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18 changed files with 85 additions and 3086 deletions

3
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz
SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz.sig
SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14.tar.xz
SOURCES/gpgkey-462225C3B46F34879FC8496CD605848ED7E69871.gpg

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@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
6ba8fb898dcf4b4046b60662ba97df835593e687 SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz
b41ac56ff6cca4539c8b084db2c84e8bc21d60ac SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16.tar.xz.sig
bea1b5abcb691acf014e592f41d0a9580a41216a SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.14.tar.xz
648ec46f9539fe756fb90131b85ae4759ed2ed21 SOURCES/gpgkey-462225C3B46F34879FC8496CD605848ED7E69871.gpg

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From cf1de82bedd01c01e70921699c84a473b08d0dab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 17:23:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] serv: omit upper bound of --maxearlydata option definition
It turned out that AutoGen treats numbers that exceed INT_MAX in a
platform dependent way. In this case, 4294967295 (UINT_MAX) is
treated as is on 64-bit platforms, while it is interpreted as "-1" on
32-bit platforms. This causes a problem when the program
documentation is compiled under multilib environment.
Reported by Ivan Molodetskikh in:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1841844
and the cause was identified by Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
src/serv-args.def | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/serv-args.def b/src/serv-args.def
index 996fbe36b..a584085e2 100644
--- a/src/serv-args.def
+++ b/src/serv-args.def
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ flag = {
flag = {
name = maxearlydata;
arg-type = number;
- arg-range = "1->4294967295";
+ arg-range = "1->";
descrip = "The maximum early data size to accept";
doc = "";
};
--
2.26.2

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@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
From f09b7627a63defb1c55e9965fb05e0bbddb90247 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 11:54:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] fips: use larger prime for DH self-tests
According to FIPS140-2 IG 7.5, the minimum key size of FFC through
2030 is defined as 2048 bits. This updates the relevant self-test
using ffdhe3072 defined in RFC 7919.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
lib/dh-primes.c | 4 --
2 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
index 70b0f618f..9b7c692a8 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests-pk.c
@@ -620,32 +620,150 @@ static int test_dh(void)
gnutls_pk_params_st priv;
gnutls_pk_params_st pub;
gnutls_datum_t out = {NULL, 0};
+
+ /* FFDHE 3072 test vector provided by Stephan Mueller in:
+ * https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/merge_requests/1342#note_424430996
+ */
static const uint8_t known_dh_k[] = {
- 0x10, 0x25, 0x04, 0xb5, 0xc6, 0xc2, 0xcb,
- 0x0c, 0xe9, 0xc5, 0x58, 0x0d, 0x22, 0x62};
- static const uint8_t test_p[] = {
- 0x24, 0x85, 0xdd, 0x3a, 0x74, 0x42, 0xe4,
- 0xb3, 0xf1, 0x0b, 0x13, 0xf9, 0x17, 0x4d };
- static const uint8_t test_g[] = { 0x02 };
+ 0xec, 0xb3, 0x85, 0x0c, 0x72, 0x55, 0x55, 0xc2, 0x98, 0x36,
+ 0xbe, 0x75, 0x9e, 0xc9, 0x9d, 0x8b, 0x16, 0xa6, 0xe6, 0x84,
+ 0x33, 0x12, 0x80, 0x1d, 0xac, 0xde, 0x6a, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0x1e,
+ 0x15, 0xca, 0x5d, 0x26, 0xb3, 0x0a, 0x35, 0xf4, 0xbb, 0xad,
+ 0x71, 0xcb, 0x03, 0x1a, 0xcb, 0xfb, 0x83, 0xf0, 0xa8, 0xde,
+ 0xed, 0x5e, 0x3d, 0x98, 0xd2, 0xb0, 0xef, 0xad, 0xdf, 0x32,
+ 0xa0, 0x16, 0x7d, 0x0e, 0x29, 0xd8, 0x85, 0xca, 0x12, 0x97,
+ 0x56, 0xab, 0x6a, 0x26, 0xa4, 0x46, 0x3d, 0x87, 0xd7, 0xe0,
+ 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x28, 0x75, 0xac, 0x59, 0xc5, 0x71, 0x3a, 0x24,
+ 0x15, 0x76, 0x98, 0x72, 0x94, 0x2d, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xbc, 0x9a,
+ 0x77, 0xd4, 0xe2, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x54, 0x4a, 0x56, 0xbe, 0x0b,
+ 0x43, 0xf8, 0x21, 0x6f, 0x54, 0x32, 0xde, 0xb7, 0xd5, 0xb7,
+ 0x08, 0x00, 0xd2, 0x57, 0x8c, 0x0b, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x3e, 0xdb,
+ 0x72, 0x54, 0x3a, 0xc0, 0x50, 0x66, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0x67, 0xf5,
+ 0x22, 0x28, 0xf2, 0x3c, 0x51, 0x94, 0x61, 0x26, 0x9a, 0xc6,
+ 0x42, 0x0e, 0x8b, 0x42, 0xad, 0x79, 0x40, 0xa9, 0x0b, 0xdc,
+ 0x84, 0xd5, 0x71, 0x83, 0x94, 0xd9, 0x83, 0x2f, 0x08, 0x74,
+ 0xbc, 0x37, 0x6a, 0x3e, 0x1e, 0xbc, 0xcc, 0x09, 0x23, 0x30,
+ 0x79, 0x01, 0x39, 0xf6, 0xe3, 0xa8, 0xc0, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0xdb,
+ 0x0b, 0x71, 0x3e, 0x4f, 0x1f, 0x69, 0x84, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x6c,
+ 0x36, 0x2c, 0xcc, 0xb4, 0x7c, 0x94, 0xec, 0x06, 0x0b, 0x11,
+ 0x53, 0x95, 0xe6, 0x05, 0x43, 0xa4, 0xe4, 0xea, 0x1d, 0x4f,
+ 0xdc, 0xd0, 0x38, 0x0e, 0x32, 0xa1, 0xde, 0xd9, 0x8d, 0xd8,
+ 0x20, 0xac, 0x04, 0x83, 0xf8, 0x1b, 0x55, 0x52, 0x16, 0x20,
+ 0xe3, 0x2e, 0x6d, 0x11, 0x15, 0x29, 0x2f, 0x3a, 0x7c, 0x80,
+ 0x0a, 0x71, 0x3d, 0x31, 0x9c, 0x1b, 0x73, 0x59, 0xe1, 0x0d,
+ 0x27, 0xc5, 0xc0, 0x6a, 0x72, 0x3a, 0x5b, 0xd6, 0xf6, 0x50,
+ 0xe6, 0x69, 0x48, 0x1e, 0xfd, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x47, 0x73, 0xfb,
+ 0x88, 0x14, 0xea, 0x6d, 0x36, 0xe1, 0x4c, 0x2c, 0xf9, 0x04,
+ 0xc1, 0xb7, 0x29, 0xfc, 0x5d, 0x02, 0x5d, 0x1c, 0x4d, 0x31,
+ 0x4a, 0x51, 0x3f, 0xa4, 0x45, 0x19, 0x29, 0xc4, 0x32, 0xa6,
+ 0x45, 0xdb, 0x94, 0x3a, 0xbd, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xd6, 0x1a, 0xb1,
+ 0xff, 0xe7, 0x62, 0x75, 0x16, 0xe5, 0x0b, 0xa3, 0x3a, 0x93,
+ 0x84, 0xd6, 0xad, 0xc2, 0x24, 0x68, 0x3d, 0xd6, 0x07, 0xe4,
+ 0xbe, 0x5a, 0x49, 0x31, 0x06, 0xad, 0x3f, 0x31, 0x4a, 0x1c,
+ 0xf7, 0x58, 0xdf, 0x34, 0xcb, 0xc8, 0xa9, 0x07, 0x24, 0x42,
+ 0x63, 0xa5, 0x8e, 0xdd, 0x37, 0x78, 0x92, 0x68, 0x3f, 0xd8,
+ 0x2f, 0xea, 0x8c, 0xf1, 0x8e, 0xd4, 0x8b, 0xa7, 0x3f, 0xa0,
+ 0xfa, 0xaf, 0xf0, 0x35,
+ };
static const uint8_t test_x[] = {
- 0x06, 0x2c, 0x96, 0xae, 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x9b,
- 0xbb, 0x41, 0x51, 0x7a, 0xa7, 0xc5, 0xfe };
+ 0x16, 0x5c, 0xa6, 0xe0, 0x9b, 0x87, 0xfa, 0x2d, 0xbc, 0x13,
+ 0x20, 0xcd, 0xac, 0x4e, 0xcc, 0x60, 0x1e, 0x48, 0xec, 0xbe,
+ 0x73, 0x0c, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0x6e, 0x2a, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xd8, 0xf3,
+ 0x2d, 0x5f, 0x75, 0xf3, 0x07, 0x94, 0x88, 0x3d, 0xb1, 0x38,
+ 0xcf, 0xae, 0x4a, 0xcc, 0xcb, 0x6a, 0x80, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x3b,
+ 0xaa, 0x0b, 0x18, 0x74, 0x58, 0x7c, 0x3e, 0x74, 0xef, 0xb6,
+ 0xd3, 0x15, 0xee, 0x73, 0x29, 0x88, 0x7b, 0x65, 0x02, 0x39,
+ 0x33, 0xec, 0x22, 0x06, 0x8c, 0x5b, 0xd6, 0x2f, 0x4c, 0xf7,
+ 0xe0, 0x97, 0x6d, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x36, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x44, 0x4d,
+ 0x9d, 0x41, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0xec, 0x25, 0xf4, 0xc3, 0xa5, 0x91,
+ 0xd0, 0x90, 0xc9, 0x34, 0x7b, 0xba, 0x27, 0x30, 0x5a, 0xa2,
+ 0x21, 0x58, 0xce, 0x88, 0x25, 0x39, 0xaf, 0xf1, 0x17, 0x02,
+ 0x12, 0xf8, 0x55, 0xdc, 0xd2, 0x08, 0x5b, 0xd3, 0xc7, 0x8e,
+ 0xcf, 0x29, 0x85, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x5c, 0x08, 0xc2, 0xd7, 0xb0,
+ 0x33, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0xb9, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0xe5, 0x76,
+ 0x8f, 0xd3, 0x14, 0xb6, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0x9a, 0xe8, 0x15, 0x60,
+ 0x60, 0x5e, 0xaa, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xa6, 0xb2, 0x4f, 0xff, 0x46,
+ 0xc1, 0x5e, 0x93, 0x50, 0x90, 0x7e, 0x4c, 0x26, 0xd7, 0xbb,
+ 0x21, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x27, 0xc5, 0x9b, 0x0d, 0x46, 0x69, 0xe4,
+ 0x74, 0x87, 0x74, 0x55, 0xee, 0x5f, 0xe5, 0x72, 0x04, 0x46,
+ 0x1f, 0x2e, 0x55, 0xc7, 0xcc, 0x2b, 0x2b, 0x39, 0x6d, 0x90,
+ 0x60, 0x31, 0x37, 0x5b, 0x44, 0xde, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0xd1, 0xc6,
+ 0x9c, 0x12, 0x82, 0xcc, 0x7c, 0xb1, 0x0e, 0xa9, 0x95, 0x9d,
+ 0xe0, 0xa8, 0x3e, 0xc1, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0x6a, 0x37, 0x59, 0x17,
+ 0x93, 0x63, 0x1e, 0xbf, 0x04, 0xa3, 0xaa, 0xc0, 0x1d, 0xc4,
+ 0x6d, 0x7a, 0xdc, 0x69, 0x9c, 0xb0, 0x22, 0x56, 0xd9, 0x76,
+ 0x92, 0x2d, 0x1e, 0x62, 0xae, 0xfd, 0xd6, 0x9b, 0xfd, 0x08,
+ 0x2c, 0x95, 0xec, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x43, 0x62, 0x68, 0x1a, 0xaf,
+ 0x46, 0x59, 0xb7, 0xce, 0x8e, 0x42, 0x24, 0xae, 0xf7, 0x0e,
+ 0x9a, 0x3b, 0xf8, 0x77, 0xdf, 0x26, 0x85, 0x9f, 0x45, 0xad,
+ 0x8c, 0xa9, 0x54, 0x9c, 0x46, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x8a, 0xe9, 0xcc,
+ 0x34, 0x5e, 0xc5, 0xd1, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x44, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0x90,
+ 0x3a, 0x32, 0x1a, 0x9c, 0x2a, 0x63, 0xec, 0x21, 0xb4, 0xfc,
+ 0xfa, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x43, 0xc7, 0x49, 0x56, 0xbc,
+ 0x50, 0xc5, 0x84, 0xf0, 0x42, 0xc8, 0x6a, 0xf1, 0x78, 0xe4,
+ 0xaa, 0x06, 0x37, 0xe1, 0x30, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x97, 0xca, 0xfd,
+ 0x35, 0xfa, 0xeb, 0x48, 0x6d, 0xaa, 0x45, 0x46, 0x9d, 0xbc,
+ 0x1d, 0x98, 0x17, 0x45, 0xa3, 0xee, 0x21, 0xa0, 0x97, 0x38,
+ 0x80, 0xc5, 0x28, 0x1f,
+ };
static const uint8_t test_y[] = { /* y=g^x mod p */
- 0x1e, 0xca, 0x23, 0x2a, 0xfd, 0x34, 0xe1,
- 0x10, 0x7a, 0xff, 0xaf, 0x2d, 0xaa, 0x53 };
+ 0x93, 0xeb, 0x5c, 0x37, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x6f, 0xbf, 0xbe,
+ 0x96, 0x51, 0x26, 0x58, 0x81, 0x36, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0x9a, 0x34,
+ 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xa8, 0xa3, 0x2c, 0x41, 0x76, 0xa8, 0xc6, 0xc0,
+ 0xa0, 0xc8, 0x51, 0x36, 0xc4, 0x40, 0x4e, 0x2c, 0x69, 0xf7,
+ 0x51, 0xbb, 0xb0, 0xd6, 0xf5, 0xdb, 0x40, 0x29, 0x50, 0x3b,
+ 0x8a, 0xf9, 0xf3, 0x53, 0x78, 0xfc, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xe9,
+ 0xac, 0x85, 0x13, 0x65, 0x62, 0x22, 0x04, 0x1b, 0x14, 0x2a,
+ 0xf4, 0x8f, 0x2f, 0xf1, 0x2f, 0x81, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x0e, 0x76,
+ 0x91, 0x43, 0xb2, 0xfc, 0x7c, 0x6f, 0x0c, 0x45, 0x37, 0x31,
+ 0x31, 0x58, 0x5c, 0xdf, 0x42, 0x24, 0x7a, 0xba, 0x8b, 0x7f,
+ 0x79, 0x06, 0x07, 0xef, 0xd6, 0x06, 0xeb, 0xcb, 0x3c, 0xbd,
+ 0xbc, 0xe5, 0xff, 0xfd, 0x62, 0x15, 0x0c, 0x40, 0x46, 0x37,
+ 0xef, 0xd0, 0xa1, 0xde, 0x63, 0x4f, 0x20, 0x0b, 0x45, 0x7d,
+ 0x06, 0x77, 0xfd, 0x23, 0xc1, 0x32, 0x8a, 0x89, 0x65, 0x16,
+ 0xe8, 0x48, 0x12, 0x1c, 0x25, 0x33, 0x2d, 0xbd, 0xd8, 0x9f,
+ 0x1c, 0x9d, 0xbc, 0xe3, 0x08, 0x60, 0x87, 0x1a, 0xc6, 0x06,
+ 0x36, 0xd2, 0xac, 0x09, 0x6d, 0x99, 0x02, 0x89, 0xc6, 0x12,
+ 0x93, 0x8c, 0x4b, 0xd0, 0x7e, 0x36, 0x8a, 0xd6, 0xa0, 0x97,
+ 0x4f, 0x97, 0x3f, 0x97, 0x0b, 0xfe, 0x05, 0xfc, 0xc8, 0xef,
+ 0x21, 0x4d, 0x4a, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xb4, 0xa6, 0x4f, 0xe1, 0xdd,
+ 0x44, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x54, 0xf5, 0x54, 0x3e, 0x8c,
+ 0xb9, 0x85, 0x86, 0x00, 0x40, 0x98, 0xe7, 0x01, 0xdd, 0x93,
+ 0x9d, 0x95, 0xea, 0xf0, 0xd3, 0x99, 0x4b, 0xeb, 0xd5, 0x79,
+ 0x47, 0xa4, 0xad, 0x2a, 0xe0, 0x4d, 0x36, 0x3b, 0x46, 0x10,
+ 0x96, 0xbb, 0x48, 0xe9, 0xa1, 0x78, 0x01, 0x35, 0x0a, 0x5c,
+ 0x7b, 0x3f, 0xf5, 0xf7, 0xb1, 0xe3, 0x97, 0x17, 0x4d, 0x76,
+ 0x10, 0x8d, 0x68, 0x4c, 0x94, 0x7d, 0xee, 0x0e, 0x20, 0x8b,
+ 0xce, 0x7d, 0x0a, 0xa3, 0x51, 0xfb, 0xe6, 0xcf, 0xf0, 0x0e,
+ 0x7f, 0x3c, 0xd4, 0xef, 0x56, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x95, 0xf0, 0x5f,
+ 0x4b, 0x9c, 0x03, 0x9e, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xc1, 0x46, 0xd7, 0xc0,
+ 0x4f, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x6c, 0xe1, 0xe9, 0x2a, 0x97, 0xe0, 0x3f,
+ 0x3a, 0x93, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x41, 0x7d, 0x45, 0x03, 0xb3, 0x40,
+ 0x20, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x2d, 0xd3, 0xf7, 0x32, 0x7b, 0xcc, 0x4f,
+ 0x81, 0x18, 0x4c, 0x50, 0x77, 0xc4, 0xb7, 0x6a, 0x4d, 0x05,
+ 0xd8, 0x6d, 0xbf, 0x6f, 0xba, 0x1d, 0x38, 0x78, 0x87, 0xd2,
+ 0x8e, 0xc2, 0x6d, 0xb6, 0xed, 0x66, 0x61, 0xa8, 0xb9, 0x19,
+ 0x0e, 0x93, 0xd1, 0xcd, 0x5b, 0xbe, 0x19, 0x05, 0x52, 0x43,
+ 0xd6, 0xc1, 0x07, 0x3c, 0x6a, 0x62, 0xbd, 0x33, 0x9b, 0x1b,
+ 0x02, 0x42, 0x61, 0x14,
+ };
gnutls_pk_params_init(&priv);
gnutls_pk_params_init(&pub);
priv.algo = pub.algo = GNUTLS_PK_DH;
- ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_P], test_p, sizeof(test_p));
+ ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_P],
+ gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_prime.data,
+ gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_prime.size);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
goto cleanup;
}
- ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_G], test_g, sizeof(test_g));
+ ret = _gnutls_mpi_init_scan(&priv.params[DH_G],
+ gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_generator.data,
+ gnutls_ffdhe_3072_group_generator.size);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
goto cleanup;
diff --git a/lib/dh-primes.c b/lib/dh-primes.c
index a440b5b98..94b69e345 100644
--- a/lib/dh-primes.c
+++ b/lib/dh-primes.c
@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@
#include "gnutls_int.h"
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
-#if defined(ENABLE_DHE) || defined(ENABLE_ANON)
-
#include "dh.h"
static const unsigned char ffdhe_generator = 0x02;
@@ -1934,5 +1932,3 @@ _gnutls_dh_prime_match_fips_approved(const uint8_t *prime,
return 0;
}
-
-#endif
--
2.26.2

View File

@ -1,713 +0,0 @@
From 93c0e3ba4d2cfee86b32f28f33303a2193c4133c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 16:12:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] fips: add self-tests for HKDF
FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-test on approved KDF algorithms. As
the guidance only requires running a single instance of each KDF
mechanism, this only exercises HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand operations
with HMAC-SHA-256 as the underlying MAC.
Although HKDF is non-approved, it would be sensible to do that as it
will be approved in FIPS140-3.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
devel/libgnutls-latest-x86_64.abi | 1 +
lib/crypto-selftests.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/fips.c | 7 ++
lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h | 1 +
lib/libgnutls.map | 1 +
5 files changed, 169 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests.c b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
index 7a1c7729c..bd148b6af 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
@@ -2917,3 +2917,162 @@ int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest)
return 0;
}
+
+struct hkdf_vectors_st {
+ const uint8_t *ikm;
+ unsigned int ikm_size;
+ const uint8_t *salt;
+ unsigned int salt_size;
+ const uint8_t *prk;
+ unsigned int prk_size;
+ const uint8_t *info;
+ unsigned int info_size;
+ const uint8_t *okm;
+ unsigned int okm_size;
+};
+
+const struct hkdf_vectors_st hkdf_sha256_vectors[] = {
+ /* RFC 5869: A.1. Test Case 1: Basic test case with SHA-256 */
+ {
+ STR(ikm, ikm_size,
+ "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"
+ "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"),
+ STR(salt, salt_size,
+ "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c"),
+ STR(prk, prk_size,
+ "\x07\x77\x09\x36\x2c\x2e\x32\xdf\x0d\xdc\x3f\x0d\xc4\x7b"
+ "\xba\x63\x90\xb6\xc7\x3b\xb5\x0f\x9c\x31\x22\xec\x84\x4a"
+ "\xd7\xc2\xb3\xe5"),
+ STR(info, info_size,
+ "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9"),
+ STR(okm, okm_size,
+ "\x3c\xb2\x5f\x25\xfa\xac\xd5\x7a\x90\x43\x4f\x64\xd0\x36"
+ "\x2f\x2a\x2d\x2d\x0a\x90\xcf\x1a\x5a\x4c\x5d\xb0\x2d\x56"
+ "\xec\xc4\xc5\xbf\x34\x00\x72\x08\xd5\xb8\x87\x18\x58\x65"),
+ },
+ /* RFC 5869: A.2. Test Case 2: Test with SHA-256 and longer inputs/outputs */
+ {
+ STR(ikm, ikm_size,
+ "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d"
+ "\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b"
+ "\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27\x28\x29"
+ "\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+ "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45"
+ "\x46\x47\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f"),
+ STR(salt, salt_size,
+ "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d"
+ "\x6e\x6f\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78\x79\x7a\x7b"
+ "\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88\x89"
+ "\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97"
+ "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5"
+ "\xa6\xa7\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf"),
+ STR(prk, prk_size,
+ "\x06\xa6\xb8\x8c\x58\x53\x36\x1a\x06\x10\x4c\x9c\xeb\x35"
+ "\xb4\x5c\xef\x76\x00\x14\x90\x46\x71\x01\x4a\x19\x3f\x40"
+ "\xc1\x5f\xc2\x44"),
+ STR(info, info_size,
+ "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd"
+ "\xbe\xbf\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb"
+ "\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7\xd8\xd9"
+ "\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7"
+ "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5"
+ "\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff"),
+ STR(okm, okm_size,
+ "\xb1\x1e\x39\x8d\xc8\x03\x27\xa1\xc8\xe7\xf7\x8c\x59\x6a"
+ "\x49\x34\x4f\x01\x2e\xda\x2d\x4e\xfa\xd8\xa0\x50\xcc\x4c"
+ "\x19\xaf\xa9\x7c\x59\x04\x5a\x99\xca\xc7\x82\x72\x71\xcb"
+ "\x41\xc6\x5e\x59\x0e\x09\xda\x32\x75\x60\x0c\x2f\x09\xb8"
+ "\x36\x77\x93\xa9\xac\xa3\xdb\x71\xcc\x30\xc5\x81\x79\xec"
+ "\x3e\x87\xc1\x4c\x01\xd5\xc1\xf3\x43\x4f\x1d\x87"),
+ },
+};
+
+static int test_hkdf(gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
+ const struct hkdf_vectors_st *vectors,
+ size_t vectors_size, unsigned flags)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < vectors_size; i++) {
+ gnutls_datum_t ikm, prk, salt, info;
+ uint8_t output[4096];
+ int ret;
+
+ ikm.data = (void *) vectors[i].ikm;
+ ikm.size = vectors[i].ikm_size;
+ salt.data = (void *) vectors[i].salt;
+ salt.size = vectors[i].salt_size;
+
+ ret = gnutls_hkdf_extract(mac, &ikm, &salt, output);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log("error extracting HKDF: MAC-%s\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].prk, vectors[i].prk_size) != 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("HKDF extract: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ prk.data = (void *) vectors[i].prk;
+ prk.size = vectors[i].prk_size;
+ info.data = (void *) vectors[i].info;
+ info.size = vectors[i].info_size;
+
+ ret = gnutls_hkdf_expand(mac, &prk, &info,
+ output, vectors[i].okm_size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log("error extracting HKDF: MAC-%s\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].okm, vectors[i].okm_size) != 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("HKDF expand: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
+
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("HKDF: MAC-%s self check succeeded\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * gnutls_hkdf_self_test:
+ * @flags: GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG flags
+ * @mac: the message authentication algorithm to use
+ *
+ * This function will run self tests on HKDF with the provided mac.
+ *
+ * Returns: Zero or a negative error code on error.
+ *
+ * Since: 3.3.0-FIPS140
+ -*/
+int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL)
+ mac = GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN;
+
+ switch (mac) {
+ case GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN:
+ CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256, test_hkdf, hkdf_sha256_vectors);
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_NO_SELF_TEST);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
index f8b10f750..48891ed57 100644
--- a/lib/fips.c
+++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -423,6 +423,13 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
goto error;
}
+ /* HKDF */
+ ret = gnutls_hkdf_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (_gnutls_rnd_ops.self_test == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
goto error;
diff --git a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
index aacbe94ca..9b7be8159 100644
--- a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
+++ b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
@@ -34,5 +34,6 @@ int gnutls_cipher_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher);
int gnutls_mac_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest);
int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk);
+int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
#endif
diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
index 61276e534..386b66f83 100644
--- a/lib/libgnutls.map
+++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1347,6 +1347,7 @@ GNUTLS_FIPS140_3_4 {
gnutls_pk_self_test;
gnutls_mac_self_test;
gnutls_digest_self_test;
+ gnutls_hkdf_self_test;
#for FIPS140-2 validation
drbg_aes_reseed;
drbg_aes_init;
--
2.26.2
From 31cc94275cd267f4e0db60999cc932fd76d43d5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 16:59:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] fips: add self-tests for PBKDF2
FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-tests on approved KDF algorithms. As
the guidance only requires running a single instance of each KDF
mechanism, this only exercises PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 as the
underlying MAC algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
devel/libgnutls-latest-x86_64.abi | 1 +
lib/crypto-selftests.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/fips.c | 7 ++
lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h | 1 +
lib/libgnutls.map | 1 +
5 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests.c b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
index bd148b6af..c4b0bd207 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
@@ -3076,3 +3076,110 @@ int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
return 0;
}
+
+struct pbkdf2_vectors_st {
+ const uint8_t *key;
+ size_t key_size;
+ const uint8_t *salt;
+ size_t salt_size;
+ unsigned iter_count;
+ const uint8_t *output;
+ size_t output_size;
+};
+
+const struct pbkdf2_vectors_st pbkdf2_sha256_vectors[] = {
+ /* RFC 7914: 11. Test Vectors for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size, "passwd"),
+ STR(salt, salt_size, "salt"),
+ .iter_count = 1,
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x55\xac\x04\x6e\x56\xe3\x08\x9f\xec\x16\x91\xc2\x25\x44"
+ "\xb6\x05\xf9\x41\x85\x21\x6d\xde\x04\x65\xe6\x8b\x9d\x57"
+ "\xc2\x0d\xac\xbc\x49\xca\x9c\xcc\xf1\x79\xb6\x45\x99\x16"
+ "\x64\xb3\x9d\x77\xef\x31\x7c\x71\xb8\x45\xb1\xe3\x0b\xd5"
+ "\x09\x11\x20\x41\xd3\xa1\x97\x83"),
+ },
+ /* RFC 7914: 11. Test Vectors for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size, "Password"),
+ STR(salt, salt_size, "NaCl"),
+ .iter_count = 80000,
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x4d\xdc\xd8\xf6\x0b\x98\xbe\x21\x83\x0c\xee\x5e\xf2\x27"
+ "\x01\xf9\x64\x1a\x44\x18\xd0\x4c\x04\x14\xae\xff\x08\x87"
+ "\x6b\x34\xab\x56\xa1\xd4\x25\xa1\x22\x58\x33\x54\x9a\xdb"
+ "\x84\x1b\x51\xc9\xb3\x17\x6a\x27\x2b\xde\xbb\xa1\xd0\x78"
+ "\x47\x8f\x62\xb3\x97\xf3\x3c\x8d"),
+ },
+};
+
+static int test_pbkdf2(gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
+ const struct pbkdf2_vectors_st *vectors,
+ size_t vectors_size, unsigned flags)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < vectors_size; i++) {
+ gnutls_datum_t key, salt;
+ uint8_t output[4096];
+ int ret;
+
+ key.data = (void *) vectors[i].key;
+ key.size = vectors[i].key_size;
+ salt.data = (void *) vectors[i].salt;
+ salt.size = vectors[i].salt_size;
+
+ ret = gnutls_pbkdf2(mac, &key, &salt, vectors[i].iter_count,
+ output, vectors[i].output_size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log("error calculating PBKDF2: MAC-%s\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].output, vectors[i].output_size) != 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("PBKDF2: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
+
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("PBKDF2: MAC-%s self check succeeded\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test:
+ * @flags: GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG flags
+ * @mac: the message authentication algorithm to use
+ *
+ * This function will run self tests on PBKDF2 with the provided mac.
+ *
+ * Returns: Zero or a negative error code on error.
+ *
+ * Since: 3.3.0-FIPS140
+ -*/
+int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL)
+ mac = GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN;
+
+ switch (mac) {
+ case GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN:
+ CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256, test_pbkdf2, pbkdf2_sha256_vectors);
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_NO_SELF_TEST);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
index 48891ed57..7cfab1049 100644
--- a/lib/fips.c
+++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -430,6 +430,13 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
goto error;
}
+ /* PBKDF2 */
+ ret = gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (_gnutls_rnd_ops.self_test == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
goto error;
diff --git a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
index 9b7be8159..958c0da8f 100644
--- a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
+++ b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
@@ -35,5 +35,6 @@ int gnutls_mac_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest);
int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk);
int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
+int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
#endif
diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
index 386b66f83..f5537a386 100644
--- a/lib/libgnutls.map
+++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1348,6 +1348,7 @@ GNUTLS_FIPS140_3_4 {
gnutls_mac_self_test;
gnutls_digest_self_test;
gnutls_hkdf_self_test;
+ gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test;
#for FIPS140-2 validation
drbg_aes_reseed;
drbg_aes_init;
--
2.26.2
From d1a3235e8c829855969d00364d8b5456fce2c78c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 17:44:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] fips: add self-tests for TLS-PRF
FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-tests on approved KDF algorithms. As
the guidance only requires to run a single instance of each KDF
mechanism, this only exercises TLS1.2 PRF with HMAC-SHA-256 as the
underlying MAC algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
devel/libgnutls-latest-x86_64.abi | 1 +
lib/crypto-selftests.c | 196 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/fips.c | 7 ++
lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h | 1 +
lib/libgnutls.map | 1 +
5 files changed, 206 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/crypto-selftests.c b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
index c4b0bd207..b740936d6 100644
--- a/lib/crypto-selftests.c
+++ b/lib/crypto-selftests.c
@@ -3183,3 +3183,199 @@ int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
return 0;
}
+
+struct tlsprf_vectors_st {
+ const uint8_t *key;
+ size_t key_size;
+ const uint8_t *label;
+ size_t label_size;
+ const uint8_t *seed;
+ size_t seed_size;
+ const uint8_t *output;
+ size_t output_size;
+};
+
+const struct tlsprf_vectors_st tls10prf_vectors[] = {
+ /* tests/tls10-prf.c: test1 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\x26\x3b\xdb\xbb\x6f\x6d\x4c\x66\x4e\x05\x8d\x0a\xa9\xd3"
+ "\x21\xbe"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\xb9\x20\x57\x3b\x19\x96\x01\x02\x4f\x04\xd6\xdc\x61\x96"
+ "\x6e\x65"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x66\x17\x99\x37\x65\xfa\x6c\xa7\x03\xd1\x9e\xc7\x0d\xd5"
+ "\xdd\x16\x0f\xfc\xc0\x77\x25\xfa\xfb\x71\x4a\x9f\x81\x5a"
+ "\x2a\x30\xbf\xb7\xe3\xbb\xfb\x7e\xee\x57\x4b\x3b\x61\x3e"
+ "\xb7\xfe\x80\xee\xc9\x69\x1d\x8c\x1b\x0e\x2d\x9b\x3c\x8b"
+ "\x4b\x02\xb6\xb6\xd6\xdb\x88\xe2\x09\x46\x23\xef\x62\x40"
+ "\x60\x7e\xda\x7a\xbe\x3c\x84\x6e\x82\xa3"),
+ },
+};
+
+const struct tlsprf_vectors_st tls12prf_sha256_vectors[] = {
+ /* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test1 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\x04\x50\xb0\xea\x9e\xcd\x36\x02\xee\x0d\x76\xc5\xc3\xc8"
+ "\x6f\x4a"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\x20\x7a\xcc\x02\x54\xb8\x67\xf5\xb9\x25\xb4\x5a\x33\x60"
+ "\x1d\x8b"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\xae\x67\x9e\x0e\x71\x4f\x59\x75\x76\x37\x68\xb1\x66\x97"
+ "\x9e\x1d"),
+ },
+ /* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test2 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\x34\x20\x4a\x9d\xf0\xbe\x6e\xb4\xe9\x25\xa8\x02\x7c\xf6"
+ "\xc6\x02"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\x98\xb2\xc4\x0b\xcd\x66\x4c\x83\xbb\x92\x0c\x18\x20\x1a"
+ "\x63\x95"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\xaf\xa9\x31\x24\x53\xc2\x2f\xa8\x3d\x2b\x51\x1b\x37\x2d"
+ "\x73\xa4\x02\xa2\xa6\x28\x73\x23\x9a\x51\xfa\xde\x45\x08"
+ "\x2f\xaf\x3f\xd2\xbb\x7f\xfb\x3e\x9b\xf3\x6e\x28\xb3\x14"
+ "\x1a\xab\xa4\x84\x00\x53\x32\xa9\xf9\xe3\x88\xa4\xd3\x29"
+ "\xf1\x58\x7a\x4b\x31\x7d\xa0\x77\x08\xea\x1b\xa9\x5a\x53"
+ "\xf8\x78\x67\x24\xbd\x83\xce\x4b\x03\xaf"),
+ },
+ /* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test3 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\xa3\x69\x1a\xa1\xf6\x81\x4b\x80\x59\x2b\xf1\xcf\x2a\xcf"
+ "\x16\x97"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\x55\x23\xd4\x1e\x32\x0e\x69\x4d\x0c\x1f\xf5\x73\x4d\x83"
+ "\x0b\x93\x3e\x46\x92\x70\x71\xc9\x26\x21"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x6a\xd0\x98\x4f\xa0\x6f\x78\xfe\x16\x1b\xd4\x6d\x7c\x26"
+ "\x1d\xe4\x33\x40\xd7\x28\xdd\xdc\x3d\x0f\xf0\xdd\x7e\x0d"),
+ },
+ /* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha256_test4 */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\x21\x0e\xc9\x37\x06\x97\x07\xe5\x46\x5b\xc4\x6b\xf7\x79"
+ "\xe1\x04\x10\x8b\x18\xfd\xb7\x93\xbe\x7b\x21\x8d\xbf\x14"
+ "\x5c\x86\x41\xf3"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\x1e\x35\x1a\x0b\xaf\x35\xc7\x99\x45\x92\x43\x94\xb8\x81"
+ "\xcf\xe3\x1d\xae\x8f\x1c\x1e\xd5\x4d\x3b"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x76\x53\xfa\x80\x9c\xde\x3b\x55\x3c\x4a\x17\xe2\xcd\xbc"
+ "\xc9\x18\xf3\x65\x27\xf2\x22\x19\xa7\xd7\xf9\x5d\x97\x24"
+ "\x3f\xf2\xd5\xde\xe8\x26\x5e\xf0\xaf\x03"),
+ },
+};
+
+const struct tlsprf_vectors_st tls12prf_sha384_vectors[] = {
+ /* tests/tls12-prf.c: sha384_test1
+ * https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg03416.html
+ */
+ {
+ STR(key, key_size,
+ "\xb8\x0b\x73\x3d\x6c\xee\xfc\xdc\x71\x56\x6e\xa4\x8e\x55"
+ "\x67\xdf"),
+ STR(label, label_size,
+ "test label"),
+ STR(seed, seed_size,
+ "\xcd\x66\x5c\xf6\xa8\x44\x7d\xd6\xff\x8b\x27\x55\x5e\xdb"
+ "\x74\x65"),
+ STR(output, output_size,
+ "\x7b\x0c\x18\xe9\xce\xd4\x10\xed\x18\x04\xf2\xcf\xa3\x4a"
+ "\x33\x6a\x1c\x14\xdf\xfb\x49\x00\xbb\x5f\xd7\x94\x21\x07"
+ "\xe8\x1c\x83\xcd\xe9\xca\x0f\xaa\x60\xbe\x9f\xe3\x4f\x82"
+ "\xb1\x23\x3c\x91\x46\xa0\xe5\x34\xcb\x40\x0f\xed\x27\x00"
+ "\x88\x4f\x9d\xc2\x36\xf8\x0e\xdd\x8b\xfa\x96\x11\x44\xc9"
+ "\xe8\xd7\x92\xec\xa7\x22\xa7\xb3\x2f\xc3\xd4\x16\xd4\x73"
+ "\xeb\xc2\xc5\xfd\x4a\xbf\xda\xd0\x5d\x91\x84\x25\x9b\x5b"
+ "\xf8\xcd\x4d\x90\xfa\x0d\x31\xe2\xde\xc4\x79\xe4\xf1\xa2"
+ "\x60\x66\xf2\xee\xa9\xa6\x92\x36\xa3\xe5\x26\x55\xc9\xe9"
+ "\xae\xe6\x91\xc8\xf3\xa2\x68\x54\x30\x8d\x5e\xaa\x3b\xe8"
+ "\x5e\x09\x90\x70\x3d\x73\xe5\x6f"),
+ },
+};
+
+static int test_tlsprf(gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
+ const struct tlsprf_vectors_st *vectors,
+ size_t vectors_size, unsigned flags)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < vectors_size; i++) {
+ char output[4096];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = _gnutls_prf_raw(mac,
+ vectors[i].key_size, vectors[i].key,
+ vectors[i].label_size, (const char *)vectors[i].label,
+ vectors[i].seed_size, vectors[i].seed,
+ vectors[i].output_size, output);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log("error calculating TLS-PRF: MAC-%s\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(output, vectors[i].output, vectors[i].output_size) != 0) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("TLS-PRF: MAC-%s test vector failed!\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
+
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+ ("TLS-PRF: MAC-%s self check succeeded\n",
+ gnutls_mac_get_name(mac));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * gnutls_tlsprf_self_test:
+ * @flags: GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG flags
+ * @mac: the message authentication algorithm to use
+ *
+ * This function will run self tests on TLS-PRF with the provided mac.
+ *
+ * Returns: Zero or a negative error code on error.
+ *
+ * Since: 3.3.0-FIPS140
+ -*/
+int gnutls_tlsprf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (flags & GNUTLS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_ALL)
+ mac = GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN;
+
+ switch (mac) {
+ case GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN:
+ NON_FIPS_CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_MD5_SHA1, test_tlsprf, tls10prf_vectors);
+ FALLTHROUGH;
+ CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256, test_tlsprf, tls12prf_sha256_vectors);
+ FALLTHROUGH;
+ CASE(GNUTLS_MAC_SHA384, test_tlsprf, tls12prf_sha384_vectors);
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_NO_SELF_TEST);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
index 7cfab1049..30d396b2c 100644
--- a/lib/fips.c
+++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -437,6 +437,13 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
goto error;
}
+ /* TLS-PRF */
+ ret = gnutls_tlsprf_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (_gnutls_rnd_ops.self_test == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
goto error;
diff --git a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
index 958c0da8f..88b5a8dbf 100644
--- a/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
+++ b/lib/includes/gnutls/self-test.h
@@ -36,5 +36,6 @@ int gnutls_digest_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest);
int gnutls_pk_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk);
int gnutls_hkdf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
int gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
+int gnutls_tlsprf_self_test(unsigned flags, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac);
#endif
diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
index f5537a386..643d400a1 100644
--- a/lib/libgnutls.map
+++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1349,6 +1349,7 @@ GNUTLS_FIPS140_3_4 {
gnutls_digest_self_test;
gnutls_hkdf_self_test;
gnutls_pbkdf2_self_test;
+ gnutls_tlsprf_self_test;
#for FIPS140-2 validation
drbg_aes_reseed;
drbg_aes_init;
--
2.26.2
From af3df0102fc377591a6de3112b034d4a492fc92c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 17:59:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] fips: run CMAC self-tests
FIPS140-2 IG D.8 mandates self-tests on CMAC.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/fips.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
index 30d396b2c..51567953d 100644
--- a/lib/fips.c
+++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -398,6 +398,12 @@ int _gnutls_fips_perform_self_checks2(void)
goto error;
}
+ ret = gnutls_mac_self_test(0, GNUTLS_MAC_AES_CMAC_256);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto error;
+ }
+
/* PK */
ret = gnutls_pk_self_test(0, GNUTLS_PK_RSA);
if (ret < 0) {
--
2.26.2

View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From d1dc655cd2c8ae417381e5f966941c75cfe287ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 16:42:07 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] _gnutls_fips_mode_enabled: treat selftest failure as FIPS
disabled
Previously gnutls_fips140_mode_enabled() returned true, even after
selftests have failed and the library state has switched to error.
While later calls to crypto operations fails, it would be more
convenient to have a function to detect that state.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/fips.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/fips.c b/lib/fips.c
index acdd2ec23..f8b10f750 100644
--- a/lib/fips.c
+++ b/lib/fips.c
@@ -491,8 +491,17 @@ unsigned gnutls_fips140_mode_enabled(void)
#ifdef ENABLE_FIPS140
unsigned ret = _gnutls_fips_mode_enabled();
- if (ret > GNUTLS_FIPS140_DISABLED)
+ if (ret > GNUTLS_FIPS140_DISABLED) {
+ /* If the previous run of selftests has failed, return as if
+ * the FIPS mode is disabled. We could use HAVE_LIB_ERROR, if
+ * we can assume that all the selftests run atomically from
+ * the ELF constructor.
+ */
+ if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_ERROR)
+ return 0;
+
return ret;
+ }
#endif
return 0;
}
--
2.26.2

Binary file not shown.

View File

@ -1,247 +0,0 @@
From 300c6315d2e644ae81b43fa2dd7bbf68b3afb5b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 19:02:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] accelerated: fix CPU feature detection for Intel CPUs
This fixes read_cpuid_vals to correctly read the CPUID quadruple, as
well as to set the bit the ustream CRYPTOGAMS uses to identify Intel
CPUs.
Suggested by Rafael Gieschke in:
https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/1282
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
index 3845c6b4c9..cf615ef24f 100644
--- a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
+++ b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
@@ -81,15 +81,38 @@ unsigned int _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[4];
# define bit_AVX 0x10000000
#endif
-#ifndef OSXSAVE_MASK
-/* OSXSAVE|FMA|MOVBE */
-# define OSXSAVE_MASK (0x8000000|0x1000|0x400000)
+#ifndef bit_AVX2
+# define bit_AVX2 0x00000020
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bit_AVX512F
+# define bit_AVX512F 0x00010000
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bit_AVX512IFMA
+# define bit_AVX512IFMA 0x00200000
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bit_AVX512BW
+# define bit_AVX512BW 0x40000000
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bit_AVX512VL
+# define bit_AVX512VL 0x80000000
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bit_OSXSAVE
+# define bit_OSXSAVE 0x8000000
#endif
#ifndef bit_MOVBE
# define bit_MOVBE 0x00400000
#endif
+#ifndef OSXSAVE_MASK
+# define OSXSAVE_MASK (bit_OSXSAVE|bit_MOVBE)
+#endif
+
#define via_bit_PADLOCK (0x3 << 6)
#define via_bit_PADLOCK_PHE (0x3 << 10)
#define via_bit_PADLOCK_PHE_SHA512 (0x3 << 25)
@@ -127,7 +150,7 @@ static unsigned read_cpuid_vals(unsigned int vals[4])
unsigned t1, t2, t3;
vals[0] = vals[1] = vals[2] = vals[3] = 0;
- if (!__get_cpuid(1, &t1, &vals[0], &vals[1], &t2))
+ if (!__get_cpuid(1, &t1, &t2, &vals[1], &vals[0]))
return 0;
/* suppress AVX512; it works conditionally on certain CPUs on the original code */
vals[1] &= 0xfffff7ff;
@@ -145,7 +168,7 @@ static unsigned check_4th_gen_intel_features(unsigned ecx)
{
uint32_t xcr0;
- if ((ecx & OSXSAVE_MASK) != OSXSAVE_MASK)
+ if ((ecx & bit_OSXSAVE) != bit_OSXSAVE)
return 0;
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__clang__)
@@ -233,10 +256,7 @@ static unsigned check_sha(void)
#ifdef ASM_X86_64
static unsigned check_avx_movbe(void)
{
- if (check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1]) == 0)
- return 0;
-
- return ((_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX));
+ return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX);
}
static unsigned check_pclmul(void)
@@ -514,33 +534,47 @@ void register_x86_padlock_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
}
#endif
-static unsigned check_intel_or_amd(void)
+enum x86_cpu_vendor {
+ X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER,
+ X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL,
+ X86_CPU_VENDOR_AMD,
+};
+
+static enum x86_cpu_vendor check_x86_cpu_vendor(void)
{
unsigned int a, b, c, d;
- if (!__get_cpuid(0, &a, &b, &c, &d))
- return 0;
+ if (!__get_cpuid(0, &a, &b, &c, &d)) {
+ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER;
+ }
- if ((memcmp(&b, "Genu", 4) == 0 &&
- memcmp(&d, "ineI", 4) == 0 &&
- memcmp(&c, "ntel", 4) == 0) ||
- (memcmp(&b, "Auth", 4) == 0 &&
- memcmp(&d, "enti", 4) == 0 && memcmp(&c, "cAMD", 4) == 0)) {
- return 1;
+ if (memcmp(&b, "Genu", 4) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(&d, "ineI", 4) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(&c, "ntel", 4) == 0) {
+ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL;
}
- return 0;
+ if (memcmp(&b, "Auth", 4) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(&d, "enti", 4) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(&c, "cAMD", 4) == 0) {
+ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_AMD;
+ }
+
+ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER;
}
static
void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
{
int ret;
+ enum x86_cpu_vendor vendor;
memset(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s, 0, sizeof(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s));
- if (check_intel_or_amd() == 0)
+ vendor = check_x86_cpu_vendor();
+ if (vendor == X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER) {
return;
+ }
if (capabilities == 0) {
if (!read_cpuid_vals(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s))
@@ -549,6 +583,23 @@ void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(capabilities);
}
+ /* CRYPTOGAMS uses the (1 << 30) bit as an indicator of Intel CPUs */
+ if (vendor == X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[0] |= 1 << 30;
+ } else {
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[0] &= ~(1 << 30);
+ }
+
+ if (!check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1])) {
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] &= ~bit_AVX;
+
+ /* Clear AVX2 bits as well, according to what OpenSSL does.
+ * Should we clear bit_AVX512DQ, bit_AVX512PF, bit_AVX512ER, and
+ * bit_AVX512CD? */
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[2] &= ~(bit_AVX2|bit_AVX512F|bit_AVX512IFMA|
+ bit_AVX512BW|bit_AVX512BW);
+ }
+
if (check_ssse3()) {
_gnutls_debug_log("Intel SSSE3 was detected\n");
--
2.37.3
From cd509dac9e6d1bf76fd12c72c1fd61f1708c254a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 09:39:18 +0900
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] accelerated: clear AVX bits if it cannot be queried
through XSAVE
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The algorithm to detect AVX is described in 14.3 of "Intel® 64 and IA-32
Architectures Software Developers Manual".
GnuTLS previously only followed that algorithm when registering the
crypto backend, while the CRYPTOGAMS derived SHA code assembly expects
that the extension bits are propagated to _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
index cf615ef24f..655d0c65f2 100644
--- a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
+++ b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ static void capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(unsigned capabilities)
}
if (capabilities & INTEL_AVX) {
- if ((a[1] & bit_AVX) && check_4th_gen_intel_features(a[1])) {
+ if ((a[1] & bit_AVX) && (a[1] & bit_MOVBE) &&
+ check_4th_gen_intel_features(a[1])) {
_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] |= bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE;
} else {
_gnutls_debug_log
@@ -256,7 +257,7 @@ static unsigned check_sha(void)
#ifdef ASM_X86_64
static unsigned check_avx_movbe(void)
{
- return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX);
+ return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & (bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE)) == (bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE);
}
static unsigned check_pclmul(void)
@@ -579,6 +580,19 @@ void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
if (capabilities == 0) {
if (!read_cpuid_vals(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s))
return;
+ if (!check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1])) {
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] &= ~bit_AVX;
+
+ /* Clear AVX2 bits as well, according to what
+ * OpenSSL does. Should we clear
+ * bit_AVX512DQ, bit_AVX512PF, bit_AVX512ER,
+ * and bit_AVX512CD? */
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[2] &= ~(bit_AVX2|
+ bit_AVX512F|
+ bit_AVX512IFMA|
+ bit_AVX512BW|
+ bit_AVX512BW);
+ }
} else {
capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(capabilities);
}
--
2.37.3

View File

@ -1,474 +0,0 @@
From 0d39e4120bc5ece53c86c5802c546259b8ca286a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 17:56:58 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] nettle: avoid normalization of mpz_t in deterministic ECDSA
This removes function calls that potentially leak bit-length of a
private key used to calculate a nonce in deterministic ECDSA. Namely:
- _gnutls_dsa_compute_k has been rewritten to work on always
zero-padded mp_limb_t arrays instead of mpz_t
- rnd_mpz_func has been replaced with rnd_datum_func, which is backed
by a byte array instead of an mpz_t value
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++------------
lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h | 31 +++++++++---
lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c | 71 +++++++++-----------------
lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h | 8 +--
lib/nettle/pk.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c
index 17d63318c4..ddeb6f6d1e 100644
--- a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c
+++ b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.c
@@ -31,33 +31,37 @@
#include "mpn-base256.h"
#include <string.h>
-#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(bits) (((bits) + GMP_NUMB_BITS - 1) / GMP_NUMB_BITS)
-
-/* The maximum size of q, choosen from the fact that we support
- * 521-bit elliptic curve generator and 512-bit DSA subgroup at
- * maximum. */
-#define MAX_Q_BITS 521
-#define MAX_Q_SIZE ((MAX_Q_BITS + 7) / 8)
-#define MAX_Q_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_Q_BITS)
-
-#define MAX_HASH_BITS (MAX_HASH_SIZE * 8)
-#define MAX_HASH_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_HASH_BITS)
-
-int
-_gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
- const mpz_t q,
- const mpz_t x,
- gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
- const uint8_t *digest,
- size_t length)
+/* For mini-gmp */
+#ifndef GMP_LIMB_BITS
+#define GMP_LIMB_BITS GMP_NUMB_BITS
+#endif
+
+static inline int is_zero_limb(mp_limb_t x)
+{
+ x |= (x << 1);
+ return ((x >> 1) - 1) >> (GMP_LIMB_BITS - 1);
+}
+
+static int sec_zero_p(const mp_limb_t *ap, mp_size_t n)
+{
+ volatile mp_limb_t w;
+ mp_size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0, w = 0; i < n; i++)
+ w |= ap[i];
+
+ return is_zero_limb(w);
+}
+
+int _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mp_limb_t *h, const mp_limb_t *q, const mp_limb_t *x,
+ mp_size_t qn, mp_bitcnt_t q_bits,
+ gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac, const uint8_t *digest,
+ size_t length)
{
uint8_t V[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint8_t K[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint8_t xp[MAX_Q_SIZE];
uint8_t tp[MAX_Q_SIZE];
- mp_limb_t h[MAX(MAX_Q_LIMBS, MAX_HASH_LIMBS)];
- mp_bitcnt_t q_bits = mpz_sizeinbase (q, 2);
- mp_size_t qn = mpz_size(q);
mp_bitcnt_t h_bits = length * 8;
mp_size_t hn = BITS_TO_LIMBS(h_bits);
size_t nbytes = (q_bits + 7) / 8;
@@ -66,6 +70,7 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
mp_limb_t cy;
gnutls_hmac_hd_t hd;
int ret = 0;
+ mp_limb_t scratch[MAX_Q_LIMBS];
if (unlikely(q_bits > MAX_Q_BITS))
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
@@ -73,7 +78,7 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
/* int2octets(x) */
- mpn_get_base256(xp, nbytes, mpz_limbs_read(x), qn);
+ mpn_get_base256(xp, nbytes, x, qn);
/* bits2octets(h) */
mpn_set_base256(h, hn, digest, length);
@@ -97,12 +102,12 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
mpn_rshift(h, h, hn, shift % GMP_NUMB_BITS);
}
- cy = mpn_sub_n(h, h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn);
+ cy = mpn_sub_n(h, h, q, qn);
/* Fall back to addmul_1, if nettle is linked with mini-gmp. */
#ifdef mpn_cnd_add_n
- mpn_cnd_add_n(cy, h, h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn);
+ mpn_cnd_add_n(cy, h, h, q, qn);
#else
- mpn_addmul_1(h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn, cy != 0);
+ mpn_addmul_1(h, q, qn, cy != 0);
#endif
mpn_get_base256(tp, nbytes, h, qn);
@@ -178,12 +183,8 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
if (tlen * 8 > q_bits)
mpn_rshift (h, h, qn, tlen * 8 - q_bits);
/* Check if k is in [1,q-1] */
- if (!mpn_zero_p (h, qn) &&
- mpn_cmp (h, mpz_limbs_read(q), qn) < 0) {
- mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(k, qn), h, qn);
- mpz_limbs_finish(k, qn);
+ if (!sec_zero_p(h, qn) && mpn_sub_n(scratch, h, q, qn))
break;
- }
ret = gnutls_hmac_init(&hd, mac, K, length);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -207,3 +208,24 @@ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
return ret;
}
+
+/* cancel-out dsa_sign's addition of 1 to random data */
+void _gnutls_dsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
+ mp_size_t n)
+{
+ /* Fall back to sub_1, if nettle is linked with mini-gmp. */
+#ifdef mpn_sec_sub_1
+ mp_limb_t t[MAX_Q_LIMBS];
+
+ mpn_sec_sub_1(h, h, n, 1, t);
+#else
+ mpn_sub_1(h, h, n, 1);
+#endif
+ mpn_get_base256(k, nbytes, h, n);
+}
+
+void _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
+ mp_size_t n)
+{
+ mpn_get_base256(k, nbytes, h, n);
+}
diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h
index 64e90e0ca2..e88fce0a6d 100644
--- a/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h
+++ b/lib/nettle/int/dsa-compute-k.h
@@ -26,12 +26,29 @@
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
#include <nettle/bignum.h> /* includes gmp.h */
-int
-_gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mpz_t k,
- const mpz_t q,
- const mpz_t x,
- gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
- const uint8_t *digest,
- size_t length);
+#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(bits) (((bits) + GMP_NUMB_BITS - 1) / GMP_NUMB_BITS)
+
+/* The maximum size of q, chosen from the fact that we support
+ * 521-bit elliptic curve generator and 512-bit DSA subgroup at
+ * maximum. */
+#define MAX_Q_BITS 521
+#define MAX_Q_SIZE ((MAX_Q_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define MAX_Q_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_Q_BITS)
+
+#define MAX_HASH_BITS (MAX_HASH_SIZE * 8)
+#define MAX_HASH_LIMBS BITS_TO_LIMBS(MAX_HASH_BITS)
+
+#define DSA_COMPUTE_K_ITCH MAX(MAX_Q_LIMBS, MAX_HASH_LIMBS)
+
+int _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(mp_limb_t *h, const mp_limb_t *q, const mp_limb_t *x,
+ mp_size_t qn, mp_bitcnt_t q_bits,
+ gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac, const uint8_t *digest,
+ size_t length);
+
+void _gnutls_dsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
+ mp_size_t n);
+
+void _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k_finish(uint8_t *k, size_t nbytes, mp_limb_t *h,
+ mp_size_t n);
#endif /* GNUTLS_LIB_NETTLE_INT_DSA_COMPUTE_K_H */
diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c
index 94914ebdfa..819302c1c7 100644
--- a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c
+++ b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.c
@@ -29,67 +29,46 @@
#include "dsa-compute-k.h"
#include "gnutls_int.h"
-static inline int
-_gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(mpz_t *q, gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve)
+int _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(mpz_t q, gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve)
{
switch (curve) {
#ifdef ENABLE_NON_SUITEB_CURVES
case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1:
- mpz_init_set_str(*q,
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836"
- "146BC9B1B4D22831",
- 16);
+ mpz_set_str(q,
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836"
+ "146BC9B1B4D22831",
+ 16);
return 0;
case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1:
- mpz_init_set_str(*q,
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2"
- "E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D",
- 16);
+ mpz_set_str(q,
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2"
+ "E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D",
+ 16);
return 0;
#endif
case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1:
- mpz_init_set_str(*q,
- "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
- "BCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551",
- 16);
+ mpz_set_str(q,
+ "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+ "BCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551",
+ 16);
return 0;
case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1:
- mpz_init_set_str(*q,
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC7634D81F4372DDF"
- "581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973",
- 16);
+ mpz_set_str(q,
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC7634D81F4372DDF"
+ "581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973",
+ 16);
return 0;
case GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1:
- mpz_init_set_str(*q,
- "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
- "FFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A"
- "5D03BB5C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386"
- "409",
- 16);
+ mpz_set_str(q,
+ "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+ "FFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A"
+ "5D03BB5C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386"
+ "409",
+ 16);
return 0;
default:
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
}
}
-
-int
-_gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k (mpz_t k,
- gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve,
- const mpz_t x,
- gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
- const uint8_t *digest,
- size_t length)
-{
- mpz_t q;
- int ret;
-
- ret = _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(&q, curve);
- if (ret < 0)
- return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
-
- ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k (k, q, x, mac, digest, length);
- mpz_clear(q);
- return ret;
-}
diff --git a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h
index 7ca401d6e4..a7e612bcab 100644
--- a/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h
+++ b/lib/nettle/int/ecdsa-compute-k.h
@@ -26,12 +26,6 @@
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
#include <nettle/bignum.h> /* includes gmp.h */
-int
-_gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k (mpz_t k,
- gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve,
- const mpz_t x,
- gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac,
- const uint8_t *digest,
- size_t length);
+int _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(mpz_t q, gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve);
#endif /* GNUTLS_LIB_NETTLE_INT_ECDSA_COMPUTE_K_H */
diff --git a/lib/nettle/pk.c b/lib/nettle/pk.c
index 588e9df502..b19fe3804a 100644
--- a/lib/nettle/pk.c
+++ b/lib/nettle/pk.c
@@ -102,10 +102,16 @@ static void rnd_nonce_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
}
}
-static void rnd_mpz_func(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
+static void rnd_datum_func(void *ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *data)
{
- mpz_t *k = _ctx;
- nettle_mpz_get_str_256 (length, data, *k);
+ gnutls_datum_t *d = ctx;
+
+ if (length > d->size) {
+ memset(data, 0, length - d->size);
+ memcpy(data + (length - d->size), d->data, d->size);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(data, d->data, length);
+ }
}
static void rnd_nonce_func_fallback(void *_ctx, size_t length, uint8_t * data)
@@ -976,7 +982,10 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
struct dsa_signature sig;
int curve_id = pk_params->curve;
const struct ecc_curve *curve;
- mpz_t k;
+ mpz_t q;
+ /* 521-bit elliptic curve generator at maximum */
+ uint8_t buf[(521 + 7) / 8];
+ gnutls_datum_t k = { NULL, 0 };
void *random_ctx;
nettle_random_func *random_func;
@@ -1005,19 +1014,32 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
hash_len = vdata->size;
}
- mpz_init(k);
+ mpz_init(q);
+
if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST ||
(sign_params->flags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_REPRODUCIBLE)) {
- ret = _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k(k,
- curve_id,
- pk_params->params[ECC_K],
- DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig),
- vdata->data,
- vdata->size);
+ mp_limb_t h[DSA_COMPUTE_K_ITCH];
+
+ ret = _gnutls_ecc_curve_to_dsa_q(q, curve_id);
if (ret < 0)
goto ecdsa_cleanup;
+
+ ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(
+ h, mpz_limbs_read(q), priv.p,
+ ecc_size(priv.ecc), ecc_bit_size(priv.ecc),
+ DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig), vdata->data,
+ vdata->size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto ecdsa_cleanup;
+
+ k.data = buf;
+ k.size = (ecc_bit_size(priv.ecc) + 7) / 8;
+
+ _gnutls_ecdsa_compute_k_finish(k.data, k.size, h,
+ ecc_size(priv.ecc));
+
random_ctx = &k;
- random_func = rnd_mpz_func;
+ random_func = rnd_datum_func;
} else {
random_ctx = NULL;
random_func = rnd_nonce_func;
@@ -1038,7 +1060,7 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
ecdsa_cleanup:
dsa_signature_clear(&sig);
ecc_scalar_zclear(&priv);
- mpz_clear(k);
+ mpz_clear(q);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
@@ -1051,7 +1073,9 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
struct dsa_params pub;
bigint_t priv;
struct dsa_signature sig;
- mpz_t k;
+ /* 512-bit DSA subgroup at maximum */
+ uint8_t buf[(512 + 7) / 8];
+ gnutls_datum_t k = { NULL, 0 };
void *random_ctx;
nettle_random_func *random_func;
@@ -1074,21 +1098,27 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
hash_len = vdata->size;
}
- mpz_init(k);
if (_gnutls_get_lib_state() == LIB_STATE_SELFTEST ||
(sign_params->flags & GNUTLS_PK_FLAG_REPRODUCIBLE)) {
- ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(k,
- pub.q,
- TOMPZ(priv),
- DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig),
- vdata->data,
- vdata->size);
+ mp_limb_t h[DSA_COMPUTE_K_ITCH];
+
+ ret = _gnutls_dsa_compute_k(
+ h, mpz_limbs_read(pub.q),
+ mpz_limbs_read(TOMPZ(priv)), mpz_size(pub.q),
+ mpz_sizeinbase(pub.q, 2),
+ DIG_TO_MAC(sign_params->dsa_dig), vdata->data,
+ vdata->size);
if (ret < 0)
goto dsa_fail;
- /* cancel-out dsa_sign's addition of 1 to random data */
- mpz_sub_ui (k, k, 1);
+
+ k.data = buf;
+ k.size = (mpz_sizeinbase(pub.q, 2) + 7) / 8;
+
+ _gnutls_dsa_compute_k_finish(k.data, k.size, h,
+ mpz_size(pub.q));
+
random_ctx = &k;
- random_func = rnd_mpz_func;
+ random_func = rnd_datum_func;
} else {
random_ctx = NULL;
random_func = rnd_nonce_func;
@@ -1108,7 +1138,6 @@ _wrap_nettle_pk_sign(gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo,
dsa_fail:
dsa_signature_clear(&sig);
- mpz_clear(k);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
diff --git a/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c b/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c
index 6e907288ee..25aa553a59 100644
--- a/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c
+++ b/tests/sign-verify-deterministic.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ void doit(void)
&signature);
if (ret < 0)
testfail("gnutls_pubkey_verify_data2\n");
- success(" - pass");
+ success(" - pass\n");
next:
gnutls_free(signature.data);
--
2.44.0

View File

@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
--- gnutls-3.7.2/doc/manpages/p11tool.1 2021-05-29 10:15:22.000000000 +0200
+++ gnutls-3.7.2-bootstrapped/doc/manpages/p11tool.1 2021-06-28 09:35:23.000000000 +0200
@@ -230,8 +230,9 @@
.NOP \f\*[B-Font]\-\-write\f[]
Writes the loaded objects to a PKCS #11 token.
.sp
-It can be used to write private, public keys, certificates or secret keys to a token. Must be combined with
- one of \--load-privkey, \--load-pubkey, \--load-certificate option.
+It can be used to write private, public keys, certificates or secret keys to a token. Must be combined with one of \--load-privkey, \--load-pubkey, \--load-certificate option.
+.sp
+When writing a certificate object, its CKA_ID is set to the same CKA_ID of the corresponding public key, if it exists on the token; otherwise it will be derived from the X.509 Subject Key Identifier of the certificate. If this behavior is undesired, write the public key to the token beforehand.
.TP
.NOP \f\*[B-Font]\-\-delete\f[]
Deletes the objects matching the given PKCS #11 URL.

View File

@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
From e5dc27d1a457d1b3abc0582cd133910dff0fc309 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 12:00:11 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix double free during gnutls_pkcs7_verify
Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
---
.gitignore | 1 +
lib/x509/pkcs7.c | 3 +-
tests/Makefile.am | 3 +-
tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
diff --git a/lib/x509/pkcs7.c b/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
index 0ff55ba04b..878f867862 100644
--- a/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
+++ b/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
@@ -1318,7 +1318,8 @@ gnutls_x509_crt_t find_signer(gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7, gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tl,
issuer = find_verified_issuer_of(pkcs7, issuer, purpose, vflags);
if (issuer != NULL && gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(issuer, issuer)) {
- if (prev) gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(prev);
+ if (prev && prev != signer)
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(prev);
prev = issuer;
break;
}
diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
index b04cb081b4..0563d3c754 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/Makefile.am
@@ -220,7 +220,8 @@ ctests += mini-record-2 simple gnutls_hmac_fast set_pkcs12_cred cert certuniquei
sign-verify-newapi sign-verify-deterministic iov aead-cipher-vec \
tls13-without-timeout-func buffer status-request-revoked \
set_x509_ocsp_multi_cli kdf-api keylog-func \
- dtls_hello_random_value tls_hello_random_value x509cert-dntypes
+ dtls_hello_random_value tls_hello_random_value x509cert-dntypes \
+ pkcs7-verify-double-free
if HAVE_SECCOMP_TESTS
ctests += dtls-with-seccomp tls-with-seccomp dtls-client-with-seccomp tls-client-with-seccomp
diff --git a/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c b/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fadf307829
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Zoltan Fridrich
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuTLS.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GnuTLS. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <gnutls/pkcs7.h>
+#include <gnutls/x509.h>
+
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static char rca_pem[] =
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIDCjCCAfKgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFt\n"
+ "cGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDMzNloYDzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0MzM2WjAVMRMwEQYD\n"
+ "VQQKDApFeGFtcGxlIENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA\n"
+ "v8hnKPJ/IA0SQB/A/a0Uh+npZ67vsgIMrtTQo0r0kJkmkBz5323xO3DVuJfB3QmX\n"
+ "v9zvoeCQLuDvWar5Aixfxgm6s5Q+yPvJj9t3NebDrU+Y4+qyewBIJUF8EF/5iBPC\n"
+ "ZHONmzbfIRWvQWGGgb2CRcOHp2J7AY/QLB6LsWPaLjs/DHva28Q13JaTTHIpdu8v\n"
+ "t6vHr0nXf66DN4MvtoF3N+o+v3snJCMsfXOqASi4tbWR7gtOfCfiz9uBjh0W2Dut\n"
+ "/jclBQkJkLe6esNSM+f4YiOpctVDjmfj8yoHCp394vt0wFqhG38wsTFAyVP6qIcf\n"
+ "5zoSu9ovEt2cTkhnZHjiiwIDAQABo2MwYTAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA4GA1Ud\n"
+ "DwEB/wQEAwIBBjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUhjeO6Uc5imbjOl2I2ltVA27Hu9YwHwYDVR0j\n"
+ "BBgwFoAUhjeO6Uc5imbjOl2I2ltVA27Hu9YwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAD+r\n"
+ "i/7FsbG0OFKGF2+JOnth6NjJQcMfM8LiglqAuBUijrv7vltoZ0Z3FJH1Vi4OeMXn\n"
+ "l7X/9tWUve0uFl75MfjDrf0+lCEdYRY1LCba2BrUgpbbkLywVUdnbsvndehegCgS\n"
+ "jss2/zys3Hlo3ZaHlTMQ/NQ4nrxcxkjOvkZSEOqgxJTLpzm6pr7YUts4k6c6lNiB\n"
+ "FSiJiDzsJCmWR9C3fBbUlfDfTJYGN3JwqX270KchXDElo8gNoDnF7jBMpLFFSEKm\n"
+ "MyfbNLX/srh+CEfZaN/OZV4A3MQ0L8vQEp6M4CJhvRLIuMVabZ2coJ0AzystrOMU\n"
+ "LirBWjg89RoAjFQ7bTE=\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+static char ca_pem[] =
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFt\n"
+ "cGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDQzNFoYDzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0NDM0WjAiMSAwHgYD\n"
+ "VQQKDBdFeGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD\n"
+ "ggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKb9ACB8u//sP6MfNU1OsVw68xz3eTPLgKxS0vpqexm6iGVg\n"
+ "ug/o9uYRLzqiEukv/eyz9WzHmY7sqlOJjOFdv92+SaNg79Jc51WHPFXgea4/qyfr\n"
+ "4y14PGs0SNxm6T44sXurUs7cXydQVUgnq2VCaWFOTUdxXoAWkV8r8GaUoPD/klVz\n"
+ "RqxSZVETmX1XBKhsMnnov41kRwVph2C+VfUspsbaUZaz/o/S1/nokhXRACzKsMBr\n"
+ "obqiGxbY35uVzsmbAW5ErhQz98AWJL3Bub1fsEMXg6OEMmPH4AtX888dTIYZNw0E\n"
+ "bUIESspz1kjJQTtVQDHTprhwz16YiSVeUonlLgMCAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/\n"
+ "BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFPBjxDWjMhjXERirKF9O\n"
+ "o/5Cllc5MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIY3julHOYpm4zpdiNpbVQNux7vWMA0GCSqGSIb3\n"
+ "DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCTm+vv3hBa6lL5IT+Fw8aTxQ2Ne7mZ5oyazhvXYwwfKNMX3SML\n"
+ "W2JdPaL64ZwbxxxYvW401o5Z0CEgru3YFrsqB/hEdl0Uf8UWWJmE1rRa+miTmbjt\n"
+ "lrLNCWdrs6CiwvsPITTHg7jevB4KyZYsTSxQFcyr3N3xF+6EmOTC4IkhPPnXYXcp\n"
+ "248ih+WOavSYoRvzgB/Dip1WnPYU2mfIV3O8JReRryngA0TzWCLPLUoWR3R4jwtC\n"
+ "+1uSLoqaenz3qv3F1WEbke37az9YJuXx/5D8CqFQiZ62TUUtI6fYd8mkMBM4Qfh6\n"
+ "NW9XrCkI9wlpL5K9HllhuW0BhKeJkuPpyQ2p\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+static char ee_pem[] =
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIDIjCCAgqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdFeGFt\n"
+ "cGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTAgFw0yMjA3MjExNDQ1MzdaGA8yMjIyMDcyMTE0\n"
+ "NDUzN1owFTETMBEGA1UEAwwKSm9obiBTbWl0aDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD\n"
+ "ggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMb1uuxppBFY+WVD45iyHUq7DkIJNNOI/JRaybVJfPktWq2E\n"
+ "eNe7XhV05KKnqZTbDO2iYqNHqGhZ8pz/IstDRTZP3z/q1vXTG0P9Gx28rEy5TaUY\n"
+ "QjtD+ZoFUQm0ORMDBjd8jikqtJ87hKeuOPMH4rzdydotMaPQSm7KLzHBGBr6gg7z\n"
+ "g1IxPWkhMyHapoMqqrhjwjzoTY97UIXpZTEoIA+KpEC8f9CciBtL0i1MPBjWozB6\n"
+ "Jma9q5iEwZXuRr3cnPYeIPlK2drgDZCMuSFcYiT8ApLw5OhKqY1m2EvfZ2ox2s9R\n"
+ "68/HzYdPi3kZwiNEtlBvMlpt5yKBJAflp76d7DkCAwEAAaNuMGwwCwYDVR0PBAQD\n"
+ "AgWgMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMCBggrBgEFBQcDBDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUc+Mi\n"
+ "kr8WMCk00SQo+P2iggp/oQkwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU8GPENaMyGNcRGKsoX06j/kKW\n"
+ "VzkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKU9+CUR0Jcfybd1+8Aqgh1RH96yQygnVuyt\n"
+ "Na9rFz4fM3ij9tGXDHXrkZw8bW1dWLU9quu8zeTxKxc3aiDIw739Alz0tukttDo7\n"
+ "dW7YqIb77zsIsWB9p7G9dlxT6ieUy+5IKk69BbeK8KR0vAciAG4KVQxPhuPy/LGX\n"
+ "PzqlJIJ4h61s3UOroReHPB1keLZgpORqrvtpClOmABH9TLFRJA/WFg8Q2XYB/p0x\n"
+ "l/pWiaoBC+8wK9cDoMUK5yOwXeuCLffCb+UlAD0+z/qxJ2pisE8E9X8rRKRrWI+i\n"
+ "G7LtJCEn86EQK8KuRlJxKgj8lClZhoULB0oL4jbblBuNow9WRmM=\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+static char msg_pem[] =
+ "-----BEGIN PKCS7-----\n"
+ "MIIK2QYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIKyjCCCsYCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwCwYJKoZI\n"
+ "hvcNAQcBoIIJTzCCAwowggHyoAMCAQICAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwFTETMBEG\n"
+ "A1UECgwKRXhhbXBsZSBDQTAgFw0xNzA3MjExNDQzMjFaGA8yMjIyMDcyMTE0NDMy\n"
+ "MVowFTETMBEGA1UECgwKRXhhbXBsZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP\n"
+ "ADCCAQoCggEBAL51eyE4j8wAKQKMGlO9HEY2iaGvsdPSJmidSdmCi1jnNK39Lx4Y\n"
+ "31h279hSHF5wtI6VM91HHfeLf1mjEZHlKrXXJQzBPLpbHWapD778drHBitOP8e56\n"
+ "fDMIfofLV4tkMk8690vPe4cJH1UHGspMyz6EQF9kPRaW80XtMV/6dalgL/9Esmaw\n"
+ "XBNPJAS1VutDuXQkJ/3/rWFLmkpYHHtGPjX782YRmT1s+VOVTsLqmKx0TEL8A381\n"
+ "bbElHPUAMjPcyWR5qqA8KWnS5Dwqk3LwI0AvuhQytCq0S7Xl4DXauvxwTRXv0UU7\n"
+ "W8r3MLAw9DnlnJiD/RFjw5rbGO3wMePk/qUCAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUw\n"
+ "AwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFIh2KRoKJoe2VtpOwWMkRAkR\n"
+ "mLWKMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIh2KRoKJoe2VtpOwWMkRAkRmLWKMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB\n"
+ "CwUAA4IBAQBovvlOjoy0MCT5U0eWfcPQQjY4Ssrn3IiPNlVkqSNo+FHX+2baTLVQ\n"
+ "5QTHxwXwzdIJiwtjFWDdGEQXqmuIvnFG+u/whGbeg6oQygfnQ5Y+q6epOxCsPgLQ\n"
+ "mKKEaF7mvh8DauUx4QSbYCNGCctOZuB1vlN9bJ3/5QbH+2pFPOfCr5CAyPDwHo6S\n"
+ "qO3yPcutRwT9xS7gXEHM9HhLp+DmdCGh4eVBPiFilyZm1d92lWxU8oxoSfXgzDT/\n"
+ "GCzlMykNZNs4JD9QmiRClP/3U0dQbOhah/Fda+N+L90xaqEgGcvwKKZa3pzo59pl\n"
+ "BbkcIP4YPyHeinwkgAn5UVJg9DOxNCS0MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG\n"
+ "9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFtcGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDQxM1oY\n"
+ "DzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0NDEzWjAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdFeGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0\n"
+ "ZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMPFDEvDANwvhviu\n"
+ "pwXTvaKyxyX94jVu1wgAhIRyQBVRiMbrn8MEufLG8oA0vKd8s92gv/lWe1jFb2rn\n"
+ "91jMkZWsjWjiJFD6SzqFfBo+XxOGikEqO1MAf92UqavmSGlXVRG1Vy7T7dWibZP0\n"
+ "WODhHYWayR0Y6owSz5IqNfrHXzDME+lSJxHgRFI7pK+b0OgiVmvyXDKFPvyU6GrP\n"
+ "lxXDi/XbjyPvC5gpiwtTgm+s8KERwmdlfZUNjkh2PpHx1g1joijHT3wIvO/Pek1E\n"
+ "C+Xs6w3XxGgL6TTL7FDuv4AjZVX9KK66/yBhX3aN8bkqAg+hs9XNk3zzWC0XEFOS\n"
+ "Qoh2va0CAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw\n"
+ "HQYDVR0OBBYEFHwi/7dUWGjkMWJctOm7MCjjQj1cMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIh2KRoK\n"
+ "Joe2VtpOwWMkRAkRmLWKMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCF6sHCBdYRwBwvfCve\n"
+ "og9cPnmPqZrG4AtmSvtoSsMvgvKb/4z3/gG8oPtTBkeRcAHoMoEp/oA+B2ylwIAc\n"
+ "S5U7jx+lYH/Pqih0X/OcOLbaMv8uzGSGQxk+L9LuuIT6E/THfRRIPEvkDkzC+/uk\n"
+ "7vUbG17bSEWeF0o/6sjzAY2aH1jnbCDyu0UC78GXkc6bZ5QlH98uLMDMrOmqcZjS\n"
+ "JFfvuRDQyKV5yBdBkYaobsIWSQDsgYxJzf/2y8c3r+HXqT+jhrXPWJ3btgMPxpu7\n"
+ "E8KmoFgp9EM+48oYlXJ66rk08/KjaVmgN7R+Hm3e2+MFT2kme4fBKalLjcazTe3x\n"
+ "0FisMIIDIjCCAgqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdF\n"
+ "eGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTAgFw0yMjA3MjExNDQ1MzBaGA8yMjIyMDcy\n"
+ "MTE0NDUzMVowFTETMBEGA1UEAwwKSm9obiBTbWl0aDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB\n"
+ "BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMjhSqhdD5RjmOm6W3hG7zkgKBP9whRN/SipcdEMlkgc\n"
+ "F/U3QMu66qIfKwheNdWalC1JLtruLDWP92ysa6Vw+CCG8aSax1AgB//RKQB7kgPA\n"
+ "9js9hi/oCdBmCv2HJxhWSLz+MVoxgzW4C7S9FenI+btxe/99Uw4nOw7kwjsYDLKr\n"
+ "tMw8myv7aCW/63CuBYGtohiZupM3RI3kKFcZots+KRPLlZpjv+I2h9xSln8VxKNb\n"
+ "XiMrYwGfHB7iX7ghe1TvFjKatEUhsqa7AvIq7nfe/cyq97f0ODQO814njgZtk5iQ\n"
+ "JVavXHdhTVaypt1HdAFMuHX5UATylHxx9tRCgSIijUsCAwEAAaNuMGwwCwYDVR0P\n"
+ "BAQDAgWgMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMCBggrBgEFBQcDBDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU\n"
+ "31+vHl4E/2Jpnwinbzf+d7usshcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUfCL/t1RYaOQxYly06bsw\n"
+ "KONCPVwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAAWe63DcNwmleQ3INFGDJZ/m2I/R/cBa\n"
+ "nnrxgR5Ey1ljHdA/x1z1JLTGmGVwqGExs5DNG9Q//Pmc9pZ1yPa8J4Xf8AvFcmkY\n"
+ "mWoH1HvW0xu/RF1UN5SAoD2PRQ+Vq4OSPD58IlEu/u4o1wZV7Wl91Cv6VNpiAb63\n"
+ "j9PA1YacOpOtcRqG59Vuj9HFm9f30ejHVo2+KJcpo290cR3Zg4fOm8mtjeMdt/QS\n"
+ "Atq+RqPAQ7yxqvEEv8zPIZj2kAOQm3mh/yYqBrR68lQUD/dBTP7ApIZkhUK3XK6U\n"
+ "nf9JvoF6Fn2+Cnqb//FLBgHSnoeqeQNwDLUXTsD02iYxHzJrhokSY4YxggFQMIIB\n"
+ "TAIBATAnMCIxIDAeBgNVBAoMF0V4YW1wbGUgaW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIENBAgEBMAsG\n"
+ "CWCGSAFlAwQCATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQATHg6wNsBcs/Ub1GQfKwTpKCk5\n"
+ "8QXuNnZ0u7b6mKgrSY2Gf47fpL2aRgaR+BAQncbctu5EH/IL38pWjaGtOhFAj/5q\n"
+ "7luVQW11kuyJN3Bd/dtLqawWOwMmAIEigw6X50l5ZHnEVzFfxt+RKTNhk4XWVtbi\n"
+ "2iIlITOplW0rnvxYAwCxKL9ocaB7etK8au7ixMxbFp75Ts4iLX8dhlAFdCuFCk8k\n"
+ "B8mi9HHuwr3QYRqMPW61hu1wBL3yB8eoZNOwPXb0gkIh6ZvgptxgQzm/cc+Iw9fP\n"
+ "QkR0fTM7ElJ5QZmSV98AUbZDHmDvpmcjcUxfSPMc3IoT8T300usRu7QHqKJi\n"
+ "-----END PKCS7-----\n";
+
+const gnutls_datum_t rca_datum = { (void *)rca_pem, sizeof(rca_pem) - 1 };
+const gnutls_datum_t ca_datum = { (void *)ca_pem, sizeof(ca_pem) - 1 };
+const gnutls_datum_t ee_datum = { (void *)ee_pem, sizeof(ee_pem) - 1 };
+const gnutls_datum_t msg_datum = { (void *)msg_pem, sizeof(msg_pem) - 1 };
+
+static void tls_log_func(int level, const char *str)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s |<%d>| %s", "err", level, str);
+}
+
+#define CHECK(X)\
+{\
+ r = X;\
+ if (r < 0)\
+ fail("error in %d: %s\n", __LINE__, gnutls_strerror(r));\
+}\
+
+void doit(void)
+{
+ int r;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t rca_cert = NULL;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t ca_cert = NULL;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t ee_cert = NULL;
+ gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tlist = NULL;
+ gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7 = NULL;
+ gnutls_datum_t data = { (unsigned char *)"xxx", 3 };
+
+ if (debug) {
+ gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func);
+ gnutls_global_set_log_level(4711);
+ }
+
+ // Import certificates
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&rca_cert));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(rca_cert, &rca_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&ca_cert));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(ca_cert, &ca_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&ee_cert));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(ee_cert, &ee_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
+
+ // Setup trust store
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_init(&tlist, 0));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, rca_cert, "rca", 3, 0));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, ca_cert, "ca", 2, 0));
+ CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, ee_cert, "ee", 2, 0));
+
+ // Setup pkcs7 structure
+ CHECK(gnutls_pkcs7_init(&pkcs7));
+ CHECK(gnutls_pkcs7_import(pkcs7, &msg_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
+
+ // Signature verification
+ gnutls_pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, tlist, NULL, 0, 0, &data, 0);
+
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(rca_cert);
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(ca_cert);
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(ee_cert);
+ gnutls_x509_trust_list_deinit(tlist, 0);
+ gnutls_pkcs7_deinit(pkcs7);
+}
--
2.37.2

View File

@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
From 9b50d94bf1c8e749d7dfc593c89e689a161444ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2023 09:30:03 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] gnutls-3.6.16-rehandshake-tickets.patch
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
---
lib/ext/session_ticket.c | 6 ++
lib/ext/session_ticket.h | 1 +
lib/libgnutls.map | 2 +
lib/state.c | 1 +
tests/Makefile.am | 3 +-
tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c | 152 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c
diff --git a/lib/ext/session_ticket.c b/lib/ext/session_ticket.c
index 8f22462..8d83a6c 100644
--- a/lib/ext/session_ticket.c
+++ b/lib/ext/session_ticket.c
@@ -618,6 +618,12 @@ gnutls_session_ticket_enable_server(gnutls_session_t session,
return 0;
}
+void
+_gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(gnutls_session_t session)
+{
+ session->internals.flags |= GNUTLS_NO_TICKETS;
+}
+
/*
* Return zero if session tickets haven't been enabled.
*/
diff --git a/lib/ext/session_ticket.h b/lib/ext/session_ticket.h
index da804ec..660c9d3 100644
--- a/lib/ext/session_ticket.h
+++ b/lib/ext/session_ticket.h
@@ -36,5 +36,6 @@ int _gnutls_encrypt_session_ticket(gnutls_session_t session,
int _gnutls_decrypt_session_ticket(gnutls_session_t session,
const gnutls_datum_t *ticket_data,
gnutls_datum_t *state);
+void _gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(gnutls_session_t session);
#endif /* GNUTLS_LIB_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_H */
diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map
index d2f7c0a..6748b3a 100644
--- a/lib/libgnutls.map
+++ b/lib/libgnutls.map
@@ -1432,4 +1432,6 @@ GNUTLS_PRIVATE_3_4 {
_gnutls_buffer_unescape;
_gnutls_buffer_pop_datum;
_gnutls_buffer_clear;
+ # needed by tests/tls12-rehandshake-cert-ticket
+ _gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server;
} GNUTLS_3_4;
diff --git a/lib/state.c b/lib/state.c
index 817a7b8..f1e9daa 100644
--- a/lib/state.c
+++ b/lib/state.c
@@ -452,6 +452,7 @@ void _gnutls_handshake_internal_state_clear(gnutls_session_t session)
session->internals.tfo.connect_addrlen = 0;
session->internals.tfo.connect_only = 0;
session->internals.early_data_received = 0;
+ session->internals.session_ticket_renew = 0;
}
/**
diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
index 0563d3c..7c5f5c4 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/Makefile.am
@@ -221,7 +221,8 @@ ctests += mini-record-2 simple gnutls_hmac_fast set_pkcs12_cred cert certuniquei
tls13-without-timeout-func buffer status-request-revoked \
set_x509_ocsp_multi_cli kdf-api keylog-func \
dtls_hello_random_value tls_hello_random_value x509cert-dntypes \
- pkcs7-verify-double-free
+ pkcs7-verify-double-free \
+ tls12-rehandshake-ticket
if HAVE_SECCOMP_TESTS
ctests += dtls-with-seccomp tls-with-seccomp dtls-client-with-seccomp tls-client-with-seccomp
diff --git a/tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c b/tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f96e46e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/tls12-rehandshake-ticket.c
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Daiki Ueno
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuTLS.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "cert-common.h"
+
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "eagain-common.h"
+
+const char *side = "";
+
+static void tls_log_func(int level, const char *str)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s|<%d>| %s", side, level, str);
+}
+
+#define MAX_BUF 1024
+
+void _gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(gnutls_session_t session);
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+ char buffer[MAX_BUF + 1];
+ /* Server stuff. */
+ gnutls_certificate_credentials_t scred;
+ gnutls_session_t server;
+ gnutls_datum_t session_ticket_key = { NULL, 0 };
+ int sret;
+ /* Client stuff. */
+ gnutls_certificate_credentials_t ccred;
+ gnutls_session_t client;
+ int cret;
+
+ /* General init. */
+ global_init();
+ gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func);
+ if (debug)
+ gnutls_global_set_log_level(9);
+
+ /* Init server */
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&scred) >= 0);
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_mem(scred,
+ &server_ca3_localhost_cert,
+ &server_ca3_key,
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem(scred,
+ &ca3_cert,
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
+
+ assert(gnutls_init(&server, GNUTLS_SERVER) >= 0);
+ gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(server, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST);
+ assert(gnutls_priority_set_direct(server,
+ "NORMAL:-VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.2",
+ NULL) >= 0);
+
+ gnutls_credentials_set(server, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, scred);
+ gnutls_transport_set_push_function(server, server_push);
+ gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(server, server_pull);
+ gnutls_transport_set_ptr(server, server);
+
+ gnutls_session_ticket_key_generate(&session_ticket_key);
+ gnutls_session_ticket_enable_server(server, &session_ticket_key);
+
+ /* Init client */
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&ccred) >= 0);
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_mem
+ (ccred, &cli_ca3_cert_chain, &cli_ca3_key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem
+ (ccred, &ca3_cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) >= 0);
+
+ gnutls_init(&client, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
+ assert(gnutls_priority_set_direct(client,
+ "NORMAL:-VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.2",
+ NULL) >= 0);
+
+ assert(gnutls_credentials_set(client, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, ccred) >= 0);
+
+ gnutls_transport_set_push_function(client, client_push);
+ gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(client, client_pull);
+ gnutls_transport_set_ptr(client, client);
+
+ HANDSHAKE(client, server);
+
+ /* Server initiates rehandshake */
+ switch_side("server");
+ sret = gnutls_rehandshake(server);
+ if (sret < 0) {
+ fail("Error sending %d byte packet: %s\n",
+ (int)sizeof(buffer), gnutls_strerror(sret));
+ } else if (debug)
+ success("server: starting rehandshake\n");
+
+ /* Stop sending session ticket */
+ _gnutls_session_ticket_disable_server(server);
+
+ /* Client gets notified with rehandshake */
+ switch_side("client");
+ do {
+ do {
+ cret = gnutls_record_recv(client, buffer, MAX_BUF);
+ } while (cret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || cret == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED);
+ } while (cret > 0);
+
+ if (cret != GNUTLS_E_REHANDSHAKE) {
+ fail("client: Error receiving rehandshake: %s\n",
+ gnutls_strerror(cret));
+ }
+
+ HANDSHAKE(client, server);
+
+ gnutls_bye(client, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+ gnutls_bye(server, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+
+ gnutls_deinit(client);
+ gnutls_deinit(server);
+
+ gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(scred);
+ gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(ccred);
+
+ gnutls_free(session_ticket_key.data);
+
+ gnutls_global_deinit();
+ reset_buffers();
+}
+
+void doit(void)
+{
+ run();
+}
--
2.41.0

View File

@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
From fe912c5dba49dcecbd5c32bf8184e60a949af452 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 19:13:17 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] rsa-psk: minimize branching after decryption
This moves any non-trivial code between gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2
and the function return in _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx up until the
decryption. This also avoids an extra memcpy to session->key.key.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
index 93c2dc9998..8f3fe5a4bd 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
@@ -269,7 +269,6 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
int ret, dsize;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
- gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
@@ -329,24 +328,48 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
- premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
- if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
+ /* Find the key of this username. A random value will be
+ * filled in if the key is not found.
+ */
+ ret =
+ _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
+
+ /* Allocate memory for premaster secret, and fill in the
+ * fields except the decryption result.
+ */
+ session->key.key.size = 2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2 + pwd_psk.size;
+ session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(session->key.key.size);
+ if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
+ _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
+ /* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
+ _gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
- premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
/* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
- ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
- premaster_secret.size);
+ ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, session->key.key.data + 2,
+ GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup;
+ _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
+ /* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
+ _gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
+ return ret;
}
+ _gnutls_write_uint16(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE, session->key.key.data);
+ _gnutls_write_uint16(pwd_psk.size,
+ &session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE]);
+ memcpy(&session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2],
+ pwd_psk.data, pwd_psk.size);
+ _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
+
gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
- &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
- premaster_secret.size);
+ &ciphertext, session->key.key.data + 2,
+ GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
* in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
* channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
@@ -365,31 +388,10 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above.
*/
- premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
- premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
-
- /* find the key of this username
- */
- ret =
- _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
- if (ret < 0) {
- gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- ret =
- set_rsa_psk_session_key(session, &pwd_psk, &premaster_secret);
- if (ret < 0) {
- gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ session->key.key.data[2] = ver_maj;
+ session->key.key.data[3] = ver_min;
- ret = 0;
- cleanup:
- _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
- _gnutls_free_temp_key_datum(&premaster_secret);
-
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
static int
--
2.43.0

View File

@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
From e007a54432c98618bde500649817d153225abf6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2023 11:52:08 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing.patch
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
---
lib/auth/rsa.c | 2 +-
lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
lib/gnutls_int.h | 4 --
lib/priority.c | 1 -
4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
index 858701f..02b6a34 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
session->key.key.size);
/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
* in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
- * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
+ * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
/* Error handling logic:
* In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
index 1a9dab5..93c2dc9 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
@@ -264,14 +264,13 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
{
gnutls_datum_t username;
psk_auth_info_t info;
- gnutls_datum_t plaintext;
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
gnutls_datum_t pwd_psk = { NULL, 0 };
int ret, dsize;
- int randomize_key = 0;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
+ volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
_gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK);
@@ -327,71 +326,47 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
}
ciphertext.size = dsize;
- ret =
- gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
- &ciphertext, &plaintext);
- if (ret < 0 || plaintext.size != GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE) {
- /* In case decryption fails then don't inform
- * the peer. Just use a random key. (in order to avoid
- * attack against pkcs-1 formatting).
- */
+ ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+ ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+
+ premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+ if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
- _gnutls_debug_log
- ("auth_rsa_psk: Possible PKCS #1 format attack\n");
- if (ret >= 0) {
- gnutls_free(plaintext.data);
- }
- randomize_key = 1;
- } else {
- /* If the secret was properly formatted, then
- * check the version number.
- */
- if (_gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session) !=
- plaintext.data[0]
- || (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0
- && _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session) !=
- plaintext.data[1])) {
- /* No error is returned here, if the version number check
- * fails. We proceed normally.
- * That is to defend against the attack described in the paper
- * "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by Vlastimil Klima,
- * Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
- */
- gnutls_assert();
- _gnutls_debug_log
- ("auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 version check format attack\n");
- }
+ return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
+ premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
-
- if (randomize_key != 0) {
- premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
- premaster_secret.data =
- gnutls_malloc(premaster_secret.size);
- if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
- gnutls_assert();
- return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
- }
-
- /* we do not need strong random numbers here.
- */
- ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
- premaster_secret.size);
- if (ret < 0) {
- gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup;
- }
- } else {
- premaster_secret.data = plaintext.data;
- premaster_secret.size = plaintext.size;
+ /* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
+ ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
+ premaster_secret.size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto cleanup;
}
+ gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
+ &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
+ premaster_secret.size);
+ /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+ * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+ * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
+
+ /* Error handling logic:
+ * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
+ * random key previously generated. (in order to avoid attack against
+ * pkcs-1 formatting).
+ *
+ * If we get version mismatches no error is returned either. We
+ * proceed normally. This is to defend against the attack described
+ * in the paper "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by
+ * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+ */
+
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above.
*/
-
- premaster_secret.data[0] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
- premaster_secret.data[1] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+ premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
+ premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
/* find the key of this username
*/
diff --git a/lib/gnutls_int.h b/lib/gnutls_int.h
index 31cec5c..815f69b 100644
--- a/lib/gnutls_int.h
+++ b/lib/gnutls_int.h
@@ -971,7 +971,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
bool _no_etm;
bool _no_ext_master_secret;
bool _allow_key_usage_violation;
- bool _allow_wrong_pms;
bool _dumbfw;
unsigned int _dh_prime_bits; /* old (deprecated) variable */
@@ -989,7 +988,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
(x)->no_etm = 1; \
(x)->no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
(x)->allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
- (x)->allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
(x)->dumbfw = 1
#define ENABLE_PRIO_COMPAT(x) \
@@ -998,7 +996,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
(x)->_no_etm = 1; \
(x)->_no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
(x)->_allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
- (x)->_allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
(x)->_dumbfw = 1
/* DH and RSA parameters types.
@@ -1123,7 +1120,6 @@ typedef struct {
bool no_etm;
bool no_ext_master_secret;
bool allow_key_usage_violation;
- bool allow_wrong_pms;
bool dumbfw;
/* old (deprecated) variable. This is used for both srp_prime_bits
diff --git a/lib/priority.c b/lib/priority.c
index 0a284ae..67ec887 100644
--- a/lib/priority.c
+++ b/lib/priority.c
@@ -681,7 +681,6 @@ gnutls_priority_set(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_priority_t priority)
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_etm);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_ext_master_secret);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_key_usage_violation);
- COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_wrong_pms);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dumbfw);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dh_prime_bits);
--
2.43.0

View File

@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
From 339bef12f478b3a12c59571c53645e31280baf7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 15:59:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] cert auth: filter out unsupported cert types from TLS 1.2 CR
When the server is advertising signature algorithms in TLS 1.2
CertificateRequest, it shouldn't send certificate_types not backed by
any of those algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/auth/cert.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
tests/suite/tls-fuzzer/gnutls-cert.json | 19 +++++++
2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/cert.c b/lib/auth/cert.c
index 3073a33d3..0b0f04b2b 100644
--- a/lib/auth/cert.c
+++ b/lib/auth/cert.c
@@ -64,6 +64,16 @@ typedef enum CertificateSigType { RSA_SIGN = 1, DSA_SIGN = 2, ECDSA_SIGN = 64,
#endif
} CertificateSigType;
+enum CertificateSigTypeFlags {
+ RSA_SIGN_FLAG = 1,
+ DSA_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 1,
+ ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 2,
+#ifdef ENABLE_GOST
+ GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 3,
+ GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG = 1 << 4
+#endif
+};
+
/* Moves data from an internal certificate struct (gnutls_pcert_st) to
* another internal certificate struct (cert_auth_info_t), and deinitializes
* the former.
@@ -1281,6 +1291,7 @@ _gnutls_gen_cert_server_cert_req(gnutls_session_t session,
uint8_t tmp_data[CERTTYPE_SIZE];
const version_entry_st *ver = get_version(session);
unsigned init_pos = data->length;
+ enum CertificateSigTypeFlags flags;
if (unlikely(ver == NULL))
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1297,18 +1308,71 @@ _gnutls_gen_cert_server_cert_req(gnutls_session_t session,
return GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS;
}
- i = 1;
+ if (_gnutls_version_has_selectable_sighash(ver)) {
+ size_t j;
+
+ flags = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < session->internals.priorities->sigalg.size; j++) {
+ const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se =
+ session->internals.priorities->sigalg.entry[j];
+ switch (se->pk) {
+ case GNUTLS_PK_RSA:
+ case GNUTLS_PK_RSA_PSS:
+ flags |= RSA_SIGN_FLAG;
+ break;
+ case GNUTLS_PK_DSA:
+ flags |= DSA_SIGN_FLAG;
+ break;
+ case GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ flags |= ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG;
+ break;
#ifdef ENABLE_GOST
- if (_gnutls_kx_is_vko_gost(session->security_parameters.cs->kx_algorithm)) {
- tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN;
- tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN;
- } else
+ case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_256:
+ flags |= GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG;
+ break;
+ case GNUTLS_PK_GOST_12_512:
+ flags |= GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG;
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ gnutls_assert();
+ _gnutls_debug_log(
+ "%s is unsupported for cert request\n",
+ gnutls_pk_get_name(se->pk));
+ }
+ }
+
+ } else {
+#ifdef ENABLE_GOST
+ if (_gnutls_kx_is_vko_gost(session->security_parameters.
+ cs->kx_algorithm)) {
+ flags = GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG |
+ GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG;
+ } else
#endif
- {
+ {
+ flags = RSA_SIGN_FLAG | DSA_SIGN_FLAG | ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG;
+ }
+ }
+
+ i = 1;
+ if (flags & RSA_SIGN_FLAG) {
tmp_data[i++] = RSA_SIGN;
+ }
+ if (flags & DSA_SIGN_FLAG) {
tmp_data[i++] = DSA_SIGN;
+ }
+ if (flags & ECDSA_SIGN_FLAG) {
tmp_data[i++] = ECDSA_SIGN;
}
+#ifdef ENABLE_GOST
+ if (flags & GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN_FLAG) {
+ tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_256_SIGN;
+ }
+ if (flags & GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN_FLAG) {
+ tmp_data[i++] = GOSTR34102012_512_SIGN;
+ }
+#endif
tmp_data[0] = i - 1;
ret = _gnutls_buffer_append_data(data, tmp_data, i);
--
2.31.1

View File

@ -1,283 +0,0 @@
From c2409e479df41620bceac314c76cabb1d35a4075 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 16:35:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x509/verify: treat SHA-1 signed CA in the trusted set
differently
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Suppose there is a certificate chain ending with an intermediate CA:
EE → ICA1 → ICA2. If the system trust store contains a root CA
generated with the same key as ICA2 but signed with a prohibited
algorithm, such as SHA-1, the library previously reported a
verification failure, though the situation is not uncommon during a
transition period of root CA.
This changes the library behavior such that the check on signature
algorithm will be skipped when examining the trusted root CA.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/x509/verify.c | 26 ++++---
tests/test-chains.h | 165 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/x509/verify.c b/lib/x509/verify.c
index fd7c6a164..a50b5ea44 100644
--- a/lib/x509/verify.c
+++ b/lib/x509/verify.c
@@ -415,14 +415,19 @@ unsigned _gnutls_is_broken_sig_allowed(const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se, unsigned
#define CASE_SEC_PARAM(profile, level) \
case profile: \
sym_bits = gnutls_sec_param_to_symmetric_bits(level); \
- hash = gnutls_sign_get_hash_algorithm(sigalg); \
- entry = mac_to_entry(hash); \
- if (hash <= 0 || entry == NULL) { \
+ se = _gnutls_sign_to_entry(sigalg); \
+ if (unlikely(se == NULL)) { \
+ _gnutls_cert_log("cert", crt); \
+ _gnutls_debug_log(#level": certificate's signature algorithm is unknown\n"); \
+ return gnutls_assert_val(0); \
+ } \
+ if (unlikely(se->hash == GNUTLS_DIG_UNKNOWN)) { \
_gnutls_cert_log("cert", crt); \
_gnutls_debug_log(#level": certificate's signature hash is unknown\n"); \
return gnutls_assert_val(0); \
} \
- if (_gnutls_sign_get_hash_strength(sigalg) < sym_bits) { \
+ if (!trusted && \
+ _gnutls_sign_get_hash_strength(sigalg) < sym_bits) { \
_gnutls_cert_log("cert", crt); \
_gnutls_debug_log(#level": certificate's signature hash strength is unacceptable (is %u bits, needed %u)\n", _gnutls_sign_get_hash_strength(sigalg), sym_bits); \
return gnutls_assert_val(0); \
@@ -449,19 +454,22 @@ unsigned _gnutls_is_broken_sig_allowed(const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se, unsigned
* @crt: a certificate
* @issuer: the certificates issuer (allowed to be NULL)
* @sigalg: the signature algorithm used
+ * @trusted: whether @crt is treated as trusted (e.g., present in the system
+ * trust list); if it is true, the check on signature algorithm will
+ * be skipped
* @flags: the specified verification flags
*/
static unsigned is_level_acceptable(
gnutls_x509_crt_t crt, gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer,
- gnutls_sign_algorithm_t sigalg, unsigned flags)
+ gnutls_sign_algorithm_t sigalg, bool trusted,
+ unsigned flags)
{
gnutls_certificate_verification_profiles_t profile = GNUTLS_VFLAGS_TO_PROFILE(flags);
- const mac_entry_st *entry;
int issuer_pkalg = 0, pkalg, ret;
unsigned bits = 0, issuer_bits = 0, sym_bits = 0;
gnutls_pk_params_st params;
gnutls_sec_param_t sp;
- int hash;
+ const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se;
gnutls_certificate_verification_profiles_t min_profile;
min_profile = _gnutls_get_system_wide_verification_profile();
@@ -798,7 +806,7 @@ verify_crt(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
}
if (sigalg >= 0 && se) {
- if (is_level_acceptable(cert, issuer, sigalg, flags) == 0) {
+ if (is_level_acceptable(cert, issuer, sigalg, false, flags) == 0) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM);
}
@@ -893,7 +901,7 @@ unsigned check_ca_sanity(const gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer,
/* we explicitly allow CAs which we do not support their self-algorithms
* to pass. */
- if (ret >= 0 && !is_level_acceptable(issuer, NULL, sigalg, flags)) {
+ if (ret >= 0 && !is_level_acceptable(issuer, NULL, sigalg, true, flags)) {
status |= GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM|GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
}
diff --git a/tests/test-chains.h b/tests/test-chains.h
index 9b06b85f5..64f50fabf 100644
--- a/tests/test-chains.h
+++ b/tests/test-chains.h
@@ -4106,6 +4106,163 @@ static const char *superseding_ca[] = {
NULL
};
+static const char *rsa_sha1_in_trusted[] = {
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIID0jCCAoqgAwIBAgIUezaBB7f4TW75oc3UV57oJvXmbBYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
+ "BQAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOR251VExTIHRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNMjEwNTAzMTQyNzIxWhcN\n"
+ "MjIwNTAzMTQyNzIxWjA3MRgwFgYDVQQDEw90ZXN0LmdudXRscy5vcmcxGzAZBgNV\n"
+ "BAoTEkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IHNlcnZlcjCCAVIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggE/ADCC\n"
+ "AToCggExALRrJ5glr8H/HsqwfvTYvO1DhmdUXdq0HsKQX4M8AhH8E3KFsoikZUEL\n"
+ "dl8jvoqf/nlLczsux0s8vxbJl1U1F/OhckswwuAnlBLzVgDmzoJLEV2kHpv6+rkb\n"
+ "Kk0Ytbql5gzHqKihbaqIhNyWDrJsHDWq58eUPfnVx8KiDUuzbnr3CF/FCc0Vkxr3\n"
+ "mN8qTGaJJO0f0BZjgWWlWDuhzSVim5mBVAgXGOx8LwiiOyhXMp0XRwqG+2KxQZnm\n"
+ "+96o6iB+8xvuuuqaIWQpkvKtc+UZBZ03U+IRnxhfIrriiw0AjJ4vp4c9QL5KoqWS\n"
+ "CAwuYcBYfJqZ4dasgzklzz4b7eujbZ3LxTjewcdumzQUvjA+gpAeuUqaduTvMwxG\n"
+ "ojFy9sNhC/iqZ4n0peV2N6Epn4B5qnUCAwEAAaOBkzCBkDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAA\n"
+ "MBoGA1UdEQQTMBGCD3Rlc3QuZ251dGxzLm9yZzATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcD\n"
+ "ATAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDB6AAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRIIzRTCokxOEpa6sq20qbezh0r\n"
+ "GDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQedyNtZzEfkQebli/s/MhG/ozhAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n"
+ "AAOCATEAXs8lOV231HQerhSGEjZJz0vBuA3biKYlu3cwCTKvF6EOyYMSWOnfqqD0\n"
+ "eDhpo1pzGtUa2zYLHagb+sU2NSTe0sqP+PK1giUg8X8/tRtWKk1p/m76yK/3iaty\n"
+ "flgz+eMai4xQu2FvAJzIASFjM9R+Pgpcf/zdvkiUPv8Rdm9FieyAZnJSo9hJHLxN\n"
+ "x60tfC5yyswdbGGW0GbJ2kr+xMfVZvxgO/x6AXlOaUGQ+jZAu9eJwFQMDW5h5/S1\n"
+ "PJkIt7f7jkU33cG+BawcjhT0GzxuvDnnCG0L7/z7bR+Sw2kNKqHbHorzv91R20Oh\n"
+ "CIISJPkiiP+mYcglTp1d9gw09GwSkGbldb9ibfc0hKyxiImFfIiTqDbXJcpKH98o\n"
+ "W8hWkb20QURlY+QM5MD49znfhPKMTQ==\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIID2TCCAkGgAwIBAgIUWsb4DATcefXbo0WrBfgqVMvPGawwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
+ "BQAwHjEcMBoGA1UEAxMTR251VExTIHRlc3Qgcm9vdCBDQTAeFw0yMTA1MDMxNDI2\n"
+ "MzVaFw0yMjA1MDMxNDI2MzVaMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMTDkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IENBMIIB\n"
+ "UjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAT8AMIIBOgKCATEAnORCsX1unl//fy2d1054XduI\n"
+ "g/3CqVBaT3Hca65SEoDwh0KiPtQoOgZLdKY2cobGs/ojYtOjcs0KnlPYdmtjEh6W\n"
+ "EhuJU95v4TQdC4OLMiE56eIGq252hZAbHoTL84Q14DxQWGuzQK830iml7fbw2WcI\n"
+ "cRQ8vFGs8SzfXw63+MI6Fq6iMAQIqP08WzGmRRzL5wvCiPhCVkrPmwbXoABub6AA\n"
+ "sYwWPJB91M9/lx5gFH5k9/iPfi3s2Kg3F8MOcppqFYjxDSnsfiz6eMh1+bYVIAo3\n"
+ "67vGVYHigXMEZC2FezlwIHaZzpEoFlY3a7LFJ00yrjQ910r8UE+CEMTYzE40D0ol\n"
+ "CMo7FA9RCjeO3bUIoYaIdVTUGWEGHWSeoxGei9Gkm6u+ASj8f+i0jxdD2qXsewID\n"
+ "AQABo2QwYjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA8GA1UdDwEB/wQFAwMHBAAwHQYDVR0O\n"
+ "BBYEFB53I21nMR+RB5uWL+z8yEb+jOEDMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFCApU0Q1pxZL+AW3\n"
+ "GctysPWxl+SfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBgQBbboeDr/rLT1tZWrdHq8FvflGm\n"
+ "EpxZIRU4DdDD/SUCWSPQvjBq0MvuKxs5FfJCKrDf2kS2qlZ1rO0AuWwREoDeTOEc\n"
+ "arjFoCry+JQ+USqS5F4gsp4XlYvli27iMp3dlnhFXEQQy7/y+gM5c9wnMi8v/LUz\n"
+ "AV6QHX0fkb4XeazeJ+Nq0EkjqiYxylN6mP+5LAEMBG/wGviAoviQ5tN9zdoQs/nT\n"
+ "3jTw3cOauuPjdcOTfo71+/MtBzhPchgNIyQo4aB40XVWsLAoruL/3CFFlTniihtd\n"
+ "zA2zA7JvbuuKx6BOv2IbWOUweb732ZpYbDgEcXp/6Cj/SIUGxidpEgdCJGqyqdC7\n"
+ "b58ujxclC6QTcicw+SX5LBox8WGLfj+x+V3uVBz9+EK608xphTj4kLh9peII9v3n\n"
+ "vBUoZRTiUTCvH4AJJgAfa3mYrSxzueuqBOwXcvZ+8OJ0J1CP21pmK5nxR7f1nm9Q\n"
+ "sYA1VHfC2dtyAYlByeF5iHl5hFR6vy1jJyzxg2M=\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const char *rsa_sha1_in_trusted_ca[] = {
+ /* This CA is generated with the same key as rsa_sha1_in_trusted[1], but
+ * self-signed using SHA-1.
+ */
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIDYzCCAhugAwIBAgIUahO8CvYPHTAltKCC2rAIcXUiLlAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF\n"
+ "BQAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOR251VExTIHRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNMjEwNTAzMTQyMDM1WhcN\n"
+ "MjIwNTAzMTQyMDM1WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5HbnVUTFMgdGVzdCBDQTCCAVIwDQYJ\n"
+ "KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggE/ADCCAToCggExAJzkQrF9bp5f/38tnddOeF3biIP9wqlQ\n"
+ "Wk9x3GuuUhKA8IdCoj7UKDoGS3SmNnKGxrP6I2LTo3LNCp5T2HZrYxIelhIbiVPe\n"
+ "b+E0HQuDizIhOeniBqtudoWQGx6Ey/OENeA8UFhrs0CvN9Ippe328NlnCHEUPLxR\n"
+ "rPEs318Ot/jCOhauojAECKj9PFsxpkUcy+cLwoj4QlZKz5sG16AAbm+gALGMFjyQ\n"
+ "fdTPf5ceYBR+ZPf4j34t7NioNxfDDnKaahWI8Q0p7H4s+njIdfm2FSAKN+u7xlWB\n"
+ "4oFzBGQthXs5cCB2mc6RKBZWN2uyxSdNMq40PddK/FBPghDE2MxONA9KJQjKOxQP\n"
+ "UQo3jt21CKGGiHVU1BlhBh1knqMRnovRpJurvgEo/H/otI8XQ9ql7HsCAwEAAaND\n"
+ "MEEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDBwQAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQe\n"
+ "dyNtZzEfkQebli/s/MhG/ozhAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCATEAYLm/4DfUp+mA\n"
+ "S/23a2bwybJoPCMzKZpi+veXkqoq/a/BCUkFpqnjpVjz0ujVKK121oeOPBAa/mG1\n"
+ "Y3fJYP+b3PloL/6xj/8680TveGirCr0Rp/8XWa8lt+Ge8DM3mfTGWFTWHa0lD9VK\n"
+ "gjV1oNZNLe5SKA6dJLAp/NjCxc/vuOkThQPeaoO5Iy/Z6m7CpTLO7T4syJFtDmSn\n"
+ "Pa/yFUDTgJYFlGVM+KC1r8bhZ6Ao1CAXTcT5Lcbe/aCcyk6B3J2AnYsqPMVNEVhb\n"
+ "9eMGO/WG24hMLy6eb1r/yL8uQ/uGi2rRlNJN8GTg09YR7l5fHrHxuHc/sme0jsnJ\n"
+ "wtqGLCJsrh7Ae1fKVUueO00Yx9BGuzLswMvnT5f0oYs0jrXgMrTbIWS/DjOcYIHb\n"
+ "w3SV1ZRcNg==\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const char *rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted[] = {
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIID0jCCAoqgAwIBAgIUNCvPV9OvyuVMtnkC3ZAvh959h4MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
+ "BQAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOR251VExTIHRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNMjEwNTA0MDg0NzAzWhcN\n"
+ "MjIwNTA0MDg0NzAzWjA3MRgwFgYDVQQDEw90ZXN0LmdudXRscy5vcmcxGzAZBgNV\n"
+ "BAoTEkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IHNlcnZlcjCCAVIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggE/ADCC\n"
+ "AToCggExALRrJ5glr8H/HsqwfvTYvO1DhmdUXdq0HsKQX4M8AhH8E3KFsoikZUEL\n"
+ "dl8jvoqf/nlLczsux0s8vxbJl1U1F/OhckswwuAnlBLzVgDmzoJLEV2kHpv6+rkb\n"
+ "Kk0Ytbql5gzHqKihbaqIhNyWDrJsHDWq58eUPfnVx8KiDUuzbnr3CF/FCc0Vkxr3\n"
+ "mN8qTGaJJO0f0BZjgWWlWDuhzSVim5mBVAgXGOx8LwiiOyhXMp0XRwqG+2KxQZnm\n"
+ "+96o6iB+8xvuuuqaIWQpkvKtc+UZBZ03U+IRnxhfIrriiw0AjJ4vp4c9QL5KoqWS\n"
+ "CAwuYcBYfJqZ4dasgzklzz4b7eujbZ3LxTjewcdumzQUvjA+gpAeuUqaduTvMwxG\n"
+ "ojFy9sNhC/iqZ4n0peV2N6Epn4B5qnUCAwEAAaOBkzCBkDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAA\n"
+ "MBoGA1UdEQQTMBGCD3Rlc3QuZ251dGxzLm9yZzATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcD\n"
+ "ATAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDB6AAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRIIzRTCokxOEpa6sq20qbezh0r\n"
+ "GDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQedyNtZzEfkQebli/s/MhG/ozhAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n"
+ "AAOCATEAWs/Qa1Ebydwo4Ke2KEdy5cUTSZjnoz93XpbrP9W60MJ4d2DIQPcYUcLF\n"
+ "+glez+mRtVXDRtH5V/4yZX1EdgrPVQGeVlO5HbNiYyYw/Yj3H6kzWtUbBxdOAOE/\n"
+ "/ul8RCKKMfvYBHCBgjBMW0aFm31Q1Z8m8nanBusyJ0DG1scBHu4/3vTCZthZAxc5\n"
+ "3l3t/jjsNRS+k5t6Ay8nEY1tAZSGVqN8qufzO2NBO06sQagp09FTfDh581OBcVtF\n"
+ "X7O0cffAWHk3JoywzEWFEAhVPqFlk07wG2O+k+fYZfavsJko5q+yWkxu8RDh4wAx\n"
+ "7UzKudGOQ+NhfYJ7N7V1/RFg1z75gE3GTUX7qmGZEVDOsMyiuUeYg8znyYpBV55Q\n"
+ "4BNr0ukwmwOdvUf+ksCu6PdOGaqThA==\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ /* ICA with SHA1 signature */
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIID2TCCAkGgAwIBAgIUYaKJkQft87M1TF+Jd30py3yIq4swDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF\n"
+ "BQAwHjEcMBoGA1UEAxMTR251VExTIHRlc3Qgcm9vdCBDQTAeFw0yMTA1MDQwODQ1\n"
+ "NDdaFw0yMjA1MDQwODQ1NDdaMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMTDkdudVRMUyB0ZXN0IENBMIIB\n"
+ "UjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAT8AMIIBOgKCATEAnORCsX1unl//fy2d1054XduI\n"
+ "g/3CqVBaT3Hca65SEoDwh0KiPtQoOgZLdKY2cobGs/ojYtOjcs0KnlPYdmtjEh6W\n"
+ "EhuJU95v4TQdC4OLMiE56eIGq252hZAbHoTL84Q14DxQWGuzQK830iml7fbw2WcI\n"
+ "cRQ8vFGs8SzfXw63+MI6Fq6iMAQIqP08WzGmRRzL5wvCiPhCVkrPmwbXoABub6AA\n"
+ "sYwWPJB91M9/lx5gFH5k9/iPfi3s2Kg3F8MOcppqFYjxDSnsfiz6eMh1+bYVIAo3\n"
+ "67vGVYHigXMEZC2FezlwIHaZzpEoFlY3a7LFJ00yrjQ910r8UE+CEMTYzE40D0ol\n"
+ "CMo7FA9RCjeO3bUIoYaIdVTUGWEGHWSeoxGei9Gkm6u+ASj8f+i0jxdD2qXsewID\n"
+ "AQABo2QwYjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA8GA1UdDwEB/wQFAwMHBAAwHQYDVR0O\n"
+ "BBYEFB53I21nMR+RB5uWL+z8yEb+jOEDMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFCApU0Q1pxZL+AW3\n"
+ "GctysPWxl+SfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBgQAewBcAGUGX28I5PDtuJkxoHonD\n"
+ "muHdXpYnrz1YXN4b7odNXockz++Xovgj126fo+PeWgmaaCic98ZcGnyVTi9+3oqN\n"
+ "2Bf4NNfyzSccgZZTphzbwjMcnc983HLQgsLSAOVivPHj5GEN58EWWamc9yA0VjGn\n"
+ "cuYmFN2dlFA8/ClEbVGu3UXBe6OljR5zUr+6oiSp2J+Rl7SerVSHlst07iU2tkeB\n"
+ "dlfOD5CquUGSka3SKvEfvu5SwYrCQVfYB6eMLInm7A0/ca0Jn3Oh4fMf2rIg/E3K\n"
+ "qsopxsu8BXrLoGK4MxbxPA65JpczhZgilQQi3e3RIvxrvyD2qamjaNbyG5cr8mW4\n"
+ "VOLf3vUORbkTi5sE7uRMu2B3z3N7ajsuQM8RHB17hOCB2FO/8rermq/oeJNtx57L\n"
+ "5s5NxCHYTksQ4gkpR4gfTIO/zwXJSwGa/Zi2y2wIi/1qr7lppBsKV2rDWX7QiIeA\n"
+ "PxOxyJA2eSeqCorz9vk3aHXleSpxsWGgKiJVmV0=\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const char *rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted_ca[] = {
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIEDTCCAnWgAwIBAgIUd5X8NZput+aNPEd9h92r4KAu16MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n"
+ "BQAwHjEcMBoGA1UEAxMTR251VExTIHRlc3Qgcm9vdCBDQTAeFw0yMTA1MDMxNDI1\n"
+ "MDNaFw0yMjA1MDMxNDI1MDNaMB4xHDAaBgNVBAMTE0dudVRMUyB0ZXN0IHJvb3Qg\n"
+ "Q0EwggGiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBjwAwggGKAoIBgQCsFAaMb/iRN+OFqQNh\n"
+ "OkkXGZlb+eLerLuB9ELnYwyLIh4MTXh0RjFZdCQLsQHfY/YFv0C50rmoXTA/d3Ef\n"
+ "K/P243KjX0XBWjO9TBuN0zth50eq94zf69yxA/a+kmT+O5YLfhi2ELM5F3IjOUoZ\n"
+ "lL0IGlFJwauAkaNylp/Evd5nW7g5DUJvMm4A3RXNfZt9gAD4lPRwryQq9jxT48Xu\n"
+ "fB0kAPEG/l/Izbz2rYin5+nySL+a0CSNuEbITxidtMhveB747oR0QS2sMQKji1ur\n"
+ "pRJ945SHiYJIgVuFAJc9StikSyIrxZgK45kAzcQAyRWWKiMNH5PprGFYJp+ypwhm\n"
+ "1t8Bphj2RFJAG3XRRZF/9uJIYc5mEHCsZFZ/IFRaKqyN30kAUijgNt+lW5mZXVFU\n"
+ "aqzV2zHjSG8jsGdia3cfBP46Z1q2eAh5jOCucTq1F7qZdVhOFmP9jFE6Uy5Kbwgc\n"
+ "kNAnsEllQeJQL2odVa7woKkZZ4M/c72X5tpBU38Rs3krn3sCAwEAAaNDMEEwDwYD\n"
+ "VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDBwQAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQgKVNENacW\n"
+ "S/gFtxnLcrD1sZfknzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAYEAaZMV71mZ9FYoVdpho61h\n"
+ "WWPs5GppQLJ1w70DNtGZ+lFrk/KopeDvOu1i61QLWRzcZCZMl+npiX1KH5kjVo3v\n"
+ "C9G8kdMW6EVRk5p6qCJMPFN2U+grMMp50aY5kmw+/v+Lhk5T/VG93l63P91FkUre\n"
+ "o8qhOudJExoUnR1uB9M6HMAxVn8Lm/N1LGPiP6A6Pboo716H7mg/A7pv9zoZ6jUp\n"
+ "7x693mA/b3I/QpDx/nJcmcdqxgEuW+aRlFXgnYZRFAawxi+5M9EwCWbkSTO4OMHP\n"
+ "Qlvak3tJO+wb92b0cICOOtzIPgQ+caiLg9d0FvesALmQzDmNmtqynoO85+Ia2Ywh\n"
+ "nxKPlpeImhLN9nGl9sOeW2m4mnA5r0h1vgML4v/MWL4TQhXallc31uFNj5HyFaTh\n"
+ "6Mr0g3GeQgN0jpT+aIOiKuW9fLts54+Ntj1NN40slqi3Y+/Yd6xhj+NgmbRvybZu\n"
+ "tnYFXKC0Q+QUf38horqG2Mc3/uh8MOm0eYUXwGJOdXYD\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+ NULL
+};
+
#if defined __clang__ || __GNUC__ > 4 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 5)
# pragma GCC diagnostic push
# pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-variable"
@@ -4275,6 +4432,14 @@ static struct
{ "ed448 - ok", ed448, &ed448[0], GNUTLS_PROFILE_TO_VFLAGS(GNUTLS_PROFILE_ULTRA),
0, NULL, 1584352960, 1},
{ "superseding - ok", superseding, superseding_ca, 0, 0, 0, 1590928011 },
+ { "rsa-sha1 in trusted - ok",
+ rsa_sha1_in_trusted, rsa_sha1_in_trusted_ca,
+ GNUTLS_PROFILE_TO_VFLAGS(GNUTLS_PROFILE_MEDIUM),
+ 0, NULL, 1620052390, 1},
+ { "rsa-sha1 not in trusted - not ok",
+ rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted, rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted_ca,
+ GNUTLS_PROFILE_TO_VFLAGS(GNUTLS_PROFILE_MEDIUM),
+ GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID, NULL, 1620118136, 1},
{ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, 0}
};
--
2.31.1

View File

@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
From c149dd0767f32789e391280cb1eb06b7eb7c6bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:05:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] auth/rsa: side-step potential side-channel
Remove branching that depends on secret data.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
---
lib/auth/rsa.c | 10 ----------
1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
index 8108ee841d..6b158bacb2 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static int
proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
size_t _data_size)
{
- const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n";
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
int ret, dsize;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
@@ -235,15 +234,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
- if (ok) {
- /* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are
- * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug
- * logging is disabled */
- _gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error);
- } else {
- _gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error);
- }
-
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above.
*/
--
2.39.1
From 7c963102ec2119eecc1789b993aabe5edfd75f3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 14:32:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] rsa: remove dead code
since the `ok` variable isn't used any more, we can remove all code
used to calculate it
Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
---
lib/auth/rsa.c | 20 +++-----------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
index 6b158bacb2..858701fe6e 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -159,8 +159,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
int ret, dsize;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
- volatile uint8_t check_ver_min;
- volatile uint32_t ok;
#ifdef ENABLE_SSL3
if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) {
@@ -186,7 +184,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
- check_ver_min = (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0);
session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
@@ -205,10 +202,9 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
return ret;
}
- ret =
- gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
- 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
- session->key.key.size);
+ gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
+ 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
+ session->key.key.size);
/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
* in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
* channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
@@ -224,16 +220,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
* Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
*/
- /* ok is 0 in case of error and 1 in case of success. */
-
- /* if ret < 0 */
- ok = CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0);
- /* session->key.key.data[0] must equal ver_maj */
- ok &= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[0], ver_maj);
- /* if check_ver_min then session->key.key.data[1] must equal ver_min */
- ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
- CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
-
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above.
*/
--
2.39.1

View File

@ -1,20 +1,10 @@
Version: 3.6.16
Release: 8%{?dist}.3
Version: 3.6.14
Release: 3%{?dist}
Patch1: gnutls-3.2.7-rpath.patch
Patch2: gnutls-3.6.4-no-now-guile.patch
Patch3: gnutls-3.6.13-enable-intel-cet.patch
Patch10: gnutls-3.6.14-fips-dh-selftests.patch
Patch11: gnutls-3.6.14-fips-kdf-selftests.patch
Patch12: gnutls-3.6.16-tls12-cert-type.patch
Patch13: gnutls-3.6.16-trust-ca-sha1.patch
Patch14: gnutls-3.6.16-doc-p11tool-ckaid.patch
Patch15: gnutls-3.6.16-pkcs7-verify.patch
Patch16: gnutls-3.6.16-cpuid.patch
Patch17: gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch
Patch18: gnutls-3.6.16-rehandshake-tickets.patch
Patch19: gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing.patch
Patch20: gnutls-3.6.16-rsa-psk-timing-followup.patch
Patch21: gnutls-3.6.16-deterministic-ecdsa-fixes.patch
Patch4: gnutls-3.6.14-autogen-int.patch
Patch5: gnutls-3.6.14-fips-mode-check.patch
%bcond_without dane
%if 0%{?rhel}
%bcond_with guile
@ -160,7 +150,7 @@ This package contains Guile bindings for the library.
%prep
gpgv2 --keyring %{SOURCE2} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
%autosetup -p1 -S git
%autosetup -p1
sed -i -e 's|sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/lib /usr/lib|sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/lib /usr/lib %{_libdir}|g' configure
rm -f lib/minitasn1/*.c lib/minitasn1/*.h
@ -172,7 +162,6 @@ echo "SYSTEM=NORMAL" >> tests/system.prio
# via the crypto policies
%build
autoreconf -fi
CCASFLAGS="$CCASFLAGS -Wa,--generate-missing-build-notes=yes"
export CCASFLAGS
%configure --with-libtasn1-prefix=%{_prefix} \
@ -299,67 +288,6 @@ fi
%endif
%changelog
* Tue Mar 26 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8.3
- Fix memleak with older GMP (RHEL-28957)
* Mon Mar 25 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8.2
- Fix timing side-channel in deterministic ECDSA (RHEL-28957)
* Thu Jan 18 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8.1
- auth/rsa-psk: minimize branching after decryption (RHEL-21586)
* Wed Dec 6 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-8
- auth/rsa_psk: side-step potential side-channel (RHEL-16753)
* Mon Jun 26 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-7
- Clear server's session ticket indication at rehandshake (#2089817)
* Thu Feb 23 2023 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-6
- Fix x86_64 CPU feature detection when AVX is not available (#2131152)
- Fix timing side-channel in TLS RSA key exchange (#2162598)
* Mon Aug 29 2022 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-5
- Fix double-free in gnutls_pkcs7_verify (#2109788)
* Mon Jun 28 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-4
- p11tool: Document ID reuse behavior when importing certs (#1776250)
* Mon Jun 7 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-3
- Treat SHA-1 signed CA in the trusted set differently (#1965445)
* Wed May 26 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-2
- Filter certificate_types in TLS 1.2 CR based on signature algorithms (#1942216)
* Mon May 24 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-1
- Update to upstream 3.6.16 release (#1956783)
- Fix potential use-after-free in key_share handling (#1927597)
- Fix potential use-after-free in pre_shared_key handling (#1927593)
- Stop gnutls-serv relying on AI_ADDRCONFIG to decide listening address (#1908334)
- Fix cert expiration issue in tests (#1908110)
* Thu Apr 1 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-10
- Port fixes for potential miscalculation in ecdsa_verify (#1942931)
* Tue Nov 24 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-9
- Revert the previous change
* Wed Nov 11 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-8
- Depend on specific NVR of gmp and nettle (#1812933)
* Tue Nov 3 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-7
- Increase DH key bits to >= 2048 in self-tests (#1879506)
- Implement self-tests for KDF and CMAC (#1890870)
- Fix CVE-2020-24659: heap buffer-overflow when "no_renegotiation" alert is received (#1873959)
* Mon Aug 24 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-6
- Fix memory leak when serializing iovec_t (#1844112)
* Sat Jul 18 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-5
- Perform validation checks on (EC)DH public keys and share secrets (#1855803)
* Mon Jun 29 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-4
- Tighten FIPS DH primes check according to SP800-56A (rev 3) (#1849079)
* Fri Jun 5 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.14-3
- Update gnutls-3.6.14-fips-mode-check.patch