freeradius/SOURCES/freeradius-blastradius-fix.patch

From: Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Jul, 2024
Subject: Backport fix for BlastRADIUS

Manual backport from v3.0.x branch, commit range 3a00a6ecc188629b0441fd45ad61ca8986de156e..da643f1edc267ce95260dc36069e6f1a7a4d66f8

Resolves: RHEL-46572
Signed-off-by: Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com>
---
 man/man1/radclient.1    |  10 ++-
 man/man1/radtest.1      |  11 ++-
 raddb/clients.conf      |  47 +++++++++---
 raddb/proxy.conf        |  19 +++++
 raddb/radiusd.conf.in   | 185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/include/clients.h   |   6 +-
 src/include/conffile.h  |   1 +
 src/include/libradius.h |  19 ++++-
 src/include/radius.h    |   1 +
 src/include/radiusd.h   |   6 ++
 src/include/realms.h    |   1 +
 src/lib/radius.c        |  87 ++++++++++++++++++++---
 src/main/client.c       |  45 ++++++++++--
 src/main/conffile.c     |   4 +-
 src/main/listen.c       | 141 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 src/main/mainconfig.c   |  70 ++++++++++++++++++
 src/main/process.c      |  65 +++++++++++++++++
 src/main/radclient.c    | 147 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 src/main/radtest.in     |   6 +-
 src/main/realms.c       |  11 +++
 src/main/tls_listen.c   |   5 ++
 21 files changed, 855 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/man/man1/radclient.1 b/man/man1/radclient.1
index 229dcae0c7..b83bee931a 100644
--- a/man/man1/radclient.1
+++ b/man/man1/radclient.1
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
-.TH RADCLIENT 1 "22 March 2019" "" "FreeRADIUS Daemon"
+.TH RADCLIENT 1 "21 May 2024" "" "FreeRADIUS Daemon"
 .SH NAME
 radclient - send packets to a RADIUS server, show reply
 .SH SYNOPSIS
 .B radclient
 .RB [ \-4 ]
 .RB [ \-6 ]
+.RB [ \-b ]
 .RB [ \-c
 .IR count ]
 .RB [ \-d
@@ -52,6 +53,13 @@ automatically encrypted before the packet is sent to the server.
 Use IPv4 (default)
 .IP \-6
 Use IPv6
+.IP \-b
+Enforce the Blast RADIUS checks.  All replies to an Access-Request packet
+must contain a Message-Authenticator as the first attribute.
+
+For compatibility with old servers, this flag is not set by default.
+However, radclient still checks for the Blast RADIUS signature, and
+discards packets which match the attack.
 .IP \-c\ \fIcount\fP
 Send each packet \fIcount\fP times.
 .IP \-d\ \fIraddb_directory\fP
diff --git a/man/man1/radtest.1 b/man/man1/radtest.1
index b3184779c0..db32e7f68d 100644
--- a/man/man1/radtest.1
+++ b/man/man1/radtest.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH RADTEST 1 "5 April 2010" "" "FreeRADIUS Daemon"
+.TH RADTEST 1 "21 May 2024" "" "FreeRADIUS Daemon"
 .SH NAME
 radtest - send packets to a RADIUS server, show reply
 .SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ radtest - send packets to a RADIUS server, show reply
 .IR ]
 .RB [ \-6
 .IR ]
+.RB [ \-b
+.IR ]
 .I user password radius-server nas-port-number secret
 .RB [ ppphint ]
 .RB [ nasname ]
@@ -26,6 +28,13 @@ way to test a radius server.
 
 .SH OPTIONS
 
+.IP \-b
+Enforce the Blast RADIUS checks.  All replies to an Access-Request packet
+must contain a Message-Authenticator as the first attribute.
+
+For compatibility with old servers, this flag is not set by default.
+However, radclient still checks for the Blast RADIUS signature, and
+discards packets which match the attack.
 .IP "\-d \fIraddb_directory\fP"
 The directory that contains the RADIUS dictionary files. Defaults to
 \fI/etc/raddb\fP.
diff --git a/raddb/clients.conf b/raddb/clients.conf
index 76b300d3c5..d55414b7d2 100644
--- a/raddb/clients.conf
+++ b/raddb/clients.conf
@@ -100,15 +100,44 @@ client localhost {
 	secret = testing123
 
 	#
-	#  Old-style clients do not send a Message-Authenticator
-	#  in an Access-Request.  RFC 5080 suggests that all clients
-	#  SHOULD include it in an Access-Request.  The configuration
-	#  item below allows the server to require it.  If a client
-	#  is required to include a Message-Authenticator and it does
-	#  not, then the packet will be silently discarded.
-	#
-	#  allowed values: yes, no
-	require_message_authenticator = no
+	#  The global configuration "security.require_message_authenticator"
+	#  flag sets the default for all clients.  That default can be
+	#  over-ridden here, by setting it to a value.  If no value is set,
+	#  then the default from the "radiusd.conf" file is used.
+	#
+	#  See that file for full documentation on the flag, along
+	#  with allowed values and meanings.
+	#
+	#  This flag exists solely for legacy clients which do not send
+	#  Message-Authenticator in all Access-Request packets.  We do not
+	#  recommend setting it to "no".
+	#
+	#  The number one way to protect yourself from the BlastRADIUS
+	#  attack is to update all RADIUS servers, and then set this
+	#  flag to "yes".  If all RADIUS servers are updated, and if
+	#  all of them have this flag set to "yes" for all clients,
+	#  then your network is safe.  You can then upgrade the
+	#  clients when it is convenient, instead of rushing the
+	#  upgrades.
+	#
+	#  allowed values: yes, no, auto
+#	require_message_authenticator = no
+
+	#
+	#  The global configuration "security.limit_proxy_state"
+	#  flag sets the default for all clients.  That default can be
+	#  over-ridden here, by setting it to "no".
+	#
+	#  See that file for full documentation on the flag, along
+	#  with allowed values,and meanings.
+	#
+	#  This flag exists solely for legacy clients which do not send
+	#  Message-Authenticator in all Access-Request packets.  We do not
+	#  recommend setting it to "no".
+	#
+	#  allowed values: yes, no, auto
+	#
+#	limit_proxy_state = yes
 
 	#
 	#  The short name is used as an alias for the fully qualified
diff --git a/raddb/proxy.conf b/raddb/proxy.conf
index 91b4b37930..fa362b8a74 100644
--- a/raddb/proxy.conf
+++ b/raddb/proxy.conf
@@ -204,6 +204,25 @@ home_server localhost {
 	#
 	secret = testing123
 
+
+	#
+	#  The global configuration "security.require_message_authenticator"
+	#  flag sets the default for all home servers.  That default can be
+	#  over-ridden here, by setting it to a value.  If no value is set,
+	#  then the default from the "radiusd.conf" file is used.
+	#
+	#  See that file for full documentation on the flag, along
+	#  with allowed values and meanings.
+	#
+	#  This flag exists solely for legacy home servers which do
+	#  not send Message-Authenticator in all Access-Accept,
+	#  Access-Reject, or Access-Challenge packets.  We do not
+	#  recommend setting it to "no".
+	#
+	#  allowed values: yes, no, auto
+	#
+#	require_message_authenticator = no
+
 	############################################################
 	#
 	#  The rest of the configuration items listed here are optional,
diff --git a/raddb/radiusd.conf.in b/raddb/radiusd.conf.in
index e8aee3c001..6fa9ded0f9 100644
--- a/raddb/radiusd.conf.in
+++ b/raddb/radiusd.conf.in
@@ -564,6 +564,191 @@ security {
 	#
 	status_server = yes
 
+	#
+	#  Global configuration for requiring Message-Authenticator in
+	#  all Access-* packets sent over UDP or TCP.  This flag is
+	#  ignored for TLS.
+	#
+	#  The number one way to protect yourself from the BlastRADIUS
+	#  attack is to update all RADIUS servers, and then set this
+	#  flag to "yes".  If all RADIUS servers are updated, and if
+	#  all of them have this flag set to "yes" for all clients,
+	#  then your network is safe.  You can then upgrade the
+	#  clients when it is convenient, instead of rushing the
+	#  upgrades.
+	#
+	#  This flag sets the global default for all clients and home
+	#  servers.  It can be over-ridden in an individual client or
+#  home_server definition by adding the same flag to that
+	#  section with an appropriate value.
+	#
+	#  All upgraded RADIUS implementations should send
+	#  Message-Authenticator in all Access-Request, Access-Accept,
+	#  Access-Reject, and Access-Challenge packets.  Once all
+	#  systems are upgraded, setting this flag to "yes" is the
+	#  best protection from the attack.
+	#
+	#  The possible values and meanings for
+	#  "require_message_authenticator" are;
+	#
+	#  * "no" - allow Access-* packet which do not contain
+	#    Message-Authenticator
+	#
+	#    For a client, if this flag is set to "no", then the
+	#    "limit_proxy_state" flag, below, is also checked.
+	#
+	#    For a home_server, if this flag is set to "no", then the
+	#    Access-Accept, Access-Reject, and Access-Challenge
+	#    packets do not need to contain Message-Authenticator.
+	#
+	#    The only reason to set this flag to "no" is when the
+	#    RADIUS client or home server has not been updated.  It is
+	#    always safer to set this flag "no" in the individual
+	#    client or home_server definition.  The global flag SHOULD
+	#    still be set to a safe value: "yes".
+	#
+	#    WARNING: Setting this flag and the "limit_proxy_state"
+	#    flag to "no" will allow MITM attackers to create fake
+	#    Access-Accept packets to the NAS!  At least one of them
+	#    MUST be set to "yes" for the system to have any
+	#    protection against the attack.
+	#
+	#  * "yes" - Require that all Access-* packets (client and
+	#    home_server) contain Message-Authenticator.  If a packet
+	#    does not contain Message-Authenticator, then it is
+	#    discarded.
+	#
+	#  * "auto" - Automatically determine the value of the flag,
+	#    based on the first packet received from that client or
+	#    home_server.
+	#
+	#    If the packet does not contain Message-Authenticator,
+	#    then the value of the flag is automatically switched to
+	#    "no".
+	#
+	#    If the packet contains Message-Authenticator but not
+	#    EAP-Message, then the value of the flag is automatically
+	#    switched to "yes".  The server has to check for
+	#    EAP-Message, because the previous RFCs require that the
+	#    packet contains Message-Authenticator when it also
+	#    contains EAP-Message.  So having a Message-Authenticator
+	#    in those packets doesn't give the server enough
+	#    information to determined if the client or home_server
+	#    has been updated.
+	#
+	#    If the packet contains Message-Authenticator and
+	#    EAP-Message, then the flag is left at the "auto" value.
+	#
+	#    WARNING: This switch is done for the first packet
+	#    received from that client or home server.  The change
+	#    does NOT persist across server restarts.  You MUST change
+	#    the to "yes" manually, in order to make a permanent
+	#    change to the configuration.
+	#
+	#    WARNING: If there are multiple NASes with the same source
+	#    IP and client definitions, BUT the NASes have different
+	#    behavior, then this flag WILL LIKELY BREAK YOUR NETWORK.
+	#
+	#    That is, when there are multiple different RADIUS clients
+	#    behind one NATed IP address, then these security settings
+	#    have to be set to allow the MOST INSECURE packets to be
+	#    processed.  This is a terrible idea, and will leave your
+	#    network vulnerable to the attack.  Please upgrade all
+	#    clients immediately.
+	#
+	#    The only solution to that rare configuration is to set
+	#    this flag to "no", in which case the network will work,
+	#    but will be vulnerable to the attack.
+	#
+	require_message_authenticator = auto
+
+	#
+	#  Global configuration for limiting the combination of
+	#  Proxy-State and Message-Authenticator.  This flag only
+	#  applies to packets sent over UDP or TCP.  This flag is
+	#  ignored for TLS.
+	#
+	#  This flag sets the global default for all clients.  It can
+	#  be over-ridden in an individual client definition by adding
+	#  the same flag to that section with an appropriate value.
+	#
+	#  If "require_message_authenticator" is set to "yes", this
+	#  configuration item is ignored.
+	#
+	#  If "require_message_authenticator" is set to "no", this
+	#  configuration item is checked.
+	#
+#  The possible values and meanings for "limit_proxy_state" are;
+	#
+	#  * "no" - allow any packets from the client, even packets
+	#    which contain the BlastRADIUS attack.  Please be aware
+	#    that in this configuration the server will complain for
+	#    EVERY packet which it receives.
+	#
+	#    The only reason to set this flag to "no" is when the
+	#    client is a proxy, AND the proxy does not send
+	#    Message-Authenticator in Access-Request packets.  Even
+	#    then, the best approach to fix the issue is to (1) update
+	#    the proxy to send Message-Authenticator, and if that
+	#    can't be done, then (2) set this flag to "no", but ONLY
+	#    for that one client.  The global flag SHOULD still be set
+	#    to a safe value: "yes".
+	#
+	#    WARNING: Setting both this flag and the
+	#    "require_message_authenticator" flag to "no" will allow
+	#    MITM attackers to create fake Access-Accept packets to the
+	#    NAS!  At least one of them MUST be set to "yes" for the
+	#    system to have any protection against the attack.
+	#
+	#  * "yes" - Allow packets without Message-Authenticator,
+	#    but only when they do not contain Proxy-State.
+	#    packets which contain Proxy-State MUST also contain
+	#    Message-Authenticator, otherwise they are discarded.
+	#
+	#    This setting is safe for most NASes, GGSNs, BRAS, etc.
+	#    Most regular RADIUS clients do not send Proxy-State
+	#    attributes for Access-Request packets that they originate.
+	#    However some aggregators (e.g. Wireless LAN Controllers)
+	#    may act as a RADIUS proxy for requests from their cohort
+	#    of managed devices, and in such cases will provide a
+	#    Proxy-State attribute. For those systems, you _must_ look
+	#    at the actual packets to determine what to do. It may be
+	#    that the only way to fix the vulnerability is to upgrade
+	#    the WLC, and set "require_message_authenticator" to "yes".
+	#
+	#  * "auto" - Automatically determine the value of the flag,
+	#    based on the first packet received from that client.
+	#
+	#    If the packet contains Proxy-State but no
+	#    Message-Authenticator, then the value of the flag is
+	#    automatically switched to "no".
+	#
+	#    For all other situations, the value of the flag is
+	#    automatically switched to "yes".
+	#
+	#    WARNING: This switch is done for the first packet
+	#    received from that client.  The change does NOT persist
+	#    across server restarts.  You MUST change the to "yes"
+	#    manually, in order to make a permanent change to the
+	#    configuration.
+	#
+	#    WARNING: If there are multiple NASes with the same source
+	#    IP and client definitions, BUT the NASes have different
+	#    behavior, then this flag WILL LIKELY BREAK YOUR NETWORK.
+	#
+	#    That is, when there are multiple different RADIUS clients
+	#    behind one NATed IP address, then these security settings
+	#    have to be set to allow the MOST INSECURE packets to be
+	#    processed.  This is a terrible idea, and will leave your
+	#    network vulnerable to the attack.  Please upgrade all
+	#    clients immediately.
+	#
+	#    The only solution to that rare configuration is to set
+	#    this flag to "no", in which case the network will work,
+	#    but will be vulnerable to the attack.
+	#
+	limit_proxy_state = auto
+
 @openssl_version_check_config@
 }
 
diff --git a/src/include/clients.h b/src/include/clients.h
index 560211557f..2cde3a2e37 100644
--- a/src/include/clients.h
+++ b/src/include/clients.h
@@ -39,7 +39,11 @@ typedef struct radclient {
 
 	char const		*secret;		//!< Secret PSK.
 
-	bool			message_authenticator;	//!< Require RADIUS message authenticator in requests.
+	fr_bool_auto_t 		require_ma;		//!< Require RADIUS message authenticator in requests.
+
+	bool			dynamic_require_ma;	//!< for dynamic clients
+
+	fr_bool_auto_t			limit_proxy_state;     	//!< Limit Proxy-State in requests
 
 	char const		*nas_type;		//!< Type of client (arbitrary).
 
diff --git a/src/include/conffile.h b/src/include/conffile.h
index 8cb045c946..ddbcae4e4f 100644
--- a/src/include/conffile.h
+++ b/src/include/conffile.h
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ typedef struct timeval _timeval_t;
 #define PW_TYPE_MULTI		(1 << 18) //!< CONF_PAIR can have multiple copies.
 #define PW_TYPE_NOT_EMPTY	(1 << 19) //!< CONF_PAIR is required to have a non zero length value.
 #define PW_TYPE_FILE_EXISTS	((1 << 20) | PW_TYPE_STRING) //!< File matching value must exist
+#define PW_TYPE_IGNORE_DEFAULT	(1 << 21) //!< don't set from .dflt if the CONF_PAIR is missing
 /* @} **/
 
 #define FR_INTEGER_COND_CHECK(_name, _var, _cond, _new)\
diff --git a/src/include/libradius.h b/src/include/libradius.h
index ce2f713de1..2efef8b1d3 100644
--- a/src/include/libradius.h
+++ b/src/include/libradius.h
@@ -402,6 +402,10 @@ typedef struct radius_packet {
 	size_t			partial;
 	int			proto;
 #endif
+	bool			tls;		//!< uses secure transport
+	bool			message_authenticator;
+	bool			proxy_state;
+	bool			eap_message;
 } RADIUS_PACKET;
 
 typedef enum {
@@ -507,6 +511,13 @@ DICT_VENDOR	*dict_vendorbyvalue(int vendor);
 /* radius.c */
 int		rad_send(RADIUS_PACKET *, RADIUS_PACKET const *, char const *secret);
 bool		rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags, decode_fail_t *reason);
+
+/*
+ *	1 == require_ma
+ *	2 == msg_peek
+ *	4 == limit_proxy_state
+ *	8 == require_ma for Access-* replies and Protocol-Error
+ */
 RADIUS_PACKET	*rad_recv(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, int fd, int flags);
 ssize_t rad_recv_header(int sockfd, fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port, int *code);
 void		rad_recv_discard(int sockfd);
@@ -694,7 +705,7 @@ extern bool	fr_dns_lookups;	/* do IP -> hostname lookups? */
 extern bool	fr_hostname_lookups; /* do hostname -> IP lookups? */
 extern int	fr_debug_lvl;	/* 0 = no debugging information */
 extern uint32_t	fr_max_attributes; /* per incoming packet */
-#define	FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE (52)
+#define	FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE (53)
 extern char const *fr_packet_codes[FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE];
 #define is_radius_code(_x) ((_x > 0) && (_x < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE))
 extern FILE	*fr_log_fp;
@@ -932,6 +943,12 @@ int		fr_socket_wait_for_connect(int sockfd, struct timeval *timeout);
 }
 #endif
 
+typedef enum {
+	FR_BOOL_FALSE = 0,
+	FR_BOOL_TRUE,
+	FR_BOOL_AUTO,
+} fr_bool_auto_t;
+
 #include <freeradius-devel/packet.h>
 
 #ifdef WITH_TCP
diff --git a/src/include/radius.h b/src/include/radius.h
index 473528d65d..147d674eed 100644
--- a/src/include/radius.h
+++ b/src/include/radius.h
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST		= 43,	//!< RFC3575/RFC5176 - CoA-Request
 	PW_CODE_COA_ACK			= 44,	//!< RFC3575/RFC5176 - CoA-Ack (positive)
 	PW_CODE_COA_NAK			= 45,	//!< RFC3575/RFC5176 - CoA-Nak (not willing to perform)
+	PW_CODE_PROTOCOL_ERROR 		= 52,	//!< RFC7930 - Protocol layer issue
 	PW_CODE_MAX			= 255,	//!< Maximum possible code
 } PW_CODE;
 
diff --git a/src/include/radiusd.h b/src/include/radiusd.h
index 0af3f51458..bd0aa668d0 100644
--- a/src/include/radiusd.h
+++ b/src/include/radiusd.h
@@ -171,6 +171,10 @@ typedef struct main_config {
 
 	bool		exiting;			//!< are we exiting?
 
+	fr_bool_auto_t		require_ma;			//!< global configuration for all clients and home servers
+
+	fr_bool_auto_t		limit_proxy_state;     		//!< global configuration for all clients
+
 
 #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_VERSION_CHECK
 	char const	*allow_vulnerable_openssl;	//!< The CVE number of the last security issue acknowledged.
@@ -557,6 +561,8 @@ int main_config_free(void);
 void main_config_hup(void);
 void hup_logfile(void);
 
+int	fr_bool_auto_parse(CONF_PAIR *cp, fr_bool_auto_t *out, char const *str);
+
 /* listen.c */
 void listen_free(rad_listen_t **head);
 int listen_init(CONF_SECTION *cs, rad_listen_t **head, bool spawn_flag);
diff --git a/src/include/realms.h b/src/include/realms.h
index 6dae8b4f85..ea5665c56c 100644
--- a/src/include/realms.h
+++ b/src/include/realms.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ typedef struct home_server {
 							//!< stats or when specifying home servers for a pool.
 
 	bool			dual;			//!< One of a pair of homeservers on consecutive ports.
+	fr_bool_auto_t			require_ma;		//!< for all replies to Access-Request and Status-Server
 	char const		*server;		//!< For internal proxying
 	char const		*parent_server;
 
diff --git a/src/lib/radius.c b/src/lib/radius.c
index 3881111f7d..556f3b961e 100644
--- a/src/lib/radius.c
+++ b/src/lib/radius.c
@@ -142,8 +142,9 @@ char const *fr_packet_codes[FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE] = {
   "47",
   "48",
   "49",
-  "IP-Address-Allocate",
-  "IP-Address-Release",			//!< 50
+  "IP-Address-Allocate",		//!< 50
+  "IP-Address-Release",
+  "Protocol-Error",
 };
 
 
@@ -1700,6 +1701,15 @@ int rad_vp2attr(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
 	return rad_vp2vsa(packet, original, secret, pvp, start, room);
 }
 
+static const bool code2ma[FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE] = {
+	[ PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST ] = true,
+	[ PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT ] = true,
+	[ PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT ] = true,
+	[ PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE ] = true,
+	[ PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER ] = true,
+	[ PW_CODE_PROTOCOL_ERROR ] = true,
+};
+
 
 /** Encode a packet
  *
@@ -1712,6 +1722,7 @@ int rad_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
 	uint16_t		total_length;
 	int			len;
 	VALUE_PAIR const	*reply;
+	bool			seen_ma = false;
 
 	/*
 	 *	A 4K packet, aligned on 64-bits.
@@ -1775,6 +1786,27 @@ int rad_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
 	 *	memcpy.
 	 */
 
+	 	/*
+	 *	Always add Message-Authenticator for replies to
+	 *	Access-Request packets, and for all Access-Accept,
+	 *	Access-Reject, Access-Challenge.
+	 *
+	 *	It must be the FIRST attribute in the packet.
+	 */
+	if (!packet->tls &&
+	    ((code2ma[packet->code]) || (original && code2ma[original->code]))) {
+		seen_ma = true;
+
+		packet->offset = RADIUS_HDR_LEN;
+
+		ptr[0] = PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR;
+		ptr[1] = 18;
+		memset(ptr + 2, 0, 16);
+
+		ptr += 18;
+		total_length += 18;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 *	Loop over the reply attributes for the packet.
 	 */
@@ -1832,6 +1864,13 @@ int rad_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
 		 *	length and initial value.
 		 */
 		if (!reply->da->vendor && (reply->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR)) {
+			/*
+			 *	We have already encoded the Message-Authenticator, don't do it again.
+			 */
+			if (seen_ma) {
+				reply = reply->next;
+				continue;
+			}
 			if (room < 18) break;
 
 			/*
@@ -2323,6 +2362,8 @@ bool rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags, decode_fail_t *reason)
 	radius_packet_t		*hdr;
 	char			host_ipaddr[128];
 	bool			require_ma = false;
+	bool			limit_proxy_state = false;
+	bool			seen_proxy_state = false;
 	bool			seen_ma = false;
 	uint32_t		num_attributes;
 	decode_fail_t		failure = DECODE_FAIL_NONE;
@@ -2371,15 +2412,26 @@ bool rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags, decode_fail_t *reason)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 *	Message-Authenticator is required in Status-Server
-	 *	packets, otherwise they can be trivially forged.
+	 *	If the caller requires Message-Authenticator, then set
+	 *	the flag.
 	 */
-	if (hdr->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER) require_ma = true;
 
 	/*
-	 *	It's also required if the caller asks for it.
+	 *	We also require Message-Authenticator if the packet
+	 *	code is Status-Server.
+	 *
+	 *	If we're receiving packets from a proxy socket, then
+	 *	require Message-Authenticator for Access-* replies,
+	 *	and for Protocol-Error.
 	 */
-	if (flags) require_ma = true;
+	require_ma = ((flags & 0x01) != 0) || (hdr->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER) || (((flags & 0x08) != 0) && code2ma[hdr->code]);
+
+	/*
+	 *
+	 *	We only limit Proxy-State if we're not requiring
+	 *	Message-Authenticator.
+	 */
+	limit_proxy_state = ((flags & 0x04) != 0) && !require_ma;
 
 	/*
 	 *	Repeat the length checks.  This time, instead of
@@ -2534,6 +2586,7 @@ bool rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags, decode_fail_t *reason)
 		case PW_EAP_MESSAGE:
 			require_ma = true;
 			eap = true;
+			packet->eap_message = true;
 			break;
 
 		case PW_USER_PASSWORD:
@@ -2542,6 +2595,11 @@ bool rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags, decode_fail_t *reason)
 			non_eap = true;
 			break;
 
+		case PW_PROXY_STATE:
+			seen_proxy_state = true;
+			packet->proxy_state = true;
+			break;
+
 		case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
 			if (attr[1] != 2 + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) {
 				FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Message-Authenticator has invalid length %d",
@@ -2553,6 +2611,7 @@ bool rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags, decode_fail_t *reason)
 				goto finish;
 			}
 			seen_ma = true;
+			packet->message_authenticator = true;
 			break;
 		}
 
@@ -2609,7 +2668,19 @@ bool rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags, decode_fail_t *reason)
 	 *	Message-Authenticator attributes.
 	 */
 	if (require_ma && !seen_ma) {
-		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Insecure packet from host %s:  Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute",
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Insecure packet from host %s:  Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute.  You may need to set \"require_message_authenticator = no\" in the configuration.",
+			   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
+		failure = DECODE_FAIL_MA_MISSING;
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	The client is a NAS which shouldn't send Proxy-State, but it did!
+	 */
+	if (limit_proxy_state && seen_proxy_state && !seen_ma) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Insecure packet from host %s:  Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute, but still has one or more Proxy-State attributes",
 			   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
 				     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
 				     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
diff --git a/src/main/client.c b/src/main/client.c
index abcc15d225..af5b122af5 100644
--- a/src/main/client.c
+++ b/src/main/client.c
@@ -279,7 +279,8 @@ bool client_add(RADCLIENT_LIST *clients, RADCLIENT *client)
 		    (old->coa_server == client->coa_server) &&
 		    (old->coa_pool == client->coa_pool) &&
 #endif
-		    (old->message_authenticator == client->message_authenticator)) {
+		    (old->require_ma == client->require_ma) &&
+		    (old->limit_proxy_state == client->limit_proxy_state)) {
 			WARN("Ignoring duplicate client %s", client->longname);
 			client_free(client);
 			return true;
@@ -443,6 +444,8 @@ static fr_ipaddr_t cl_ipaddr;
 static uint32_t cl_netmask;
 static char const *cl_srcipaddr = NULL;
 static char const *hs_proto = NULL;
+static char const *require_message_authenticator = NULL;
+static char const *limit_proxy_state = NULL;
 
 #ifdef WITH_TCP
 static CONF_PARSER limit_config[] = {
@@ -465,7 +468,8 @@ static const CONF_PARSER client_config[] = {
 
 	{ "src_ipaddr", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_STRING, &cl_srcipaddr), NULL },
 
-	{ "require_message_authenticator",  FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, RADCLIENT, message_authenticator), "no" },
+	{ "require_message_authenticator", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_STRING| PW_TYPE_IGNORE_DEFAULT, &require_message_authenticator), NULL },
+	{ "limit_proxy_state", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_STRING| PW_TYPE_IGNORE_DEFAULT, &limit_proxy_state), NULL },
 
 	{ "secret", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING | PW_TYPE_SECRET, RADCLIENT, secret), NULL },
 	{ "shortname", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, RADCLIENT, shortname), NULL },
@@ -661,7 +665,7 @@ static const CONF_PARSER dynamic_config[] = {
 	{ "FreeRADIUS-Client-Src-IP-Address", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR, RADCLIENT, src_ipaddr), NULL },
 	{ "FreeRADIUS-Client-Src-IPv6-Address", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR, RADCLIENT, src_ipaddr), NULL },
 
-	{ "FreeRADIUS-Client-Require-MA", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, RADCLIENT, message_authenticator), NULL },
+	{ "FreeRADIUS-Client-Require-MA", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, RADCLIENT, dynamic_require_ma), NULL },
 
 	{ "FreeRADIUS-Client-Secret",  FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, RADCLIENT, secret), "" },
 	{ "FreeRADIUS-Client-Shortname",  FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, RADCLIENT, shortname), "" },
@@ -843,8 +847,19 @@ RADCLIENT *client_afrom_cs(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, CONF_SECTION *cs, bool in_server, bo
 	c = talloc_zero(ctx, RADCLIENT);
 	c->cs = cs;
 
+	/*
+	 *	Set the "require message authenticator" and "limit
+	 *	proxy state" flags from the global default.  If the
+	 *	configuration item exists, AND is set, it will
+	 *	over-ride the flag.
+	 */
+	c->require_ma = main_config.require_ma;
+	c->limit_proxy_state = main_config.limit_proxy_state;
+
 	memset(&cl_ipaddr, 0, sizeof(cl_ipaddr));
 	cl_netmask = 255;
+	require_message_authenticator = NULL;
+	limit_proxy_state = NULL;
 
 	if (cf_section_parse(cs, c, client_config) < 0) {
 		cf_log_err_cs(cs, "Error parsing client section");
@@ -855,6 +870,9 @@ RADCLIENT *client_afrom_cs(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, CONF_SECTION *cs, bool in_server, bo
 		cl_srcipaddr = NULL;
 #endif
 
+		require_message_authenticator = NULL;
+		limit_proxy_state = NULL;
+
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
@@ -1112,6 +1130,16 @@ done_coa:
 	}
 #endif
 
+	if (fr_bool_auto_parse(cf_pair_find(cs, "require_message_authenticator"), &c->require_ma, require_message_authenticator) < 0) {
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (c->require_ma != FR_BOOL_TRUE) {
+		if (fr_bool_auto_parse(cf_pair_find(cs, "limit_proxy_state"), &c->limit_proxy_state, limit_proxy_state) < 0) {
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
 	return c;
 }
 
@@ -1156,7 +1184,7 @@ RADCLIENT *client_afrom_query(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, char const *identifier, char cons
 	if (shortname) c->shortname = talloc_typed_strdup(c, shortname);
 	if (type) c->nas_type = talloc_typed_strdup(c, type);
 	if (server) c->server = talloc_typed_strdup(c, server);
-	c->message_authenticator = require_ma;
+	c->require_ma = require_ma;
 
 	return c;
 }
@@ -1342,10 +1370,10 @@ RADCLIENT *client_afrom_request(RADCLIENT_LIST *clients, REQUEST *request)
 			*pi = vp->vp_integer;
 
 			/*
-			 *	Same nastiness as above.
+			 * Same nastiness as above, but hard-coded for require Message-Authenticator.
 			 */
 			for (parse = client_config; parse->name; parse++) {
-				if (parse->offset == dynamic_config[i].offset) break;
+				if (parse->type == PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN) break;
 			}
 			if (!parse) break;
 
@@ -1434,6 +1462,11 @@ validate:
 		goto error;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 *	It can't be set to "auto".  Too bad.
+	 */
+	c->require_ma = (fr_bool_auto_t) c->dynamic_require_ma;
+
 	if (!client_add_dynamic(clients, request->client, c)) {
 		return NULL;
 	}
diff --git a/src/main/conffile.c b/src/main/conffile.c
index 6d6441a55b..0e1ced2385 100644
--- a/src/main/conffile.c
+++ b/src/main/conffile.c
@@ -1417,6 +1417,7 @@ int cf_item_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs, char const *name, unsigned int type, void *d
 {
 	int rcode;
 	bool deprecated, required, attribute, secret, file_input, cant_be_empty, tmpl, multi, file_exists;
+	bool ignore_dflt;
 	char **q;
 	char const *value;
 	CONF_PAIR *cp = NULL;
@@ -1440,6 +1441,7 @@ int cf_item_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs, char const *name, unsigned int type, void *d
 	cant_be_empty = (type & PW_TYPE_NOT_EMPTY);
 	tmpl = (type & PW_TYPE_TMPL);
 	multi = (type & PW_TYPE_MULTI);
+	ignore_dflt = (type & PW_TYPE_IGNORE_DEFAULT);
 
 	if (attribute) required = true;
 	if (required) cant_be_empty = true;	/* May want to review this in the future... */
@@ -1463,7 +1465,7 @@ int cf_item_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs, char const *name, unsigned int type, void *d
 	 *	section, use the default value.
 	 */
 	if (!cp) {
-		if (deprecated) return 0;	/* Don't set the default value */
+		if (deprecated || ignore_dflt) return 0;	/* Don't set the default value */
 
 		rcode = 1;
 		value = dflt;
diff --git a/src/main/listen.c b/src/main/listen.c
index ebf7f5221c..0d178138c9 100644
--- a/src/main/listen.c
+++ b/src/main/listen.c
@@ -456,6 +456,122 @@ int rad_status_server(REQUEST *request)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void blastradius_checks(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADCLIENT *client)
+{
+	if (client->require_ma == FR_BOOL_TRUE) return;
+
+	if (client->require_ma == FR_BOOL_AUTO) {
+		if (!packet->message_authenticator) {
+			ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+			ERROR("BlastRADIUS check: Received packet without Message-Authenticator.");
+			ERROR("Setting \"require_message_authenticator = false\" for client %s", client->shortname);
+			ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+			ERROR("UPGRADE THE CLIENT AS YOUR NETWORK IS VULNERABLE TO THE BLASTRADIUS ATTACK.");
+			ERROR("Once the client is upgraded, set \"require_message_authenticator = true\" for  client %s", client->shortname);
+			ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+			client->require_ma = FR_BOOL_FALSE;
+
+			/*
+			 *	And fall through to the
+			 *	limit_proxy_state checks, which might
+			 *	complain again.  Oh well, maybe that
+			 *	will make people read the messages.
+			 */
+
+		} else if (packet->eap_message) {
+			/*
+			 *	Don't set it to "true" for packets
+			 *	with EAP-Message.  It's already
+			 *	required there, and we might get a
+			 *	non-EAP packet with (or without)
+			 *	Message-Authenticator
+			 */
+			return;
+		} else {
+			ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+			ERROR("BlastRADIUS check: Received packet with Message-Authenticator.");
+			ERROR("Setting \"require_message_authenticator = true\" for client %s", client->shortname);
+			ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+			ERROR("It looks like the client has been updated to protect from the BlastRADIUS attack.");
+			ERROR("Please set \"require_message_authenticator = true\" for client %s", client->shortname);
+			ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+
+			client->require_ma = FR_BOOL_TRUE;
+			return;
+		}
+
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	If all of the checks are turned off, then complain for every packet we receive.
+	 */
+	if (client->limit_proxy_state == FR_BOOL_FALSE) {
+		/*
+		 *	We have a Message-Authenticator, and it's valid.  We don't need to compain.
+		 */
+		if (!fr_debug_lvl) return; /* easier than checking for each line below */
+
+		DEBUG("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+		DEBUG("BlastRADIUS check: Received packet without Message-Authenticator.");
+		DEBUG("YOU MUST SET \"require_message_authenticator = true\", or");
+		DEBUG("YOU MUST SET \"limit_proxy_state = true\" for client %s", client->shortname);
+		DEBUG("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+		DEBUG("The packet does not contain Message-Authenticator, which is a security issue");
+		DEBUG("UPGRADE THE CLIENT AS YOUR NETWORK IS VULNERABLE TO THE BLASTRADIUS ATTACK.");
+		DEBUG("Once the client is upgraded, set \"require_message_authenticator = true\" for client %s", client->shortname);
+		DEBUG("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Don't complain here.  rad_packet_ok() will instead
+	 *	complain about every packet with Proxy-State but which
+	 *	is missing Message-Authenticator.
+	 */
+	if (client->limit_proxy_state == FR_BOOL_TRUE) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (packet->proxy_state && !packet->message_authenticator) {
+		ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+		ERROR("BlastRADIUS check: Received packet with Proxy-State, but without Message-Authenticator.");
+		ERROR("This is either a BlastRADIUS attack, OR");
+		ERROR("the client is a proxy RADIUS server which has not been upgraded.");
+		ERROR("Setting \"limit_proxy_state = false\" for client %s", client->shortname);
+		ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+		ERROR("UPGRADE THE CLIENT AS YOUR NETWORK IS VULNERABLE TO THE BLASTRADIUS ATTACK.");
+		DEBUG("Once the client is upgraded, set \"require_message_authenticator = true\" for client %s", client->shortname);
+		ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+
+		client->limit_proxy_state = FR_BOOL_FALSE;
+
+	} else {
+		client->limit_proxy_state = FR_BOOL_TRUE;
+
+		ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+		if (!packet->proxy_state) {
+			ERROR("BlastRADIUS check: Received packet without Proxy-State.");
+		} else {
+			ERROR("BlastRADIUS check: Received packet with Proxy-State and Message-Authenticator.");
+		}
+
+		ERROR("Setting \"limit_proxy_state = true\" for client %s", client->shortname);
+		ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+
+		if (!packet->message_authenticator) {
+			ERROR("The packet does not contain Message-Authenticator, which is a security issue.");
+			ERROR("UPGRADE THE CLIENT AS YOUR NETWORK MAY BE VULNERABLE TO THE BLASTRADIUS ATTACK.");
+			DEBUG("Once the client is upgraded, set \"require_message_authenticator = true\" for client %s", client->shortname);
+		} else {
+			ERROR("The packet contains Message-Authenticator.");
+			if (!packet->eap_message) ERROR("The client has likely been upgraded to protect from the attack.");
+			ERROR("Please set \"require_message_authenticator = true\" for client %s", client->shortname);
+		}
+		ERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+	}
+}
+
+
 #ifdef WITH_TCP
 static int dual_tcp_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
 {
@@ -532,6 +648,21 @@ static int dual_tcp_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
 	switch (packet->code) {
 	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST:
 		if (listener->type != RAD_LISTEN_AUTH) goto bad_packet;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Enforce BlastRADIUS checks on TCP, too.
+		 */
+		if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, (client->require_ma == FR_BOOL_TRUE) | ((client->limit_proxy_state == FR_BOOL_TRUE) << 2), NULL)) {
+			FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_malformed_requests);
+			rad_free(&sock->packet);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	Perform BlastRADIUS checks and warnings.
+		 */
+		if (packet->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST) blastradius_checks(packet, client);
+
 		FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_requests);
 		fun = rad_authenticate;
 		break;
@@ -1562,7 +1693,7 @@ static int auth_socket_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
 	 *	Now that we've sanity checked everything, receive the
 	 *	packet.
 	 */
-	packet = rad_recv(ctx, listener->fd, client->message_authenticator);
+	packet = rad_recv(ctx, listener->fd, (client->require_ma == FR_BOOL_TRUE) | ((client->limit_proxy_state == FR_BOOL_TRUE) << 2));
 	if (!packet) {
 		FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_malformed_requests);
 		if (DEBUG_ENABLED) ERROR("Receive - %s", fr_strerror());
@@ -1570,6 +1701,12 @@ static int auth_socket_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+
+	/*
+	 *	Perform BlastRADIUS checks and warnings.
+	 */
+	if (packet->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST) blastradius_checks(packet, client);
+
 #ifdef __APPLE__
 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
 	/*
@@ -1955,7 +2092,7 @@ static int coa_socket_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
 	 *	Now that we've sanity checked everything, receive the
 	 *	packet.
 	 */
-	packet = rad_recv(ctx, listener->fd, client->message_authenticator);
+	packet = rad_recv(ctx, listener->fd, client->require_ma | (((int) client->limit_proxy_state) << 2));
 	if (!packet) {
 		FR_STATS_INC(coa, total_malformed_requests);
 		if (DEBUG_ENABLED) ERROR("Receive - %s", fr_strerror());
diff --git a/src/main/mainconfig.c b/src/main/mainconfig.c
index e9dd412dee..854c7155aa 100644
--- a/src/main/mainconfig.c
+++ b/src/main/mainconfig.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static char const *gid_name = NULL;
 static char const *chroot_dir = NULL;
 static bool allow_core_dumps = false;
 static char const *radlog_dest = NULL;
+static char const *require_message_authenticator = NULL;
+static char const *limit_proxy_state = NULL;
 
 /*
  *	These are not used anywhere else..
@@ -87,6 +89,53 @@ static bool		do_colourise = false;
 
 static char const	*radius_dir = NULL;	//!< Path to raddb directory
 
+static const FR_NAME_NUMBER fr_bool_auto_names[] = {
+	{ "false",	FR_BOOL_FALSE     },
+	{ "no",		FR_BOOL_FALSE     },
+	{ "0",		FR_BOOL_FALSE     },
+
+	{ "true",	FR_BOOL_TRUE      },
+	{ "yes",       	FR_BOOL_TRUE      },
+	{ "1",		FR_BOOL_TRUE      },
+
+	{ "auto",	FR_BOOL_AUTO      },
+
+	{ NULL,	0 }
+};
+
+/*
+ *	Get decent values for false / true / auto
+ */
+int fr_bool_auto_parse(CONF_PAIR *cp, fr_bool_auto_t *out, char const *str)
+{
+	int value;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Don't change anything.
+	 */
+	if (!str) return 0;
+
+	value = fr_str2int(fr_bool_auto_names, str, -1);
+	if (value >= 0) {
+		*out = value;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	This should never happen, as the defaults are in the
+	 *	source code.  If there's no CONF_PAIR, and there's a
+	 *	parse error, then the source code is wrong.
+	 */
+	if (!cp) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: Error - Invalid value in configuration", main_config.name);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	cf_log_err(cf_pair_to_item(cp), "Invalid value for \"%s\"", cf_pair_attr(cp));
+	return -1;
+}
+
+
 /**********************************************************************
  *
  *	We need to figure out where the logs go, before doing anything
@@ -159,6 +208,8 @@ static const CONF_PARSER security_config[] = {
 	{ "max_attributes",  FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, &fr_max_attributes), STRINGIFY(0) },
 	{ "reject_delay",  FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_TIMEVAL, &main_config.reject_delay), STRINGIFY(0) },
 	{ "status_server", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, &main_config.status_server), "no"},
+	{ "require_message_authenticator", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_STRING, &require_message_authenticator), "auto"},
+	{ "limit_proxy_state", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_STRING, &limit_proxy_state), "auto"},
 #ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_VERSION_CHECK
 	{ "allow_vulnerable_openssl", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_STRING, &main_config.allow_vulnerable_openssl), "no"},
 #endif
@@ -838,6 +889,8 @@ int main_config_init(void)
 	if (!main_config.dictionary_dir) {
 		main_config.dictionary_dir = DICTDIR;
 	}
+	main_config.require_ma = FR_BOOL_AUTO;
+	main_config.limit_proxy_state = FR_BOOL_AUTO;
 
 	/*
 	 *	About sizeof(REQUEST) + sizeof(RADIUS_PACKET) * 2 + sizeof(VALUE_PAIR) * 400
@@ -1127,6 +1180,23 @@ do {\
 	main_config.init_delay.tv_sec = 0;
 	main_config.init_delay.tv_usec = 2* (1000000 / 3);
 
+	{
+		CONF_PAIR *cp = NULL;
+
+		subcs = cf_section_sub_find(cs, "security");
+		if (subcs) cp = cf_pair_find(subcs, "require_message_authenticator");
+		if (fr_bool_auto_parse(cp, &main_config.require_ma, require_message_authenticator) < 0) {
+			cf_file_free(cs);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (subcs) cp = cf_pair_find(subcs, "limit_proxy_state");
+		if (fr_bool_auto_parse(cp, &main_config.limit_proxy_state, limit_proxy_state) < 0) {
+			cf_file_free(cs);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 *	Free the old configuration items, and replace them
 	 *	with the new ones.
diff --git a/src/main/process.c b/src/main/process.c
index 78c6d8a9e5..a478026024 100644
--- a/src/main/process.c
+++ b/src/main/process.c
@@ -2594,6 +2594,23 @@ int request_proxy_reply(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
 
 	PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&proxy_mutex);
 
+	if (!request->proxy_reply) {
+		decode_fail_t reason;
+
+		/*
+		 *	If the home server configuration requires a Message-Authenticator, then set the flag,
+		 *	but only if the proxied packet is Access-Request or Status-Sercer.
+		 *
+		 *	The realms.c file already clears require_ma for TLS connections.
+		 */
+		bool require_ma = (request->home_server->require_ma == FR_BOOL_TRUE) && (request->proxy->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST);
+
+		if(!rad_packet_ok(packet, require_ma, &reason)) {
+			DEBUG("Ignoring invalid packet - %s", fr_strerror());
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 *	No reply, BUT the current packet fails verification:
 	 *	ignore it.  This does the MD5 calculations in the
@@ -2619,6 +2636,54 @@ int request_proxy_reply(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+
+		/*
+		 *	BlastRADIUS checks.  We're running in the main
+		 *	listener thread, so there's no conflict
+		 *	checking or setting these fields.
+		 */
+		if (!request->proxy_reply && (request->proxy->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST) && 
+#ifdef WITH_TLS
+		    !request->home_server->tls &&
+#endif
+		    !packet->eap_message) {
+			if (request->home_server->require_ma == FR_BOOL_AUTO) {
+				if (!packet->message_authenticator) {
+					RERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+					RERROR("BlastRADIUS check: Received response to Access-Request without Message-Authenticator.");
+					RERROR("Setting \"require_message_authenticator = false\" for home_server %s", request->home_server->name);
+					RERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+					RERROR("UPGRADE THE HOME SERVER AS YOUR NETWORK IS VULNERABLE TO THE BLASTRADIUS ATTACK.");
+					RERROR("Once the home_server is upgraded, set \"require_message_authenticator = true\" for home_server %s.", request->home_server->name);
+					RERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+
+					request->home_server->require_ma = FR_BOOL_FALSE;
+				} else {
+					RERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+					RERROR("BlastRADIUS check: Received response to Access-Request with Message-Authenticator.");
+					RERROR("Setting \"require_message_authenticator = true\" for home_server %s", request->home_server->name);
+					RERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+					RERROR("It looks like the home server has been updated to protect from the BlastRADIUS attack.");
+					RERROR("Please set \"require_message_authenticator = true\" for home_server %s", request->home_server->name);
+					RERROR("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+
+					request->home_server->require_ma = FR_BOOL_TRUE;
+				}
+
+			} else if (fr_debug_lvl && (request->home_server->require_ma == FR_BOOL_FALSE) && !packet->message_authenticator) {
+				/*
+				 *	If it's "no" AND we don't have a Message-Authenticator, then complain on every packet.
+				 */
+				RDEBUG("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+				RDEBUG("BlastRADIUS check: Received packet without Message-Authenticator from home_server %s", request->home_server->name);
+				RDEBUG("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+				RDEBUG("The packet does not contain Message-Authenticator, which is a security issue");
+				RDEBUG("UPGRADE THE HOME SERVER AS YOUR NETWORK IS VULNERABLE TO THE BLASTRADIUS ATTACK.");
+				RERROR("Once the home_server is upgraded, set \"require_message_authenticator = true\" for home_server %s.", request->home_server->name);
+				RDEBUG("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+			}
+		}
+
 	/*
 	 *	This shouldn't happen, but threads and race
 	 *	conditions.
diff --git a/src/main/radclient.c b/src/main/radclient.c
index 52d2872b13..dd2b342ba2 100644
--- a/src/main/radclient.c
+++ b/src/main/radclient.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static fr_ipaddr_t server_ipaddr;
 static int resend_count = 1;
 static bool done = true;
 static bool print_filename = false;
+static bool blast_radius = false;
 
 static fr_ipaddr_t client_ipaddr;
 static uint16_t client_port = 0;
@@ -89,6 +90,7 @@ static void NEVER_RETURNS usage(void)
 	fprintf(stderr, "  <command>              One of auth, acct, status, coa, disconnect or auto.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -4                     Use IPv4 address of server\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -6                     Use IPv6 address of server.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -b                     Mandate checks for Blast RADIUS (this is not set by default).\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -c <count>             Send each packet 'count' times.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -d <raddb>             Set user dictionary directory (defaults to " RADDBDIR ").\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -D <dictdir>           Set main dictionary directory (defaults to " DICTDIR ").\n");
@@ -1000,6 +1002,130 @@ static int send_one_packet(rc_request_t *request)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ *	Do Blast RADIUS checks.
+ *
+ *	The request is an Access-Request, and does NOT contain Proxy-State.
+ *
+ *	The reply is a raw packet, and is NOT yet decoded.
+ */
+static int blast_radius_check(rc_request_t *request, RADIUS_PACKET *reply)
+{
+	uint8_t *attr, *end;
+	VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+	bool have_message_authenticator = false;
+
+	/*
+	 *	We've received a raw packet.  Nothing has (as of yet) checked
+	 *	anything in it other than the length, and that it's a
+	 *	well-formed RADIUS packet.
+	 */
+	switch (reply->data[0]) {
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
+		if (reply->data[1] != request->packet->id) {
+			ERROR("Invalid reply ID %d to Access-Request ID %d", reply->data[1], request->packet->id);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		ERROR("Invalid reply code %d to Access-Request", reply->data[0]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	If the reply has a Message-Authenticator, then it MIGHT be fine.
+	 */
+	attr = reply->data + 20;
+	end = reply->data + reply->data_len;
+
+	/*
+	 *	It should be the first attribute, so we warn if it isn't there.
+	 *
+	 *	But it's not a fatal error.
+	 */
+	if (blast_radius && (attr[0] != PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR)) {
+		RDEBUG("WARNING The %s reply packet does not have Message-Authenticator as the first attribute.  The packet may be vulnerable to Blast RADIUS attacks.",
+		       fr_packet_codes[reply->data[0]]);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Set up for Proxy-State checks.
+	 *
+	 *	If we see a Proxy-State in the reply which we didn't send, then it's a Blast RADIUS attack.
+	 */
+	vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_PROXY_STATE, 0, TAG_ANY);
+
+	while (attr < end) {
+		/*
+		 *	Blast RADIUS work-arounds require that
+		 *	Message-Authenticator is the first attribute in the
+		 *	reply.  Note that we don't check for it being the
+		 *	first attribute, but simply that it exists.
+		 *
+		 *	That check is a balance between securing the reply
+		 *	packet from attacks, and not violating the RFCs which
+		 *	say that there is no order to attributes in the
+		 *	packet.
+		 *
+		 *	However, no matter the status of the '-b' flag we
+		 *	still can check for the signature of the attack, and
+		 *	discard packets which are suspicious.  This behavior
+		 *	protects radclient from the attack, without mandating
+		 *	new behavior on the server side.
+		 *
+		 *	Note that we don't set the '-b' flag by default.
+		 *	radclient is intended for testing / debugging, and is
+		 *	not intended to be used as part of a secure login /
+		 *	user checking system.
+		 */
+		if (attr[0] == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
+			have_message_authenticator = true;
+			goto next;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	If there are Proxy-State attributes in the reply, they must
+		 *	match EXACTLY the Proxy-State attributes in the request.
+		 *
+		 *	Note that we don't care if there are more Proxy-States
+		 *	in the request than in the reply.  The Blast RADIUS
+		 *	issue requires _adding_ Proxy-State attributes, and
+		 *	cannot work when the server _deletes_ Proxy-State
+		 *	attributes.
+		 */
+		if (attr[0] == PW_PROXY_STATE) {
+			if (!vp || (vp->length != (size_t) (attr[1] - 2)) || (memcmp(vp->vp_octets, attr + 2, vp->length) != 0)) {
+				ERROR("Invalid reply to Access-Request ID %d - Discarding packet due to Blast RADIUS attack being detected.", request->packet->id);
+				ERROR("We received a Proxy-State in the reply which we did not send, or which is different from what we sent.");
+				return -1;
+			}
+
+			vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(vp->next, PW_PROXY_STATE, 0, TAG_ANY);
+		}
+
+	next:
+		attr += attr[1];
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	If "-b" is set, then we require Message-Authenticator in the reply.
+	 */
+	if (blast_radius && !have_message_authenticator) {
+		ERROR("The %s reply packet does not contain Message-Authenticator - discarding packet due to Blast RADIUS checks.",
+		      fr_packet_codes[reply->data[0]]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	The packet doesn't look like it's a Blast RADIUS attack.  The
+	 *	caller will now verify the packet signature.
+	 */
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  *	Receive one packet, maybe.
  */
@@ -1051,6 +1177,21 @@ static int recv_one_packet(int wait_time)
 	}
 	request = fr_packet2myptr(rc_request_t, packet, packet_p);
 
+
+	/*
+	 *	We want radclient to be able to send any packet, including
+	 *	imperfect ones.  However, we do NOT want to be vulnerable to
+	 *	the "Blast RADIUS" issue.  Instead of adding command-line
+	 *	flags to enable/disable similar flags to what the server
+	 *	sends, we just do a few more smart checks to double-check
+	 *	things.
+	 */
+	if ((request->packet->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST) &&
+	    blast_radius_check(request, reply) < 0) {
+		rad_free(&reply);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 *	Fails the signature validation: not a real reply.
 	 *	FIXME: Silently drop it and listen for another packet.
@@ -1183,7 +1324,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		exit(1);
 	}
 
-	while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "46c:d:D:f:Fhn:p:qr:sS:t:vx"
+	while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "46bc:d:D:f:Fhn:p:qr:sS:t:vx"
 #ifdef WITH_TCP
 		"P:"
 #endif
@@ -1196,6 +1337,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 			force_af = AF_INET6;
 			break;
 
+		case 'b':
+			blast_radius = true;
+			break;
+
 		case 'c':
 			if (!isdigit((int) *optarg))
 				usage();
diff --git a/src/main/radtest.in b/src/main/radtest.in
index 38b1ba9a0f..8a6741a26c 100644
--- a/src/main/radtest.in
+++ b/src/main/radtest.in
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ usage() {
 	echo "        -x                  Enable debug output" >&2
 	echo "        -4                  Use IPv4 for the NAS address (default)" >&2
 	echo "        -6                  Use IPv6 for the NAS address" >&2
+	echo "        -6                  Mandate checks for Blast RADIUS (this is not set by default)." >&2
 	exit 1
 }
 
@@ -55,6 +56,10 @@ do
 		NAS_ADDR_ATTR="NAS-IPv6-Address"
 		shift
 		;;
+	-b)
+		OPTIONS="$OPTIONS -b"
+		shift
+		;;
 	-d) 
 		OPTIONS="$OPTIONS -d $2"
 		shift;shift
@@ -120,7 +125,6 @@ fi
 	echo "$PASSWORD = \"$2\""
 	echo "$NAS_ADDR_ATTR = $nas"
 	echo "NAS-Port = $4"
-	echo "Message-Authenticator = 0x00"
 	if [ "$radclient" = "$radeapclient" ]
 	then
 	    echo "EAP-Code = Response"
diff --git a/src/main/realms.c b/src/main/realms.c
index eb42598116..c82d2eb1ea 100644
--- a/src/main/realms.c
+++ b/src/main/realms.c
@@ -366,7 +366,10 @@ static CONF_PARSER home_server_coa[] = {
 };
 #endif
 
+static const char *require_message_authenticator = NULL;
+
 static CONF_PARSER home_server_config[] = {
+	{ "require_message_authenticator", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_STRING| PW_TYPE_IGNORE_DEFAULT, &require_message_authenticator), NULL },
 	{ "ipaddr", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP_ADDR, home_server_t, ipaddr), NULL },
 	{ "ipv4addr", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR, home_server_t, ipaddr), NULL },
 	{ "ipv6addr", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR, home_server_t, ipaddr), NULL },
@@ -640,6 +643,9 @@ home_server_t *home_server_afrom_cs(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, realm_config_t *rc, CONF_SE
 	home->cs = cs;
 	home->state = HOME_STATE_UNKNOWN;
 	home->proto = IPPROTO_UDP;
+	home->require_ma = main_config.require_ma;
+
+	require_message_authenticator = false;
 
 	/*
 	 *	Parse the configuration into the home server
@@ -647,6 +653,10 @@ home_server_t *home_server_afrom_cs(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, realm_config_t *rc, CONF_SE
 	 */
 	if (cf_section_parse(cs, home, home_server_config) < 0) goto error;
 
+	if (fr_bool_auto_parse(cf_pair_find(cs, "require_message_authenticator"), &home->require_ma, require_message_authenticator) < 0) {
+		goto error;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 *	It has an IP address, it must be a remote server.
 	 */
@@ -924,6 +934,7 @@ home_server_t *home_server_afrom_cs(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, realm_config_t *rc, CONF_SE
 		 *	Parse the SSL client configuration.
 		 */
 		if (tls) {
+ 			home->require_ma = false;
 			home->tls = tls_client_conf_parse(tls);
 			if (!home->tls) {
 				goto error;
diff --git a/src/main/tls_listen.c b/src/main/tls_listen.c
index 0eed87b64f..4ae3c5b975 100644
--- a/src/main/tls_listen.c
+++ b/src/main/tls_listen.c
@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ get_application_data:
 	packet->vps = NULL;
 	PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
 
+	packet->tls = true;
+
 	if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, 0, NULL)) {
 		if (DEBUG_ENABLED) ERROR("Receive - %s", fr_strerror());
 		DEBUG("Closing TLS socket from client");
@@ -713,6 +715,8 @@ int proxy_tls_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
 	memcpy(packet->data, data, packet->data_len);
 	memcpy(packet->vector, packet->data + 4, 16);
 
+	packet->tls = true;
+
 	/*
 	 *	FIXME: Client MIB updates?
 	 */
@@ -765,6 +769,7 @@ int proxy_tls_send(rad_listen_t *listener, REQUEST *request)
 	 *	if there's no packet, encode it here.
 	 */
 	if (!request->proxy->data) {
+		request->reply->tls = true;
 		request->proxy_listener->encode(request->proxy_listener,
 						request);
 	}