flatpak/SOURCES/flatpak-1.12.x-CVE-2024-42472.patch

From 8451fa0ae30397b83705a193aa0d3f7752486dda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2024 12:22:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Don't follow symlinks when mounting persisted directories

These directories are in a location under application control, so we
can't trust them to not be a symlink outside of the files accessibe to
the application.

Continue to treat --persist=/foo as --persist=foo for backwards compat,
since this is how it (accidentally) worked before, but print a warning.

Don't allow ".." elements in persist paths: these would not be useful
anyway, and are unlikely to be in use, however they could potentially
be used to confuse the persist path handling.

This partially addresses CVE-2024-42472. If only one instance of the
malicious or compromised app is run at a time, the vulnerability
is avoided. If two instances can run concurrently, there is a
time-of-check/time-of-use issue remaining, which can only be resolved
with changes to bubblewrap; this will be resolved in a separate commit,
because the bubblewrap dependency might be more difficult to provide in
LTS distributions.

Helps: CVE-2024-42472, GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87
[smcv: Make whitespace consistent]
[smcv: Use g_warning() if unable to create --persist paths]
[smcv: Use stat() to detect symlinks and warn about them]
[smcv: Use glnx_steal_fd() for portability to older GLib]
Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
---
 common/flatpak-context.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 105 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
index 53b79807..8c784acf 100644
--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
@@ -2686,6 +2686,90 @@ flatpak_context_get_exports_full (FlatpakContext *context,
   return g_steal_pointer (&exports);
 }
 
+/* This creates zero or more directories unders base_fd+basedir, each
+ * being guaranteed to either exist and be a directory (no symlinks)
+ * or be created as a directory. The last directory is opened
+ * and the fd is returned.
+ */
+static gboolean
+mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (int          base_fd,
+                          const char  *basedir,
+                          int          mode,
+                          const char  *subdir,
+                          int         *out_fd,
+                          GError     **error)
+{
+  glnx_autofd int parent_fd = -1;
+
+  if (g_path_is_absolute (subdir))
+    {
+      const char *skipped_prefix = subdir;
+
+      while (*skipped_prefix == '/')
+        skipped_prefix++;
+
+      g_warning ("--persist=\"%s\" is deprecated, treating it as --persist=\"%s\"", subdir, skipped_prefix);
+      subdir = skipped_prefix;
+    }
+
+  g_autofree char *subdir_dirname = g_path_get_dirname (subdir);
+
+  if (strcmp (subdir_dirname, ".") == 0)
+    {
+      /* It is ok to open basedir with follow=true */
+      if (!glnx_opendirat (base_fd, basedir, TRUE, &parent_fd, error))
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+  else if (strcmp (subdir_dirname, "..") == 0)
+    {
+      return glnx_throw (error, "'..' not supported in --persist paths");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if (!mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (base_fd, basedir, mode,
+                                     subdir_dirname, &parent_fd, error))
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+
+  g_autofree char *subdir_basename = g_path_get_basename (subdir);
+
+  if (strcmp (subdir_basename, ".") == 0)
+    {
+      *out_fd = glnx_steal_fd (&parent_fd);
+      return TRUE;
+    }
+  else if (strcmp (subdir_basename, "..") == 0)
+    {
+      return glnx_throw (error, "'..' not supported in --persist paths");
+    }
+
+  if (!glnx_shutil_mkdir_p_at (parent_fd, subdir_basename, mode, NULL, error))
+    return FALSE;
+
+  int fd = openat (parent_fd, subdir_basename, O_PATH | O_NONBLOCK | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOCTTY | O_NOFOLLOW);
+  if (fd == -1)
+    {
+      int saved_errno = errno;
+      struct stat stat_buf;
+
+      /* If it's a symbolic link, that could be a user trying to offload
+       * large data to another filesystem, but it could equally well be
+       * a malicious or compromised app trying to exploit GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87.
+       * Produce a clearer error message in this case.
+       * Unfortunately the errno we get in this case is ENOTDIR, so we have
+       * to ask again to find out whether it's really a symlink. */
+      if (saved_errno == ENOTDIR &&
+          fstatat (parent_fd, subdir_basename, &stat_buf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0 &&
+          S_ISLNK (stat_buf.st_mode))
+        return glnx_throw (error, "Symbolic link \"%s\" not allowed to avoid sandbox escape", subdir_basename);
+
+      return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "openat(%s)", subdir_basename);
+    }
+
+  *out_fd = fd;
+  return TRUE;
+}
+
 void
 flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext  *context,
                                          FlatpakBwrap    *bwrap,
@@ -2709,12 +2793,30 @@ flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext  *context,
       while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, &key, NULL))
         {
           const char *persist = key;
-          g_autofree char *src = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), ".var/app", app_id, persist, NULL);
+          g_autofree char *appdir = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), ".var/app", app_id, NULL);
           g_autofree char *dest = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), persist, NULL);
+          g_autoptr(GError) local_error = NULL;
+
+          if (g_mkdir_with_parents (appdir, 0755) != 0)
+            {
+              g_warning ("Unable to create directory %s", appdir);
+              continue;
+            }
+
+          /* Don't follow symlinks from the persist directory, as it is under user control */
+          glnx_autofd int src_fd = -1;
+          if (!mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (AT_FDCWD, appdir, 0755,
+                                         persist, &src_fd,
+                                         &local_error))
+            {
+              g_warning ("Failed to create persist path %s: %s", persist, local_error->message);
+              continue;
+            }
 
-          g_mkdir_with_parents (src, 0755);
+          g_autofree char *src_via_proc = g_strdup_printf ("/proc/self/fd/%d", src_fd);
 
-          flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind", src, dest);
+          flatpak_bwrap_add_fd (bwrap, glnx_steal_fd (&src_fd));
+          flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind", src_via_proc, dest);
         }
     }
 
-- 
2.46.0


From 5462c9b1e1a34b1104c8a0843a10382e90c9bb6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2024 12:59:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Add test coverage for --persist

This adds three "positive" tests: the common case --persist=.persist, the
deprecated spelling --persist=/.persist, and the less common special case
--persist=. as used by Steam.

It also adds "negative" tests for CVE-2024-42472: if the --persist
directory is a symbolic link or contains path segment "..", we want that
to be rejected.

Reproduces: CVE-2024-42472, GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87
[smcv: Add "positive" tests]
[smcv: Exercise --persist=..]
[smcv: Assert that --persist with a symlink produces expected message]
Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
---
 tests/test-run.sh | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tests/test-run.sh b/tests/test-run.sh
index dd371df3..bca0845d 100644
--- a/tests/test-run.sh
+++ b/tests/test-run.sh
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ set -euo pipefail
 skip_without_bwrap
 skip_revokefs_without_fuse
 
-echo "1..20"
+echo "1..21"
 
 # Use stable rather than master as the branch so we can test that the run
 # command automatically finds the branch correctly
@@ -512,3 +512,42 @@ ${FLATPAK} ${U} info -m org.test.App > out
 assert_file_has_content out "^sdk=org\.test\.Sdk/$(flatpak --default-arch)/stable$"
 
 ok "--sdk option"
+
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+run --command=sh --persist=.persist org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persist/rc'
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=.persist# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" >&2
+assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" "can-persist"
+
+ok "--persist=.persist persists a directory"
+
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+# G_DEBUG= to avoid the deprecation warning being fatal
+G_DEBUG= run --command=sh --persist=/.persist org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persist/rc'
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=/.persist# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" >&2
+assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" "can-persist"
+
+ok "--persist=/.persist is a deprecated form of --persist=.persist"
+
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+run --command=sh --persist=. org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persistrc'
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=.# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persistrc" >&2
+assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persistrc" "can-persist"
+
+ok "--persist=. persists all files"
+
+mkdir "${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible"
+echo FOO > ${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible/secret-file
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+ln -fns "${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible" "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/persist"
+# G_DEBUG= to avoid the warnings being fatal when we reject a --persist option.
+# LC_ALL=C so we get the expected non-localized string.
+LC_ALL=C G_DEBUG= run --command=ls --persist=persist --persist=relative/../escape org.test.Hello -la ~/persist &> hello_out || true
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=symlink# ,g' < hello_out >&2
+assert_file_has_content hello_out "not allowed to avoid sandbox escape"
+assert_not_file_has_content hello_out "secret-file"
+
+ok "--persist doesn't allow sandbox escape via a symlink (CVE-2024-42472)"
-- 
2.46.0


From 04d8ad3009cd8a4350fba6cf7cc6c7819ccdfd34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2024 19:48:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] build: Require a version of bubblewrap with the --bind-fd
 option

We need this for the --bind-fd option, which will close a race
condition in our solution to CVE-2024-42472.

For this stable branch, check the --help output for a --bind-fd option
instead of requiring a specific version number, to accommodate possible
backports in LTS distributions.

Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
---
 configure.ac | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 0a44e11a..0c8e2d0e 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ if test "x$BWRAP" != xfalse; then
    BWRAP_VERSION=`$BWRAP --version | sed 's,.*\ \([0-9]*\.[0-9]*\.[0-9]*\)$,\1,'`
    AX_COMPARE_VERSION([$SYSTEM_BWRAP_REQS],[gt],[$BWRAP_VERSION],
                       [AC_MSG_ERROR([You need at least version $SYSTEM_BWRAP_REQS of bubblewrap to use the system installed version])])
+   AS_IF([$BWRAP --help | grep '@<:@-@:>@-bind-fd' >/dev/null],
+         [:],
+         [AC_MSG_ERROR([$BWRAP does not list required option --bind-fd in its --help])])
    AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SYSTEM_BWRAP], [true])
 else
    AC_CHECK_LIB(cap, cap_from_text, CAP_LIB=-lcap)
-- 
2.46.0


From 2772f19e50c0e809dde8cf3c105d90ee8baf4fa8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 13:44:30 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] persist directories: Pass using new bwrap --bind-fd
 option

Instead of passing a /proc/self/fd bind mount we use --bind-fd, which
has two advantages:
 * bwrap closes the fd when used, so it doesn't leak into the started app
 * bwrap ensures that what was mounted was the passed in fd (same dev/ino),
   as there is a small (required) gap between symlink resolve and mount
   where the target path could be replaced.

Please note that this change requires an updated version of bubblewrap.

Resolves: CVE-2024-42472, GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87
[smcv: Make whitespace consistent]
Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
---
 common/flatpak-context.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
index 8c784acf..baa62728 100644
--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
@@ -2813,10 +2813,10 @@ flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext  *context,
               continue;
             }
 
-          g_autofree char *src_via_proc = g_strdup_printf ("/proc/self/fd/%d", src_fd);
+          g_autofree char *src_via_proc = g_strdup_printf ("%d", src_fd);
 
           flatpak_bwrap_add_fd (bwrap, glnx_steal_fd (&src_fd));
-          flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind", src_via_proc, dest);
+          flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind-fd", src_via_proc, dest);
         }
     }
 
-- 
2.46.0