From the release announcement¹
A malicious third-party can give a crafted "ssh://..." URL to an
unsuspecting victim, and an attempt to visit the URL can result in
any program that exists on the victim's machine being executed.
Such a URL could be placed in the .gitmodules file of a malicious
project, and an unsuspecting victim could be tricked into running
"git clone --recurse-submodules" to trigger the vulnerability.
Credits to find and fix the issue go to Brian Neel at GitLab, Joern
Schneeweisz of Recurity Labs and Jeff King at GitHub.
¹ https://public-inbox.org/git/xmqqh8xf482j.fsf@gitster.mtv.corp.google.com/
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3 lines
318 B
Plaintext
SHA512 (git-2.14.1.tar.xz) = bee35ad9c6a0d0588045ec2fe5f6987cb1eeb3961cdf33cd9b51ae52017969131ea4ec09908f9b30944f85b0daa99614fb42c248c9c8dac5f21a90e2866c33b4
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SHA512 (git-2.14.1.tar.sign) = 695509fa3f8f66beb6048682914873ee445bfc9e87192cdeced060c6088681f1cf6dc292c0831a1313c294981b77c99f4bd2da586e0bbb35db1169f42b71549c
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