17:59:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] fips: run CMAC self-tests
FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-tests on CMAC.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/fips.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
index 30d396b2c..51567953d 100644
--- a/lib/fips.c
+++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -398,6 +398,12 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
goto error;
}
+ ret = gnutls_mac_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_AES_CMAC_256);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto error;
+ }
+
/* PK */
ret = gnutls_pk_self_test(0, GNUTLS_PK_RSA);
if (ret < 0) {
--
2.26.2

View File

@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
From 300c6315d2e644ae81b43fa2dd7bbf68b3afb5b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 19:02:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] accelerated: fix CPU feature detection for Intel CPUs
This fixes read_cpuid_vals to correctly read the CPUID quadruple, as
well as to set the bit the ustream CRYPTOGAMS uses to identify Intel
CPUs.
Suggested by Rafael Gieschke in:
https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/1282
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
index 3845c6b4c9..cf615ef24f 100644
--- a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
+++ b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
@@ -81,15 +81,38 @@ unsigned int _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[4];
# define bit_AVX 0x10000000
#endif
-#ifndef OSXSAVE_MASK
-/* OSXSAVE|FMA|MOVBE */
-# define OSXSAVE_MASK (0x8000000|0x1000|0x400000)
+#ifndef bit_AVX2
+# define bit_AVX2 0x00000020
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bit_AVX512F
+# define bit_AVX512F 0x00010000
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bit_AVX512IFMA
+# define bit_AVX512IFMA 0x00200000
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bit_AVX512BW
+# define bit_AVX512BW 0x40000000
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bit_AVX512VL
+# define bit_AVX512VL 0x80000000
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bit_OSXSAVE
+# define bit_OSXSAVE 0x8000000
#endif
#ifndef bit_MOVBE
# define bit_MOVBE 0x00400000
#endif
+#ifndef OSXSAVE_MASK
+# define OSXSAVE_MASK (bit_OSXSAVE|bit_MOVBE)
+#endif
+
#define via_bit_PADLOCK (0x3 << 6)
#define via_bit_PADLOCK_PHE (0x3 << 10)
#define via_bit_PADLOCK_PHE_SHA512 (0x3 << 25)
@@ -127,7 +150,7 @@ static unsigned read_cpuid_vals(unsigned int vals[4])
unsigned t1, t2, t3;
vals[0] = vals[1] = vals[2] = vals[3] = 0;
- if (!__get_cpuid(1, &t1, &vals[0], &vals[1], &t2))
+ if (!__get_cpuid(1, &t1, &t2, &vals[1], &vals[0]))
return 0;
/* suppress AVX512; it works conditionally on certain CPUs on the original code */
vals[1] &= 0xfffff7ff;
@@ -145,7 +168,7 @@ static unsigned check_4th_gen_intel_features(unsigned ecx)
{
uint32_t xcr0;
- if ((ecx & OSXSAVE_MASK) != OSXSAVE_MASK)
+ if ((ecx & bit_OSXSAVE) != bit_OSXSAVE)
return 0;
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__clang__)
@@ -233,10 +256,7 @@ static unsigned check_sha(void)
#ifdef ASM_X86_64
static unsigned check_avx_movbe(void)
{
- if (check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1]) == 0)
- return 0;
-
- return ((_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX));
+ return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX);
}
static unsigned check_pclmul(void)
@@ -514,33 +534,47 @@ void register_x86_padlock_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
}
#endif
-static unsigned check_intel_or_amd(void)
+enum x86_cpu_vendor {
+ X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER,
+ X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL,
+ X86_CPU_VENDOR_AMD,
+};
+
+static enum x86_cpu_vendor check_x86_cpu_vendor(void)
{
unsigned int a, b, c, d;
- if (!__get_cpuid(0, &a, &b, &c, &d))
- return 0;
+ if (!__get_cpuid(0, &a, &b, &c, &d)) {
+ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER;
+ }
- if ((memcmp(&b, "Genu", 4) == 0 &&
- memcmp(&d, "ineI", 4) == 0 &&
- memcmp(&c, "ntel", 4) == 0) ||
- (memcmp(&b, "Auth", 4) == 0 &&
- memcmp(&d, "enti", 4) == 0 && memcmp(&c, "cAMD", 4) == 0)) {
- return 1;
+ if (memcmp(&b, "Genu", 4) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(&d, "ineI", 4) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(&c, "ntel", 4) == 0) {
+ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL;
}
- return 0;
+ if (memcmp(&b, "Auth", 4) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(&d, "enti", 4) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(&c, "cAMD", 4) == 0) {
+ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_AMD;
+ }
+
+ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER;
}
static
void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
{
int ret;
+ enum x86_cpu_vendor vendor;
memset(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s, 0, sizeof(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s));
- if (check_intel_or_amd() == 0)
+ vendor = check_x86_cpu_vendor();
+ if (vendor == X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER) {
return;
+ }
if (capabilities == 0) {
if (!read_cpuid_vals(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s))
@@ -549,6 +583,23 @@ void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(capabilities);
}
+ /* CRYPTOGAMS uses the (1 << 30) bit as an indicator of Intel CPUs */
+ if (vendor == X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[0] |= 1 << 30;
+ } else {
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[0] &= ~(1 << 30);
+ }
+
+ if (!check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1])) {
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] &= ~bit_AVX;
+
+ /* Clear AVX2 bits as well, according to what OpenSSL does.
+ * Should we clear bit_AVX512DQ, bit_AVX512PF, bit_AVX512ER, and
+ * bit_AVX512CD? */
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[2] &= ~(bit_AVX2|bit_AVX512F|bit_AVX512IFMA|
+ bit_AVX512BW|bit_AVX512BW);
+ }
+
if (check_ssse3()) {
_gnutls_debug_log("Intel SSSE3 was detected\n");
--
2.37.3
From cd509dac9e6d1bf76fd12c72c1fd61f1708c254a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 09:39:18 +0900
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] accelerated: clear AVX bits if it cannot be queried
through XSAVE
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The algorithm to detect AVX is described in 14.3 of "Intel® 64 and IA-32
Architectures Software Developers Manual".
GnuTLS previously only followed that algorithm when registering the
crypto backend, while the CRYPTOGAMS derived SHA code assembly expects
that the extension bits are propagated to _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
index cf615ef24f..655d0c65f2 100644
--- a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
+++ b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ static void capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(unsigned capabilities)
}
if (capabilities & INTEL_AVX) {
- if ((a[1] & bit_AVX) && check_4th_gen_intel_features(a[1])) {
+ if ((a[1] & bit_AVX) && (a[1] & bit_MOVBE) &&
+ check_4th_gen_intel_features(a[1])) {
_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] |= bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE;
} else {
_gnutls_debug_log
@@ -256,7 +257,7 @@ static unsigned check_sha(void)
#ifdef ASM_X86_64
static unsigned check_avx_movbe(void)
{
- return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX);
+ return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & (bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE)) == (bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE);
}
static unsigned check_pclmul(void)
@@ -579,6 +580,19 @@ void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
if (capabilities == 0) {
if (!read_cpuid_vals(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s))
return;
+ if (!check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1])) {
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] &= ~bit_AVX;
+
+ /* Clear AVX2 bits as well, according to what
+ * OpenSSL does. Should we clear
+ * bit_AVX512DQ, bit_AVX512PF, bit_AVX512ER,
+ * and bit_AVX512CD? */
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[2] &= ~(bit_AVX2|
+ bit_AVX512F|
+ bit_AVX512IFMA|
+ bit_AVX512BW|
+ bit_AVX512BW);
+ }
} else {
capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(capabilities);
}
--
2.37.3

View File

@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
From 0d39e4120bc5ece53c86c5802c546259b8ca286a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 17:56:58 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] nettle: avoid normalization of mpz_t in deterministic ECDSA
This removes function calls that potentially leak bit-length of a
private key used to calculate a nonce in deterministic ECDSA. Namely:
- _gnutls_dsa_compute_k has been rewritten to work on always
zero-padded mp_limb_t arrays instead of mpz_t
- rnd_mpz_func has been replaced with rnd_datum_func, which is backed
by a byte array instead of an mpz_t value
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++------------
lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h | 31 +++++++++---
lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c | 71 +++++++++-----------------
lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h | 8 +--
lib/nettle/pk.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c
index 17d63318c4..ddeb6f6d1e 100644
--- a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c
+++ b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c
@@ -31,33 +31,37 @@
#include "mpn-base256.h"
#include <string.h>
-#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(bits) (((bits) + GMP_NUMB_BITS - 1) / GMP_NUMB_BITS)
-
-/* The maximum size of q, choosen from the fact that we support
- * 521-bit elliptic curve generator and 512-bit DSA subgroup at
- * maximum. */
-#define MAX_Q_BITS 521
-#define MAX_Q_SIZE ((MAX_Q_BITS + 7) / 8)
-#define MAX_Q_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_Q_BITS)
-
-#define MAX_HASH_BITS (MAX_HASH_SIZE * 8)
-#define MAX_HASH_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_HASH_BITS)
-
-int
-_gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
- const mpz_t q,
- const mpz_t x,
- gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
- const uint8_t *digest,
- size_t length)
+/* For mini-gmp */
+#ifndef GMP_LIMB_BITS
+#define GMP_LIMB_BITS GMP_NUMB_BITS
+#endif
+
+static inline int is_zero_limb(mp_limb_t x)
+{
+ x |= (x << 1);
+ return ((x >> 1) - 1) >> (GMP_LIMB_BITS - 1);
+}
+
+static int sec_zero_p(const mp_limb_t *ap, mp_size_t n)
+{
+ volatile mp_limb_t w;
+ mp_size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0, w = 0; i < n; i++)
+ w |= ap[i];
+
+ return is_zero_limb(w);
+}
+
+int _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mp_limb_t *h, const mp_limb_t *q, const mp_limb_t *x,
+ mp_size_t qn, mp_bitcnt_t q_bits,
+ gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac, const uint8_t *digest,
+ size_t length)
{
uint8_t V[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint8_t K[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint8_t xp[MAX_Q_SIZE];
uint8_t tp[MAX_Q_SIZE];
- mp_limb_t h[MAX(MAX_Q_LIMBS, MAX_HASH_LIMBS)];
- mp_bitcnt_t q_bits = mpz_sizeinbase (q, 2);
- mp_size_t qn = mpz_size(q);
mp_bitcnt_t h_bits = length * 8;
mp_size_t hn = BITS_TO_LIMBS(h_bits);
size_t nbytes = (q_bits + 7) / 8;
@@ -66,6 +70,7 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
mp_limb_t cy;
gnutls_hmac_hd_t hd;
int ret = 0;
+ mp_limb_t scratch[MAX_Q_LIMBS];
if (unlikely(q_bits > MAX_Q_BITS))
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
@@ -73,7 +78,7 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
/* int2octets(x) */
- mpn_get_base256(xp, nbytes, mpz_limbs_read(x), qn);
+ mpn_get_base256(xp, nbytes, x, qn);
/* bits2octets(h) */
mpn_set_base256(h, hn, digest, length);
@@ -97,12 +102,12 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
mpn_rshift(h, h, hn, shift % GMP_NUMB_BITS);
}
- cy = mpn_sub_n(h, h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn);
+ cy = mpn_sub_n(h, h, q, qn);
/* Fall back to addmul_1, if nettle is linked with mini-gmp. */
#ifdef mpn_cnd_add_n
- mpn_cnd_add_n(cy, h, h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn);
+ mpn_cnd_add_n(cy, h, h, q, qn);
#else
- mpn_addmul_1(h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn, cy != 0);
+ mpn_addmul_1(h, q, qn, cy != 0);
#endif
mpn_get_base256(tp, nbytes, h, qn);
@@ -178,12 +183,8 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
if (tlen * 8 > q_bits)
mpn_rshift (h, h, qn, tlen * 8 - q_bits);
/* Check if k is in [1,q-1] */
- if (!mpn_zero_p (h, qn) &&
- mpn_cmp (h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn) < 0) {
- mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(k, qn), h, qn);
- mpz_limbs_finish(k, qn);
+ if (!sec_zero_p(h, qn) && mpn_sub_n(scratch, h, q, qn))
break;
- }
ret = gnutls_hmac_init(&hd, mac, K, length);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -207,3 +208,24 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
return ret;
}
+
+/* cancel-out dsa_sign's addition of 1 to random data */
+void _gnutls_dsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
+ mp_size_t n)
+{
+ /* Fall back to sub_1, if nettle is linked with mini-gmp. */
+#ifdef mpn_sec_sub_1
+ mp_limb_t t[MAX_Q_LIMBS];
+
+ mpn_sec_sub_1(h, h, n, 1, t);
+#else
+ mpn_sub_1(h, h, n, 1);
+#endif
+ mpn_get_base256(k, nbytes, h, n);
+}
+
+void _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
+ mp_size_t n)
+{
+ mpn_get_base256(k, nbytes, h, n);
+}
diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h
index 64e90e0ca2..e88fce0a6d 100644
--- a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h
+++ b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h
@@ -26,12 +26,29 @@
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
#include <nettle/bignum.h> /* includes gmp.h */
-int
-_gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
- const mpz_t q,
- const mpz_t x,
- gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
- const uint8_t *digest,
- size_t length);
+#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(bits) (((bits) + GMP_NUMB_BITS - 1) / GMP_NUMB_BITS)
+
+/* The maximum size of q, chosen from the fact that we support
+ * 521-bit elliptic curve generator and 512-bit DSA subgroup at
+ * maximum. */
+#define MAX_Q_BITS 521
+#define MAX_Q_SIZE ((MAX_Q_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define MAX_Q_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_Q_BITS)
+
+#define MAX_HASH_BITS (MAX_HASH_SIZE * 8)
+#define MAX_HASH_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_HASH_BITS)
+
+#define DSA_COMPUTE_K_ITCH MAX(MAX_Q_LIMBS, MAX_HASH_LIMBS)
+
+int _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mp_limb_t *h, const mp_limb_t *q, const mp_limb_t *x,
+ mp_size_t qn, mp_bitcnt_t q_bits,
+ gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac, const uint8_t *digest,
+ size_t length);
+
+void _gnutls_dsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
+ mp_size_t n);
+
+void _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
+ mp_size_t n);
#endif /* GNUTLS_LIB_NETTLE_INT_DSA_COMPUTE_K_H */
diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c
index 94914ebdfa..819302c1c7 100644
--- a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c
+++ b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c
@@ -29,67 +29,46 @@
#include "dsa-compute-k.h"
#include "gnutls_int.h"
-static inline int
-_gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(mpz_t *q, gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve)
+int _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(mpz_t q, gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve)
{
switch (curve) {
#ifdef ENABLE_NON_SUITEB_CURVES
case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1:
- mpz_init_set_str(*q,
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836"
- "146BC9B1B4D22831",
- 16);
+ mpz_set_str(q,
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836"
+ "146BC9B1B4D22831",
+ 16);
return 0;
case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1:
- mpz_init_set_str(*q,
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2"
- "E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D",
- 16);
+ mpz_set_str(q,
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2"
+ "E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D",
+ 16);
return 0;
#endif
case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1:
- mpz_init_set_str(*q,
- "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
- "BCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551",
- 16);
+ mpz_set_str(q,
+ "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+ "BCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551",
+ 16);
return 0;
case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1:
- mpz_init_set_str(*q,
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC7634D81F4372DDF"
- "581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973",
- 16);
+ mpz_set_str(q,
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC7634D81F4372DDF"
+ "581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973",
+ 16);
return 0;
case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1:
- mpz_init_set_str(*q,
- "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
- "FFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A"
- "5D03BB5C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386"
- "409",
- 16);
+ mpz_set_str(q,
+ "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+ "FFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A"
+ "5D03BB5C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386"
+ "409",
+ 16);
return 0;
default:
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
}
}
-
-int
-_gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k (mpz_t k,
- gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve,
- const mpz_t x,
- gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
- const uint8_t *digest,
- size_t length)
-{
- mpz_t q;
- int ret;
-
- ret = _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(&q, curve);
- if (ret < 0)
- return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
-
- ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k (k, q, x, mac, digest, length);
- mpz_clear(q);
- return ret;
-}
diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h
index 7ca401d6e4..a7e612bcab 100644
--- a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h
+++ b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h
@@ -26,12 +26,6 @@
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
#include <nettle/bignum.h> /* includes gmp.h */
-int
-_gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k (mpz_t k,
- gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve,
- const mpz_t x,
- gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
- const uint8_t *digest,
- size_t length);
+int _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(mpz_t q, gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve);
#endif /* GNUTLS_LIB_NETTLE_INT_ECDSA_COMPUTE_K_H */
diff --git a/lib/nettle/pk.c b/lib/nettle/pk.c
index 588e9df502..b19fe3804a 100644
--- a/lib/nettle/pk.c
+++ b/lib/nettle/pk.c
@@ -102,10 +102,16 @@ static void rnd_nonce_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
}
}
-static void rnd_mpz_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
+static void rnd_datum_func(void *ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *data)
{
- mpz_t *k = _ctx;
- nettle_mpz_get_str_256 (length, data, *k);
+ gnutls_datum_t *d = ctx;
+
+ if (length > d->size) {
+ memset(data, 0, length - d->size);
+ memcpy(data + (length - d->size), d->data, d->size);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(data, d->data, length);
+ }
}
static void rnd_nonce_func_fallback(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
@@ -976,7 +982,10 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
struct dsa_signature sig;
int curve_id = pk_params->curve;
const struct ecc_curve *curve;
- mpz_t k;
+ mpz_t q;
+ /* 521-bit elliptic curve generator at maximum */
+ uint8_t buf[(521 + 7) / 8];
+ gnutls_datum_t k = { NULL, 0 };
void *random_ctx;
nettle_random_func *random_func;
@@ -1005,19 +1014,32 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
hash_len = vdata->size;
}
- mpz_init(k);
+ mpz_init(q);
+
if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST ||
(sign_params->flags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_REPRODUCIBLE)) {
- ret = _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k(k,
- curve_id,
- pk_params->params[ECC_K],
- DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig),
- vdata->data,
- vdata->size);
+ mp_limb_t h[DSA_COMPUTE_K_ITCH];
+
+ ret = _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(q, curve_id);
if (ret < 0)
goto ecdsa_cleanup;
+
+ ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(
+ h, mpz_limbs_read(q), priv.p,
+ ecc_size(priv.ecc), ecc_bit_size(priv.ecc),
+ DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig), vdata->data,
+ vdata->size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto ecdsa_cleanup;
+
+ k.data = buf;
+ k.size = (ecc_bit_size(priv.ecc) + 7) / 8;
+
+ _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k_finish(k.data, k.size, h,
+ ecc_size(priv.ecc));
+
random_ctx = &k;
- random_func = rnd_mpz_func;
+ random_func = rnd_datum_func;
} else {
random_ctx = NULL;
random_func = rnd_nonce_func;
@@ -1038,7 +1060,7 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
ecdsa_cleanup:
dsa_signature_clear(&sig);
ecc_scalar_zclear(&priv);
- mpz_clear(k);
+ mpz_clear(q);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
@@ -1051,7 +1073,9 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
struct dsa_params pub;
bigint_t priv;
struct dsa_signature sig;
- mpz_t k;
+ /* 512-bit DSA subgroup at maximum */
+ uint8_t buf[(512 + 7) / 8];
+ gnutls_datum_t k = { NULL, 0 };
void *random_ctx;
nettle_random_func *random_func;
@@ -1074,21 +1098,27 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
hash_len = vdata->size;
}
- mpz_init(k);
if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST ||
(sign_params->flags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_REPRODUCIBLE)) {
- ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(k,
- pub.q,
- TOMPZ(priv),
- DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig),
- vdata->data,
- vdata->size);
+ mp_limb_t h[DSA_COMPUTE_K_ITCH];
+
+ ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(
+ h, mpz_limbs_read(pub.q),
+ mpz_limbs_read(TOMPZ(priv)), mpz_size(pub.q),
+ mpz_sizeinbase(pub.q, 2),
+ DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig), vdata->data,
+ vdata->size);
if (ret < 0)
goto dsa_fail;
- /* cancel-out dsa_sign's addition of 1 to random data */
- mpz_sub_ui (k, k, 1);
+
+ k.data = buf;
+ k.size = (mpz_sizeinbase(pub.q, 2) + 7) / 8;
+
+ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k_finish(k.data, k.size, h,
+ mpz_size(pub.q));
+
random_ctx = &k;
- random_func = rnd_mpz_func;
+ random_func = rnd_datum_func;
} else {
random_ctx = NULL;
random_func = rnd_nonce_func;
@@ -1108,7 +1138,6 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
dsa_fail:
dsa_signature_clear(&sig);
- mpz_clear(k);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
diff --git a/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c b/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c
index 6e907288ee..25aa553a59 100644
--- a/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c
+++ b/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ void doit(void)
&signature);
if (ret < 0)
testfail("gnutls_pubkey_verify_data2\n");
- success(" - pass");
+ success(" - pass\n");
next:
gnutls_free(signature.data);
--
2.44.0

View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
--- gnutls-3.7.2/doc/manpages/p11tool.1 2021-05-29 10:15:22.000000000 +0200
+++ gnutls-3.7.2-bootstrapped/doc/manpages/p11tool.1 2021-06-28 09:35:23.000000000 +0200
@@ -230,8 +230,9 @@
.NOP \f\*[B-Font]\-\-write\f[]
Writes the loaded objects to a PKCS #11 token.
.sp
-It can be used to write private, public keys, certificates or secret keys to a token. Must be combined with
- one of \--load-privkey, \--load-pubkey, \--load-certificate option.
+It can be used to write private, public keys, certificates or secret keys to a token. Must be combined with one of \--load-privkey, \--load-pubkey, \--load-certificate option.
+.sp
+When writing a certificate object, its CKA_ID is set to the same CKA_ID of the corresponding public key, if it exists on the token; otherwise it will be derived from the X.509 Subject Key Identifier of the certificate. If this behavior is undesired, write the public key to the token beforehand.
.TP
.NOP \f\*[B-Font]\-\-delete\f[]
Deletes the objects matching the given PKCS #11 URL.

View File

@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
From e5dc27d1a457d1b3abc0582cd133910dff0fc309 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 12:00:11 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix double free during gnutls_pkcs7_verify
Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
---
.gitignore | 1 +
lib/x509/pkcs7.c | 3 +-
tests/Makefile.am | 3 +-
tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
diff --git a/lib/x509/pkcs7.c b/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
index 0ff55ba04b..878f867862 100644
--- a/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
+++ b/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
@@ -1318,7 +1318,8 @@ gnutls_x509_crt_t find_signer(gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7, gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tl,
issuer = find_verified_issuer_of(pkcs7, issuer, purpose, vflags);
if (issuer != NULL && gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(issuer, issuer)) {
- if (prev) gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(prev);
+ if (prev && prev != signer)
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(prev);
prev = issuer;
break;
}
diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
index b04cb081b4..0563d3c754 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/Makefile.am
@@ -220,7 +220,8 @@ ctests += mini-record-2 simple gnutls_hmac_fast set_pkcs12_cred cert certuniquei
sign-verify-newapi sign-verify-deterministic iov aead-cipher-vec \
tls13-without-timeout-func buffer status-request-revoked \
set_x509_ocsp_multi_cli kdf-api keylog-func \
- dtls_hello_random_value tls_hello_random_value x509cert-dntypes
+ dtls_hello_random_value tls_hello_random_value x509cert-dntypes \
+ pkcs7-verify-double-free
if HAVE_SECCOMP_TESTS
ctests += dtls-with-seccomp tls-with-seccomp dtls-client-with-seccomp tls-client-with-seccomp
diff --git a/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c b/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fadf307829
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Zoltan Fridrich
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuTLS.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GnuTLS. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <gnutls/pkcs7.h>
+#include <gnutls/x509.h>
+
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static char rca_pem[] =
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIDCjCCAfKgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFt\n"
+ "cGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDMzNloYDzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0MzM2WjAVMRMwEQYD\n"
+ "VQQKDApFeGFtcGxlIENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA\n"
+ "v8hnKPJ/IA0SQB/A/a0Uh+npZ67vsgIMrtTQo0r0kJkmkBz5323xO3DVuJfB3QmX\n"
+ "v9zvoeCQLuDvWar5Aixfxgm6s5Q+yPvJj9t3NebDrU+Y4+qyewBIJUF8EF/5iBPC\n"
+ "ZHONmzbfIRWvQWGGgb2CRcOHp2J7AY/QLB6LsWPaLjs/DHva28Q13JaTTHIpdu8v\n"
+ "t6vHr0nXf66DN4MvtoF3N+o+v3snJCMsfXOqASi4tbWR7gtOfCfiz9uBjh0W2Dut\n"
+ "/jclBQkJkLe6esNSM+f4YiOpctVDjmfj8yoHCp394vt0wFqhG38wsTFAyVP6qIcf\n"
+ "5zoSu9ovEt2cTkhnZHjiiwIDAQABo2MwYTAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA4GA1Ud\n"
+ "DwEB/wQEAwIBBjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUhjeO6Uc5imbjOl2I2ltVA27Hu9YwHwYDVR0j\n"
+ "BBgwFoAUhjeO6Uc5imbjOl2I2ltVA27Hu9YwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAD+r\n"
+ "i/7FsbG0OFKGF2+JOnth6NjJQcMfM8LiglqAuBUijrv7vltoZ0Z3FJH1Vi4OeMXn\n"
+ "l7X/9tWUve0uFl75MfjDrf0+lCEdYRY1LCba2BrUgpbbkLywVUdnbsvndehegCgS\n"
+ "jss2/zys3Hlo3ZaHlTMQ/NQ4nrxcxkjOvkZSEOqgxJTLpzm6pr7YUts4k6c6lNiB\n"
+ "FSiJiDzsJCmWR9C3fBbUlfDfTJYGN3JwqX270KchXDElo8gNoDnF7jBMpLFFSEKm\n"
+ "MyfbNLX/srh+CEfZaN/OZV4A3MQ0L8vQEp6M4CJhvRLIuMVabZ2coJ0AzystrOMU\n"
+ "LirBWjg89RoAjFQ7bTE=\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+static char ca_pem[] =
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFt\n"
+ "cGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDQzNFoYDzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0NDM0WjAiMSAwHgYD\n"
+ "VQQKDBdFeGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD\n"
+ "ggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKb9ACB8u//sP6MfNU1OsVw68xz3eTPLgKxS0vpqexm6iGVg\n"
+ "ug/o9uYRLzqiEukv/eyz9WzHmY7sqlOJjOFdv92+SaNg79Jc51WHPFXgea4/qyfr\n"
+ "4y14PGs0SNxm6T44sXurUs7cXydQVUgnq2VCaWFOTUdxXoAWkV8r8GaUoPD/klVz\n"
+ "RqxSZVETmX1XBKhsMnnov41kRwVph2C+VfUspsbaUZaz/o/S1/nokhXRACzKsMBr\n"
+ "obqiGxbY35uVzsmbAW5ErhQz98AWJL3Bub1fsEMXg6OEMmPH4AtX888dTIYZNw0E\n"
+ "bUIESspz1kjJQTtVQDHTprhwz16YiSVeUonlLgMCAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/\n"
+ "BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFPBjxDWjMhjXERirKF9O\n"
+ "o/5Cllc5MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIY3julHOYpm4zpdiNpbVQNux7vWMA0GCSqGSIb3\n"
+ "DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCTm+vv3hBa6lL5IT+Fw8aTxQ2Ne7mZ5oyazhvXYwwfKNMX3SML\n"
+ "W2JdPaL64ZwbxxxYvW401o5Z0CEgru3YFrsqB/hEdl0Uf8UWWJmE1rRa+miTmbjt\n"
+ "lrLNCWdrs6CiwvsPITTHg7jevB4KyZYsTSxQFcyr3N3xF+6EmOTC4IkhPPnXYXcp\n"
+ "248ih+WOavSYoRvzgB/Dip1WnPYU2mfIV3O8JReRryngA0TzWCLPLUoWR3R4jwtC\n"
+ "+1uSLoqaenz3qv3F1WEbke37az9YJuXx/5D8CqFQiZ62TUUtI6fYd8mkMBM4Qfh6\n"
+ "NW9XrCkI9wlpL5K9HllhuW0BhKeJkuPpyQ2p\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+static char ee_pem[] =
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIDIjCCAgqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdFeGFt\n"
+ "cGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTAgFw0yMjA3MjExNDQ1MzdaGA8yMjIyMDcyMTE0\n"
+ "NDUzN1owFTETMBEGA1UEAwwKSm9obiBTbWl0aDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD\n"
+ "ggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMb1uuxppBFY+WVD45iyHUq7DkIJNNOI/JRaybVJfPktWq2E\n"
+ "eNe7XhV05KKnqZTbDO2iYqNHqGhZ8pz/IstDRTZP3z/q1vXTG0P9Gx28rEy5TaUY\n"
+ "QjtD+ZoFUQm0ORMDBjd8jikqtJ87hKeuOPMH4rzdydotMaPQSm7KLzHBGBr6gg7z\n"
+ "g1IxPWkhMyHapoMqqrhjwjzoTY97UIXpZTEoIA+KpEC8f9CciBtL0i1MPBjWozB6\n"
+ "Jma9q5iEwZXuRr3cnPYeIPlK2drgDZCMuSFcYiT8ApLw5OhKqY1m2EvfZ2ox2s9R\n"
+ "68/HzYdPi3kZwiNEtlBvMlpt5yKBJAflp76d7DkCAwEAAaNuMGwwCwYDVR0PBAQD\n"
+ "AgWgMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMCBggrBgEFBQcDBDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUc+Mi\n"
+ "kr8WMCk00SQo+P2iggp/oQkwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU8GPENaMyGNcRGKsoX06j/kKW\n"
+ "VzkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKU9+CUR0Jcfybd1+8Aqgh1RH96yQygnVuyt\n"
+ "Na9rFz4fM3ij9tGXDHXrkZw8bW1dWLU9quu8zeTxKxc3aiDIw739Alz0tukttDo7\n"
+ "dW7YqIb77zsIsWB9p7G9dlxT6ieUy+5IKk69BbeK8KR0vAciAG4KVQxPhuPy/LGX\n"
+ "PzqlJIJ4h61s3UOroReHPB1keLZgpORqrvtpClOmABH9TLFRJA/WFg8Q2XYB/p0x\n"
+ "l/pWiaoBC+8wK9cDoMUK5yOwXeuCLffCb+UlAD0+z/qxJ2pisE8E9X8rRKRrWI+i\n"
+ "G7LtJCEn86EQK8KuRlJxKgj8lClZhoULB0oL4jbblBuNow9WRmM=\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+static char msg_pem[] =
+ "-----BEGIN PKCS7-----\n"
+ "MIIK2QYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIKyjCCCsYCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwCwYJKoZI\n"
+ "hvcNAQcBoIIJTzCCAwowggHyoAMCAQICAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwFTETMBEG\n"
+ "A1UECgwKRXhhbXBsZSBDQTAgFw0xNzA3MjExNDQzMjFaGA8yMjIyMDcyMTE0NDMy\n"
+ "MVowFTETMBEGA1UECgwKRXhhbXBsZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP\n"
+ "ADCCAQoCggEBAL51eyE4j8wAKQKMGlO9HEY2iaGvsdPSJmidSdmCi1jnNK39Lx4Y\n"
+ "31h279hSHF5wtI6VM91HHfeLf1mjEZHlKrXXJQzBPLpbHWapD778drHBitOP8e56\n"
+ "fDMIfofLV4tkMk8690vPe4cJH1UHGspMyz6EQF9kPRaW80XtMV/6dalgL/9Esmaw\n"
+ "XBNPJAS1VutDuXQkJ/3/rWFLmkpYHHtGPjX782YRmT1s+VOVTsLqmKx0TEL8A381\n"
+ "bbElHPUAMjPcyWR5qqA8KWnS5Dwqk3LwI0AvuhQytCq0S7Xl4DXauvxwTRXv0UU7\n"
+ "W8r3MLAw9DnlnJiD/RFjw5rbGO3wMePk/qUCAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUw\n"
+ "AwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFIh2KRoKJoe2VtpOwWMkRAkR\n"
+ "mLWKMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIh2KRoKJoe2VtpOwWMkRAkRmLWKMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB\n"
+ "CwUAA4IBAQBovvlOjoy0MCT5U0eWfcPQQjY4Ssrn3IiPNlVkqSNo+FHX+2baTLVQ\n"
+ "5QTHxwXwzdIJiwtjFWDdGEQXqmuIvnFG+u/whGbeg6oQygfnQ5Y+q6epOxCsPgLQ\n"
+ "mKKEaF7mvh8DauUx4QSbYCNGCctOZuB1vlN9bJ3/5QbH+2pFPOfCr5CAyPDwHo6S\n"
+ "qO3yPcutRwT9xS7gXEHM9HhLp+DmdCGh4eVBPiFilyZm1d92lWxU8oxoSfXgzDT/\n"
+ "GCzlMykNZNs4JD9QmiRClP/3U0dQbOhah/Fda+N+L90xaqEgGcvwKKZa3pzo59pl\n"
+ "BbkcIP4YPyHeinwkgAn5UVJg9DOxNCS0MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG\n"
+ "9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFtcGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDQxM1oY\n"
+ "DzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0NDEzWjAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdFeGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0\n"
+ "ZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMPFDEvDANwvhviu\n"
+ "pwXTvaKyxyX94jVu1wgAhIRyQBVRiMbrn8MEufLG8oA0vKd8s92gv/lWe1jFb2rn\n"
+ "91jMkZWsjWjiJFD6SzqFfBo+XxOGikEqO1MAf92UqavmSGlXVRG1Vy7T7dWibZP0\n"
+ "WODhHYWayR0Y6owSz5IqNfrHXzDME+lSJxHgRFI7pK+b0OgiVmvyXDKFPvyU6GrP\n"
+ "lxXDi/XbjyPvC5gpiwtTgm+s8KERwmdlfZUNjkh2PpHx1g1joijHT3wIvO/Pek1E\n"
+ "C+Xs6w3XxGgL6TTL7FDuv4AjZVX9KK66/yBhX3aN8bkqAg+hs9XNk3zzWC0XEFOS\n"
+ "Qoh2va0CAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw\n"
+ "HQYDVR0OBBYEFHwi/7dUWGjkMWJctOm7MCjjQj1cMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIh2KRoK\n"
+ "Joe2VtpOwWMkRAkRmLWKMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCF6sHCBdYRwBwvfCve\n"
+ "og9cPnmPqZrG4AtmSvtoSsMvgvKb/4z3/gG8oPtTBkeRcAHoMoEp/oA+B2ylwIAc\n"
+ "S5U7jx+lYH/Pqih0X/OcOLbaMv8uzGSGQxk+L9LuuIT6E/THfRRIPEvkDkzC+/uk\n"
+ "7vUbG17bSEWeF0o/6sjzAY2aH1jnbCDyu0UC78GXkc6bZ5QlH98uLMDMrOmqcZjS\n"
+ "JFfvuRDQyKV5yBdBkYaobsIWSQDsgYxJzf/2y8c3r+HXqT+jhrXPWJ3btgMPxpu7\n"
+ "E8KmoFgp9EM+48oYlXJ66rk08/KjaVmgN7R+Hm3e2+MFT2kme4fBKalLjcazTe3x\n"
+ "0FisMIIDIjCCAgqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdF\n"
+ "eGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTAgFw0yMjA3MjExNDQ1MzBaGA8yMjIyMDcy\n"
+ "MTE0NDUzMVowFTETMBEGA1UEAwwKSm9obiBTbWl0aDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB\n"
+ "BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMjhSqhdD5RjmOm6W3hG7zkgKBP9whRN/SipcdEMlkgc\n"
+ "F/U3QMu66qIfKwheNdWalC1JLtruLDWP92ysa6Vw+CCG8aSax1AgB//RKQB7kgPA\n"
+ "9js9hi/oCdBmCv2HJxhWSLz+MVoxgzW4C7S9FenI+btxe/99Uw4nOw7kwjsYDLKr\n"
+ "tMw8myv7aCW/63CuBYGtohiZupM3RI3kKFcZots+KRPLlZpjv+I2h9xSln8VxKNb\n"
+ "XiMrYwGfHB7iX7ghe1TvFjKatEUhsqa7AvIq7nfe/cyq97f0ODQO814njgZtk5iQ\n"
+ "JVavXHdhTVaypt1HdAFMuHX5UATylHxx9tRCgSIijUsCAwEAAaNuMGwwCwYDVR0P\n"
+ "BAQDAgWgMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMCBggrBgEFBQcDBDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU\n"
+ "31+vHl4E/2Jpnwinbzf+d7usshcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUfCL/t1RYaOQxYly06bsw\n"
+ "KONCPVwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAAWe63DcNwmleQ3INFGDJZ/m2I/R/cBa\n"
+ "nnrxgR5Ey1ljHdA/x1z1JLTGmGVwqGExs5DNG9Q//Pmc9pZ1yPa8J4Xf8AvFcmkY\n"
+ "mWoH1HvW0xu/RF1UN5SAoD2PRQ+Vq4OSPD58IlEu/u4o1wZV7Wl91Cv6VNpiAb63\n"
+ "j9PA1YacOpOtcRqG59Vuj9HFm9f30ejHVo2+KJcpo290cR3Zg4fOm8mtjeMdt/QS\n"
+ "Atq+RqPAQ7yxqvEEv8zPIZj2kAOQm3mh/yYqBrR68lQUD/dBTP7ApIZkhUK3XK6U\n"
+ "nf9JvoF6Fn2+Cnqb//FLBgHSnoeqeQNwDLUXTsD02iYxHzJrhokSY4YxggFQMIIB\n"
+ "TAIBATAnMCIxIDAeBgNVBAoMF0V4YW1wbGUgaW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIENBAgEBMAsG\n"
+ "CWCGSAFlAwQCATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQATHg6wNsBcs/Ub1GQfKwTpKCk5\n"
+ "8QXuNnZ0u7b6mKgrSY2Gf47fpL2aRgaR+BAQncbctu5EH/IL38pWjaGtOhFAj/5q\n"
+ "7luVQW11kuyJN3Bd/dtLqawWOwMmAIEigw6X50l5ZHnEVzFfxt+RKTNhk4XWVtbi\n"
+ "2iIlITOplW0rnvxYAwCxKL9ocaB7etK8au7ixMxbFp75Ts4iLX8dhlAFdCuFCk8k\n"
+ "B8mi9HHuwr3QYRqMPW61hu1wBL3yB8eoZNOwPXb0gkIh6ZvgptxgQzm/cc+Iw9fP\n"
+ "QkR0fTM7ElJ5QZmSV98AUbZDHmDvpmcjcUxfSPMc3IoT8T300usRu7QHqKJi\n"
+ "-----END PKCS7-----\n";
+
+const gnutls_datum_t rca_datum = { (void *)rca_pem, sizeof(rca_pem) - 1 };
+const gnutls_datum_t ca_datum = { (void *)ca_pem, sizeof(ca_pem) - 1 };
+const gnutls_datum_t ee_datum = { (void *)ee_pem, sizeof(ee_pem) - 1 };
+const gnutls_datum_t msg_datum = { (void *)msg_pem, sizeof(msg_pem) - 1 };
+
+static void tls_log_func(int level, const char *str)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s |<%d>| %s", "err", level, str);
+}
+
+#define CHECK(X)\
+{\
+ r = X;\
+ if (r < 0)\
+ fail("error in %d: %s\n", __LINE__, gnutls_strerror(r));\
+}\
+
+void doit(void)
+{
+ int r;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t rca_cert = NULL;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t ca_cert = NULL;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t ee_cert = NULL;
+ gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tlist = NULL;
+ gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7 = NULL;
+ gnutls_datum_t data = { (unsigned char *)"xxx", 3 };
+
+ if (debug) {
+ gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func);
+ gnutls_global_set_log_level(4711);
+ }
+
+ // Import certificates
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&rca_cert));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(rca_cert, &rca_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&ca_cert));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(ca_cert, &ca_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&ee_cert));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(ee_cert, &ee_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
+
+ // Setup trust store
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_init(&tlist, 0));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, rca_cert, "rca", 3, 0));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, ca_cert, "ca", 2, 0));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, ee_cert, "ee", 2, 0));
+
+ // Setup pkcs7 structure
+ CHECK(gnutls_pkcs7_init(&pkcs7));
+ CHECK(gnutls_pkcs7_import(pkcs7, &msg_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
+
+ // Signature verification
+ gnutls_pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, tlist, NULL, 0, 0, &data, 0);
+
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(rca_cert);
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(ca_cert);
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(ee_cert);
+ gnutls_x509_trust_list_deinit(tlist, 0);
+ gnutls_pkcs7_deinit(pkcs7);
+}
--
2.37.2

View File

@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
From 9b50d94bf1c8e749d7dfc593c89e689a161444ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2023 09:30:03 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] gnutls-3.6.16-rehandshake-tickets.patch
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
---
lib/ext/session_ticket.c | 6 ++
lib/ext/session_ticket.h | 1 +
lib/libgnutls.map | 2 +
lib/state.c | 1 +
tests/Makefile.am | 3 +-
tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c | 152 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c
diff --git a/lib/ext/session_ticket.c b/lib/ext/session_ticket.c
index 8f22462..8d83a6c 100644
--- a/lib/ext/session_ticket.c
+++ b/lib/ext/session_ticket.c
@@ -618,6 +618,12 @@ gnutls_session_ticket_enable_server(gnutls_session_t session,
return 0;
}
+void
+_gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(gnutls_session_t session)
+{
+ session->internals.flags |= GNUTLS_NO_TICKETS;
+}
+
/*
* Return zero if session tickets haven't been enabled.
*/
diff --git a/lib/ext/session_ticket.h b/lib/ext/session_ticket.h
index da804ec..660c9d3 100644
--- a/lib/ext/session_ticket.h
+++ b/lib/ext/session_ticket.h
@@ -36,5 +36,6 @@ int _gnutls_encrypt_session_ticket(gnutls_session_t session,
int _gnutls_decrypt_session_ticket(gnutls_session_t session,
const gnutls_datum_t *ticket_data,
gnutls_datum_t *state);
+void _gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(gnutls_session_t session);
#endif /* GNUTLS_LIB_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_H */
diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
index d2f7c0a..6748b3a 100644
--- a/lib/libgnutls.map
+++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1432,4 +1432,6 @@ GNUTLS_PRIVATE_3_4 {
_gnutls_buffer_unescape;
_gnutls_buffer_pop_datum;
_gnutls_buffer_clear;
+ # needed by tests/tls12-rehandshake-cert-ticket
+ _gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server;
} GNUTLS_3_4;
diff --git a/lib/state.c b/lib/state.c
index 817a7b8..f1e9daa 100644
--- a/lib/state.c
+++ b/lib/state.c
@@ -452,6 +452,7 @@ void _gnutls_handshake_internal_state_clear(gnutls_session_t session)
session->internals.tfo.connect_addrlen = 0;
session->internals.tfo.connect_only = 0;
session->internals.early_data_received = 0;
+ session->internals.session_ticket_renew = 0;
}
/**
diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
index 0563d3c..7c5f5c4 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/Makefile.am
@@ -221,7 +221,8 @@ ctests += mini-record-2 simple gnutls_hmac_fast set_pkcs12_cred cert certuniquei
tls13-without-timeout-func buffer status-request-revoked \
set_x509_ocsp_multi_cli kdf-api keylog-func \
dtls_hello_random_value tls_hello_random_value x509cert-dntypes \
- pkcs7-verify-double-free
+ pkcs7-verify-double-free \
+ tls12-rehandshake-ticket
if HAVE_SECCOMP_TESTS
ctests += dtls-with-seccomp tls-with-seccomp dtls-client-with-seccomp tls-client-with-seccomp
diff --git a/tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c b/tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f96e46e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Daiki Ueno
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuTLS.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "cert-common.h"
+
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "eagain-common.h"
+
+const char *side = "";
+
+static void tls_log_func(int level, const char *str)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s|<%d>| %s", side, level, str);
+}
+
+#define MAX_BUF 1024
+
+void _gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(gnutls_session_t session);
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+ char buffer[MAX_BUF + 1];
+ /* Server stuff. */
+ gnutls_certificate_credentials_t scred;
+ gnutls_session_t server;
+ gnutls_datum_t session_ticket_key = { NULL, 0 };
+ int sret;
+ /* Client stuff. */
+ gnutls_certificate_credentials_t ccred;
+ gnutls_session_t client;
+ int cret;
+
+ /* General init. */
+ global_init();
+ gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func);
+ if (debug)
+ gnutls_global_set_log_level(9);
+
+ /* Init server */
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&scred) >= 0);
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_mem(scred,
+ &server_ca3_localhost_cert,
+ &server_ca3_key,
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem(scred,
+ &ca3_cert,
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
+
+ assert(gnutls_init(&server, GNUTLS_SERVER) >= 0);
+ gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(server, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST);
+ assert(gnutls_priority_set_direct(server,
+ "NORMAL:-VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.2",
+ NULL) >= 0);
+
+ gnutls_credentials_set(server, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, scred);
+ gnutls_transport_set_push_function(server, server_push);
+ gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(server, server_pull);
+ gnutls_transport_set_ptr(server, server);
+
+ gnutls_session_ticket_key_generate(&session_ticket_key);
+ gnutls_session_ticket_enable_server(server, &session_ticket_key);
+
+ /* Init client */
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&ccred) >= 0);
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_mem
+ (ccred, &cli_ca3_cert_chain, &cli_ca3_key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem
+ (ccred, &ca3_cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
+
+ gnutls_init(&client, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
+ assert(gnutls_priority_set_direct(client,
+ "NORMAL:-VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.2",
+ NULL) >= 0);
+
+ assert(gnutls_credentials_set(client, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, ccred) >= 0);
+
+ gnutls_transport_set_push_function(client, client_push);
+ gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(client, client_pull);
+ gnutls_transport_set_ptr(client, client);
+
+ HANDSHAKE(client, server);
+
+ /* Server initiates rehandshake */
+ switch_side("server");
+ sret = gnutls_rehandshake(server);
+ if (sret < 0) {
+ fail("Error sending %d byte packet: %s\n",
+ (int)sizeof(buffer), gnutls_strerror(sret));
+ } else if (debug)
+ success("server: starting rehandshake\n");
+
+ /* Stop sending session ticket */
+ _gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(server);
+
+ /* Client gets notified with rehandshake */
+ switch_side("client");
+ do {
+ do {
+ cret = gnutls_record_recv(client, buffer, MAX_BUF);
+ } while (cret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || cret == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED);
+ } while (cret > 0);
+
+ if (cret != GNUTLS_E_REHANDSHAKE) {
+ fail("client: Error receiving rehandshake: %s\n",
+ gnutls_strerror(cret));
+ }
+
+ HANDSHAKE(client, server);
+
+ gnutls_bye(client, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+ gnutls_bye(server, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+
+ gnutls_deinit(client);
+ gnutls_deinit(server);
+
+ gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(scred);
+ gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(ccred);
+
+ gnutls_free(session_ticket_key.data);
+
+ gnutls_global_deinit();
+ reset_buffers();
+}
+
+void doit(void)
+{
+ run();
+}
--
2.41.0

View File

@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
From fe912c5dba49dcecbd5c32bf8184e60a949af452 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 19:13:17 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] rsa-psk: minimize branching after decryption
This moves any non-trivial code between gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2
and the function return in _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx up until the
decryption. This also avoids an extra memcpy to session->key.key.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
index 93c2dc9998..8f3fe5a4bd 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
@@ -269,7 +269,6 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
int ret, dsize;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
- gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
@@ -329,24 +328,48 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
- premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
- if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
+ /* Find the key of this username. A random value will be
+ * filled in if the key is not found.
+ */
+ ret =
+ _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
+
+ /* Allocate memory for premaster secret, and fill in the
+ * fields except the decryption result.
+ */
+ session->key.key.size = 2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2 + pwd_psk.size;
+ session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(session->key.key.size);
+ if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
+ _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
+ /* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
+ _gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
- premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
/* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
- ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
- premaster_secret.size);
+ ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, session->key.key.data + 2,
+ GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup;
+ _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
+ /* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
+ _gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
+ return ret;
}
+ _gnutls_write_uint16(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE, session->key.key.data);
+ _gnutls_write_uint16(pwd_psk.size,
+ &session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE]);
+ memcpy(&session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2],
+ pwd_psk.data, pwd_psk.size);
+ _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
+
gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
- &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
- premaster_secret.size);
+ &ciphertext, session->key.key.data + 2,
+ GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
* in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
* channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
@@ -365,31 +388,10 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above.
*/
- premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
- premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
-
- /* find the key of this username
- */
- ret =
- _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
- if (ret < 0) {
- gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- ret =
- set_rsa_psk_session_key(session, &pwd_psk, &premaster_secret);
- if (ret < 0) {
- gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ session->key.key.data[2] = ver_maj;
+ session->key.key.data[3] = ver_min;
- ret = 0;
- cleanup:
- _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
- _gnutls_free_temp_key_datum(&premaster_secret);
-
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
static int
--
2.43.0

View File

@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
From e007a54432c98618bde500649817d153225abf6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2023 11:52:08 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing.patch
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
---
lib/auth/rsa.c | 2 +-
lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
lib/gnutls_int.h | 4 --
lib/priority.c | 1 -
4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
index 858701f..02b6a34 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
session->key.key.size);
/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
* in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
- * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
+ * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
/* Error handling logic:
* In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
index 1a9dab5..93c2dc9 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
@@ -264,14 +264,13 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
{
gnutls_datum_t username;
psk_auth_info_t info;
- gnutls_datum_t plaintext;
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
gnutls_datum_t pwd_psk = { NULL, 0 };
int ret, dsize;
- int randomize_key = 0;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
+ volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
_gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK);
@@ -327,71 +326,47 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
}
ciphertext.size = dsize;
- ret =
- gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
- &ciphertext, &plaintext);
- if (ret < 0 || plaintext.size != GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE) {
- /* In case decryption fails then don't inform
- * the peer. Just use a random key. (in order to avoid
- * attack against pkcs-1 formatting).
- */
+ ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+ ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+
+ premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+ if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
- _gnutls_debug_log
- ("auth_rsa_psk: Possible PKCS #1 format attack\n");
- if (ret >= 0) {
- gnutls_free(plaintext.data);
- }
- randomize_key = 1;
- } else {
- /* If the secret was properly formatted, then
- * check the version number.
- */
- if (_gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session) !=
- plaintext.data[0]
- || (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0
- && _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session) !=
- plaintext.data[1])) {
- /* No error is returned here, if the version number check
- * fails. We proceed normally.
- * That is to defend against the attack described in the paper
- * "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by Vlastimil Klima,
- * Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
- */
- gnutls_assert();
- _gnutls_debug_log
- ("auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 version check format attack\n");
- }
+ return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
+ premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
-
- if (randomize_key != 0) {
- premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
- premaster_secret.data =
- gnutls_malloc(premaster_secret.size);
- if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
- gnutls_assert();
- return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
- }
-
- /* we do not need strong random numbers here.
- */
- ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
- premaster_secret.size);
- if (ret < 0) {
- gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup;
- }
- } else {
- premaster_secret.data = plaintext.data;
- premaster_secret.size = plaintext.size;
+ /* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
+ ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
+ premaster_secret.size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto cleanup;
}
+ gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
+ &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
+ premaster_secret.size);
+ /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+ * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+ * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
+
+ /* Error handling logic:
+ * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
+ * random key previously generated. (in order to avoid attack against
+ * pkcs-1 formatting).
+ *
+ * If we get version mismatches no error is returned either. We
+ * proceed normally. This is to defend against the attack described
+ * in the paper "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by
+ * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+ */
+
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above.
*/
-
- premaster_secret.data[0] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
- premaster_secret.data[1] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+ premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
+ premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
/* find the key of this username
*/
diff --git a/lib/gnutls_int.h b/lib/gnutls_int.h
index 31cec5c..815f69b 100644
--- a/lib/gnutls_int.h
+++ b/lib/gnutls_int.h
@@ -971,7 +971,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
bool _no_etm;
bool _no_ext_master_secret;
bool _allow_key_usage_violation;
- bool _allow_wrong_pms;
bool _dumbfw;
unsigned int _dh_prime_bits; /* old (deprecated) variable */
@@ -989,7 +988,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
(x)->no_etm = 1; \
(x)->no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
(x)->allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
- (x)->allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
(x)->dumbfw = 1
#define ENABLE_PRIO_COMPAT(x) \
@@ -998,7 +996,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
(x)->_no_etm = 1; \
(x)->_no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
(x)->_allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
- (x)->_allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
(x)->_dumbfw = 1
/* DH and RSA parameters types.
@@ -1123,7 +1120,6 @@ typedef struct {
bool no_etm;
bool no_ext_master_secret;
bool allow_key_usage_violation;
- bool allow_wrong_pms;
bool dumbfw;
/* old (deprecated) variable. This is used for both srp_prime_bits
diff --git a/lib/priority.c b/lib/priority.c
index 0a284ae..67ec887 100644
--- a/lib/priority.c
+++ b/lib/priority.c
@@ -681,7 +681,6 @@ gnutls_priority_set(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_priority_t priority)
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_etm);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_ext_master_secret);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_key_usage_violation);
- COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_wrong_pms);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dumbfw);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dh_prime_bits);
--
2.43.0

View File

@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
From 339bef12f478b3a12c59571c53645e31280baf7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 15:59:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] cert auth: filter out unsupported cert types from TLS 1.2 CR
When the server is advertising signature algorithms in TLS 1.2
CertificateRequest, it shouldn't send certificate_types not backed by
any of those algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/auth/cert.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
tests/suite/tls-fuzzer/gnutls-cert.json | 19 +++++++
2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/cert.c b/lib/auth/cert.c
index 3073a33d3..0b0f04b2b 100644
--- a/lib/auth/cert.c
+++ b/lib/auth/cert.c
@@ -64,6 +64,16 @@ typedef enum CertificateSigType { RSA_SIGN = 1, DSA_SIGN = 2, ECDSA_SIGN = 64,
#endif
} CertificateSigType;
+enum CertificateSigTypeFlags {
+ RSA_SIGN_FLAG = 1,
+ DSA_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 1,
+ ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 2,
+#ifdef ENABLE_GOST
+ GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 3,
+ GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 4
+#endif
+};
+
/* Moves data from an internal certificate struct (gnutls_pcert_st) to
* another internal certificate struct (cert_auth_info_t), and deinitializes
* the former.
@@ -1281,6 +1291,7 @@ _gnutls_gen_cert_server_cert_req(gnutls_session_t session,
uint8_t tmp_data[CERTTYPE_SIZE];
const version_entry_st *ver = get_version(session);
unsigned init_pos = data->length;
+ enum CertificateSigTypeFlags flags;
if (unlikely(ver == NULL))
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1297,18 +1308,71 @@ _gnutls_gen_cert_server_cert_req(gnutls_session_t session,
return GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS;
}
- i = 1;
+ if (_gnutls_version_has_selectable_sighash(ver)) {
+ size_t j;
+
+ flags = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < session->internals.priorities->sigalg.size; j++) {
+ const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se =
+ session->internals.priorities->sigalg.entry[j];
+ switch (se->pk) {
+ case GNUTLS_PK_RSA:
+ case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS:
+ flags |= RSA_SIGN_FLAG;
+ break;
+ case GNUTLS_PK_DSA:
+ flags |= DSA_SIGN_FLAG;
+ break;
+ case GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ flags |= ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG;
+ break;
#ifdef ENABLE_GOST
- if (_gnutls_kx_is_vko_gost(session->security_parameters.cs->kx_algorithm)) {
- tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN;
- tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN;
- } else
+ case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
+ flags |= GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG;
+ break;
+ case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512:
+ flags |= GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG;
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ gnutls_assert();
+ _gnutls_debug_log(
+ "%s is unsupported for cert request\n",
+ gnutls_pk_get_name(se->pk));
+ }
+ }
+
+ } else {
+#ifdef ENABLE_GOST
+ if (_gnutls_kx_is_vko_gost(session->security_parameters.
+ cs->kx_algorithm)) {
+ flags = GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG |
+ GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG;
+ } else
#endif
- {
+ {
+ flags = RSA_SIGN_FLAG | DSA_SIGN_FLAG | ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG;
+ }
+ }
+
+ i = 1;
+ if (flags & RSA_SIGN_FLAG) {
tmp_data[i++] = RSA_SIGN;
+ }
+ if (flags & DSA_SIGN_FLAG) {
tmp_data[i++] = DSA_SIGN;
+ }
+ if (flags & ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG) {
tmp_data[i++] = ECDSA_SIGN;
}
+#ifdef ENABLE_GOST
+ if (flags & GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG) {
+ tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN;
+ }
+ if (flags & GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG) {
+ tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN;
+ }
+#endif
tmp_data[0] = i - 1;
ret = _gnutls_buffer_append_data(data, tmp_data, i);
--
2.31.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
From c2409e479df41620bceac314c76cabb1d35a4075 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 16:35:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x509/verify: treat SHA-1 signed CA in the trusted set
differently
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Suppose there is a certificate chain ending with an intermediate CA:
EE → ICA1 → ICA2. If the system trust store contains a root CA
generated with the same key as ICA2 but signed with a prohibited
algorithm, such as SHA-1, the library previously reported a
verification failure, though the situation is not uncommon during a
transition period of root CA.
This changes the library behavior such that the check on signature
algorithm will be skipped when examining the trusted root CA.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/x509/verify.c | 26 ++++---
tests/test-chains.h | 165 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/x509/verify.c b/lib/x509/verify.c
index fd7c6a164..a50b5ea44 100644
--- a/lib/x509/verify.c
+++ b/lib/x509/verify.c
@@ -415,14 +415,19 @@ unsigned _gnutls_is_broken_sig_allowed(const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se, unsigned
#define CASE_SEC_PARAM(profile, level) \
case profile: \
sym_bits = gnutls_sec_param_to_symmetric_bits(level); \
- hash = gnutls_sign_get_hash_algorithm(sigalg); \
- entry = mac_to_entry(hash); \
- if (hash <= 0 || entry == NULL) { \
+ se = _gnutls_sign_to_entry(sigalg); \
+ if (unlikely(se == NULL)) { \
+ _gnutls_cert_log("cert", crt); \
+ _gnutls_debug_log(#level": certificate's signature algorithm is unknown\n"); \
+ return gnutls_assert_val(0); \
+ } \
+ if (unlikely(se->hash == GNUTLS_DIG_UNKNOWN)) { \
_gnutls_cert_log("cert", crt); \
_gnutls_debug_log(#level": certificate's signature hash is unknown\n"); \
return gnutls_assert_val(0); \
} \
- if (_gnutls_sign_get_hash_strength(sigalg) < sym_bits) { \
+ if (!trusted && \
+ _gnutls_sign_get_hash_strength(sigalg) < sym_bits) { \
_gnutls_cert_log("cert", crt); \
_gnutls_debug_log(#level": certificate's signature hash strength is unacceptable (is %u bits, needed %u)\n", _gnutls_sign_get_hash_strength(sigalg), sym_bits); \
return gnutls_assert_val(0); \
@@ -449,19 +454,22 @@ unsigned _gnutls_is_broken_sig_allowed(const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se, unsigned
* @crt: a certificate
* @issuer: the certificates issuer (allowed to be NULL)
* @sigalg: the signature algorithm used
+ * @trusted: whether @crt is treated as trusted (e.g., present in the system
+ * trust list); if it is true, the check on signature algorithm will
+ * be skipped
* @flags: the specified verification flags
*/
static unsigned is_level_acceptable(
gnutls_x509_crt_t crt, gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer,
- gnutls_sign_algorithm_t sigalg, unsigned flags)
+ gnutls_sign_algorithm_t sigalg, bool trusted,
+ unsigned flags)
{
gnutls_certificate_verification_profiles_t profile = GNUTLS_VFLAGS_TO_PROFILE(flags);
- const mac_entry_st *entry;
int issuer_pkalg = 0, pkalg, ret;
unsigned bits = 0, issuer_bits = 0, sym_bits = 0;
gnutls_pk_params_st params;
gnutls_sec_param_t sp;
- int hash;
+ const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se;
gnutls_certificate_verification_profiles_t min_profile;
min_profile = _gnutls_get_system_wide_verification_profile();
@@ -798,7 +806,7 @@ verify_crt(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
}
if (sigalg >= 0 && se) {
- if (is_level_acceptable(cert, issuer, sigalg, flags) == 0) {
+ if (is_level_acceptable(cert, issuer, sigalg, false, flags) == 0) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM);
}
@@ -893,7 +901,7 @@ unsigned check_ca_sanity(const gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer,
/* we explicitly allow CAs which we do not support their self-algorithms
* to pass. */
- if (ret >= 0 && !is_level_acceptable(issuer, NULL, sigalg, flags)) {
+ if (ret >= 0 && !is_level_acceptable(issuer, NULL, sigalg, true, flags)) {
status |= GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM|GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
}
diff --git a/tests/test-chains.h b/tests/test-chains.h
index 9b06b85f5..64f50fabf 100644
--- a/tests/test-chains.h
+++ b/tests/test-chains.h
@@ -4106,6 +4106,163 @@ static const char *superseding_ca[] = {
NULL
};
+static const char *rsa_sha1_in_trusted[] = {
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIID0jCCAoqgAwIBAgIUezaBB7f4TW75oc3UV57oJvXmbBYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
+ "BQAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOR251VExTIHRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNMjEwNTAzMTQyNzIxWhcN\n"
+ "MjIwNTAzMTQyNzIxWjA3MRgwFgYDVQQDEw90ZXN0LmdudXRscy5vcmcxGzAZBgNV\n"
+ "BAoTEkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IHNlcnZlcjCCAVIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggE/ADCC\n"
+ "AToCggExALRrJ5glr8H/HsqwfvTYvO1DhmdUXdq0HsKQX4M8AhH8E3KFsoikZUEL\n"
+ "dl8jvoqf/nlLczsux0s8vxbJl1U1F/OhckswwuAnlBLzVgDmzoJLEV2kHpv6+rkb\n"
+ "Kk0Ytbql5gzHqKihbaqIhNyWDrJsHDWq58eUPfnVx8KiDUuzbnr3CF/FCc0Vkxr3\n"
+ "mN8qTGaJJO0f0BZjgWWlWDuhzSVim5mBVAgXGOx8LwiiOyhXMp0XRwqG+2KxQZnm\n"
+ "+96o6iB+8xvuuuqaIWQpkvKtc+UZBZ03U+IRnxhfIrriiw0AjJ4vp4c9QL5KoqWS\n"
+ "CAwuYcBYfJqZ4dasgzklzz4b7eujbZ3LxTjewcdumzQUvjA+gpAeuUqaduTvMwxG\n"
+ "ojFy9sNhC/iqZ4n0peV2N6Epn4B5qnUCAwEAAaOBkzCBkDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAA\n"
+ "MBoGA1UdEQQTMBGCD3Rlc3QuZ251dGxzLm9yZzATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcD\n"
+ "ATAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDB6AAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRIIzRTCokxOEpa6sq20qbezh0r\n"
+ "GDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQedyNtZzEfkQebli/s/MhG/ozhAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n"
+ "AAOCATEAXs8lOV231HQerhSGEjZJz0vBuA3biKYlu3cwCTKvF6EOyYMSWOnfqqD0\n"
+ "eDhpo1pzGtUa2zYLHagb+sU2NSTe0sqP+PK1giUg8X8/tRtWKk1p/m76yK/3iaty\n"
+ "flgz+eMai4xQu2FvAJzIASFjM9R+Pgpcf/zdvkiUPv8Rdm9FieyAZnJSo9hJHLxN\n"
+ "x60tfC5yyswdbGGW0GbJ2kr+xMfVZvxgO/x6AXlOaUGQ+jZAu9eJwFQMDW5h5/S1\n"
+ "PJkIt7f7jkU33cG+BawcjhT0GzxuvDnnCG0L7/z7bR+Sw2kNKqHbHorzv91R20Oh\n"
+ "CIISJPkiiP+mYcglTp1d9gw09GwSkGbldb9ibfc0hKyxiImFfIiTqDbXJcpKH98o\n"
+ "W8hWkb20QURlY+QM5MD49znfhPKMTQ==\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIID2TCCAkGgAwIBAgIUWsb4DATcefXbo0WrBfgqVMvPGawwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
+ "BQAwHjEcMBoGA1UEAxMTR251VExTIHRlc3Qgcm9vdCBDQTAeFw0yMTA1MDMxNDI2\n"
+ "MzVaFw0yMjA1MDMxNDI2MzVaMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMTDkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IENBMIIB\n"
+ "UjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAT8AMIIBOgKCATEAnORCsX1unl//fy2d1054XduI\n"
+ "g/3CqVBaT3Hca65SEoDwh0KiPtQoOgZLdKY2cobGs/ojYtOjcs0KnlPYdmtjEh6W\n"
+ "EhuJU95v4TQdC4OLMiE56eIGq252hZAbHoTL84Q14DxQWGuzQK830iml7fbw2WcI\n"
+ "cRQ8vFGs8SzfXw63+MI6Fq6iMAQIqP08WzGmRRzL5wvCiPhCVkrPmwbXoABub6AA\n"
+ "sYwWPJB91M9/lx5gFH5k9/iPfi3s2Kg3F8MOcppqFYjxDSnsfiz6eMh1+bYVIAo3\n"
+ "67vGVYHigXMEZC2FezlwIHaZzpEoFlY3a7LFJ00yrjQ910r8UE+CEMTYzE40D0ol\n"
+ "CMo7FA9RCjeO3bUIoYaIdVTUGWEGHWSeoxGei9Gkm6u+ASj8f+i0jxdD2qXsewID\n"
+ "AQABo2QwYjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA8GA1UdDwEB/wQFAwMHBAAwHQYDVR0O\n"
+ "BBYEFB53I21nMR+RB5uWL+z8yEb+jOEDMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFCApU0Q1pxZL+AW3\n"
+ "GctysPWxl+SfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBgQBbboeDr/rLT1tZWrdHq8FvflGm\n"
+ "EpxZIRU4DdDD/SUCWSPQvjBq0MvuKxs5FfJCKrDf2kS2qlZ1rO0AuWwREoDeTOEc\n"
+ "arjFoCry+JQ+USqS5F4gsp4XlYvli27iMp3dlnhFXEQQy7/y+gM5c9wnMi8v/LUz\n"
+ "AV6QHX0fkb4XeazeJ+Nq0EkjqiYxylN6mP+5LAEMBG/wGviAoviQ5tN9zdoQs/nT\n"
+ "3jTw3cOauuPjdcOTfo71+/MtBzhPchgNIyQo4aB40XVWsLAoruL/3CFFlTniihtd\n"
+ "zA2zA7JvbuuKx6BOv2IbWOUweb732ZpYbDgEcXp/6Cj/SIUGxidpEgdCJGqyqdC7\n"
+ "b58ujxclC6QTcicw+SX5LBox8WGLfj+x+V3uVBz9+EK608xphTj4kLh9peII9v3n\n"
+ "vBUoZRTiUTCvH4AJJgAfa3mYrSxzueuqBOwXcvZ+8OJ0J1CP21pmK5nxR7f1nm9Q\n"
+ "sYA1VHfC2dtyAYlByeF5iHl5hFR6vy1jJyzxg2M=\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const char *rsa_sha1_in_trusted_ca[] = {
+ /* This CA is generated with the same key as rsa_sha1_in_trusted[1], but
+ * self-signed using SHA-1.
+ */
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIDYzCCAhugAwIBAgIUahO8CvYPHTAltKCC2rAIcXUiLlAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF\n"
+ "BQAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOR251VExTIHRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNMjEwNTAzMTQyMDM1WhcN\n"
+ "MjIwNTAzMTQyMDM1WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5HbnVUTFMgdGVzdCBDQTCCAVIwDQYJ\n"
+ "KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggE/ADCCAToCggExAJzkQrF9bp5f/38tnddOeF3biIP9wqlQ\n"
+ "Wk9x3GuuUhKA8IdCoj7UKDoGS3SmNnKGxrP6I2LTo3LNCp5T2HZrYxIelhIbiVPe\n"
+ "b+E0HQuDizIhOeniBqtudoWQGx6Ey/OENeA8UFhrs0CvN9Ippe328NlnCHEUPLxR\n"
+ "rPEs318Ot/jCOhauojAECKj9PFsxpkUcy+cLwoj4QlZKz5sG16AAbm+gALGMFjyQ\n"
+ "fdTPf5ceYBR+ZPf4j34t7NioNxfDDnKaahWI8Q0p7H4s+njIdfm2FSAKN+u7xlWB\n"
+ "4oFzBGQthXs5cCB2mc6RKBZWN2uyxSdNMq40PddK/FBPghDE2MxONA9KJQjKOxQP\n"
+ "UQo3jt21CKGGiHVU1BlhBh1knqMRnovRpJurvgEo/H/otI8XQ9ql7HsCAwEAAaND\n"
+ "MEEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDBwQAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQe\n"
+ "dyNtZzEfkQebli/s/MhG/ozhAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCATEAYLm/4DfUp+mA\n"
+ "S/23a2bwybJoPCMzKZpi+veXkqoq/a/BCUkFpqnjpVjz0ujVKK121oeOPBAa/mG1\n"
+ "Y3fJYP+b3PloL/6xj/8680TveGirCr0Rp/8XWa8lt+Ge8DM3mfTGWFTWHa0lD9VK\n"
+ "gjV1oNZNLe5SKA6dJLAp/NjCxc/vuOkThQPeaoO5Iy/Z6m7CpTLO7T4syJFtDmSn\n"
+ "Pa/yFUDTgJYFlGVM+KC1r8bhZ6Ao1CAXTcT5Lcbe/aCcyk6B3J2AnYsqPMVNEVhb\n"
+ "9eMGO/WG24hMLy6eb1r/yL8uQ/uGi2rRlNJN8GTg09YR7l5fHrHxuHc/sme0jsnJ\n"
+ "wtqGLCJsrh7Ae1fKVUueO00Yx9BGuzLswMvnT5f0oYs0jrXgMrTbIWS/DjOcYIHb\n"
+ "w3SV1ZRcNg==\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const char *rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted[] = {
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIID0jCCAoqgAwIBAgIUNCvPV9OvyuVMtnkC3ZAvh959h4MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
+ "BQAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOR251VExTIHRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNMjEwNTA0MDg0NzAzWhcN\n"
+ "MjIwNTA0MDg0NzAzWjA3MRgwFgYDVQQDEw90ZXN0LmdudXRscy5vcmcxGzAZBgNV\n"
+ "BAoTEkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IHNlcnZlcjCCAVIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggE/ADCC\n"
+ "AToCggExALRrJ5glr8H/HsqwfvTYvO1DhmdUXdq0HsKQX4M8AhH8E3KFsoikZUEL\n"
+ "dl8jvoqf/nlLczsux0s8vxbJl1U1F/OhckswwuAnlBLzVgDmzoJLEV2kHpv6+rkb\n"
+ "Kk0Ytbql5gzHqKihbaqIhNyWDrJsHDWq58eUPfnVx8KiDUuzbnr3CF/FCc0Vkxr3\n"
+ "mN8qTGaJJO0f0BZjgWWlWDuhzSVim5mBVAgXGOx8LwiiOyhXMp0XRwqG+2KxQZnm\n"
+ "+96o6iB+8xvuuuqaIWQpkvKtc+UZBZ03U+IRnxhfIrriiw0AjJ4vp4c9QL5KoqWS\n"
+ "CAwuYcBYfJqZ4dasgzklzz4b7eujbZ3LxTjewcdumzQUvjA+gpAeuUqaduTvMwxG\n"
+ "ojFy9sNhC/iqZ4n0peV2N6Epn4B5qnUCAwEAAaOBkzCBkDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAA\n"
+ "MBoGA1UdEQQTMBGCD3Rlc3QuZ251dGxzLm9yZzATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcD\n"
+ "ATAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDB6AAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRIIzRTCokxOEpa6sq20qbezh0r\n"
+ "GDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQedyNtZzEfkQebli/s/MhG/ozhAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n"
+ "AAOCATEAWs/Qa1Ebydwo4Ke2KEdy5cUTSZjnoz93XpbrP9W60MJ4d2DIQPcYUcLF\n"
+ "+glez+mRtVXDRtH5V/4yZX1EdgrPVQGeVlO5HbNiYyYw/Yj3H6kzWtUbBxdOAOE/\n"
+ "/ul8RCKKMfvYBHCBgjBMW0aFm31Q1Z8m8nanBusyJ0DG1scBHu4/3vTCZthZAxc5\n"
+ "3l3t/jjsNRS+k5t6Ay8nEY1tAZSGVqN8qufzO2NBO06sQagp09FTfDh581OBcVtF\n"
+ "X7O0cffAWHk3JoywzEWFEAhVPqFlk07wG2O+k+fYZfavsJko5q+yWkxu8RDh4wAx\n"
+ "7UzKudGOQ+NhfYJ7N7V1/RFg1z75gE3GTUX7qmGZEVDOsMyiuUeYg8znyYpBV55Q\n"
+ "4BNr0ukwmwOdvUf+ksCu6PdOGaqThA==\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ /* ICA with SHA1 signature */
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIID2TCCAkGgAwIBAgIUYaKJkQft87M1TF+Jd30py3yIq4swDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF\n"
+ "BQAwHjEcMBoGA1UEAxMTR251VExTIHRlc3Qgcm9vdCBDQTAeFw0yMTA1MDQwODQ1\n"
+ "NDdaFw0yMjA1MDQwODQ1NDdaMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMTDkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IENBMIIB\n"
+ "UjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAT8AMIIBOgKCATEAnORCsX1unl//fy2d1054XduI\n"
+ "g/3CqVBaT3Hca65SEoDwh0KiPtQoOgZLdKY2cobGs/ojYtOjcs0KnlPYdmtjEh6W\n"
+ "EhuJU95v4TQdC4OLMiE56eIGq252hZAbHoTL84Q14DxQWGuzQK830iml7fbw2WcI\n"
+ "cRQ8vFGs8SzfXw63+MI6Fq6iMAQIqP08WzGmRRzL5wvCiPhCVkrPmwbXoABub6AA\n"
+ "sYwWPJB91M9/lx5gFH5k9/iPfi3s2Kg3F8MOcppqFYjxDSnsfiz6eMh1+bYVIAo3\n"
+ "67vGVYHigXMEZC2FezlwIHaZzpEoFlY3a7LFJ00yrjQ910r8UE+CEMTYzE40D0ol\n"
+ "CMo7FA9RCjeO3bUIoYaIdVTUGWEGHWSeoxGei9Gkm6u+ASj8f+i0jxdD2qXsewID\n"
+ "AQABo2QwYjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA8GA1UdDwEB/wQFAwMHBAAwHQYDVR0O\n"
+ "BBYEFB53I21nMR+RB5uWL+z8yEb+jOEDMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFCApU0Q1pxZL+AW3\n"
+ "GctysPWxl+SfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBgQAewBcAGUGX28I5PDtuJkxoHonD\n"
+ "muHdXpYnrz1YXN4b7odNXockz++Xovgj126fo+PeWgmaaCic98ZcGnyVTi9+3oqN\n"
+ "2Bf4NNfyzSccgZZTphzbwjMcnc983HLQgsLSAOVivPHj5GEN58EWWamc9yA0VjGn\n"
+ "cuYmFN2dlFA8/ClEbVGu3UXBe6OljR5zUr+6oiSp2J+Rl7SerVSHlst07iU2tkeB\n"
+ "dlfOD5CquUGSka3SKvEfvu5SwYrCQVfYB6eMLInm7A0/ca0Jn3Oh4fMf2rIg/E3K\n"
+ "qsopxsu8BXrLoGK4MxbxPA65JpczhZgilQQi3e3RIvxrvyD2qamjaNbyG5cr8mW4\n"
+ "VOLf3vUORbkTi5sE7uRMu2B3z3N7ajsuQM8RHB17hOCB2FO/8rermq/oeJNtx57L\n"
+ "5s5NxCHYTksQ4gkpR4gfTIO/zwXJSwGa/Zi2y2wIi/1qr7lppBsKV2rDWX7QiIeA\n"
+ "PxOxyJA2eSeqCorz9vk3aHXleSpxsWGgKiJVmV0=\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const char *rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted_ca[] = {
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIEDTCCAnWgAwIBAgIUd5X8NZput+aNPEd9h92r4KAu16MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
+ "BQAwHjEcMBoGA1UEAxMTR251VExTIHRlc3Qgcm9vdCBDQTAeFw0yMTA1MDMxNDI1\n"
+ "MDNaFw0yMjA1MDMxNDI1MDNaMB4xHDAaBgNVBAMTE0dudVRMUyB0ZXN0IHJvb3Qg\n"
+ "Q0EwggGiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBjwAwggGKAoIBgQCsFAaMb/iRN+OFqQNh\n"
+ "OkkXGZlb+eLerLuB9ELnYwyLIh4MTXh0RjFZdCQLsQHfY/YFv0C50rmoXTA/d3Ef\n"
+ "K/P243KjX0XBWjO9TBuN0zth50eq94zf69yxA/a+kmT+O5YLfhi2ELM5F3IjOUoZ\n"
+ "lL0IGlFJwauAkaNylp/Evd5nW7g5DUJvMm4A3RXNfZt9gAD4lPRwryQq9jxT48Xu\n"
+ "fB0kAPEG/l/Izbz2rYin5+nySL+a0CSNuEbITxidtMhveB747oR0QS2sMQKji1ur\n"
+ "pRJ945SHiYJIgVuFAJc9StikSyIrxZgK45kAzcQAyRWWKiMNH5PprGFYJp+ypwhm\n"
+ "1t8Bphj2RFJAG3XRRZF/9uJIYc5mEHCsZFZ/IFRaKqyN30kAUijgNt+lW5mZXVFU\n"
+ "aqzV2zHjSG8jsGdia3cfBP46Z1q2eAh5jOCucTq1F7qZdVhOFmP9jFE6Uy5Kbwgc\n"
+ "kNAnsEllQeJQL2odVa7woKkZZ4M/c72X5tpBU38Rs3krn3sCAwEAAaNDMEEwDwYD\n"
+ "VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDBwQAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQgKVNENacW\n"
+ "S/gFtxnLcrD1sZfknzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAYEAaZMV71mZ9FYoVdpho61h\n"
+ "WWPs5GppQLJ1w70DNtGZ+lFrk/KopeDvOu1i61QLWRzcZCZMl+npiX1KH5kjVo3v\n"
+ "C9G8kdMW6EVRk5p6qCJMPFN2U+grMMp50aY5kmw+/v+Lhk5T/VG93l63P91FkUre\n"
+ "o8qhOudJExoUnR1uB9M6HMAxVn8Lm/N1LGPiP6A6Pboo716H7mg/A7pv9zoZ6jUp\n"
+ "7x693mA/b3I/QpDx/nJcmcdqxgEuW+aRlFXgnYZRFAawxi+5M9EwCWbkSTO4OMHP\n"
+ "Qlvak3tJO+wb92b0cICOOtzIPgQ+caiLg9d0FvesALmQzDmNmtqynoO85+Ia2Ywh\n"
+ "nxKPlpeImhLN9nGl9sOeW2m4mnA5r0h1vgML4v/MWL4TQhXallc31uFNj5HyFaTh\n"
+ "6Mr0g3GeQgN0jpT+aIOiKuW9fLts54+Ntj1NN40slqi3Y+/Yd6xhj+NgmbRvybZu\n"
+ "tnYFXKC0Q+QUf38horqG2Mc3/uh8MOm0eYUXwGJOdXYD\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ NULL
+};
+
#if defined __clang__ || __GNUC__ > 4 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 5)
# pragma GCC diagnostic push
# pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-variable"
@@ -4275,6 +4432,14 @@ static struct
{ "ed448 - ok", ed448, &ed448[0], GNUTLS_PROFILE_TO_VFLAGS(GNUTLS_PROFILE_ULTRA),
0, NULL, 1584352960, 1},
{ "superseding - ok", superseding, superseding_ca, 0, 0, 0, 1590928011 },
+ { "rsa-sha1 in trusted - ok",
+ rsa_sha1_in_trusted, rsa_sha1_in_trusted_ca,
+ GNUTLS_PROFILE_TO_VFLAGS(GNUTLS_PROFILE_MEDIUM),
+ 0, NULL, 1620052390, 1},
+ { "rsa-sha1 not in trusted - not ok",
+ rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted, rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted_ca,
+ GNUTLS_PROFILE_TO_VFLAGS(GNUTLS_PROFILE_MEDIUM),
+ GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID, NULL, 1620118136, 1},
{ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, 0}
};
--
2.31.1

View File

@ -1,846 +0,0 @@
From 2c44e9f8b2e7a1ebc65caeb03f9f106d31e30822 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 13:40:04 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/7] crypto-selftests-pk.c: Move hardcoded values to the top
The objective of moving these values to the top is to allow them to be
used by other functions, in particular test_sig().
Signed-off-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
---
lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c | 224 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 112 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
index 1aa53ea29..4fadd4161 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
@@ -107,6 +107,118 @@ static const char gost12_512_key[] =
"KjL7CLBERDm7Yvlv\n"
"-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
+/* A precomputed RSA-SHA256 signature using the rsa_key2048 */
+static const char rsa_sig[] =
+ "\x7a\xb3\xf8\xb0\xf9\xf0\x52\x88\x37\x17\x97\x9f\xbe\x61\xb4\xd2\x43\x78\x9f\x79\x92\xd0\xad\x08\xdb\xbd\x3c\x72\x7a\xb5\x51\x59\x63\xd6\x7d\xf1\x9c\x1e\x10\x7b\x27\xab\xf8\xd4\x9d\xcd\xc5\xf9\xae\xf7\x09\x6b\x40\x93\xc5\xe9\x1c\x0f\xb4\x82\xa1\x47\x86\x54\x63\xd2\x4d\x40\x9a\x80\xb9\x38\x45\x69\xa2\xd6\x92\xb6\x69\x7f\x3f\xf3\x5b\xa5\x1d\xac\x06\xad\xdf\x4e\xbb\xe6\xda\x68\x0d\xe5\xab\xef\xd2\xf0\xc5\xd8\xc0\xed\x80\xe2\xd4\x76\x98\xec\x44\xa2\xfc\x3f\xce\x2e\x8b\xc4\x4b\xab\xb0\x70\x24\x52\x85\x2a\x36\xcd\x9a\xb5\x05\x00\xea\x98\x7c\x72\x06\x68\xb1\x38\x44\x16\x80\x6a\x3b\x64\x72\xbb\xfd\x4b\xc9\xdd\xda\x2a\x68\xde\x7f\x6e\x48\x28\xc1\x63\x57\x2b\xde\x83\xa3\x27\x34\xd7\xa6\x87\x18\x35\x10\xff\x31\xd9\x47\xc9\x84\x35\xe1\xaa\xe2\xf7\x98\xfa\x19\xd3\xf1\x94\x25\x2a\x96\xe4\xa8\xa7\x05\x10\x93\x87\xde\x96\x85\xe5\x68\xb8\xe5\x4e\xbf\x66\x85\x91\xbd\x52\x5b\x3d\x9f\x1b\x79\xea\xe3\x8b\xef\x62\x18\x39\x7a\x50\x01\x46\x1b\xde\x8d\x37\xbc\x90\x6c\x07\xc0\x07\xed\x60\xce\x2e\x31\xd6\x8f\xe8\x75\xdb\x45\x21\xc6\xcb";
+
+/* ECDSA key and signature */
+static const char ecdsa_secp256r1_privkey[] =
+ "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+ "MHcCAQEEIPAKWV7+pZe9c5EubMNfAEKWRQtP/MvlO9HehwHmJssNoAoGCCqGSM49\n"
+ "AwEHoUQDQgAE2CNONRio3ciuXtoomJKs3MdbzLbd44VPhtzJN30VLFm5gvnfiCj2\n"
+ "zzz7pl9Cv0ECHl6yedNI8QEKdcwCDgEmkQ==\n"
+ "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
+
+static const char ecdsa_secp256r1_sig[] =
+ "\x30\x45\x02\x21\x00\x9b\x8f\x60\xed\x9e\x40\x8d\x74\x82\x73\xab\x20\x1a\x69\xfc\xf9\xee\x3c\x41\x80\xc0\x39\xdd\x21\x1a\x64\xfd\xbf\x7e\xaa\x43\x70\x02\x20\x44\x28\x05\xdd\x30\x47\x58\x96\x18\x39\x94\x18\xba\xe7\x7a\xf6\x1e\x2d\xba\xb1\xe0\x7d\x73\x9e\x2f\x58\xee\x0c\x2a\x89\xe8\x35";
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_NON_SUITEB_CURVES
+/* sha256 */
+static const char ecdsa_secp192r1_privkey[] =
+ "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
+ "MF8CAQEEGLjezFcbgDMeApVrdtZHvu/k1a8/tVZ41KAKBggqhkjOPQMBAaE0AzIA"
+ "BO1lciKdgxeRH8k64vxcaV1OYIK9akVrW02Dw21MXhRLP0l0wzCw6LGSr5rS6AaL"
+ "Fg==" "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----";
+
+static const char ecdsa_secp192r1_sig[] =
+ "\x30\x34\x02\x18\x5f\xb3\x10\x4b\x4d\x44\x48\x29\x4b\xfd\xa7\x8e\xce\x57\xac\x36\x38\x54\xab\x73\xdb\xed\xb8\x5f\x02\x18\x0b\x8b\xf3\xae\x49\x50\x0e\x47\xca\x89\x1a\x00\xca\x23\xf5\x8d\xd6\xe3\xce\x9a\xff\x2e\x4f\x5c";
+
+static const char ecdsa_secp224r1_privkey[] =
+ "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
+ "MGgCAQEEHOKWJFdWdrR/CgVrUeTeawOrJ9GozE9KKx2a8PmgBwYFK4EEACGhPAM6"
+ "AAQKQj3YpenWT7lFR41SnBvmj/+Bj+kgzQnaF65qWAtPRJsZXFlLTu3/IUNqSRu9"
+ "DqPsk8xBHAB7pA==" "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----";
+
+static const char ecdsa_secp224r1_sig[] =
+ "\x30\x3d\x02\x1c\x76\x03\x8d\x74\xf4\xd3\x09\x2a\xb5\xdf\x6b\x5b\xf4\x4b\x86\xb8\x62\x81\x5d\x7b\x7a\xbb\x37\xfc\xf1\x46\x1c\x2b\x02\x1d\x00\xa0\x98\x5d\x80\x43\x89\xe5\xee\x1a\xec\x46\x08\x04\x55\xbc\x50\xfa\x2a\xd5\xa6\x18\x92\x19\xdb\x68\xa0\x2a\xda";
+#endif
+
+static const char ecdsa_secp384r1_privkey[] =
+ "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
+ "MIGkAgEBBDDevshD6gb+4rZpC9vwFcIwNs4KmGzdqCxyyN40a8uOWRbyf7aHdiSS"
+ "03oAyKtc4JCgBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAARO1KkPMno2tnNXx1S9EZkp8SOpDCZ4aobH"
+ "IYv8RHnSmKf8I3OKD6TaoeR+1MwJmNJUH90Bj45WXla68/vsPiFcfVKboxsZYe/n"
+ "pv8e4ugXagVQVBXNZJ859iYPdJR24vo=" "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----";
+
+static const char ecdsa_secp384r1_sig[] =
+ "\x30\x66\x02\x31\x00\xbb\x4d\x25\x30\x13\x1b\x3b\x75\x60\x07\xed\x53\x8b\x52\xee\xd8\x6e\xf1\x9d\xa8\x36\x0e\x2e\x20\x31\x51\x11\x48\x78\xdd\xaf\x24\x38\x64\x81\x71\x6b\xa6\xb7\x29\x58\x28\x82\x32\xba\x29\x29\xd9\x02\x31\x00\xeb\x70\x09\x87\xac\x7b\x78\x0d\x4c\x4f\x08\x2b\x86\x27\xe2\x60\x1f\xc9\x11\x9f\x1d\xf5\x82\x4c\xc7\x3d\xb0\x27\xc8\x93\x29\xc7\xd0\x0e\x88\x02\x09\x93\xc2\x72\xce\xa5\x74\x8c\x3d\xe0\x8c\xad";
+
+static const char ecdsa_secp521r1_privkey[] =
+ "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
+ "MIHbAgEBBEGO2n7NN363qSCvJVdlQtCvudtaW4o0fEufXRjE1AsCrle+VXX0Zh0w"
+ "Y1slSeDHMndpakoiF+XkQ+bhcB867UV6aKAHBgUrgQQAI6GBiQOBhgAEAQb6jDpo"
+ "byy1tF8Zucg0TMGUzIN2DK+RZJ3QQRdWdirO25OIC3FoFi1Yird6rpoB6HlNyJ7R"
+ "0bNG9Uv34bSHMn8yAFoiqxUCdJZQbEenMoZsi6COaePe3e0QqvDMr0hEWT23Sr3t"
+ "LpEV7eZGFfFIJw5wSUp2KOcs+O9WjmoukTWtDKNV"
+ "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----";
+
+static const char ecdsa_secp521r1_sig[] =
+ "\x30\x81\x87\x02\x42\x01\xb8\xcb\x52\x9e\x10\xa8\x49\x3f\xe1\x9e\x14\x0a\xcf\x96\xed\x7e\xab\x7d\x0c\xe1\x9b\xa4\x97\xdf\x01\xf5\x35\x42\x5f\x5b\x28\x15\x24\x33\x6e\x59\x6c\xaf\x10\x8b\x98\x8e\xe9\x4c\x23\x0d\x76\x92\x03\xdd\x6d\x8d\x08\x47\x15\x5b\xf8\x66\x75\x75\x40\xe8\xf4\xa0\x52\x02\x41\x15\x27\x7c\x5f\xa6\x33\xa6\x29\x68\x3f\x55\x8d\x7f\x1d\x4f\x88\xc6\x61\x6e\xac\x21\xdf\x2b\x7b\xde\x76\x9a\xdc\xe6\x3b\x94\x3f\x03\x9c\xa2\xa6\xa3\x63\x39\x48\xbd\x79\x70\x21\xf2\x6b\xff\x58\x66\xf1\x58\xc2\x58\xad\x4f\x84\x14\x5d\x05\x12\x83\xd0\x87\xbd\xf3";
+
+/* DSA key and signature */
+static const char dsa_privkey[] =
+ "-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+ "MIIDTQIBAAKCAQEAh60B6yPMRIT7udq2kKuwnQDohvT1U0w+RJcSr23C05cM/Ovn\n"
+ "UP/8Rrj6T8K+uYhMbKgLaZiJJW9q04jaPQk0cfUphbLvRjzVHwE/0Bkb+Y1Rv7ni\n"
+ "Jot2IFMq5iuNraf889PC0WREvFCcIkSFY2Ac4WT7mCcBtfx/raGFXDUjcUrJ0HwZ\n"
+ "IOhjQDfcXUsztuyYsYA75ociEY8kyDZq/ixyr5++R1VjNf30Re8AbQlXOEGxEN5t\n"
+ "t+Tvpq8K5L3prQs2KNSzyOUmedjb/ojH4T4qe/RL9EVjjeuIGHDNUT6F197yZ91y\n"
+ "qLLTf1WjnUyZcKij5rryX0LJBBWawEZjNSHZawIdAMQlyycia4NigCdiDR+QptUn\n"
+ "2xrj9o14fXkIrXcCggEAXRZm1rbPhsjSTo6cpCVrmDzO1grv83EHiBH4MvRQQnP8\n"
+ "FpAREsBA5cYju97XvLaLhioZeMjLn08kU7TUbHRUB+ULTuVvE2dQbBpGuKiLRRt9\n"
+ "6U2T0eD3xGLoM+o8EY/kpqaWGEpZv7hzM9xuo4vy55+viAZgFWULqmltwfG/7w7V\n"
+ "NXUHNv5H4Ipw//fSDLTPqzUlNqSSswDLz6pCjWEs0rWAqNAMaOiLTz4id9pL48Oe\n"
+ "oAfpcQR9tgTEnwyXfZBnrJVclHhkHKGeXvU05IgCzpKO76Z5R+By50T0i/JV7vzM\n"
+ "l2yS9aAl/cprT6U7yI3oU/blldCVNpMcFAFb+fO8DAKCAQBVMo8xptyvQOJeSvbO\n"
+ "SSYdJ3IiI/0GdkcGWXblWg9z7mrPaWEnT7OquEm/+vYtWd3GHDtyNM+jzsN4Xgjc\n"
+ "TL3AEd2hLiozJQ1BFKw25VU08UHAYTzUxZhO4Vwtmp46Kwj8YLDQ3NHRWCBxpDQR\n"
+ "fbiFvyXP+qXap6plMfrydnUD1mae/JSOWOYgdB7tFIehstLxVXx/cAnjwgFU03Df\n"
+ "grjsad92zA1Hc9wIjbsgAQdTR5DWnFRkRt3UtayBwoyqm6QceZHsv1NAGvkQ4ion\n"
+ "bEjkHkjF9YCkR9/rspR8cLghRIXMjOpypuSbaRPeeWq0gP2UOxFL/d3iWH0ETr/L\n"
+ "kTlCAhxYGpVgtfB96qmJukyl9GOGvfkwFTgEyIDoV84M\n"
+ "-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
+
+static const char dsa_sig[] =
+ "\x30\x3d\x02\x1c\x2e\x40\x14\xb3\x7a\x3f\xc0\x4f\x06\x74\x4f\xa6\x5f\xc2\x0a\x46\x35\x38\x88\xb4\x1a\xcf\x94\x02\x40\x42\x7c\x7f\x02\x1d\x00\x98\xfc\xf1\x08\x66\xf1\x86\x28\xc9\x73\x9e\x2b\x5d\xce\x57\xe8\xb5\xeb\xcf\xa3\xf6\x60\xf6\x63\x16\x0e\xc0\x42";
+
+static const char gost01_privkey[] =
+ "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+ "MEUCAQAwHAYGKoUDAgITMBIGByqFAwICIwEGByqFAwICHgEEIgQgdNfuHGmmTdPm\n"
+ "p5dAa3ea9UYxpdYQPP9lbDwzQwG2bJM=\n"
+ "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
+
+static const char gost01_sig[] =
+ "\xc5\xc8\xf8\xdc\x22\x51\xb0\x72\xe9\xa2\xbb\x84\x6c\xe2\x24\xd5\x72\x39\x2a\x5a\x0e\x7a\x43\xfc\x9c\xc3\x5d\x32\x92\xbb\xab\xc0\x4b\x99\xbd\xc8\x47\x24\x70\x06\x7e\xa1\xc6\xe3\xa0\xdc\x42\xed\xa0\x66\xf0\xcc\x50\x97\xe9\x5a\x7d\x3f\x65\x2d\x7b\x1b\x03\xcb";
+
+static const char gost12_256_privkey[] =
+ "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+ "MEgCAQAwHwYIKoUDBwEBAQEwEwYHKoUDAgIjAQYIKoUDBwEBAgIEIgQgKOF96tom\n"
+ "D61rhSnzKjyrmO3fv0gdlHei+6ovrc8SnBk=\n"
+ "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
+
+static const char gost12_256_sig[] =
+ "\xb2\x51\x5a\x1a\xbd\x95\x4e\x71\x55\xad\x74\x74\x81\xa6\xca\x6c\x14\x01\xe0\x18\xda\xe4\x0d\x02\x4f\x14\xd2\x39\xd6\x3c\xb5\x85\xa8\x37\xfd\x7f\x2b\xfa\xe4\xf5\xbc\xbc\x15\x20\x8b\x83\x4b\x84\x0d\x5d\x02\x21\x8c\x0d\xb9\xc4\x2b\xc0\x3e\xfd\x42\x55\x1d\xb0";
+
+static const char gost12_512_privkey[] =
+ "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+ "MGoCAQAwIQYIKoUDBwEBAQIwFQYJKoUDBwECAQIBBggqhQMHAQECAwRCBECjFpvp\n"
+ "B0vdc7u59b99TCNXhHiB69JJtUjvieNkGYJpoaaIvoKZTNCjpSZASsZcQZCHOTof\n"
+ "hsQ3JCCy4xnd5jWT\n"
+ "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
+
+static const char gost12_512_sig[] =
+ "\x52\x4f\xa2\x77\x51\xd2\xc5\xef\xd3\xa3\x99\x4e\xec\xff\xc6\xe9\xfc\x2f\xc0\x28\x42\x03\x95\x6c\x9a\x38\xee\xea\x89\x79\xae\x1a\xc3\x68\x5e\xe4\x15\x15\x4b\xec\x0f\xf1\x7e\x0f\xba\x01\xc7\x84\x16\xc7\xb5\xac\x9d\x0c\x22\xdd\x31\xf7\xb0\x9b\x59\x4b\xf0\x02\xa8\x7d\xfd\x6d\x02\x43\xc7\x4f\x65\xbd\x84\x5c\x54\x91\xba\x75\x9f\x5a\x61\x19\x5c\x9a\x10\x78\x34\xa0\xa6\xf6\xdc\xb6\xb0\x50\x22\x38\x5f\xb0\x16\x66\xf1\xd5\x46\x00\xd5\xe2\xa8\xe5\xd2\x11\x5f\xd1\xbe\x6e\xac\xb2\x9c\x14\x34\x96\xe7\x58\x94\xb8\xf4\x5f";
+
static int test_rsa_enc(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk,
unsigned bits, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t ign)
{
@@ -302,118 +414,6 @@ static int test_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk,
return ret;
}
-/* A precomputed RSA-SHA1 signature using the rsa_key2048 */
-static const char rsa_sig[] =
- "\x7a\xb3\xf8\xb0\xf9\xf0\x52\x88\x37\x17\x97\x9f\xbe\x61\xb4\xd2\x43\x78\x9f\x79\x92\xd0\xad\x08\xdb\xbd\x3c\x72\x7a\xb5\x51\x59\x63\xd6\x7d\xf1\x9c\x1e\x10\x7b\x27\xab\xf8\xd4\x9d\xcd\xc5\xf9\xae\xf7\x09\x6b\x40\x93\xc5\xe9\x1c\x0f\xb4\x82\xa1\x47\x86\x54\x63\xd2\x4d\x40\x9a\x80\xb9\x38\x45\x69\xa2\xd6\x92\xb6\x69\x7f\x3f\xf3\x5b\xa5\x1d\xac\x06\xad\xdf\x4e\xbb\xe6\xda\x68\x0d\xe5\xab\xef\xd2\xf0\xc5\xd8\xc0\xed\x80\xe2\xd4\x76\x98\xec\x44\xa2\xfc\x3f\xce\x2e\x8b\xc4\x4b\xab\xb0\x70\x24\x52\x85\x2a\x36\xcd\x9a\xb5\x05\x00\xea\x98\x7c\x72\x06\x68\xb1\x38\x44\x16\x80\x6a\x3b\x64\x72\xbb\xfd\x4b\xc9\xdd\xda\x2a\x68\xde\x7f\x6e\x48\x28\xc1\x63\x57\x2b\xde\x83\xa3\x27\x34\xd7\xa6\x87\x18\x35\x10\xff\x31\xd9\x47\xc9\x84\x35\xe1\xaa\xe2\xf7\x98\xfa\x19\xd3\xf1\x94\x25\x2a\x96\xe4\xa8\xa7\x05\x10\x93\x87\xde\x96\x85\xe5\x68\xb8\xe5\x4e\xbf\x66\x85\x91\xbd\x52\x5b\x3d\x9f\x1b\x79\xea\xe3\x8b\xef\x62\x18\x39\x7a\x50\x01\x46\x1b\xde\x8d\x37\xbc\x90\x6c\x07\xc0\x07\xed\x60\xce\x2e\x31\xd6\x8f\xe8\x75\xdb\x45\x21\xc6\xcb";
-
-/* ECDSA key and signature */
-static const char ecdsa_secp256r1_privkey[] =
- "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
- "MHcCAQEEIPAKWV7+pZe9c5EubMNfAEKWRQtP/MvlO9HehwHmJssNoAoGCCqGSM49\n"
- "AwEHoUQDQgAE2CNONRio3ciuXtoomJKs3MdbzLbd44VPhtzJN30VLFm5gvnfiCj2\n"
- "zzz7pl9Cv0ECHl6yedNI8QEKdcwCDgEmkQ==\n"
- "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
-
-static const char ecdsa_secp256r1_sig[] =
- "\x30\x45\x02\x21\x00\x9b\x8f\x60\xed\x9e\x40\x8d\x74\x82\x73\xab\x20\x1a\x69\xfc\xf9\xee\x3c\x41\x80\xc0\x39\xdd\x21\x1a\x64\xfd\xbf\x7e\xaa\x43\x70\x02\x20\x44\x28\x05\xdd\x30\x47\x58\x96\x18\x39\x94\x18\xba\xe7\x7a\xf6\x1e\x2d\xba\xb1\xe0\x7d\x73\x9e\x2f\x58\xee\x0c\x2a\x89\xe8\x35";
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_NON_SUITEB_CURVES
-/* sha256 */
-static const char ecdsa_secp192r1_privkey[] =
- "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
- "MF8CAQEEGLjezFcbgDMeApVrdtZHvu/k1a8/tVZ41KAKBggqhkjOPQMBAaE0AzIA"
- "BO1lciKdgxeRH8k64vxcaV1OYIK9akVrW02Dw21MXhRLP0l0wzCw6LGSr5rS6AaL"
- "Fg==" "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----";
-
-static const char ecdsa_secp192r1_sig[] =
- "\x30\x34\x02\x18\x5f\xb3\x10\x4b\x4d\x44\x48\x29\x4b\xfd\xa7\x8e\xce\x57\xac\x36\x38\x54\xab\x73\xdb\xed\xb8\x5f\x02\x18\x0b\x8b\xf3\xae\x49\x50\x0e\x47\xca\x89\x1a\x00\xca\x23\xf5\x8d\xd6\xe3\xce\x9a\xff\x2e\x4f\x5c";
-
-static const char ecdsa_secp224r1_privkey[] =
- "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
- "MGgCAQEEHOKWJFdWdrR/CgVrUeTeawOrJ9GozE9KKx2a8PmgBwYFK4EEACGhPAM6"
- "AAQKQj3YpenWT7lFR41SnBvmj/+Bj+kgzQnaF65qWAtPRJsZXFlLTu3/IUNqSRu9"
- "DqPsk8xBHAB7pA==" "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----";
-
-static const char ecdsa_secp224r1_sig[] =
- "\x30\x3d\x02\x1c\x76\x03\x8d\x74\xf4\xd3\x09\x2a\xb5\xdf\x6b\x5b\xf4\x4b\x86\xb8\x62\x81\x5d\x7b\x7a\xbb\x37\xfc\xf1\x46\x1c\x2b\x02\x1d\x00\xa0\x98\x5d\x80\x43\x89\xe5\xee\x1a\xec\x46\x08\x04\x55\xbc\x50\xfa\x2a\xd5\xa6\x18\x92\x19\xdb\x68\xa0\x2a\xda";
-#endif
-
-static const char ecdsa_secp384r1_privkey[] =
- "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
- "MIGkAgEBBDDevshD6gb+4rZpC9vwFcIwNs4KmGzdqCxyyN40a8uOWRbyf7aHdiSS"
- "03oAyKtc4JCgBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAARO1KkPMno2tnNXx1S9EZkp8SOpDCZ4aobH"
- "IYv8RHnSmKf8I3OKD6TaoeR+1MwJmNJUH90Bj45WXla68/vsPiFcfVKboxsZYe/n"
- "pv8e4ugXagVQVBXNZJ859iYPdJR24vo=" "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----";
-
-static const char ecdsa_secp384r1_sig[] =
- "\x30\x66\x02\x31\x00\xbb\x4d\x25\x30\x13\x1b\x3b\x75\x60\x07\xed\x53\x8b\x52\xee\xd8\x6e\xf1\x9d\xa8\x36\x0e\x2e\x20\x31\x51\x11\x48\x78\xdd\xaf\x24\x38\x64\x81\x71\x6b\xa6\xb7\x29\x58\x28\x82\x32\xba\x29\x29\xd9\x02\x31\x00\xeb\x70\x09\x87\xac\x7b\x78\x0d\x4c\x4f\x08\x2b\x86\x27\xe2\x60\x1f\xc9\x11\x9f\x1d\xf5\x82\x4c\xc7\x3d\xb0\x27\xc8\x93\x29\xc7\xd0\x0e\x88\x02\x09\x93\xc2\x72\xce\xa5\x74\x8c\x3d\xe0\x8c\xad";
-
-static const char ecdsa_secp521r1_privkey[] =
- "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
- "MIHbAgEBBEGO2n7NN363qSCvJVdlQtCvudtaW4o0fEufXRjE1AsCrle+VXX0Zh0w"
- "Y1slSeDHMndpakoiF+XkQ+bhcB867UV6aKAHBgUrgQQAI6GBiQOBhgAEAQb6jDpo"
- "byy1tF8Zucg0TMGUzIN2DK+RZJ3QQRdWdirO25OIC3FoFi1Yird6rpoB6HlNyJ7R"
- "0bNG9Uv34bSHMn8yAFoiqxUCdJZQbEenMoZsi6COaePe3e0QqvDMr0hEWT23Sr3t"
- "LpEV7eZGFfFIJw5wSUp2KOcs+O9WjmoukTWtDKNV"
- "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----";
-
-static const char ecdsa_secp521r1_sig[] =
- "\x30\x81\x87\x02\x42\x01\xb8\xcb\x52\x9e\x10\xa8\x49\x3f\xe1\x9e\x14\x0a\xcf\x96\xed\x7e\xab\x7d\x0c\xe1\x9b\xa4\x97\xdf\x01\xf5\x35\x42\x5f\x5b\x28\x15\x24\x33\x6e\x59\x6c\xaf\x10\x8b\x98\x8e\xe9\x4c\x23\x0d\x76\x92\x03\xdd\x6d\x8d\x08\x47\x15\x5b\xf8\x66\x75\x75\x40\xe8\xf4\xa0\x52\x02\x41\x15\x27\x7c\x5f\xa6\x33\xa6\x29\x68\x3f\x55\x8d\x7f\x1d\x4f\x88\xc6\x61\x6e\xac\x21\xdf\x2b\x7b\xde\x76\x9a\xdc\xe6\x3b\x94\x3f\x03\x9c\xa2\xa6\xa3\x63\x39\x48\xbd\x79\x70\x21\xf2\x6b\xff\x58\x66\xf1\x58\xc2\x58\xad\x4f\x84\x14\x5d\x05\x12\x83\xd0\x87\xbd\xf3";
-
-/* DSA key and signature */
-static const char dsa_privkey[] =
- "-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
- "MIIDTQIBAAKCAQEAh60B6yPMRIT7udq2kKuwnQDohvT1U0w+RJcSr23C05cM/Ovn\n"
- "UP/8Rrj6T8K+uYhMbKgLaZiJJW9q04jaPQk0cfUphbLvRjzVHwE/0Bkb+Y1Rv7ni\n"
- "Jot2IFMq5iuNraf889PC0WREvFCcIkSFY2Ac4WT7mCcBtfx/raGFXDUjcUrJ0HwZ\n"
- "IOhjQDfcXUsztuyYsYA75ociEY8kyDZq/ixyr5++R1VjNf30Re8AbQlXOEGxEN5t\n"
- "t+Tvpq8K5L3prQs2KNSzyOUmedjb/ojH4T4qe/RL9EVjjeuIGHDNUT6F197yZ91y\n"
- "qLLTf1WjnUyZcKij5rryX0LJBBWawEZjNSHZawIdAMQlyycia4NigCdiDR+QptUn\n"
- "2xrj9o14fXkIrXcCggEAXRZm1rbPhsjSTo6cpCVrmDzO1grv83EHiBH4MvRQQnP8\n"
- "FpAREsBA5cYju97XvLaLhioZeMjLn08kU7TUbHRUB+ULTuVvE2dQbBpGuKiLRRt9\n"
- "6U2T0eD3xGLoM+o8EY/kpqaWGEpZv7hzM9xuo4vy55+viAZgFWULqmltwfG/7w7V\n"
- "NXUHNv5H4Ipw//fSDLTPqzUlNqSSswDLz6pCjWEs0rWAqNAMaOiLTz4id9pL48Oe\n"
- "oAfpcQR9tgTEnwyXfZBnrJVclHhkHKGeXvU05IgCzpKO76Z5R+By50T0i/JV7vzM\n"
- "l2yS9aAl/cprT6U7yI3oU/blldCVNpMcFAFb+fO8DAKCAQBVMo8xptyvQOJeSvbO\n"
- "SSYdJ3IiI/0GdkcGWXblWg9z7mrPaWEnT7OquEm/+vYtWd3GHDtyNM+jzsN4Xgjc\n"
- "TL3AEd2hLiozJQ1BFKw25VU08UHAYTzUxZhO4Vwtmp46Kwj8YLDQ3NHRWCBxpDQR\n"
- "fbiFvyXP+qXap6plMfrydnUD1mae/JSOWOYgdB7tFIehstLxVXx/cAnjwgFU03Df\n"
- "grjsad92zA1Hc9wIjbsgAQdTR5DWnFRkRt3UtayBwoyqm6QceZHsv1NAGvkQ4ion\n"
- "bEjkHkjF9YCkR9/rspR8cLghRIXMjOpypuSbaRPeeWq0gP2UOxFL/d3iWH0ETr/L\n"
- "kTlCAhxYGpVgtfB96qmJukyl9GOGvfkwFTgEyIDoV84M\n"
- "-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
-
-static const char dsa_sig[] =
- "\x30\x3d\x02\x1c\x2e\x40\x14\xb3\x7a\x3f\xc0\x4f\x06\x74\x4f\xa6\x5f\xc2\x0a\x46\x35\x38\x88\xb4\x1a\xcf\x94\x02\x40\x42\x7c\x7f\x02\x1d\x00\x98\xfc\xf1\x08\x66\xf1\x86\x28\xc9\x73\x9e\x2b\x5d\xce\x57\xe8\xb5\xeb\xcf\xa3\xf6\x60\xf6\x63\x16\x0e\xc0\x42";
-
-static const char gost01_privkey[] =
- "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
- "MEUCAQAwHAYGKoUDAgITMBIGByqFAwICIwEGByqFAwICHgEEIgQgdNfuHGmmTdPm\n"
- "p5dAa3ea9UYxpdYQPP9lbDwzQwG2bJM=\n"
- "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
-
-static const char gost01_sig[] =
- "\xc5\xc8\xf8\xdc\x22\x51\xb0\x72\xe9\xa2\xbb\x84\x6c\xe2\x24\xd5\x72\x39\x2a\x5a\x0e\x7a\x43\xfc\x9c\xc3\x5d\x32\x92\xbb\xab\xc0\x4b\x99\xbd\xc8\x47\x24\x70\x06\x7e\xa1\xc6\xe3\xa0\xdc\x42\xed\xa0\x66\xf0\xcc\x50\x97\xe9\x5a\x7d\x3f\x65\x2d\x7b\x1b\x03\xcb";
-
-static const char gost12_256_privkey[] =
- "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
- "MEgCAQAwHwYIKoUDBwEBAQEwEwYHKoUDAgIjAQYIKoUDBwEBAgIEIgQgKOF96tom\n"
- "D61rhSnzKjyrmO3fv0gdlHei+6ovrc8SnBk=\n"
- "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
-
-static const char gost12_256_sig[] =
- "\xb2\x51\x5a\x1a\xbd\x95\x4e\x71\x55\xad\x74\x74\x81\xa6\xca\x6c\x14\x01\xe0\x18\xda\xe4\x0d\x02\x4f\x14\xd2\x39\xd6\x3c\xb5\x85\xa8\x37\xfd\x7f\x2b\xfa\xe4\xf5\xbc\xbc\x15\x20\x8b\x83\x4b\x84\x0d\x5d\x02\x21\x8c\x0d\xb9\xc4\x2b\xc0\x3e\xfd\x42\x55\x1d\xb0";
-
-static const char gost12_512_privkey[] =
- "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
- "MGoCAQAwIQYIKoUDBwEBAQIwFQYJKoUDBwECAQIBBggqhQMHAQECAwRCBECjFpvp\n"
- "B0vdc7u59b99TCNXhHiB69JJtUjvieNkGYJpoaaIvoKZTNCjpSZASsZcQZCHOTof\n"
- "hsQ3JCCy4xnd5jWT\n"
- "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
-
-static const char gost12_512_sig[] =
- "\x52\x4f\xa2\x77\x51\xd2\xc5\xef\xd3\xa3\x99\x4e\xec\xff\xc6\xe9\xfc\x2f\xc0\x28\x42\x03\x95\x6c\x9a\x38\xee\xea\x89\x79\xae\x1a\xc3\x68\x5e\xe4\x15\x15\x4b\xec\x0f\xf1\x7e\x0f\xba\x01\xc7\x84\x16\xc7\xb5\xac\x9d\x0c\x22\xdd\x31\xf7\xb0\x9b\x59\x4b\xf0\x02\xa8\x7d\xfd\x6d\x02\x43\xc7\x4f\x65\xbd\x84\x5c\x54\x91\xba\x75\x9f\x5a\x61\x19\x5c\x9a\x10\x78\x34\xa0\xa6\xf6\xdc\xb6\xb0\x50\x22\x38\x5f\xb0\x16\x66\xf1\xd5\x46\x00\xd5\xe2\xa8\xe5\xd2\x11\x5f\xd1\xbe\x6e\xac\xb2\x9c\x14\x34\x96\xe7\x58\x94\xb8\xf4\x5f";
-
static int test_known_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk, unsigned bits,
gnutls_digest_algorithm_t dig,
const void *privkey, size_t privkey_size,
--
2.20.1
From 4b04d899849ea566ae33862289276d9b297cd493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 13:44:56 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/7] crypto-selftests-pk.c: Add a comparison with a known
signature
For RSA, compare the generated signature with a stored known value in
test_sig().
Signed-off-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
---
lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
index 4fadd4161..0233e6b9f 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ static int test_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk,
{
int ret;
gnutls_datum_t sig = { NULL, 0 };
+ gnutls_datum_t known_sig = { NULL, 0 };
gnutls_datum_t raw_rsa_key = { (void*)rsa_key2048, sizeof(rsa_key2048)-1 };
gnutls_datum_t raw_dsa_key = { (void*)dsa_key, sizeof(dsa_key)-1 };
gnutls_datum_t raw_ecc_key = { (void*)ecc_key, sizeof(ecc_key)-1 };
@@ -343,6 +344,8 @@ static int test_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk,
}
if (pk == GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
+ known_sig.data = (void *)rsa_sig;
+ known_sig.size = sizeof(rsa_sig) - 1;
ret = gnutls_privkey_import_x509_raw(key, &raw_rsa_key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, NULL, 0);
} else if (pk == GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS) {
ret = gnutls_privkey_import_x509_raw(key, &raw_rsa_key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, NULL, 0);
@@ -378,6 +381,16 @@ static int test_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk,
goto cleanup;
}
+ /* Compare with a stored known signature */
+ if (known_sig.data != NULL) {
+ if (sig.size != known_sig.size
+ || memcmp(sig.data, known_sig.data, sig.size) != 0) {
+ ret = GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR;
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
ret =
gnutls_pubkey_verify_data2(pub, sigalgo, 0,
&signed_data, &sig);
--
2.20.1
From 2123049ab9b963ef0ba108ed1cb180016bd672ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:22:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/7] nettle/pk.c: Do not call gnutls_rnd() during self tests
When the library state is LIB_STATE_SELFTEST, use constant data instead
of calling gnutls_rnd(). This prevents the library to block if there is
insufficient entropy during FIPS self tests.
Signed-off-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
---
lib/nettle/pk.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/nettle/pk.c b/lib/nettle/pk.c
index 08117c2d8..64633cc73 100644
--- a/lib/nettle/pk.c
+++ b/lib/nettle/pk.c
@@ -60,6 +60,33 @@
static inline const struct ecc_curve *get_supported_nist_curve(int curve);
static inline const struct ecc_curve *get_supported_gost_curve(int curve);
+/* Fill the buffer with data for testing purposes.
+ * This should be called only during self tests.
+ */
+static int _pk_fill_buffer(void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+ if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() != LIB_STATE_SELFTEST) {
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_RANDOM_FAILED);
+ }
+
+ memset(buffer, 0xAA, length);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _pk_rnd(gnutls_rnd_level_t level, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST) {
+ ret = _pk_fill_buffer(data, len);
+ } else {
+ ret = gnutls_rnd(level, data, len);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* When these callbacks are used for a nettle operation, the
* caller must check the macro HAVE_LIB_ERROR() after the operation
* is complete. If the macro is true, the operation is to be considered
@@ -67,21 +94,21 @@ static inline const struct ecc_curve *get_supported_gost_curve(int curve);
*/
static void rnd_key_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
{
- if (gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_KEY, data, length) < 0) {
+ if (_pk_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_KEY, data, length) < 0) {
_gnutls_switch_lib_state(LIB_STATE_ERROR);
}
}
static void rnd_tmpkey_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
{
- if (gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_RANDOM, data, length) < 0) {
+ if (_pk_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_RANDOM, data, length) < 0) {
_gnutls_switch_lib_state(LIB_STATE_ERROR);
}
}
static void rnd_nonce_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
{
- if (gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, data, length) < 0) {
+ if (_pk_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, data, length) < 0) {
_gnutls_switch_lib_state(LIB_STATE_ERROR);
}
}
@@ -650,7 +677,7 @@ _rsa_pss_sign_digest_tr(gnutls_digest_algorithm_t dig,
if (salt == NULL)
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
- ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, salt, salt_size);
+ ret = _pk_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, salt, salt_size);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
goto cleanup;
@@ -1732,7 +1759,7 @@ gnutls_x509_spki_st spki;
_gnutls_dsa_q_to_hash(params, &hash_len);
gen_data = gnutls_malloc(hash_len);
- gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, gen_data, hash_len);
+ _pk_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, gen_data, hash_len);
ddata.data = (void*)gen_data;
ddata.size = hash_len;
@@ -2101,7 +2128,7 @@ wrap_nettle_pk_generate_keys(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
goto fail;
}
- ret = gnutls_rnd(rnd_level, params->raw_priv.data, size);
+ ret = _pk_rnd(rnd_level, params->raw_priv.data, size);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
goto fail;
@@ -2240,7 +2267,7 @@ wrap_nettle_pk_generate_keys(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
goto fail;
}
- ret = gnutls_rnd(rnd_level, params->raw_priv.data, size);
+ ret = _pk_rnd(rnd_level, params->raw_priv.data, size);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
goto fail;
--
2.20.1
From db2b308fdbe98420b722eaf678c1a911bc51b0a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 17:22:18 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] tests: Run rng-no-onload test in FIPS mode
This changes the function used in the test to override gnutls_rnd() to
fill the given buffer with a different value each time it is called.
This allows the test to run when FIPS mode is enabled.
Previously the rng-no-onload test could get stuck if FIPS mode was
enabled. This happened if gnutls_rnd() function was called during
global_init() in a loop that checks the generated value (e.g. if ECDSA
signature generation is called during self tests).
Signed-off-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
---
tests/rng-no-onload.c | 12 +++++++-----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tests/rng-no-onload.c b/tests/rng-no-onload.c
index ac01be214..a485a440d 100644
--- a/tests/rng-no-onload.c
+++ b/tests/rng-no-onload.c
@@ -50,18 +50,20 @@ static int _rnd_called = 0;
int __attribute__ ((visibility ("protected")))
gnutls_rnd(gnutls_rnd_level_t level, void *data, size_t len)
{
+ static unsigned int value = 0;
+
_rnd_called = 1;
- memset(data, 0xff, len);
+ /* Increment 'value' in each call up to 255, then start again from 0 */
+ value = (value + 1) & 0xFF;
+
+ memset(data, value, len);
+
return 0;
}
void doit(void)
{
- if (gnutls_fips140_mode_enabled()) {
- exit(77);
- }
-
global_init();
if (_rnd_called != 0)
--
2.20.1
From fc926cd65f1de06f359315c6693c1a9c9899ba8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 15:45:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 5/7] crypto-selftests-pk.c: Fix test_known_sig
Previously a new signature was generated only for deterministic
algorithms (i.e. only RSA). With this, a new signature is always
generated (and compared with a stored signature for deterministic
algorithms). The signature verification is tested for both generated
and stored signatures.
Signed-off-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
---
lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
index 0233e6b9f..ba8f5e376 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
@@ -475,19 +475,17 @@ static int test_known_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk, unsigned bits,
goto cleanup;
}
- /* Test if the signature we generate matches the stored */
+ ret = gnutls_privkey_sign_data(key, dig, 0, &signed_data, &sig);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Test if the generated signature matches the stored */
ssig.data = (void *) stored_sig;
ssig.size = stored_sig_size;
if (deterministic_sigs != 0) { /* do not compare against stored signature if not provided */
- ret =
- gnutls_privkey_sign_data(key, dig, 0, &signed_data,
- &sig);
- if (ret < 0) {
- gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
if (sig.size != ssig.size
|| memcmp(sig.data, ssig.data, sig.size) != 0) {
ret = GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR;
@@ -507,7 +505,7 @@ static int test_known_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk, unsigned bits,
}
}
- /* Test if we can verify the signature */
+ /* Test if we can verify the generated signature */
ret = gnutls_pubkey_import_privkey(pub, key, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -515,6 +513,17 @@ static int test_known_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk, unsigned bits,
goto cleanup;
}
+ ret =
+ gnutls_pubkey_verify_data2(pub, gnutls_pk_to_sign(pk, dig), 0,
+ &signed_data, &sig);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR;
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Test if we can verify the stored signature */
+
ret =
gnutls_pubkey_verify_data2(pub, gnutls_pk_to_sign(pk, dig), 0,
&signed_data, &ssig);
@@ -528,7 +537,7 @@ static int test_known_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk, unsigned bits,
ret =
gnutls_pubkey_verify_data2(pub, gnutls_pk_to_sign(pk, dig), 0,
- &bad_data, &ssig);
+ &bad_data, &sig);
if (ret != GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED) {
ret = GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR;
--
2.20.1
From 7e49999db264556ac73ff498bd8f7edce401cdd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 17:22:04 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] crypto-selftests-pk.c: Fix PK_KNOWN_TEST and PK_TEST
Remove the flag check from the end of the macros. This change allows
more than one test to run in sequence when GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL is
not set. Move the flags checks to run the minimal set of tests required
for FIPS and keep the previous behaviour for GOST (run the first test
for each algorithm).
Signed-off-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
---
lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
index ba8f5e376..fc8ee2525 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
@@ -568,18 +568,14 @@ static int test_known_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk, unsigned bits,
if (ret < 0) { \
gnutls_assert(); \
goto cleanup; \
- } \
- if (!(flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL)) \
- return 0
+ }
#define PK_KNOWN_TEST(pk, det, bits, dig, pkey, sig) \
ret = test_known_sig(pk, bits, dig, pkey, sizeof(pkey)-1, sig, sizeof(sig)-1, det); \
if (ret < 0) { \
gnutls_assert(); \
goto cleanup; \
- } \
- if (!(flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL)) \
- return 0
+ }
/* This file is also included by the test app in tests/slow/cipher-test, so in that
@@ -812,11 +808,12 @@ int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk)
PK_KNOWN_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_RSA, 1, 2048, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256,
rsa_key2048, rsa_sig);
PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_RSA, test_rsa_enc, 2048, 0);
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_RSA, test_sig, 3072, GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA256);
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL))
return 0;
+ PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_RSA, test_sig, 3072, GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA256);
+
FALLTHROUGH;
case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS:
PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS, test_sig, 2048, GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256);
@@ -828,11 +825,12 @@ int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk)
case GNUTLS_PK_DSA:
PK_KNOWN_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_DSA, 0, 2048, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256,
dsa_privkey, dsa_sig);
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_DSA, test_sig, 3072, GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA256);
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL))
return 0;
+ PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_DSA, test_sig, 3072, GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA256);
+
FALLTHROUGH;
case GNUTLS_PK_EC:
/* Test ECDH and ECDSA */
@@ -850,13 +848,14 @@ int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk)
(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1),
GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256, ecdsa_secp256r1_privkey,
ecdsa_secp256r1_sig);
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_EC, test_sig,
- GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1),
- GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA256);
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL))
return 0;
+ PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_EC, test_sig,
+ GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1),
+ GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA256);
+
PK_KNOWN_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_EC, 0,
GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS
(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1),
@@ -900,31 +899,35 @@ int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk)
case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01:
PK_KNOWN_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01, 0, GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST256CPA, GNUTLS_DIG_GOSTR_94,
gost01_privkey, gost01_sig);
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01, test_sig, GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST256CPA),
- GNUTLS_SIGN_GOST_94);
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL))
return 0;
+ PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01, test_sig, GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST256CPA),
+ GNUTLS_SIGN_GOST_94);
+
FALLTHROUGH;
case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
PK_KNOWN_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256, 0, GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST256CPA, GNUTLS_DIG_STREEBOG_256,
gost12_256_privkey, gost12_256_sig);
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256, test_sig, GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST256CPA),
- GNUTLS_SIGN_GOST_256);
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL))
return 0;
+ PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256, test_sig, GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST256CPA),
+ GNUTLS_SIGN_GOST_256);
+
FALLTHROUGH;
case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512:
PK_KNOWN_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512, 0, GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST512A, GNUTLS_DIG_STREEBOG_512,
gost12_512_privkey, gost12_512_sig);
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512, test_sig, GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST512A),
- GNUTLS_SIGN_GOST_512);
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL))
return 0;
+
+ PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512, test_sig, GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_GOST512A),
+ GNUTLS_SIGN_GOST_512);
+
#endif
break;
--
2.20.1
From c2e83d2110b98d93588f1b6187bc932feb958ca4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 14:21:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] crypto-selftests-pk.c: Cleanup self tests
test_sig() always uses the same key for RSA, DSA, and ECDSA regardless
of the value provided in the "bits" parameter. Therefore, avoid
printing specific information (number of bits or name of the curve).
Changes test_sig() to use 2048 bits key for DSA; deleted hardcoded 512
bits DSA key;
Avoid calling test_sig() multiple times for ECDSA: the same key is
used regardless of the curve provided in the parameters.
Signed-off-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
---
lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c | 42 +++++++++------------------------------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
index fc8ee2525..3d665b723 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
@@ -78,16 +78,6 @@ static const char ecc_key[] =
"MSHpe5vd0TQz+/GAa1zxle8mB/Cdh0JaTrA=\n"
"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
-static const char dsa_key[] =
- "-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
- "MIH4AgEAAkEA6KUOSXfFNcInFLPdOlLlKNCe79zJrkxnsQN+lllxuk1ifZrE07r2\n"
- "3edTrc4riQNnZ2nZ372tYUAMJg+5jM6IIwIVAOa58exwZ+42Tl+p3b4Kbpyu2Ron\n"
- "AkBocj7gkiBYHtv6HMIIzooaxn4vpGR0Ns6wBfroBUGvrnSAgfT3WyiNaHkIF28e\n"
- "quWcEeOJjUgFvatcM8gcY288AkEAyKWlgzBurIYST8TM3j4PuQJDTvdHDaGoAUAa\n"
- "EfjmOw2UXKwqTmwPiT5BYKgCo2ILS87ttlTpd8vndH37pmnmVQIUQIVuKpZ8y9Bw\n"
- "VzO8qcrLCFvTOXY=\n"
- "-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
-
static const char gost01_key[] =
"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
"MEUCAQAwHAYGKoUDAgITMBIGByqFAwICJAAGByqFAwICHgEEIgQgR1lBLIr4WBpn\n"
@@ -315,22 +305,20 @@ static int test_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk,
gnutls_datum_t sig = { NULL, 0 };
gnutls_datum_t known_sig = { NULL, 0 };
gnutls_datum_t raw_rsa_key = { (void*)rsa_key2048, sizeof(rsa_key2048)-1 };
- gnutls_datum_t raw_dsa_key = { (void*)dsa_key, sizeof(dsa_key)-1 };
+ gnutls_datum_t raw_dsa_key = { (void*)dsa_privkey, sizeof(dsa_privkey)-1 };
gnutls_datum_t raw_ecc_key = { (void*)ecc_key, sizeof(ecc_key)-1 };
gnutls_datum_t raw_gost01_key = { (void*)gost01_key, sizeof(gost01_key)-1 };
gnutls_datum_t raw_gost12_256_key = { (void*)gost12_256_key, sizeof(gost12_256_key)-1 };
gnutls_datum_t raw_gost12_512_key = { (void*)gost12_512_key, sizeof(gost12_512_key)-1 };
gnutls_privkey_t key;
gnutls_pubkey_t pub = NULL;
- char param_name[32];
+ char param_name[32] = "";
- if (pk == GNUTLS_PK_EC || pk == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01 ||
- pk == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256 || pk == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512) {
- snprintf(param_name, sizeof(param_name), "%s",
+ if (pk == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_01 || pk == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256 ||
+ pk == GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512) {
+ snprintf(param_name, sizeof(param_name), "-%s",
gnutls_ecc_curve_get_name(GNUTLS_BITS_TO_CURVE
(bits)));
- } else {
- snprintf(param_name, sizeof(param_name), "%u", bits);
}
ret = gnutls_privkey_init(&key);
@@ -418,10 +406,10 @@ static int test_sig(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk,
gnutls_free(sig.data);
if (ret == 0)
- _gnutls_debug_log("%s-%s-sig self test succeeded\n",
+ _gnutls_debug_log("%s%s-sig self test succeeded\n",
gnutls_pk_get_name(pk), param_name);
else
- _gnutls_debug_log("%s-%s-sig self test failed\n",
+ _gnutls_debug_log("%s%s-sig self test failed\n",
gnutls_pk_get_name(pk), param_name);
return ret;
@@ -812,7 +800,7 @@ int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk)
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL))
return 0;
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_RSA, test_sig, 3072, GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA256);
+ PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_RSA, test_sig, 2048, GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA256);
FALLTHROUGH;
case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS:
@@ -829,7 +817,7 @@ int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk)
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL))
return 0;
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_DSA, test_sig, 3072, GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA256);
+ PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_DSA, test_sig, 2048, GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA256);
FALLTHROUGH;
case GNUTLS_PK_EC:
@@ -861,18 +849,12 @@ int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk)
(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1),
GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256, ecdsa_secp384r1_privkey,
ecdsa_secp384r1_sig);
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_EC, test_sig,
- GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1),
- GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA384);
PK_KNOWN_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_EC, 0,
GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS
(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1),
GNUTLS_DIG_SHA512, ecdsa_secp521r1_privkey,
ecdsa_secp521r1_sig);
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_EC, test_sig,
- GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1),
- GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA512);
#ifdef ENABLE_NON_SUITEB_CURVES
PK_KNOWN_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_EC, 0,
@@ -880,18 +862,12 @@ int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk)
(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1),
GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256, ecdsa_secp192r1_privkey,
ecdsa_secp192r1_sig);
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_EC, test_sig,
- GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1),
- GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA256);
PK_KNOWN_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_EC, 0,
GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS
(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1),
GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256, ecdsa_secp224r1_privkey,
ecdsa_secp224r1_sig);
- PK_TEST(GNUTLS_PK_EC, test_sig,
- GNUTLS_CURVE_TO_BITS(GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1),
- GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA256);
#endif
#if ENABLE_GOST
--
2.20.1

View File

@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
From facea2b7659e11efce7014bda8800574d35dd05d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 14:02:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] fips: run selftests over overridden AES-CBC algorithm
Previously, we only tested nettle's AES-CBC in
_gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks1(), which is called before the
implementation is overridden. This adds an AES-CBC self-test in
_gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2() so it can test the actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
---
lib/fips.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
index b92edbbd7..902af5674 100644
--- a/lib/fips.c
+++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -317,6 +317,12 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
goto error;
}
+ ret = gnutls_cipher_self_test(0, GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto error;
+ }
+
ret = gnutls_cipher_self_test(0, GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
--
2.20.1

View File

@ -1,286 +0,0 @@
From 6023c69c616d866e19ab1c0bb87931e5143c79d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 16:48:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] tls13/key_update: ignore multiple key updates instead of
error
This fixes the multiple KeyUpdate messages handling in commit
65e2aa80d114d4bef095d129c2eda475e473244a, where illegal_parameter is
sent even if the limit doesn't exceed.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
---
.gitignore | 1 +
lib/tls13/key_update.c | 2 -
tests/Makefile.am | 2 +
tests/tls13/key_update_multiple.c | 232 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 235 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tests/tls13/key_update_multiple.c
diff --git a/lib/tls13/key_update.c b/lib/tls13/key_update.c
index d542a214b..c6f6e0aa1 100644
--- a/lib/tls13/key_update.c
+++ b/lib/tls13/key_update.c
@@ -117,8 +117,6 @@ int _gnutls13_recv_key_update(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_buffer_st *buf)
session->internals.rsend_state = RECORD_SEND_KEY_UPDATE_1;
else if (session->internals.rsend_state == RECORD_SEND_CORKED)
session->internals.rsend_state = RECORD_SEND_CORKED_TO_KU;
- else
- return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_RECEIVED_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
break;
default:
diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
index ca0481879..4ffa69825 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/Makefile.am
@@ -119,6 +119,8 @@ ctests += tls13/psk-ext
ctests += tls13/key_update
+ctests += tls13/key_update_multiple
+
ctests += tls13/key_limits
ctests += tls13/multi-ocsp
diff --git a/tests/tls13/key_update_multiple.c b/tests/tls13/key_update_multiple.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8b2c2db4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/tls13/key_update_multiple.c
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2019 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Daiki Ueno
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuTLS.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "cert-common.h"
+
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "virt-time.h"
+#define RANDOMIZE
+#include "eagain-common.h"
+
+const char *side = "";
+
+/* This program tests whether multiple key update messages are handled
+ * properly with rate-limit. */
+
+static void tls_log_func(int level, const char *str)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s|<%d>| %s", side, level, str);
+}
+
+#define MAX_BUF 1024
+#define MSG "Hello TLS, and hi and how are you and more data here... and more... and even more and even more more data..."
+
+/* These must match the definitions in lib/tls13/key_update.c. */
+#define KEY_UPDATES_WINDOW 1000
+#define KEY_UPDATES_PER_WINDOW 8
+
+static unsigned key_update_msg_inc = 0;
+static unsigned key_update_msg_out = 0;
+
+static int hsk_callback(gnutls_session_t session, unsigned int htype,
+ unsigned post, unsigned int incoming, const gnutls_datum_t *msg)
+{
+ assert(post == GNUTLS_HOOK_PRE);
+
+ assert(msg->size == 1);
+
+ if (htype == GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE) {
+ if (incoming)
+ key_update_msg_inc++;
+ else
+ key_update_msg_out++;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void run(const char *name, bool exceed_limit)
+{
+ /* Server stuff. */
+ gnutls_certificate_credentials_t ccred;
+ gnutls_certificate_credentials_t scred;
+ gnutls_session_t server;
+ int sret, cret;
+ /* Client stuff. */
+ gnutls_session_t client;
+ /* Need to enable anonymous KX specifically. */
+ char buffer[MAX_BUF + 1];
+ int ret, transferred = 0;
+ size_t i;
+
+ success("%s\n", name);
+
+ /* General init. */
+ global_init();
+ gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func);
+ if (debug)
+ gnutls_global_set_log_level(9);
+
+ /* Init server */
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&scred) >= 0);
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_mem(scred,
+ &server_ca3_localhost_cert,
+ &server_ca3_key,
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
+
+ assert(gnutls_init(&server, GNUTLS_SERVER) >= 0);
+ ret =
+ gnutls_priority_set_direct(server,
+ "NORMAL:-VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3",
+ NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ exit(1);
+
+ gnutls_credentials_set(server, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, scred);
+ gnutls_transport_set_push_function(server, server_push);
+ gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(server, server_pull);
+ gnutls_transport_set_ptr(server, server);
+
+ /* Init client */
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&ccred) >= 0);
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem
+ (ccred, &ca3_cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
+
+ gnutls_init(&client, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
+ ret =
+ gnutls_priority_set_direct(client,
+ "NORMAL:-VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3",
+ NULL);
+ assert(ret >= 0);
+
+ ret = gnutls_credentials_set(client, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, ccred);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ exit(1);
+
+ gnutls_transport_set_push_function(client, client_push);
+ gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(client, client_pull);
+ gnutls_transport_set_ptr(client, client);
+
+
+ HANDSHAKE(client, server);
+ if (debug)
+ success("Handshake established\n");
+
+ key_update_msg_inc = 0;
+ key_update_msg_out = 0;
+
+ gnutls_handshake_set_hook_function(client, -1, GNUTLS_HOOK_PRE, hsk_callback);
+
+ /* schedule multiple key updates */
+ for (i = 0; i < KEY_UPDATES_PER_WINDOW; i++) {
+ do {
+ ret = gnutls_session_key_update(client, 1);
+ } while (ret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || ret == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ fail("error in key update: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(ret));
+ }
+
+ /* server receives the client key update and sends data */
+ TRANSFER(client, server, MSG, strlen(MSG), buffer, MAX_BUF);
+ TRANSFER(server, client, MSG, strlen(MSG), buffer, MAX_BUF);
+ EMPTY_BUF(server, client, buffer, MAX_BUF);
+
+ if (key_update_msg_out != KEY_UPDATES_PER_WINDOW)
+ fail("unexpected number of key updates are sent: %d\n",
+ key_update_msg_out);
+ else {
+ if (debug)
+ success("successfully sent %d key updates\n",
+ KEY_UPDATES_PER_WINDOW);
+ }
+ if (key_update_msg_inc != 1)
+ fail("unexpected number of key updates received: %d\n",
+ key_update_msg_inc);
+ else {
+ if (debug)
+ success("successfully received 1 key update\n");
+ }
+
+ if (exceed_limit) {
+ /* excessive key update in the same time window should
+ * be rejected by the peer */
+ do {
+ ret = gnutls_session_key_update(client, 1);
+ } while (ret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || ret == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED);
+
+ /* server receives the client key update and sends data */
+ ret = record_send_loop(client, MSG, strlen(MSG), 0);
+ assert(ret == strlen(MSG));
+ ret = gnutls_record_recv(server, buffer, MAX_BUF);
+ if (ret != GNUTLS_E_TOO_MANY_HANDSHAKE_PACKETS)
+ fail("server didn't reject excessive number of key updates\n");
+ else {
+ if (debug)
+ success("server rejected excessive number of key updates\n");
+ }
+ } else {
+ virt_sec_sleep(KEY_UPDATES_WINDOW / 1000 + 1);
+
+ /* the time window should be rolled over now */
+ do {
+ ret = gnutls_session_key_update(client, 1);
+ } while (ret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || ret == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ fail("error in key update: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(ret));
+
+ /* server receives the client key update and sends data */
+ TRANSFER(client, server, MSG, strlen(MSG), buffer, MAX_BUF);
+ TRANSFER(server, client, MSG, strlen(MSG), buffer, MAX_BUF);
+ EMPTY_BUF(server, client, buffer, MAX_BUF);
+ }
+
+ gnutls_bye(client, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+ gnutls_bye(server, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+
+ gnutls_deinit(client);
+ gnutls_deinit(server);
+
+ gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(scred);
+ gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(ccred);
+
+ gnutls_global_deinit();
+ reset_buffers();
+}
+
+void doit(void)
+{
+ virt_time_init();
+
+ run("not exceeding limit", 0);
+ run("exceeding limit", 1);
+}
--
2.20.1

Binary file not shown.

View File

@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
From c149dd0767f32789e391280cb1eb06b7eb7c6bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:05:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] auth/rsa: side-step potential side-channel
Remove branching that depends on secret data.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
---
lib/auth/rsa.c | 10 ----------
1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
index 8108ee841d..6b158bacb2 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static int
proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
size_t _data_size)
{
- const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n";
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
int ret, dsize;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
@@ -235,15 +234,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
- if (ok) {
- /* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are
- * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug
- * logging is disabled */
- _gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error);
- } else {
- _gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error);
- }
-
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above.
*/
--
2.39.1
From 7c963102ec2119eecc1789b993aabe5edfd75f3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 14:32:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] rsa: remove dead code
since the `ok` variable isn't used any more, we can remove all code
used to calculate it
Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
---
lib/auth/rsa.c | 20 +++-----------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
index 6b158bacb2..858701fe6e 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -159,8 +159,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
int ret, dsize;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
- volatile uint8_t check_ver_min;
- volatile uint32_t ok;
#ifdef ENABLE_SSL3
if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) {
@@ -186,7 +184,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
- check_ver_min = (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0);
session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
@@ -205,10 +202,9 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
return ret;
}
- ret =
- gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
- 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
- session->key.key.size);
+ gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
+ 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
+ session->key.key.size);
/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
* in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
* channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
@@ -224,16 +220,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
* Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
*/
- /* ok is 0 in case of error and 1 in case of success. */
-
- /* if ret < 0 */
- ok = CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0);
- /* session->key.key.data[0] must equal ver_maj */
- ok &= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[0], ver_maj);
- /* if check_ver_min then session->key.key.data[1] must equal ver_min */
- ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
- CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
-
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above.
*/
--
2.39.1

View File

@ -1,10 +1,20 @@
Version: 3.6.8
Release: 3%{?dist}
Version: 3.6.16
Release: 8%{?dist}.3
Patch1: gnutls-3.2.7-rpath.patch
Patch2: gnutls-3.6.4-no-now-guile.patch
Patch3: gnutls-3.6.5-fix-fips-signature-post.patch
Patch4: gnutls-3.6.8-fips-aes-cbc-kat.patch
Patch5: gnutls-3.6.8-multiple-key-updates.patch
Patch3: gnutls-3.6.13-enable-intel-cet.patch
Patch10: gnutls-3.6.14-fips-dh-selftests.patch
Patch11: gnutls-3.6.14-fips-kdf-selftests.patch
Patch12: gnutls-3.6.16-tls12-cert-type.patch
Patch13: gnutls-3.6.16-trust-ca-sha1.patch
Patch14: gnutls-3.6.16-doc-p11tool-ckaid.patch
Patch15: gnutls-3.6.16-pkcs7-verify.patch
Patch16: gnutls-3.6.16-cpuid.patch
Patch17: gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch
Patch18: gnutls-3.6.16-rehandshake-tickets.patch
Patch19: gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing.patch
Patch20: gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing-followup.patch
Patch21: gnutls-3.6.16-deterministic-ecdsa-fixes.patch
%bcond_without dane
%if 0%{?rhel}
%bcond_with guile
@ -50,7 +60,7 @@ BuildRequires: guile-devel
URL: http://www.gnutls.org/
Source0: ftp://ftp.gnutls.org/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.6/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz
Source1: ftp://ftp.gnutls.org/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.6/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz.sig
Source2: gpgkey-1F42418905D8206AA754CCDC29EE58B996865171.gpg
Source2: gpgkey-462225C3B46F34879FC8496CD605848ED7E69871.gpg
# Wildcard bundling exception https://fedorahosted.org/fpc/ticket/174
Provides: bundled(gnulib) = 20130424
@ -150,7 +160,7 @@ This package contains Guile bindings for the library.
%prep
gpgv2 --keyring %{SOURCE2} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
%autosetup -p1
%autosetup -p1 -S git
sed -i -e 's|sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/lib /usr/lib|sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/lib /usr/lib %{_libdir}|g' configure
rm -f lib/minitasn1/*.c lib/minitasn1/*.h
@ -162,6 +172,7 @@ echo "SYSTEM=NORMAL" >> tests/system.prio
# via the crypto policies
%build
autoreconf -fi
CCASFLAGS="$CCASFLAGS -Wa,--generate-missing-build-notes=yes"
export CCASFLAGS
%configure --with-libtasn1-prefix=%{_prefix} \
@ -288,6 +299,109 @@ fi
%endif
%changelog
* Tue Mar 26 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8.3
- Fix memleak with older GMP (RHEL-28957)
* Mon Mar 25 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8.2
- Fix timing side-channel in deterministic ECDSA (RHEL-28957)
* Thu Jan 18 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8.1
- auth/rsa-psk: minimize branching after decryption (RHEL-21586)
* Wed Dec 6 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8
- auth/rsa_psk: side-step potential side-channel (RHEL-16753)
* Mon Jun 26 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-7
- Clear server's session ticket indication at rehandshake (#2089817)
* Thu Feb 23 2023 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-6
- Fix x86_64 CPU feature detection when AVX is not available (#2131152)
- Fix timing side-channel in TLS RSA key exchange (#2162598)
* Mon Aug 29 2022 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-5
- Fix double-free in gnutls_pkcs7_verify (#2109788)
* Mon Jun 28 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-4
- p11tool: Document ID reuse behavior when importing certs (#1776250)
* Mon Jun 7 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-3
- Treat SHA-1 signed CA in the trusted set differently (#1965445)
* Wed May 26 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-2
- Filter certificate_types in TLS 1.2 CR based on signature algorithms (#1942216)
* Mon May 24 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-1
- Update to upstream 3.6.16 release (#1956783)
- Fix potential use-after-free in key_share handling (#1927597)
- Fix potential use-after-free in pre_shared_key handling (#1927593)
- Stop gnutls-serv relying on AI_ADDRCONFIG to decide listening address (#1908334)
- Fix cert expiration issue in tests (#1908110)
* Thu Apr 1 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-10
- Port fixes for potential miscalculation in ecdsa_verify (#1942931)
* Tue Nov 24 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-9
- Revert the previous change
* Wed Nov 11 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-8
- Depend on specific NVR of gmp and nettle (#1812933)
* Tue Nov 3 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-7
- Increase DH key bits to >= 2048 in self-tests (#1879506)
- Implement self-tests for KDF and CMAC (#1890870)
- Fix CVE-2020-24659: heap buffer-overflow when "no_renegotiation" alert is received (#1873959)
* Mon Aug 24 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-6
- Fix memory leak when serializing iovec_t (#1844112)
* Sat Jul 18 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-5
- Perform validation checks on (EC)DH public keys and share secrets (#1855803)
* Mon Jun 29 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-4
- Tighten FIPS DH primes check according to SP800-56A (rev 3) (#1849079)
* Fri Jun 5 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-3
- Update gnutls-3.6.14-fips-mode-check.patch
* Thu Jun 4 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-2
- Return false from gnutls_fips140_mode_enabled() if selftests failed (#1827687)
* Thu Jun 4 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-1
- Update to upstream 3.6.14 release
* Mon May 25 2020 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 3.6.13-3
- Add an option to gnutls-cli to wait for resumption under TLS 1.3 (#1677754)
* Wed May 20 2020 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 3.6.13-2
- Enable Intel CET (#1838476)
* Tue May 5 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.13-1
- Update to upstream 3.6.13 release
* Tue Apr 21 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-10
- Fix CVE-2020-11501 (#1822005)
* Wed Nov 6 2019 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-9
- Fix CFB8 decryption when repeatedly called (#1757848)
- Fix gnutls_aead_cipher_{en,de}cryptv2 with input not multiple of block size (#1757856)
* Fri Aug 16 2019 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-8
- Use fallback random function for RSA blinding in FIPS selftests
* Fri Aug 16 2019 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-7
- Fix deterministic signature creation in selftests
* Fri Aug 16 2019 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-6
- Treat login error more gracefully when enumerating PKCS#11 tokens (#1705478)
- Use deterministic ECDSA/DSA in FIPS selftests (#1716560)
- Add gnutls_aead_cipher_{encrypt,decrypt}v2 functions (#1684461)
* Fri Aug 9 2019 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-5
- Avoid UB when encrypting session tickets
* Tue Jul 2 2019 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-4
- Add RNG continuous test under FIPS
* Fri Jun 14 2019 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-3
- Follow-up fix on multiple key updates handling (#1673975)