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import glib2-2.56.4-156.el8

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CentOS Sources 2021-11-09 04:53:14 -05:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent 455c8008af
commit c913e00e78
19 changed files with 1298 additions and 503 deletions
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170
SOURCES/0001-GDBus-prefer-getsockopt-style-credentials-passing-AP.patch
View File

@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
From ee502dbbe89a5976c32eb8863c9a9d274ddb60e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2019 08:47:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] GDBus: prefer getsockopt()-style credentials-passing APIs
Conceptually, a D-Bus server is really trying to determine the credentials
of (the process that initiated) a connection, not the credentials that
the process had when it sent a particular message. Ideally, it does
this with a getsockopt()-style API that queries the credentials of the
connection's initiator without requiring any particular cooperation from
that process, avoiding a class of possible failures.
The leading '\0' in the D-Bus protocol is primarily a workaround
for platforms where the message-based credentials-passing API is
strictly better than the getsockopt()-style API (for example, on
FreeBSD, SCM_CREDS includes a process ID but getpeereid() does not),
or where the getsockopt()-style API does not exist at all. As a result
libdbus, the reference implementation of D-Bus, does not implement
Linux SCM_CREDENTIALS at all - it has no reason to do so, because the
SO_PEERCRED socket option is equally informative.
This change makes GDBusServer on Linux more closely match the behaviour
of libdbus.
In particular, GNOME/glib#1831 indicates that when a libdbus client
connects to a GDBus server, recvmsg() sometimes yields a SCM_CREDENTIALS
message with cmsg_data={pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}. I think this is
most likely a race condition in the early steps to connect:
client server
connect
accept
send '\0' <- race -> set SO_PASSCRED = 1
receive '\0'
If the server wins the race:
client server
connect
accept
set SO_PASSCRED = 1
send '\0'
receive '\0'
then everything is fine. However, if the client wins the race:
client server
connect
accept
send '\0'
set SO_PASSCRED = 1
receive '\0'
then the kernel does not record credentials for the message containing
'\0' (because SO_PASSCRED was 0 at the time). However, by the time the
server receives the message, the kernel knows that credentials are
desired. I would have expected the kernel to omit the credentials header
in this case, but it seems that instead, it synthesizes a credentials
structure with a dummy process ID 0, a dummy uid derived from
/proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and a dummy gid derived from
/proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid.
In an unconfigured GDBusServer, hitting this race condition results in
falling back to DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication, which in practice usually
succeeds in authenticating the peer's uid. However, we encourage AF_UNIX
servers on Unix platforms to allow only EXTERNAL authentication as a
security-hardening measure, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 relies on a series
of assumptions including a cryptographically strong PRNG and a shared
home directory with no write access by others, which are not necessarily
true for all operating systems and users. EXTERNAL authentication will
fail if the server cannot determine the client's credentials.
In particular, this caused a regression when CVE-2019-14822 was fixed
in ibus, which appears to be resolved by this commit. Qt clients
(which use libdbus) intermittently fail to connect to an ibus server
(which uses GDBusServer), because ibus no longer allows DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1
authentication or non-matching uids.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Closes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/issues/1831
---
gio/gcredentialsprivate.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
gio/gdbusauth.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
index 06f0aed19..e9ec09b9f 100644
--- a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
+++ b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
@@ -81,6 +81,18 @@
*/
#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if the data structure transferred by the message-passing
+ * API is strictly more informative than the one transferred by the
+ * `getsockopt()`-style API, and hence should be preferred, even for
+ * protocols like D-Bus that are defined in terms of the credentials of
+ * the (process that opened the) socket, as opposed to the credentials
+ * of an individual message.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING
+
#ifdef __linux__
#define G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED 1
#define G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED 1
@@ -100,6 +112,12 @@
#define G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_SIZE (sizeof (struct cmsgcred))
#define G_CREDENTIALS_UNIX_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE_SUPPORTED 1
#define G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED 1
+/* GLib doesn't implement it yet, but FreeBSD's getsockopt()-style API
+ * is getpeereid(), which is not as informative as struct cmsgcred -
+ * it does not tell us the PID. As a result, libdbus prefers to use
+ * SCM_CREDS, and if we implement getpeereid() in future, we should
+ * do the same. */
+#define G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING 1
#elif defined(__NetBSD__)
#define G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED 1
diff --git a/gio/gdbusauth.c b/gio/gdbusauth.c
index 752ec23fc..14cc5d70e 100644
--- a/gio/gdbusauth.c
+++ b/gio/gdbusauth.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include "gdbusutils.h"
#include "gioenumtypes.h"
#include "gcredentials.h"
+#include "gcredentialsprivate.h"
#include "gdbusprivate.h"
#include "giostream.h"
#include "gdatainputstream.h"
@@ -969,9 +970,31 @@ _g_dbus_auth_run_server (GDBusAuth *auth,
g_data_input_stream_set_newline_type (dis, G_DATA_STREAM_NEWLINE_TYPE_CR_LF);
- /* first read the NUL-byte */
+ /* read the NUL-byte, possibly with credentials attached */
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
- if (G_IS_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
+#ifndef G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING
+ if (G_IS_SOCKET_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
+ {
+ GSocket *sock = g_socket_connection_get_socket (G_SOCKET_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream));
+
+ local_error = NULL;
+ credentials = g_socket_get_credentials (sock, &local_error);
+
+ if (credentials == NULL && !g_error_matches (local_error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED))
+ {
+ g_propagate_error (error, local_error);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Clear the error indicator, so we can retry with
+ * g_unix_connection_receive_credentials() if necessary */
+ g_clear_error (&local_error);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (credentials == NULL && G_IS_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
{
local_error = NULL;
credentials = g_unix_connection_receive_credentials (G_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream),
--
2.23.0

118
SOURCES/0001-credentials-Invalid-Linux-struct-ucred-means-no-info.patch
View File

@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
From 1485a97d8051b0aa047987f7b0c0bfe4ba4ce55b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2019 10:55:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] credentials: Invalid Linux struct ucred means "no
information"
On Linux, if getsockopt SO_PEERCRED is used on a TCP socket, one
might expect it to fail with an appropriate error like ENOTSUP or
EPROTONOSUPPORT. However, it appears that in fact it succeeds, but
yields a credentials structure with pid 0, uid -1 and gid -1. These
are not real process, user and group IDs that can be allocated to a
real process (pid 0 needs to be reserved to give kill(0) its documented
special semantics, and similarly uid and gid -1 need to be reserved for
setresuid() and setresgid()) so it is not meaningful to signal them to
high-level API users.
An API user with Linux-specific knowledge can still inspect these fields
via g_credentials_get_native() if desired.
Similarly, if SO_PASSCRED is used to receive a SCM_CREDENTIALS message
on a receiving Unix socket, but the sending socket had not enabled
SO_PASSCRED at the time that the message was sent, it is possible
for it to succeed but yield a credentials structure with pid 0, uid
/proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and gid /proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid. Even
if we were to read those pseudo-files, we cannot distinguish between
the overflow IDs and a real process that legitimately has the same IDs
(typically they are set to 'nobody' and 'nogroup', which can be used
by a real process), so we detect this situation by noticing that
pid == 0, and to save syscalls we do not read the overflow IDs from
/proc at all.
This results in a small API change: g_credentials_is_same_user() now
returns FALSE if we compare two credentials structures that are both
invalid. This seems like reasonable, conservative behaviour: if we cannot
prove that they are the same user, we should assume they are not.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
---
gio/gcredentials.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gio/gcredentials.c b/gio/gcredentials.c
index c350e3c88..c4794ded7 100644
--- a/gio/gcredentials.c
+++ b/gio/gcredentials.c
@@ -265,6 +265,35 @@ g_credentials_to_string (GCredentials *credentials)
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
+/*
+ * Check whether @native contains invalid data. If getsockopt SO_PEERCRED
+ * is used on a TCP socket, it succeeds but yields a credentials structure
+ * with pid 0, uid -1 and gid -1. Similarly, if SO_PASSCRED is used on a
+ * receiving Unix socket when the sending socket did not also enable
+ * SO_PASSCRED, it can succeed but yield a credentials structure with
+ * pid 0, uid /proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and gid
+ * /proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid.
+ */
+static gboolean
+linux_ucred_check_valid (struct ucred *native,
+ GError **error)
+{
+ if (native->pid == 0
+ || native->uid == -1
+ || native->gid == -1)
+ {
+ g_set_error_literal (error,
+ G_IO_ERROR,
+ G_IO_ERROR_INVALID_DATA,
+ _("GCredentials contains invalid data"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+#endif
+
/**
* g_credentials_is_same_user:
* @credentials: A #GCredentials.
@@ -294,7 +323,8 @@ g_credentials_is_same_user (GCredentials *credentials,
ret = FALSE;
#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
- if (credentials->native.uid == other_credentials->native.uid)
+ if (linux_ucred_check_valid (&credentials->native, NULL)
+ && credentials->native.uid == other_credentials->native.uid)
ret = TRUE;
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
if (credentials->native.cmcred_euid == other_credentials->native.cmcred_euid)
@@ -453,7 +483,10 @@ g_credentials_get_unix_user (GCredentials *credentials,
g_return_val_if_fail (error == NULL || *error == NULL, -1);
#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
- ret = credentials->native.uid;
+ if (linux_ucred_check_valid (&credentials->native, error))
+ ret = credentials->native.uid;
+ else
+ ret = -1;
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
ret = credentials->native.cmcred_euid;
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_NETBSD_UNPCBID
@@ -499,7 +532,10 @@ g_credentials_get_unix_pid (GCredentials *credentials,
g_return_val_if_fail (error == NULL || *error == NULL, -1);
#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
- ret = credentials->native.pid;
+ if (linux_ucred_check_valid (&credentials->native, error))
+ ret = credentials->native.pid;
+ else
+ ret = -1;
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
ret = credentials->native.cmcred_pid;
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_NETBSD_UNPCBID
--
2.23.0

83
SOURCES/0001-gcredentialsprivate-Document-the-various-private-mac.patch
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@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
From ef1035d9d86464ea0b5dde60a7a0e190895fdf5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2019 08:22:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] gcredentialsprivate: Document the various private macros
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
---
gio/gcredentialsprivate.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+)
diff --git a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
index 4d1c420a8..06f0aed19 100644
--- a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
+++ b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
@@ -22,6 +22,65 @@
#include "gio/gcredentials.h"
#include "gio/gnetworking.h"
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if GCredentials works.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED, etc.:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if GCredentials uses Linux `struct ucred`, etc.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_NETBSD_UNPCBID
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_OPENBSD_SOCKPEERCRED
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_SOLARIS_UCRED
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_TYPE:
+ *
+ * Defined to one of G_CREDENTIALS_TYPE_LINUX_UCRED, etc.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_TYPE
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_SIZE:
+ *
+ * Defined to the size of the %G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_TYPE
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_SIZE
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_UNIX_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE_SUPPORTED:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if we have a message-passing API in which credentials
+ * are attached to a particular message, such as `SCM_CREDENTIALS` on Linux
+ * or `SCM_CREDS` on FreeBSD.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_UNIX_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE_SUPPORTED
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_SOCKET_GET_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if we have a `getsockopt()`-style API in which one end of
+ * a socket connection can directly query the credentials of the process
+ * that initiated the other end, such as `getsockopt SO_PEERCRED` on Linux
+ * or `getpeereid()` on multiple operating systems.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SOCKET_GET_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if privileged processes can spoof their credentials when
+ * using the message-passing API.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED
+
#ifdef __linux__
#define G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED 1
#define G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED 1
--
2.23.0

47
SOURCES/0002-gvariant-test-Also-force-alignment-for-tuple-test-da.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From 4ef58e5661849317a1110c9b93957f2c608677dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 08:21:40 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] gvariant test: Also force alignment for tuple test data
glib!552 (commit 9eed22b3) fixed this for the tests that failed on i686,
but this additional test failed on Debian's s390x port
(IBM z/Architecture, 64-bit big-endian).
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
---
glib/tests/gvariant.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/glib/tests/gvariant.c b/glib/tests/gvariant.c
index a7b19826d..c4a996c1f 100644
--- a/glib/tests/gvariant.c
+++ b/glib/tests/gvariant.c
@@ -4820,6 +4820,7 @@ test_normal_checking_array_offsets (void)
static void
test_normal_checking_tuple_offsets (void)
{
+ gpointer aligned_data;
const guint8 data[] = {
0x07, 0xe5, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x07,
'(', 'a', 's', 'a', 's', 'a', 's', 'a', 's', 'a', 's', 'a', 's', ')',
@@ -4828,13 +4829,15 @@ test_normal_checking_tuple_offsets (void)
GVariant *variant = NULL;
GVariant *normal_variant = NULL;
- variant = g_variant_new_from_data (G_VARIANT_TYPE_VARIANT, data, size,
- FALSE, NULL, NULL);
+ aligned_data = g_memdup (data, size); /* guarantee alignment */
+ variant = g_variant_new_from_data (G_VARIANT_TYPE_VARIANT, aligned_data,
+ size, FALSE, NULL, NULL);
g_assert_nonnull (variant);
normal_variant = g_variant_get_normal_form (variant);
g_assert_nonnull (normal_variant);
+ g_free (aligned_data);
g_variant_unref (normal_variant);
g_variant_unref (variant);
}
--
2.19.1

0
SOURCES/backport-per-desktop-overrides.patch → SOURCES/105.patch
View File

371
SOURCES/1176.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,371 @@
From ef1035d9d86464ea0b5dde60a7a0e190895fdf5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2019 08:22:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] gcredentialsprivate: Document the various private macros
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
---
gio/gcredentialsprivate.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+)
diff --git a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
index 4d1c420a8..06f0aed19 100644
--- a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
+++ b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
@@ -22,6 +22,65 @@
#include "gio/gcredentials.h"
#include "gio/gnetworking.h"
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if GCredentials works.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED, etc.:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if GCredentials uses Linux `struct ucred`, etc.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_NETBSD_UNPCBID
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_OPENBSD_SOCKPEERCRED
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_SOLARIS_UCRED
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_TYPE:
+ *
+ * Defined to one of G_CREDENTIALS_TYPE_LINUX_UCRED, etc.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_TYPE
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_SIZE:
+ *
+ * Defined to the size of the %G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_TYPE
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_SIZE
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_UNIX_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE_SUPPORTED:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if we have a message-passing API in which credentials
+ * are attached to a particular message, such as `SCM_CREDENTIALS` on Linux
+ * or `SCM_CREDS` on FreeBSD.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_UNIX_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE_SUPPORTED
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_SOCKET_GET_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if we have a `getsockopt()`-style API in which one end of
+ * a socket connection can directly query the credentials of the process
+ * that initiated the other end, such as `getsockopt SO_PEERCRED` on Linux
+ * or `getpeereid()` on multiple operating systems.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SOCKET_GET_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED
+
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if privileged processes can spoof their credentials when
+ * using the message-passing API.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED
+
#ifdef __linux__
#define G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED 1
#define G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED 1
--
2.23.0
From ee502dbbe89a5976c32eb8863c9a9d274ddb60e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2019 08:47:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] GDBus: prefer getsockopt()-style credentials-passing APIs
Conceptually, a D-Bus server is really trying to determine the credentials
of (the process that initiated) a connection, not the credentials that
the process had when it sent a particular message. Ideally, it does
this with a getsockopt()-style API that queries the credentials of the
connection's initiator without requiring any particular cooperation from
that process, avoiding a class of possible failures.
The leading '\0' in the D-Bus protocol is primarily a workaround
for platforms where the message-based credentials-passing API is
strictly better than the getsockopt()-style API (for example, on
FreeBSD, SCM_CREDS includes a process ID but getpeereid() does not),
or where the getsockopt()-style API does not exist at all. As a result
libdbus, the reference implementation of D-Bus, does not implement
Linux SCM_CREDENTIALS at all - it has no reason to do so, because the
SO_PEERCRED socket option is equally informative.
This change makes GDBusServer on Linux more closely match the behaviour
of libdbus.
In particular, GNOME/glib#1831 indicates that when a libdbus client
connects to a GDBus server, recvmsg() sometimes yields a SCM_CREDENTIALS
message with cmsg_data={pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}. I think this is
most likely a race condition in the early steps to connect:
client server
connect
accept
send '\0' <- race -> set SO_PASSCRED = 1
receive '\0'
If the server wins the race:
client server
connect
accept
set SO_PASSCRED = 1
send '\0'
receive '\0'
then everything is fine. However, if the client wins the race:
client server
connect
accept
send '\0'
set SO_PASSCRED = 1
receive '\0'
then the kernel does not record credentials for the message containing
'\0' (because SO_PASSCRED was 0 at the time). However, by the time the
server receives the message, the kernel knows that credentials are
desired. I would have expected the kernel to omit the credentials header
in this case, but it seems that instead, it synthesizes a credentials
structure with a dummy process ID 0, a dummy uid derived from
/proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and a dummy gid derived from
/proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid.
In an unconfigured GDBusServer, hitting this race condition results in
falling back to DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication, which in practice usually
succeeds in authenticating the peer's uid. However, we encourage AF_UNIX
servers on Unix platforms to allow only EXTERNAL authentication as a
security-hardening measure, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 relies on a series
of assumptions including a cryptographically strong PRNG and a shared
home directory with no write access by others, which are not necessarily
true for all operating systems and users. EXTERNAL authentication will
fail if the server cannot determine the client's credentials.
In particular, this caused a regression when CVE-2019-14822 was fixed
in ibus, which appears to be resolved by this commit. Qt clients
(which use libdbus) intermittently fail to connect to an ibus server
(which uses GDBusServer), because ibus no longer allows DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1
authentication or non-matching uids.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Closes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/issues/1831
---
gio/gcredentialsprivate.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
gio/gdbusauth.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
index 06f0aed19..e9ec09b9f 100644
--- a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
+++ b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
@@ -81,6 +81,18 @@
*/
#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED
+/*
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING:
+ *
+ * Defined to 1 if the data structure transferred by the message-passing
+ * API is strictly more informative than the one transferred by the
+ * `getsockopt()`-style API, and hence should be preferred, even for
+ * protocols like D-Bus that are defined in terms of the credentials of
+ * the (process that opened the) socket, as opposed to the credentials
+ * of an individual message.
+ */
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING
+
#ifdef __linux__
#define G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED 1
#define G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED 1
@@ -100,6 +112,12 @@
#define G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_SIZE (sizeof (struct cmsgcred))
#define G_CREDENTIALS_UNIX_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE_SUPPORTED 1
#define G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED 1
+/* GLib doesn't implement it yet, but FreeBSD's getsockopt()-style API
+ * is getpeereid(), which is not as informative as struct cmsgcred -
+ * it does not tell us the PID. As a result, libdbus prefers to use
+ * SCM_CREDS, and if we implement getpeereid() in future, we should
+ * do the same. */
+#define G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING 1
#elif defined(__NetBSD__)
#define G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED 1
diff --git a/gio/gdbusauth.c b/gio/gdbusauth.c
index 752ec23fc..14cc5d70e 100644
--- a/gio/gdbusauth.c
+++ b/gio/gdbusauth.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include "gdbusutils.h"
#include "gioenumtypes.h"
#include "gcredentials.h"
+#include "gcredentialsprivate.h"
#include "gdbusprivate.h"
#include "giostream.h"
#include "gdatainputstream.h"
@@ -969,9 +970,31 @@ _g_dbus_auth_run_server (GDBusAuth *auth,
g_data_input_stream_set_newline_type (dis, G_DATA_STREAM_NEWLINE_TYPE_CR_LF);
- /* first read the NUL-byte */
+ /* read the NUL-byte, possibly with credentials attached */
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
- if (G_IS_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
+#ifndef G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING
+ if (G_IS_SOCKET_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
+ {
+ GSocket *sock = g_socket_connection_get_socket (G_SOCKET_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream));
+
+ local_error = NULL;
+ credentials = g_socket_get_credentials (sock, &local_error);
+
+ if (credentials == NULL && !g_error_matches (local_error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED))
+ {
+ g_propagate_error (error, local_error);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Clear the error indicator, so we can retry with
+ * g_unix_connection_receive_credentials() if necessary */
+ g_clear_error (&local_error);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (credentials == NULL && G_IS_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
{
local_error = NULL;
credentials = g_unix_connection_receive_credentials (G_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream),
--
2.23.0
From 1485a97d8051b0aa047987f7b0c0bfe4ba4ce55b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2019 10:55:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] credentials: Invalid Linux struct ucred means "no
information"
On Linux, if getsockopt SO_PEERCRED is used on a TCP socket, one
might expect it to fail with an appropriate error like ENOTSUP or
EPROTONOSUPPORT. However, it appears that in fact it succeeds, but
yields a credentials structure with pid 0, uid -1 and gid -1. These
are not real process, user and group IDs that can be allocated to a
real process (pid 0 needs to be reserved to give kill(0) its documented
special semantics, and similarly uid and gid -1 need to be reserved for
setresuid() and setresgid()) so it is not meaningful to signal them to
high-level API users.
An API user with Linux-specific knowledge can still inspect these fields
via g_credentials_get_native() if desired.
Similarly, if SO_PASSCRED is used to receive a SCM_CREDENTIALS message
on a receiving Unix socket, but the sending socket had not enabled
SO_PASSCRED at the time that the message was sent, it is possible
for it to succeed but yield a credentials structure with pid 0, uid
/proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and gid /proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid. Even
if we were to read those pseudo-files, we cannot distinguish between
the overflow IDs and a real process that legitimately has the same IDs
(typically they are set to 'nobody' and 'nogroup', which can be used
by a real process), so we detect this situation by noticing that
pid == 0, and to save syscalls we do not read the overflow IDs from
/proc at all.
This results in a small API change: g_credentials_is_same_user() now
returns FALSE if we compare two credentials structures that are both
invalid. This seems like reasonable, conservative behaviour: if we cannot
prove that they are the same user, we should assume they are not.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
---
gio/gcredentials.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gio/gcredentials.c b/gio/gcredentials.c
index c350e3c88..c4794ded7 100644
--- a/gio/gcredentials.c
+++ b/gio/gcredentials.c
@@ -265,6 +265,35 @@ g_credentials_to_string (GCredentials *credentials)
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
+/*
+ * Check whether @native contains invalid data. If getsockopt SO_PEERCRED
+ * is used on a TCP socket, it succeeds but yields a credentials structure
+ * with pid 0, uid -1 and gid -1. Similarly, if SO_PASSCRED is used on a
+ * receiving Unix socket when the sending socket did not also enable
+ * SO_PASSCRED, it can succeed but yield a credentials structure with
+ * pid 0, uid /proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and gid
+ * /proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid.
+ */
+static gboolean
+linux_ucred_check_valid (struct ucred *native,
+ GError **error)
+{
+ if (native->pid == 0
+ || native->uid == -1
+ || native->gid == -1)
+ {
+ g_set_error_literal (error,
+ G_IO_ERROR,
+ G_IO_ERROR_INVALID_DATA,
+ _("GCredentials contains invalid data"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+#endif
+
/**
* g_credentials_is_same_user:
* @credentials: A #GCredentials.
@@ -294,7 +323,8 @@ g_credentials_is_same_user (GCredentials *credentials,
ret = FALSE;
#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
- if (credentials->native.uid == other_credentials->native.uid)
+ if (linux_ucred_check_valid (&credentials->native, NULL)
+ && credentials->native.uid == other_credentials->native.uid)
ret = TRUE;
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
if (credentials->native.cmcred_euid == other_credentials->native.cmcred_euid)
@@ -453,7 +483,10 @@ g_credentials_get_unix_user (GCredentials *credentials,
g_return_val_if_fail (error == NULL || *error == NULL, -1);
#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
- ret = credentials->native.uid;
+ if (linux_ucred_check_valid (&credentials->native, error))
+ ret = credentials->native.uid;
+ else
+ ret = -1;
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
ret = credentials->native.cmcred_euid;
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_NETBSD_UNPCBID
@@ -499,7 +532,10 @@ g_credentials_get_unix_pid (GCredentials *credentials,
g_return_val_if_fail (error == NULL || *error == NULL, -1);
#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
- ret = credentials->native.pid;
+ if (linux_ucred_check_valid (&credentials->native, error))
+ ret = credentials->native.pid;
+ else
+ ret = -1;
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
ret = credentials->native.cmcred_pid;
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_NETBSD_UNPCBID
--
2.23.0

38
SOURCES/1369.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From a18f091c6c090b93cd816f8cd5be763b6e238632 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2020 17:10:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] libcharset: Drop a redundant environment variable
It was used for running tests when we built with autotools, but is no
longer used in the Meson build system. If we need something similar in
future, it should be done by adding internal API to override the
directory on a per-call basis, rather than loading a path from a shared
global table every time.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Helps: #1919
---
glib/libcharset/localcharset.c | 6 +-----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/glib/libcharset/localcharset.c b/glib/libcharset/localcharset.c
index 0c4d544be..ab3a2678d 100644
--- a/glib/libcharset/localcharset.c
+++ b/glib/libcharset/localcharset.c
@@ -117,11 +117,7 @@ _g_locale_get_charset_aliases (void)
const char *base = "charset.alias";
char *file_name;
- /* Make it possible to override the charset.alias location. This is
- necessary for running the testsuite before "make install". */
- dir = getenv ("CHARSETALIASDIR");
- if (dir == NULL || dir[0] == '\0')
- dir = relocate (GLIB_CHARSETALIAS_DIR);
+ dir = relocate (GLIB_CHARSETALIAS_DIR);
/* Concatenate dir and base into freshly allocated file_name. */
{
--
2.31.1

204
SOURCES/1713.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
From 4f0a31d66c2a6588495b8ae682f555584dafdf45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Claudio Saavedra <csaavedra@igalia.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 13:19:42 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] gmain: g_main_context_check() can skip updating polled FD
sources
If there is a file descriptor source that has a lower priority
than the one for sources that are going to be dispatched,
all subsequent file descriptor sources (internally sorted by
file descriptor identifier) do not get an update in their GPollRec
and later on wrong sources can be dispatched.
Fix this by first finding the first GPollRec that matches the current
GPollFD, instead of relying on it to be the current one. At
the same time, document the assumptions about the ordering of the
file descriptor records and array and make explicit in the documentation
that the array needs to be passed to g_main_context_check() as it was
received from g_main_context_query().
Added a new test that reproduces the bug by creating two file
descriptor sources and an idle one. Since the first
file descriptor created has a lower identifier and a low priority,
the second one is not dispatched even when it has the same, higher,
priority as the idle source. After fixing this bug, both
higher priority sources are dispatched as expected.
While this patch was written independently, a similar fix for this
bug was first submitted by Eugene M in GNOME/glib!562. Having a
second fix that basically does the same is a reassurance that we
are in the right here.
Fixes #1592
---
glib/gmain.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
glib/tests/mainloop.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/glib/gmain.c b/glib/gmain.c
index 95992253d..a59cd686c 100644
--- a/glib/gmain.c
+++ b/glib/gmain.c
@@ -3573,7 +3573,10 @@ g_main_context_prepare (GMainContext *context,
* store #GPollFD records that need to be polled.
* @n_fds: (in): length of @fds.
*
- * Determines information necessary to poll this main loop.
+ * Determines information necessary to poll this main loop. You should
+ * be careful to pass the resulting @fds array and its length @n_fds
+ * as is when calling g_main_context_check(), as this function relies
+ * on assumptions made when the array is filled.
*
* You must have successfully acquired the context with
* g_main_context_acquire() before you may call this function.
@@ -3597,6 +3600,10 @@ g_main_context_query (GMainContext *context,
TRACE (GLIB_MAIN_CONTEXT_BEFORE_QUERY (context, max_priority));
+ /* fds is filled sequentially from poll_records. Since poll_records
+ * are incrementally sorted by file descriptor identifier, fds will
+ * also be incrementally sorted.
+ */
n_poll = 0;
lastpollrec = NULL;
for (pollrec = context->poll_records; pollrec; pollrec = pollrec->next)
@@ -3611,6 +3618,10 @@ g_main_context_query (GMainContext *context,
*/
events = pollrec->fd->events & ~(G_IO_ERR|G_IO_HUP|G_IO_NVAL);
+ /* This optimization --using the same GPollFD to poll for more
+ * than one poll record-- relies on the poll records being
+ * incrementally sorted.
+ */
if (lastpollrec && pollrec->fd->fd == lastpollrec->fd->fd)
{
if (n_poll - 1 < n_fds)
@@ -3656,7 +3667,10 @@ g_main_context_query (GMainContext *context,
* the last call to g_main_context_query()
* @n_fds: return value of g_main_context_query()
*
- * Passes the results of polling back to the main loop.
+ * Passes the results of polling back to the main loop. You should be
+ * careful to pass @fds and its length @n_fds as received from
+ * g_main_context_query(), as this functions relies on assumptions
+ * on how @fds is filled.
*
* You must have successfully acquired the context with
* g_main_context_acquire() before you may call this function.
@@ -3711,10 +3725,22 @@ g_main_context_check (GMainContext *context,
return FALSE;
}
+ /* The linear iteration below relies on the assumption that both
+ * poll records and the fds array are incrementally sorted by file
+ * descriptor identifier.
+ */
pollrec = context->poll_records;
i = 0;
while (pollrec && i < n_fds)
{
+ /* Make sure that fds is sorted by file descriptor identifier. */
+ g_assert (i <= 0 || fds[i - 1].fd < fds[i].fd);
+
+ /* Skip until finding the first GPollRec matching the current GPollFD. */
+ while (pollrec && pollrec->fd->fd != fds[i].fd)
+ pollrec = pollrec->next;
+
+ /* Update all consecutive GPollRecs that match. */
while (pollrec && pollrec->fd->fd == fds[i].fd)
{
if (pollrec->priority <= max_priority)
@@ -3725,6 +3751,7 @@ g_main_context_check (GMainContext *context,
pollrec = pollrec->next;
}
+ /* Iterate to next GPollFD. */
i++;
}
@@ -4320,6 +4347,7 @@ g_main_context_add_poll_unlocked (GMainContext *context,
newrec->fd = fd;
newrec->priority = priority;
+ /* Poll records are incrementally sorted by file descriptor identifier. */
prevrec = NULL;
nextrec = context->poll_records;
while (nextrec)
diff --git a/glib/tests/mainloop.c b/glib/tests/mainloop.c
index f5d672a63..397921f2d 100644
--- a/glib/tests/mainloop.c
+++ b/glib/tests/mainloop.c
@@ -1511,6 +1511,62 @@ test_unix_file_poll (void)
close (fd);
}
+static void
+test_unix_fd_priority (void)
+{
+ gint fd1, fd2;
+ GMainLoop *loop;
+ GSource *source;
+
+ gint s1 = 0;
+ gboolean s2 = FALSE, s3 = FALSE;
+
+ g_test_bug ("https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/1592");
+
+ loop = g_main_loop_new (NULL, FALSE);
+
+ source = g_idle_source_new ();
+ g_source_set_callback (source, count_calls, &s1, NULL);
+ g_source_set_priority (source, 0);
+ g_source_attach (source, NULL);
+ g_source_unref (source);
+
+ fd1 = open ("/dev/random", O_RDONLY);
+ g_assert_cmpint (fd1, >=, 0);
+ source = g_unix_fd_source_new (fd1, G_IO_IN);
+ g_source_set_callback (source, (GSourceFunc) (void (*)(void)) (flag_bool), &s2, NULL);
+ g_source_set_priority (source, 10);
+ g_source_attach (source, NULL);
+ g_source_unref (source);
+
+ fd2 = open ("/dev/random", O_RDONLY);
+ g_assert_cmpint (fd2, >=, 0);
+ source = g_unix_fd_source_new (fd2, G_IO_IN);
+ g_source_set_callback (source, (GSourceFunc) (void (*)(void)) (flag_bool), &s3, NULL);
+ g_source_set_priority (source, 0);
+ g_source_attach (source, NULL);
+ g_source_unref (source);
+
+ /* This tests a bug that depends on the source with the lowest FD
+ identifier to have the lowest priority. Make sure that this is
+ the case. */
+ g_assert_cmpint (fd1, <, fd2);
+
+ g_assert_true (g_main_context_iteration (NULL, FALSE));
+
+ /* Idle source should have been dispatched. */
+ g_assert_cmpint (s1, ==, 1);
+ /* Low priority FD source shouldn't have been dispatched. */
+ g_assert_false (s2);
+ /* Default priority FD source should have been dispatched. */
+ g_assert_true (s3);
+
+ g_main_loop_unref (loop);
+
+ close (fd1);
+ close (fd2);
+}
+
#endif
static gboolean
@@ -1751,6 +1807,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
g_test_add_func ("/mainloop/source-unix-fd-api", test_source_unix_fd_api);
g_test_add_func ("/mainloop/wait", test_mainloop_wait);
g_test_add_func ("/mainloop/unix-file-poll", test_unix_file_poll);
+ g_test_add_func ("/mainloop/unix-fd-priority", test_unix_fd_priority);
#endif
g_test_add_func ("/mainloop/nfds", test_nfds);
--
2.31.1

0
SOURCES/0001-codegen-Change-pointer-casting-to-remove-type-punnin.patch → SOURCES/309.patch
View File

0
SOURCES/0001-build-sys-Pass-CFLAGS-to-DTRACE.patch → SOURCES/409.patch
View File

0
SOURCES/0001-gdbus-unix-addresses-test-don-t-g_debug-when-also-te.patch → SOURCES/50.patch
View File

0
SOURCES/0001-gdbus-codegen-honor-Property.EmitsChangedSignal-anno.patch → SOURCES/532.patch
View File

0
SOURCES/0001-spawn-add-shebang-line-to-script.patch → SOURCES/546.patch
View File

0
SOURCES/0001-gfile-Limit-access-to-files-when-copying.patch → SOURCES/CVE-2019-12450.patch
View File

1
SOURCES/CVE-2021-27218.patch
View File

@ -126,3 +126,4 @@ index 5ea5c2b35..42281307b 100644
g_test_add_func ("/bytes/null", test_null);
--
2.31.1

388
SOURCES/CVE-2021-28153.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
From 8fef6abe1131da0c8a7211c740a12ebe11cbcc51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2021 16:05:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] glocalfileoutputstream: Factor out a flag check
This clarifies the code a little. It introduces no functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
---
gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c b/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c
index 57d2d5dfe..6a70b2a04 100644
--- a/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c
+++ b/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c
@@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ handle_overwrite_open (const char *filename,
int res;
int mode;
int errsv;
+ gboolean replace_destination_set = (flags & G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION);
mode = mode_from_flags_or_info (flags, reference_info);
@@ -857,8 +858,8 @@ handle_overwrite_open (const char *filename,
* The second strategy consist simply in copying the old file
* to a backup file and rewrite the contents of the file.
*/
-
- if ((flags & G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION) ||
+
+ if (replace_destination_set ||
(!(original_stat.st_nlink > 1) && !is_symlink))
{
char *dirname, *tmp_filename;
@@ -877,7 +878,7 @@ handle_overwrite_open (const char *filename,
/* try to keep permissions (unless replacing) */
- if ( ! (flags & G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION) &&
+ if (!replace_destination_set &&
(
#ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN
fchown (tmpfd, original_stat.st_uid, original_stat.st_gid) == -1 ||
@@ -1016,7 +1017,7 @@ handle_overwrite_open (const char *filename,
}
}
- if (flags & G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION)
+ if (replace_destination_set)
{
g_close (fd, NULL);
--
2.31.1
From 6c10e8ce6905e8fcc3466eb8af707b5d0d3bdb85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 17:36:07 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] glocalfileoutputstream: Fix CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION
with symlinks
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The `G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION` flag is equivalent to unlinking
the destination file and re-creating it from scratch. That did
previously work, but in the process the code would call `open(O_CREAT)`
on the file. If the file was a dangling symlink, this would create the
destination file (empty). That’s not an intended side-effect, and has
security implications if the symlink is controlled by a lower-privileged
process.
Fix that by not opening the destination file if it’s a symlink, and
adjusting the rest of the code to cope with
- the fact that `fd == -1` is not an error iff `is_symlink` is true,
- and that `original_stat` will contain the `lstat()` results for the
symlink now, rather than the `stat()` results for its target (again,
iff `is_symlink` is true).
This means that the target of the dangling symlink is no longer created,
which was the bug. The symlink itself continues to be replaced (as
before) with the new file — this is the intended behaviour of
`g_file_replace()`.
The behaviour for non-symlink cases, or cases where the symlink was not
dangling, should be unchanged.
Includes a unit test.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Fixes: #2325
---
gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c | 63 ++++++++++++++-------
gio/tests/file.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c b/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c
index 6a70b2a04..4a7766f68 100644
--- a/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c
+++ b/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c
@@ -779,16 +779,22 @@ handle_overwrite_open (const char *filename,
/* Could be a symlink, or it could be a regular ELOOP error,
* but then the next open will fail too. */
is_symlink = TRUE;
- fd = g_open (filename, open_flags, mode);
+ if (!replace_destination_set)
+ fd = g_open (filename, open_flags, mode);
}
-#else
- fd = g_open (filename, open_flags, mode);
- errsv = errno;
+#else /* if !O_NOFOLLOW */
/* This is racy, but we do it as soon as possible to minimize the race */
is_symlink = g_file_test (filename, G_FILE_TEST_IS_SYMLINK);
+
+ if (!is_symlink || !replace_destination_set)
+ {
+ fd = g_open (filename, open_flags, mode);
+ errsv = errno;
+ }
#endif
- if (fd == -1)
+ if (fd == -1 &&
+ (!is_symlink || !replace_destination_set))
{
char *display_name = g_filename_display_name (filename);
g_set_error (error, G_IO_ERROR,
@@ -800,10 +806,17 @@ handle_overwrite_open (const char *filename,
}
#ifdef G_OS_WIN32
- res = GLIB_PRIVATE_CALL (g_win32_fstat) (fd, &original_stat);
-#else
- res = fstat (fd, &original_stat);
+#error This patch has not been ported to Windows, sorry
#endif
+
+ if (!is_symlink)
+ {
+ res = fstat (fd, &original_stat);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ res = lstat (filename, &original_stat);
+ }
errsv = errno;
if (res != 0)
@@ -821,16 +834,27 @@ handle_overwrite_open (const char *filename,
if (!S_ISREG (original_stat.st_mode))
{
if (S_ISDIR (original_stat.st_mode))
- g_set_error_literal (error,
- G_IO_ERROR,
- G_IO_ERROR_IS_DIRECTORY,
- _("Target file is a directory"));
- else
- g_set_error_literal (error,
- G_IO_ERROR,
- G_IO_ERROR_NOT_REGULAR_FILE,
- _("Target file is not a regular file"));
- goto err_out;
+ {
+ g_set_error_literal (error,
+ G_IO_ERROR,
+ G_IO_ERROR_IS_DIRECTORY,
+ _("Target file is a directory"));
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ else if (!is_symlink ||
+#ifdef S_ISLNK
+ !S_ISLNK (original_stat.st_mode)
+#else
+ FALSE
+#endif
+ )
+ {
+ g_set_error_literal (error,
+ G_IO_ERROR,
+ G_IO_ERROR_NOT_REGULAR_FILE,
+ _("Target file is not a regular file"));
+ goto err_out;
+ }
}
if (etag != NULL)
@@ -911,7 +935,8 @@ handle_overwrite_open (const char *filename,
}
}
- g_close (fd, NULL);
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ g_close (fd, NULL);
*temp_filename = tmp_filename;
return tmpfd;
}
diff --git a/gio/tests/file.c b/gio/tests/file.c
index 98eeb85d4..44db6e295 100644
--- a/gio/tests/file.c
+++ b/gio/tests/file.c
@@ -671,8 +671,6 @@ test_replace_cancel (void)
guint count;
GError *error = NULL;
- g_test_bug ("629301");
-
path = g_dir_make_tmp ("g_file_replace_cancel_XXXXXX", &error);
g_assert_no_error (error);
tmpdir = g_file_new_for_path (path);
@@ -779,6 +777,110 @@ test_replace_cancel (void)
g_object_unref (tmpdir);
}
+static void
+test_replace_symlink (void)
+{
+#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
+ gchar *tmpdir_path = NULL;
+ GFile *tmpdir = NULL, *source_file = NULL, *target_file = NULL;
+ GFileOutputStream *stream = NULL;
+ const gchar *new_contents = "this is a test message which should be written to source and not target";
+ gsize n_written;
+ GFileEnumerator *enumerator = NULL;
+ GFileInfo *info = NULL;
+ gchar *contents = NULL;
+ gsize length = 0;
+ GError *local_error = NULL;
+
+ /* Create a fresh, empty working directory. */
+ tmpdir_path = g_dir_make_tmp ("g_file_replace_symlink_XXXXXX", &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+ tmpdir = g_file_new_for_path (tmpdir_path);
+
+ g_test_message ("Using temporary directory %s", tmpdir_path);
+ g_free (tmpdir_path);
+
+ /* Create symlink `source` which points to `target`. */
+ source_file = g_file_get_child (tmpdir, "source");
+ target_file = g_file_get_child (tmpdir, "target");
+ g_file_make_symbolic_link (source_file, "target", NULL, &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+
+ /* Ensure that `target` doesn’t exist */
+ g_assert_false (g_file_query_exists (target_file, NULL));
+
+ /* Replace the `source` symlink with a regular file using
+ * %G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION, which should replace it *without*
+ * following the symlink */
+ stream = g_file_replace (source_file, NULL, FALSE /* no backup */,
+ G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION, NULL, &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+
+ g_output_stream_write_all (G_OUTPUT_STREAM (stream), new_contents, strlen (new_contents),
+ &n_written, NULL, &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+ g_assert_cmpint (n_written, ==, strlen (new_contents));
+
+ g_output_stream_close (G_OUTPUT_STREAM (stream), NULL, &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+
+ g_clear_object (&stream);
+
+ /* At this point, there should still only be one file: `source`. It should
+ * now be a regular file. `target` should not exist. */
+ enumerator = g_file_enumerate_children (tmpdir,
+ G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME ","
+ G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE,
+ G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS, NULL, &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+
+ info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator, NULL, &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+ g_assert_nonnull (info);
+
+ g_assert_cmpstr (g_file_info_get_name (info), ==, "source");
+ g_assert_cmpint (g_file_info_get_file_type (info), ==, G_FILE_TYPE_REGULAR);
+
+ g_clear_object (&info);
+
+ info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator, NULL, &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+ g_assert_null (info);
+
+ g_file_enumerator_close (enumerator, NULL, &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+ g_clear_object (&enumerator);
+
+ /* Double-check that `target` doesn’t exist */
+ g_assert_false (g_file_query_exists (target_file, NULL));
+
+ /* Check the content of `source`. */
+ g_file_load_contents (source_file,
+ NULL,
+ &contents,
+ &length,
+ NULL,
+ &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+ g_assert_cmpstr (contents, ==, new_contents);
+ g_assert_cmpuint (length, ==, strlen (new_contents));
+ g_free (contents);
+
+ /* Tidy up. */
+ g_file_delete (source_file, NULL, &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+
+ g_file_delete (tmpdir, NULL, &local_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (local_error);
+
+ g_clear_object (&target_file);
+ g_clear_object (&source_file);
+ g_clear_object (&tmpdir);
+#else /* if !G_OS_UNIX */
+ g_test_skip ("Symlink replacement tests can only be run on Unix")
+#endif
+}
+
static void
on_file_deleted (GObject *object,
GAsyncResult *result,
@@ -1170,6 +1272,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
g_test_add_data_func ("/file/async-create-delete/4096", GINT_TO_POINTER (4096), test_create_delete);
g_test_add_func ("/file/replace-load", test_replace_load);
g_test_add_func ("/file/replace-cancel", test_replace_cancel);
+ g_test_add_func ("/file/replace-symlink", test_replace_symlink);
g_test_add_func ("/file/async-delete", test_async_delete);
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
g_test_add_func ("/file/copy-preserve-mode", test_copy_preserve_mode);
--
2.31.1
From 7f0b0d7fd744ad2f51236444005db49c80a0293d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 17:42:24 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] glocalfileoutputstream: Add a missing O_CLOEXEC flag to
replace()
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
---
gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c b/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c
index 4a7766f68..275770fa4 100644
--- a/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c
+++ b/gio/glocalfileoutputstream.c
@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@
#define O_BINARY 0
#endif
+#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
+#define O_CLOEXEC 0
+#else
+#define HAVE_O_CLOEXEC 1
+#endif
+
struct _GLocalFileOutputStreamPrivate {
char *tmp_filename;
char *original_filename;
@@ -1127,7 +1133,7 @@ _g_local_file_output_stream_replace (const char *filename,
sync_on_close = FALSE;
/* If the file doesn't exist, create it */
- open_flags = O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_BINARY;
+ open_flags = O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC;
if (readable)
open_flags |= O_RDWR;
else
@@ -1157,8 +1163,11 @@ _g_local_file_output_stream_replace (const char *filename,
set_error_from_open_errno (filename, error);
return NULL;
}
-
-
+#if !defined(HAVE_O_CLOEXEC) && defined(F_SETFD)
+ else
+ fcntl (fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+#endif
+
stream = g_object_new (G_TYPE_LOCAL_FILE_OUTPUT_STREAM, NULL);
stream->priv->fd = fd;
stream->priv->sync_on_close = sync_on_close;
--
2.31.1

219
SOURCES/ghmac-gnutls.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 440a178c5aad19050a3d5b5d76881931138af680 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From c5cc0bb6f2d6e468c7402915a0a4e6799f0febdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 18:44:43 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] ghmac: Split off wrapper functions into ghmac-utils.c
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] ghmac: Split off wrapper functions into ghmac-utils.c
Prep for adding a GnuTLS HMAC implementation; these are just
utility functions that call the "core" API.
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ utility functions that call the "core" API.
create mode 100644 glib/ghmac-utils.c
diff --git a/glib/Makefile.am b/glib/Makefile.am
index 8da549c7f..c367b09ad 100644
index c0c3b92f0..43fa17051 100644
--- a/glib/Makefile.am
+++ b/glib/Makefile.am
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ libglib_2_0_la_SOURCES = \
@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ index 9b58fd81c..7db38e34a 100644
- (const guchar *) str, length);
-}
diff --git a/glib/meson.build b/glib/meson.build
index 9df77b6f9..c7f28b5b6 100644
index c81e99f9c..306a67f13 100644
--- a/glib/meson.build
+++ b/glib/meson.build
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ glib_sources = files(
@ -309,13 +309,12 @@ index 9df77b6f9..c7f28b5b6 100644
'ghostutils.c',
'giochannel.c',
--
2.21.0
2.31.1
From 423355787ba9133b310c0b72708024b1428d7d14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 3befcf1eb31e0fa7a988b22a9c24240218cd4744 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 19:36:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Add a gnutls backend for GHmac
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Add a gnutls backend for GHmac
For RHEL we want apps to use FIPS-certified crypto libraries,
and HMAC apparently counts as "keyed" and hence needs to
@ -329,26 +328,53 @@ Most distributors ship glib-networking built with GnuTLS, and
most apps use glib-networking, so this isn't a net-new library
in most cases.
However, a fun wrinkle is that the GnuTLS HMAC API doesn't expose
the necessary bits to implement `g_hmac_copy()`; OpenSSL does.
I chose to just make that abort for now since I didn't find
apps using it.
=======================================================================
mcatanzaro note:
I've updated Colin's original patch with several enhancements:
Implement g_hmac_copy() using gnutls_hmac_copy(), which didn't exist
when Colin developed this patch.
Removed use of GSlice
Better error checking in g_hmac_new(). It is possible for
gnutls_hmac_init() to fail if running in FIPS mode and an MD5 digest is
requested. In this case, we should return NULL rather than returning a
broken GHmac with a NULL gnutls_hmac_hd_t. This was leading to a later
null pointer dereference inside gnutls_hmac_update(). Applications are
responsible for checking to ensure the return value of g_hmac_new() is
not NULL since it is annotated as nullable. Added documentation to
indicate this possibility.
Properly handle length -1 in g_hmac_update(). This means we've been
given a NUL-terminated string and should use strlen(). GnuTLS doesn't
accept -1, so let's call strlen() ourselves.
Crash the application with g_error() if gnutls_hmac() fails for any
reason. This is necessary because g_hmac_update() is not fallible, so we
have no way to indicate error. Crashing seems better than returning the
wrong result later when g_hmac_get_string() or g_hmac_get_digest() is
later called. (Those functions are also not fallible.) Fortunately, I
don't think this error should actually be hit in practice.
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/903
---
glib/Makefile.am | 9 ++-
glib/gchecksum.c | 9 +--
glib/gchecksumprivate.h | 32 +++++++++
glib/ghmac-gnutls.c | 151 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
glib/ghmac.c | 1 +
glib/Makefile.am | 8 +-
glib/gchecksum.c | 9 +-
glib/gchecksumprivate.h | 32 +++++++
glib/ghmac-gnutls.c | 182 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
glib/ghmac.c | 13 +++
glib/meson.build | 10 ++-
glib/tests/hmac.c | 6 ++
meson.build | 7 ++
meson_options.txt | 5 ++
9 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
8 files changed, 258 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 glib/gchecksumprivate.h
create mode 100644 glib/ghmac-gnutls.c
diff --git a/glib/Makefile.am b/glib/Makefile.am
index c367b09ad..b0a721ad0 100644
index 43fa17051..1175bbe40 100644
--- a/glib/Makefile.am
+++ b/glib/Makefile.am
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ libglib_2_0_la_SOURCES = \
@ -360,7 +386,7 @@ index c367b09ad..b0a721ad0 100644
ghmac-utils.c \
ghook.c \
ghostutils.c \
@@ -352,11 +352,14 @@ pcre_lib = pcre/libpcre.la
@@ -352,11 +352,15 @@ pcre_lib = pcre/libpcre.la
pcre_inc =
endif
@ -372,8 +398,8 @@ index c367b09ad..b0a721ad0 100644
libglib_2_0_la_LIBADD = libcharset/libcharset.la $(printf_la) @GIO@ @GSPAWN@ @PLATFORMDEP@ @ICONV_LIBS@ @G_LIBS_EXTRA@ $(pcre_lib) $(G_THREAD_LIBS_EXTRA) $(G_THREAD_LIBS_FOR_GTHREAD) $(LIBSYSTEMD_LIBS)
libglib_2_0_la_DEPENDENCIES = libcharset/libcharset.la $(printf_la) @GIO@ @GSPAWN@ @PLATFORMDEP@ $(glib_win32_res) $(glib_def)
-libglib_2_0_la_LDFLAGS = $(GLIB_LINK_FLAGS) \
+libglib_2_0_la_LDFLAGS = $(GLIB_LINK_FLAGS) $(gnutls_libs) \
libglib_2_0_la_LDFLAGS = $(GLIB_LINK_FLAGS) \
+ $(gnutls_libs) \
$(glib_win32_res_ldflag) \
-version-info $(LT_CURRENT):$(LT_REVISION):$(LT_AGE) \
-export-dynamic $(no_undefined)
@ -452,10 +478,10 @@ index 000000000..86c7a3b61
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/glib/ghmac-gnutls.c b/glib/ghmac-gnutls.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3b4dfb872
index 000000000..522b9b302
--- /dev/null
+++ b/glib/ghmac-gnutls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/* ghmac.h - data hashing functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Collabora Ltd.
@ -506,9 +532,11 @@ index 000000000..3b4dfb872
+ gsize key_len)
+{
+ gnutls_mac_algorithm_t algo;
+ GHmac *hmac = g_slice_new0 (GHmac);
+ GHmac *hmac = g_new0 (GHmac, 1);
+ int ret;
+
+ hmac->ref_count = 1;
+ hmac->digest_type = digest_type;
+ hmac->digest_type = digest_type;
+
+ switch (digest_type)
+ {
@ -531,7 +559,15 @@ index 000000000..3b4dfb872
+ g_return_val_if_reached (NULL);
+ }
+
+ gnutls_hmac_init (&hmac->hmac, algo, key, key_len);
+ ret = gnutls_hmac_init (&hmac->hmac, algo, key, key_len);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ {
+ /* There is no way to report an error here, but one possible cause of
+ * failure is that the requested digest may be disabled by FIPS mode.
+ */
+ g_free (hmac->hmac);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return hmac;
+}
@ -543,11 +579,15 @@ index 000000000..3b4dfb872
+
+ g_return_val_if_fail (hmac != NULL, NULL);
+
+ copy = g_slice_new0 (GHmac);
+ copy = g_new0 (GHmac, 1);
+ copy->ref_count = 1;
+ copy->digest_type = hmac->digest_type;
+ copy->hmac = gnutls_hmac_copy (hmac->hmac);
+
+ /* g_hmac_copy is not allowed to fail, so we'll have to crash on error. */
+ if (!copy->hmac)
+ g_error ("gnutls_hmac_copy failed");
+
+ return copy;
+}
+
@ -570,7 +610,7 @@ index 000000000..3b4dfb872
+ {
+ gnutls_hmac_deinit (hmac->hmac, NULL);
+ g_free (hmac->digest_str);
+ g_slice_free (GHmac, hmac);
+ g_free (hmac);
+ }
+}
+
@ -580,10 +620,18 @@ index 000000000..3b4dfb872
+ const guchar *data,
+ gssize length)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ g_return_if_fail (hmac != NULL);
+ g_return_if_fail (length == 0 || data != NULL);
+
+ gnutls_hmac (hmac->hmac, data, length);
+ if (length == -1)
+ length = strlen ((const char *)data);
+
+ /* g_hmac_update is not allowed to fail, so we'll have to crash on error. */
+ ret = gnutls_hmac (hmac->hmac, data, length);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ g_error ("gnutls_hmac failed: %s", gnutls_strerror (ret));
+}
+
+const gchar *
@ -617,7 +665,7 @@ index 000000000..3b4dfb872
+ *digest_len = g_checksum_type_get_length (hmac->digest_type);
+}
diff --git a/glib/ghmac.c b/glib/ghmac.c
index 7db38e34a..b12eb07c4 100644
index 7db38e34a..b03a5aea7 100644
--- a/glib/ghmac.c
+++ b/glib/ghmac.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
@ -628,11 +676,38 @@ index 7db38e34a..b12eb07c4 100644
/**
* SECTION:hmac
@@ -84,6 +85,18 @@ struct _GHmac
* Support for digests of type %G_CHECKSUM_SHA512 has been added in GLib 2.42.
* Support for %G_CHECKSUM_SHA384 was added in GLib 2.52.
*
+ * Note that #GHmac creation may fail, in which case this function will
+ * return %NULL. Since there is no error parameter, it is not possible
+ * to indicate why.
+ *
+ * In Fedora, CentOS Stream, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux, GLib is
+ * configured to use GnuTLS to implement #GHmac in order to support FIPS
+ * compliance. This introduces additional failure possibilities that are
+ * not present in upstream GLib. For example, the creation of a #GHmac
+ * will fail if @digest_type is %G_CHECKSUM_MD5 and the system is
+ * running in FIPS mode. #GHmac creation may also fail if GLib is unable
+ * to load GnuTLS.
+ *
* Returns: the newly created #GHmac, or %NULL.
* Use g_hmac_unref() to free the memory allocated by it.
*
diff --git a/glib/meson.build b/glib/meson.build
index c7f28b5b6..a2f9da81c 100644
index 306a67f13..07d41456d 100644
--- a/glib/meson.build
+++ b/glib/meson.build
@@ -137,7 +137,6 @@ glib_sources = files(
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ glib_sources = files(
'gbytes.c',
'gcharset.c',
'gchecksum.c',
+ 'gchecksumprivate.h',
'gconvert.c',
'gdataset.c',
'gdate.c',
@@ -137,7 +138,6 @@ glib_sources = files(
'gfileutils.c',
'ggettext.c',
'ghash.c',
@ -640,15 +715,7 @@ index c7f28b5b6..a2f9da81c 100644
'ghmac-utils.c',
'ghook.c',
'ghostutils.c',
@@ -185,6 +184,7 @@ glib_sources = files(
'gunidecomp.c',
'gurifuncs.c',
'gutils.c',
+ 'gchecksumprivate.h',
'guuid.c',
'gvariant.c',
'gvariant-core.c',
@@ -222,6 +222,12 @@ else
@@ -223,6 +223,12 @@ else
glib_dtrace_hdr = []
endif
@ -661,17 +728,17 @@ index c7f28b5b6..a2f9da81c 100644
pcre_static_args = []
if use_pcre_static_flag
@@ -238,7 +244,7 @@ libglib = library('glib-2.0',
@@ -239,7 +245,7 @@ libglib = library('glib-2.0',
link_args : platform_ldflags + noseh_link_args,
include_directories : configinc,
link_with : [charset_lib, gnulib_lib],
- dependencies : [pcre, thread_dep, libintl, librt] + libiconv + platform_deps,
+ dependencies : [pcre, thread_dep, libintl, librt] + libiconv + platform_deps + libgnutls_dep,
+ dependencies : [pcre, thread_dep, libintl, librt] + libgnutls_dep + libiconv + platform_deps,
c_args : ['-DG_LOG_DOMAIN="GLib"', '-DGLIB_COMPILATION'] + pcre_static_args + glib_hidden_visibility_args
)
diff --git a/meson.build b/meson.build
index 0cefee51d..81b16b004 100644
index 0cefee51d..eaf8d3900 100644
--- a/meson.build
+++ b/meson.build
@@ -1596,6 +1596,13 @@ if host_system == 'linux' and get_option('libmount')
@ -705,5 +772,63 @@ index 4504c6858..d18c42a36 100644
type : 'boolean',
value : false,
--
2.21.0
2.31.1
From 87280b23902290dcf843a42d06cedeef571a673f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 15:51:26 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Add more tests for GHmac
This will test a few problems that we hit recently:
g_hmac_copy() is broken, https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1786538
Crash in g_hmac_update() in FIPS mode, https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1971533
Crash when passing -1 length to g_hmac_update() (discovered in #1971533)
---
glib/tests/hmac.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/glib/tests/hmac.c b/glib/tests/hmac.c
index 3ac3206df..16b2fac9c 100644
--- a/glib/tests/hmac.c
+++ b/glib/tests/hmac.c
@@ -493,6 +493,27 @@ test_hmac_for_bytes (void)
g_bytes_unref (data);
}
+static void
+test_ghmac_gnutls_regressions (void)
+{
+ GHmac *hmac;
+ GHmac *copy;
+
+ hmac = g_hmac_new (G_CHECKSUM_SHA256, (const guchar *)"abc123", sizeof ("abc123"));
+ g_assert_nonnull (hmac);
+
+ /* Ensure g_hmac_update() does not crash when called with -1. */
+ g_hmac_update (hmac, (const guchar *)"You win again, gravity!", -1);
+
+ /* Ensure g_hmac_copy() does not crash. */
+ copy = g_hmac_copy (hmac);
+ g_assert_nonnull (hmac);
+ g_hmac_unref (hmac);
+
+ g_assert_cmpstr (g_hmac_get_string (copy), ==, "795ba6900bcb22e8ce65c2ec02db4e85697da921deb960ee3143bf88a4a60f83");
+ g_hmac_unref (copy);
+}
+
int
main (int argc,
char **argv)
@@ -545,6 +566,7 @@ main (int argc,
g_test_add_func ("/hmac/for-data", test_hmac_for_data);
g_test_add_func ("/hmac/for-string", test_hmac_for_string);
g_test_add_func ("/hmac/for-bytes", test_hmac_for_bytes);
+ g_test_add_func ("/hmac/ghmac-gnutls-regressions", test_ghmac_gnutls_regressions);
return g_test_run ();
}
--
2.31.1

46
SOURCES/0001-tests-Allocate-gvariant-data-from-the-heap-to-guaran.patch → SOURCES/gvariant-tests.patch
View File

@ -94,3 +94,49 @@ index 6e417f6c1..a7b19826d 100644
--
2.19.1
From 4ef58e5661849317a1110c9b93957f2c608677dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 08:21:40 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] gvariant test: Also force alignment for tuple test data
glib!552 (commit 9eed22b3) fixed this for the tests that failed on i686,
but this additional test failed on Debian's s390x port
(IBM z/Architecture, 64-bit big-endian).
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
---
glib/tests/gvariant.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/glib/tests/gvariant.c b/glib/tests/gvariant.c
index a7b19826d..c4a996c1f 100644
--- a/glib/tests/gvariant.c
+++ b/glib/tests/gvariant.c
@@ -4820,6 +4820,7 @@ test_normal_checking_array_offsets (void)
static void
test_normal_checking_tuple_offsets (void)
{
+ gpointer aligned_data;
const guint8 data[] = {
0x07, 0xe5, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x07,
'(', 'a', 's', 'a', 's', 'a', 's', 'a', 's', 'a', 's', 'a', 's', ')',
@@ -4828,13 +4829,15 @@ test_normal_checking_tuple_offsets (void)
GVariant *variant = NULL;
GVariant *normal_variant = NULL;
- variant = g_variant_new_from_data (G_VARIANT_TYPE_VARIANT, data, size,
- FALSE, NULL, NULL);
+ aligned_data = g_memdup (data, size); /* guarantee alignment */
+ variant = g_variant_new_from_data (G_VARIANT_TYPE_VARIANT, aligned_data,
+ size, FALSE, NULL, NULL);
g_assert_nonnull (variant);
normal_variant = g_variant_get_normal_form (variant);
g_assert_nonnull (normal_variant);
+ g_free (aligned_data);
g_variant_unref (normal_variant);
g_variant_unref (variant);
}
--
2.19.1

116
SPECS/glib2.spec
View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
Name: glib2
Version: 2.56.4
Release: 10%{?dist}.1
Release: 156%{?dist}
Summary: A library of handy utility functions
License: LGPLv2+
@ -37,50 +37,71 @@ BuildRequires: python3-devel
# for GIO content-type support
Recommends: shared-mime-info
# Downstream patches
Patch01: 0001-gdbus-unix-addresses-test-don-t-g_debug-when-also-te.patch
# Backported from git master
Patch10: 0001-codegen-Change-pointer-casting-to-remove-type-punnin.patch
Patch11: 0001-spawn-add-shebang-line-to-script.patch
Patch12: 0001-build-sys-Pass-CFLAGS-to-DTRACE.patch
Patch13: 0001-gfile-Limit-access-to-files-when-copying.patch
# Backported from git glib-2-56 branch
Patch20: 0001-tests-Allocate-gvariant-data-from-the-heap-to-guaran.patch
Patch21: 0002-gvariant-test-Also-force-alignment-for-tuple-test-da.patch
# Backported from 2.58 (for 3.32 GNOME rebase)
Patch30: backport-per-desktop-overrides.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/merge_requests/903
# Implement RHEL 8 core crypto components policy
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1630260
Patch37: ghmac-gnutls.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/merge_requests/903
Patch0: ghmac-gnutls.patch
# Backported from git
Patch40: 0001-gdbus-codegen-honor-Property.EmitsChangedSignal-anno.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/50
Patch1: 50.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/309
Patch2: 309.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/403
Patch3: 409.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/546
Patch4: 546.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/876
Patch5: CVE-2019-12450.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/552
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/569
Patch6: gvariant-tests.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/105
Patch7: 105.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/532
Patch8: 532.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1777213
Patch50: 0001-gcredentialsprivate-Document-the-various-private-mac.patch
Patch51: 0001-GDBus-prefer-getsockopt-style-credentials-passing-AP.patch
Patch52: 0001-credentials-Invalid-Linux-struct-ucred-means-no-info.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/1176
Patch9: 1176.patch
# Mostly from https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commits/master/gio/gkeyfilesettingsbackend.c
Patch60: keyfile-backend.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/1658
Patch61: CVE-2019-13012.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/450
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/603
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/974
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/984
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/985
Patch10: keyfile-backend.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/604
Patch11: CVE-2019-13012.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/1942
Patch12: CVE-2021-27218.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/1927
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/2000
Patch70: CVE-2021-27219.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/1944
Patch71: CVE-2021-27218.patch
Patch13: CVE-2021-27219.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/1981
Patch14: CVE-2021-28153.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1938284
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/1369
Patch15: 1369.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1948988
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/873
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/1353
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/1691
Patch80: gmain-corruption.patch
Patch16: gmain-corruption.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/1713
Patch17: 1713.patch
%description
GLib is the low-level core library that forms the basis for projects
@ -279,15 +300,34 @@ glib-compile-schemas %{_datadir}/glib-2.0/schemas &> /dev/null || :
%{_datadir}/installed-tests
%changelog
* Mon Jul 26 2021 Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com> - 2.56.4-10.1
- Fix CVE-2021-27218
Resolves: #1974888
* Thu Jul 01 2021 Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com> - 2.56.4-15
- Fix test failure introduced in previous update
- Related: #1971533
* Thu May 20 2021 Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com> - 2.56.4-10
* Wed Jun 23 2021 Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com> - 2.56.4-14
- Refresh GHmac patchset
- Resolves: #1971533
* Thu May 20 2021 Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com> - 2.56.4-13
- Rename and consolidate existing patches for better maintainability
- Refresh CVE-2021-27219 patcheset, using better-targeted fixes
Resolves: #1939108
* Wed May 05 2021 Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com> - 2.56.4-12
- Fix various problems in GMainContext
Resolves: #1953553
Resolves: #1948988
* Tue May 04 2021 Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com> - 2.56.4-11
- Remove CHARSETALIASDIR environment variable
Resolves: #1938284
* Wed Mar 31 2021 Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com> - 2.56.4-10
- Fix CVE-2021-27218
Resolves: #1939072
- Fix CVE-2021-27219
Resolves: #1960600
Resolves: #1939108
- Fix CVE-2021-28153
Resolves: #1939118
* Tue Nov 10 2020 Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com> - 2.56.4-9
- Update GHmac patch to implement g_hmac_copy()