Resolves: #985625

- Fix CVE-2013-4788: Static applications now support pointer mangling.
  Existing static applications must be recompiled (#985625).

glibc-rh985625-CVE-2013-4788.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,464 @@
+#
+# CVE-2013-4788 The pointer guard used for pointer mangling was not
+# initialized for static applications resulting in the security feature
+# being disabled. The pointer guard is now correctly initialized to a
+# random value for static applications. Existing static applications need
+# to be recompiled to take advantage of the fix (bug 15754).
+#
+# Not yet upstream.
+#
+diff --git a/csu/libc-start.c b/csu/libc-start.c
+index e5da3ef..c898d06 100644
+--- a/csu/libc-start.c
++++ b/csu/libc-start.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ extern void __pthread_initialize_minimal (void);
+    in thread local area.  */
+ uintptr_t __stack_chk_guard attribute_relro;
+ # endif
++# ifndef  THREAD_SET_POINTER_GUARD
++/* Only exported for architectures that don't store the pointer guard
++   value in thread local area.  */
++uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
++	attribute_relro attribute_hidden __attribute__ ((nocommon));
++# endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_PTR_NTHREADS
+@@ -195,6 +201,16 @@ LIBC_START_MAIN (int (*main) (int, char **, char ** MAIN_AUXVEC_DECL),
+ # else
+   __stack_chk_guard = stack_chk_guard;
+ # endif
++
++  /* Set up the pointer guard value.  */
++  uintptr_t pointer_chk_guard = _dl_setup_pointer_guard (_dl_random,
++							 stack_chk_guard);
++# ifdef THREAD_SET_POINTER_GUARD
++  THREAD_SET_POINTER_GUARD (pointer_chk_guard);
++# else
++  __pointer_chk_guard_local = pointer_chk_guard;
++# endif
++
+ #endif
+ 
+   /* Register the destructor of the dynamic linker if there is any.  */
+diff --git a/elf/Makefile b/elf/Makefile
+index aaa9534..cb8da93 100644
+--- a/elf/Makefile
++++ b/elf/Makefile
+@@ -121,7 +121,8 @@ endif
+ tests = tst-tls1 tst-tls2 tst-tls9 tst-leaks1 \
+ 	tst-array1 tst-array2 tst-array3 tst-array4 tst-array5
+ tests-static = tst-tls1-static tst-tls2-static tst-stackguard1-static \
+-	       tst-leaks1-static tst-array1-static tst-array5-static
++	       tst-leaks1-static tst-array1-static tst-array5-static \
++	       tst-ptrguard1-static
+ ifeq (yes,$(build-shared))
+ tests-static += tst-tls9-static
+ tst-tls9-static-ENV = \
+@@ -145,7 +146,8 @@ tests += loadtest restest1 preloadtest loadfail multiload origtest resolvfail \
+ 	 tst-audit1 tst-audit2 tst-audit8 \
+ 	 tst-stackguard1 tst-addr1 tst-thrlock \
+ 	 tst-unique1 tst-unique2 tst-unique3 tst-unique4 \
+-	 tst-initorder tst-initorder2 tst-relsort1 tst-null-argv
++	 tst-initorder tst-initorder2 tst-relsort1 tst-null-argv \
++	 tst-ptrguard1
+ #	 reldep9
+ test-srcs = tst-pathopt
+ selinux-enabled := $(shell cat /selinux/enforce 2> /dev/null)
+@@ -1016,6 +1018,9 @@ LDFLAGS-order2mod2.so = $(no-as-needed)
+ tst-stackguard1-ARGS = --command "$(host-test-program-cmd) --child"
+ tst-stackguard1-static-ARGS = --command "$(objpfx)tst-stackguard1-static --child"
+ 
++tst-ptrguard1-ARGS = --command "$(host-test-program-cmd) --child"
++tst-ptrguard1-static-ARGS = --command "$(objpfx)tst-ptrguard1-static --child"
++
+ $(objpfx)tst-leaks1: $(libdl)
+ $(objpfx)tst-leaks1-mem: $(objpfx)tst-leaks1.out
+ 	$(common-objpfx)malloc/mtrace $(objpfx)tst-leaks1.mtrace > $@
+diff --git a/elf/tst-ptrguard1-static.c b/elf/tst-ptrguard1-static.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7aff3b7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/elf/tst-ptrguard1-static.c
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++#include "tst-ptrguard1.c"
+diff --git a/elf/tst-ptrguard1.c b/elf/tst-ptrguard1.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..c344a04
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/elf/tst-ptrguard1.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
++/* Copyright (C) 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
++   This file is part of the GNU C Library.
++
++   The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++   modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
++   License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
++   version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
++
++   The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
++   Lesser General Public License for more details.
++
++   You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
++   License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
++   <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
++
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdbool.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/wait.h>
++#include <stackguard-macros.h>
++#include <tls.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++
++#ifndef POINTER_CHK_GUARD
++extern uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard;
++# define POINTER_CHK_GUARD __pointer_chk_guard
++#endif
++
++static const char *command;
++static bool child;
++static uintptr_t ptr_chk_guard_copy;
++static bool ptr_chk_guard_copy_set;
++static int fds[2];
++
++static void __attribute__ ((constructor))
++con (void)
++{
++  ptr_chk_guard_copy = POINTER_CHK_GUARD;
++  ptr_chk_guard_copy_set = true;
++}
++
++static int
++uintptr_t_cmp (const void *a, const void *b)
++{
++  if (*(uintptr_t *) a < *(uintptr_t *) b)
++    return 1;
++  if (*(uintptr_t *) a > *(uintptr_t *) b)
++    return -1;
++  return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++do_test (void)
++{
++  if (!ptr_chk_guard_copy_set)
++    {
++      puts ("constructor has not been run");
++      return 1;
++    }
++
++  if (ptr_chk_guard_copy != POINTER_CHK_GUARD)
++    {
++      puts ("POINTER_CHK_GUARD changed between constructor and do_test");
++      return 1;
++    }
++
++  if (child)
++    {
++      write (2, &ptr_chk_guard_copy, sizeof (ptr_chk_guard_copy));
++      return 0;
++    }
++
++  if (command == NULL)
++    {
++      puts ("missing --command or --child argument");
++      return 1;
++    }
++
++#define N 16
++  uintptr_t child_ptr_chk_guards[N + 1];
++  child_ptr_chk_guards[N] = ptr_chk_guard_copy;
++  int i;
++  for (i = 0; i < N; ++i)
++    {
++      if (pipe (fds) < 0)
++	{
++	  printf ("couldn't create pipe: %m\n");
++	  return 1;
++	}
++
++      pid_t pid = fork ();
++      if (pid < 0)
++	{
++	  printf ("fork failed: %m\n");
++	  return 1;
++	}
++
++      if (!pid)
++	{
++	  if (ptr_chk_guard_copy != POINTER_CHK_GUARD)
++	    {
++	      puts ("POINTER_CHK_GUARD changed after fork");
++	      exit (1);
++	    }
++
++	  close (fds[0]);
++	  close (2);
++	  dup2 (fds[1], 2);
++	  close (fds[1]);
++
++	  system (command);
++	  exit (0);
++	}
++
++      close (fds[1]);
++
++      if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (read (fds[0], &child_ptr_chk_guards[i],
++				    sizeof (uintptr_t))) != sizeof (uintptr_t))
++	{
++	  puts ("could not read ptr_chk_guard value from child");
++	  return 1;
++	}
++
++      close (fds[0]);
++
++      pid_t termpid;
++      int status;
++      termpid = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (waitpid (pid, &status, 0));
++      if (termpid == -1)
++	{
++	  printf ("waitpid failed: %m\n");
++	  return 1;
++	}
++      else if (termpid != pid)
++	{
++	  printf ("waitpid returned %ld != %ld\n",
++		  (long int) termpid, (long int) pid);
++	  return 1;
++	}
++      else if (!WIFEXITED (status) || WEXITSTATUS (status))
++	{
++	  puts ("child hasn't exited with exit status 0");
++	  return 1;
++	}
++    }
++
++  qsort (child_ptr_chk_guards, N + 1, sizeof (uintptr_t), uintptr_t_cmp);
++
++  /* The default pointer guard is the same as the default stack guard.
++     They are only set to default if dl_random is NULL.  */
++  uintptr_t default_guard = 0;
++  unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) &default_guard;
++  p[sizeof (uintptr_t) - 1] = 255;
++  p[sizeof (uintptr_t) - 2] = '\n';
++  p[0] = 0;
++
++  /* Test if the pointer guard canaries are either randomized,
++     or equal to the default pointer guard value.
++     Even with randomized pointer guards it might happen
++     that the random number generator generates the same
++     values, but if that happens in more than half from
++     the 16 runs, something is very wrong.  */
++  int ndifferences = 0;
++  int ndefaults = 0;
++  for (i = 0; i < N; ++i)
++    {
++      if (child_ptr_chk_guards[i] != child_ptr_chk_guards[i+1])
++	ndifferences++;
++      else if (child_ptr_chk_guards[i] == default_guard)
++	ndefaults++;
++    }
++
++  printf ("differences %d defaults %d\n", ndifferences, ndefaults);
++
++  if (ndifferences < N / 2 && ndefaults < N / 2)
++    {
++      puts ("pointer guard values are not randomized enough");
++      puts ("nor equal to the default value");
++      return 1;
++    }
++
++  return 0;
++}
++
++#define OPT_COMMAND	10000
++#define OPT_CHILD	10001
++#define CMDLINE_OPTIONS	\
++  { "command", required_argument, NULL, OPT_COMMAND },  \
++  { "child", no_argument, NULL, OPT_CHILD },
++#define CMDLINE_PROCESS	\
++  case OPT_COMMAND:	\
++    command = optarg;	\
++    break;		\
++  case OPT_CHILD:	\
++    child = true;	\
++    break;
++#define TEST_FUNCTION do_test ()
++#include "../test-skeleton.c"
+diff --git a/ports/sysdeps/ia64/stackguard-macros.h b/ports/sysdeps/ia64/stackguard-macros.h
+index dc683c2..3907293 100644
+--- a/ports/sysdeps/ia64/stackguard-macros.h
++++ b/ports/sysdeps/ia64/stackguard-macros.h
+@@ -2,3 +2,6 @@
+ 
+ #define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
+   ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("adds %0 = -8, r13;; ld8 %0 = [%0]" : "=r" (x)); x; })
++
++#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("adds %0 = -16, r13;; ld8 %0 = [%0]" : "=r" (x)); x; })
+diff --git a/ports/sysdeps/tile/stackguard-macros.h b/ports/sysdeps/tile/stackguard-macros.h
+index 589ea2b..f2e041b 100644
+--- a/ports/sysdeps/tile/stackguard-macros.h
++++ b/ports/sysdeps/tile/stackguard-macros.h
+@@ -4,11 +4,17 @@
+ # if __WORDSIZE == 64
+ #  define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
+   ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -16; ld %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
++#  define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -24; ld %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
+ # else
+ #  define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
+   ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -8; ld4s %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
++#  define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -12; ld4s %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
+ # endif
+ #else
+ # define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
+   ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -8; lw %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
++# define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -12; lw %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
+ #endif
+diff --git a/sysdeps/generic/stackguard-macros.h b/sysdeps/generic/stackguard-macros.h
+index ababf65..77408c6 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/generic/stackguard-macros.h
++++ b/sysdeps/generic/stackguard-macros.h
+@@ -2,3 +2,6 @@
+ 
+ extern uintptr_t __stack_chk_guard;
+ #define STACK_CHK_GUARD __stack_chk_guard
++
++extern uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard;
++#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD __pointer_chk_guard
+diff --git a/sysdeps/i386/stackguard-macros.h b/sysdeps/i386/stackguard-macros.h
+index 8c31e19..0397629 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/i386/stackguard-macros.h
++++ b/sysdeps/i386/stackguard-macros.h
+@@ -2,3 +2,11 @@
+ 
+ #define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
+   ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("movl %%gs:0x14, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
++
++#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({							\
++     uintptr_t x;					\
++     asm ("movl %%gs:%c1, %0" : "=r" (x)		\
++	  : "i" (offsetof (tcbhead_t, pointer_guard)));	\
++     x;							\
++   })
+diff --git a/sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc32/stackguard-macros.h b/sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc32/stackguard-macros.h
+index 839f6a4..b3d0af8 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc32/stackguard-macros.h
++++ b/sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc32/stackguard-macros.h
+@@ -2,3 +2,13 @@
+ 
+ #define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
+   ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("lwz %0,-28680(2)" : "=r" (x)); x; })
++
++#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({												\
++     uintptr_t x;										\
++     asm ("lwz %0,%1(2)"									\
++	  : "=r" (x)										\
++	  : "i" (offsetof (tcbhead_t, pointer_guard) - TLS_TCB_OFFSET - sizeof (tcbhead_t))	\
++         );											\
++     x;												\
++   })
+diff --git a/sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/stackguard-macros.h b/sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/stackguard-macros.h
+index 9da879c..4620f96 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/stackguard-macros.h
++++ b/sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/stackguard-macros.h
+@@ -2,3 +2,13 @@
+ 
+ #define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
+   ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("ld %0,-28688(13)" : "=r" (x)); x; })
++
++#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({												\
++     uintptr_t x;										\
++     asm ("ld %0,%1(2)"										\
++	  : "=r" (x)										\
++	  : "i" (offsetof (tcbhead_t, pointer_guard) - TLS_TCB_OFFSET - sizeof (tcbhead_t))	\
++         );											\
++     x;												\
++   })
+diff --git a/sysdeps/s390/s390-32/stackguard-macros.h b/sysdeps/s390/s390-32/stackguard-macros.h
+index b74c579..449e8d4 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/s390/s390-32/stackguard-macros.h
++++ b/sysdeps/s390/s390-32/stackguard-macros.h
+@@ -2,3 +2,14 @@
+ 
+ #define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
+   ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("ear %0,%%a0; l %0,0x14(%0)" : "=a" (x)); x; })
++
++/* On s390/s390x there is no unique pointer guard, instead we use the
++   same value as the stack guard.  */
++#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({							\
++     uintptr_t x;					\
++     asm ("ear %0,%%a0; l %0,%1(%0)"			\
++	  : "=a" (x)					\
++	  : "i" (offsetof (tcbhead_t, stack_guard)));	\
++     x;							\
++   })
+diff --git a/sysdeps/s390/s390-64/stackguard-macros.h b/sysdeps/s390/s390-64/stackguard-macros.h
+index 0cebb5f..c8270fb 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/s390/s390-64/stackguard-macros.h
++++ b/sysdeps/s390/s390-64/stackguard-macros.h
+@@ -2,3 +2,17 @@
+ 
+ #define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
+   ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("ear %0,%%a0; sllg %0,%0,32; ear %0,%%a1; lg %0,0x28(%0)" : "=a" (x)); x; })
++
++/* On s390/s390x there is no unique pointer guard, instead we use the
++   same value as the stack guard.  */
++#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({							\
++     uintptr_t x;					\
++     asm ("ear %0,%%a0;"				\
++	  "sllg %0,%0,32;"				\
++	  "ear %0,%%a1;"				\
++	  "lg %0,%1(%0)"				\
++	 : "=a" (x)					\
++	 : "i" (offsetof (tcbhead_t, stack_guard)));	\
++     x;							\
++   })
+diff --git a/sysdeps/sparc/sparc32/stackguard-macros.h b/sysdeps/sparc/sparc32/stackguard-macros.h
+index c0b02b0..1eef0f1 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/sparc/sparc32/stackguard-macros.h
++++ b/sysdeps/sparc/sparc32/stackguard-macros.h
+@@ -2,3 +2,6 @@
+ 
+ #define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
+   ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("ld [%%g7+0x14], %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
++
++#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("ld [%%g7+0x18], %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
+diff --git a/sysdeps/sparc/sparc64/stackguard-macros.h b/sysdeps/sparc/sparc64/stackguard-macros.h
+index 80f0635..cc0c12c 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/sparc/sparc64/stackguard-macros.h
++++ b/sysdeps/sparc/sparc64/stackguard-macros.h
+@@ -2,3 +2,6 @@
+ 
+ #define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
+   ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("ldx [%%g7+0x28], %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
++
++#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("ldx [%%g7+0x30], %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
+diff --git a/sysdeps/x86_64/stackguard-macros.h b/sysdeps/x86_64/stackguard-macros.h
+index d7fedb3..1948800 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/x86_64/stackguard-macros.h
++++ b/sysdeps/x86_64/stackguard-macros.h
+@@ -4,3 +4,8 @@
+   ({ uintptr_t x;						\
+      asm ("mov %%fs:%c1, %0" : "=r" (x)				\
+ 	  : "i" (offsetof (tcbhead_t, stack_guard))); x; })
++
++#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
++  ({ uintptr_t x;						\
++     asm ("mov %%fs:%c1, %0" : "=r" (x)				\
++	  : "i" (offsetof (tcbhead_t, pointer_guard))); x; })

glibc.spec

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 %define glibcsrcdir glibc-2.18-113-gf06dd27
 %define glibcversion 2.18.90
-%define glibcrelease 3%{?dist}
+%define glibcrelease 4%{?dist}
 # Pre-release tarballs are pulled in from git using a command that is
 # effectively:
 #
@@ -208,9 +208,12 @@ Patch2026: %{name}-rh841787.patch
 # Upstream BZ 14185
 Patch2027: %{name}-rh819430.patch
 
-#Upstream BZ 14547
+# Upstream BZ 14547
 Patch2028: %{name}-strcoll-cve.patch
 
+# Upstream BZ 15754
+Patch2029: %{name}-rh985625-CVE-2013-4788.patch
+
 ##############################################################################
 # End of glibc patches.
 ##############################################################################
@@ -536,6 +539,7 @@ package or when debugging this package.
 %patch0040 -p1
 %patch0041 -p1
 %patch0042 -p1
+%patch2029 -p1
 
 ##############################################################################
 # %%prep - Additional prep required...
@@ -1621,6 +1625,10 @@ rm -f *.filelist*
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Sun Sep 22 2013 Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com> - 2.18.90-4
+- Fix CVE-2013-4788: Static applications now support pointer mangling.
+  Existing static applications must be recompiled (#985625).
+
 * Wed Sep 18 2013 Patsy Franklin <pfrankli@redhat.com> - 2.18.90-3
 - Fix conditional requiring specific binutils for s390/s390x.