.flatpak.metadata

@@ -1 +1 @@
-a3dcd13e85090e9d8156f1db2a375074e459aa79 SOURCES/flatpak-1.8.5.tar.xz
+41429400eab33868b6c6045fe235e86e1086a056 SOURCES/flatpak-1.12.9.tar.xz

.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/flatpak-1.8.5.tar.xz
+SOURCES/flatpak-1.12.9.tar.xz

SOURCES/flatpak-1.12.x-CVE-2024-42472.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+From 8451fa0ae30397b83705a193aa0d3f7752486dda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2024 12:22:30 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Don't follow symlinks when mounting persisted directories
+
+These directories are in a location under application control, so we
+can't trust them to not be a symlink outside of the files accessibe to
+the application.
+
+Continue to treat --persist=/foo as --persist=foo for backwards compat,
+since this is how it (accidentally) worked before, but print a warning.
+
+Don't allow ".." elements in persist paths: these would not be useful
+anyway, and are unlikely to be in use, however they could potentially
+be used to confuse the persist path handling.
+
+This partially addresses CVE-2024-42472. If only one instance of the
+malicious or compromised app is run at a time, the vulnerability
+is avoided. If two instances can run concurrently, there is a
+time-of-check/time-of-use issue remaining, which can only be resolved
+with changes to bubblewrap; this will be resolved in a separate commit,
+because the bubblewrap dependency might be more difficult to provide in
+LTS distributions.
+
+Helps: CVE-2024-42472, GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87
+[smcv: Make whitespace consistent]
+[smcv: Use g_warning() if unable to create --persist paths]
+[smcv: Use stat() to detect symlinks and warn about them]
+[smcv: Use glnx_steal_fd() for portability to older GLib]
+Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+---
+ common/flatpak-context.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 105 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
+index 53b79807..8c784acf 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
++++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
+@@ -2686,6 +2686,90 @@ flatpak_context_get_exports_full (FlatpakContext *context,
+   return g_steal_pointer (&exports);
+ }
+ 
++/* This creates zero or more directories unders base_fd+basedir, each
++ * being guaranteed to either exist and be a directory (no symlinks)
++ * or be created as a directory. The last directory is opened
++ * and the fd is returned.
++ */
++static gboolean
++mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (int          base_fd,
++                          const char  *basedir,
++                          int          mode,
++                          const char  *subdir,
++                          int         *out_fd,
++                          GError     **error)
++{
++  glnx_autofd int parent_fd = -1;
++
++  if (g_path_is_absolute (subdir))
++    {
++      const char *skipped_prefix = subdir;
++
++      while (*skipped_prefix == '/')
++        skipped_prefix++;
++
++      g_warning ("--persist=\"%s\" is deprecated, treating it as --persist=\"%s\"", subdir, skipped_prefix);
++      subdir = skipped_prefix;
++    }
++
++  g_autofree char *subdir_dirname = g_path_get_dirname (subdir);
++
++  if (strcmp (subdir_dirname, ".") == 0)
++    {
++      /* It is ok to open basedir with follow=true */
++      if (!glnx_opendirat (base_fd, basedir, TRUE, &parent_fd, error))
++        return FALSE;
++    }
++  else if (strcmp (subdir_dirname, "..") == 0)
++    {
++      return glnx_throw (error, "'..' not supported in --persist paths");
++    }
++  else
++    {
++      if (!mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (base_fd, basedir, mode,
++                                     subdir_dirname, &parent_fd, error))
++        return FALSE;
++    }
++
++  g_autofree char *subdir_basename = g_path_get_basename (subdir);
++
++  if (strcmp (subdir_basename, ".") == 0)
++    {
++      *out_fd = glnx_steal_fd (&parent_fd);
++      return TRUE;
++    }
++  else if (strcmp (subdir_basename, "..") == 0)
++    {
++      return glnx_throw (error, "'..' not supported in --persist paths");
++    }
++
++  if (!glnx_shutil_mkdir_p_at (parent_fd, subdir_basename, mode, NULL, error))
++    return FALSE;
++
++  int fd = openat (parent_fd, subdir_basename, O_PATH | O_NONBLOCK | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOCTTY | O_NOFOLLOW);
++  if (fd == -1)
++    {
++      int saved_errno = errno;
++      struct stat stat_buf;
++
++      /* If it's a symbolic link, that could be a user trying to offload
++       * large data to another filesystem, but it could equally well be
++       * a malicious or compromised app trying to exploit GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87.
++       * Produce a clearer error message in this case.
++       * Unfortunately the errno we get in this case is ENOTDIR, so we have
++       * to ask again to find out whether it's really a symlink. */
++      if (saved_errno == ENOTDIR &&
++          fstatat (parent_fd, subdir_basename, &stat_buf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0 &&
++          S_ISLNK (stat_buf.st_mode))
++        return glnx_throw (error, "Symbolic link \"%s\" not allowed to avoid sandbox escape", subdir_basename);
++
++      return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "openat(%s)", subdir_basename);
++    }
++
++  *out_fd = fd;
++  return TRUE;
++}
++
+ void
+ flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext  *context,
+                                          FlatpakBwrap    *bwrap,
+@@ -2709,12 +2793,30 @@ flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext  *context,
+       while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, &key, NULL))
+         {
+           const char *persist = key;
+-          g_autofree char *src = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), ".var/app", app_id, persist, NULL);
++          g_autofree char *appdir = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), ".var/app", app_id, NULL);
+           g_autofree char *dest = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), persist, NULL);
++          g_autoptr(GError) local_error = NULL;
++
++          if (g_mkdir_with_parents (appdir, 0755) != 0)
++            {
++              g_warning ("Unable to create directory %s", appdir);
++              continue;
++            }
++
++          /* Don't follow symlinks from the persist directory, as it is under user control */
++          glnx_autofd int src_fd = -1;
++          if (!mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (AT_FDCWD, appdir, 0755,
++                                         persist, &src_fd,
++                                         &local_error))
++            {
++              g_warning ("Failed to create persist path %s: %s", persist, local_error->message);
++              continue;
++            }
+ 
+-          g_mkdir_with_parents (src, 0755);
++          g_autofree char *src_via_proc = g_strdup_printf ("/proc/self/fd/%d", src_fd);
+ 
+-          flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind", src, dest);
++          flatpak_bwrap_add_fd (bwrap, glnx_steal_fd (&src_fd));
++          flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind", src_via_proc, dest);
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+2.46.0
+
+
+From 5462c9b1e1a34b1104c8a0843a10382e90c9bb6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2024 12:59:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Add test coverage for --persist
+
+This adds three "positive" tests: the common case --persist=.persist, the
+deprecated spelling --persist=/.persist, and the less common special case
+--persist=. as used by Steam.
+
+It also adds "negative" tests for CVE-2024-42472: if the --persist
+directory is a symbolic link or contains path segment "..", we want that
+to be rejected.
+
+Reproduces: CVE-2024-42472, GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87
+[smcv: Add "positive" tests]
+[smcv: Exercise --persist=..]
+[smcv: Assert that --persist with a symlink produces expected message]
+Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+---
+ tests/test-run.sh | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tests/test-run.sh b/tests/test-run.sh
+index dd371df3..bca0845d 100644
+--- a/tests/test-run.sh
++++ b/tests/test-run.sh
+@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ set -euo pipefail
+ skip_without_bwrap
+ skip_revokefs_without_fuse
+ 
+-echo "1..20"
++echo "1..21"
+ 
+ # Use stable rather than master as the branch so we can test that the run
+ # command automatically finds the branch correctly
+@@ -512,3 +512,42 @@ ${FLATPAK} ${U} info -m org.test.App > out
+ assert_file_has_content out "^sdk=org\.test\.Sdk/$(flatpak --default-arch)/stable$"
+ 
+ ok "--sdk option"
++
++rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
++mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
++run --command=sh --persist=.persist org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persist/rc'
++sed -e 's,^,#--persist=.persist# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" >&2
++assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" "can-persist"
++
++ok "--persist=.persist persists a directory"
++
++rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
++mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
++# G_DEBUG= to avoid the deprecation warning being fatal
++G_DEBUG= run --command=sh --persist=/.persist org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persist/rc'
++sed -e 's,^,#--persist=/.persist# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" >&2
++assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" "can-persist"
++
++ok "--persist=/.persist is a deprecated form of --persist=.persist"
++
++rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
++mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
++run --command=sh --persist=. org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persistrc'
++sed -e 's,^,#--persist=.# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persistrc" >&2
++assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persistrc" "can-persist"
++
++ok "--persist=. persists all files"
++
++mkdir "${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible"
++echo FOO > ${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible/secret-file
++rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
++mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
++ln -fns "${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible" "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/persist"
++# G_DEBUG= to avoid the warnings being fatal when we reject a --persist option.
++# LC_ALL=C so we get the expected non-localized string.
++LC_ALL=C G_DEBUG= run --command=ls --persist=persist --persist=relative/../escape org.test.Hello -la ~/persist &> hello_out || true
++sed -e 's,^,#--persist=symlink# ,g' < hello_out >&2
++assert_file_has_content hello_out "not allowed to avoid sandbox escape"
++assert_not_file_has_content hello_out "secret-file"
++
++ok "--persist doesn't allow sandbox escape via a symlink (CVE-2024-42472)"
+-- 
+2.46.0
+
+
+From 04d8ad3009cd8a4350fba6cf7cc6c7819ccdfd34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2024 19:48:18 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] build: Require a version of bubblewrap with the --bind-fd
+ option
+
+We need this for the --bind-fd option, which will close a race
+condition in our solution to CVE-2024-42472.
+
+For this stable branch, check the --help output for a --bind-fd option
+instead of requiring a specific version number, to accommodate possible
+backports in LTS distributions.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+---
+ configure.ac | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 0a44e11a..0c8e2d0e 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ if test "x$BWRAP" != xfalse; then
+    BWRAP_VERSION=`$BWRAP --version | sed 's,.*\ \([0-9]*\.[0-9]*\.[0-9]*\)$,\1,'`
+    AX_COMPARE_VERSION([$SYSTEM_BWRAP_REQS],[gt],[$BWRAP_VERSION],
+                       [AC_MSG_ERROR([You need at least version $SYSTEM_BWRAP_REQS of bubblewrap to use the system installed version])])
++   AS_IF([$BWRAP --help | grep '@<:@-@:>@-bind-fd' >/dev/null],
++         [:],
++         [AC_MSG_ERROR([$BWRAP does not list required option --bind-fd in its --help])])
+    AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SYSTEM_BWRAP], [true])
+ else
+    AC_CHECK_LIB(cap, cap_from_text, CAP_LIB=-lcap)
+-- 
+2.46.0
+
+
+From 2772f19e50c0e809dde8cf3c105d90ee8baf4fa8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 13:44:30 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] persist directories: Pass using new bwrap --bind-fd
+ option
+
+Instead of passing a /proc/self/fd bind mount we use --bind-fd, which
+has two advantages:
+ * bwrap closes the fd when used, so it doesn't leak into the started app
+ * bwrap ensures that what was mounted was the passed in fd (same dev/ino),
+   as there is a small (required) gap between symlink resolve and mount
+   where the target path could be replaced.
+
+Please note that this change requires an updated version of bubblewrap.
+
+Resolves: CVE-2024-42472, GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87
+[smcv: Make whitespace consistent]
+Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+---
+ common/flatpak-context.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
+index 8c784acf..baa62728 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
++++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
+@@ -2813,10 +2813,10 @@ flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext  *context,
+               continue;
+             }
+ 
+-          g_autofree char *src_via_proc = g_strdup_printf ("/proc/self/fd/%d", src_fd);
++          g_autofree char *src_via_proc = g_strdup_printf ("%d", src_fd);
+ 
+           flatpak_bwrap_add_fd (bwrap, glnx_steal_fd (&src_fd));
+-          flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind", src_via_proc, dest);
++          flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind-fd", src_via_proc, dest);
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

SOURCES/flatpak-1.8.5-fix-CVE-2021-21381.patch

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-From cb6fce9e4122ace2960c437def3b1a197bb49b3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ryan Gonzalez <rymg19@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2021 13:20:07 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Disallow @@ and @@u usage in desktop files
-
-Fixes #4146.
----
- common/flatpak-dir.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-dir.c b/common/flatpak-dir.c
-index e6e4d6fb3..7d3374dad 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-dir.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-dir.c
-@@ -7139,6 +7139,8 @@ export_desktop_file (const char         *app,
-                 g_string_append_printf (new_exec, " @@ %s @@", arg);
-               else if (strcasecmp (arg, "%u") == 0)
-                 g_string_append_printf (new_exec, " @@u %s @@", arg);
-+              else if (strcmp (arg, "@@") == 0 || strcmp (arg, "@@u") == 0)
-+                g_print (_("Skipping invalid Exec argument %s\n"), arg);
-               else
-                 g_string_append_printf (new_exec, " %s", arg);
-             }
-
-From 0bdcb88b2d0013aa435dc03950fb42cef2cbd359 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 13:49:36 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] dir: Reserve the whole @@ prefix
-
-If we add new features analogous to file forwarding later, we might
-find that we need a different magic token. Let's reserve the whole
-@@* namespace so we can call it @@something-else.
-
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
----
- common/flatpak-dir.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-dir.c b/common/flatpak-dir.c
-index 7d3374dad..facfab37a 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-dir.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-dir.c
-@@ -7139,7 +7139,7 @@ export_desktop_file (const char         *app,
-                 g_string_append_printf (new_exec, " @@ %s @@", arg);
-               else if (strcasecmp (arg, "%u") == 0)
-                 g_string_append_printf (new_exec, " @@u %s @@", arg);
--              else if (strcmp (arg, "@@") == 0 || strcmp (arg, "@@u") == 0)
-+              else if (g_str_has_prefix (arg, "@@"))
-                 g_print (_("Skipping invalid Exec argument %s\n"), arg);
-               else
-                 g_string_append_printf (new_exec, " %s", arg);
-
-From 230f4c3521cd0dffa446ab9b70e958cdd9241bbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 13:51:33 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] dir: Refuse to export .desktop files with suspicious uses
- of @@ tokens
-
-This is either a malicious/compromised app trying to do an attack, or
-a mistake that will break handling of %f, %u and so on. Either way,
-if we refuse to export the .desktop file, resulting in installation
-failing, then it makes the rejection more obvious than quietly
-removing the magic tokens.
-
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
----
- common/flatpak-dir.c | 6 +++++-
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-dir.c b/common/flatpak-dir.c
-index facfab37a..c5edf346f 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-dir.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-dir.c
-@@ -7140,7 +7140,11 @@ export_desktop_file (const char         *app,
-               else if (strcasecmp (arg, "%u") == 0)
-                 g_string_append_printf (new_exec, " @@u %s @@", arg);
-               else if (g_str_has_prefix (arg, "@@"))
--                g_print (_("Skipping invalid Exec argument %s\n"), arg);
-+                {
-+                  flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_EXPORT_FAILED,
-+                                     _("Invalid Exec argument %s"), arg);
-+                  goto out;
-+                }
-               else
-                 g_string_append_printf (new_exec, " %s", arg);
-             }

SOURCES/flatpak-1.8.5-fix-CVE-2021-41133.patch

@@ -1,818 +0,0 @@
-From e49dee0f37e0264ecd55b86832955d8b98d0d74d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 11:53:23 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 01/11] run: Add an errno value to seccomp filters
-
-At the moment, if we block a syscall we always make it fail with EPERM,
-but this is risky: user-space libraries can start to use new replacements
-for old syscalls at any time, and will often treat EPERM as a fatal error.
-For new syscalls, we should make the syscall fail with ENOSYS, which is
-indistinguishable from running on an older kernel and will cause fallback
-to an older implementation, for example clone3() to clone().
-
-In future we should probably move from EPERM to ENOSYS for some of the
-syscalls we already block, but for now keep the status quo.
-
-This is a prerequisite for fixing the vulnerability tracked as
-GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
-
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
----
- common/flatpak-run.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
-index 3e26710009f9..14212e1f6e55 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-run.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
-@@ -2623,61 +2623,63 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-   struct
-   {
-     int                  scall;
-+    int                  errnum;
-     struct scmp_arg_cmp *arg;
-   } syscall_blocklist[] = {
-     /* Block dmesg */
--    {SCMP_SYS (syslog)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (syslog), EPERM},
-     /* Useless old syscall */
--    {SCMP_SYS (uselib)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (uselib), EPERM},
-     /* Don't allow disabling accounting */
--    {SCMP_SYS (acct)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (acct), EPERM},
-     /* 16-bit code is unnecessary in the sandbox, and modify_ldt is a
-        historic source of interesting information leaks. */
--    {SCMP_SYS (modify_ldt)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (modify_ldt), EPERM},
-     /* Don't allow reading current quota use */
--    {SCMP_SYS (quotactl)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (quotactl), EPERM},
- 
-     /* Don't allow access to the kernel keyring */
--    {SCMP_SYS (add_key)},
--    {SCMP_SYS (keyctl)},
--    {SCMP_SYS (request_key)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (add_key), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (keyctl), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (request_key), EPERM},
- 
-     /* Scary VM/NUMA ops */
--    {SCMP_SYS (move_pages)},
--    {SCMP_SYS (mbind)},
--    {SCMP_SYS (get_mempolicy)},
--    {SCMP_SYS (set_mempolicy)},
--    {SCMP_SYS (migrate_pages)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (move_pages), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (mbind), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (get_mempolicy), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (set_mempolicy), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (migrate_pages), EPERM},
- 
-     /* Don't allow subnamespace setups: */
--    {SCMP_SYS (unshare)},
--    {SCMP_SYS (mount)},
--    {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (unshare), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (mount), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root), EPERM},
- #if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__CRIS__)
-     /* Architectures with CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS2: the child stack
-      * and flags arguments are reversed so the flags come second */
--    {SCMP_SYS (clone), &SCMP_A1 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A1 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
- #else
-     /* Normally the flags come first */
--    {SCMP_SYS (clone), &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
- #endif
- 
-     /* Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226) */
--    {SCMP_SYS (ioctl), &SCMP_A1 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int) TIOCSTI)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (ioctl), EPERM, &SCMP_A1 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int) TIOCSTI)},
-   };
- 
-   struct
-   {
-     int                  scall;
-+    int                  errnum;
-     struct scmp_arg_cmp *arg;
-   } syscall_nondevel_blocklist[] = {
-     /* Profiling operations; we expect these to be done by tools from outside
-      * the sandbox.  In particular perf has been the source of many CVEs.
-      */
--    {SCMP_SYS (perf_event_open)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (perf_event_open), EPERM},
-     /* Don't allow you to switch to bsd emulation or whatnot */
--    {SCMP_SYS (personality), &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_NE, allowed_personality)},
--    {SCMP_SYS (ptrace)}
-+    {SCMP_SYS (personality), EPERM, &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_NE, allowed_personality)},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (ptrace), EPERM}
-   };
-   /* Blocklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink */
-   struct
-@@ -2762,10 +2764,14 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-   for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_blocklist); i++)
-     {
-       int scall = syscall_blocklist[i].scall;
-+      int errnum = syscall_blocklist[i].errnum;
-+
-+      g_return_val_if_fail (errnum == EPERM || errnum == ENOSYS, FALSE);
-+
-       if (syscall_blocklist[i].arg)
--        r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 1, *syscall_blocklist[i].arg);
-+        r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 1, *syscall_blocklist[i].arg);
-       else
--        r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 0);
-+        r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0);
-       if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT /* unknown syscall */)
-         return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall);
-     }
-@@ -2775,10 +2781,14 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-       for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_nondevel_blocklist); i++)
-         {
-           int scall = syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].scall;
-+          int errnum = syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].errnum;
-+
-+          g_return_val_if_fail (errnum == EPERM || errnum == ENOSYS, FALSE);
-+
-           if (syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].arg)
--            r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 1, *syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].arg);
-+            r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 1, *syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].arg);
-           else
--            r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 0);
-+            r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0);
- 
-           if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT /* unknown syscall */)
-             return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall);
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-
-From 0f1fbc35a6c3d17465614427fadaf9866984a297 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 12:44:04 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 02/11] run: Add cross-references for some other seccomp
- syscall filters
-
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
----
- common/flatpak-run.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
-index 14212e1f6e55..d51e535b822f 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-run.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
-@@ -2618,6 +2618,10 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-    *  https://git.gnome.org/browse/linux-user-chroot
-    *    in src/setup-seccomp.c
-    *
-+   * Other useful resources:
-+   * https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/HEAD/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
-+   * https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/HEAD/profiles/seccomp/default.json
-+   *
-    **** END NOTE ON CODE SHARING
-    */
-   struct
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-
-From 5dcb1f731c6dacf85ad5ea61230f049cbf2b3bbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 14:17:04 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 03/11] common: Add a list of recently-added Linux syscalls
-
-Historically, syscalls could take arbitrarily-different values on
-different architectures, but new syscalls are added with syscall numbers
-that align on each architecture.
-
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
----
- common/Makefile.am.inc            |   1 +
- common/flatpak-run.c              |   2 +
- common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 200 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h
-
-diff --git a/common/Makefile.am.inc b/common/Makefile.am.inc
-index 82d85ad78724..599146ab00b9 100644
---- a/common/Makefile.am.inc
-+++ b/common/Makefile.am.inc
-@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ libflatpak_common_la_SOURCES = \
- 	common/flatpak-remote.c \
- 	common/flatpak-run-private.h \
- 	common/flatpak-run.c \
-+	common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h \
- 	common/flatpak-transaction-private.h \
- 	common/flatpak-transaction.c \
- 	common/flatpak-transaction.h \
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
-index d51e535b822f..7015b11a07fe 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-run.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
-@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
- #include <libmalcontent/malcontent.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#include "flatpak-syscalls-private.h"
-+
- #ifdef ENABLE_SECCOMP
- #include <seccomp.h>
- #endif
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h b/common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000000..04eb38ce3631
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2021 Collabora Ltd.
-+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
-+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
-+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ *
-+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
-+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
-+ *
-+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
-+ * License along with this library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-+ */
-+
-+#pragma once
-+
-+#include <sys/syscall.h>
-+
-+#if defined(_MIPS_SIM)
-+# if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32
-+#   define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 4000
-+# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64
-+#   define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 5000
-+# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32
-+#   define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 6000
-+# else
-+#   error "Unknown MIPS ABI"
-+# endif
-+#endif
-+
-+#if defined(__ia64__)
-+# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 1024
-+#endif
-+
-+#if defined(__alpha__)
-+# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 110
-+#endif
-+
-+#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__)
-+# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 0x40000000
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE:
-+ *
-+ * Number to add to the syscall numbers of recently-added syscalls
-+ * to get the appropriate syscall for the current ABI.
-+ */
-+#ifndef FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE
-+# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 0
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_open_tree
-+# define __NR_open_tree (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 428)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_open_tree
-+# define __SNR_open_tree __NR_open_tree
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_move_mount
-+# define __NR_move_mount (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 429)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_move_mount
-+# define __SNR_move_mount __NR_move_mount
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_fsopen
-+# define __NR_fsopen (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 430)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_fsopen
-+# define __SNR_fsopen __NR_fsopen
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_fsconfig
-+# define __NR_fsconfig (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 431)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_fsconfig
-+# define __SNR_fsconfig __NR_fsconfig
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_fsmount
-+# define __NR_fsmount (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 432)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_fsmount
-+# define __SNR_fsmount __NR_fsmount
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_fspick
-+# define __NR_fspick (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 433)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_fspick
-+# define __SNR_fspick __NR_fspick
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_pidfd_open
-+# define __NR_pidfd_open (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 434)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_pidfd_open
-+# define __SNR_pidfd_open __NR_pidfd_open
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_clone3
-+# define __NR_clone3 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 435)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_clone3
-+# define __SNR_clone3 __NR_clone3
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_close_range
-+# define __NR_close_range (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 436)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_close_range
-+# define __SNR_close_range __NR_close_range
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_openat2
-+# define __NR_openat2 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 437)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_openat2
-+# define __SNR_openat2 __NR_openat2
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_pidfd_getfd
-+# define __NR_pidfd_getfd (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 438)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_pidfd_getfd
-+# define __SNR_pidfd_getfd __NR_pidfd_getfd
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_faccessat2
-+# define __NR_faccessat2 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 439)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_faccessat2
-+# define __SNR_faccessat2 __NR_faccessat2
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_process_madvise
-+# define __NR_process_madvise (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 440)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_process_madvise
-+# define __SNR_process_madvise __NR_process_madvise
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_epoll_pwait2
-+# define __NR_epoll_pwait2 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 441)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_epoll_pwait2
-+# define __SNR_epoll_pwait2 __NR_epoll_pwait2
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_mount_setattr
-+# define __NR_mount_setattr (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 442)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_mount_setattr
-+# define __SNR_mount_setattr __NR_mount_setattr
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_quotactl_fd
-+# define __NR_quotactl_fd (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 443)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_quotactl_fd
-+# define __SNR_quotactl_fd __NR_quotactl_fd
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_landlock_create_ruleset
-+# define __NR_landlock_create_ruleset (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 444)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_landlock_create_ruleset
-+# define __SNR_landlock_create_ruleset __NR_landlock_create_ruleset
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_landlock_add_rule
-+# define __NR_landlock_add_rule (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 445)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_landlock_add_rule
-+# define __SNR_landlock_add_rule __NR_landlock_add_rule
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_landlock_restrict_self
-+# define __NR_landlock_restrict_self (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 446)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_landlock_restrict_self
-+# define __SNR_landlock_restrict_self __NR_landlock_restrict_self
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef __NR_memfd_secret
-+# define __NR_memfd_secret (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 447)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef __SNR_memfd_secret
-+# define __SNR_memfd_secret __NR_memfd_secret
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Last updated: Linux 5.14, syscall numbers < 448 */
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-
-From 2965b7fa2de4ff13b712dd6ffa7e77bfb431530c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 11:59:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 04/11] run: Block clone3() in sandbox
-
-clone3() can be used to implement clone() with CLONE_NEWUSER, allowing
-a sandboxed process to get CAP_SYS_ADMIN in a new namespace and
-manipulate its root directory. We need to block this so that AF_UNIX-based
-socket servers (X11, Wayland, etc.) can rely on
-/proc/PID/root/.flatpak-info existing for all Flatpak-sandboxed apps.
-
-Partially fixes GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
-
-Thanks: an anonymous reporter
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
----
- common/flatpak-run.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
-index 7015b11a07fe..25b3ca40a65a 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-run.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
-@@ -2671,6 +2671,12 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
- 
-     /* Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226) */
-     {SCMP_SYS (ioctl), EPERM, &SCMP_A1 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int) TIOCSTI)},
-+
-+    /* seccomp can't look into clone3()'s struct clone_args to check whether
-+     * the flags are OK, so we have no choice but to block clone3().
-+     * Return ENOSYS so user-space will fall back to clone().
-+     * (GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q; see also https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/9f6b562d) */
-+    {SCMP_SYS (clone3), ENOSYS},
-   };
- 
-   struct
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-
-From 8dd2c81f79e364f485b708e6170a4dbb5c0379d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 12:45:54 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 05/11] run: Disallow recently-added mount-manipulation
- syscalls
-
-If we don't allow mount() then we shouldn't allow these either.
-
-Partially fixes GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
-
-Thanks: an anonymous reporter
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
----
- common/flatpak-run.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
-index 25b3ca40a65a..a06f75690528 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-run.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
-@@ -2677,6 +2677,18 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-      * Return ENOSYS so user-space will fall back to clone().
-      * (GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q; see also https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/9f6b562d) */
-     {SCMP_SYS (clone3), ENOSYS},
-+
-+    /* New mount manipulation APIs can also change our VFS. There's no
-+     * legitimate reason to do these in the sandbox, so block all of them
-+     * rather than thinking about which ones might be dangerous.
-+     * (GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q) */
-+    {SCMP_SYS (open_tree), ENOSYS},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (move_mount), ENOSYS},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (fsopen), ENOSYS},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (fsconfig), ENOSYS},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (fsmount), ENOSYS},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (fspick), ENOSYS},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (mount_setattr), ENOSYS},
-   };
- 
-   struct
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-
-From d448d643d0c5a0b315bbc4eccc605c1afcde8111 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 14:19:31 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 06/11] run: Block setns()
-
-If we don't allow unshare() or clone() with CLONE_NEWUSER, we also
-shouldn't allow joining an existing (but different) namespace.
-
-Partially fixes GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
-
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
----
- common/flatpak-run.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
-index a06f75690528..09ab8369bcf2 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-run.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
-@@ -2658,6 +2658,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
- 
-     /* Don't allow subnamespace setups: */
-     {SCMP_SYS (unshare), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (setns), EPERM},
-     {SCMP_SYS (mount), EPERM},
-     {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root), EPERM},
- #if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__CRIS__)
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-
-From c553d29a6d2402489fe2aab2e1fd7f27ffc0ba89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 14:20:29 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 07/11] run: Don't allow unmounting filesystems
-
-If we don't allow mounting filesystems, we shouldn't allow unmounting
-either.
-
-Partially fixes GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
-
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
----
- common/flatpak-run.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
-index 09ab8369bcf2..d298f91804ff 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-run.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
-@@ -2660,6 +2660,8 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-     {SCMP_SYS (unshare), EPERM},
-     {SCMP_SYS (setns), EPERM},
-     {SCMP_SYS (mount), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (umount), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (umount2), EPERM},
-     {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root), EPERM},
- #if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__CRIS__)
-     /* Architectures with CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS2: the child stack
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-
-From 0b85038cd1bd2fba41225fa2180ee3cbbde68ee9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 14:21:04 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 08/11] run: Don't allow chroot()
-
-If we don't allow pivot_root() then there seems no reason why we should
-allow chroot().
-
-Partially fixes GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
-
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
----
- common/flatpak-run.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
-index d298f91804ff..9b3648065b82 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-run.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
-@@ -2663,6 +2663,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-     {SCMP_SYS (umount), EPERM},
-     {SCMP_SYS (umount2), EPERM},
-     {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root), EPERM},
-+    {SCMP_SYS (chroot), EPERM},
- #if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__CRIS__)
-     /* Architectures with CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS2: the child stack
-      * and flags arguments are reversed so the flags come second */
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-
-From f0e2093275199ec6ff023c332f012f42615e9f8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 17:05:07 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 09/11] run: Handle unknown syscalls as intended
-
-The error-handling here was
-
-    if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT)
-
-but Alex says it was almost certainly intended to be
-
-    if (r < 0 && r != -EFAULT)
-
-so that syscalls not known to libseccomp are not a fatal error.
-
-Instead of literally making that change, emit a debug message on -EFAULT
-so we can see what is going on.
-
-This temporarily weakens our defence against CVE-2021-41133
-(GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q) in order to avoid regressions: if the installed
-version of libseccomp does not know about the recently-added syscalls,
-but the kernel does, then we will not prevent non-native executables
-from using those syscalls.
-
-Resolves: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/issues/4458
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-(cherry picked from commit d419fa67038370e4f4c3ce8c3b5f672d4876cfc8)
-(cherry picked from commit 270701f900c8612cf1fc5e6f5a6e2eb6459708c1)
----
- common/flatpak-run.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
-index 9b3648065b82..04a034f27392 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-run.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
-@@ -2800,7 +2800,16 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-         r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 1, *syscall_blocklist[i].arg);
-       else
-         r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0);
--      if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT /* unknown syscall */)
-+
-+      /* EFAULT means "internal libseccomp error", but in practice we get
-+       * this for syscall numbers added via flatpak-syscalls-private.h
-+       * when trying to filter them on a non-native architecture, because
-+       * libseccomp cannot map the syscall number to a name and back to a
-+       * number for the non-native architecture. */
-+      if (r == -EFAULT)
-+        flatpak_debug2 ("Unable to block syscall %d: syscall not known to libseccomp?",
-+                        scall);
-+      else if (r < 0)
-         return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall);
-     }
- 
-@@ -2818,7 +2827,11 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-           else
-             r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0);
- 
--          if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT /* unknown syscall */)
-+          /* See above for the meaning of EFAULT. */
-+          if (errno == EFAULT)
-+            flatpak_debug2 ("Unable to block syscall %d: syscall not known to libseccomp?",
-+                            scall);
-+          else if (r < 0)
-             return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall);
-         }
-     }
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-
-From de504cb72d2978ab67c9aa4bbbd63895128199c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 19:00:13 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 10/11] Fix handling of syscalls only allowed by --devel
-
-This was incorrectly looking at errno instead of -r.
-
-Fixes: 0b38b0f0 "run: Handle unknown syscalls as intended"
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 3fc8c672676ae016f8e7cc90481b2feecbad9861)
-(cherry picked from commit 97e128c2c1520202486b5e165e1734cbb421568a)
----
- common/flatpak-run.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
-index 04a034f27392..87988b9f7e51 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-run.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
-@@ -2828,7 +2828,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-             r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0);
- 
-           /* See above for the meaning of EFAULT. */
--          if (errno == EFAULT)
-+          if (r == -EFAULT)
-             flatpak_debug2 ("Unable to block syscall %d: syscall not known to libseccomp?",
-                             scall);
-           else if (r < 0)
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-
-From 81492b64bbacc3c523e150ad5164f18973852b28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 19:06:13 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 11/11] run: Improve error handling/diagnostics for calls into
- libseccomp
-
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 53bde36585b88a2b96bf896ed79b40ccb6a72c54)
-(cherry picked from commit bd2c58fc27fa5e31029339dbce8eea10717015f3)
----
- common/flatpak-run.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
-index 87988b9f7e51..c72b0cd96598 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-run.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
-@@ -2572,6 +2572,38 @@ static const uint32_t seccomp_x86_64_extra_arches[] = { SCMP_ARCH_X86, 0, };
- static const uint32_t seccomp_aarch64_extra_arches[] = { SCMP_ARCH_ARM, 0 };
- #endif
- 
-+/*
-+ * @negative_errno: Result code as returned by libseccomp functions
-+ *
-+ * Translate a libseccomp error code into an error message. libseccomp
-+ * mostly returns negative `errno` values such as `-ENOMEM`, but some
-+ * standard `errno` values are used for non-standard purposes where their
-+ * `strerror()` would be misleading.
-+ *
-+ * Returns: a string version of @negative_errno if possible
-+ */
-+static const char *
-+flatpak_seccomp_strerror (int negative_errno)
-+{
-+  g_return_val_if_fail (negative_errno < 0, "Non-negative error value from libseccomp?");
-+  g_return_val_if_fail (negative_errno > INT_MIN, "Out of range error value from libseccomp?");
-+
-+  switch (negative_errno)
-+    {
-+      case -EDOM:
-+        return "Architecture specific failure";
-+
-+      case -EFAULT:
-+        return "Internal libseccomp failure (unknown syscall?)";
-+
-+      case -ECANCELED:
-+        return "System failure beyond the control of libseccomp";
-+    }
-+
-+  /* e.g. -ENOMEM: the result of strerror() is good enough */
-+  return g_strerror (-negative_errno);
-+}
-+
- static inline void
- cleanup_seccomp (void *p)
- {
-@@ -2769,7 +2801,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-              couldn't continue running. */
-           r = seccomp_arch_add (seccomp, arch_id);
-           if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
--            return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to add architecture to seccomp filter"));
-+            return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to add architecture to seccomp filter: %s"), flatpak_seccomp_strerror (r));
- 
-           if (multiarch && extra_arches != NULL)
-             {
-@@ -2778,7 +2810,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-                 {
-                   r = seccomp_arch_add (seccomp, extra_arches[i]);
-                   if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
--                    return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to add multiarch architecture to seccomp filter"));
-+                    return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to add multiarch architecture to seccomp filter: %s"), flatpak_seccomp_strerror (r));
-                 }
-             }
-         }
-@@ -2810,7 +2842,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-         flatpak_debug2 ("Unable to block syscall %d: syscall not known to libseccomp?",
-                         scall);
-       else if (r < 0)
--        return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall);
-+        return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d: %s"), scall, flatpak_seccomp_strerror (r));
-     }
- 
-   if (!devel)
-@@ -2832,7 +2864,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-             flatpak_debug2 ("Unable to block syscall %d: syscall not known to libseccomp?",
-                             scall);
-           else if (r < 0)
--            return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall);
-+            return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d: %s"), scall, flatpak_seccomp_strerror (r));
-         }
-     }
- 
-@@ -2862,8 +2894,10 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
-   if (!glnx_open_anonymous_tmpfile_full (O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, "/tmp", &seccomp_tmpf, error))
-     return FALSE;
- 
--  if (seccomp_export_bpf (seccomp, seccomp_tmpf.fd) != 0)
--    return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to export bpf"));
-+  r = seccomp_export_bpf (seccomp, seccomp_tmpf.fd);
-+
-+  if (r != 0)
-+    return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to export bpf: %s"), flatpak_seccomp_strerror (r));
- 
-   lseek (seccomp_tmpf.fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
- 
--- 
-2.31.1
-

SOURCES/flatpak-1.8.5-post-cve-fixes.patch

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From 93ecea3488081a726bcd2ddb04d557decaa87f80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 17:52:13 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] build: Convert environment into a sequence of bwrap arguments
-
-This means we can systematically pass the environment variables
-through bwrap(1), even if it is setuid and thus is filtering out
-security-sensitive environment variables. bwrap itself ends up being
-run with an empty environment instead.
-
-This fixes a regression when CVE-2021-21261 was fixed: before the
-CVE fixes, LD_LIBRARY_PATH would have been passed through like this
-and appeared in the `flatpak build` shell, but during the CVE fixes,
-the special case that protected LD_LIBRARY_PATH was removed in favour
-of the more general flatpak_bwrap_envp_to_args(). That reasoning only
-works if we use flatpak_bwrap_envp_to_args(), consistently, everywhere
-that we run the potentially-setuid bwrap.
-
-Fixes: 6d1773d2 "run: Convert all environment variables into bwrap arguments"
-Resolves: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/issues/4080
-Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=980323
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 9a61d2c44f0a58cebcb9b2787ae88db07ca68bb0)
----
- app/flatpak-builtins-build.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/app/flatpak-builtins-build.c b/app/flatpak-builtins-build.c
-index 8da0de814..07ef6fc07 100644
---- a/app/flatpak-builtins-build.c
-+++ b/app/flatpak-builtins-build.c
-@@ -569,6 +569,8 @@ flatpak_builtin_build (int argc, char **argv, GCancellable *cancellable, GError
-                               NULL);
-     }
- 
-+  flatpak_bwrap_envp_to_args (bwrap);
-+
-   if (!flatpak_bwrap_bundle_args (bwrap, 1, -1, FALSE, error))
-     return FALSE;
- 
-From f91857c07ede7ef5150a38d6b8e49ee43d6b3d50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 18:07:38 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] dir: Pass environment via bwrap --setenv when running
- apply_extra
-
-This means we can systematically pass the environment variables
-through bwrap(1), even if it is setuid and thus is filtering out
-security-sensitive environment variables. bwrap ends up being
-run with an empty environment instead.
-
-As with the previous commit, this regressed while fixing CVE-2021-21261.
-
-Fixes: 6d1773d2 "run: Convert all environment variables into bwrap arguments"
-Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
-(cherry picked from commit fb473cad801c6b61706353256cab32330557374a)
----
- common/flatpak-dir.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/common/flatpak-dir.c b/common/flatpak-dir.c
-index ed1248e74..40767fa77 100644
---- a/common/flatpak-dir.c
-+++ b/common/flatpak-dir.c
-@@ -7426,6 +7426,8 @@ apply_extra_data (FlatpakDir   *self,
-                                          app_context, NULL, NULL, NULL, cancellable, error))
-     return FALSE;
- 
-+  flatpak_bwrap_envp_to_args (bwrap);
-+
-   flatpak_bwrap_add_arg (bwrap, "/app/bin/apply_extra");
- 
-   flatpak_bwrap_finish (bwrap);

SOURCES/flatpak-1.8.5-profile.d-Disable-gvfs-plugins-when-listing-flatpak-.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From e61282d89bffe0b2ed923d9a0158cee35996e8e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mourad De Clerck <bugs-debian@aquazul.com>
-Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2020 13:55:28 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] profile.d: Disable gvfs plugins when listing flatpak
- installations
-
-This avoids gvfs-daemon being started when logging in as root via ssh.
-
-Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/975710
-(cherry picked from commit f69a35ceec7322e02007b45d676e0b6f1e9376b0)
----
- profile/flatpak.sh | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/profile/flatpak.sh b/profile/flatpak.sh
-index 6c6e113ffd89..9dc6cf901ffd 100644
---- a/profile/flatpak.sh
-+++ b/profile/flatpak.sh
-@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ if command -v flatpak > /dev/null; then
-         (
-             unset G_MESSAGES_DEBUG
-             echo "${XDG_DATA_HOME:-"$HOME/.local/share"}/flatpak"
--            flatpak --installations
-+            GIO_USE_VFS=local flatpak --installations
-         ) | (
-             new_dirs=
-             while read -r install_path
--- 
-2.31.1
-

SOURCES/flatpak-Revert-selinux-Permit-using-systemd-userdbd.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 1c73110795b865246ce3595042dcd2d5e7891359 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Debarshi Ray <debarshir@gnome.org>
+Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 20:27:16 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "selinux: Permit using systemd-userdbd"
+
+This reverts commit 399710ada185c1ee232bc3e6266a71688eb152b7.
+---
+ selinux/flatpak.te | 4 ----
+ 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/selinux/flatpak.te b/selinux/flatpak.te
+index bb3d80e316eb..4cf895c44abe 100644
+--- a/selinux/flatpak.te
++++ b/selinux/flatpak.te
+@@ -33,10 +33,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+    policykit_dbus_chat(flatpak_helper_t)
+ ')
+ 
+-optional_policy(`
+-   systemd_userdbd_stream_connect(flatpak_helper_t)
+-')
+-
+ optional_policy(`                   
+     unconfined_domain(flatpak_helper_t)
+ ')
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

SPECS/flatpak.spec

@@ -1,31 +1,33 @@
-%global bubblewrap_version 0.4.0
+%global bubblewrap_version 0.4.0-2
-%global ostree_version 2018.9
+%global ostree_version 2020.8
 
 Name:           flatpak
-Version:        1.8.5
+Version:        1.12.9
-Release:        6%{?dist}
+Release:        3%{?dist}
 Summary:        Application deployment framework for desktop apps
 
 License:        LGPLv2+
 URL:            http://flatpak.org/
 Source0:        https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/releases/download/%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1918776
-Patch0:         flatpak-1.8.5-post-cve-fixes.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1938064
-Patch1:         flatpak-1.8.5-fix-CVE-2021-21381.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1980438
-Patch2:         flatpak-1.8.5-profile.d-Disable-gvfs-plugins-when-listing-flatpak-.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2012868
-Patch3:         flatpak-1.8.5-fix-CVE-2021-41133.patch
 
-BuildRequires:  autoconf
+%if 0%{?fedora}
-BuildRequires:  automake
+# Add Fedora flatpak repositories
+Source1:        flatpak-add-fedora-repos.service
+%endif
+
+# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-4220
+Patch0:         flatpak-Revert-selinux-Permit-using-systemd-userdbd.patch
+
+# Backported upstream patch for CVE-2024-42472
+Patch1:         flatpak-1.12.x-CVE-2024-42472.patch
+
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(appstream-glib)
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(dconf)
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(fuse)
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(gdk-pixbuf-2.0)
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(gio-unix-2.0)
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(gobject-introspection-1.0) >= 1.40.0
+BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(gpgme)
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(json-glib-1.0)
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(libarchive) >= 2.8.0
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(libseccomp)
@@ -41,19 +43,14 @@ BuildRequires:  bubblewrap >= %{bubblewrap_version}
 BuildRequires:  docbook-dtds
 BuildRequires:  docbook-style-xsl
 BuildRequires:  gettext
-BuildRequires:  gettext-devel
+BuildRequires:  libassuan-devel
-BuildRequires:  gpgme-devel
-BuildRequires:  gtk-doc
 BuildRequires:  libcap-devel
-BuildRequires:  libtool
+BuildRequires:  python3-devel
 BuildRequires:  python3-pyparsing
 BuildRequires:  systemd
-BuildRequires:  /usr/bin/python3
 BuildRequires:  /usr/bin/xmlto
 BuildRequires:  /usr/bin/xsltproc
 
-%{?systemd_requires}
-
 Requires:       bubblewrap >= %{bubblewrap_version}
 Requires:       librsvg2%{?_isa}
 Requires:       ostree-libs%{?_isa} >= %{ostree_version}
@@ -131,11 +128,11 @@ This package contains installed tests for %{name}.
 
 %prep
 %autosetup -p1
+# Make sure to use the RHEL-lifetime supported Python and no other
+%py3_shebang_fix scripts/* subprojects/variant-schema-compiler/* tests/*
 
 
 %build
-autoreconf --force --install --verbose
-
 (if ! test -x configure; then NOCONFIGURE=1 ./autogen.sh; CONFIGFLAGS=--enable-gtk-doc; fi;
  # Generate consistent IDs between runs to avoid multilib problems.
  export XMLTO_FLAGS="--stringparam generate.consistent.ids=1"
@@ -156,8 +153,18 @@ install -pm 644 NEWS README.md %{buildroot}/%{_pkgdocdir}
 install -d %{buildroot}%{_localstatedir}/lib/flatpak
 install -d %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/flatpak/remotes.d
 rm -f %{buildroot}%{_libdir}/libflatpak.la
+
+%if 0%{?fedora}
+install -D -t %{buildroot}%{_unitdir} %{SOURCE1}
+%endif
+
 %find_lang %{name}
 
+# Work around selinux denials, see
+# https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/issues/4128 for details. Note that we are
+# going to need the system env generator if we should enable malcontent support
+# in the future.
+rm %{buildroot}%{_systemd_system_env_generator_dir}/60-flatpak-system-only
 
 %pre
 getent group flatpak >/dev/null || groupadd -r flatpak
@@ -167,15 +174,28 @@ getent passwd flatpak >/dev/null || \
 exit 0
 
 
+%if 0%{?fedora}
 %post
-# Create an (empty) system-wide repo.
+%systemd_post flatpak-add-fedora-repos.service
-flatpak remote-list --system &> /dev/null || :
+%endif
 
 
 %post selinux
 %selinux_modules_install %{_datadir}/selinux/packages/flatpak.pp.bz2
 
 
+%if 0%{?fedora}
+%preun
+%systemd_preun flatpak-add-fedora-repos.service
+%endif
+
+
+%if 0%{?fedora}
+%postun
+%systemd_postun_with_restart flatpak-add-fedora-repos.service
+%endif
+
+
 %postun selinux
 if [ $1 -eq 0 ]; then
     %selinux_modules_uninstall %{_datadir}/selinux/packages/flatpak.pp.bz2
@@ -218,6 +238,7 @@ fi
 %{_mandir}/man5/flatpak-installation.5*
 %{_mandir}/man5/flatpak-remote.5*
 %{_sysconfdir}/dbus-1/system.d/org.freedesktop.Flatpak.SystemHelper.conf
+%dir %{_sysconfdir}/flatpak
 %{_sysconfdir}/flatpak/remotes.d
 %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/flatpak.sh
 %{_sysusersdir}/flatpak.conf
@@ -226,6 +247,10 @@ fi
 %{_userunitdir}/flatpak-portal.service
 %{_systemd_user_env_generator_dir}/60-flatpak
 
+%if 0%{?fedora}
+%{_unitdir}/flatpak-add-fedora-repos.service
+%endif
+
 %files devel
 %{_datadir}/gir-1.0/Flatpak-1.0.gir
 %{_datadir}/gtk-doc/
@@ -255,6 +280,39 @@ fi
 
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Sep 04 2024 Kalev Lember <klember@redhat.com> - 1.12.9-3
+- Fix previous changelog entry
+
+* Mon Sep 02 2024 Kalev Lember <klember@redhat.com> - 1.12.9-2
+- Backport upstream patches for CVE-2024-42472
+- Require bubblewrap version that has new --bind-fd option backported for
+  addressing CVE-2024-42472
+
+* Tue Apr 30 2024 Kalev Lember <klember@redhat.com> - 1.12.9-1
+- Update to 1.12.9 (CVE-2024-32462)
+
+* Mon Nov 06 2023 Debarshi Ray <rishi@fedoraproject.org> - 1.12.8-1
+- Rebase to 1.12.8 (RHEL-4220)
+
+* Mon Nov 06 2023 Debarshi Ray <rishi@fedoraproject.org> - 1.10.8-3
+- Let flatpak own %%{_sysconfdir}/flatpak (RHEL-15822)
+
+* Mon Sep 04 2023 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 1.10.8-2
+- Make sure to use the RHEL-lifetime supported Python and no other (RHEL-2225)
+
+* Tue Jul 11 2023 Debarshi Ray <rishi@fedoraproject.org> - 1.10.8-1
+- Rebase to 1.10.8 (#2222103)
+- Fix CVE-2023-28100 and CVE-2023-28101 (#2180311)
+
+* Wed Mar 09 2022 Debarshi Ray <rishi@fedoraproject.org> - 1.10.7-1
+- Rebase to 1.10.7 (#2062417)
+
+* Thu Feb 03 2022 Debarshi Ray <rishi@fedoraproject.org> - 1.8.7-1
+- Rebase to 1.8.7 (#2041972)
+
+* Tue Jan 25 2022 Debarshi Ray <rishi@fedoraproject.org> - 1.8.6-1
+- Rebase to 1.8.6 (#2010533)
+
 * Tue Oct 26 2021 Debarshi Ray <rishi@fedoraproject.org> - 1.8.5-6
 - Fix CVE-2021-41133 (#2012869)