diff --git a/CVE-2026-15588.patch b/CVE-2026-15588.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b439f50 --- /dev/null +++ b/CVE-2026-15588.patch @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +From 9bbe8d82a27f24ef371718bae8815cd7fca92def Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Philip Withnall +Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 18:13:08 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] gdbusauth: Limit length of lines read from client +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +The client isn’t trusted at this point, and there was previously nothing +limiting how long a line `GDBusAuth` would read. So an untrusted client +could exhaust the server’s memory by sending anything except `\r\n`. + +Fix that by applying a reasonably length limit when reading a line, and +add a unit test. + +Spotted by Gitee Codepecker Lab. + +Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall +Fixes: #3985 +--- + gio/gdbusauth.c | 44 +++++++++++++++ + gio/tests/gdbus-auth.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 163 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/gio/gdbusauth.c b/gio/gdbusauth.c +index cb84d0d64..72ffd0b4d 100644 +--- a/gio/gdbusauth.c ++++ b/gio/gdbusauth.c +@@ -262,6 +262,21 @@ find_mech_by_name (GDBusAuth *auth, + return ret; + } + ++static size_t ++get_longest_mechanism_name_length (GDBusAuth *auth) ++{ ++ size_t len = 0; ++ ++ for (GList *l = auth->priv->available_mechanisms; l != NULL; l = l->next) ++ { ++ Mechanism *m = l->data; ++ ++ len = MAX (len, strlen (m->name)); ++ } ++ ++ return len; ++} ++ + GDBusAuth * + _g_dbus_auth_new (GIOStream *stream) + { +@@ -270,6 +285,20 @@ _g_dbus_auth_new (GIOStream *stream) + NULL); + } + ++/* Arbitrarily chosen limit on the length of a DATA command payload, to prevent ++ * unbounded reads from malicious clients. ++ * ++ * - The ANONYMOUS mechanism doesn’t use DATA. ++ * - The EXTERNAL mechanism just uses it to transfer a decimal-encoded UID. ++ * - The DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 mechanism transfers a challenge and a SHA1 hash. The ++ * hash is bounded in length, but the challenge is not, so could potentially ++ * hit this limit. It doesn’t seem unreasonable to bound the challenge to ++ * ~4KB though. GDBus itself generates a 16 byte challenge. ++ * ++ * See https://dbus.freedesktop.org/doc/dbus-specification.html#auth-command-data ++ */ ++#define MAX_DATA_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_BYTES 4096 ++ + /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + /* like g_data_input_stream_read_line() but sets error if there's no content to read */ + static gchar * +@@ -307,6 +336,7 @@ _my_g_data_input_stream_read_line (GDataInputStream *dis, + */ + static gchar * + _my_g_input_stream_read_line_safe (GInputStream *i, ++ size_t max_line_length, + gsize *out_line_length, + GCancellable *cancellable, + GError **error) +@@ -316,11 +346,22 @@ _my_g_input_stream_read_line_safe (GInputStream *i, + gssize num_read; + gboolean last_was_cr; + ++ g_assert (max_line_length <= SIZE_MAX - 2); ++ + str = g_string_new (NULL); + + last_was_cr = FALSE; + while (TRUE) + { ++ if (str->len >= max_line_length + 2 /* allow for \r\n */) ++ { ++ g_set_error_literal (error, ++ G_IO_ERROR, ++ G_IO_ERROR_FAILED, ++ _("Malformed D-Bus authentication line")); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ + num_read = g_input_stream_read (i, + &c, + 1, +@@ -1075,6 +1116,7 @@ _g_dbus_auth_run_server (GDBusAuth *auth, + case SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_AUTH: + debug_print ("SERVER: WaitingForAuth"); + line = _my_g_input_stream_read_line_safe (g_io_stream_get_input_stream (auth->priv->stream), ++ strlen ("AUTH ") + get_longest_mechanism_name_length (auth) + strlen (" ") + MAX_DATA_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_BYTES, + &line_length, + cancellable, + error); +@@ -1296,6 +1338,7 @@ _g_dbus_auth_run_server (GDBusAuth *auth, + case SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_DATA: + debug_print ("SERVER: WaitingForData"); + line = _my_g_input_stream_read_line_safe (g_io_stream_get_input_stream (auth->priv->stream), ++ strlen ("DATA ") + MAX_DATA_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_BYTES, + &line_length, + cancellable, + error); +@@ -1338,6 +1381,7 @@ _g_dbus_auth_run_server (GDBusAuth *auth, + case SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BEGIN: + debug_print ("SERVER: WaitingForBegin"); + line = _my_g_input_stream_read_line_safe (g_io_stream_get_input_stream (auth->priv->stream), ++ MAX (strlen ("BEGIN"), strlen ("NEGOTIATE_UNIX_FD")), + &line_length, + cancellable, + error); +diff --git a/gio/tests/gdbus-auth.c b/gio/tests/gdbus-auth.c +index 18288f36d..ed1894969 100644 +--- a/gio/tests/gdbus-auth.c ++++ b/gio/tests/gdbus-auth.c +@@ -278,6 +278,124 @@ temp_dbus_keyrings_teardown (void) + g_unsetenv ("G_DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1_KEYRING_DIR_IGNORE_PERMISSION"); + } + ++static void ++async_result_cb (GObject *obj, ++ GAsyncResult *result, ++ void *user_data) ++{ ++ GAsyncResult **result_out = user_data; ++ ++ g_assert (result_out != NULL); ++ g_assert (*result_out == NULL); ++ ++ *result_out = g_object_ref (result); ++ g_main_context_wakeup (g_main_context_get_thread_default ()); ++} ++ ++static gboolean ++server_new_connection_unexpected_cb (GDBusServer *server, ++ GDBusConnection *connection, ++ void *user_data) ++{ ++ g_assert_not_reached (); ++ return FALSE; ++} ++ ++static void ++test_auth_server_read_limit (void) ++{ ++ GDBusServer *server = NULL; ++ unsigned long new_connection_id = 0; ++ const char *server_address; ++ GIOStream *client_stream = NULL; ++ GOutputStream *client_output_stream; ++ GInputStream *client_input_stream; ++ GAsyncResult *result = NULL; ++ char *write_buffer = NULL; ++ char read_buffer[100]; ++ ssize_t read_len; ++ size_t bytes_written; ++ GError *local_error = NULL; ++ ++ g_test_summary ("Test that GDBusServer limits the lengths of reads it does during auth from a client"); ++ g_test_bug ("https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/3985"); ++ ++ server = server_new_for_mechanism (NULL); ++ ++ new_connection_id = g_signal_connect (server, ++ "new-connection", ++ G_CALLBACK (server_new_connection_unexpected_cb), ++ NULL); ++ server_address = g_dbus_server_get_client_address (server); ++ g_dbus_server_start (server); ++ ++ /* Start connecting as a client */ ++ g_dbus_address_get_stream (server_address, NULL, async_result_cb, &result); ++ ++ while (result == NULL) ++ g_main_context_iteration (NULL, TRUE); ++ ++ client_stream = g_dbus_address_get_stream_finish (result, NULL, &local_error); ++ g_assert_no_error (local_error); ++ g_clear_object (&result); ++ ++ /* Send an over-long AUTH line, maliciously */ ++ client_output_stream = g_io_stream_get_output_stream (client_stream); ++ client_input_stream = g_io_stream_get_input_stream (client_stream); ++ ++ write_buffer = g_strdup_printf ("AUTH DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 context%0*d 123 456\r\n", 5000, 0); ++ ++ g_output_stream_write_all_async (client_output_stream, ++ write_buffer, ++ strlen (write_buffer), ++ G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, ++ NULL, ++ async_result_cb, ++ &result); ++ ++ while (result == NULL) ++ g_main_context_iteration (NULL, TRUE); ++ ++ g_output_stream_write_all_finish (client_output_stream, result, &bytes_written, &local_error); ++ g_assert_no_error (local_error); ++ g_assert_cmpuint (bytes_written, ==, strlen (write_buffer)); ++ g_clear_object (&result); ++ ++ g_clear_pointer (&write_buffer, g_free); ++ ++ /* Authentication should have been rejected, so reading or writing the stream ++ * should now fail. */ ++ read_len = g_input_stream_read (client_input_stream, ++ read_buffer, ++ sizeof (read_buffer), ++ NULL, ++ &local_error); ++ g_assert_error (local_error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_CONNECTION_CLOSED); ++ g_assert_cmpint (read_len, <, 0); ++ g_clear_error (&local_error); ++ ++ write_buffer = g_strdup_printf ("AUTH\r\n"); ++ ++ g_output_stream_write_all (client_output_stream, ++ write_buffer, ++ strlen (write_buffer), ++ &bytes_written, ++ NULL, ++ &local_error); ++ g_assert_error (local_error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_CONNECTION_CLOSED); ++ g_assert_cmpuint (bytes_written, ==, 0); ++ g_clear_error (&local_error); ++ ++ g_clear_pointer (&write_buffer, g_free); ++ ++ /* Cleanup */ ++ g_clear_object (&client_stream); ++ g_dbus_server_stop (server); ++ ++ g_clear_signal_handler (&new_connection_id, server); ++ g_clear_object (&server); ++} ++ + /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + + int +@@ -297,6 +415,7 @@ main (int argc, + g_test_add_func ("/gdbus/auth/server/ANONYMOUS", auth_server_anonymous); + g_test_add_func ("/gdbus/auth/server/EXTERNAL", auth_server_external); + g_test_add_func ("/gdbus/auth/server/DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1", auth_server_dbus_cookie_sha1); ++ g_test_add_func ("/gdbus/auth/server/read-limit", test_auth_server_read_limit); + + /* TODO: we currently don't have tests for + * diff --git a/glib2.spec b/glib2.spec index 61dc45a..d3b36d9 100644 --- a/glib2.spec +++ b/glib2.spec @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ Name: glib2 Version: 2.68.4 -Release: 26%{?dist} +Release: 27%{?dist} Summary: A library of handy utility functions License: LGPLv2+ @@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ Patch: CVE-2026-58013.patch # https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/5131 Patch: CVE-2026-58011.patch +# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/5240 +Patch: CVE-2026-15588.patch + BuildRequires: chrpath BuildRequires: gcc BuildRequires: gcc-c++ @@ -331,6 +334,10 @@ glib-compile-schemas %{_datadir}/glib-2.0/schemas &> /dev/null || : %{_datadir}/installed-tests %changelog +* Wed Aug 19 2026 RHEL Packaging Agent - 2.68.4-27 +- Fix CVE-2026-15588: limit D-Bus auth line read length + Resolves: RHEL-219128 + * Wed Aug 19 2026 RHEL Packaging Agent - 2.68.4-26 - Fix CVE-2026-58011: range validation in g_date_time_add_full() Resolves: RHEL-212196