import glib2-2.56.4-8.el8
This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources
parent
7d1bfd9d81
commit
bea9bf982b
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From ee502dbbe89a5976c32eb8863c9a9d274ddb60e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
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Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2019 08:47:39 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] GDBus: prefer getsockopt()-style credentials-passing APIs
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Conceptually, a D-Bus server is really trying to determine the credentials
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of (the process that initiated) a connection, not the credentials that
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the process had when it sent a particular message. Ideally, it does
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this with a getsockopt()-style API that queries the credentials of the
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connection's initiator without requiring any particular cooperation from
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that process, avoiding a class of possible failures.
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The leading '\0' in the D-Bus protocol is primarily a workaround
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for platforms where the message-based credentials-passing API is
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strictly better than the getsockopt()-style API (for example, on
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FreeBSD, SCM_CREDS includes a process ID but getpeereid() does not),
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or where the getsockopt()-style API does not exist at all. As a result
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libdbus, the reference implementation of D-Bus, does not implement
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Linux SCM_CREDENTIALS at all - it has no reason to do so, because the
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SO_PEERCRED socket option is equally informative.
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This change makes GDBusServer on Linux more closely match the behaviour
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of libdbus.
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In particular, GNOME/glib#1831 indicates that when a libdbus client
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connects to a GDBus server, recvmsg() sometimes yields a SCM_CREDENTIALS
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message with cmsg_data={pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}. I think this is
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most likely a race condition in the early steps to connect:
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client server
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connect
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accept
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send '\0' <- race -> set SO_PASSCRED = 1
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receive '\0'
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If the server wins the race:
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client server
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connect
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accept
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set SO_PASSCRED = 1
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send '\0'
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receive '\0'
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then everything is fine. However, if the client wins the race:
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client server
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connect
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accept
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send '\0'
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set SO_PASSCRED = 1
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receive '\0'
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then the kernel does not record credentials for the message containing
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'\0' (because SO_PASSCRED was 0 at the time). However, by the time the
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server receives the message, the kernel knows that credentials are
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desired. I would have expected the kernel to omit the credentials header
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in this case, but it seems that instead, it synthesizes a credentials
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structure with a dummy process ID 0, a dummy uid derived from
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/proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and a dummy gid derived from
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/proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid.
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In an unconfigured GDBusServer, hitting this race condition results in
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falling back to DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication, which in practice usually
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succeeds in authenticating the peer's uid. However, we encourage AF_UNIX
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servers on Unix platforms to allow only EXTERNAL authentication as a
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security-hardening measure, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 relies on a series
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of assumptions including a cryptographically strong PRNG and a shared
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home directory with no write access by others, which are not necessarily
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true for all operating systems and users. EXTERNAL authentication will
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fail if the server cannot determine the client's credentials.
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In particular, this caused a regression when CVE-2019-14822 was fixed
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in ibus, which appears to be resolved by this commit. Qt clients
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(which use libdbus) intermittently fail to connect to an ibus server
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(which uses GDBusServer), because ibus no longer allows DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1
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authentication or non-matching uids.
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Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
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Closes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/issues/1831
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---
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gio/gcredentialsprivate.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
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gio/gdbusauth.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
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2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
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index 06f0aed19..e9ec09b9f 100644
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--- a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
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+++ b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
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@@ -81,6 +81,18 @@
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*/
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#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED
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+/*
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+ * G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING:
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+ *
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+ * Defined to 1 if the data structure transferred by the message-passing
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+ * API is strictly more informative than the one transferred by the
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+ * `getsockopt()`-style API, and hence should be preferred, even for
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+ * protocols like D-Bus that are defined in terms of the credentials of
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+ * the (process that opened the) socket, as opposed to the credentials
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+ * of an individual message.
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+ */
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+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING
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+
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#ifdef __linux__
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#define G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED 1
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#define G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED 1
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@@ -100,6 +112,12 @@
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#define G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_SIZE (sizeof (struct cmsgcred))
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#define G_CREDENTIALS_UNIX_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE_SUPPORTED 1
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#define G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED 1
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+/* GLib doesn't implement it yet, but FreeBSD's getsockopt()-style API
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+ * is getpeereid(), which is not as informative as struct cmsgcred -
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+ * it does not tell us the PID. As a result, libdbus prefers to use
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+ * SCM_CREDS, and if we implement getpeereid() in future, we should
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+ * do the same. */
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+#define G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING 1
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#elif defined(__NetBSD__)
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#define G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED 1
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diff --git a/gio/gdbusauth.c b/gio/gdbusauth.c
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index 752ec23fc..14cc5d70e 100644
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--- a/gio/gdbusauth.c
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+++ b/gio/gdbusauth.c
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@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
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#include "gdbusutils.h"
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#include "gioenumtypes.h"
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#include "gcredentials.h"
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+#include "gcredentialsprivate.h"
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#include "gdbusprivate.h"
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#include "giostream.h"
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#include "gdatainputstream.h"
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@@ -969,9 +970,31 @@ _g_dbus_auth_run_server (GDBusAuth *auth,
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g_data_input_stream_set_newline_type (dis, G_DATA_STREAM_NEWLINE_TYPE_CR_LF);
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- /* first read the NUL-byte */
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+ /* read the NUL-byte, possibly with credentials attached */
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#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
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- if (G_IS_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
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+#ifndef G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING
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+ if (G_IS_SOCKET_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
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+ {
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+ GSocket *sock = g_socket_connection_get_socket (G_SOCKET_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream));
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+
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+ local_error = NULL;
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+ credentials = g_socket_get_credentials (sock, &local_error);
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+
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+ if (credentials == NULL && !g_error_matches (local_error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED))
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+ {
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+ g_propagate_error (error, local_error);
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+ else
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+ {
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+ /* Clear the error indicator, so we can retry with
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+ * g_unix_connection_receive_credentials() if necessary */
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+ g_clear_error (&local_error);
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+ }
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+ }
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+#endif
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+
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+ if (credentials == NULL && G_IS_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
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{
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local_error = NULL;
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credentials = g_unix_connection_receive_credentials (G_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream),
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--
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2.23.0
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From 1485a97d8051b0aa047987f7b0c0bfe4ba4ce55b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
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Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2019 10:55:09 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] credentials: Invalid Linux struct ucred means "no
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information"
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On Linux, if getsockopt SO_PEERCRED is used on a TCP socket, one
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might expect it to fail with an appropriate error like ENOTSUP or
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EPROTONOSUPPORT. However, it appears that in fact it succeeds, but
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yields a credentials structure with pid 0, uid -1 and gid -1. These
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are not real process, user and group IDs that can be allocated to a
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real process (pid 0 needs to be reserved to give kill(0) its documented
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special semantics, and similarly uid and gid -1 need to be reserved for
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setresuid() and setresgid()) so it is not meaningful to signal them to
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high-level API users.
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An API user with Linux-specific knowledge can still inspect these fields
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via g_credentials_get_native() if desired.
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Similarly, if SO_PASSCRED is used to receive a SCM_CREDENTIALS message
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on a receiving Unix socket, but the sending socket had not enabled
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SO_PASSCRED at the time that the message was sent, it is possible
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for it to succeed but yield a credentials structure with pid 0, uid
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/proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and gid /proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid. Even
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if we were to read those pseudo-files, we cannot distinguish between
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the overflow IDs and a real process that legitimately has the same IDs
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(typically they are set to 'nobody' and 'nogroup', which can be used
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by a real process), so we detect this situation by noticing that
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pid == 0, and to save syscalls we do not read the overflow IDs from
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/proc at all.
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This results in a small API change: g_credentials_is_same_user() now
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returns FALSE if we compare two credentials structures that are both
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invalid. This seems like reasonable, conservative behaviour: if we cannot
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prove that they are the same user, we should assume they are not.
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Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
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---
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gio/gcredentials.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
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1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/gio/gcredentials.c b/gio/gcredentials.c
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index c350e3c88..c4794ded7 100644
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--- a/gio/gcredentials.c
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+++ b/gio/gcredentials.c
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@@ -265,6 +265,35 @@ g_credentials_to_string (GCredentials *credentials)
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/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
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+#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
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+/*
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+ * Check whether @native contains invalid data. If getsockopt SO_PEERCRED
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+ * is used on a TCP socket, it succeeds but yields a credentials structure
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+ * with pid 0, uid -1 and gid -1. Similarly, if SO_PASSCRED is used on a
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+ * receiving Unix socket when the sending socket did not also enable
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+ * SO_PASSCRED, it can succeed but yield a credentials structure with
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+ * pid 0, uid /proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and gid
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+ * /proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid.
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+ */
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+static gboolean
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+linux_ucred_check_valid (struct ucred *native,
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+ GError **error)
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+{
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+ if (native->pid == 0
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+ || native->uid == -1
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+ || native->gid == -1)
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|
+ {
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+ g_set_error_literal (error,
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+ G_IO_ERROR,
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+ G_IO_ERROR_INVALID_DATA,
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|
+ _("GCredentials contains invalid data"));
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|
+ return FALSE;
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|
+ }
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+
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|
+ return TRUE;
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|
+}
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|
+#endif
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|
+
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|
/**
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* g_credentials_is_same_user:
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|
* @credentials: A #GCredentials.
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|
@@ -294,7 +323,8 @@ g_credentials_is_same_user (GCredentials *credentials,
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|
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|
ret = FALSE;
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|
#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
|
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|
- if (credentials->native.uid == other_credentials->native.uid)
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|
+ if (linux_ucred_check_valid (&credentials->native, NULL)
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|
+ && credentials->native.uid == other_credentials->native.uid)
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|
ret = TRUE;
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|
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
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|
if (credentials->native.cmcred_euid == other_credentials->native.cmcred_euid)
|
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|
@@ -453,7 +483,10 @@ g_credentials_get_unix_user (GCredentials *credentials,
|
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|
g_return_val_if_fail (error == NULL || *error == NULL, -1);
|
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|
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|
#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
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|
- ret = credentials->native.uid;
|
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|
+ if (linux_ucred_check_valid (&credentials->native, error))
|
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|
+ ret = credentials->native.uid;
|
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|
+ else
|
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|
+ ret = -1;
|
||||||
|
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
|
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|
ret = credentials->native.cmcred_euid;
|
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|
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_NETBSD_UNPCBID
|
||||||
|
@@ -499,7 +532,10 @@ g_credentials_get_unix_pid (GCredentials *credentials,
|
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|
g_return_val_if_fail (error == NULL || *error == NULL, -1);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#if G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
|
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|
- ret = credentials->native.pid;
|
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|
+ if (linux_ucred_check_valid (&credentials->native, error))
|
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|
+ ret = credentials->native.pid;
|
||||||
|
+ else
|
||||||
|
+ ret = -1;
|
||||||
|
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
|
||||||
|
ret = credentials->native.cmcred_pid;
|
||||||
|
#elif G_CREDENTIALS_USE_NETBSD_UNPCBID
|
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|
--
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|
2.23.0
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|
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@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
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|
From ef1035d9d86464ea0b5dde60a7a0e190895fdf5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||||
|
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
|
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|
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2019 08:22:24 +0100
|
||||||
|
Subject: [PATCH] gcredentialsprivate: Document the various private macros
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
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|
---
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|
gio/gcredentialsprivate.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||||
|
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+)
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|
|
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|
diff --git a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
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|
index 4d1c420a8..06f0aed19 100644
|
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|
--- a/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
|
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|
+++ b/gio/gcredentialsprivate.h
|
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|
@@ -22,6 +22,65 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "gio/gcredentials.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "gio/gnetworking.h"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+/*
|
||||||
|
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED:
|
||||||
|
+ *
|
||||||
|
+ * Defined to 1 if GCredentials works.
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+/*
|
||||||
|
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED, etc.:
|
||||||
|
+ *
|
||||||
|
+ * Defined to 1 if GCredentials uses Linux `struct ucred`, etc.
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED
|
||||||
|
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_FREEBSD_CMSGCRED
|
||||||
|
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_NETBSD_UNPCBID
|
||||||
|
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_OPENBSD_SOCKPEERCRED
|
||||||
|
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_USE_SOLARIS_UCRED
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+/*
|
||||||
|
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_TYPE:
|
||||||
|
+ *
|
||||||
|
+ * Defined to one of G_CREDENTIALS_TYPE_LINUX_UCRED, etc.
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_TYPE
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+/*
|
||||||
|
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_SIZE:
|
||||||
|
+ *
|
||||||
|
+ * Defined to the size of the %G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_TYPE
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_NATIVE_SIZE
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+/*
|
||||||
|
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_UNIX_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE_SUPPORTED:
|
||||||
|
+ *
|
||||||
|
+ * Defined to 1 if we have a message-passing API in which credentials
|
||||||
|
+ * are attached to a particular message, such as `SCM_CREDENTIALS` on Linux
|
||||||
|
+ * or `SCM_CREDS` on FreeBSD.
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_UNIX_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE_SUPPORTED
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+/*
|
||||||
|
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_SOCKET_GET_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED:
|
||||||
|
+ *
|
||||||
|
+ * Defined to 1 if we have a `getsockopt()`-style API in which one end of
|
||||||
|
+ * a socket connection can directly query the credentials of the process
|
||||||
|
+ * that initiated the other end, such as `getsockopt SO_PEERCRED` on Linux
|
||||||
|
+ * or `getpeereid()` on multiple operating systems.
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SOCKET_GET_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+/*
|
||||||
|
+ * G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED:
|
||||||
|
+ *
|
||||||
|
+ * Defined to 1 if privileged processes can spoof their credentials when
|
||||||
|
+ * using the message-passing API.
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+#undef G_CREDENTIALS_SPOOFING_SUPPORTED
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
#ifdef __linux__
|
||||||
|
#define G_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED 1
|
||||||
|
#define G_CREDENTIALS_USE_LINUX_UCRED 1
|
||||||
|
--
|
||||||
|
2.23.0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
Name: glib2
|
Name: glib2
|
||||||
Version: 2.56.4
|
Version: 2.56.4
|
||||||
Release: 7%{?dist}
|
Release: 8%{?dist}
|
||||||
Summary: A library of handy utility functions
|
Summary: A library of handy utility functions
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
License: LGPLv2+
|
License: LGPLv2+
|
||||||
@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ Patch30: backport-per-desktop-overrides.patch
|
|||||||
# Backported from git
|
# Backported from git
|
||||||
Patch40: 0001-gdbus-codegen-honor-Property.EmitsChangedSignal-anno.patch
|
Patch40: 0001-gdbus-codegen-honor-Property.EmitsChangedSignal-anno.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1777213
|
||||||
|
Patch50: 0001-gcredentialsprivate-Document-the-various-private-mac.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch51: 0001-GDBus-prefer-getsockopt-style-credentials-passing-AP.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch52: 0001-credentials-Invalid-Linux-struct-ucred-means-no-info.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%description
|
%description
|
||||||
GLib is the low-level core library that forms the basis for projects
|
GLib is the low-level core library that forms the basis for projects
|
||||||
such as GTK+ and GNOME. It provides data structure handling for C,
|
such as GTK+ and GNOME. It provides data structure handling for C,
|
||||||
@ -256,6 +261,10 @@ glib-compile-schemas %{_datadir}/glib-2.0/schemas &> /dev/null || :
|
|||||||
%{_datadir}/installed-tests
|
%{_datadir}/installed-tests
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%changelog
|
%changelog
|
||||||
|
* Mon Dec 02 2019 Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org> - 2.56.4-8
|
||||||
|
- Backport patches for GDBus auth
|
||||||
|
Resolves: #1777213
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Sat Jul 13 2019 Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com> - 2.56.4-7
|
* Sat Jul 13 2019 Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com> - 2.56.4-7
|
||||||
- Backport patch for CVE-2019-12450
|
- Backport patch for CVE-2019-12450
|
||||||
Resolves: #1722101
|
Resolves: #1722101
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user