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Fix CVE-2025-32988, CVE-2025-32989, CVE-2025-32990, and CVE-2025-6395

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Resolves: RHEL-102049
Resolves: RHEL-102052
Resolves: RHEL-102056
Resolves: RHEL-102066
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Daiki Ueno 2025-07-16 16:57:29 +09:00
parent 187518c4ce
commit 0232b2fe99
5 changed files with 2451 additions and 1 deletions
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40
gnutls-3.8.3-cve-2025-32988.patch Normal file
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From f1fe8d2a7669c4cdcdaaabd8969d358040c142ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2025 10:44:12 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] x509: avoid double free when exporting othernames in SAN
Previously, the _gnutls_write_new_othername function, called by
gnutls_x509_ext_export_subject_alt_names to export "otherName" in a
certificate's SAN extension, freed the caller allocated ASN.1
structure upon error, resulting in a potential double-free.
Reported by OpenAI Security Research Team.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/x509/extensions.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/x509/extensions.c b/lib/x509/extensions.c
index 6c2da8fd10..e8be12eaf5 100644
--- a/lib/x509/extensions.c
+++ b/lib/x509/extensions.c
@@ -754,7 +754,6 @@ int _gnutls_write_new_othername(asn1_node ext, const char *ext_name,
result = asn1_write_value(ext, name2, oid, 1);
if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS) {
gnutls_assert();
- asn1_delete_structure(&ext);
return _gnutls_asn2err(result);
}
@@ -763,7 +762,6 @@ int _gnutls_write_new_othername(asn1_node ext, const char *ext_name,
result = asn1_write_value(ext, name2, data, data_size);
if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS) {
gnutls_assert();
- asn1_delete_structure(&ext);
return _gnutls_asn2err(result);
}
--
2.50.0

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gnutls-3.8.3-cve-2025-32989.patch Normal file
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From 639a551c6d4707c7fb880412d695dbdd31f60cf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2025 10:23:59 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] x509: fix read buffer overrun in SCT timestamps
Prevent reading beyond heap buffer in call to _gnutls_parse_ct_sct
when processing x509 Signed Certificate Timestamps with certain
malformed data. Spotted by oss-fuzz at:
https://issues.oss-fuzz.com/issues/42530513
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/x509/x509_ext.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/x509/x509_ext.c b/lib/x509/x509_ext.c
index ad3af1430a..9a36f3536b 100644
--- a/lib/x509/x509_ext.c
+++ b/lib/x509/x509_ext.c
@@ -3759,7 +3759,7 @@ int gnutls_x509_ext_ct_import_scts(const gnutls_datum_t *ext,
}
length = _gnutls_read_uint16(scts_content.data);
- if (length < 4) {
+ if (length < 4 || length > scts_content.size) {
gnutls_free(scts_content.data);
return GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
--
2.50.0

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gnutls-3.8.3-cve-2025-32990.patch Normal file
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282
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From 853a64f5e92bedd2ebf97baadba39f2d2bfa95ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2025 11:15:45 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] handshake: clear HSK_PSK_SELECTED is when resetting binders
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
When a TLS 1.3 handshake involves HRR and resumption or PSK, and the
second Client Hello omits PSK, the server would result in a NULL
pointer dereference as the PSK binder information is cleared while the
HSK_PSK_SELECTED flag is still set. This makes sure that
HSK_PSK_SELECTED flag is always cleared when the PSK binders are
reset. This also makes it clear the HSK_PSK_SELECTED flag is valid
only during a handshake; after that, whether PSK is used can be
checked with gnutls_auth_client_get_type.
Reported by Stefan Bühler.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
.gitignore | 1 +
lib/handshake.c | 25 +++-
lib/state.c | 4 +-
tests/Makefile.am | 2 +
tests/tls13/hello_retry_request_psk.c | 173 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 201 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tests/tls13/hello_retry_request_psk.c
diff --git a/lib/handshake.c b/lib/handshake.c
index 722307be7c..489d021945 100644
--- a/lib/handshake.c
+++ b/lib/handshake.c
@@ -589,9 +589,28 @@ static int set_auth_types(gnutls_session_t session)
/* Under TLS1.3 this returns a KX which matches the negotiated
* groups from the key shares; if we are resuming then the KX seen
* here doesn't match the original session. */
- if (!session->internals.resumed)
- kx = gnutls_kx_get(session);
- else
+ if (!session->internals.resumed) {
+ const gnutls_group_entry_st *group = get_group(session);
+
+ if (session->internals.hsk_flags & HSK_PSK_SELECTED) {
+ if (group) {
+ kx = group->pk == GNUTLS_PK_DH ?
+ GNUTLS_KX_DHE_PSK :
+ GNUTLS_KX_ECDHE_PSK;
+ } else {
+ kx = GNUTLS_KX_PSK;
+ }
+ } else if (group) {
+ /* Not necessarily be RSA, but just to
+ * make _gnutls_map_kx_get_cred below
+ * work.
+ */
+ kx = group->pk == GNUTLS_PK_DH ?
+ GNUTLS_KX_DHE_RSA :
+ GNUTLS_KX_ECDHE_RSA;
+ } else
+ kx = GNUTLS_KX_UNKNOWN;
+ } else
kx = GNUTLS_KX_UNKNOWN;
} else {
/* TLS1.2 or earlier, kx is associated with ciphersuite */
diff --git a/lib/state.c b/lib/state.c
index ec514c0cd2..10ec0eadb6 100644
--- a/lib/state.c
+++ b/lib/state.c
@@ -202,7 +202,8 @@ gnutls_kx_algorithm_t gnutls_kx_get(gnutls_session_t session)
const gnutls_group_entry_st *group = get_group(session);
if (ver->tls13_sem) {
- if (session->internals.hsk_flags & HSK_PSK_SELECTED) {
+ if (gnutls_auth_client_get_type(session) ==
+ GNUTLS_CRD_PSK) {
if (group) {
if (group->pk == GNUTLS_PK_DH)
return GNUTLS_KX_DHE_PSK;
@@ -349,6 +350,7 @@ void reset_binders(gnutls_session_t session)
_gnutls_free_temp_key_datum(&session->key.binders[0].psk);
_gnutls_free_temp_key_datum(&session->key.binders[1].psk);
memset(session->key.binders, 0, sizeof(session->key.binders));
+ session->internals.hsk_flags &= ~HSK_PSK_SELECTED;
}
/* Check whether certificate credentials of type @cert_type are set
diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
index babf3be108..f6a16552d1 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/Makefile.am
@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ ctests += tls13/hello_retry_request
ctests += tls13/hello_retry_request_resume
+ctests += tls13/hello_retry_request_psk
+
ctests += tls13/psk-ext
ctests += tls13/key_update
diff --git a/tests/tls13/hello_retry_request_psk.c b/tests/tls13/hello_retry_request_psk.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a20cb0d965
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/tls13/hello_retry_request_psk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2025 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos, Daiki Ueno
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuTLS.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include "config.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "cert-common.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "tls13/ext-parse.h"
+#include "eagain-common.h"
+
+/* This program exercises the case where a TLS 1.3 handshake ends up
+ * with HRR, and the first CH includes PSK while the 2nd CH omits
+ * it */
+
+const char *testname = "hello entry request";
+
+const char *side = "";
+
+#define myfail(fmt, ...) fail("%s: " fmt, testname, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+static void tls_log_func(int level, const char *str)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s|<%d>| %s", side, level, str);
+}
+
+struct ctx_st {
+ unsigned hrr_seen;
+ unsigned hello_counter;
+};
+
+static int pskfunc(gnutls_session_t session, const char *username,
+ gnutls_datum_t *key)
+{
+ if (debug)
+ printf("psk: username %s\n", username);
+ key->data = gnutls_malloc(4);
+ key->data[0] = 0xDE;
+ key->data[1] = 0xAD;
+ key->data[2] = 0xBE;
+ key->data[3] = 0xEF;
+ key->size = 4;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int hello_callback(gnutls_session_t session, unsigned int htype,
+ unsigned post, unsigned int incoming,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *msg)
+{
+ struct ctx_st *ctx = gnutls_session_get_ptr(session);
+ assert(ctx != NULL);
+
+ if (htype == GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
+ ctx->hrr_seen = 1;
+
+ if (htype == GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ if (post == GNUTLS_HOOK_POST)
+ ctx->hello_counter++;
+ else {
+ /* Unset the PSK credential to omit the extension */
+ gnutls_credentials_set(session, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void doit(void)
+{
+ int sret, cret;
+ gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t scred;
+ gnutls_psk_client_credentials_t ccred;
+ gnutls_certificate_credentials_t ccred2;
+ gnutls_session_t server, client;
+ /* Need to enable anonymous KX specifically. */
+ const gnutls_datum_t key = { (void *)"DEADBEEF", 8 };
+
+ struct ctx_st ctx;
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+ global_init();
+
+ gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func);
+ if (debug)
+ gnutls_global_set_log_level(9);
+
+ /* Init server */
+ assert(gnutls_psk_allocate_server_credentials(&scred) >= 0);
+ gnutls_psk_set_server_credentials_function(scred, pskfunc);
+
+ gnutls_init(&server, GNUTLS_SERVER);
+
+ assert(gnutls_priority_set_direct(
+ server,
+ "NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:-GROUP-ALL:+GROUP-X25519:+DHE-PSK",
+ NULL) >= 0);
+
+ gnutls_credentials_set(server, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK, scred);
+ gnutls_transport_set_push_function(server, server_push);
+ gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(server, server_pull);
+ gnutls_transport_set_ptr(server, server);
+
+ /* Init client */
+ assert(gnutls_psk_allocate_client_credentials(&ccred) >= 0);
+ gnutls_psk_set_client_credentials(ccred, "test", &key,
+ GNUTLS_PSK_KEY_HEX);
+ assert(gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&ccred2) >= 0);
+
+ assert(gnutls_init(&client, GNUTLS_CLIENT | GNUTLS_KEY_SHARE_TOP) >= 0);
+
+ gnutls_session_set_ptr(client, &ctx);
+
+ cret = gnutls_priority_set_direct(
+ client,
+ "NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:-GROUP-ALL:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+GROUP-X25519:+DHE-PSK",
+ NULL);
+ if (cret < 0)
+ myfail("cannot set TLS 1.3 priorities\n");
+
+ gnutls_credentials_set(client, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK, ccred);
+ gnutls_credentials_set(client, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, ccred2);
+ gnutls_transport_set_push_function(client, client_push);
+ gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(client, client_pull);
+ gnutls_transport_set_ptr(client, client);
+
+ gnutls_handshake_set_hook_function(client, GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_ANY,
+ GNUTLS_HOOK_BOTH, hello_callback);
+
+ HANDSHAKE_EXPECT(client, server, GNUTLS_E_AGAIN,
+ GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS);
+
+ assert(ctx.hrr_seen != 0);
+
+ gnutls_bye(client, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+ gnutls_bye(server, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+
+ gnutls_deinit(client);
+ gnutls_deinit(server);
+
+ gnutls_psk_free_server_credentials(scred);
+ gnutls_psk_free_client_credentials(ccred);
+ gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(ccred2);
+
+ gnutls_global_deinit();
+ reset_buffers();
+}
--
2.50.0

6
gnutls.spec
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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
}
Version: 3.8.3
Release: 6%{?dist}
Release: 7%{?dist}
# not upstreamed
Patch: gnutls-3.2.7-rpath.patch
Patch: gnutls-3.7.2-enable-intel-cet.patch
@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ Patch: gnutls-3.8.3-ktls-utsname.patch
Patch: gnutls-3.8.3-deterministic-ecdsa-fixes.patch
Patch: gnutls-3.8.3-verify-chain.patch
Patch: gnutls-3.8.9-CVE-2024-12243.patch
Patch: gnutls-3.8.3-cve-2025-32988.patch
Patch: gnutls-3.8.3-cve-2025-32989.patch
Patch: gnutls-3.8.3-cve-2025-32990.patch
Patch: gnutls-3.8.3-cve-2025-6395.patch
%bcond_without bootstrap
%bcond_without dane