import freeradius-3.0.20-14.module+el8.8.0+17558+3f8a93b9
This commit is contained in:
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47
SOURCES/freeradius-fix-crash-on-invalid-abinary-data.patch
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47
SOURCES/freeradius-fix-crash-on-invalid-abinary-data.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
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From: Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2022
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Subject: Fix crash on invalid abinary data
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A malicious RADIUS client or home server can send a malformed abinary
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attribute which can cause the server to crash.
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Backport of https://github.com/FreeRADIUS/freeradius-server/commit/0ec2b39d260e
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Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2151706
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Signed-off-by: Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com>
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---
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diff --git a/src/lib/filters.c b/src/lib/filters.c
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index 4868cd385d9f..3f3b63daeef3 100644
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--- a/src/lib/filters.c
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+++ b/src/lib/filters.c
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@@ -1205,13 +1205,19 @@ void print_abinary(char *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t const *data, size_t len, in
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}
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}
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} else if (filter->type == RAD_FILTER_GENERIC) {
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- int count;
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+ size_t count, masklen;
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+
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+ masklen = ntohs(filter->u.generic.len);
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+ if (masklen >= sizeof(filter->u.generic.mask)) {
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+ *p = '\0';
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+ return;
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+ }
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i = snprintf(p, outlen, " %u ", (unsigned int) ntohs(filter->u.generic.offset));
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p += i;
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/* show the mask */
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- for (count = 0; count < ntohs(filter->u.generic.len); count++) {
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+ for (count = 0; count < masklen; count++) {
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i = snprintf(p, outlen, "%02x", filter->u.generic.mask[count]);
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p += i;
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outlen -= i;
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@@ -1222,7 +1228,7 @@ void print_abinary(char *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t const *data, size_t len, in
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outlen--;
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/* show the value */
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- for (count = 0; count < ntohs(filter->u.generic.len); count++) {
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+ for (count = 0; count < masklen; count++) {
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i = snprintf(p, outlen, "%02x", filter->u.generic.value[count]);
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p += i;
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outlen -= i;
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115
SOURCES/freeradius-fix-crash-unknown-eap-sim.patch
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115
SOURCES/freeradius-fix-crash-unknown-eap-sim.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
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From: Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2022
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Subject: Fix crash on unknown option in EAP-SIM
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When an EAP-SIM supplicant sends an unknown SIM option, the server will try to
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look that option up in the internal dictionaries. This lookup will fail, but the
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SIM code will not check for that failure. Instead, it will dereference a NULL
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pointer, and cause the server to crash.
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Backport of:
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https://github.com/FreeRADIUS/freeradius-server/commit/f1cdbb33ec61c4a64a
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https://github.com/FreeRADIUS/freeradius-server/commit/71128cac3ee236a88a05cc7bddd43e43a88a3089
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Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2151704
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Signed-off-by: Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com>
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---
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diff --git a/src/modules/rlm_eap/libeap/eapsimlib.c b/src/modules/rlm_eap/libeap/eapsimlib.c
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index cf1e8a7dd92..e438a844eab 100644
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--- a/src/modules/rlm_eap/libeap/eapsimlib.c
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+++ b/src/modules/rlm_eap/libeap/eapsimlib.c
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@@ -307,42 +307,77 @@ int unmap_eapsim_basictypes(RADIUS_PACKET *r,
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newvp->vp_length = 1;
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fr_pair_add(&(r->vps), newvp);
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+ /*
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+ * EAP-SIM has a 1 octet of subtype, and 2 octets
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+ * reserved.
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+ */
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attr += 3;
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attrlen -= 3;
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- /* now, loop processing each attribute that we find */
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- while(attrlen > 0) {
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+ /*
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+ * Loop over each attribute. The format is:
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+ *
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+ * 1 octet of type
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+ * 1 octet of length (value 1..255)
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+ * ((4 * length) - 2) octets of data.
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+ */
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+ while (attrlen > 0) {
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uint8_t *p;
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- if(attrlen < 2) {
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+ if (attrlen < 2) {
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fr_strerror_printf("EAP-Sim attribute %d too short: %d < 2", es_attribute_count, attrlen);
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return 0;
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}
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+ if (!attr[1]) {
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+ fr_strerror_printf("EAP-Sim attribute %d (no.%d) has no data", attr[0],
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+ es_attribute_count);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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eapsim_attribute = attr[0];
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eapsim_len = attr[1] * 4;
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+ /*
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+ * The length includes the 2-byte header.
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+ */
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if (eapsim_len > attrlen) {
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fr_strerror_printf("EAP-Sim attribute %d (no.%d) has length longer than data (%d > %d)",
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eapsim_attribute, es_attribute_count, eapsim_len, attrlen);
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return 0;
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}
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- if(eapsim_len > MAX_STRING_LEN) {
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- eapsim_len = MAX_STRING_LEN;
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- }
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- if (eapsim_len < 2) {
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- fr_strerror_printf("EAP-Sim attribute %d (no.%d) has length too small", eapsim_attribute,
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- es_attribute_count);
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- return 0;
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- }
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+ newvp = fr_pair_afrom_num(r, eapsim_attribute + PW_EAP_SIM_BASE, 0);
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+ if (!newvp) {
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+ /*
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+ * RFC 4186 Section 8.1 says 0..127 are
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+ * "non-skippable". If one such
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+ * attribute is found and we don't
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+ * understand it, the server has to send:
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+ *
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+ * EAP-Request/SIM/Notification packet with an
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+ * (AT_NOTIFICATION code, which implies general failure ("General
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+ * failure after authentication" (0), or "General failure" (16384),
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+ * depending on the phase of the exchange), which terminates the
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+ * authentication exchange.
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+ */
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+ if (eapsim_attribute <= 127) {
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+ fr_strerror_printf("Unknown mandatory attribute %d, failing",
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+ eapsim_attribute);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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- newvp = fr_pair_afrom_num(r, eapsim_attribute+PW_EAP_SIM_BASE, 0);
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- newvp->vp_length = eapsim_len-2;
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- newvp->vp_octets = p = talloc_array(newvp, uint8_t, newvp->vp_length);
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- memcpy(p, &attr[2], eapsim_len-2);
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- fr_pair_add(&(r->vps), newvp);
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- newvp = NULL;
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+ } else {
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+ /*
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+ * It's known, ccount for header, and
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+ * copy the value over.
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+ */
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+ newvp->vp_length = eapsim_len - 2;
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+
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+ newvp->vp_octets = p = talloc_array(newvp, uint8_t, newvp->vp_length);
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+ memcpy(p, &attr[2], newvp->vp_length);
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+ fr_pair_add(&(r->vps), newvp);
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+ }
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/* advance pointers, decrement length */
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attr += eapsim_len;
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76
SOURCES/freeradius-fix-info-leakage-eap-pwd.patch
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76
SOURCES/freeradius-fix-info-leakage-eap-pwd.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
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From: Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2022
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Subject: Fix information leakage in EAP-PWD
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The EAP-PWD function compute_password_element() leaks information about the
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password which allows an attacker to substantially reduce the size of an
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offline dictionary attack.
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Patch adapted from: https://github.com/FreeRADIUS/freeradius-server/commit/9e5e8f2f
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Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2151702
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Signed-off-by: Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com>
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---
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diff --git a/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c b/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c
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index d94851c3aa..9f86b62114 100644
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--- a/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c
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@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API /* OpenSSL API has been deprecated by Apple */
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#include <freeradius-devel/radiusd.h>
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#include <freeradius-devel/modules.h>
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+static uint8_t allzero[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x00 };
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+
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/* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */
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static void H_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
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{
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@@ -114,15 +116,13 @@ int compute_password_element (pwd_session_t *session, uint16_t grp_num,
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uint32_t *token)
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{
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BIGNUM *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
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- HMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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+ EVP_MD_CTX *hmac_ctx;
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+ EVP_PKEY *hmac_pkey;
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uint8_t pwe_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
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int nid, is_odd, primebitlen, primebytelen, ret = 0;
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- ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
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- if (ctx == NULL) {
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- DEBUG("failed allocating HMAC context");
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- goto fail;
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- }
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+ MEM(hmac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new());
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+ MEM(hmac_pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, allzero, sizeof(allzero)));
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switch (grp_num) { /* from IANA registry for IKE D-H groups */
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case 19:
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@@ -203,13 +203,12 @@ int compute_password_element (pwd_session_t *session, uint16_t grp_num,
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* pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
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* counter)
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*/
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- H_Init(ctx);
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- H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t *)token, sizeof(*token));
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- H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_peer, id_peer_len);
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- H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_server, id_server_len);
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- H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t const *)password, password_len);
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- H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t *)&ctr, sizeof(ctr));
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- H_Final(ctx, pwe_digest);
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+ EVP_DigestSignInit(hmac_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, hmac_pkey);
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+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)token, sizeof(*token));
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+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_peer, id_peer_len);
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+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_server, id_server_len);
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+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)password, password_len);
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+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)&ctr, sizeof(ctr));
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BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, rnd);
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if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
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@@ -282,7 +281,8 @@ int compute_password_element (pwd_session_t *session, uint16_t grp_num,
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BN_clear_free(x_candidate);
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BN_clear_free(rnd);
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talloc_free(prfbuf);
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- HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
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+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
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+ EVP_PKEY_free(hmac_pkey);
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return ret;
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}
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
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Summary: High-performance and highly configurable free RADIUS server
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Name: freeradius
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Version: 3.0.20
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Release: 12%{?dist}
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Release: 14%{?dist}
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License: GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+
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Group: System Environment/Daemons
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URL: http://www.freeradius.org/
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@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Patch11: freeradius-FIPS-exit-if-md5-not-allowed.patch
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Patch12: freeradius-bootstrap-run-only-once.patch
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Patch13: freeradius-Fix-unterminated-strings-in-SQL-queries.patch
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Patch14: freeradius-Fix-segfault-when-home_server-is-null.patch
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Patch15: freeradius-fix-crash-on-invalid-abinary-data.patch
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Patch16: freeradius-fix-crash-unknown-eap-sim.patch
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Patch17: freeradius-fix-info-leakage-eap-pwd.patch
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%global docdir %{?_pkgdocdir}%{!?_pkgdocdir:%{_docdir}/%{name}-%{version}}
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@ -246,6 +249,9 @@ This plugin provides the REST support for the FreeRADIUS server project.
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%patch12 -p1
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%patch13 -p1
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%patch14 -p1
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%patch15 -p1
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%patch16 -p1
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%patch17 -p1
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# Add fixed dhparam file to the source to ensure `make tests` can run.
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cp %{SOURCE105} raddb/certs/rfc3526-group-18-8192.dhparam
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@ -896,6 +902,17 @@ exit 0
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%attr(640,root,radiusd) %config(noreplace) /etc/raddb/mods-available/rest
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%changelog
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* Fri Dec 14 2022 Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com> - 3.0.20-14
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- Fix defect found by Covscan
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Resolves: #2151704
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* Fri Dec 09 2022 Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com> - 3.0.20-13
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- Fix multiple CVEs
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- Add rpminspect configuration
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Resolves: #2151702
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Resolves: #2151704
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Resolves: #2151706
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* Thu Dec 9 2021 Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com> - 3.0.20-12
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- Fix segfault when home_server is null
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Resolves: bz#2030173
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