Add patch for CVE-2025-13601 and patches for GUnixMount issues

Also, rename new patch files to follow this package's naming
conventions.

Resolves: RHEL-138588
Resolves: RHEL-130990
This commit is contained in:
Michael Catanzaro 2026-01-19 15:09:19 -06:00
parent 89cbf708d7
commit 2276a29b08
5 changed files with 651 additions and 2 deletions

124
CVE-2025-13601.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
From 291b47380b2e0dd7c526bbde8d82ae6d739ef266 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2025 18:27:22 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gconvert: Error out if g_escape_uri_string() would overflow
If the string to escape contains a very large number of unacceptable
characters (which would need escaping), the calculation of the length of
the escaped string could overflow, leading to a potential write off the
end of the newly allocated string.
In addition to that, the number of unacceptable characters was counted
in a signed integer, which would overflow to become negative, making it
easier for an attacker to craft an input string which would cause an
out-of-bounds write.
Fix that by validating the allocation length, and using an unsigned
integer to count the number of unacceptable characters.
Spotted by treeplus. Thanks to the Sovereign Tech Resilience programme
from the Sovereign Tech Agency. ID: #YWH-PGM9867-134
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
Fixes: #3827
---
glib/gconvert.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/glib/gconvert.c b/glib/gconvert.c
index e7c222f8d..ffd860a83 100644
--- a/glib/gconvert.c
+++ b/glib/gconvert.c
@@ -1338,8 +1338,9 @@ static const gchar hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
/* Note: This escape function works on file: URIs, but if you want to
* escape something else, please read RFC-2396 */
static gchar *
-g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string,
- UnsafeCharacterSet mask)
+g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string,
+ UnsafeCharacterSet mask,
+ GError **error)
{
#define ACCEPTABLE(a) ((a)>=32 && (a)<128 && (acceptable[(a)-32] & use_mask))
@@ -1347,7 +1348,7 @@ g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string,
gchar *q;
gchar *result;
int c;
- gint unacceptable;
+ size_t unacceptable;
UnsafeCharacterSet use_mask;
g_return_val_if_fail (mask == UNSAFE_ALL
@@ -1364,7 +1365,14 @@ g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string,
if (!ACCEPTABLE (c))
unacceptable++;
}
-
+
+ if (unacceptable >= (G_MAXSIZE - (p - string)) / 2)
+ {
+ g_set_error_literal (error, G_CONVERT_ERROR, G_CONVERT_ERROR_BAD_URI,
+ _("The URI is too long"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
result = g_malloc (p - string + unacceptable * 2 + 1);
use_mask = mask;
@@ -1389,12 +1397,13 @@ g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string,
static gchar *
-g_escape_file_uri (const gchar *hostname,
- const gchar *pathname)
+g_escape_file_uri (const gchar *hostname,
+ const gchar *pathname,
+ GError **error)
{
char *escaped_hostname = NULL;
- char *escaped_path;
- char *res;
+ char *escaped_path = NULL;
+ char *res = NULL;
#ifdef G_OS_WIN32
char *p, *backslash;
@@ -1415,10 +1424,14 @@ g_escape_file_uri (const gchar *hostname,
if (hostname && *hostname != '\0')
{
- escaped_hostname = g_escape_uri_string (hostname, UNSAFE_HOST);
+ escaped_hostname = g_escape_uri_string (hostname, UNSAFE_HOST, error);
+ if (escaped_hostname == NULL)
+ goto out;
}
- escaped_path = g_escape_uri_string (pathname, UNSAFE_PATH);
+ escaped_path = g_escape_uri_string (pathname, UNSAFE_PATH, error);
+ if (escaped_path == NULL)
+ goto out;
res = g_strconcat ("file://",
(escaped_hostname) ? escaped_hostname : "",
@@ -1426,6 +1439,7 @@ g_escape_file_uri (const gchar *hostname,
escaped_path,
NULL);
+out:
#ifdef G_OS_WIN32
g_free ((char *) pathname);
#endif
@@ -1759,7 +1773,7 @@ g_filename_to_uri (const gchar *filename,
hostname = NULL;
#endif
- escaped_uri = g_escape_file_uri (hostname, filename);
+ escaped_uri = g_escape_file_uri (hostname, filename, error);
return escaped_uri;
}
--
2.52.0

View File

@ -29,10 +29,19 @@ Patch: CVE-2024-52533.patch
Patch: CVE-2025-4373.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/4470
Patch: RHEL-114857.patch
Patch: gdbusconnection-serial-number-overflow.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/3933
Patch: 0001-gappinfo-Allow-giving-no-GAppInfo-for-getting-startu.patch
Patch: startup-notify-without-gappinfo.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/4914
Patch: CVE-2025-13601.patch
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/4916
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/4918
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/4930
# https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/4931
Patch: gunixmount-improvements.patch
BuildRequires: gcc
BuildRequires: gcc-c++

View File

@ -0,0 +1,516 @@
From e2de4e224a638918842e0578ddf4cb3101a2b0fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Hergert <chergert@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2025 12:31:13 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] gio/gunixmounts: mark some file-system types as system
Since this list was originally created, more file system types have
become commonly used and would benefit from being marked as a system
file-system type.
This was found while tracking down some performance issues in
gnome-settings-daemon trash handling.
---
gio/gunixmounts.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/gio/gunixmounts.c b/gio/gunixmounts.c
index 6df984420..c15eb5f4e 100644
--- a/gio/gunixmounts.c
+++ b/gio/gunixmounts.c
@@ -320,6 +320,8 @@ g_unix_is_system_fs_type (const char *fs_type)
"auto",
"autofs",
"autofs4",
+ "binfmt_misc",
+ "bpf",
"cgroup",
"configfs",
"cxfs",
@@ -328,6 +330,7 @@ g_unix_is_system_fs_type (const char *fs_type)
"devpts",
"devtmpfs",
"ecryptfs",
+ "efivarfs",
"fdescfs",
"fusectl",
"gfs",
@@ -356,6 +359,7 @@ g_unix_is_system_fs_type (const char *fs_type)
"selinuxfs",
"sysfs",
"tmpfs",
+ "tracefs",
"usbfs",
NULL
};
--
2.52.0
From ccfc181691e5eda9d914473496f5f0e198e7364e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Holy <oholy@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 15:36:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] gio/gunixmounts: Mark more file systems as system
internal
The commit f1a90a67 updated list of system internal file systems.
I think we can add a few more file systems (i.e. `cgroups2`,
`fuse.gvfsd-fuse`, `fuse.portal`) and `/bin/efi` path. This is to
improve performance of `gvfsd-trash`, `gsd-houskeeping` and similar.
Related: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/-/issues/814
---
gio/gunixmounts.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/gio/gunixmounts.c b/gio/gunixmounts.c
index c15eb5f4e..99a72e154 100644
--- a/gio/gunixmounts.c
+++ b/gio/gunixmounts.c
@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ g_unix_is_mount_path_system_internal (const char *mount_path)
*/
"/", /* we already have "Filesystem root" in Nautilus */
"/bin",
+ "/bin/efi",
"/boot",
"/compat/linux/proc",
"/compat/linux/sys",
@@ -323,6 +324,7 @@ g_unix_is_system_fs_type (const char *fs_type)
"binfmt_misc",
"bpf",
"cgroup",
+ "cgroup2",
"configfs",
"cxfs",
"debugfs",
@@ -332,6 +334,8 @@ g_unix_is_system_fs_type (const char *fs_type)
"ecryptfs",
"efivarfs",
"fdescfs",
+ "fuse.gvfsd-fuse",
+ "fuse.portal",
"fusectl",
"gfs",
"gfs2",
--
2.52.0
From cfe7f8f178155bf12598583c6efeea55cb204c94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Holy <oholy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 10:02:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] gio/gunixmounts: Replace /bin/efi with /boot/efi
The commit 06e9f2c0 added `/bin/efi` instead of `/boot/efi` to the
list of system internal mount paths by mistake. Let's fix it.
---
gio/gunixmounts.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/gio/gunixmounts.c b/gio/gunixmounts.c
index 99a72e154..d51079b3b 100644
--- a/gio/gunixmounts.c
+++ b/gio/gunixmounts.c
@@ -239,8 +239,8 @@ g_unix_is_mount_path_system_internal (const char *mount_path)
*/
"/", /* we already have "Filesystem root" in Nautilus */
"/bin",
- "/bin/efi",
"/boot",
+ "/boot/efi",
"/compat/linux/proc",
"/compat/linux/sys",
"/dev",
--
2.52.0
From 6f0aa00dc242df965cc8a59f2dc9540911b3b61c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Hergert <chergert@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2025 18:54:33 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] gio/unixmounts: use bsearch() to check for set inclusion
This turns out to be about 17% faster than the previous set comparisons
on large (in the thousands) /proc/mounts configurations. It does require
that we keep the lists sorted but ended up faster than gperf hashing.
---
gio/gunixmounts.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gio/gunixmounts.c b/gio/gunixmounts.c
index d51079b3b..897c73ef9 100644
--- a/gio/gunixmounts.c
+++ b/gio/gunixmounts.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <gstdio.h>
@@ -206,16 +207,17 @@ static GSource *proc_mounts_watch_source = NULL;
static struct libmnt_monitor *proc_mounts_monitor = NULL;
#endif
+static int
+compare_str (const char * key,
+ const char * const *element)
+{
+ return strcmp (key, *element);
+}
+
static gboolean
-is_in (const char *value, const char *set[])
+is_in (const char *value, const char *set[], gsize set_size)
{
- int i;
- for (i = 0; set[i] != NULL; i++)
- {
- if (strcmp (set[i], value) == 0)
- return TRUE;
- }
- return FALSE;
+ return bsearch (value, set, set_size, sizeof (char *), (GCompareFunc)compare_str) != NULL;
}
/**
@@ -233,11 +235,12 @@ is_in (const char *value, const char *set[])
gboolean
g_unix_is_mount_path_system_internal (const char *mount_path)
{
+ /* keep sorted for bsearch */
const char *ignore_mountpoints[] = {
/* Includes all FHS 2.3 toplevel dirs and other specialized
* directories that we want to hide from the user.
*/
- "/", /* we already have "Filesystem root" in Nautilus */
+ "/", /* we already have "Filesystem root" in Nautilus */
"/bin",
"/boot",
"/boot/efi",
@@ -253,11 +256,15 @@ g_unix_is_mount_path_system_internal (const char *mount_path)
"/live/image",
"/media",
"/mnt",
+ "/net",
"/opt",
+ "/proc",
"/rescue",
"/root",
"/sbin",
+ "/sbin",
"/srv",
+ "/sys",
"/tmp",
"/usr",
"/usr/X11R6",
@@ -269,23 +276,21 @@ g_unix_is_mount_path_system_internal (const char *mount_path)
"/var",
"/var/crash",
"/var/local",
- GLIB_LOCALSTATEDIR,
"/var/log",
"/var/log/audit", /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=333041 */
"/var/mail",
"/var/run",
- GLIB_RUNSTATEDIR,
"/var/tmp", /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=335241 */
- "/proc",
- "/sbin",
- "/net",
- "/sys",
- NULL
};
- if (is_in (mount_path, ignore_mountpoints))
+ if (is_in (mount_path, ignore_mountpoints, G_N_ELEMENTS (ignore_mountpoints)))
return TRUE;
-
+
+ /* Kept separate from sorted list as they may vary */
+ if (g_str_equal (GLIB_LOCALSTATEDIR, mount_path) ||
+ g_str_equal (GLIB_RUNSTATEDIR, mount_path))
+ return TRUE;
+
if (g_str_has_prefix (mount_path, "/dev/") ||
g_str_has_prefix (mount_path, "/proc/") ||
g_str_has_prefix (mount_path, "/sys/"))
@@ -315,14 +320,13 @@ g_unix_is_mount_path_system_internal (const char *mount_path)
gboolean
g_unix_is_system_fs_type (const char *fs_type)
{
+ /* keep sorted for bsearch */
const char *ignore_fs[] = {
"adfs",
"afs",
"auto",
"autofs",
"autofs4",
- "binfmt_misc",
- "bpf",
"cgroup",
"cgroup2",
"configfs",
@@ -332,7 +336,6 @@ g_unix_is_system_fs_type (const char *fs_type)
"devpts",
"devtmpfs",
"ecryptfs",
- "efivarfs",
"fdescfs",
"fuse.gvfsd-fuse",
"fuse.portal",
@@ -363,14 +366,12 @@ g_unix_is_system_fs_type (const char *fs_type)
"selinuxfs",
"sysfs",
"tmpfs",
- "tracefs",
"usbfs",
- NULL
};
g_return_val_if_fail (fs_type != NULL && *fs_type != '\0', FALSE);
- return is_in (fs_type, ignore_fs);
+ return is_in (fs_type, ignore_fs, G_N_ELEMENTS (ignore_fs));
}
/**
@@ -392,19 +393,19 @@ g_unix_is_system_fs_type (const char *fs_type)
gboolean
g_unix_is_system_device_path (const char *device_path)
{
+ /* keep sorted for bsearch */
const char *ignore_devices[] = {
- "none",
- "sunrpc",
- "devpts",
- "nfsd",
"/dev/loop",
"/dev/vn",
- NULL
+ "devpts",
+ "nfsd",
+ "none",
+ "sunrpc",
};
g_return_val_if_fail (device_path != NULL && *device_path != '\0', FALSE);
- return is_in (device_path, ignore_devices);
+ return is_in (device_path, ignore_devices, G_N_ELEMENTS (ignore_devices));
}
static gboolean
--
2.52.0
From 182df8cc63f902288d377d9664dbf63448ca1cfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Hergert <chergert@gnome.org>
Date: Tue, 6 Jan 2026 10:56:59 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] gio/unixmounts: test that mounts are in sorted order
---
gio/gunixmounts-private.h | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
gio/gunixmounts.c | 51 ++---------------------------
gio/tests/unix-mounts.c | 25 ++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 gio/gunixmounts-private.h
diff --git a/gio/gunixmounts-private.h b/gio/gunixmounts-private.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..196e81aca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gio/gunixmounts-private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/* GIO - GLib Input, Output and Streaming Library
+ *
+ * Copyright 2006-2007 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2026 Christian Hergert
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General
+ * Public License along with this library; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+/* keep sorted for bsearch */
+static const char *system_mount_paths[] = {
+ /* Includes all FHS 2.3 toplevel dirs and other specialized
+ * directories that we want to hide from the user.
+ */
+ "/", /* we already have "Filesystem root" in Nautilus */
+ "/bin",
+ "/boot",
+ "/compat/linux/proc",
+ "/compat/linux/sys",
+ "/dev",
+ "/etc",
+ "/home",
+ "/lib",
+ "/lib64",
+ "/libexec",
+ "/live/cow",
+ "/live/image",
+ "/media",
+ "/mnt",
+ "/net",
+ "/opt",
+ "/proc",
+ "/rescue",
+ "/root",
+ "/sbin",
+ "/sbin",
+ "/srv",
+ "/sys",
+ "/tmp",
+ "/usr",
+ "/usr/X11R6",
+ "/usr/local",
+ "/usr/obj",
+ "/usr/ports",
+ "/usr/src",
+ "/usr/xobj",
+ "/var",
+ "/var/crash",
+ "/var/local",
+ "/var/log",
+ "/var/log/audit", /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=333041 */
+ "/var/mail",
+ "/var/run",
+ "/var/tmp", /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=335241 */
+};
diff --git a/gio/gunixmounts.c b/gio/gunixmounts.c
index 897c73ef9..ec7c1e7d9 100644
--- a/gio/gunixmounts.c
+++ b/gio/gunixmounts.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ extern char* hasmntopt(const struct mntent* mnt, const char* opt);
#endif
#include "gunixmounts.h"
+#include "gunixmounts-private.h"
#include "gfile.h"
#include "gfilemonitor.h"
#include "glibintl.h"
@@ -235,55 +236,7 @@ is_in (const char *value, const char *set[], gsize set_size)
gboolean
g_unix_is_mount_path_system_internal (const char *mount_path)
{
- /* keep sorted for bsearch */
- const char *ignore_mountpoints[] = {
- /* Includes all FHS 2.3 toplevel dirs and other specialized
- * directories that we want to hide from the user.
- */
- "/", /* we already have "Filesystem root" in Nautilus */
- "/bin",
- "/boot",
- "/boot/efi",
- "/compat/linux/proc",
- "/compat/linux/sys",
- "/dev",
- "/etc",
- "/home",
- "/lib",
- "/lib64",
- "/libexec",
- "/live/cow",
- "/live/image",
- "/media",
- "/mnt",
- "/net",
- "/opt",
- "/proc",
- "/rescue",
- "/root",
- "/sbin",
- "/sbin",
- "/srv",
- "/sys",
- "/tmp",
- "/usr",
- "/usr/X11R6",
- "/usr/local",
- "/usr/obj",
- "/usr/ports",
- "/usr/src",
- "/usr/xobj",
- "/var",
- "/var/crash",
- "/var/local",
- "/var/log",
- "/var/log/audit", /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=333041 */
- "/var/mail",
- "/var/run",
- "/var/tmp", /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=335241 */
- };
-
- if (is_in (mount_path, ignore_mountpoints, G_N_ELEMENTS (ignore_mountpoints)))
+ if (is_in (mount_path, system_mount_paths, G_N_ELEMENTS (system_mount_paths)))
return TRUE;
/* Kept separate from sorted list as they may vary */
diff --git a/gio/tests/unix-mounts.c b/gio/tests/unix-mounts.c
index e3cc6c18c..98a3bcdfc 100644
--- a/gio/tests/unix-mounts.c
+++ b/gio/tests/unix-mounts.c
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
#include <gio/gio.h>
#include <gio/gunixmounts.h>
+#include "../gunixmounts-private.h"
+
static void
test_is_system_fs_type (void)
{
@@ -50,6 +52,28 @@ test_is_system_device_path (void)
g_assert_false (g_unix_is_system_device_path ("/"));
}
+static void
+test_system_mount_paths_sorted (void)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ size_t n_paths = G_N_ELEMENTS (system_mount_paths);
+
+ g_test_summary ("Verify that system_mount_paths array is sorted for bsearch");
+
+ for (i = 1; i < n_paths; i++)
+ {
+ int cmp = strcmp (system_mount_paths[i - 1], system_mount_paths[i]);
+ if (cmp > 0)
+ {
+ g_test_fail_printf ("system_mount_paths array is not sorted: "
+ "\"%s\" should come before \"%s\"",
+ system_mount_paths[i - 1],
+ system_mount_paths[i]);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
int
main (int argc,
char *argv[])
@@ -60,6 +84,7 @@ main (int argc,
g_test_add_func ("/unix-mounts/is-system-fs-type", test_is_system_fs_type);
g_test_add_func ("/unix-mounts/is-system-device-path", test_is_system_device_path);
+ g_test_add_func ("/unix-mounts/system-mount-paths-sorted", test_system_mount_paths_sorted);
return g_test_run ();
}
--
2.52.0