18 changed files with 85 additions and 3086 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
-SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz
+SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14.tar.xz
 SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz.sig
 SOURCES/gpgkey-462225C3B46F34879FC8496CD605848ED7E69871.gpg
--- a/.gnutls.metadata
+++ b/.gnutls.metadata
@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
-6ba8fb898dcf4b4046b60662ba97df835593e687 SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz
+bea1b5abcb691acf014e592f41d0a9580a41216a SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14.tar.xz
 b41ac56ff6cca4539c8b084db2c84e8bc21d60ac SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz.sig
 648ec46f9539fe756fb90131b85ae4759ed2ed21 SOURCES/gpgkey-462225C3B46F34879FC8496CD605848ED7E69871.gpg
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14-autogen-int.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14-autogen-int.patch
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
 From cf1de82bedd01c01e70921699c84a473b08d0dab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 17:23:59 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] serv: omit upper bound of --maxearlydata option definition
 It turned out that AutoGen treats numbers that exceed INT_MAX in a
 platform dependent way.  In this case, 4294967295 (UINT_MAX) is
 treated as is on 64-bit platforms, while it is interpreted as "-1" on
 32-bit platforms.  This causes a problem when the program
 documentation is compiled under multilib environment.
 Reported by Ivan Molodetskikh in:
 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1841844
 and the cause was identified by Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 src/serv-args.def | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/src/serv-args.def b/src/serv-args.def
 index 996fbe36b..a584085e2 100644
 --- a/src/serv-args.def
 +++ b/src/serv-args.def
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ flag = {
 flag = {
     name      = maxearlydata;
     arg-type  = number;
 -    arg-range = "1->4294967295";
 +    arg-range = "1->";
     descrip   = "The maximum early data size to accept";
     doc      = "";
 };
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14-fips-dh-selftests.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14-fips-dh-selftests.patch
@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
 From f09b7627a63defb1c55e9965fb05e0bbddb90247 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 11:54:21 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] fips: use larger prime for DH self-tests
 According to FIPS140-2 IG 7.5, the minimum key size of FFC through
 2030 is defined as 2048 bits.  This updates the relevant self-test
 using ffdhe3072 defined in RFC 7919.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 lib/dh-primes.c           |   4 --
 2 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
 index 70b0f618f..9b7c692a8 100644
 --- a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
 +++ b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
@@ -620,32 +620,150 @@ static int test_dh(void)
 	gnutls_pk_params_st priv;
 	gnutls_pk_params_st pub;
 	gnutls_datum_t out = {NULL, 0};
 +
 +	/* FFDHE 3072 test vector provided by Stephan Mueller in:
 +	 * https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/merge_requests/1342#note_424430996
 +	 */
 	static const uint8_t known_dh_k[] = {
 -		0x10, 0x25, 0x04, 0xb5, 0xc6, 0xc2, 0xcb, 
 -		0x0c, 0xe9, 0xc5, 0x58, 0x0d, 0x22, 0x62};
 -	static const uint8_t test_p[] = {
 -		0x24, 0x85, 0xdd, 0x3a, 0x74, 0x42, 0xe4, 
 -		0xb3, 0xf1, 0x0b, 0x13, 0xf9, 0x17, 0x4d };
 -	static const uint8_t test_g[] = { 0x02 };
 +		0xec, 0xb3, 0x85, 0x0c, 0x72, 0x55, 0x55, 0xc2, 0x98, 0x36,
 +		0xbe, 0x75, 0x9e, 0xc9, 0x9d, 0x8b, 0x16, 0xa6, 0xe6, 0x84,
 +		0x33, 0x12, 0x80, 0x1d, 0xac, 0xde, 0x6a, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0x1e,
 +		0x15, 0xca, 0x5d, 0x26, 0xb3, 0x0a, 0x35, 0xf4, 0xbb, 0xad,
 +		0x71, 0xcb, 0x03, 0x1a, 0xcb, 0xfb, 0x83, 0xf0, 0xa8, 0xde,
 +		0xed, 0x5e, 0x3d, 0x98, 0xd2, 0xb0, 0xef, 0xad, 0xdf, 0x32,
 +		0xa0, 0x16, 0x7d, 0x0e, 0x29, 0xd8, 0x85, 0xca, 0x12, 0x97,
 +		0x56, 0xab, 0x6a, 0x26, 0xa4, 0x46, 0x3d, 0x87, 0xd7, 0xe0,
 +		0xb4, 0x3e, 0x28, 0x75, 0xac, 0x59, 0xc5, 0x71, 0x3a, 0x24,
 +		0x15, 0x76, 0x98, 0x72, 0x94, 0x2d, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xbc, 0x9a,
 +		0x77, 0xd4, 0xe2, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x54, 0x4a, 0x56, 0xbe, 0x0b,
 +		0x43, 0xf8, 0x21, 0x6f, 0x54, 0x32, 0xde, 0xb7, 0xd5, 0xb7,
 +		0x08, 0x00, 0xd2, 0x57, 0x8c, 0x0b, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x3e, 0xdb,
 +		0x72, 0x54, 0x3a, 0xc0, 0x50, 0x66, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0x67, 0xf5,
 +		0x22, 0x28, 0xf2, 0x3c, 0x51, 0x94, 0x61, 0x26, 0x9a, 0xc6,
 +		0x42, 0x0e, 0x8b, 0x42, 0xad, 0x79, 0x40, 0xa9, 0x0b, 0xdc,
 +		0x84, 0xd5, 0x71, 0x83, 0x94, 0xd9, 0x83, 0x2f, 0x08, 0x74,
 +		0xbc, 0x37, 0x6a, 0x3e, 0x1e, 0xbc, 0xcc, 0x09, 0x23, 0x30,
 +		0x79, 0x01, 0x39, 0xf6, 0xe3, 0xa8, 0xc0, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0xdb,
 +		0x0b, 0x71, 0x3e, 0x4f, 0x1f, 0x69, 0x84, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x6c,
 +		0x36, 0x2c, 0xcc, 0xb4, 0x7c, 0x94, 0xec, 0x06, 0x0b, 0x11,
 +		0x53, 0x95, 0xe6, 0x05, 0x43, 0xa4, 0xe4, 0xea, 0x1d, 0x4f,
 +		0xdc, 0xd0, 0x38, 0x0e, 0x32, 0xa1, 0xde, 0xd9, 0x8d, 0xd8,
 +		0x20, 0xac, 0x04, 0x83, 0xf8, 0x1b, 0x55, 0x52, 0x16, 0x20,
 +		0xe3, 0x2e, 0x6d, 0x11, 0x15, 0x29, 0x2f, 0x3a, 0x7c, 0x80,
 +		0x0a, 0x71, 0x3d, 0x31, 0x9c, 0x1b, 0x73, 0x59, 0xe1, 0x0d,
 +		0x27, 0xc5, 0xc0, 0x6a, 0x72, 0x3a, 0x5b, 0xd6, 0xf6, 0x50,
 +		0xe6, 0x69, 0x48, 0x1e, 0xfd, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x47, 0x73, 0xfb,
 +		0x88, 0x14, 0xea, 0x6d, 0x36, 0xe1, 0x4c, 0x2c, 0xf9, 0x04,
 +		0xc1, 0xb7, 0x29, 0xfc, 0x5d, 0x02, 0x5d, 0x1c, 0x4d, 0x31,
 +		0x4a, 0x51, 0x3f, 0xa4, 0x45, 0x19, 0x29, 0xc4, 0x32, 0xa6,
 +		0x45, 0xdb, 0x94, 0x3a, 0xbd, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xd6, 0x1a, 0xb1,
 +		0xff, 0xe7, 0x62, 0x75, 0x16, 0xe5, 0x0b, 0xa3, 0x3a, 0x93,
 +		0x84, 0xd6, 0xad, 0xc2, 0x24, 0x68, 0x3d, 0xd6, 0x07, 0xe4,
 +		0xbe, 0x5a, 0x49, 0x31, 0x06, 0xad, 0x3f, 0x31, 0x4a, 0x1c,
 +		0xf7, 0x58, 0xdf, 0x34, 0xcb, 0xc8, 0xa9, 0x07, 0x24, 0x42,
 +		0x63, 0xa5, 0x8e, 0xdd, 0x37, 0x78, 0x92, 0x68, 0x3f, 0xd8,
 +		0x2f, 0xea, 0x8c, 0xf1, 0x8e, 0xd4, 0x8b, 0xa7, 0x3f, 0xa0,
 +		0xfa, 0xaf, 0xf0, 0x35,
 +	};
 	static const uint8_t test_x[] = {
 -		0x06, 0x2c, 0x96, 0xae, 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x9b, 
 -		0xbb, 0x41, 0x51, 0x7a, 0xa7, 0xc5, 0xfe };
 +		0x16, 0x5c, 0xa6, 0xe0, 0x9b, 0x87, 0xfa, 0x2d, 0xbc, 0x13,
 +		0x20, 0xcd, 0xac, 0x4e, 0xcc, 0x60, 0x1e, 0x48, 0xec, 0xbe,
 +		0x73, 0x0c, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0x6e, 0x2a, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xd8, 0xf3,
 +		0x2d, 0x5f, 0x75, 0xf3, 0x07, 0x94, 0x88, 0x3d, 0xb1, 0x38,
 +		0xcf, 0xae, 0x4a, 0xcc, 0xcb, 0x6a, 0x80, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x3b,
 +		0xaa, 0x0b, 0x18, 0x74, 0x58, 0x7c, 0x3e, 0x74, 0xef, 0xb6,
 +		0xd3, 0x15, 0xee, 0x73, 0x29, 0x88, 0x7b, 0x65, 0x02, 0x39,
 +		0x33, 0xec, 0x22, 0x06, 0x8c, 0x5b, 0xd6, 0x2f, 0x4c, 0xf7,
 +		0xe0, 0x97, 0x6d, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x36, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x44, 0x4d,
 +		0x9d, 0x41, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0xec, 0x25, 0xf4, 0xc3, 0xa5, 0x91,
 +		0xd0, 0x90, 0xc9, 0x34, 0x7b, 0xba, 0x27, 0x30, 0x5a, 0xa2,
 +		0x21, 0x58, 0xce, 0x88, 0x25, 0x39, 0xaf, 0xf1, 0x17, 0x02,
 +		0x12, 0xf8, 0x55, 0xdc, 0xd2, 0x08, 0x5b, 0xd3, 0xc7, 0x8e,
 +		0xcf, 0x29, 0x85, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x5c, 0x08, 0xc2, 0xd7, 0xb0,
 +		0x33, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0xb9, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0xe5, 0x76,
 +		0x8f, 0xd3, 0x14, 0xb6, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0x9a, 0xe8, 0x15, 0x60,
 +		0x60, 0x5e, 0xaa, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xa6, 0xb2, 0x4f, 0xff, 0x46,
 +		0xc1, 0x5e, 0x93, 0x50, 0x90, 0x7e, 0x4c, 0x26, 0xd7, 0xbb,
 +		0x21, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x27, 0xc5, 0x9b, 0x0d, 0x46, 0x69, 0xe4,
 +		0x74, 0x87, 0x74, 0x55, 0xee, 0x5f, 0xe5, 0x72, 0x04, 0x46,
 +		0x1f, 0x2e, 0x55, 0xc7, 0xcc, 0x2b, 0x2b, 0x39, 0x6d, 0x90,
 +		0x60, 0x31, 0x37, 0x5b, 0x44, 0xde, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0xd1, 0xc6,
 +		0x9c, 0x12, 0x82, 0xcc, 0x7c, 0xb1, 0x0e, 0xa9, 0x95, 0x9d,
 +		0xe0, 0xa8, 0x3e, 0xc1, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0x6a, 0x37, 0x59, 0x17,
 +		0x93, 0x63, 0x1e, 0xbf, 0x04, 0xa3, 0xaa, 0xc0, 0x1d, 0xc4,
 +		0x6d, 0x7a, 0xdc, 0x69, 0x9c, 0xb0, 0x22, 0x56, 0xd9, 0x76,
 +		0x92, 0x2d, 0x1e, 0x62, 0xae, 0xfd, 0xd6, 0x9b, 0xfd, 0x08,
 +		0x2c, 0x95, 0xec, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x43, 0x62, 0x68, 0x1a, 0xaf,
 +		0x46, 0x59, 0xb7, 0xce, 0x8e, 0x42, 0x24, 0xae, 0xf7, 0x0e,
 +		0x9a, 0x3b, 0xf8, 0x77, 0xdf, 0x26, 0x85, 0x9f, 0x45, 0xad,
 +		0x8c, 0xa9, 0x54, 0x9c, 0x46, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x8a, 0xe9, 0xcc,
 +		0x34, 0x5e, 0xc5, 0xd1, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x44, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0x90,
 +		0x3a, 0x32, 0x1a, 0x9c, 0x2a, 0x63, 0xec, 0x21, 0xb4, 0xfc,
 +		0xfa, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x43, 0xc7, 0x49, 0x56, 0xbc,
 +		0x50, 0xc5, 0x84, 0xf0, 0x42, 0xc8, 0x6a, 0xf1, 0x78, 0xe4,
 +		0xaa, 0x06, 0x37, 0xe1, 0x30, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x97, 0xca, 0xfd,
 +		0x35, 0xfa, 0xeb, 0x48, 0x6d, 0xaa, 0x45, 0x46, 0x9d, 0xbc,
 +		0x1d, 0x98, 0x17, 0x45, 0xa3, 0xee, 0x21, 0xa0, 0x97, 0x38,
 +		0x80, 0xc5, 0x28, 0x1f,
 +	};
 	static const uint8_t test_y[] = { /* y=g^x mod p */
 -		0x1e, 0xca, 0x23, 0x2a, 0xfd, 0x34, 0xe1, 
 -		0x10, 0x7a, 0xff, 0xaf, 0x2d, 0xaa, 0x53 };
 +		0x93, 0xeb, 0x5c, 0x37, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x6f, 0xbf, 0xbe,
 +		0x96, 0x51, 0x26, 0x58, 0x81, 0x36, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0x9a, 0x34,
 +		0xc4, 0xc5, 0xa8, 0xa3, 0x2c, 0x41, 0x76, 0xa8, 0xc6, 0xc0,
 +		0xa0, 0xc8, 0x51, 0x36, 0xc4, 0x40, 0x4e, 0x2c, 0x69, 0xf7,
 +		0x51, 0xbb, 0xb0, 0xd6, 0xf5, 0xdb, 0x40, 0x29, 0x50, 0x3b,
 +		0x8a, 0xf9, 0xf3, 0x53, 0x78, 0xfc, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xe9,
 +		0xac, 0x85, 0x13, 0x65, 0x62, 0x22, 0x04, 0x1b, 0x14, 0x2a,
 +		0xf4, 0x8f, 0x2f, 0xf1, 0x2f, 0x81, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x0e, 0x76,
 +		0x91, 0x43, 0xb2, 0xfc, 0x7c, 0x6f, 0x0c, 0x45, 0x37, 0x31,
 +		0x31, 0x58, 0x5c, 0xdf, 0x42, 0x24, 0x7a, 0xba, 0x8b, 0x7f,
 +		0x79, 0x06, 0x07, 0xef, 0xd6, 0x06, 0xeb, 0xcb, 0x3c, 0xbd,
 +		0xbc, 0xe5, 0xff, 0xfd, 0x62, 0x15, 0x0c, 0x40, 0x46, 0x37,
 +		0xef, 0xd0, 0xa1, 0xde, 0x63, 0x4f, 0x20, 0x0b, 0x45, 0x7d,
 +		0x06, 0x77, 0xfd, 0x23, 0xc1, 0x32, 0x8a, 0x89, 0x65, 0x16,
 +		0xe8, 0x48, 0x12, 0x1c, 0x25, 0x33, 0x2d, 0xbd, 0xd8, 0x9f,
 +		0x1c, 0x9d, 0xbc, 0xe3, 0x08, 0x60, 0x87, 0x1a, 0xc6, 0x06,
 +		0x36, 0xd2, 0xac, 0x09, 0x6d, 0x99, 0x02, 0x89, 0xc6, 0x12,
 +		0x93, 0x8c, 0x4b, 0xd0, 0x7e, 0x36, 0x8a, 0xd6, 0xa0, 0x97,
 +		0x4f, 0x97, 0x3f, 0x97, 0x0b, 0xfe, 0x05, 0xfc, 0xc8, 0xef,
 +		0x21, 0x4d, 0x4a, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xb4, 0xa6, 0x4f, 0xe1, 0xdd,
 +		0x44, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x54, 0xf5, 0x54, 0x3e, 0x8c,
 +		0xb9, 0x85, 0x86, 0x00, 0x40, 0x98, 0xe7, 0x01, 0xdd, 0x93,
 +		0x9d, 0x95, 0xea, 0xf0, 0xd3, 0x99, 0x4b, 0xeb, 0xd5, 0x79,
 +		0x47, 0xa4, 0xad, 0x2a, 0xe0, 0x4d, 0x36, 0x3b, 0x46, 0x10,
 +		0x96, 0xbb, 0x48, 0xe9, 0xa1, 0x78, 0x01, 0x35, 0x0a, 0x5c,
 +		0x7b, 0x3f, 0xf5, 0xf7, 0xb1, 0xe3, 0x97, 0x17, 0x4d, 0x76,
 +		0x10, 0x8d, 0x68, 0x4c, 0x94, 0x7d, 0xee, 0x0e, 0x20, 0x8b,
 +		0xce, 0x7d, 0x0a, 0xa3, 0x51, 0xfb, 0xe6, 0xcf, 0xf0, 0x0e,
 +		0x7f, 0x3c, 0xd4, 0xef, 0x56, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x95, 0xf0, 0x5f,
 +		0x4b, 0x9c, 0x03, 0x9e, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xc1, 0x46, 0xd7, 0xc0,
 +		0x4f, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x6c, 0xe1, 0xe9, 0x2a, 0x97, 0xe0, 0x3f,
 +		0x3a, 0x93, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x41, 0x7d, 0x45, 0x03, 0xb3, 0x40,
 +		0x20, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x2d, 0xd3, 0xf7, 0x32, 0x7b, 0xcc, 0x4f,
 +		0x81, 0x18, 0x4c, 0x50, 0x77, 0xc4, 0xb7, 0x6a, 0x4d, 0x05,
 +		0xd8, 0x6d, 0xbf, 0x6f, 0xba, 0x1d, 0x38, 0x78, 0x87, 0xd2,
 +		0x8e, 0xc2, 0x6d, 0xb6, 0xed, 0x66, 0x61, 0xa8, 0xb9, 0x19,
 +		0x0e, 0x93, 0xd1, 0xcd, 0x5b, 0xbe, 0x19, 0x05, 0x52, 0x43,
 +		0xd6, 0xc1, 0x07, 0x3c, 0x6a, 0x62, 0xbd, 0x33, 0x9b, 0x1b,
 +		0x02, 0x42, 0x61, 0x14,
 +	};
 	gnutls_pk_params_init(&priv);
 	gnutls_pk_params_init(&pub);
 	priv.algo = pub.algo = GNUTLS_PK_DH;
 -	ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_P], test_p, sizeof(test_p));
 +	ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_P],
 +				    gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_prime.data,
 +				    gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_prime.size);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		gnutls_assert();
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 -	ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_G], test_g, sizeof(test_g));
 +	ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_G],
 +				    gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_generator.data,
 +				    gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_generator.size);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		gnutls_assert();
 		goto cleanup;
 diff --git a/lib/dh-primes.c b/lib/dh-primes.c
 index a440b5b98..94b69e345 100644
 --- a/lib/dh-primes.c
 +++ b/lib/dh-primes.c
@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@
 #include "gnutls_int.h"
 #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
 -#if defined(ENABLE_DHE) || defined(ENABLE_ANON)
 -
 #include "dh.h"
 static const unsigned char ffdhe_generator = 0x02;
@@ -1934,5 +1932,3 @@ _gnutls_dh_prime_match_fips_approved(const uint8_t *prime,
 	return 0;
 }
 -
 -#endif
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14-fips-kdf-selftests.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14-fips-kdf-selftests.patch
@ -1,713 +0,0 @@
 From 93c0e3ba4d2cfee86b32f28f33303a2193c4133c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 16:12:46 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 1/4] fips: add self-tests for HKDF
 FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-test on approved KDF algorithms.  As
 the guidance only requires running a single instance of each KDF
 mechanism, this only exercises HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand operations
 with HMAC-SHA-256 as the underlying MAC.
 Although HKDF is non-approved, it would be sensible to do that as it
 will be approved in FIPS140-3.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 devel/libgnutls-latest-x86_64.abi |   1 +
 lib/crypto-selftests.c            | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 lib/fips.c                        |   7 ++
 lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h   |   1 +
 lib/libgnutls.map                 |   1 +
 5 files changed, 169 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests.c b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
 index 7a1c7729c..bd148b6af 100644
 --- a/lib/crypto-selftests.c
 +++ b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
@@ -2917,3 +2917,162 @@ int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest)
 	return 0;
 }
 +
 +struct hkdf_vectors_st {
 +	const uint8_t *ikm;
 +	unsigned int ikm_size;
 +	const uint8_t *salt;
 +	unsigned int salt_size;
 +	const uint8_t *prk;
 +	unsigned int prk_size;
 +	const uint8_t *info;
 +	unsigned int info_size;
 +	const uint8_t *okm;
 +	unsigned int okm_size;
 +};
 +
 +const struct hkdf_vectors_st hkdf_sha256_vectors[] = {
 +	/* RFC 5869: A.1. Test Case 1: Basic test case with SHA-256 */
 +	{
 +		STR(ikm, ikm_size,
 +		    "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"
 +		    "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"),
 +		STR(salt, salt_size,
 +		    "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c"),
 +		STR(prk, prk_size,
 +		    "\x07\x77\x09\x36\x2c\x2e\x32\xdf\x0d\xdc\x3f\x0d\xc4\x7b"
 +		    "\xba\x63\x90\xb6\xc7\x3b\xb5\x0f\x9c\x31\x22\xec\x84\x4a"
 +		    "\xd7\xc2\xb3\xe5"),
 +		STR(info, info_size,
 +		    "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9"),
 +		STR(okm, okm_size,
 +		    "\x3c\xb2\x5f\x25\xfa\xac\xd5\x7a\x90\x43\x4f\x64\xd0\x36"
 +		    "\x2f\x2a\x2d\x2d\x0a\x90\xcf\x1a\x5a\x4c\x5d\xb0\x2d\x56"
 +		    "\xec\xc4\xc5\xbf\x34\x00\x72\x08\xd5\xb8\x87\x18\x58\x65"),
 +	},
 +	/* RFC 5869: A.2. Test Case 2: Test with SHA-256 and longer inputs/outputs */
 +	{
 +		STR(ikm, ikm_size,
 +		    "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d"
 +		    "\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b"
 +		    "\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27\x28\x29"
 +		    "\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
 +		    "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45"
 +		    "\x46\x47\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f"),
 +		STR(salt, salt_size,
 +		    "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d"
 +		    "\x6e\x6f\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78\x79\x7a\x7b"
 +		    "\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88\x89"
 +		    "\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97"
 +		    "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5"
 +		    "\xa6\xa7\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf"),
 +		STR(prk, prk_size,
 +		    "\x06\xa6\xb8\x8c\x58\x53\x36\x1a\x06\x10\x4c\x9c\xeb\x35"
 +		    "\xb4\x5c\xef\x76\x00\x14\x90\x46\x71\x01\x4a\x19\x3f\x40"
 +		    "\xc1\x5f\xc2\x44"),
 +		STR(info, info_size,
 +		    "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd"
 +		    "\xbe\xbf\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb"
 +		    "\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7\xd8\xd9"
 +		    "\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7"
 +		    "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5"
 +		    "\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff"),
 +		STR(okm, okm_size,
 +		    "\xb1\x1e\x39\x8d\xc8\x03\x27\xa1\xc8\xe7\xf7\x8c\x59\x6a"
 +		    "\x49\x34\x4f\x01\x2e\xda\x2d\x4e\xfa\xd8\xa0\x50\xcc\x4c"
 +		    "\x19\xaf\xa9\x7c\x59\x04\x5a\x99\xca\xc7\x82\x72\x71\xcb"
 +		    "\x41\xc6\x5e\x59\x0e\x09\xda\x32\x75\x60\x0c\x2f\x09\xb8"
 +		    "\x36\x77\x93\xa9\xac\xa3\xdb\x71\xcc\x30\xc5\x81\x79\xec"
 +		    "\x3e\x87\xc1\x4c\x01\xd5\xc1\xf3\x43\x4f\x1d\x87"),
 +	},
 +};
 +
 +static int test_hkdf(gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
 +		     const struct hkdf_vectors_st *vectors,
 +		     size_t vectors_size, unsigned flags)
 +{
 +	unsigned int i;
 +
 +	for (i = 0; i < vectors_size; i++) {
 +		gnutls_datum_t ikm, prk, salt, info;
 +		uint8_t output[4096];
 +		int ret;
 +
 +		ikm.data = (void *) vectors[i].ikm;
 +		ikm.size = vectors[i].ikm_size;
 +		salt.data = (void *) vectors[i].salt;
 +		salt.size = vectors[i].salt_size;
 +
 +		ret = gnutls_hkdf_extract(mac, &ikm, &salt, output);
 +		if (ret < 0) {
 +			_gnutls_debug_log("error extracting HKDF: MAC-%s\n",
 +					  gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
 +			return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
 +		}
 +
 +		if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].prk, vectors[i].prk_size) != 0) {
 +			_gnutls_debug_log
 +			    ("HKDF extract: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
 +			     gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
 +
 +			return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
 +		}
 +
 +		prk.data = (void *) vectors[i].prk;
 +		prk.size = vectors[i].prk_size;
 +		info.data = (void *) vectors[i].info;
 +		info.size = vectors[i].info_size;
 +
 +		ret = gnutls_hkdf_expand(mac, &prk, &info,
 +					 output, vectors[i].okm_size);
 +		if (ret < 0) {
 +			_gnutls_debug_log("error extracting HKDF: MAC-%s\n",
 +					  gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
 +			return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
 +		}
 +
 +		if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].okm, vectors[i].okm_size) != 0) {
 +			_gnutls_debug_log
 +			    ("HKDF expand: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
 +			     gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
 +
 +			return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	_gnutls_debug_log
 +	    ("HKDF: MAC-%s self check succeeded\n",
 +	     gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/*-
 + * gnutls_hkdf_self_test:
 + * @flags: GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG flags
 + * @mac: the message authentication algorithm to use
 + *
 + * This function will run self tests on HKDF with the provided mac.
 + *
 + * Returns: Zero or a negative error code on error.
 + *
 + * Since: 3.3.0-FIPS140
 + -*/
 +int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
 +{
 +	int ret;
 +
 +	if (flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL)
 +		mac = GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN;
 +
 +	switch (mac) {
 +	case GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN:
 +		CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256, test_hkdf, hkdf_sha256_vectors);
 +
 +		break;
 +	default:
 +		return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_NO_SELF_TEST);
 +	}
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
 index f8b10f750..48891ed57 100644
 --- a/lib/fips.c
 +++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -423,6 +423,13 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
 		goto error;
 	}
 +	/* HKDF */
 +	ret = gnutls_hkdf_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256);
 +	if (ret < 0) {
 +		gnutls_assert();
 +		goto error;
 +	}
 +
 	if (_gnutls_rnd_ops.self_test == NULL) {
 		gnutls_assert();
 		goto error;
 diff --git a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
 index aacbe94ca..9b7be8159 100644
 --- a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
 +++ b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
@@ -34,5 +34,6 @@ int gnutls_cipher_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher);
 int gnutls_mac_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
 int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest);
 int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk);
 +int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
 #endif
 diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
 index 61276e534..386b66f83 100644
 --- a/lib/libgnutls.map
 +++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1347,6 +1347,7 @@ GNUTLS_FIPS140_3_4 {
 	gnutls_pk_self_test;
 	gnutls_mac_self_test;
 	gnutls_digest_self_test;
 +	gnutls_hkdf_self_test;
 	#for FIPS140-2 validation
 	drbg_aes_reseed;
 	drbg_aes_init;
 -- 
 2.26.2
 From 31cc94275cd267f4e0db60999cc932fd76d43d5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 16:59:50 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 2/4] fips: add self-tests for PBKDF2
 FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-tests on approved KDF algorithms.  As
 the guidance only requires running a single instance of each KDF
 mechanism, this only exercises PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 as the
 underlying MAC algorithm.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 devel/libgnutls-latest-x86_64.abi |   1 +
 lib/crypto-selftests.c            | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 lib/fips.c                        |   7 ++
 lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h   |   1 +
 lib/libgnutls.map                 |   1 +
 5 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests.c b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
 index bd148b6af..c4b0bd207 100644
 --- a/lib/crypto-selftests.c
 +++ b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
@@ -3076,3 +3076,110 @@ int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
 	return 0;
 }
 +
 +struct pbkdf2_vectors_st {
 +	const uint8_t *key;
 +	size_t key_size;
 +	const uint8_t *salt;
 +	size_t salt_size;
 +	unsigned iter_count;
 +	const uint8_t *output;
 +	size_t output_size;
 +};
 +
 +const struct pbkdf2_vectors_st pbkdf2_sha256_vectors[] = {
 +	/* RFC 7914: 11. Test Vectors for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 */
 +	{
 +		STR(key, key_size, "passwd"),
 +		STR(salt, salt_size, "salt"),
 +		.iter_count = 1,
 +		STR(output, output_size,
 +		    "\x55\xac\x04\x6e\x56\xe3\x08\x9f\xec\x16\x91\xc2\x25\x44"
 +		    "\xb6\x05\xf9\x41\x85\x21\x6d\xde\x04\x65\xe6\x8b\x9d\x57"
 +		    "\xc2\x0d\xac\xbc\x49\xca\x9c\xcc\xf1\x79\xb6\x45\x99\x16"
 +		    "\x64\xb3\x9d\x77\xef\x31\x7c\x71\xb8\x45\xb1\xe3\x0b\xd5"
 +		    "\x09\x11\x20\x41\xd3\xa1\x97\x83"),
 +	},
 +	/* RFC 7914: 11. Test Vectors for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 */
 +	{
 +		STR(key, key_size, "Password"),
 +		STR(salt, salt_size, "NaCl"),
 +		.iter_count = 80000,
 +		STR(output, output_size,
 +		    "\x4d\xdc\xd8\xf6\x0b\x98\xbe\x21\x83\x0c\xee\x5e\xf2\x27"
 +		    "\x01\xf9\x64\x1a\x44\x18\xd0\x4c\x04\x14\xae\xff\x08\x87"
 +		    "\x6b\x34\xab\x56\xa1\xd4\x25\xa1\x22\x58\x33\x54\x9a\xdb"
 +		    "\x84\x1b\x51\xc9\xb3\x17\x6a\x27\x2b\xde\xbb\xa1\xd0\x78"
 +		    "\x47\x8f\x62\xb3\x97\xf3\x3c\x8d"),
 +	},
 +};
 +
 +static int test_pbkdf2(gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
 +		       const struct pbkdf2_vectors_st *vectors,
 +		       size_t vectors_size, unsigned flags)
 +{
 +	unsigned int i;
 +
 +	for (i = 0; i < vectors_size; i++) {
 +		gnutls_datum_t key, salt;
 +		uint8_t output[4096];
 +		int ret;
 +
 +		key.data = (void *) vectors[i].key;
 +		key.size = vectors[i].key_size;
 +		salt.data = (void *) vectors[i].salt;
 +		salt.size = vectors[i].salt_size;
 +
 +		ret = gnutls_pbkdf2(mac, &key, &salt, vectors[i].iter_count,
 +				    output, vectors[i].output_size);
 +		if (ret < 0) {
 +			_gnutls_debug_log("error calculating PBKDF2: MAC-%s\n",
 +					  gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
 +			return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
 +		}
 +
 +		if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].output, vectors[i].output_size) != 0) {
 +			_gnutls_debug_log
 +			    ("PBKDF2: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
 +			     gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
 +
 +			return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	_gnutls_debug_log
 +	    ("PBKDF2: MAC-%s self check succeeded\n",
 +	     gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/*-
 + * gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test:
 + * @flags: GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG flags
 + * @mac: the message authentication algorithm to use
 + *
 + * This function will run self tests on PBKDF2 with the provided mac.
 + *
 + * Returns: Zero or a negative error code on error.
 + *
 + * Since: 3.3.0-FIPS140
 + -*/
 +int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
 +{
 +	int ret;
 +
 +	if (flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL)
 +		mac = GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN;
 +
 +	switch (mac) {
 +	case GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN:
 +		CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256, test_pbkdf2, pbkdf2_sha256_vectors);
 +
 +		break;
 +	default:
 +		return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_NO_SELF_TEST);
 +	}
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
 index 48891ed57..7cfab1049 100644
 --- a/lib/fips.c
 +++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -430,6 +430,13 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
 		goto error;
 	}
 +	/* PBKDF2 */
 +	ret = gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256);
 +	if (ret < 0) {
 +		gnutls_assert();
 +		goto error;
 +	}
 +
 	if (_gnutls_rnd_ops.self_test == NULL) {
 		gnutls_assert();
 		goto error;
 diff --git a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
 index 9b7be8159..958c0da8f 100644
 --- a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
 +++ b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
@@ -35,5 +35,6 @@ int gnutls_mac_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
 int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest);
 int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk);
 int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
 +int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
 #endif
 diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
 index 386b66f83..f5537a386 100644
 --- a/lib/libgnutls.map
 +++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1348,6 +1348,7 @@ GNUTLS_FIPS140_3_4 {
 	gnutls_mac_self_test;
 	gnutls_digest_self_test;
 	gnutls_hkdf_self_test;
 +	gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test;
 	#for FIPS140-2 validation
 	drbg_aes_reseed;
 	drbg_aes_init;
 -- 
 2.26.2
 From d1a3235e8c829855969d00364d8b5456fce2c78c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 17:44:30 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 3/4] fips: add self-tests for TLS-PRF
 FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-tests on approved KDF algorithms.  As
 the guidance only requires to run a single instance of each KDF
 mechanism, this only exercises TLS1.2 PRF with HMAC-SHA-256 as the
 underlying MAC algorithm.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 devel/libgnutls-latest-x86_64.abi |   1 +
 lib/crypto-selftests.c            | 196 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 lib/fips.c                        |   7 ++
 lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h   |   1 +
 lib/libgnutls.map                 |   1 +
 5 files changed, 206 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests.c b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
 index c4b0bd207..b740936d6 100644
 --- a/lib/crypto-selftests.c
 +++ b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
@@ -3183,3 +3183,199 @@ int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
 	return 0;
 }
 +
 +struct tlsprf_vectors_st {
 +	const uint8_t *key;
 +	size_t key_size;
 +	const uint8_t *label;
 +	size_t label_size;
 +	const uint8_t *seed;
 +	size_t seed_size;
 +	const uint8_t *output;
 +	size_t output_size;
 +};
 +
 +const struct tlsprf_vectors_st tls10prf_vectors[] = {
 +	/* tests/tls10-prf.c: test1 */
 +	{
 +		STR(key, key_size,
 +		    "\x26\x3b\xdb\xbb\x6f\x6d\x4c\x66\x4e\x05\x8d\x0a\xa9\xd3"
 +		    "\x21\xbe"),
 +		STR(label, label_size,
 +		    "test label"),
 +		STR(seed, seed_size,
 +		    "\xb9\x20\x57\x3b\x19\x96\x01\x02\x4f\x04\xd6\xdc\x61\x96"
 +		    "\x6e\x65"),
 +		STR(output, output_size,
 +		    "\x66\x17\x99\x37\x65\xfa\x6c\xa7\x03\xd1\x9e\xc7\x0d\xd5"
 +		    "\xdd\x16\x0f\xfc\xc0\x77\x25\xfa\xfb\x71\x4a\x9f\x81\x5a"
 +		    "\x2a\x30\xbf\xb7\xe3\xbb\xfb\x7e\xee\x57\x4b\x3b\x61\x3e"
 +		    "\xb7\xfe\x80\xee\xc9\x69\x1d\x8c\x1b\x0e\x2d\x9b\x3c\x8b"
 +		    "\x4b\x02\xb6\xb6\xd6\xdb\x88\xe2\x09\x46\x23\xef\x62\x40"
 +		    "\x60\x7e\xda\x7a\xbe\x3c\x84\x6e\x82\xa3"),
 +	},
 +};
 +
 +const struct tlsprf_vectors_st tls12prf_sha256_vectors[] = {
 +	/* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test1 */
 +	{
 +		STR(key, key_size,
 +		    "\x04\x50\xb0\xea\x9e\xcd\x36\x02\xee\x0d\x76\xc5\xc3\xc8"
 +		    "\x6f\x4a"),
 +		STR(label, label_size,
 +		    "test label"),
 +		STR(seed, seed_size,
 +		    "\x20\x7a\xcc\x02\x54\xb8\x67\xf5\xb9\x25\xb4\x5a\x33\x60"
 +		    "\x1d\x8b"),
 +		STR(output, output_size,
 +		    "\xae\x67\x9e\x0e\x71\x4f\x59\x75\x76\x37\x68\xb1\x66\x97"
 +		    "\x9e\x1d"),
 +	},
 +	/* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test2 */
 +	{
 +		STR(key, key_size,
 +		    "\x34\x20\x4a\x9d\xf0\xbe\x6e\xb4\xe9\x25\xa8\x02\x7c\xf6"
 +		    "\xc6\x02"),
 +		STR(label, label_size,
 +		    "test label"),
 +		STR(seed, seed_size,
 +		    "\x98\xb2\xc4\x0b\xcd\x66\x4c\x83\xbb\x92\x0c\x18\x20\x1a"
 +		    "\x63\x95"),
 +		STR(output, output_size,
 +		    "\xaf\xa9\x31\x24\x53\xc2\x2f\xa8\x3d\x2b\x51\x1b\x37\x2d"
 +		    "\x73\xa4\x02\xa2\xa6\x28\x73\x23\x9a\x51\xfa\xde\x45\x08"
 +		    "\x2f\xaf\x3f\xd2\xbb\x7f\xfb\x3e\x9b\xf3\x6e\x28\xb3\x14"
 +		    "\x1a\xab\xa4\x84\x00\x53\x32\xa9\xf9\xe3\x88\xa4\xd3\x29"
 +		    "\xf1\x58\x7a\x4b\x31\x7d\xa0\x77\x08\xea\x1b\xa9\x5a\x53"
 +		    "\xf8\x78\x67\x24\xbd\x83\xce\x4b\x03\xaf"),
 +	},
 +	/* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test3 */
 +	{
 +		STR(key, key_size,
 +		    "\xa3\x69\x1a\xa1\xf6\x81\x4b\x80\x59\x2b\xf1\xcf\x2a\xcf"
 +		    "\x16\x97"),
 +		STR(label, label_size,
 +		    "test label"),
 +		STR(seed, seed_size,
 +		    "\x55\x23\xd4\x1e\x32\x0e\x69\x4d\x0c\x1f\xf5\x73\x4d\x83"
 +		    "\x0b\x93\x3e\x46\x92\x70\x71\xc9\x26\x21"),
 +		STR(output, output_size,
 +		    "\x6a\xd0\x98\x4f\xa0\x6f\x78\xfe\x16\x1b\xd4\x6d\x7c\x26"
 +		    "\x1d\xe4\x33\x40\xd7\x28\xdd\xdc\x3d\x0f\xf0\xdd\x7e\x0d"),
 +	},
 +	/* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test4 */
 +	{
 +		STR(key, key_size,
 +		    "\x21\x0e\xc9\x37\x06\x97\x07\xe5\x46\x5b\xc4\x6b\xf7\x79"
 +		    "\xe1\x04\x10\x8b\x18\xfd\xb7\x93\xbe\x7b\x21\x8d\xbf\x14"
 +		    "\x5c\x86\x41\xf3"),
 +		STR(label, label_size,
 +		    "test label"),
 +		STR(seed, seed_size,
 +		    "\x1e\x35\x1a\x0b\xaf\x35\xc7\x99\x45\x92\x43\x94\xb8\x81"
 +		    "\xcf\xe3\x1d\xae\x8f\x1c\x1e\xd5\x4d\x3b"),
 +		STR(output, output_size,
 +		    "\x76\x53\xfa\x80\x9c\xde\x3b\x55\x3c\x4a\x17\xe2\xcd\xbc"
 +		    "\xc9\x18\xf3\x65\x27\xf2\x22\x19\xa7\xd7\xf9\x5d\x97\x24"
 +		    "\x3f\xf2\xd5\xde\xe8\x26\x5e\xf0\xaf\x03"),
 +	},
 +};
 +
 +const struct tlsprf_vectors_st tls12prf_sha384_vectors[] = {
 +	/* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha384_test1
 +	 * https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg03416.html
 +	 */
 +	{
 +		STR(key, key_size,
 +		    "\xb8\x0b\x73\x3d\x6c\xee\xfc\xdc\x71\x56\x6e\xa4\x8e\x55"
 +		    "\x67\xdf"),
 +		STR(label, label_size,
 +		    "test label"),
 +		STR(seed, seed_size,
 +		    "\xcd\x66\x5c\xf6\xa8\x44\x7d\xd6\xff\x8b\x27\x55\x5e\xdb"
 +		    "\x74\x65"),
 +		STR(output, output_size,
 +		    "\x7b\x0c\x18\xe9\xce\xd4\x10\xed\x18\x04\xf2\xcf\xa3\x4a"
 +		    "\x33\x6a\x1c\x14\xdf\xfb\x49\x00\xbb\x5f\xd7\x94\x21\x07"
 +		    "\xe8\x1c\x83\xcd\xe9\xca\x0f\xaa\x60\xbe\x9f\xe3\x4f\x82"
 +		    "\xb1\x23\x3c\x91\x46\xa0\xe5\x34\xcb\x40\x0f\xed\x27\x00"
 +		    "\x88\x4f\x9d\xc2\x36\xf8\x0e\xdd\x8b\xfa\x96\x11\x44\xc9"
 +		    "\xe8\xd7\x92\xec\xa7\x22\xa7\xb3\x2f\xc3\xd4\x16\xd4\x73"
 +		    "\xeb\xc2\xc5\xfd\x4a\xbf\xda\xd0\x5d\x91\x84\x25\x9b\x5b"
 +		    "\xf8\xcd\x4d\x90\xfa\x0d\x31\xe2\xde\xc4\x79\xe4\xf1\xa2"
 +		    "\x60\x66\xf2\xee\xa9\xa6\x92\x36\xa3\xe5\x26\x55\xc9\xe9"
 +		    "\xae\xe6\x91\xc8\xf3\xa2\x68\x54\x30\x8d\x5e\xaa\x3b\xe8"
 +		    "\x5e\x09\x90\x70\x3d\x73\xe5\x6f"),
 +	},
 +};
 +
 +static int test_tlsprf(gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
 +		       const struct tlsprf_vectors_st *vectors,
 +		       size_t vectors_size, unsigned flags)
 +{
 +	unsigned int i;
 +
 +	for (i = 0; i < vectors_size; i++) {
 +		char output[4096];
 +		int ret;
 +
 +		ret = _gnutls_prf_raw(mac,
 +				      vectors[i].key_size, vectors[i].key,
 +				      vectors[i].label_size, (const char *)vectors[i].label,
 +				      vectors[i].seed_size, vectors[i].seed,
 +				      vectors[i].output_size, output);
 +		if (ret < 0) {
 +			_gnutls_debug_log("error calculating TLS-PRF: MAC-%s\n",
 +					  gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
 +			return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
 +		}
 +
 +		if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].output, vectors[i].output_size) != 0) {
 +			_gnutls_debug_log
 +			    ("TLS-PRF: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
 +			     gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
 +
 +			return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	_gnutls_debug_log
 +	    ("TLS-PRF: MAC-%s self check succeeded\n",
 +	     gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/*-
 + * gnutls_tlsprf_self_test:
 + * @flags: GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG flags
 + * @mac: the message authentication algorithm to use
 + *
 + * This function will run self tests on TLS-PRF with the provided mac.
 + *
 + * Returns: Zero or a negative error code on error.
 + *
 + * Since: 3.3.0-FIPS140
 + -*/
 +int gnutls_tlsprf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
 +{
 +	int ret;
 +
 +	if (flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL)
 +		mac = GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN;
 +
 +	switch (mac) {
 +	case GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN:
 +		NON_FIPS_CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_MD5_SHA1, test_tlsprf, tls10prf_vectors);
 +		FALLTHROUGH;
 +		CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256, test_tlsprf, tls12prf_sha256_vectors);
 +		FALLTHROUGH;
 +		CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA384, test_tlsprf, tls12prf_sha384_vectors);
 +
 +		break;
 +	default:
 +		return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_NO_SELF_TEST);
 +	}
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
 index 7cfab1049..30d396b2c 100644
 --- a/lib/fips.c
 +++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -437,6 +437,13 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
 		goto error;
 	}
 +	/* TLS-PRF */
 +	ret = gnutls_tlsprf_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256);
 +	if (ret < 0) {
 +		gnutls_assert();
 +		goto error;
 +	}
 +
 	if (_gnutls_rnd_ops.self_test == NULL) {
 		gnutls_assert();
 		goto error;
 diff --git a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
 index 958c0da8f..88b5a8dbf 100644
 --- a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
 +++ b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
@@ -36,5 +36,6 @@ int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest);
 int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk);
 int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
 int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
 +int gnutls_tlsprf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
 #endif
 diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
 index f5537a386..643d400a1 100644
 --- a/lib/libgnutls.map
 +++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1349,6 +1349,7 @@ GNUTLS_FIPS140_3_4 {
 	gnutls_digest_self_test;
 	gnutls_hkdf_self_test;
 	gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test;
 +	gnutls_tlsprf_self_test;
 	#for FIPS140-2 validation
 	drbg_aes_reseed;
 	drbg_aes_init;
 -- 
 2.26.2
 From af3df0102fc377591a6de3112b034d4a492fc92c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 17:59:46 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 4/4] fips: run CMAC self-tests
 FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-tests on CMAC.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 lib/fips.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
 index 30d396b2c..51567953d 100644
 --- a/lib/fips.c
 +++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -398,6 +398,12 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
 		goto error;
 	}
 +	ret = gnutls_mac_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_AES_CMAC_256);
 +	if (ret < 0) {
 +		gnutls_assert();
 +		goto error;
 +	}
 +
 	/* PK */
 	ret = gnutls_pk_self_test(0, GNUTLS_PK_RSA);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14-fips-mode-check.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14-fips-mode-check.patch
@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
 From d1dc655cd2c8ae417381e5f966941c75cfe287ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 16:42:07 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] _gnutls_fips_mode_enabled: treat selftest failure as FIPS
 disabled
 Previously gnutls_fips140_mode_enabled() returned true, even after
 selftests have failed and the library state has switched to error.
 While later calls to crypto operations fails, it would be more
 convenient to have a function to detect that state.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 lib/fips.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
 index acdd2ec23..f8b10f750 100644
 --- a/lib/fips.c
 +++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -491,8 +491,17 @@ unsigned gnutls_fips140_mode_enabled(void)
 #ifdef ENABLE_FIPS140
 	unsigned ret = _gnutls_fips_mode_enabled();
 -	if (ret > GNUTLS_FIPS140_DISABLED)
 +	if (ret > GNUTLS_FIPS140_DISABLED) {
 +		/* If the previous run of selftests has failed, return as if
 +		 * the FIPS mode is disabled. We could use HAVE_LIB_ERROR, if
 +		 * we can assume that all the selftests run atomically from
 +		 * the ELF constructor.
 +		 */
 +		if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_ERROR)
 +			return 0;
 +
 		return ret;
 +	}
 #endif
 	return 0;
 }
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14.tar.xz.sig
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14.tar.xz.sig
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-cpuid.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-cpuid.patch
@ -1,247 +0,0 @@
 From 300c6315d2e644ae81b43fa2dd7bbf68b3afb5b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 19:02:03 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] accelerated: fix CPU feature detection for Intel CPUs
 This fixes read_cpuid_vals to correctly read the CPUID quadruple, as
 well as to set the bit the ustream CRYPTOGAMS uses to identify Intel
 CPUs.
 Suggested by Rafael Gieschke in:
 https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/1282
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
 index 3845c6b4c9..cf615ef24f 100644
 --- a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
 +++ b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
@@ -81,15 +81,38 @@ unsigned int _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[4];
 # define bit_AVX 0x10000000
 #endif
 -#ifndef OSXSAVE_MASK
 -/* OSXSAVE|FMA|MOVBE */
 -# define OSXSAVE_MASK (0x8000000|0x1000|0x400000)
 +#ifndef bit_AVX2
 +# define bit_AVX2 0x00000020
 +#endif
 +
 +#ifndef bit_AVX512F
 +# define bit_AVX512F 0x00010000
 +#endif
 +
 +#ifndef bit_AVX512IFMA
 +# define bit_AVX512IFMA 0x00200000
 +#endif
 +
 +#ifndef bit_AVX512BW
 +# define bit_AVX512BW 0x40000000
 +#endif
 +
 +#ifndef bit_AVX512VL
 +# define bit_AVX512VL 0x80000000
 +#endif
 +
 +#ifndef bit_OSXSAVE
 +# define bit_OSXSAVE 0x8000000
 #endif
 #ifndef bit_MOVBE
 # define bit_MOVBE 0x00400000
 #endif
 +#ifndef OSXSAVE_MASK
 +# define OSXSAVE_MASK (bit_OSXSAVE|bit_MOVBE)
 +#endif
 +
 #define via_bit_PADLOCK (0x3 << 6)
 #define via_bit_PADLOCK_PHE (0x3 << 10)
 #define via_bit_PADLOCK_PHE_SHA512 (0x3 << 25)
@@ -127,7 +150,7 @@ static unsigned read_cpuid_vals(unsigned int vals[4])
 	unsigned t1, t2, t3;
 	vals[0] = vals[1] = vals[2] = vals[3] = 0;
 -	if (!__get_cpuid(1, &t1, &vals[0], &vals[1], &t2))
 +	if (!__get_cpuid(1, &t1, &t2, &vals[1], &vals[0]))
 		return 0;
 	/* suppress AVX512; it works conditionally on certain CPUs on the original code */
 	vals[1] &= 0xfffff7ff;
@@ -145,7 +168,7 @@ static unsigned check_4th_gen_intel_features(unsigned ecx)
 {
 	uint32_t xcr0;
 -	if ((ecx & OSXSAVE_MASK) != OSXSAVE_MASK)
 +	if ((ecx & bit_OSXSAVE) != bit_OSXSAVE)
 		return 0;
 #if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__clang__)
@@ -233,10 +256,7 @@ static unsigned check_sha(void)
 #ifdef ASM_X86_64
 static unsigned check_avx_movbe(void)
 {
 -	if (check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1]) == 0)
 -		return 0;
 -
 -	return ((_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX));
 +	return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX);
 }
 static unsigned check_pclmul(void)
@@ -514,33 +534,47 @@ void register_x86_padlock_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
 }
 #endif
 -static unsigned check_intel_or_amd(void)
 +enum x86_cpu_vendor {
 +	X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER,
 +	X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL,
 +	X86_CPU_VENDOR_AMD,
 +};
 +
 +static enum x86_cpu_vendor check_x86_cpu_vendor(void)
 {
 	unsigned int a, b, c, d;
 -	if (!__get_cpuid(0, &a, &b, &c, &d))
 -		return 0;
 +	if (!__get_cpuid(0, &a, &b, &c, &d)) {
 +		return X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER;
 +	}
 -	if ((memcmp(&b, "Genu", 4) == 0 &&
 -	     memcmp(&d, "ineI", 4) == 0 &&
 -	     memcmp(&c, "ntel", 4) == 0) ||
 -	    (memcmp(&b, "Auth", 4) == 0 &&
 -	     memcmp(&d, "enti", 4) == 0 && memcmp(&c, "cAMD", 4) == 0)) {
 -		return 1;
 +	if (memcmp(&b, "Genu", 4) == 0 &&
 +	    memcmp(&d, "ineI", 4) == 0 &&
 +	    memcmp(&c, "ntel", 4) == 0) {
 +		return X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL;
 	}
 -	return 0;
 +	if (memcmp(&b, "Auth", 4) == 0 &&
 +	    memcmp(&d, "enti", 4) == 0 &&
 +	    memcmp(&c, "cAMD", 4) == 0) {
 +		return X86_CPU_VENDOR_AMD;
 +	}
 +
 +	return X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER;
 }
 static
 void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
 {
 	int ret;
 +	enum x86_cpu_vendor vendor;
 	memset(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s, 0, sizeof(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s));
 -	if (check_intel_or_amd() == 0)
 +	vendor = check_x86_cpu_vendor();
 +	if (vendor == X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER) {
 		return;
 +	}
 	if (capabilities == 0) {
 		if (!read_cpuid_vals(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s))
@@ -549,6 +583,23 @@ void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
 		capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(capabilities);
 	}
 +	/* CRYPTOGAMS uses the (1 << 30) bit as an indicator of Intel CPUs */
 +	if (vendor == X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL) {
 +		_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[0] |= 1 << 30;
 +	} else {
 +		_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[0] &= ~(1 << 30);
 +	}
 +
 +	if (!check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1])) {
 +		_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] &= ~bit_AVX;
 +
 +		/* Clear AVX2 bits as well, according to what OpenSSL does.
 +		 * Should we clear bit_AVX512DQ, bit_AVX512PF, bit_AVX512ER, and
 +		 * bit_AVX512CD? */
 +		_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[2] &= ~(bit_AVX2|bit_AVX512F|bit_AVX512IFMA|
 +					    bit_AVX512BW|bit_AVX512BW);
 +	}
 +
 	if (check_ssse3()) {
 		_gnutls_debug_log("Intel SSSE3 was detected\n");
 -- 
 2.37.3
 From cd509dac9e6d1bf76fd12c72c1fd61f1708c254a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 09:39:18 +0900
 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] accelerated: clear AVX bits if it cannot be queried
 through XSAVE
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 The algorithm to detect AVX is described in 14.3 of "Intel® 64 and IA-32
 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual".
 GnuTLS previously only followed that algorithm when registering the
 crypto backend, while the CRYPTOGAMS derived SHA code assembly expects
 that the extension bits are propagated to _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
 index cf615ef24f..655d0c65f2 100644
 --- a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
 +++ b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ static void capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(unsigned capabilities)
 	}
 	if (capabilities & INTEL_AVX) {
 -		if ((a[1] & bit_AVX) && check_4th_gen_intel_features(a[1])) {
 +		if ((a[1] & bit_AVX) && (a[1] & bit_MOVBE) &&
 +		    check_4th_gen_intel_features(a[1])) {
 			_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] |= bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE;
 		} else {
 			_gnutls_debug_log
@@ -256,7 +257,7 @@ static unsigned check_sha(void)
 #ifdef ASM_X86_64
 static unsigned check_avx_movbe(void)
 {
 -	return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX);
 +	return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & (bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE)) == (bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE);
 }
 static unsigned check_pclmul(void)
@@ -579,6 +580,19 @@ void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
 	if (capabilities == 0) {
 		if (!read_cpuid_vals(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s))
 			return;
 +		if (!check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1])) {
 +			_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] &= ~bit_AVX;
 +
 +			/* Clear AVX2 bits as well, according to what
 +			 * OpenSSL does.  Should we clear
 +			 * bit_AVX512DQ, bit_AVX512PF, bit_AVX512ER,
 +			 * and bit_AVX512CD? */
 +			_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[2] &= ~(bit_AVX2|
 +						    bit_AVX512F|
 +						    bit_AVX512IFMA|
 +						    bit_AVX512BW|
 +						    bit_AVX512BW);
 +		}
 	} else {
 		capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(capabilities);
 	}
 -- 
 2.37.3
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-deterministic-ecdsa-fixes.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-deterministic-ecdsa-fixes.patch
@ -1,474 +0,0 @@
 From 0d39e4120bc5ece53c86c5802c546259b8ca286a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 17:56:58 +0900
 Subject: [PATCH] nettle: avoid normalization of mpz_t in deterministic ECDSA
 This removes function calls that potentially leak bit-length of a
 private key used to calculate a nonce in deterministic ECDSA.  Namely:
 - _gnutls_dsa_compute_k has been rewritten to work on always
  zero-padded mp_limb_t arrays instead of mpz_t
 - rnd_mpz_func has been replaced with rnd_datum_func, which is backed
  by a byte array instead of an mpz_t value
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c    | 84 +++++++++++++++++++------------
 lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h    | 31 +++++++++---
 lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c  | 71 +++++++++-----------------
 lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h  |  8 +--
 lib/nettle/pk.c                   | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
 tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c
 index 17d63318c4..ddeb6f6d1e 100644
 --- a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c
 +++ b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c
@@ -31,33 +31,37 @@
 #include "mpn-base256.h"
 #include <string.h>
 -#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(bits) (((bits) + GMP_NUMB_BITS - 1) / GMP_NUMB_BITS)
 -
 -/* The maximum size of q, choosen from the fact that we support
 - * 521-bit elliptic curve generator and 512-bit DSA subgroup at
 - * maximum. */
 -#define MAX_Q_BITS 521
 -#define MAX_Q_SIZE ((MAX_Q_BITS + 7) / 8)
 -#define MAX_Q_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_Q_BITS)
 -
 -#define MAX_HASH_BITS (MAX_HASH_SIZE * 8)
 -#define MAX_HASH_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_HASH_BITS)
 -
 -int
 -_gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
 -		      const mpz_t q,
 -		      const mpz_t x,
 -		      gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
 -		      const uint8_t *digest,
 -		      size_t length)
 +/* For mini-gmp */
 +#ifndef GMP_LIMB_BITS
 +#define GMP_LIMB_BITS GMP_NUMB_BITS
 +#endif
 +
 +static inline int is_zero_limb(mp_limb_t x)
 +{
 +	x |= (x << 1);
 +	return ((x >> 1) - 1) >> (GMP_LIMB_BITS - 1);
 +}
 +
 +static int sec_zero_p(const mp_limb_t *ap, mp_size_t n)
 +{
 +	volatile mp_limb_t w;
 +	mp_size_t i;
 +
 +	for (i = 0, w = 0; i < n; i++)
 +		w |= ap[i];
 +
 +	return is_zero_limb(w);
 +}
 +
 +int _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mp_limb_t *h, const mp_limb_t *q, const mp_limb_t *x,
 +			  mp_size_t qn, mp_bitcnt_t q_bits,
 +			  gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac, const uint8_t *digest,
 +			  size_t length)
 {
 	uint8_t V[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
 	uint8_t K[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
 	uint8_t xp[MAX_Q_SIZE];
 	uint8_t tp[MAX_Q_SIZE];
 -	mp_limb_t h[MAX(MAX_Q_LIMBS, MAX_HASH_LIMBS)];
 -	mp_bitcnt_t q_bits = mpz_sizeinbase (q, 2);
 -	mp_size_t qn = mpz_size(q);
 	mp_bitcnt_t h_bits = length * 8;
 	mp_size_t hn = BITS_TO_LIMBS(h_bits);
 	size_t nbytes = (q_bits + 7) / 8;
@@ -66,6 +70,7 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
 	mp_limb_t cy;
 	gnutls_hmac_hd_t hd;
 	int ret = 0;
 +	mp_limb_t scratch[MAX_Q_LIMBS];
 	if (unlikely(q_bits > MAX_Q_BITS))
 		return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
@@ -73,7 +78,7 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
 		return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
 	/* int2octets(x) */
 -	mpn_get_base256(xp, nbytes, mpz_limbs_read(x), qn);
 +	mpn_get_base256(xp, nbytes, x, qn);
 	/* bits2octets(h) */
 	mpn_set_base256(h, hn, digest, length);
@@ -97,12 +102,12 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
 			mpn_rshift(h, h, hn, shift % GMP_NUMB_BITS);
 	}
 -	cy = mpn_sub_n(h, h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn);
 +	cy = mpn_sub_n(h, h, q, qn);
 	/* Fall back to addmul_1, if nettle is linked with mini-gmp. */
 #ifdef mpn_cnd_add_n
 -	mpn_cnd_add_n(cy, h, h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn);
 +	mpn_cnd_add_n(cy, h, h, q, qn);
 #else
 -	mpn_addmul_1(h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn, cy != 0);
 +	mpn_addmul_1(h, q, qn, cy != 0);
 #endif
 	mpn_get_base256(tp, nbytes, h, qn);
@@ -178,12 +183,8 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
 		if (tlen * 8 > q_bits)
 			mpn_rshift (h, h, qn, tlen * 8 - q_bits);
 		/* Check if k is in [1,q-1] */
 -		if (!mpn_zero_p (h, qn) &&
 -		    mpn_cmp (h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn) < 0) {
 -			mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(k, qn), h, qn);
 -			mpz_limbs_finish(k, qn);
 +		if (!sec_zero_p(h, qn) && mpn_sub_n(scratch, h, q, qn))
 			break;
 -		}
 		ret = gnutls_hmac_init(&hd, mac, K, length);
 		if (ret < 0)
@@ -207,3 +208,24 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
 	return ret;
 }
 +
 +/* cancel-out dsa_sign's addition of 1 to random data */
 +void _gnutls_dsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
 +				  mp_size_t n)
 +{
 +	/* Fall back to sub_1, if nettle is linked with mini-gmp. */
 +#ifdef mpn_sec_sub_1
 +	mp_limb_t t[MAX_Q_LIMBS];
 +
 +	mpn_sec_sub_1(h, h, n, 1, t);
 +#else
 +	mpn_sub_1(h, h, n, 1);
 +#endif
 +	mpn_get_base256(k, nbytes, h, n);
 +}
 +
 +void _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
 +				    mp_size_t n)
 +{
 +	mpn_get_base256(k, nbytes, h, n);
 +}
 diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h
 index 64e90e0ca2..e88fce0a6d 100644
 --- a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h
 +++ b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h
@@ -26,12 +26,29 @@
 #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
 #include <nettle/bignum.h> /* includes gmp.h */
 -int
 -_gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
 -		      const mpz_t q,
 -		      const mpz_t x,
 -		      gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
 -		      const uint8_t *digest,
 -		      size_t length);
 +#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(bits) (((bits) + GMP_NUMB_BITS - 1) / GMP_NUMB_BITS)
 +
 +/* The maximum size of q, chosen from the fact that we support
 + * 521-bit elliptic curve generator and 512-bit DSA subgroup at
 + * maximum. */
 +#define MAX_Q_BITS 521
 +#define MAX_Q_SIZE ((MAX_Q_BITS + 7) / 8)
 +#define MAX_Q_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_Q_BITS)
 +
 +#define MAX_HASH_BITS (MAX_HASH_SIZE * 8)
 +#define MAX_HASH_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_HASH_BITS)
 +
 +#define DSA_COMPUTE_K_ITCH MAX(MAX_Q_LIMBS, MAX_HASH_LIMBS)
 +
 +int _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mp_limb_t *h, const mp_limb_t *q, const mp_limb_t *x,
 +			  mp_size_t qn, mp_bitcnt_t q_bits,
 +			  gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac, const uint8_t *digest,
 +			  size_t length);
 +
 +void _gnutls_dsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
 +				  mp_size_t n);
 +
 +void _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
 +				    mp_size_t n);
 #endif /* GNUTLS_LIB_NETTLE_INT_DSA_COMPUTE_K_H */
 diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c
 index 94914ebdfa..819302c1c7 100644
 --- a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c
 +++ b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c
@@ -29,67 +29,46 @@
 #include "dsa-compute-k.h"
 #include "gnutls_int.h"
 -static inline int
 -_gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(mpz_t *q, gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve)
 +int _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(mpz_t q, gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve)
 {
 	switch (curve) {
 #ifdef ENABLE_NON_SUITEB_CURVES
 	case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1:
 -		mpz_init_set_str(*q,
 -				 "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836"
 -				 "146BC9B1B4D22831",
 -				 16);
 +		mpz_set_str(q,
 +			    "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836"
 +			    "146BC9B1B4D22831",
 +			    16);
 		return 0;
 	case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1:
 -		mpz_init_set_str(*q,
 -				 "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2"
 -				 "E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D",
 -				 16);
 +		mpz_set_str(q,
 +			    "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2"
 +			    "E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D",
 +			    16);
 		return 0;
 #endif
 	case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1:
 -		mpz_init_set_str(*q,
 -				 "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
 -				 "BCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551",
 -				 16);
 +		mpz_set_str(q,
 +			    "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
 +			    "BCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551",
 +			    16);
 		return 0;
 	case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1:
 -		mpz_init_set_str(*q,
 -				 "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
 -				 "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC7634D81F4372DDF"
 -				 "581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973",
 -				 16);
 +		mpz_set_str(q,
 +			    "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
 +			    "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC7634D81F4372DDF"
 +			    "581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973",
 +			    16);
 		return 0;
 	case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1:
 -		mpz_init_set_str(*q,
 -				 "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
 -				 "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
 -				 "FFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A"
 -				 "5D03BB5C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386"
 -				 "409",
 -				 16);
 +		mpz_set_str(q,
 +			    "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
 +			    "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
 +			    "FFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A"
 +			    "5D03BB5C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386"
 +			    "409",
 +			    16);
 		return 0;
 	default:
 		return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
 	}
 }
 -
 -int
 -_gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k (mpz_t k,
 -			 gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve,
 -			 const mpz_t x,
 -			 gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
 -			 const uint8_t *digest,
 -			 size_t length)
 -{
 -	mpz_t q;
 -	int ret;
 -
 -	ret = _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(&q, curve);
 -	if (ret < 0)
 -		return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
 -
 -	ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k (k, q, x, mac, digest, length);
 -	mpz_clear(q);
 -	return ret;
 -}
 diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h
 index 7ca401d6e4..a7e612bcab 100644
 --- a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h
 +++ b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h
@@ -26,12 +26,6 @@
 #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
 #include <nettle/bignum.h> /* includes gmp.h */
 -int
 -_gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k (mpz_t k,
 -			 gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve,
 -			 const mpz_t x,
 -			 gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
 -			 const uint8_t *digest,
 -			 size_t length);
 +int _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(mpz_t q, gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve);
 #endif /* GNUTLS_LIB_NETTLE_INT_ECDSA_COMPUTE_K_H */
 diff --git a/lib/nettle/pk.c b/lib/nettle/pk.c
 index 588e9df502..b19fe3804a 100644
 --- a/lib/nettle/pk.c
 +++ b/lib/nettle/pk.c
@@ -102,10 +102,16 @@ static void rnd_nonce_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
 	}
 }
 -static void rnd_mpz_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
 +static void rnd_datum_func(void *ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *data)
 {
 -	mpz_t *k = _ctx;
 -	nettle_mpz_get_str_256 (length, data, *k);
 +	gnutls_datum_t *d = ctx;
 +
 +	if (length > d->size) {
 +		memset(data, 0, length - d->size);
 +		memcpy(data + (length - d->size), d->data, d->size);
 +	} else {
 +		memcpy(data, d->data, length);
 +	}
 }
 static void rnd_nonce_func_fallback(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
@@ -976,7 +982,10 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
 			struct dsa_signature sig;
 			int curve_id = pk_params->curve;
 			const struct ecc_curve *curve;
 -			mpz_t k;
 +			mpz_t q;
 +			/* 521-bit elliptic curve generator at maximum */
 +			uint8_t buf[(521 + 7) / 8];
 +			gnutls_datum_t k = { NULL, 0 };
 			void *random_ctx;
 			nettle_random_func *random_func;
@@ -1005,19 +1014,32 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
 				hash_len = vdata->size;
 			}
 -			mpz_init(k);
 +			mpz_init(q);
 +
 			if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST ||
 			    (sign_params->flags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_REPRODUCIBLE)) {
 -				ret = _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k(k,
 -							      curve_id,
 -							      pk_params->params[ECC_K],
 -							      DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig),
 -							      vdata->data,
 -							      vdata->size);
 +				mp_limb_t h[DSA_COMPUTE_K_ITCH];
 +
 +				ret = _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(q, curve_id);
 				if (ret < 0)
 					goto ecdsa_cleanup;
 +
 +				ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(
 +					h, mpz_limbs_read(q), priv.p,
 +					ecc_size(priv.ecc), ecc_bit_size(priv.ecc),
 +					DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig), vdata->data,
 +					vdata->size);
 +				if (ret < 0)
 +					goto ecdsa_cleanup;
 +
 +				k.data = buf;
 +				k.size = (ecc_bit_size(priv.ecc) + 7) / 8;
 +
 +				_gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k_finish(k.data, k.size, h,
 +							       ecc_size(priv.ecc));
 +
 				random_ctx = &k;
 -				random_func = rnd_mpz_func;
 +				random_func = rnd_datum_func;
 			} else {
 				random_ctx = NULL;
 				random_func = rnd_nonce_func;
@@ -1038,7 +1060,7 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
  ecdsa_cleanup:
 			dsa_signature_clear(&sig);
 			ecc_scalar_zclear(&priv);
 -			mpz_clear(k);
 +			mpz_clear(q);
 			if (ret < 0) {
 				gnutls_assert();
@@ -1051,7 +1073,9 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
 			struct dsa_params pub;
 			bigint_t priv;
 			struct dsa_signature sig;
 -			mpz_t k;
 +			/* 512-bit DSA subgroup at maximum */
 +			uint8_t buf[(512 + 7) / 8];
 +			gnutls_datum_t k = { NULL, 0 };
 			void *random_ctx;
 			nettle_random_func *random_func;
@@ -1074,21 +1098,27 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
 				hash_len = vdata->size;
 			}
 -			mpz_init(k);
 			if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST ||
 			    (sign_params->flags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_REPRODUCIBLE)) {
 -				ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(k,
 -							    pub.q,
 -							    TOMPZ(priv),
 -							    DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig),
 -							    vdata->data,
 -							    vdata->size);
 +				mp_limb_t h[DSA_COMPUTE_K_ITCH];
 +
 +				ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(
 +					h, mpz_limbs_read(pub.q),
 +					mpz_limbs_read(TOMPZ(priv)), mpz_size(pub.q),
 +					mpz_sizeinbase(pub.q, 2),
 +					DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig), vdata->data,
 +					vdata->size);
 				if (ret < 0)
 					goto dsa_fail;
 -				/* cancel-out dsa_sign's addition of 1 to random data */
 -				mpz_sub_ui (k, k, 1);
 +
 +				k.data = buf;
 +				k.size = (mpz_sizeinbase(pub.q, 2) + 7) / 8;
 +
 +				_gnutls_dsa_compute_k_finish(k.data, k.size, h,
 +							     mpz_size(pub.q));
 +
 				random_ctx = &k;
 -				random_func = rnd_mpz_func;
 +				random_func = rnd_datum_func;
 			} else {
 				random_ctx = NULL;
 				random_func = rnd_nonce_func;
@@ -1108,7 +1138,6 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
  dsa_fail:
 			dsa_signature_clear(&sig);
 -			mpz_clear(k);
 			if (ret < 0) {
 				gnutls_assert();
 diff --git a/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c b/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c
 index 6e907288ee..25aa553a59 100644
 --- a/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c
 +++ b/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ void doit(void)
 					      &signature);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			testfail("gnutls_pubkey_verify_data2\n");
 -		success(" - pass");
 +		success(" - pass\n");
 	next:
 		gnutls_free(signature.data);
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-doc-p11tool-ckaid.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-doc-p11tool-ckaid.patch
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
 --- gnutls-3.7.2/doc/manpages/p11tool.1	2021-05-29 10:15:22.000000000 +0200
 +++ gnutls-3.7.2-bootstrapped/doc/manpages/p11tool.1	2021-06-28 09:35:23.000000000 +0200
@@ -230,8 +230,9 @@
 .NOP \f\*[B-Font]\-\-write\f[]
 Writes the loaded objects to a PKCS #11 token.
 .sp
 -It can be used to write private, public keys, certificates or secret keys to a token. Must be combined with
 -    one of \--load-privkey, \--load-pubkey, \--load-certificate option.
 +It can be used to write private, public keys, certificates or secret keys to a token. Must be combined with one of \--load-privkey, \--load-pubkey, \--load-certificate option.
 +.sp
 +When writing a certificate object, its CKA_ID is set to the same CKA_ID of the corresponding public key, if it exists on the token; otherwise it will be derived from the X.509 Subject Key Identifier of the certificate. If this behavior is undesired, write the public key to the token beforehand.
 .TP
 .NOP \f\*[B-Font]\-\-delete\f[]
 Deletes the objects matching the given PKCS #11 URL.
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-pkcs7-verify.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-pkcs7-verify.patch
@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
 From e5dc27d1a457d1b3abc0582cd133910dff0fc309 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 12:00:11 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix double free during gnutls_pkcs7_verify
 Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
 ---
 .gitignore                       |   1 +
 lib/x509/pkcs7.c                 |   3 +-
 tests/Makefile.am                |   3 +-
 tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
 diff --git a/lib/x509/pkcs7.c b/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
 index 0ff55ba04b..878f867862 100644
 --- a/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
 +++ b/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
@@ -1318,7 +1318,8 @@ gnutls_x509_crt_t find_signer(gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7, gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tl,
 				issuer = find_verified_issuer_of(pkcs7, issuer, purpose, vflags);
 				if (issuer != NULL && gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(issuer, issuer)) {
 -					if (prev) gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(prev);
 +					if (prev && prev != signer)
 +						gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(prev);
 					prev = issuer;
 					break;
 				}
 diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
 index b04cb081b4..0563d3c754 100644
 --- a/tests/Makefile.am
 +++ b/tests/Makefile.am
@@ -220,7 +220,8 @@ ctests += mini-record-2 simple gnutls_hmac_fast set_pkcs12_cred cert certuniquei
 	 sign-verify-newapi sign-verify-deterministic iov aead-cipher-vec \
 	 tls13-without-timeout-func buffer status-request-revoked \
 	 set_x509_ocsp_multi_cli kdf-api keylog-func \
 -	 dtls_hello_random_value tls_hello_random_value x509cert-dntypes
 +	 dtls_hello_random_value tls_hello_random_value x509cert-dntypes \
 +	 pkcs7-verify-double-free
 if HAVE_SECCOMP_TESTS
 ctests += dtls-with-seccomp tls-with-seccomp dtls-client-with-seccomp tls-client-with-seccomp
 diff --git a/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c b/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..fadf307829
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (C) 2022 Red Hat, Inc.
 + *
 + * Author: Zoltan Fridrich
 + *
 + * This file is part of GnuTLS.
 + *
 + * GnuTLS is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
 + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
 + * (at your option) any later version.
 + *
 + * GnuTLS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
 + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
 + * General Public License for more details.
 + *
 + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 + * along with GnuTLS. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 + */
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
 +#include <config.h>
 +#endif
 +
 +#include <stdio.h>
 +#include <gnutls/pkcs7.h>
 +#include <gnutls/x509.h>
 +
 +#include "utils.h"
 +
 +static char rca_pem[] =
 +	"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
 +	"MIIDCjCCAfKgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFt\n"
 +	"cGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDMzNloYDzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0MzM2WjAVMRMwEQYD\n"
 +	"VQQKDApFeGFtcGxlIENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA\n"
 +	"v8hnKPJ/IA0SQB/A/a0Uh+npZ67vsgIMrtTQo0r0kJkmkBz5323xO3DVuJfB3QmX\n"
 +	"v9zvoeCQLuDvWar5Aixfxgm6s5Q+yPvJj9t3NebDrU+Y4+qyewBIJUF8EF/5iBPC\n"
 +	"ZHONmzbfIRWvQWGGgb2CRcOHp2J7AY/QLB6LsWPaLjs/DHva28Q13JaTTHIpdu8v\n"
 +	"t6vHr0nXf66DN4MvtoF3N+o+v3snJCMsfXOqASi4tbWR7gtOfCfiz9uBjh0W2Dut\n"
 +	"/jclBQkJkLe6esNSM+f4YiOpctVDjmfj8yoHCp394vt0wFqhG38wsTFAyVP6qIcf\n"
 +	"5zoSu9ovEt2cTkhnZHjiiwIDAQABo2MwYTAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA4GA1Ud\n"
 +	"DwEB/wQEAwIBBjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUhjeO6Uc5imbjOl2I2ltVA27Hu9YwHwYDVR0j\n"
 +	"BBgwFoAUhjeO6Uc5imbjOl2I2ltVA27Hu9YwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAD+r\n"
 +	"i/7FsbG0OFKGF2+JOnth6NjJQcMfM8LiglqAuBUijrv7vltoZ0Z3FJH1Vi4OeMXn\n"
 +	"l7X/9tWUve0uFl75MfjDrf0+lCEdYRY1LCba2BrUgpbbkLywVUdnbsvndehegCgS\n"
 +	"jss2/zys3Hlo3ZaHlTMQ/NQ4nrxcxkjOvkZSEOqgxJTLpzm6pr7YUts4k6c6lNiB\n"
 +	"FSiJiDzsJCmWR9C3fBbUlfDfTJYGN3JwqX270KchXDElo8gNoDnF7jBMpLFFSEKm\n"
 +	"MyfbNLX/srh+CEfZaN/OZV4A3MQ0L8vQEp6M4CJhvRLIuMVabZ2coJ0AzystrOMU\n"
 +	"LirBWjg89RoAjFQ7bTE=\n"
 +	"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
 +
 +static char ca_pem[] =
 +	"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
 +	"MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFt\n"
 +	"cGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDQzNFoYDzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0NDM0WjAiMSAwHgYD\n"
 +	"VQQKDBdFeGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD\n"
 +	"ggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKb9ACB8u//sP6MfNU1OsVw68xz3eTPLgKxS0vpqexm6iGVg\n"
 +	"ug/o9uYRLzqiEukv/eyz9WzHmY7sqlOJjOFdv92+SaNg79Jc51WHPFXgea4/qyfr\n"
 +	"4y14PGs0SNxm6T44sXurUs7cXydQVUgnq2VCaWFOTUdxXoAWkV8r8GaUoPD/klVz\n"
 +	"RqxSZVETmX1XBKhsMnnov41kRwVph2C+VfUspsbaUZaz/o/S1/nokhXRACzKsMBr\n"
 +	"obqiGxbY35uVzsmbAW5ErhQz98AWJL3Bub1fsEMXg6OEMmPH4AtX888dTIYZNw0E\n"
 +	"bUIESspz1kjJQTtVQDHTprhwz16YiSVeUonlLgMCAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/\n"
 +	"BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFPBjxDWjMhjXERirKF9O\n"
 +	"o/5Cllc5MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIY3julHOYpm4zpdiNpbVQNux7vWMA0GCSqGSIb3\n"
 +	"DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCTm+vv3hBa6lL5IT+Fw8aTxQ2Ne7mZ5oyazhvXYwwfKNMX3SML\n"
 +	"W2JdPaL64ZwbxxxYvW401o5Z0CEgru3YFrsqB/hEdl0Uf8UWWJmE1rRa+miTmbjt\n"
 +	"lrLNCWdrs6CiwvsPITTHg7jevB4KyZYsTSxQFcyr3N3xF+6EmOTC4IkhPPnXYXcp\n"
 +	"248ih+WOavSYoRvzgB/Dip1WnPYU2mfIV3O8JReRryngA0TzWCLPLUoWR3R4jwtC\n"
 +	"+1uSLoqaenz3qv3F1WEbke37az9YJuXx/5D8CqFQiZ62TUUtI6fYd8mkMBM4Qfh6\n"
 +	"NW9XrCkI9wlpL5K9HllhuW0BhKeJkuPpyQ2p\n"
 +	"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
 +
 +static char ee_pem[] =
 +	"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
 +	"MIIDIjCCAgqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdFeGFt\n"
 +	"cGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTAgFw0yMjA3MjExNDQ1MzdaGA8yMjIyMDcyMTE0\n"
 +	"NDUzN1owFTETMBEGA1UEAwwKSm9obiBTbWl0aDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD\n"
 +	"ggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMb1uuxppBFY+WVD45iyHUq7DkIJNNOI/JRaybVJfPktWq2E\n"
 +	"eNe7XhV05KKnqZTbDO2iYqNHqGhZ8pz/IstDRTZP3z/q1vXTG0P9Gx28rEy5TaUY\n"
 +	"QjtD+ZoFUQm0ORMDBjd8jikqtJ87hKeuOPMH4rzdydotMaPQSm7KLzHBGBr6gg7z\n"
 +	"g1IxPWkhMyHapoMqqrhjwjzoTY97UIXpZTEoIA+KpEC8f9CciBtL0i1MPBjWozB6\n"
 +	"Jma9q5iEwZXuRr3cnPYeIPlK2drgDZCMuSFcYiT8ApLw5OhKqY1m2EvfZ2ox2s9R\n"
 +	"68/HzYdPi3kZwiNEtlBvMlpt5yKBJAflp76d7DkCAwEAAaNuMGwwCwYDVR0PBAQD\n"
 +	"AgWgMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMCBggrBgEFBQcDBDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUc+Mi\n"
 +	"kr8WMCk00SQo+P2iggp/oQkwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU8GPENaMyGNcRGKsoX06j/kKW\n"
 +	"VzkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKU9+CUR0Jcfybd1+8Aqgh1RH96yQygnVuyt\n"
 +	"Na9rFz4fM3ij9tGXDHXrkZw8bW1dWLU9quu8zeTxKxc3aiDIw739Alz0tukttDo7\n"
 +	"dW7YqIb77zsIsWB9p7G9dlxT6ieUy+5IKk69BbeK8KR0vAciAG4KVQxPhuPy/LGX\n"
 +	"PzqlJIJ4h61s3UOroReHPB1keLZgpORqrvtpClOmABH9TLFRJA/WFg8Q2XYB/p0x\n"
 +	"l/pWiaoBC+8wK9cDoMUK5yOwXeuCLffCb+UlAD0+z/qxJ2pisE8E9X8rRKRrWI+i\n"
 +	"G7LtJCEn86EQK8KuRlJxKgj8lClZhoULB0oL4jbblBuNow9WRmM=\n"
 +	"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
 +
 +static char msg_pem[] =
 +	"-----BEGIN PKCS7-----\n"
 +	"MIIK2QYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIKyjCCCsYCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwCwYJKoZI\n"
 +	"hvcNAQcBoIIJTzCCAwowggHyoAMCAQICAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwFTETMBEG\n"
 +	"A1UECgwKRXhhbXBsZSBDQTAgFw0xNzA3MjExNDQzMjFaGA8yMjIyMDcyMTE0NDMy\n"
 +	"MVowFTETMBEGA1UECgwKRXhhbXBsZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP\n"
 +	"ADCCAQoCggEBAL51eyE4j8wAKQKMGlO9HEY2iaGvsdPSJmidSdmCi1jnNK39Lx4Y\n"
 +	"31h279hSHF5wtI6VM91HHfeLf1mjEZHlKrXXJQzBPLpbHWapD778drHBitOP8e56\n"
 +	"fDMIfofLV4tkMk8690vPe4cJH1UHGspMyz6EQF9kPRaW80XtMV/6dalgL/9Esmaw\n"
 +	"XBNPJAS1VutDuXQkJ/3/rWFLmkpYHHtGPjX782YRmT1s+VOVTsLqmKx0TEL8A381\n"
 +	"bbElHPUAMjPcyWR5qqA8KWnS5Dwqk3LwI0AvuhQytCq0S7Xl4DXauvxwTRXv0UU7\n"
 +	"W8r3MLAw9DnlnJiD/RFjw5rbGO3wMePk/qUCAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUw\n"
 +	"AwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFIh2KRoKJoe2VtpOwWMkRAkR\n"
 +	"mLWKMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIh2KRoKJoe2VtpOwWMkRAkRmLWKMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB\n"
 +	"CwUAA4IBAQBovvlOjoy0MCT5U0eWfcPQQjY4Ssrn3IiPNlVkqSNo+FHX+2baTLVQ\n"
 +	"5QTHxwXwzdIJiwtjFWDdGEQXqmuIvnFG+u/whGbeg6oQygfnQ5Y+q6epOxCsPgLQ\n"
 +	"mKKEaF7mvh8DauUx4QSbYCNGCctOZuB1vlN9bJ3/5QbH+2pFPOfCr5CAyPDwHo6S\n"
 +	"qO3yPcutRwT9xS7gXEHM9HhLp+DmdCGh4eVBPiFilyZm1d92lWxU8oxoSfXgzDT/\n"
 +	"GCzlMykNZNs4JD9QmiRClP/3U0dQbOhah/Fda+N+L90xaqEgGcvwKKZa3pzo59pl\n"
 +	"BbkcIP4YPyHeinwkgAn5UVJg9DOxNCS0MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG\n"
 +	"9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFtcGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDQxM1oY\n"
 +	"DzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0NDEzWjAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdFeGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0\n"
 +	"ZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMPFDEvDANwvhviu\n"
 +	"pwXTvaKyxyX94jVu1wgAhIRyQBVRiMbrn8MEufLG8oA0vKd8s92gv/lWe1jFb2rn\n"
 +	"91jMkZWsjWjiJFD6SzqFfBo+XxOGikEqO1MAf92UqavmSGlXVRG1Vy7T7dWibZP0\n"
 +	"WODhHYWayR0Y6owSz5IqNfrHXzDME+lSJxHgRFI7pK+b0OgiVmvyXDKFPvyU6GrP\n"
 +	"lxXDi/XbjyPvC5gpiwtTgm+s8KERwmdlfZUNjkh2PpHx1g1joijHT3wIvO/Pek1E\n"
 +	"C+Xs6w3XxGgL6TTL7FDuv4AjZVX9KK66/yBhX3aN8bkqAg+hs9XNk3zzWC0XEFOS\n"
 +	"Qoh2va0CAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw\n"
 +	"HQYDVR0OBBYEFHwi/7dUWGjkMWJctOm7MCjjQj1cMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIh2KRoK\n"
 +	"Joe2VtpOwWMkRAkRmLWKMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCF6sHCBdYRwBwvfCve\n"
 +	"og9cPnmPqZrG4AtmSvtoSsMvgvKb/4z3/gG8oPtTBkeRcAHoMoEp/oA+B2ylwIAc\n"
 +	"S5U7jx+lYH/Pqih0X/OcOLbaMv8uzGSGQxk+L9LuuIT6E/THfRRIPEvkDkzC+/uk\n"
 +	"7vUbG17bSEWeF0o/6sjzAY2aH1jnbCDyu0UC78GXkc6bZ5QlH98uLMDMrOmqcZjS\n"
 +	"JFfvuRDQyKV5yBdBkYaobsIWSQDsgYxJzf/2y8c3r+HXqT+jhrXPWJ3btgMPxpu7\n"
 +	"E8KmoFgp9EM+48oYlXJ66rk08/KjaVmgN7R+Hm3e2+MFT2kme4fBKalLjcazTe3x\n"
 +	"0FisMIIDIjCCAgqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdF\n"
 +	"eGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTAgFw0yMjA3MjExNDQ1MzBaGA8yMjIyMDcy\n"
 +	"MTE0NDUzMVowFTETMBEGA1UEAwwKSm9obiBTbWl0aDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB\n"
 +	"BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMjhSqhdD5RjmOm6W3hG7zkgKBP9whRN/SipcdEMlkgc\n"
 +	"F/U3QMu66qIfKwheNdWalC1JLtruLDWP92ysa6Vw+CCG8aSax1AgB//RKQB7kgPA\n"
 +	"9js9hi/oCdBmCv2HJxhWSLz+MVoxgzW4C7S9FenI+btxe/99Uw4nOw7kwjsYDLKr\n"
 +	"tMw8myv7aCW/63CuBYGtohiZupM3RI3kKFcZots+KRPLlZpjv+I2h9xSln8VxKNb\n"
 +	"XiMrYwGfHB7iX7ghe1TvFjKatEUhsqa7AvIq7nfe/cyq97f0ODQO814njgZtk5iQ\n"
 +	"JVavXHdhTVaypt1HdAFMuHX5UATylHxx9tRCgSIijUsCAwEAAaNuMGwwCwYDVR0P\n"
 +	"BAQDAgWgMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMCBggrBgEFBQcDBDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU\n"
 +	"31+vHl4E/2Jpnwinbzf+d7usshcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUfCL/t1RYaOQxYly06bsw\n"
 +	"KONCPVwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAAWe63DcNwmleQ3INFGDJZ/m2I/R/cBa\n"
 +	"nnrxgR5Ey1ljHdA/x1z1JLTGmGVwqGExs5DNG9Q//Pmc9pZ1yPa8J4Xf8AvFcmkY\n"
 +	"mWoH1HvW0xu/RF1UN5SAoD2PRQ+Vq4OSPD58IlEu/u4o1wZV7Wl91Cv6VNpiAb63\n"
 +	"j9PA1YacOpOtcRqG59Vuj9HFm9f30ejHVo2+KJcpo290cR3Zg4fOm8mtjeMdt/QS\n"
 +	"Atq+RqPAQ7yxqvEEv8zPIZj2kAOQm3mh/yYqBrR68lQUD/dBTP7ApIZkhUK3XK6U\n"
 +	"nf9JvoF6Fn2+Cnqb//FLBgHSnoeqeQNwDLUXTsD02iYxHzJrhokSY4YxggFQMIIB\n"
 +	"TAIBATAnMCIxIDAeBgNVBAoMF0V4YW1wbGUgaW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIENBAgEBMAsG\n"
 +	"CWCGSAFlAwQCATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQATHg6wNsBcs/Ub1GQfKwTpKCk5\n"
 +	"8QXuNnZ0u7b6mKgrSY2Gf47fpL2aRgaR+BAQncbctu5EH/IL38pWjaGtOhFAj/5q\n"
 +	"7luVQW11kuyJN3Bd/dtLqawWOwMmAIEigw6X50l5ZHnEVzFfxt+RKTNhk4XWVtbi\n"
 +	"2iIlITOplW0rnvxYAwCxKL9ocaB7etK8au7ixMxbFp75Ts4iLX8dhlAFdCuFCk8k\n"
 +	"B8mi9HHuwr3QYRqMPW61hu1wBL3yB8eoZNOwPXb0gkIh6ZvgptxgQzm/cc+Iw9fP\n"
 +	"QkR0fTM7ElJ5QZmSV98AUbZDHmDvpmcjcUxfSPMc3IoT8T300usRu7QHqKJi\n"
 +	"-----END PKCS7-----\n";
 +
 +const gnutls_datum_t rca_datum = { (void *)rca_pem, sizeof(rca_pem) - 1 };
 +const gnutls_datum_t ca_datum = { (void *)ca_pem, sizeof(ca_pem) - 1 };
 +const gnutls_datum_t ee_datum = { (void *)ee_pem, sizeof(ee_pem) - 1 };
 +const gnutls_datum_t msg_datum = { (void *)msg_pem, sizeof(msg_pem) - 1 };
 +
 +static void tls_log_func(int level, const char *str)
 +{
 +	fprintf(stderr, "%s |<%d>| %s", "err", level, str);
 +}
 +
 +#define CHECK(X)\
 +{\
 +	r = X;\
 +	if (r < 0)\
 +		fail("error in %d: %s\n", __LINE__, gnutls_strerror(r));\
 +}\
 +
 +void doit(void)
 +{
 +	int r;
 +	gnutls_x509_crt_t rca_cert = NULL;
 +	gnutls_x509_crt_t ca_cert = NULL;
 +	gnutls_x509_crt_t ee_cert = NULL;
 +	gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tlist = NULL;
 +	gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7 = NULL;
 +	gnutls_datum_t data = { (unsigned char *)"xxx", 3 };
 +
 +	if (debug) {
 +		gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func);
 +		gnutls_global_set_log_level(4711);
 +	}
 +
 +	// Import certificates
 +	CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&rca_cert));
 +	CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(rca_cert, &rca_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
 +	CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&ca_cert));
 +	CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(ca_cert, &ca_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
 +	CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&ee_cert));
 +	CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(ee_cert, &ee_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
 +
 +	// Setup trust store
 +	CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_init(&tlist, 0));
 +	CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, rca_cert, "rca", 3, 0));
 +	CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, ca_cert, "ca", 2, 0));
 +	CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, ee_cert, "ee", 2, 0));
 +
 +	// Setup pkcs7 structure
 +	CHECK(gnutls_pkcs7_init(&pkcs7));
 +	CHECK(gnutls_pkcs7_import(pkcs7, &msg_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
 +
 +	// Signature verification
 +	gnutls_pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, tlist, NULL, 0, 0, &data, 0);
 +
 +	gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(rca_cert);
 +	gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(ca_cert);
 +	gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(ee_cert);
 +	gnutls_x509_trust_list_deinit(tlist, 0);
 +	gnutls_pkcs7_deinit(pkcs7);
 +}
 -- 
 2.37.2
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-rehandshake-tickets.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-rehandshake-tickets.patch
@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
 From 9b50d94bf1c8e749d7dfc593c89e689a161444ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2023 09:30:03 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] gnutls-3.6.16-rehandshake-tickets.patch
 Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 ---
 lib/ext/session_ticket.c         |   6 ++
 lib/ext/session_ticket.h         |   1 +
 lib/libgnutls.map                |   2 +
 lib/state.c                      |   1 +
 tests/Makefile.am                |   3 +-
 tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c | 152 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c
 diff --git a/lib/ext/session_ticket.c b/lib/ext/session_ticket.c
 index 8f22462..8d83a6c 100644
 --- a/lib/ext/session_ticket.c
 +++ b/lib/ext/session_ticket.c
@@ -618,6 +618,12 @@ gnutls_session_ticket_enable_server(gnutls_session_t session,
 	return 0;
 }
 +void
 +_gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(gnutls_session_t session)
 +{
 +	session->internals.flags |= GNUTLS_NO_TICKETS;
 +}
 +
 /*
  * Return zero if session tickets haven't been enabled.
  */
 diff --git a/lib/ext/session_ticket.h b/lib/ext/session_ticket.h
 index da804ec..660c9d3 100644
 --- a/lib/ext/session_ticket.h
 +++ b/lib/ext/session_ticket.h
@@ -36,5 +36,6 @@ int _gnutls_encrypt_session_ticket(gnutls_session_t session,
 int _gnutls_decrypt_session_ticket(gnutls_session_t session,
 				   const gnutls_datum_t *ticket_data,
 				   gnutls_datum_t *state);
 +void _gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(gnutls_session_t session);
 #endif /* GNUTLS_LIB_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_H */
 diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
 index d2f7c0a..6748b3a 100644
 --- a/lib/libgnutls.map
 +++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1432,4 +1432,6 @@ GNUTLS_PRIVATE_3_4 {
 	_gnutls_buffer_unescape;
 	_gnutls_buffer_pop_datum;
 	_gnutls_buffer_clear;
 +	# needed by tests/tls12-rehandshake-cert-ticket
 +	_gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server;
 } GNUTLS_3_4;
 diff --git a/lib/state.c b/lib/state.c
 index 817a7b8..f1e9daa 100644
 --- a/lib/state.c
 +++ b/lib/state.c
@@ -452,6 +452,7 @@ void _gnutls_handshake_internal_state_clear(gnutls_session_t session)
 	session->internals.tfo.connect_addrlen = 0;
 	session->internals.tfo.connect_only = 0;
 	session->internals.early_data_received = 0;
 +	session->internals.session_ticket_renew = 0;
 }
 /**
 diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
 index 0563d3c..7c5f5c4 100644
 --- a/tests/Makefile.am
 +++ b/tests/Makefile.am
@@ -221,7 +221,8 @@ ctests += mini-record-2 simple gnutls_hmac_fast set_pkcs12_cred cert certuniquei
 	 tls13-without-timeout-func buffer status-request-revoked \
 	 set_x509_ocsp_multi_cli kdf-api keylog-func \
 	 dtls_hello_random_value tls_hello_random_value x509cert-dntypes \
 -	 pkcs7-verify-double-free
 +	 pkcs7-verify-double-free \
 +	 tls12-rehandshake-ticket
 if HAVE_SECCOMP_TESTS
 ctests += dtls-with-seccomp tls-with-seccomp dtls-client-with-seccomp tls-client-with-seccomp
 diff --git a/tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c b/tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..f96e46e
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (C) 2022 Red Hat, Inc.
 + *
 + * Author: Daiki Ueno
 + *
 + * This file is part of GnuTLS.
 + *
 + * GnuTLS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
 + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
 + * (at your option) any later version.
 + *
 + * GnuTLS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
 + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
 + * General Public License for more details.
 + *
 + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
 + * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
 + */
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
 +#include <config.h>
 +#endif
 +
 +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
 +#include <assert.h>
 +#include "cert-common.h"
 +
 +#include "utils.h"
 +#include "eagain-common.h"
 +
 +const char *side = "";
 +
 +static void tls_log_func(int level, const char *str)
 +{
 +	fprintf(stderr, "%s|<%d>| %s", side, level, str);
 +}
 +
 +#define MAX_BUF 1024
 +
 +void _gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(gnutls_session_t session);
 +
 +static void run(void)
 +{
 +	char buffer[MAX_BUF + 1];
 +	/* Server stuff. */
 +	gnutls_certificate_credentials_t scred;
 +	gnutls_session_t server;
 +	gnutls_datum_t session_ticket_key = { NULL, 0 };
 +	int sret;
 +	/* Client stuff. */
 +	gnutls_certificate_credentials_t ccred;
 +	gnutls_session_t client;
 +	int cret;
 +
 +	/* General init. */
 +	global_init();
 +	gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func);
 +	if (debug)
 +		gnutls_global_set_log_level(9);
 +
 +	/* Init server */
 +	assert(gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&scred) >= 0);
 +	assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_mem(scred,
 +						   &server_ca3_localhost_cert,
 +						   &server_ca3_key,
 +						   GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
 +	assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem(scred,
 +						     &ca3_cert,
 +						     GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
 +
 +	assert(gnutls_init(&server, GNUTLS_SERVER) >= 0);
 +	gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(server, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST);
 +	assert(gnutls_priority_set_direct(server,
 +					  "NORMAL:-VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.2",
 +					  NULL) >= 0);
 +
 +	gnutls_credentials_set(server, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, scred);
 +	gnutls_transport_set_push_function(server, server_push);
 +	gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(server, server_pull);
 +	gnutls_transport_set_ptr(server, server);
 +
 +	gnutls_session_ticket_key_generate(&session_ticket_key);
 +	gnutls_session_ticket_enable_server(server, &session_ticket_key);
 +
 +	/* Init client */
 +	assert(gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&ccred) >= 0);
 +	assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_mem
 +	       (ccred, &cli_ca3_cert_chain, &cli_ca3_key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
 +	assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem
 +	       (ccred, &ca3_cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
 +
 +	gnutls_init(&client, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
 +	assert(gnutls_priority_set_direct(client,
 +					  "NORMAL:-VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.2",
 +					  NULL) >= 0);
 +
 +	assert(gnutls_credentials_set(client, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, ccred) >= 0);
 +
 +	gnutls_transport_set_push_function(client, client_push);
 +	gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(client, client_pull);
 +	gnutls_transport_set_ptr(client, client);
 +
 +	HANDSHAKE(client, server);
 +
 +	/* Server initiates rehandshake */
 +	switch_side("server");
 +	sret = gnutls_rehandshake(server);
 +	if (sret < 0) {
 +		fail("Error sending %d byte packet: %s\n",
 +		     (int)sizeof(buffer), gnutls_strerror(sret));
 +	} else if (debug)
 +		success("server: starting rehandshake\n");
 +
 +	/* Stop sending session ticket */
 +	_gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(server);
 +
 +	/* Client gets notified with rehandshake */
 +	switch_side("client");
 +	do {
 +		do {
 +			cret = gnutls_record_recv(client, buffer, MAX_BUF);
 +		} while (cret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || cret == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED);
 +	} while (cret > 0);
 +
 +	if (cret != GNUTLS_E_REHANDSHAKE) {
 +		fail("client: Error receiving rehandshake: %s\n",
 +		     gnutls_strerror(cret));
 +	}
 +
 +	HANDSHAKE(client, server);
 +
 +	gnutls_bye(client, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
 +	gnutls_bye(server, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
 +
 +	gnutls_deinit(client);
 +	gnutls_deinit(server);
 +
 +	gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(scred);
 +	gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(ccred);
 +
 +	gnutls_free(session_ticket_key.data);
 +
 +	gnutls_global_deinit();
 +	reset_buffers();
 +}
 +
 +void doit(void)
 +{
 +	run();
 +}
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing-followup.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing-followup.patch
@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
 From fe912c5dba49dcecbd5c32bf8184e60a949af452 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 19:13:17 +0900
 Subject: [PATCH] rsa-psk: minimize branching after decryption
 This moves any non-trivial code between gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2
 and the function return in _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx up until the
 decryption.  This also avoids an extra memcpy to session->key.key.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
 index 93c2dc9998..8f3fe5a4bd 100644
 --- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
 +++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
@@ -269,7 +269,6 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 	int ret, dsize;
 	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
 	gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
 -	gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
 	volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
 	cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
@@ -329,24 +328,48 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 	ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
 	ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
 -	premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
 -	if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
 +	/* Find the key of this username. A random value will be
 +	 * filled in if the key is not found.
 +	 */
 +	ret =
 +	    _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
 +	if (ret < 0)
 +		return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
 +
 +	/* Allocate memory for premaster secret, and fill in the
 +	 * fields except the decryption result.
 +	 */
 +	session->key.key.size = 2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2 + pwd_psk.size;
 +	session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(session->key.key.size);
 +	if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
 		gnutls_assert();
 +		_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
 +		/* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
 +		_gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
 		return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
 	}
 -	premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
 	/* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
 -	ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
 -			 premaster_secret.size);
 +	ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, session->key.key.data + 2,
 +			 GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		gnutls_assert();
 -		goto cleanup;
 +		_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
 +		/* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
 +		_gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
 +		return ret;
 	}
 +	_gnutls_write_uint16(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE, session->key.key.data);
 +	_gnutls_write_uint16(pwd_psk.size,
 +			     &session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE]);
 +	memcpy(&session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2],
 +	       pwd_psk.data, pwd_psk.size);
 +	_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
 +
 	gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
 -				     &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
 -				     premaster_secret.size);
 +				     &ciphertext, session->key.key.data + 2,
 +				     GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
 	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
 	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
 	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
@@ -365,31 +388,10 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 	/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
 	 * discussed above.
 	 */
 -	premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
 -	premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
 -
 -	/* find the key of this username
 -	 */
 -	ret =
 -	    _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
 -	if (ret < 0) {
 -		gnutls_assert();
 -		goto cleanup;
 -	}
 -
 -	ret =
 -	    set_rsa_psk_session_key(session, &pwd_psk, &premaster_secret);
 -	if (ret < 0) {
 -		gnutls_assert();
 -		goto cleanup;
 -	}
 +	session->key.key.data[2] = ver_maj;
 +	session->key.key.data[3] = ver_min;
 -	ret = 0;
 -      cleanup:
 -	_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
 -	_gnutls_free_temp_key_datum(&premaster_secret);
 -
 -	return ret;
 +	return 0;
 }
 static int
 -- 
 2.43.0
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing.patch
@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
 From e007a54432c98618bde500649817d153225abf6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2023 11:52:08 +0900
 Subject: [PATCH] gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing.patch
 Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 ---
 lib/auth/rsa.c     |  2 +-
 lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
 lib/gnutls_int.h   |  4 --
 lib/priority.c     |  1 -
 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
 index 858701f..02b6a34 100644
 --- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
 +++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 				     session->key.key.size);
 	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
 	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
 -	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
 +	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
 	/* Error handling logic:
 	 * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
 diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
 index 1a9dab5..93c2dc9 100644
 --- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
 +++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
@@ -264,14 +264,13 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 {
 	gnutls_datum_t username;
 	psk_auth_info_t info;
 -	gnutls_datum_t plaintext;
 	gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
 	gnutls_datum_t pwd_psk = { NULL, 0 };
 	int ret, dsize;
 -	int randomize_key = 0;
 	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
 	gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
 	gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
 +	volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
 	cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
 	    _gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK);
@@ -327,71 +326,47 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 	}
 	ciphertext.size = dsize;
 -	ret =
 -	    gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
 -					&ciphertext, &plaintext);
 -	if (ret < 0 || plaintext.size != GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE) {
 -		/* In case decryption fails then don't inform
 -		 * the peer. Just use a random key. (in order to avoid
 -		 * attack against pkcs-1 formatting).
 -		 */
 +	ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
 +	ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
 +
 +	premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
 +	if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
 		gnutls_assert();
 -		_gnutls_debug_log
 -		    ("auth_rsa_psk: Possible PKCS #1 format attack\n");
 -		if (ret >= 0) {
 -			gnutls_free(plaintext.data);
 -		}
 -		randomize_key = 1;
 -	} else {
 -		/* If the secret was properly formatted, then
 -		 * check the version number.
 -		 */
 -		if (_gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session) !=
 -		    plaintext.data[0]
 -		    || (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0
 -			&& _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session) !=
 -			plaintext.data[1])) {
 -			/* No error is returned here, if the version number check
 -			 * fails. We proceed normally.
 -			 * That is to defend against the attack described in the paper
 -			 * "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by Vlastimil Klima,
 -			 * Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
 -			 */
 -			gnutls_assert();
 -			_gnutls_debug_log
 -			    ("auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 version check format attack\n");
 -		}
 +		return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
 	}
 +	premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
 -
 -	if (randomize_key != 0) {
 -		premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
 -		premaster_secret.data =
 -		    gnutls_malloc(premaster_secret.size);
 -		if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
 -			gnutls_assert();
 -			return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
 -		}
 -
 -		/* we do not need strong random numbers here.
 -		 */
 -		ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
 -				  premaster_secret.size);
 -		if (ret < 0) {
 -			gnutls_assert();
 -			goto cleanup;
 -		}
 -	} else {
 -		premaster_secret.data = plaintext.data;
 -		premaster_secret.size = plaintext.size;
 +	/* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
 +	ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
 +			 premaster_secret.size);
 +	if (ret < 0) {
 +		gnutls_assert();
 +		goto cleanup;
 	}
 +	gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
 +				     &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
 +				     premaster_secret.size);
 +	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
 +	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
 +	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
 +
 +	/* Error handling logic:
 +	 * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
 +	 * random key previously generated. (in order to avoid attack against
 +	 * pkcs-1 formatting).
 +	 *
 +	 * If we get version mismatches no error is returned either. We
 +	 * proceed normally. This is to defend against the attack described
 +	 * in the paper "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by
 +	 * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
 +	 */
 +
 	/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
 	 * discussed above.
 	 */
 -
 -	premaster_secret.data[0] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
 -	premaster_secret.data[1] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
 +	premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
 +	premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
 	/* find the key of this username
 	 */
 diff --git a/lib/gnutls_int.h b/lib/gnutls_int.h
 index 31cec5c..815f69b 100644
 --- a/lib/gnutls_int.h
 +++ b/lib/gnutls_int.h
@@ -971,7 +971,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
 	bool _no_etm;
 	bool _no_ext_master_secret;
 	bool _allow_key_usage_violation;
 -	bool _allow_wrong_pms;
 	bool _dumbfw;
 	unsigned int _dh_prime_bits;	/* old (deprecated) variable */
@@ -989,7 +988,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
 	      (x)->no_etm = 1; \
 	      (x)->no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
 	      (x)->allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
 -	      (x)->allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
 	      (x)->dumbfw = 1
 #define ENABLE_PRIO_COMPAT(x) \
@@ -998,7 +996,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
 	      (x)->_no_etm = 1; \
 	      (x)->_no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
 	      (x)->_allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
 -	      (x)->_allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
 	      (x)->_dumbfw = 1
 /* DH and RSA parameters types.
@@ -1123,7 +1120,6 @@ typedef struct {
 	bool no_etm;
 	bool no_ext_master_secret;
 	bool allow_key_usage_violation;
 -	bool allow_wrong_pms;
 	bool dumbfw;
 	/* old (deprecated) variable. This is used for both srp_prime_bits
 diff --git a/lib/priority.c b/lib/priority.c
 index 0a284ae..67ec887 100644
 --- a/lib/priority.c
 +++ b/lib/priority.c
@@ -681,7 +681,6 @@ gnutls_priority_set(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_priority_t priority)
 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_etm);
 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_ext_master_secret);
 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_key_usage_violation);
 -	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_wrong_pms);
 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dumbfw);
 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dh_prime_bits);
 -- 
 2.43.0
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-tls12-cert-type.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-tls12-cert-type.patch
@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
 From 339bef12f478b3a12c59571c53645e31280baf7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 15:59:37 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] cert auth: filter out unsupported cert types from TLS 1.2 CR
 When the server is advertising signature algorithms in TLS 1.2
 CertificateRequest, it shouldn't send certificate_types not backed by
 any of those algorithms.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 lib/auth/cert.c                         | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 tests/suite/tls-fuzzer/gnutls-cert.json | 19 +++++++
 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/auth/cert.c b/lib/auth/cert.c
 index 3073a33d3..0b0f04b2b 100644
 --- a/lib/auth/cert.c
 +++ b/lib/auth/cert.c
@@ -64,6 +64,16 @@ typedef enum CertificateSigType { RSA_SIGN = 1, DSA_SIGN = 2, ECDSA_SIGN = 64,
 #endif
 } CertificateSigType;
 +enum CertificateSigTypeFlags {
 +	RSA_SIGN_FLAG = 1,
 +	DSA_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 1,
 +	ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 2,
 +#ifdef ENABLE_GOST
 +	GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 3,
 +	GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 4
 +#endif
 +};
 +
 /* Moves data from an internal certificate struct (gnutls_pcert_st) to
  * another internal certificate struct (cert_auth_info_t), and deinitializes
  * the former.
@@ -1281,6 +1291,7 @@ _gnutls_gen_cert_server_cert_req(gnutls_session_t session,
 	uint8_t tmp_data[CERTTYPE_SIZE];
 	const version_entry_st *ver = get_version(session);
 	unsigned init_pos = data->length;
 +	enum CertificateSigTypeFlags flags;
 	if (unlikely(ver == NULL))
 		return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1297,18 +1308,71 @@ _gnutls_gen_cert_server_cert_req(gnutls_session_t session,
 		return GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS;
 	}
 -	i = 1;
 +	if (_gnutls_version_has_selectable_sighash(ver)) {
 +		size_t j;
 +
 +		flags = 0;
 +		for (j = 0; j < session->internals.priorities->sigalg.size; j++) {
 +			const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se =
 +				session->internals.priorities->sigalg.entry[j];
 +			switch (se->pk) {
 +			case GNUTLS_PK_RSA:
 +			case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS:
 +				flags |= RSA_SIGN_FLAG;
 +				break;
 +			case GNUTLS_PK_DSA:
 +				flags |= DSA_SIGN_FLAG;
 +				break;
 +			case GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA:
 +				flags |= ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG;
 +				break;
 #ifdef ENABLE_GOST
 -	if (_gnutls_kx_is_vko_gost(session->security_parameters.cs->kx_algorithm)) {
 -		tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN;
 -		tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN;
 -	} else
 +			case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
 +				flags |= GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG;
 +				break;
 +			case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512:
 +				flags |= GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG;
 +				break;
 +#endif
 +			default:
 +				gnutls_assert();
 +				_gnutls_debug_log(
 +					"%s is unsupported for cert request\n",
 +					gnutls_pk_get_name(se->pk));
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 +	} else {
 +#ifdef ENABLE_GOST
 +		if (_gnutls_kx_is_vko_gost(session->security_parameters.
 +					   cs->kx_algorithm)) {
 +			flags = GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG |
 +				GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG;
 +		} else
 #endif
 -	{
 +		{
 +			flags = RSA_SIGN_FLAG | DSA_SIGN_FLAG | ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG;
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	i = 1;
 +	if (flags & RSA_SIGN_FLAG) {
 		tmp_data[i++] = RSA_SIGN;
 +	}
 +	if (flags & DSA_SIGN_FLAG) {
 		tmp_data[i++] = DSA_SIGN;
 +	}
 +	if (flags & ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG) {
 		tmp_data[i++] = ECDSA_SIGN;
 	}
 +#ifdef ENABLE_GOST
 +	if (flags & GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG) {
 +		tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN;
 +	}
 +	if (flags & GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG) {
 +		tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN;
 +	}
 +#endif
 	tmp_data[0] = i - 1;
 	ret = _gnutls_buffer_append_data(data, tmp_data, i);
 -- 
 2.31.1
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-trust-ca-sha1.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-trust-ca-sha1.patch
@ -1,283 +0,0 @@
 From c2409e479df41620bceac314c76cabb1d35a4075 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 16:35:43 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] x509/verify: treat SHA-1 signed CA in the trusted set
 differently
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 Suppose there is a certificate chain ending with an intermediate CA:
 EE → ICA1 → ICA2.  If the system trust store contains a root CA
 generated with the same key as ICA2 but signed with a prohibited
 algorithm, such as SHA-1, the library previously reported a
 verification failure, though the situation is not uncommon during a
 transition period of root CA.
 This changes the library behavior such that the check on signature
 algorithm will be skipped when examining the trusted root CA.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
 ---
 lib/x509/verify.c   |  26 ++++---
 tests/test-chains.h | 165 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/x509/verify.c b/lib/x509/verify.c
 index fd7c6a164..a50b5ea44 100644
 --- a/lib/x509/verify.c
 +++ b/lib/x509/verify.c
@@ -415,14 +415,19 @@ unsigned _gnutls_is_broken_sig_allowed(const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se, unsigned
 #define CASE_SEC_PARAM(profile, level) \
 	case profile: \
 		sym_bits = gnutls_sec_param_to_symmetric_bits(level); \
 -		hash = gnutls_sign_get_hash_algorithm(sigalg); \
 -		entry = mac_to_entry(hash); \
 -		if (hash <= 0 || entry == NULL) { \
 +		se = _gnutls_sign_to_entry(sigalg); \
 +		if (unlikely(se == NULL)) { \
 +			_gnutls_cert_log("cert", crt); \
 +			_gnutls_debug_log(#level": certificate's signature algorithm is unknown\n"); \
 +			return gnutls_assert_val(0); \
 +		} \
 +		if (unlikely(se->hash == GNUTLS_DIG_UNKNOWN)) {	\
 			_gnutls_cert_log("cert", crt); \
 			_gnutls_debug_log(#level": certificate's signature hash is unknown\n"); \
 			return gnutls_assert_val(0); \
 		} \
 -		if (_gnutls_sign_get_hash_strength(sigalg) < sym_bits) { \
 +		if (!trusted && \
 +		    _gnutls_sign_get_hash_strength(sigalg) < sym_bits) { \
 			_gnutls_cert_log("cert", crt); \
 			_gnutls_debug_log(#level": certificate's signature hash strength is unacceptable (is %u bits, needed %u)\n", _gnutls_sign_get_hash_strength(sigalg), sym_bits); \
 			return gnutls_assert_val(0); \
@@ -449,19 +454,22 @@ unsigned _gnutls_is_broken_sig_allowed(const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se, unsigned
  * @crt: a certificate
  * @issuer: the certificates issuer (allowed to be NULL)
  * @sigalg: the signature algorithm used
 + * @trusted: whether @crt is treated as trusted (e.g., present in the system
 + *           trust list); if it is true, the check on signature algorithm will
 + *           be skipped
  * @flags: the specified verification flags
  */
 static unsigned is_level_acceptable(
 	gnutls_x509_crt_t crt, gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer,
 -	gnutls_sign_algorithm_t sigalg, unsigned flags)
 +	gnutls_sign_algorithm_t sigalg, bool trusted,
 +	unsigned flags)
 {
 	gnutls_certificate_verification_profiles_t profile = GNUTLS_VFLAGS_TO_PROFILE(flags);
 -	const mac_entry_st *entry;
 	int issuer_pkalg = 0, pkalg, ret;
 	unsigned bits = 0, issuer_bits = 0, sym_bits = 0;
 	gnutls_pk_params_st params;
 	gnutls_sec_param_t sp;
 -	int hash;
 +	const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se;
 	gnutls_certificate_verification_profiles_t min_profile;
 	min_profile = _gnutls_get_system_wide_verification_profile();
@@ -798,7 +806,7 @@ verify_crt(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
 	}
 	if (sigalg >= 0 && se) {
 -		if (is_level_acceptable(cert, issuer, sigalg, flags) == 0) {
 +		if (is_level_acceptable(cert, issuer, sigalg, false, flags) == 0) {
 			MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM);
 		}
@@ -893,7 +901,7 @@ unsigned check_ca_sanity(const gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer,
 	/* we explicitly allow CAs which we do not support their self-algorithms
 	 * to pass. */
 -	if (ret >= 0 && !is_level_acceptable(issuer, NULL, sigalg, flags)) {
 +	if (ret >= 0 && !is_level_acceptable(issuer, NULL, sigalg, true, flags)) {
 		status |= GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM|GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
 	}
 diff --git a/tests/test-chains.h b/tests/test-chains.h
 index 9b06b85f5..64f50fabf 100644
 --- a/tests/test-chains.h
 +++ b/tests/test-chains.h
@@ -4106,6 +4106,163 @@ static const char *superseding_ca[] = {
 	NULL
 };
 +static const char *rsa_sha1_in_trusted[] = {
 +	"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
 +	"MIID0jCCAoqgAwIBAgIUezaBB7f4TW75oc3UV57oJvXmbBYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
 +	"BQAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOR251VExTIHRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNMjEwNTAzMTQyNzIxWhcN\n"
 +	"MjIwNTAzMTQyNzIxWjA3MRgwFgYDVQQDEw90ZXN0LmdudXRscy5vcmcxGzAZBgNV\n"
 +	"BAoTEkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IHNlcnZlcjCCAVIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggE/ADCC\n"
 +	"AToCggExALRrJ5glr8H/HsqwfvTYvO1DhmdUXdq0HsKQX4M8AhH8E3KFsoikZUEL\n"
 +	"dl8jvoqf/nlLczsux0s8vxbJl1U1F/OhckswwuAnlBLzVgDmzoJLEV2kHpv6+rkb\n"
 +	"Kk0Ytbql5gzHqKihbaqIhNyWDrJsHDWq58eUPfnVx8KiDUuzbnr3CF/FCc0Vkxr3\n"
 +	"mN8qTGaJJO0f0BZjgWWlWDuhzSVim5mBVAgXGOx8LwiiOyhXMp0XRwqG+2KxQZnm\n"
 +	"+96o6iB+8xvuuuqaIWQpkvKtc+UZBZ03U+IRnxhfIrriiw0AjJ4vp4c9QL5KoqWS\n"
 +	"CAwuYcBYfJqZ4dasgzklzz4b7eujbZ3LxTjewcdumzQUvjA+gpAeuUqaduTvMwxG\n"
 +	"ojFy9sNhC/iqZ4n0peV2N6Epn4B5qnUCAwEAAaOBkzCBkDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAA\n"
 +	"MBoGA1UdEQQTMBGCD3Rlc3QuZ251dGxzLm9yZzATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcD\n"
 +	"ATAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDB6AAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRIIzRTCokxOEpa6sq20qbezh0r\n"
 +	"GDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQedyNtZzEfkQebli/s/MhG/ozhAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n"
 +	"AAOCATEAXs8lOV231HQerhSGEjZJz0vBuA3biKYlu3cwCTKvF6EOyYMSWOnfqqD0\n"
 +	"eDhpo1pzGtUa2zYLHagb+sU2NSTe0sqP+PK1giUg8X8/tRtWKk1p/m76yK/3iaty\n"
 +	"flgz+eMai4xQu2FvAJzIASFjM9R+Pgpcf/zdvkiUPv8Rdm9FieyAZnJSo9hJHLxN\n"
 +	"x60tfC5yyswdbGGW0GbJ2kr+xMfVZvxgO/x6AXlOaUGQ+jZAu9eJwFQMDW5h5/S1\n"
 +	"PJkIt7f7jkU33cG+BawcjhT0GzxuvDnnCG0L7/z7bR+Sw2kNKqHbHorzv91R20Oh\n"
 +	"CIISJPkiiP+mYcglTp1d9gw09GwSkGbldb9ibfc0hKyxiImFfIiTqDbXJcpKH98o\n"
 +	"W8hWkb20QURlY+QM5MD49znfhPKMTQ==\n"
 +	"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
 +	"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
 +	"MIID2TCCAkGgAwIBAgIUWsb4DATcefXbo0WrBfgqVMvPGawwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
 +	"BQAwHjEcMBoGA1UEAxMTR251VExTIHRlc3Qgcm9vdCBDQTAeFw0yMTA1MDMxNDI2\n"
 +	"MzVaFw0yMjA1MDMxNDI2MzVaMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMTDkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IENBMIIB\n"
 +	"UjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAT8AMIIBOgKCATEAnORCsX1unl//fy2d1054XduI\n"
 +	"g/3CqVBaT3Hca65SEoDwh0KiPtQoOgZLdKY2cobGs/ojYtOjcs0KnlPYdmtjEh6W\n"
 +	"EhuJU95v4TQdC4OLMiE56eIGq252hZAbHoTL84Q14DxQWGuzQK830iml7fbw2WcI\n"
 +	"cRQ8vFGs8SzfXw63+MI6Fq6iMAQIqP08WzGmRRzL5wvCiPhCVkrPmwbXoABub6AA\n"
 +	"sYwWPJB91M9/lx5gFH5k9/iPfi3s2Kg3F8MOcppqFYjxDSnsfiz6eMh1+bYVIAo3\n"
 +	"67vGVYHigXMEZC2FezlwIHaZzpEoFlY3a7LFJ00yrjQ910r8UE+CEMTYzE40D0ol\n"
 +	"CMo7FA9RCjeO3bUIoYaIdVTUGWEGHWSeoxGei9Gkm6u+ASj8f+i0jxdD2qXsewID\n"
 +	"AQABo2QwYjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA8GA1UdDwEB/wQFAwMHBAAwHQYDVR0O\n"
 +	"BBYEFB53I21nMR+RB5uWL+z8yEb+jOEDMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFCApU0Q1pxZL+AW3\n"
 +	"GctysPWxl+SfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBgQBbboeDr/rLT1tZWrdHq8FvflGm\n"
 +	"EpxZIRU4DdDD/SUCWSPQvjBq0MvuKxs5FfJCKrDf2kS2qlZ1rO0AuWwREoDeTOEc\n"
 +	"arjFoCry+JQ+USqS5F4gsp4XlYvli27iMp3dlnhFXEQQy7/y+gM5c9wnMi8v/LUz\n"
 +	"AV6QHX0fkb4XeazeJ+Nq0EkjqiYxylN6mP+5LAEMBG/wGviAoviQ5tN9zdoQs/nT\n"
 +	"3jTw3cOauuPjdcOTfo71+/MtBzhPchgNIyQo4aB40XVWsLAoruL/3CFFlTniihtd\n"
 +	"zA2zA7JvbuuKx6BOv2IbWOUweb732ZpYbDgEcXp/6Cj/SIUGxidpEgdCJGqyqdC7\n"
 +	"b58ujxclC6QTcicw+SX5LBox8WGLfj+x+V3uVBz9+EK608xphTj4kLh9peII9v3n\n"
 +	"vBUoZRTiUTCvH4AJJgAfa3mYrSxzueuqBOwXcvZ+8OJ0J1CP21pmK5nxR7f1nm9Q\n"
 +	"sYA1VHfC2dtyAYlByeF5iHl5hFR6vy1jJyzxg2M=\n"
 +	"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
 +	NULL
 +};
 +
 +static const char *rsa_sha1_in_trusted_ca[] = {
 +	/* This CA is generated with the same key as rsa_sha1_in_trusted[1], but
 +	 * self-signed using SHA-1.
 +	 */
 +	"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
 +	"MIIDYzCCAhugAwIBAgIUahO8CvYPHTAltKCC2rAIcXUiLlAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF\n"
 +	"BQAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOR251VExTIHRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNMjEwNTAzMTQyMDM1WhcN\n"
 +	"MjIwNTAzMTQyMDM1WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5HbnVUTFMgdGVzdCBDQTCCAVIwDQYJ\n"
 +	"KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggE/ADCCAToCggExAJzkQrF9bp5f/38tnddOeF3biIP9wqlQ\n"
 +	"Wk9x3GuuUhKA8IdCoj7UKDoGS3SmNnKGxrP6I2LTo3LNCp5T2HZrYxIelhIbiVPe\n"
 +	"b+E0HQuDizIhOeniBqtudoWQGx6Ey/OENeA8UFhrs0CvN9Ippe328NlnCHEUPLxR\n"
 +	"rPEs318Ot/jCOhauojAECKj9PFsxpkUcy+cLwoj4QlZKz5sG16AAbm+gALGMFjyQ\n"
 +	"fdTPf5ceYBR+ZPf4j34t7NioNxfDDnKaahWI8Q0p7H4s+njIdfm2FSAKN+u7xlWB\n"
 +	"4oFzBGQthXs5cCB2mc6RKBZWN2uyxSdNMq40PddK/FBPghDE2MxONA9KJQjKOxQP\n"
 +	"UQo3jt21CKGGiHVU1BlhBh1knqMRnovRpJurvgEo/H/otI8XQ9ql7HsCAwEAAaND\n"
 +	"MEEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDBwQAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQe\n"
 +	"dyNtZzEfkQebli/s/MhG/ozhAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCATEAYLm/4DfUp+mA\n"
 +	"S/23a2bwybJoPCMzKZpi+veXkqoq/a/BCUkFpqnjpVjz0ujVKK121oeOPBAa/mG1\n"
 +	"Y3fJYP+b3PloL/6xj/8680TveGirCr0Rp/8XWa8lt+Ge8DM3mfTGWFTWHa0lD9VK\n"
 +	"gjV1oNZNLe5SKA6dJLAp/NjCxc/vuOkThQPeaoO5Iy/Z6m7CpTLO7T4syJFtDmSn\n"
 +	"Pa/yFUDTgJYFlGVM+KC1r8bhZ6Ao1CAXTcT5Lcbe/aCcyk6B3J2AnYsqPMVNEVhb\n"
 +	"9eMGO/WG24hMLy6eb1r/yL8uQ/uGi2rRlNJN8GTg09YR7l5fHrHxuHc/sme0jsnJ\n"
 +	"wtqGLCJsrh7Ae1fKVUueO00Yx9BGuzLswMvnT5f0oYs0jrXgMrTbIWS/DjOcYIHb\n"
 +	"w3SV1ZRcNg==\n"
 +	"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
 +	NULL
 +};
 +
 +static const char *rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted[] = {
 +	"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
 +	"MIID0jCCAoqgAwIBAgIUNCvPV9OvyuVMtnkC3ZAvh959h4MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
 +	"BQAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOR251VExTIHRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNMjEwNTA0MDg0NzAzWhcN\n"
 +	"MjIwNTA0MDg0NzAzWjA3MRgwFgYDVQQDEw90ZXN0LmdudXRscy5vcmcxGzAZBgNV\n"
 +	"BAoTEkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IHNlcnZlcjCCAVIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggE/ADCC\n"
 +	"AToCggExALRrJ5glr8H/HsqwfvTYvO1DhmdUXdq0HsKQX4M8AhH8E3KFsoikZUEL\n"
 +	"dl8jvoqf/nlLczsux0s8vxbJl1U1F/OhckswwuAnlBLzVgDmzoJLEV2kHpv6+rkb\n"
 +	"Kk0Ytbql5gzHqKihbaqIhNyWDrJsHDWq58eUPfnVx8KiDUuzbnr3CF/FCc0Vkxr3\n"
 +	"mN8qTGaJJO0f0BZjgWWlWDuhzSVim5mBVAgXGOx8LwiiOyhXMp0XRwqG+2KxQZnm\n"
 +	"+96o6iB+8xvuuuqaIWQpkvKtc+UZBZ03U+IRnxhfIrriiw0AjJ4vp4c9QL5KoqWS\n"
 +	"CAwuYcBYfJqZ4dasgzklzz4b7eujbZ3LxTjewcdumzQUvjA+gpAeuUqaduTvMwxG\n"
 +	"ojFy9sNhC/iqZ4n0peV2N6Epn4B5qnUCAwEAAaOBkzCBkDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAA\n"
 +	"MBoGA1UdEQQTMBGCD3Rlc3QuZ251dGxzLm9yZzATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcD\n"
 +	"ATAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDB6AAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRIIzRTCokxOEpa6sq20qbezh0r\n"
 +	"GDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQedyNtZzEfkQebli/s/MhG/ozhAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n"
 +	"AAOCATEAWs/Qa1Ebydwo4Ke2KEdy5cUTSZjnoz93XpbrP9W60MJ4d2DIQPcYUcLF\n"
 +	"+glez+mRtVXDRtH5V/4yZX1EdgrPVQGeVlO5HbNiYyYw/Yj3H6kzWtUbBxdOAOE/\n"
 +	"/ul8RCKKMfvYBHCBgjBMW0aFm31Q1Z8m8nanBusyJ0DG1scBHu4/3vTCZthZAxc5\n"
 +	"3l3t/jjsNRS+k5t6Ay8nEY1tAZSGVqN8qufzO2NBO06sQagp09FTfDh581OBcVtF\n"
 +	"X7O0cffAWHk3JoywzEWFEAhVPqFlk07wG2O+k+fYZfavsJko5q+yWkxu8RDh4wAx\n"
 +	"7UzKudGOQ+NhfYJ7N7V1/RFg1z75gE3GTUX7qmGZEVDOsMyiuUeYg8znyYpBV55Q\n"
 +	"4BNr0ukwmwOdvUf+ksCu6PdOGaqThA==\n"
 +	"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
 +	/* ICA with SHA1 signature */
 +	"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
 +	"MIID2TCCAkGgAwIBAgIUYaKJkQft87M1TF+Jd30py3yIq4swDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF\n"
 +	"BQAwHjEcMBoGA1UEAxMTR251VExTIHRlc3Qgcm9vdCBDQTAeFw0yMTA1MDQwODQ1\n"
 +	"NDdaFw0yMjA1MDQwODQ1NDdaMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMTDkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IENBMIIB\n"
 +	"UjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAT8AMIIBOgKCATEAnORCsX1unl//fy2d1054XduI\n"
 +	"g/3CqVBaT3Hca65SEoDwh0KiPtQoOgZLdKY2cobGs/ojYtOjcs0KnlPYdmtjEh6W\n"
 +	"EhuJU95v4TQdC4OLMiE56eIGq252hZAbHoTL84Q14DxQWGuzQK830iml7fbw2WcI\n"
 +	"cRQ8vFGs8SzfXw63+MI6Fq6iMAQIqP08WzGmRRzL5wvCiPhCVkrPmwbXoABub6AA\n"
 +	"sYwWPJB91M9/lx5gFH5k9/iPfi3s2Kg3F8MOcppqFYjxDSnsfiz6eMh1+bYVIAo3\n"
 +	"67vGVYHigXMEZC2FezlwIHaZzpEoFlY3a7LFJ00yrjQ910r8UE+CEMTYzE40D0ol\n"
 +	"CMo7FA9RCjeO3bUIoYaIdVTUGWEGHWSeoxGei9Gkm6u+ASj8f+i0jxdD2qXsewID\n"
 +	"AQABo2QwYjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA8GA1UdDwEB/wQFAwMHBAAwHQYDVR0O\n"
 +	"BBYEFB53I21nMR+RB5uWL+z8yEb+jOEDMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFCApU0Q1pxZL+AW3\n"
 +	"GctysPWxl+SfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBgQAewBcAGUGX28I5PDtuJkxoHonD\n"
 +	"muHdXpYnrz1YXN4b7odNXockz++Xovgj126fo+PeWgmaaCic98ZcGnyVTi9+3oqN\n"
 +	"2Bf4NNfyzSccgZZTphzbwjMcnc983HLQgsLSAOVivPHj5GEN58EWWamc9yA0VjGn\n"
 +	"cuYmFN2dlFA8/ClEbVGu3UXBe6OljR5zUr+6oiSp2J+Rl7SerVSHlst07iU2tkeB\n"
 +	"dlfOD5CquUGSka3SKvEfvu5SwYrCQVfYB6eMLInm7A0/ca0Jn3Oh4fMf2rIg/E3K\n"
 +	"qsopxsu8BXrLoGK4MxbxPA65JpczhZgilQQi3e3RIvxrvyD2qamjaNbyG5cr8mW4\n"
 +	"VOLf3vUORbkTi5sE7uRMu2B3z3N7ajsuQM8RHB17hOCB2FO/8rermq/oeJNtx57L\n"
 +	"5s5NxCHYTksQ4gkpR4gfTIO/zwXJSwGa/Zi2y2wIi/1qr7lppBsKV2rDWX7QiIeA\n"
 +	"PxOxyJA2eSeqCorz9vk3aHXleSpxsWGgKiJVmV0=\n"
 +	"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
 +	NULL
 +};
 +
 +static const char *rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted_ca[] = {
 +	"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
 +	"MIIEDTCCAnWgAwIBAgIUd5X8NZput+aNPEd9h92r4KAu16MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
 +	"BQAwHjEcMBoGA1UEAxMTR251VExTIHRlc3Qgcm9vdCBDQTAeFw0yMTA1MDMxNDI1\n"
 +	"MDNaFw0yMjA1MDMxNDI1MDNaMB4xHDAaBgNVBAMTE0dudVRMUyB0ZXN0IHJvb3Qg\n"
 +	"Q0EwggGiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBjwAwggGKAoIBgQCsFAaMb/iRN+OFqQNh\n"
 +	"OkkXGZlb+eLerLuB9ELnYwyLIh4MTXh0RjFZdCQLsQHfY/YFv0C50rmoXTA/d3Ef\n"
 +	"K/P243KjX0XBWjO9TBuN0zth50eq94zf69yxA/a+kmT+O5YLfhi2ELM5F3IjOUoZ\n"
 +	"lL0IGlFJwauAkaNylp/Evd5nW7g5DUJvMm4A3RXNfZt9gAD4lPRwryQq9jxT48Xu\n"
 +	"fB0kAPEG/l/Izbz2rYin5+nySL+a0CSNuEbITxidtMhveB747oR0QS2sMQKji1ur\n"
 +	"pRJ945SHiYJIgVuFAJc9StikSyIrxZgK45kAzcQAyRWWKiMNH5PprGFYJp+ypwhm\n"
 +	"1t8Bphj2RFJAG3XRRZF/9uJIYc5mEHCsZFZ/IFRaKqyN30kAUijgNt+lW5mZXVFU\n"
 +	"aqzV2zHjSG8jsGdia3cfBP46Z1q2eAh5jOCucTq1F7qZdVhOFmP9jFE6Uy5Kbwgc\n"
 +	"kNAnsEllQeJQL2odVa7woKkZZ4M/c72X5tpBU38Rs3krn3sCAwEAAaNDMEEwDwYD\n"
 +	"VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDBwQAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQgKVNENacW\n"
 +	"S/gFtxnLcrD1sZfknzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAYEAaZMV71mZ9FYoVdpho61h\n"
 +	"WWPs5GppQLJ1w70DNtGZ+lFrk/KopeDvOu1i61QLWRzcZCZMl+npiX1KH5kjVo3v\n"
 +	"C9G8kdMW6EVRk5p6qCJMPFN2U+grMMp50aY5kmw+/v+Lhk5T/VG93l63P91FkUre\n"
 +	"o8qhOudJExoUnR1uB9M6HMAxVn8Lm/N1LGPiP6A6Pboo716H7mg/A7pv9zoZ6jUp\n"
 +	"7x693mA/b3I/QpDx/nJcmcdqxgEuW+aRlFXgnYZRFAawxi+5M9EwCWbkSTO4OMHP\n"
 +	"Qlvak3tJO+wb92b0cICOOtzIPgQ+caiLg9d0FvesALmQzDmNmtqynoO85+Ia2Ywh\n"
 +	"nxKPlpeImhLN9nGl9sOeW2m4mnA5r0h1vgML4v/MWL4TQhXallc31uFNj5HyFaTh\n"
 +	"6Mr0g3GeQgN0jpT+aIOiKuW9fLts54+Ntj1NN40slqi3Y+/Yd6xhj+NgmbRvybZu\n"
 +	"tnYFXKC0Q+QUf38horqG2Mc3/uh8MOm0eYUXwGJOdXYD\n"
 +	"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
 +	NULL
 +};
 +
 #if defined __clang__ || __GNUC__ > 4 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 5)
 #  pragma GCC diagnostic push
 #  pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-variable"
@@ -4275,6 +4432,14 @@ static struct
   { "ed448 - ok", ed448, &ed448[0], GNUTLS_PROFILE_TO_VFLAGS(GNUTLS_PROFILE_ULTRA),
     0, NULL, 1584352960, 1},
   { "superseding - ok", superseding, superseding_ca, 0, 0, 0, 1590928011 },
 +  { "rsa-sha1 in trusted - ok",
 +    rsa_sha1_in_trusted, rsa_sha1_in_trusted_ca,
 +    GNUTLS_PROFILE_TO_VFLAGS(GNUTLS_PROFILE_MEDIUM),
 +    0, NULL, 1620052390, 1},
 +  { "rsa-sha1 not in trusted - not ok",
 +    rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted, rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted_ca,
 +    GNUTLS_PROFILE_TO_VFLAGS(GNUTLS_PROFILE_MEDIUM),
 +    GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID, NULL, 1620118136, 1},
   { NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, 0}
 };
 -- 
 2.31.1
--- a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch
@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
 From c149dd0767f32789e391280cb1eb06b7eb7c6bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:05:53 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] auth/rsa: side-step potential side-channel
 Remove branching that depends on secret data.
 Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
 Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
 Tested-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
 ---
 lib/auth/rsa.c | 10 ----------
 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
 index 8108ee841d..6b158bacb2 100644
 --- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
 +++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static int
 proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 		   size_t _data_size)
 {
 -	const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n";
 	gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
 	int ret, dsize;
 	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
@@ -235,15 +234,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 	ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
 	        CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
 -	if (ok) {
 -		/* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are
 -		 * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug
 -		 * logging is disabled */
 -		_gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error);
 -	} else {
 -		_gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error);
 -	}
 -
 	/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
 	 * discussed above.
 	 */
 -- 
 2.39.1
 From 7c963102ec2119eecc1789b993aabe5edfd75f3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
 Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 14:32:09 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] rsa: remove dead code
 since the `ok` variable isn't used any more, we can remove all code
 used to calculate it
 Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
 ---
 lib/auth/rsa.c | 20 +++-----------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
 index 6b158bacb2..858701fe6e 100644
 --- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
 +++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -159,8 +159,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 	int ret, dsize;
 	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
 	volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
 -	volatile uint8_t check_ver_min;
 -	volatile uint32_t ok;
 #ifdef ENABLE_SSL3
 	if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) {
@@ -186,7 +184,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 	ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
 	ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
 -	check_ver_min = (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0);
 	session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
 	if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
@@ -205,10 +202,9 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 		return ret;
 	}
 -	ret =
 -	    gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
 -					 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
 -					 session->key.key.size);
 +	gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
 +				     0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
 +				     session->key.key.size);
 	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
 	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
 	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
@@ -224,16 +220,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 	 * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
 	 */
 -	/* ok is 0 in case of error and 1 in case of success. */
 -
 -	/* if ret < 0 */
 -	ok = CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0);
 -	/* session->key.key.data[0] must equal ver_maj */
 -	ok &= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[0], ver_maj);
 -	/* if check_ver_min then session->key.key.data[1] must equal ver_min */
 -	ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
 -	        CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
 -
 	/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
 	 * discussed above.
 	 */
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SPECS/gnutls.spec
+++ b/SPECS/gnutls.spec
@ -1,20 +1,10 @@
-Version:	3.6.16
+Version:	3.6.14
-Release: 8%{?dist}.3
+Release: 3%{?dist}
 Patch1:	gnutls-3.2.7-rpath.patch
 Patch2:	gnutls-3.6.4-no-now-guile.patch
 Patch3:	gnutls-3.6.13-enable-intel-cet.patch
-Patch10:	gnutls-3.6.14-fips-dh-selftests.patch
+Patch4:	gnutls-3.6.14-autogen-int.patch
-Patch11:	gnutls-3.6.14-fips-kdf-selftests.patch
+Patch5:	gnutls-3.6.14-fips-mode-check.patch
 Patch12:	gnutls-3.6.16-tls12-cert-type.patch
 Patch13:	gnutls-3.6.16-trust-ca-sha1.patch
 Patch14:	gnutls-3.6.16-doc-p11tool-ckaid.patch
 Patch15:	gnutls-3.6.16-pkcs7-verify.patch
 Patch16:	gnutls-3.6.16-cpuid.patch
 Patch17:	gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch
 Patch18:	gnutls-3.6.16-rehandshake-tickets.patch
 Patch19:	gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing.patch
 Patch20:	gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing-followup.patch
 Patch21:	gnutls-3.6.16-deterministic-ecdsa-fixes.patch
 %bcond_without dane
 %if 0%{?rhel}
 %bcond_with guile
@ -160,7 +150,7 @@ This package contains Guile bindings for the library.
 %prep
 gpgv2 --keyring %{SOURCE2} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
-%autosetup -p1 -S git
+%autosetup -p1
 sed -i -e 's|sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/lib /usr/lib|sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/lib /usr/lib %{_libdir}|g' configure
 rm -f lib/minitasn1/*.c lib/minitasn1/*.h
@ -172,7 +162,6 @@ echo "SYSTEM=NORMAL" >> tests/system.prio
 # via the crypto policies
 %build
 autoreconf -fi
 CCASFLAGS="$CCASFLAGS -Wa,--generate-missing-build-notes=yes"
 export CCASFLAGS
 %configure --with-libtasn1-prefix=%{_prefix} \
@ -299,67 +288,6 @@ fi
 %endif
 %changelog
 * Tue Mar 26 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8.3
 - Fix memleak with older GMP (RHEL-28957)
 * Mon Mar 25 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8.2
 - Fix timing side-channel in deterministic ECDSA (RHEL-28957)
 * Thu Jan 18 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8.1
 - auth/rsa-psk: minimize branching after decryption (RHEL-21586)
 * Wed Dec  6 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8
 - auth/rsa_psk: side-step potential side-channel (RHEL-16753)
 * Mon Jun 26 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-7
 - Clear server's session ticket indication at rehandshake (#2089817)
 * Thu Feb 23 2023 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-6
 - Fix x86_64 CPU feature detection when AVX is not available (#2131152)
 - Fix timing side-channel in TLS RSA key exchange (#2162598)
 * Mon Aug 29 2022 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-5
 - Fix double-free in gnutls_pkcs7_verify (#2109788)
 * Mon Jun 28 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-4
 - p11tool: Document ID reuse behavior when importing certs (#1776250)
 * Mon Jun  7 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-3
 - Treat SHA-1 signed CA in the trusted set differently (#1965445)
 * Wed May 26 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-2
 - Filter certificate_types in TLS 1.2 CR based on signature algorithms (#1942216)
 * Mon May 24 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-1
 - Update to upstream 3.6.16 release (#1956783)
 - Fix potential use-after-free in key_share handling (#1927597)
 - Fix potential use-after-free in pre_shared_key handling (#1927593)
 - Stop gnutls-serv relying on AI_ADDRCONFIG to decide listening address (#1908334)
 - Fix cert expiration issue in tests (#1908110)
 * Thu Apr  1 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-10
 - Port fixes for potential miscalculation in ecdsa_verify (#1942931)
 * Tue Nov 24 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-9
 - Revert the previous change
 * Wed Nov 11 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-8
 - Depend on specific NVR of gmp and nettle (#1812933)
 * Tue Nov  3 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-7
 - Increase DH key bits to >= 2048 in self-tests (#1879506)
 - Implement self-tests for KDF and CMAC (#1890870)
 - Fix CVE-2020-24659: heap buffer-overflow when "no_renegotiation" alert is received (#1873959)
 * Mon Aug 24 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-6
 - Fix memory leak when serializing iovec_t (#1844112)
 * Sat Jul 18 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-5
 - Perform validation checks on (EC)DH public keys and share secrets (#1855803)
 * Mon Jun 29 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-4
 - Tighten FIPS DH primes check according to SP800-56A (rev 3) (#1849079)
 * Fri Jun  5 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-3
 - Update gnutls-3.6.14-fips-mode-check.patch