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import fapolicyd-1.1.3-8.el8

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CentOS Sources 2022-09-27 08:19:20 -04:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent ca6977e37f
commit c63d08f28e
11 changed files with 777 additions and 30 deletions
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2
.fapolicyd.metadata
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@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
1fa6cf3f0a15bbef745438c1ba7b685ebf7e75f1 SOURCES/fapolicyd-1.1.tar.gz
3887d3f97a4f506ad6bf7dcef36b01cc7897a692 SOURCES/fapolicyd-1.1.3.tar.gz
bdbe20a4db2cd58073abf17a537e3a6766cdea21 SOURCES/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4.tar.gz

2
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
SOURCES/fapolicyd-1.1.tar.gz
SOURCES/fapolicyd-1.1.3.tar.gz
SOURCES/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4.tar.gz

13
SOURCES/fagenrules-group.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
diff -up ./init/fagenrules.fix ./init/fagenrules
--- ./init/fagenrules.fix 2022-04-01 16:12:50.512164904 +0200
+++ ./init/fagenrules 2022-04-01 16:21:07.924712100 +0200
@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ fi
# We copy the file so that it gets the right selinux label
cp ${TmpRules} ${DestinationFile}
-chmod 0640 ${DestinationFile}
+chmod 0644 ${DestinationFile}
+chgrp fapolicyd ${DestinationFile}
# Restore context on MLS system.
# /tmp is SystemLow & fapolicyd.rules is SystemHigh

11
SOURCES/fapolicyd-cli-segfault.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
diff -up ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.segfault ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c
--- ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.segfault 2022-08-03 17:51:54.903081124 +0200
+++ ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c 2022-08-03 17:55:18.256458750 +0200
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ static struct option long_opts[] =
{"ftype", 1, NULL, 't'},
{"list", 0, NULL, 'l'},
{"update", 0, NULL, 'u'},
+ {NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
};
static const char *_pipe = "/run/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.fifo";

215
SOURCES/fapolicyd-fgets-update-thread.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
diff -up ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.upgrade-thread ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c
--- ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.upgrade-thread 2022-08-03 18:00:02.374999369 +0200
+++ ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c 2022-08-03 18:00:09.802830497 +0200
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ static int do_update(void)
}
}
- ssize_t ret = write(fd, "1", 2);
+ ssize_t ret = write(fd, "1\n", 3);
if (ret == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Write: %s -> %s\n", _pipe, strerror(errno));
diff -up ./src/library/database.c.upgrade-thread ./src/library/database.c
--- ./src/library/database.c.upgrade-thread 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/library/database.c 2022-08-03 17:58:04.034689808 +0200
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
#include <gcrypt.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@
#include "message.h"
#include "llist.h"
#include "file.h"
+#include "fd-fgets.h"
#include "fapolicyd-backend.h"
#include "backend-manager.h"
@@ -1181,6 +1183,7 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
return NULL;
}
+ fcntl(ffd[0].fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
ffd[0].events = POLLIN;
while (!stop) {
@@ -1200,97 +1203,102 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
} else {
msg(LOG_ERR, "Update poll error (%s)",
strerror_r(errno, err_buff, BUFFER_SIZE));
- goto err_out;
+ goto finalize;
}
} else if (rc == 0) {
#ifdef DEBUG
msg(LOG_DEBUG, "Update poll timeout expired");
#endif
- if (db_operation != DB_NO_OP)
- goto handle_db_ops;
continue;
} else {
if (ffd[0].revents & POLLIN) {
- ssize_t count = read(ffd[0].fd, buff,
- BUFFER_SIZE-1);
- if (count == -1) {
- msg(LOG_ERR,
- "Failed to read from a pipe %s (%s)",
- fifo_path,
- strerror_r(errno, err_buff,
- BUFFER_SIZE));
- goto err_out;
- }
+ do {
+ fd_fgets_rewind();
+ int res = fd_fgets(buff, sizeof(buff), ffd[0].fd);
- if (count == 0) {
-#ifdef DEBUG
- msg(LOG_DEBUG,
- "Buffer contains zero bytes!");
-#endif
- continue;
- } else // Manually terminate buff
- buff[count] = 0;
-#ifdef DEBUG
- msg(LOG_DEBUG, "Buffer contains: \"%s\"", buff);
-#endif
- for (int i = 0 ; i < count ; i++) {
- // assume file name
- // operation = 0
- if (buff[i] == '/') {
- db_operation = ONE_FILE;
+ // nothing to read
+ if (res == -1)
break;
- }
+ else if (res > 0) {
+ char* end = strchr(buff, '\n');
- if (buff[i] == '1') {
- db_operation = RELOAD_DB;
- break;
+ if (end == NULL) {
+ msg(LOG_ERR, "Too long line?");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ int count = end - buff;
+
+ *end = '\0';
+
+ for (int i = 0 ; i < count ; i++) {
+ // assume file name
+ // operation = 0
+ if (buff[i] == '/') {
+ db_operation = ONE_FILE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (buff[i] == '1') {
+ db_operation = RELOAD_DB;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (buff[i] == '2') {
+ db_operation = FLUSH_CACHE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (isspace(buff[i]))
+ continue;
+
+ msg(LOG_ERR, "Cannot handle data \"%s\" from pipe", buff);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ *end = '\n';
+
+ // got "1" -> reload db
+ if (db_operation == RELOAD_DB) {
+ db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ msg(LOG_INFO,
+ "It looks like there was an update of the system... Syncing DB.");
+
+ backend_close();
+ backend_init(config);
+ backend_load(config);
+
+ if ((rc = update_database(config))) {
+ msg(LOG_ERR,
+ "Cannot update trust database!");
+ close(ffd[0].fd);
+ backend_close();
+ unlink_fifo();
+ exit(rc);
+ }
+
+ msg(LOG_INFO, "Updated");
+
+ // Conserve memory
+ backend_close();
+ // got "2" -> flush cache
+ } else if (db_operation == FLUSH_CACHE) {
+ db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ needs_flush = true;
+ } else if (db_operation == ONE_FILE) {
+ db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ if (handle_record(buff))
+ continue;
+ }
}
- if (buff[i] == '2') {
- db_operation = FLUSH_CACHE;
- break;
- }
- }
-
-handle_db_ops:
- // got "1" -> reload db
- if (db_operation == RELOAD_DB) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
- msg(LOG_INFO,
- "It looks like there was an update of the system... Syncing DB.");
-
- backend_close();
- backend_init(config);
- backend_load(config);
-
- if ((rc = update_database(config))) {
- msg(LOG_ERR,
- "Cannot update trust database!");
- close(ffd[0].fd);
- backend_close();
- unlink_fifo();
- exit(rc);
- } else
- msg(LOG_INFO, "Updated");
-
- // Conserve memory
- backend_close();
- // got "2" -> flush cache
- } else if (db_operation == FLUSH_CACHE) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
- needs_flush = true;
- } else if (db_operation == ONE_FILE) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
- if (handle_record(buff))
- continue;
- }
+ } while(!fd_fgets_eof());
}
}
-
}
-err_out:
+finalize:
close(ffd[0].fd);
unlink_fifo();

195
SOURCES/fapolicyd-openssl.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
diff -up ./BUILD.md.openssl ./BUILD.md
--- ./BUILD.md.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./BUILD.md 2022-08-02 14:10:48.092466542 +0200
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ BUILD-TIME DEPENDENCIES (fedora and RHEL
* libudev-devel
* kernel-headers
* systemd-devel
-* libgcrypt-devel
+* libgcrypt-devel ( <= fapolicyd-1.1.3)
+* openssl ( >= fapolicyd-1.1.4)
* rpm-devel (optional)
* file
* file-devel
diff -U0 ./ChangeLog.openssl ./ChangeLog
diff -up ./configure.ac.openssl ./configure.ac
--- ./configure.ac.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./configure.ac 2022-08-02 14:10:48.092466542 +0200
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADER(uthash.h, , [AC_MSG_ERRO
echo .
echo Checking for required libraries
AC_CHECK_LIB(udev, udev_device_get_devnode, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libudev not found])], -ludev)
-AC_CHECK_LIB(gcrypt, gcry_md_open, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libgcrypt not found])], -lgcrypt)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, SHA256, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([openssl libcrypto not found])], -lcrypto)
AC_CHECK_LIB(magic, magic_descriptor, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libmagic not found])], -lmagic)
AC_CHECK_LIB(cap-ng, capng_change_id, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libcap-ng not found])], -lcap-ng)
AC_CHECK_LIB(seccomp, seccomp_rule_add, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libseccomp not found])], -lseccomp)
diff -up ./fapolicyd.spec.openssl ./fapolicyd.spec
--- ./fapolicyd.spec.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./fapolicyd.spec 2022-08-02 14:10:48.092466542 +0200
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Source0: https://people.redhat.com/sgrub
BuildRequires: gcc
BuildRequires: kernel-headers
BuildRequires: autoconf automake make gcc libtool
-BuildRequires: systemd-devel libgcrypt-devel rpm-devel file-devel file
+BuildRequires: systemd-devel openssl-devel rpm-devel file-devel file
BuildRequires: libcap-ng-devel libseccomp-devel lmdb-devel
BuildRequires: python3-devel
BuildRequires: uthash-devel
diff -up ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.openssl ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c
--- ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c 2022-08-02 14:10:48.093466520 +0200
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@
#include <stdatomic.h>
#include <lmdb.h>
#include <limits.h>
-#include <gcrypt.h>
#include "policy.h"
#include "database.h"
#include "file-cli.h"
@@ -670,11 +669,6 @@ static int check_trustdb(void)
if (rc)
return 1;
- // Initialize libgcrypt
- gcry_check_version(NULL);
- gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);
- gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
-
do {
unsigned int tsource; // unused
off_t size;
diff -up ./src/library/database.c.openssl ./src/library/database.c
--- ./src/library/database.c.openssl 2022-08-02 14:10:48.090466587 +0200
+++ ./src/library/database.c 2022-08-02 14:13:11.995236110 +0200
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <ctype.h>
-#include <gcrypt.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
@@ -244,26 +244,18 @@ static void abort_transaction(MDB_txn *t
static char *path_to_hash(const char *path, const size_t path_len) MALLOCLIKE;
static char *path_to_hash(const char *path, const size_t path_len)
{
- gcry_md_hd_t h;
- unsigned int len;
- unsigned char *hptr;
+ unsigned char hptr[80];
char *digest;
- if (gcry_md_open(&h, GCRY_MD_SHA512, GCRY_MD_FLAG_SECURE))
+ if (path_len == 0)
return NULL;
- gcry_md_write(h, path, path_len);
- hptr = gcry_md_read(h, GCRY_MD_SHA512);
-
- len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA512) * sizeof(char);
- digest = malloc((2 * len) + 1);
- if (digest == NULL) {
- gcry_md_close(h);
+ SHA512((unsigned char *)path, path_len, (unsigned char *)&hptr);
+ digest = malloc((SHA512_LEN * 2) + 1);
+ if (digest == NULL)
return digest;
- }
- bytes2hex(digest, hptr, len);
- gcry_md_close(h);
+ bytes2hex(digest, hptr, SHA512_LEN);
return digest;
}
@@ -296,7 +288,7 @@ static int write_db(const char *idx, con
if (hash == NULL)
return 5;
key.mv_data = (void *)hash;
- key.mv_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA512) * 2 + 1;
+ key.mv_size = (SHA512_LEN * 2) + 1;
} else {
key.mv_data = (void *)idx;
key.mv_size = len;
@@ -416,7 +408,7 @@ static char *lt_read_db(const char *inde
if (hash == NULL)
return NULL;
key.mv_data = (void *)hash;
- key.mv_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA512) * 2 + 1;
+ key.mv_size = (SHA512_LEN * 2) + 1;
} else {
key.mv_data = (void *)index;
key.mv_size = len;
diff -up ./src/library/file.c.openssl ./src/library/file.c
--- ./src/library/file.c.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/library/file.c 2022-08-02 14:10:48.094466497 +0200
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <gcrypt.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <magic.h>
#include <libudev.h>
#include <elf.h>
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ static struct udev *udev;
magic_t magic_cookie;
struct cache { dev_t device; const char *devname; };
static struct cache c = { 0, NULL };
-static size_t hash_size = 32; // init so cli doesn't need to call file_init
// readelf -l path-to-app | grep 'Requesting' | cut -d':' -f2 | tr -d ' ]';
static const char *interpreters[] = {
@@ -96,12 +95,6 @@ void file_init(void)
msg(LOG_ERR, "Unable to load magic database");
exit(1);
}
-
- // Initialize libgcrypt
- gcry_check_version(NULL);
- gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);
- gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
- hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA256) * sizeof(char);
}
@@ -445,12 +438,12 @@ char *get_hash_from_fd2(int fd, size_t s
if (mapped != MAP_FAILED) {
unsigned char hptr[40];
- gcry_md_hash_buffer(GCRY_MD_SHA256, &hptr, mapped, size);
+ SHA256(mapped, size, (unsigned char *)&hptr);
munmap(mapped, size);
- digest = malloc(65);
+ digest = malloc((SHA256_LEN * 2) + 1);
// Convert to ASCII string
- bytes2hex(digest, hptr, hash_size);
+ bytes2hex(digest, hptr, SHA256_LEN);
}
return digest;
}
@@ -476,7 +469,7 @@ int get_ima_hash(int fd, char *sha)
}
// Looks like it what we want...
- bytes2hex(sha, &tmp[2], 32);
+ bytes2hex(sha, &tmp[2], SHA256_LEN);
return 1;
}
diff -up ./src/library/file.h.openssl ./src/library/file.h
--- ./src/library/file.h.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/library/file.h 2022-08-02 14:10:48.094466497 +0200
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ struct file_info
struct timespec time;
};
+#define SHA256_LEN 32
+#define SHA512_LEN 64
+
void file_init(void);
void file_close(void);
struct file_info *stat_file_entry(int fd) MALLOCLIKE;

30
SOURCES/fapolicyd-readme.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From b4618d133f473b9bbc36f2a5e94b8b0f257ba3e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 14:49:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Add mention that using of names requires name resolution
- using of user and group names as uid and gid attributes
requires correct name resolution
Signed-off-by: Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com>
---
README.md | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index d932e00..abc5eee 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -131,6 +131,12 @@ You can similarly do this for trusted users that have to execute things in
the home dir. You can create a trusted_user group, add them the group,
and then write a rule allowing them to execute from their home dir.
+When you want to use user or group name (as a string). You have to guarantee
+that these names were correctly resolved. In case of systemd, you need to add
+a new after target 'After=nss-user-lookup.target'.
+To achieve that you can use `systemctl edit --full fapolicyd`,
+uncomment the respective line and save the change.
+
```
allow perm=any gid=trusted_user : ftype=%languages dir=/home
deny_audit perm=any all : ftype=%languages dir=/home

13
SOURCES/fapolicyd-selinux.patch
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@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
diff --color -ru a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
--- a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te 2021-03-23 10:21:31.000000000 +0100
+++ b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te 2021-11-19 10:24:20.000002248 +0100
@@ -63,23 +63,13 @@
diff -up ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te.selinux ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
--- ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te.selinux 2021-03-23 10:21:31.000000000 +0100
+++ ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te 2022-06-29 12:06:57.958124735 +0200
@@ -61,25 +61,15 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(fapolicyd_t)
files_mmap_usr_files(fapolicyd_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(fapolicyd_t)
-files_mmap_usr_files(fapolicyd_t)
+files_mmap_all_files(fapolicyd_t)
files_read_all_files(fapolicyd_t)
-files_watch_mount_generic_tmp_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
-files_watch_with_perm_generic_tmp_dirs(fapolicyd_t)

141
SOURCES/fapolicyd-sighup.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
diff -up ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c.sighup ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c
--- ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c.sighup 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c 2022-08-04 11:07:10.245069443 +0200
@@ -527,6 +527,7 @@ int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
while (!stop) {
if (hup) {
hup = 0;
+ msg(LOG_INFO, "Got SIGHUP");
reconfigure();
}
rc = poll(pfd, 2, -1);
diff -up ./src/library/database.c.sighup ./src/library/database.c
--- ./src/library/database.c.sighup 2022-08-04 11:07:10.237069609 +0200
+++ ./src/library/database.c 2022-08-04 11:08:44.852057119 +0200
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int lib_symlink=0, lib64_symlink=
static struct pollfd ffd[1] = { {0, 0, 0} };
static const char *fifo_path = "/run/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.fifo";
static integrity_t integrity;
-static atomic_int db_operation;
+static atomic_int reload_db = 0;
static pthread_t update_thread;
static pthread_mutex_t update_lock;
@@ -1147,7 +1147,31 @@ static int handle_record(const char * bu
void update_trust_database(void)
{
- db_operation = RELOAD_DB;
+ reload_db = 1;
+}
+
+static void do_reload_db(conf_t* config)
+{
+ msg(LOG_INFO,"It looks like there was an update of the system... Syncing DB.");
+
+ int rc;
+ backend_close();
+ backend_init(config);
+ backend_load(config);
+
+ if ((rc = update_database(config))) {
+ msg(LOG_ERR,
+ "Cannot update trust database!");
+ close(ffd[0].fd);
+ backend_close();
+ unlink_fifo();
+ exit(rc);
+ }
+
+ msg(LOG_INFO, "Updated");
+
+ // Conserve memory
+ backend_close();
}
static void *update_thread_main(void *arg)
@@ -1158,6 +1182,8 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
char err_buff[BUFFER_SIZE];
conf_t *config = (conf_t *)arg;
+ int do_operation = DB_NO_OP;;
+
#ifdef DEBUG
msg(LOG_DEBUG, "Update thread main started");
#endif
@@ -1182,6 +1208,12 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
rc = poll(ffd, 1, 1000);
+ // got SIGHUP
+ if (reload_db) {
+ reload_db = 0;
+ do_reload_db(config);
+ }
+
#ifdef DEBUG
msg(LOG_DEBUG, "Update poll interrupted");
#endif
@@ -1228,17 +1260,17 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
// assume file name
// operation = 0
if (buff[i] == '/') {
- db_operation = ONE_FILE;
+ do_operation = ONE_FILE;
break;
}
if (buff[i] == '1') {
- db_operation = RELOAD_DB;
+ do_operation = RELOAD_DB;
break;
}
if (buff[i] == '2') {
- db_operation = FLUSH_CACHE;
+ do_operation = FLUSH_CACHE;
break;
}
@@ -1252,34 +1284,16 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
*end = '\n';
// got "1" -> reload db
- if (db_operation == RELOAD_DB) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
- msg(LOG_INFO,
- "It looks like there was an update of the system... Syncing DB.");
-
- backend_close();
- backend_init(config);
- backend_load(config);
-
- if ((rc = update_database(config))) {
- msg(LOG_ERR,
- "Cannot update trust database!");
- close(ffd[0].fd);
- backend_close();
- unlink_fifo();
- exit(rc);
- }
-
- msg(LOG_INFO, "Updated");
+ if (do_operation == RELOAD_DB) {
+ do_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ do_reload_db(config);
- // Conserve memory
- backend_close();
// got "2" -> flush cache
- } else if (db_operation == FLUSH_CACHE) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ } else if (do_operation == FLUSH_CACHE) {
+ do_operation = DB_NO_OP;
needs_flush = true;
- } else if (db_operation == ONE_FILE) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ } else if (do_operation == ONE_FILE) {
+ do_operation = DB_NO_OP;
if (handle_record(buff))
continue;
}

47
SOURCES/fapolicyd-user-group-doc.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From fb4c274f4857f2d652014b0189abafb1df4b001a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 12:18:18 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Add documentation describing support for user/group names
---
doc/fapolicyd.rules.5 | 6 +++---
init/fapolicyd.service | 2 ++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/fapolicyd.rules.5 b/doc/fapolicyd.rules.5
index aa77177..3b8ec09 100644
--- a/doc/fapolicyd.rules.5
+++ b/doc/fapolicyd.rules.5
@@ -35,13 +35,13 @@ The subject is the process that is performing actions on system resources. The f
This matches against any subject. When used, this must be the only subject in the rule.
.TP
.B auid
-This is the login uid that the audit system assigns users when they log in to the system. Daemons have a value of -1.
+This is the login uid that the audit system assigns users when they log in to the system. Daemons have a value of -1. The given value may be numeric or the account name.
.TP
.B uid
-This is the user id that the program is running under.
+This is the user id that the program is running under. The given value may be numeric or the account name.
.TP
.B gid
-This is the group id that the program is running under.
+This is the group id that the program is running under. The given value may be numeric or the group name.
.TP
.B sessionid
This is the numeric session id that the audit system assigns to users when they log in. Daemons have a value of -1.
diff --git a/init/fapolicyd.service b/init/fapolicyd.service
index 715de98..a5a6a3f 100644
--- a/init/fapolicyd.service
+++ b/init/fapolicyd.service
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ PIDFile=/run/fapolicyd.pid
ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/fagenrules
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/fapolicyd
Restart=on-abnormal
+# Uncomment the following line if rules need user/group name lookup
+#After=nss-user-lookup.target
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
--
2.37.1

138
SPECS/fapolicyd.spec
View File

@ -2,11 +2,10 @@
%global moduletype contrib
%define semodule_version 0.4
Summary: Application Whitelisting Daemon
Name: fapolicyd
Version: 1.1
Release: 1%{?dist}
Version: 1.1.3
Release: 8%{?dist}
License: GPLv3+
URL: http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/fapolicyd
Source0: https://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/fapolicyd/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
@ -14,7 +13,7 @@ Source1: https://github.com/linux-application-whitelisting/%{name}-selinux/relea
BuildRequires: gcc
BuildRequires: kernel-headers
BuildRequires: autoconf automake make gcc libtool
BuildRequires: systemd-devel libgcrypt-devel rpm-devel file-devel file
BuildRequires: systemd-devel openssl-devel rpm-devel file-devel file
BuildRequires: libcap-ng-devel libseccomp-devel lmdb-devel
BuildRequires: python3-devel
BuildRequires: python2-devel
@ -32,6 +31,14 @@ Requires(postun): systemd-units
# the fapolicyd package because it provides safe upgrade path
Patch1: fapolicyd-dnf-plugin.patch
Patch2: fapolicyd-selinux.patch
Patch3: fagenrules-group.patch
Patch4: fapolicyd-fgets-update-thread.patch
Patch5: fapolicyd-openssl.patch
Patch6: fapolicyd-user-group-doc.patch
Patch7: fapolicyd-cli-segfault.patch
Patch8: fapolicyd-sighup.patch
Patch9: fapolicyd-readme.patch
%description
Fapolicyd (File Access Policy Daemon) implements application whitelisting
@ -60,11 +67,25 @@ The %{name}-selinux package contains selinux policy for the %{name} daemon.
%patch1 -p1 -b .plugin
%patch2 -p1 -b .selinux
%patch3 -p1 -b .group
%patch4 -p1 -b .update-thread
%patch5 -p1 -b .openssl
%patch6 -p1 -b .user-group
%patch7 -p1 -b .segfault
%patch8 -p1 -b .sighup
%patch9 -p1 -b .readme
# generate rules for python
sed -i "s/%python2_path%/`readlink -f %{__python2} | sed 's/\//\\\\\//g'`/g" rules.d/*.rules
sed -i "s/%python3_path%/`readlink -f %{__python3} | sed 's/\//\\\\\//g'`/g" rules.d/*.rules
sed -i "s/%ld_so_path%/`find /usr/lib64/ -type f -name 'ld-linux-*.so.*' | sed 's/\//\\\\\//g'`/g" rules.d/*.rules
sed -i "s|%python2_path%|`readlink -f %{__python2}`|g" rules.d/*.rules
sed -i "s|%python3_path%|`readlink -f %{__python3}`|g" rules.d/*.rules
interpret=`readelf -e /usr/bin/bash \
| grep Requesting \
| sed 's/.$//' \
| rev | cut -d" " -f1 \
| rev`
sed -i "s|%ld_so_path%|`realpath $interpret`|g" rules.d/*.rules
%build
./autogen.sh
@ -83,7 +104,7 @@ popd
%check
make check
# selinux
# Selinux
%pre selinux
%selinux_relabel_pre -s %{selinuxtype}
@ -96,6 +117,12 @@ mkdir -p %{buildroot}/%{_localstatedir}/lib/%{name}
mkdir -p %{buildroot}/run/%{name}
mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/trust.d
mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d
# get list of file names between known-libs and restrictive from sample-rules/README-rules
cat %{buildroot}/%{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/README-rules \
| grep -A 100 'known-libs' \
| grep -B 100 'restrictive' \
| grep '^[0-9]' > %{buildroot}/%{_datadir}/%{name}/default-ruleset.known-libs
chmod 644 %{buildroot}/%{_datadir}/%{name}/default-ruleset.known-libs
# selinux
install -d %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/selinux/packages/%{selinuxtype}
@ -106,8 +133,49 @@ install -p -m 644 %{name}-selinux-%{semodule_version}/%{name}.if %{buildroot}%{_
#cleanup
find %{buildroot} \( -name '*.la' -o -name '*.a' \) -delete
%define manage_default_rules default_changed=0 \
# check changed fapolicyd.rules \
if [ -e %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules ]; then \
diff %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules %{_datadir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules.known-libs >/dev/null 2>&1 || { \
default_changed=1; \
#echo "change detected in fapolicyd.rules"; \
} \
fi \
if [ -e %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d ]; then \
default_ruleset='' \
# get listing of default rule files in known-libs \
[ -e %{_datadir}/%{name}/default-ruleset.known-libs ] && default_ruleset=`cat %{_datadir}/%{name}/default-ruleset.known-libs` \
# check for removed or added files \
default_count=`echo "$default_ruleset" | wc -l` \
current_count=`ls -1 %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/*.rules | wc -l` \
[ $default_count -eq $current_count ] || { \
default_changed=1; \
#echo "change detected in number of rule files d:$default_count vs c:$current_count"; \
} \
for file in %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/*.rules; do \
if echo "$default_ruleset" | grep -q "`basename $file`"; then \
# compare content of the rule files \
diff $file %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/`basename $file` >/dev/null 2>&1 || { \
default_changed=1; \
#echo "change detected in `basename $file`"; \
} \
else \
# added file detected \
default_changed=1 \
#echo "change detected in added rules file `basename $file`"; \
fi \
done \
fi \
# remove files if no change against default rules detected \
[ $default_changed -eq 0 ] && rm -rf %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/* || : \
%pre
getent passwd %{name} >/dev/null || useradd -r -M -d %{_localstatedir}/lib/%{name} -s /sbin/nologin -c "Application Whitelisting Daemon" %{name}
if [ $1 -eq 2 ]; then
# detect changed default rules in case of upgrade
%manage_default_rules
fi
%post
# if no pre-existing rule file
@ -116,29 +184,27 @@ if [ ! -e %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules ] ; then
# Only if no pre-existing component rules
if [ "$files" -eq 0 ] ; then
## Install the known libs policy
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/10-languages.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/20-patterns.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/30-dracut.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/30-updaters.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/40-bad-elf.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/41-shared-obj.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/42-trusted-elf.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/70-trusted-lang.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/72-shell.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/90-deny-execute.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/95-allow-open.rules %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
for rulesfile in `cat %{_datadir}/%{name}/default-ruleset.known-libs`; do
cp %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/$rulesfile %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/
done
chgrp %{name} %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/*
if [ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ] ; then
# restore correct label
/usr/sbin/restorecon -F %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/*
fi
fagenrules --load
fagenrules >/dev/null
fi
fi
%systemd_post %{name}.service
%preun
%systemd_preun %{name}.service
if [ $1 -eq 0 ]; then
# detect changed default rules in case of uninstall
%manage_default_rules
else
[ -e %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules ] && rm -rf %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/* || :
fi
%postun
%systemd_postun_with_restart %{name}.service
@ -149,16 +215,17 @@ fi
%license COPYING
%attr(755,root,%{name}) %dir %{_datadir}/%{name}
%attr(755,root,%{name}) %dir %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules
%attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_datadir}/%{name}/default-ruleset.known-libs
%attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_datadir}/%{name}/sample-rules/*
%attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_datadir}/%{name}/fapolicyd-magic.mgc
%attr(750,root,%{name}) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}
%attr(750,root,%{name}) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/trust.d
%attr(750,root,%{name}) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d
%ghost %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/*
%ghost %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules
%ghost %verify(not md5 size mtime) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/*
%ghost %verify(not md5 size mtime) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules
%ghost %verify(not md5 size mtime) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/compiled.rules
%config(noreplace) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.conf
%config(noreplace) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.trust
%ghost %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/compiled.rules
%attr(644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/%{name}.service
%attr(644,root,root) %{_tmpfilesdir}/%{name}.conf
%attr(755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/%{name}
@ -195,6 +262,31 @@ fi
%selinux_relabel_post -s %{selinuxtype}
%changelog
* Fri Aug 05 2022 Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com> - 1.1.3-8
RHEL 8.7.0 ERRATUM
- rebase fapolicyd to the latest stable vesion
Resolves: rhbz#2100087
- fapolicyd does not correctly handle SIGHUP
Resolves: rhbz#2070639
- fapolicyd often breaks package updates
Resolves: rhbz#2111243
- drop libgcrypt in favour of openssl
Resolves: rhbz#2111935
- fapolicyd.rules doesn't advertise that using a username/groupname instead of uid/gid also works
Resolves: rhbz#2103914
- fapolicyd gets way too easily killed by OOM killer
Resolves: rhbz#2100089
- compiled.rules file ownership and mode
Resolves: rhbz#2066653
- Faulty handling of static applications
Resolves: rhbz#2084497
- Introduce ppid rule attribute
Resolves: rhbz#2102563
- CVE-2022-1117 fapolicyd: fapolicyd wrongly prepares ld.so path [rhel-8.7.0]
Resolves: rhbz#2069121
- Fapolicyd denies access to /usr/lib64/ld-2.28.so [rhel-8.7.0]
Resolves: rhbz#2068105
* Wed Feb 16 2022 Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com> - 1.1-1
RHEL 8.6.0 ERRATUM
- rebase to 1.1