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import CS fapolicyd-1.3.2-100.el9

This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2023-09-21 18:24:07 +00:00
parent 6d8b6f1cae
commit 5ec57bbe77
24 changed files with 165 additions and 2496 deletions
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4
.fapolicyd.metadata
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@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
3887d3f97a4f506ad6bf7dcef36b01cc7897a692 SOURCES/fapolicyd-1.1.3.tar.gz
bdbe20a4db2cd58073abf17a537e3a6766cdea21 SOURCES/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4.tar.gz
f4fc52c6ec16cec13405d66752c0b222fff893e7 SOURCES/fapolicyd-1.3.2.tar.gz
e61573db3de4d229377eebff8252765058ad4ab9 SOURCES/fapolicyd-selinux-0.6.tar.gz
fbafa356359ace80787ce6634d84425b40d90907 SOURCES/uthash-2.3.0.tar.gz

4
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
SOURCES/fapolicyd-1.1.3.tar.gz
SOURCES/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4.tar.gz
SOURCES/fapolicyd-1.3.2.tar.gz
SOURCES/fapolicyd-selinux-0.6.tar.gz
SOURCES/uthash-2.3.0.tar.gz

13
SOURCES/fagenrules-group.patch
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@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./init/fagenrules.fix ./init/fagenrules
--- ./init/fagenrules.fix 2022-04-01 16:12:50.512164904 +0200
+++ ./init/fagenrules 2022-04-01 16:21:07.924712100 +0200
@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ fi
# We copy the file so that it gets the right selinux label
cp ${TmpRules} ${DestinationFile}
-chmod 0640 ${DestinationFile}
+chmod 0644 ${DestinationFile}
+chgrp fapolicyd ${DestinationFile}
# Restore context on MLS system.
# /tmp is SystemLow & fapolicyd.rules is SystemHigh

110
SOURCES/fapolicyd-already-started.patch
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@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c.already-started ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c
--- ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c.already-started 2023-01-12 17:40:45.366909652 +0100
+++ ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c 2023-01-12 17:46:22.458139519 +0100
@@ -378,6 +378,58 @@ static void usage(void)
}
+int already_running(void)
+{
+ int pidfd = open(pidfile, O_RDONLY);
+ if (pidfd >= 0) {
+ char pid_buf[16];
+
+ if (fd_fgets(pid_buf, sizeof(pid_buf), pidfd)) {
+ int pid;
+ char exe_buf[80], my_path[80];
+
+ // Get our path
+ if (get_program_from_pid(getpid(),
+ sizeof(exe_buf), my_path) == NULL)
+ goto err_out; // shouldn't happen, but be safe
+
+ // convert pidfile to integer
+ errno = 0;
+ pid = strtoul(pid_buf, NULL, 10);
+ if (errno)
+ goto err_out; // shouldn't happen, but be safe
+
+ // verify it really is fapolicyd
+ if (get_program_from_pid(pid,
+ sizeof(exe_buf), exe_buf) == NULL)
+ goto good; //if pid doesn't exist, we're OK
+
+ // If the path doesn't have fapolicyd in it, we're OK
+ if (strstr(exe_buf, "fapolicyd") == NULL)
+ goto good;
+
+ if (strcmp(exe_buf, my_path) == 0)
+ goto err_out; // if the same, we need to exit
+
+ // one last sanity check in case path is unexpected
+ // for example: /sbin/fapolicyd & /home/test/fapolicyd
+ if (pid != getpid())
+ goto err_out;
+good:
+ close(pidfd);
+ unlink(pidfile);
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ msg(LOG_ERR, "fapolicyd pid file found but unreadable");
+err_out: // At this point, we have a pid file, let's just assume it's alive
+ // because if 2 are running, it deadlocks the machine
+ close(pidfd);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0; // pid file doesn't exist, we're good to go
+}
+
+
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
struct pollfd pfd[2];
@@ -428,6 +480,11 @@ int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
}
}
+ if (already_running()) {
+ msg(LOG_ERR, "fapolicyd is already running");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
// Set a couple signal handlers
sa.sa_flags = 0;
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
@@ -446,9 +503,6 @@ int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &limit);
setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &limit);
- // Set strict umask
- (void) umask( 0117 );
-
// get more time slices because everything is waiting on us
rc = nice(-config.nice_val);
if (rc == -1)
@@ -473,17 +527,20 @@ int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
exit(1);
}
- if (preconstruct_fifo(&config)) {
- msg(LOG_ERR, "Cannot contruct a pipe");
- exit(1);
- }
-
// Setup filesystem to watch list
init_fs_list(config.watch_fs);
// Write the pid file for the init system
write_pid_file();
+ // Set strict umask
+ (void) umask( 0117 );
+
+ if (preconstruct_fifo(&config)) {
+ msg(LOG_ERR, "Cannot contruct a pipe");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
// If we are not going to be root, then setup necessary capabilities
if (config.uid != 0) {
capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);

11
SOURCES/fapolicyd-cli-segfault.patch
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@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.segfault ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c
--- ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.segfault 2022-08-03 17:51:54.903081124 +0200
+++ ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c 2022-08-03 17:55:18.256458750 +0200
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ static struct option long_opts[] =
{"ftype", 1, NULL, 't'},
{"list", 0, NULL, 'l'},
{"update", 0, NULL, 'u'},
+ {NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
};
static const char *_pipe = "/run/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.fifo";

1088
SOURCES/fapolicyd-exclude-list.patch
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

79
SOURCES/fapolicyd-falcon-sensor.patch
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@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
From 2b13715219bbb6a84a73e007cea84f0d5d1d39ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2022 15:09:44 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Extend new_event state machine
- allow other opens before dynamic linker execution
- split original STATE_REOPEN to the new STATE_REOPEN and STATE_DEFAULT_REOPEN
- STATE_REOPEN now behaves as loop state for new opens (from the same subject),
uses skip_path
- STATE_DEFAULT_REOPEN is needed when dynamic linker is directly executed
in such scenario we need to be sure that non of the following opens will
skip the path
Signed-off-by: Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com>
---
src/library/event.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
src/library/process.h | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/library/event.c b/src/library/event.c
index 4d79eb98..649cb9d6 100644
--- a/src/library/event.c
+++ b/src/library/event.c
@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ int new_event(const struct fanotify_event_metadata *m, event_t *e)
(e->type & FAN_OPEN_PERM) && !rc) {
skip_path = 1;
s->info->state = STATE_REOPEN;
+
+ // special branch after ld_so exec
+ // next opens will go fall trough
+ if (s->info->path1 &&
+ (strcmp(s->info->path1, SYSTEM_LD_SO) == 0))
+ s->info->state = STATE_DEFAULT_REOPEN;
}
// If not same proc or we detect execution, evict
@@ -164,6 +170,7 @@ int new_event(const struct fanotify_event_metadata *m, event_t *e)
skip_path = 1;
}
+
// If we've seen the reopen and its an execute and process
// has an interpreter and we're the same process, don't evict
// and don't collect the path since reopen interp will. The
@@ -172,10 +179,19 @@ int new_event(const struct fanotify_event_metadata *m, event_t *e)
if ((s->info->state == STATE_REOPEN) && !skip_path &&
(e->type & FAN_OPEN_EXEC_PERM) &&
(s->info->elf_info & HAS_INTERP) && !rc) {
+ s->info->state = STATE_DEFAULT_REOPEN;
evict = 0;
skip_path = 1;
}
+ // this is how STATE_REOPEN and
+ // STATE_DEFAULT_REOPEN differs
+ // in STATE_REOPEN path is always skipped
+ if ((s->info->state == STATE_REOPEN) && !skip_path &&
+ (e->type & FAN_OPEN_PERM) && !rc) {
+ skip_path = 1;
+ }
+
if (evict) {
lru_evict(subj_cache, key);
q_node = check_lru_cache(subj_cache, key);
diff --git a/src/library/process.h b/src/library/process.h
index daa9d0d0..a741d1ac 100644
--- a/src/library/process.h
+++ b/src/library/process.h
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@
#include "gcc-attributes.h"
typedef enum { STATE_COLLECTING=0, // initial state - execute
- STATE_REOPEN, // anticipating open perm next
+ STATE_REOPEN, // anticipating open perm next, always skips the path
+ STATE_DEFAULT_REOPEN, // reopen after dyn. linker exec, never skips the path
STATE_STATIC_REOPEN, // static app aniticipating
STATE_PARTIAL, // second path collected
STATE_STATIC_PARTIAL, // second path collected

215
SOURCES/fapolicyd-fgets-update-thread.patch
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@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.upgrade-thread ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c
--- ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.upgrade-thread 2022-08-03 18:00:02.374999369 +0200
+++ ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c 2022-08-03 18:00:09.802830497 +0200
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ static int do_update(void)
}
}
- ssize_t ret = write(fd, "1", 2);
+ ssize_t ret = write(fd, "1\n", 3);
if (ret == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Write: %s -> %s\n", _pipe, strerror(errno));
diff -up ./src/library/database.c.upgrade-thread ./src/library/database.c
--- ./src/library/database.c.upgrade-thread 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/library/database.c 2022-08-03 17:58:04.034689808 +0200
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
#include <gcrypt.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@
#include "message.h"
#include "llist.h"
#include "file.h"
+#include "fd-fgets.h"
#include "fapolicyd-backend.h"
#include "backend-manager.h"
@@ -1181,6 +1183,7 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
return NULL;
}
+ fcntl(ffd[0].fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
ffd[0].events = POLLIN;
while (!stop) {
@@ -1200,97 +1203,102 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
} else {
msg(LOG_ERR, "Update poll error (%s)",
strerror_r(errno, err_buff, BUFFER_SIZE));
- goto err_out;
+ goto finalize;
}
} else if (rc == 0) {
#ifdef DEBUG
msg(LOG_DEBUG, "Update poll timeout expired");
#endif
- if (db_operation != DB_NO_OP)
- goto handle_db_ops;
continue;
} else {
if (ffd[0].revents & POLLIN) {
- ssize_t count = read(ffd[0].fd, buff,
- BUFFER_SIZE-1);
- if (count == -1) {
- msg(LOG_ERR,
- "Failed to read from a pipe %s (%s)",
- fifo_path,
- strerror_r(errno, err_buff,
- BUFFER_SIZE));
- goto err_out;
- }
+ do {
+ fd_fgets_rewind();
+ int res = fd_fgets(buff, sizeof(buff), ffd[0].fd);
- if (count == 0) {
-#ifdef DEBUG
- msg(LOG_DEBUG,
- "Buffer contains zero bytes!");
-#endif
- continue;
- } else // Manually terminate buff
- buff[count] = 0;
-#ifdef DEBUG
- msg(LOG_DEBUG, "Buffer contains: \"%s\"", buff);
-#endif
- for (int i = 0 ; i < count ; i++) {
- // assume file name
- // operation = 0
- if (buff[i] == '/') {
- db_operation = ONE_FILE;
+ // nothing to read
+ if (res == -1)
break;
- }
+ else if (res > 0) {
+ char* end = strchr(buff, '\n');
- if (buff[i] == '1') {
- db_operation = RELOAD_DB;
- break;
+ if (end == NULL) {
+ msg(LOG_ERR, "Too long line?");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ int count = end - buff;
+
+ *end = '\0';
+
+ for (int i = 0 ; i < count ; i++) {
+ // assume file name
+ // operation = 0
+ if (buff[i] == '/') {
+ db_operation = ONE_FILE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (buff[i] == '1') {
+ db_operation = RELOAD_DB;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (buff[i] == '2') {
+ db_operation = FLUSH_CACHE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (isspace(buff[i]))
+ continue;
+
+ msg(LOG_ERR, "Cannot handle data \"%s\" from pipe", buff);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ *end = '\n';
+
+ // got "1" -> reload db
+ if (db_operation == RELOAD_DB) {
+ db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ msg(LOG_INFO,
+ "It looks like there was an update of the system... Syncing DB.");
+
+ backend_close();
+ backend_init(config);
+ backend_load(config);
+
+ if ((rc = update_database(config))) {
+ msg(LOG_ERR,
+ "Cannot update trust database!");
+ close(ffd[0].fd);
+ backend_close();
+ unlink_fifo();
+ exit(rc);
+ }
+
+ msg(LOG_INFO, "Updated");
+
+ // Conserve memory
+ backend_close();
+ // got "2" -> flush cache
+ } else if (db_operation == FLUSH_CACHE) {
+ db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ needs_flush = true;
+ } else if (db_operation == ONE_FILE) {
+ db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ if (handle_record(buff))
+ continue;
+ }
}
- if (buff[i] == '2') {
- db_operation = FLUSH_CACHE;
- break;
- }
- }
-
-handle_db_ops:
- // got "1" -> reload db
- if (db_operation == RELOAD_DB) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
- msg(LOG_INFO,
- "It looks like there was an update of the system... Syncing DB.");
-
- backend_close();
- backend_init(config);
- backend_load(config);
-
- if ((rc = update_database(config))) {
- msg(LOG_ERR,
- "Cannot update trust database!");
- close(ffd[0].fd);
- backend_close();
- unlink_fifo();
- exit(rc);
- } else
- msg(LOG_INFO, "Updated");
-
- // Conserve memory
- backend_close();
- // got "2" -> flush cache
- } else if (db_operation == FLUSH_CACHE) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
- needs_flush = true;
- } else if (db_operation == ONE_FILE) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
- if (handle_record(buff))
- continue;
- }
+ } while(!fd_fgets_eof());
}
}
-
}
-err_out:
+finalize:
close(ffd[0].fd);
unlink_fifo();

78
SOURCES/fapolicyd-leaks.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From 248219377a034d7da9238e7424c97558395700e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 17:05:11 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix multiple leaks
Signed-off-by: Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com>
---
src/library/filter.c | 3 +++
src/library/policy.c | 13 +++++++++++--
src/library/rules.c | 3 ---
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/library/filter.c b/src/library/filter.c
index d5d8cca..eb378ca 100644
--- a/src/library/filter.c
+++ b/src/library/filter.c
@@ -472,9 +472,12 @@ int filter_load_file(void)
msg(LOG_ERR, "filter_load_file: paring error line: %ld, \"%s\"", line_number, line);
filter_destroy_obj(filter);
free(line);
+ line = NULL;
goto bad;
}
+ }
+ if (line) {
free(line);
line = NULL;
}
diff --git a/src/library/policy.c b/src/library/policy.c
index 7fe1210..31ff6e2 100644
--- a/src/library/policy.c
+++ b/src/library/policy.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
* Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com>
*/
+#include "attr-sets.h"
#include "config.h"
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -273,12 +274,20 @@ int load_rules(const conf_t *_config)
return 1;
FILE * f = open_file();
- if (f == NULL)
+ if (f == NULL) {
+ destroy_attr_sets();
return 1;
+ }
int res = _load_rules(_config, f);
fclose(f);
- return res;
+
+ if (res) {
+ destroy_attr_sets();
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
void destroy_rules(void)
diff --git a/src/library/rules.c b/src/library/rules.c
index 5ffa40e..4a8b098 100644
--- a/src/library/rules.c
+++ b/src/library/rules.c
@@ -65,9 +65,6 @@ int rules_create(llist *l)
l->cur = NULL;
l->cnt = 0;
- if (init_attr_sets())
- return 1;
-
return 0;
}

170
SOURCES/fapolicyd-markfs-1.patch
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@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
From 2d15ea13e2a3dca1bb159f2cf031ca437c0b9aa1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2022 10:33:44 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Add support for using FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM to see bind mounted
accesses
---
ChangeLog | 1 +
configure.ac | 1 +
doc/fapolicyd.conf.5 | 5 ++++-
init/fapolicyd.conf | 1 +
src/daemon/notify.c | 12 ++++++++++--
src/library/conf.h | 3 ++-
src/library/daemon-config.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
7 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 4437685..a67c46b 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([FAN_OPEN_EXEC_PERM], [perm=yes], [perm=no], [[#include <linux/fa
if test $perm = "no"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([FAN_OPEN_EXEC_PERM is not defined in linux/fanotify.h. It is required for the kernel to support it])
fi
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM], [], [], [[#include <linux/fanotify.h>]])
withval=""
AC_ARG_WITH(rpm,
diff --git a/doc/fapolicyd.conf.5 b/doc/fapolicyd.conf.5
index 812cfa4..d8cb296 100644
--- a/doc/fapolicyd.conf.5
+++ b/doc/fapolicyd.conf.5
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH FAPOLICYD.CONF: "6" "October 2021" "Red Hat" "System Administration Utilities"
+.TH FAPOLICYD.CONF: "6" "September 2022" "Red Hat" "System Administration Utilities"
.SH NAME
fapolicyd.conf \- fapolicyd configuration file
.SH DESCRIPTION
@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ Example:
.B rpm_sha256_only
The option set to 1 forces the daemon to work only with SHA256 hashes. This is useful on the systems where the integrity is set to SHA256 or IMA and some rpms were originally built with e.g. SHA1. The daemon will ingore these SHA1 entries therefore they can be added manually via CLI with correct SHA256 to a trust file later. If set to 0 the daemon stores SHA1 in trustdb as well. This is compatible with older behavior which works with the integrity set to NONE and SIZE. The NONE or SIZE integrity setting considers the files installed via rpm as trusted and it does not care about their hashes at all. On the other hand the integrity set to SHA256 or IMA will never consider a file with SHA1 in trustdb as trusted. The default value is 0.
+.TP
+.B allow_filesystem_mark
+When this option is set to 1, it allows fapolicyd to monitor file access events on the underlying file system when they are bind mounted or are overlayed (e.g. the overlayfs). Normally they block fapolicyd from seeing events on the underlying file systems. This may or may not be desirable. For example, you might start seeing containers accessing things outside of the container but there is no source of trust for the container. In that case you probably do not want to see access from the container. Or maybe you do not use containers but want to control anything run by systemd-run when dynamic users are allowed. In that case you probably want to turn it on. Not all kernel's supoport this option. Therefore the default value is 0.
.SH "SEE ALSO"
.BR fapolicyd (8),
diff --git a/init/fapolicyd.conf b/init/fapolicyd.conf
index 42e8798..8363b89 100644
--- a/init/fapolicyd.conf
+++ b/init/fapolicyd.conf
@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ trust = rpmdb,file
integrity = none
syslog_format = rule,dec,perm,auid,pid,exe,:,path,ftype,trust
rpm_sha256_only = 0
+allow_filesystem_mark = 0
diff --git a/src/daemon/notify.c b/src/daemon/notify.c
index f550e99..c91abc4 100644
--- a/src/daemon/notify.c
+++ b/src/daemon/notify.c
@@ -123,8 +123,16 @@ int init_fanotify(const conf_t *conf, mlist *m)
path = mlist_first(m);
while (path) {
retry_mark:
- if (fanotify_mark(fd, FAN_MARK_ADD | FAN_MARK_MOUNT,
- mask, -1, path) == -1) {
+ unsigned int flags = FAN_MARK_ADD;
+#ifdef HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM
+ if (conf->allow_filesystem_mark)
+ flags |= FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM;
+#else
+ if (conf->allow_filesystem_mark)
+ msg(LOG_ERR,
+ "allow_filesystem_mark is unsupported for this kernel - ignoring");
+#endif
+ if (fanotify_mark(fd, flags, mask, -1, path) == -1) {
/*
* The FAN_OPEN_EXEC_PERM mask is not supported by
* all kernel releases prior to 5.0. Retry setting
diff --git a/src/library/conf.h b/src/library/conf.h
index e774ff6..57c19a2 100644
--- a/src/library/conf.h
+++ b/src/library/conf.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* conf.h configuration structure
- * Copyright 2018-20 Red Hat Inc.
+ * Copyright 2018-20,22 Red Hat Inc.
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ typedef struct conf
integrity_t integrity;
const char *syslog_format;
unsigned int rpm_sha256_only;
+ unsigned int allow_filesystem_mark;
} conf_t;
#endif
diff --git a/src/library/daemon-config.c b/src/library/daemon-config.c
index e803e0b..89b7f68 100644
--- a/src/library/daemon-config.c
+++ b/src/library/daemon-config.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* daemon-config.c - This is a config file parser
*
- * Copyright 2018-21 Red Hat Inc.
+ * Copyright 2018-22 Red Hat Inc.
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ static int syslog_format_parser(const struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
conf_t *config);
static int rpm_sha256_only_parser(const struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
conf_t *config);
+static int fs_mark_parser(const struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
+ conf_t *config);
static const struct kw_pair keywords[] =
{
@@ -110,6 +112,7 @@ static const struct kw_pair keywords[] =
{"integrity", integrity_parser },
{"syslog_format", syslog_format_parser },
{"rpm_sha256_only", rpm_sha256_only_parser},
+ {"allow_filesystem_mark", fs_mark_parser },
{ NULL, NULL }
};
@@ -138,6 +141,7 @@ static void clear_daemon_config(conf_t *config)
config->syslog_format =
strdup("rule,dec,perm,auid,pid,exe,:,path,ftype");
config->rpm_sha256_only = 0;
+ config->allow_filesystem_mark = 0;
}
int load_daemon_config(conf_t *config)
@@ -590,6 +594,7 @@ static int syslog_format_parser(const struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
return 1;
}
+
static int rpm_sha256_only_parser(const struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
conf_t *config)
{
@@ -607,3 +612,24 @@ static int rpm_sha256_only_parser(const struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
return rc;
}
+
+
+static int fs_mark_parser(const struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
+ conf_t *config)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+#ifndef HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM
+ msg(LOG_WARNING,
+ "allow_filesystem_mark is unsupported on this kernel - ignoring");
+#else
+ rc = unsigned_int_parser(&(config->allow_filesystem_mark), nv->value, line);
+
+ if (rc == 0 && config->allow_filesystem_mark > 1) {
+ msg(LOG_WARNING,
+ "allow_filesystem_mark value reset to 0 - line %d", line);
+ config->allow_filesystem_mark = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return rc;
+}

38
SOURCES/fapolicyd-markfs-2.patch
View File

@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
From ca225c8e83b37e5f29703d7352af0b937b2e933c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2022 19:41:24 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Correct the optional inclusion of code based on
HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM
---
ChangeLog | 1 +
src/daemon/notify.c | 2 +-
src/library/daemon-config.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/daemon/notify.c b/src/daemon/notify.c
index c91abc4..f36b644 100644
--- a/src/daemon/notify.c
+++ b/src/daemon/notify.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int init_fanotify(const conf_t *conf, mlist *m)
while (path) {
retry_mark:
unsigned int flags = FAN_MARK_ADD;
-#ifdef HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM
+#if HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM != 0
if (conf->allow_filesystem_mark)
flags |= FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM;
#else
diff --git a/src/library/daemon-config.c b/src/library/daemon-config.c
index 89b7f68..778b89a 100644
--- a/src/library/daemon-config.c
+++ b/src/library/daemon-config.c
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ static int fs_mark_parser(const struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
conf_t *config)
{
int rc = 0;
-#ifndef HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM
+#if HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM == 0
msg(LOG_WARNING,
"allow_filesystem_mark is unsupported on this kernel - ignoring");
#else

53
SOURCES/fapolicyd-markfs-3.patch
View File

@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
From cd315ebb45e3a095f612ec0e03f606a5383c39ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2022 16:36:28 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Add a check to see if they are defined before using them
---
src/daemon/notify.c | 2 +-
src/library/daemon-config.c | 14 ++++++++------
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/daemon/notify.c b/src/daemon/notify.c
index f36b644..3986390 100644
--- a/src/daemon/notify.c
+++ b/src/daemon/notify.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int init_fanotify(const conf_t *conf, mlist *m)
while (path) {
retry_mark:
unsigned int flags = FAN_MARK_ADD;
-#if HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM != 0
+#if defined HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM && HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM != 0
if (conf->allow_filesystem_mark)
flags |= FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM;
#else
diff --git a/src/library/daemon-config.c b/src/library/daemon-config.c
index 778b89a..ba8ade0 100644
--- a/src/library/daemon-config.c
+++ b/src/library/daemon-config.c
@@ -618,17 +618,19 @@ static int fs_mark_parser(const struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
conf_t *config)
{
int rc = 0;
-#if HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM == 0
- msg(LOG_WARNING,
- "allow_filesystem_mark is unsupported on this kernel - ignoring");
-#else
- rc = unsigned_int_parser(&(config->allow_filesystem_mark), nv->value, line);
+#if defined HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM && HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM != 0
+ rc = unsigned_int_parser(&(config->allow_filesystem_mark),
+ nv->value, line);
if (rc == 0 && config->allow_filesystem_mark > 1) {
msg(LOG_WARNING,
- "allow_filesystem_mark value reset to 0 - line %d", line);
+ "allow_filesystem_mark value reset to 0 - line %d",
+ line);
config->allow_filesystem_mark = 0;
}
+#else
+ msg(LOG_WARNING,
+ "allow_filesystem_mark is unsupported on this kernel - ignoring");
#endif
return rc;

29
SOURCES/fapolicyd-markfs-4.patch
View File

@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
From 194ac1b87ba46ea9e26a865e8432e228cf8fefef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steven Brzozowski <stevenbrz8@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 17:55:30 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Add `FAN_MARK_MOUNT` when opting out of `FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM`
(#210)
Without `FAN_MARK_MOUNT`, fapolicyd will not receive events for any subdirectories specified by the path parameter.
---
src/daemon/notify.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/daemon/notify.c b/src/daemon/notify.c
index 586b6df..5e4f160 100644
--- a/src/daemon/notify.c
+++ b/src/daemon/notify.c
@@ -128,10 +128,13 @@ int init_fanotify(const conf_t *conf, mlist *m)
#if defined HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM && HAVE_DECL_FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM != 0
if (conf->allow_filesystem_mark)
flags |= FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM;
+ else
+ flags |= FAN_MARK_MOUNT;
#else
if (conf->allow_filesystem_mark)
msg(LOG_ERR,
"allow_filesystem_mark is unsupported for this kernel - ignoring");
+ flags |= FAN_MARK_MOUNT;
#endif
if (fanotify_mark(fd, flags, mask, -1, path) == -1) {
/*

195
SOURCES/fapolicyd-openssl.patch
View File

@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./BUILD.md.openssl ./BUILD.md
--- ./BUILD.md.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./BUILD.md 2022-08-02 14:10:48.092466542 +0200
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ BUILD-TIME DEPENDENCIES (fedora and RHEL
* libudev-devel
* kernel-headers
* systemd-devel
-* libgcrypt-devel
+* libgcrypt-devel ( <= fapolicyd-1.1.3)
+* openssl ( >= fapolicyd-1.1.4)
* rpm-devel (optional)
* file
* file-devel
diff -U0 ./ChangeLog.openssl ./ChangeLog
diff -up ./configure.ac.openssl ./configure.ac
--- ./configure.ac.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./configure.ac 2022-08-02 14:10:48.092466542 +0200
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADER(uthash.h, , [AC_MSG_ERRO
echo .
echo Checking for required libraries
AC_CHECK_LIB(udev, udev_device_get_devnode, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libudev not found])], -ludev)
-AC_CHECK_LIB(gcrypt, gcry_md_open, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libgcrypt not found])], -lgcrypt)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, SHA256, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([openssl libcrypto not found])], -lcrypto)
AC_CHECK_LIB(magic, magic_descriptor, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libmagic not found])], -lmagic)
AC_CHECK_LIB(cap-ng, capng_change_id, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libcap-ng not found])], -lcap-ng)
AC_CHECK_LIB(seccomp, seccomp_rule_add, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libseccomp not found])], -lseccomp)
diff -up ./fapolicyd.spec.openssl ./fapolicyd.spec
--- ./fapolicyd.spec.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./fapolicyd.spec 2022-08-02 14:10:48.092466542 +0200
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Source0: https://people.redhat.com/sgrub
BuildRequires: gcc
BuildRequires: kernel-headers
BuildRequires: autoconf automake make gcc libtool
-BuildRequires: systemd-devel libgcrypt-devel rpm-devel file-devel file
+BuildRequires: systemd-devel openssl-devel rpm-devel file-devel file
BuildRequires: libcap-ng-devel libseccomp-devel lmdb-devel
BuildRequires: python3-devel
BuildRequires: uthash-devel
diff -up ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.openssl ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c
--- ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c 2022-08-02 14:10:48.093466520 +0200
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@
#include <stdatomic.h>
#include <lmdb.h>
#include <limits.h>
-#include <gcrypt.h>
#include "policy.h"
#include "database.h"
#include "file-cli.h"
@@ -670,11 +669,6 @@ static int check_trustdb(void)
if (rc)
return 1;
- // Initialize libgcrypt
- gcry_check_version(NULL);
- gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);
- gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
-
do {
unsigned int tsource; // unused
off_t size;
diff -up ./src/library/database.c.openssl ./src/library/database.c
--- ./src/library/database.c.openssl 2022-08-02 14:10:48.090466587 +0200
+++ ./src/library/database.c 2022-08-02 14:13:11.995236110 +0200
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <ctype.h>
-#include <gcrypt.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
@@ -244,26 +244,18 @@ static void abort_transaction(MDB_txn *t
static char *path_to_hash(const char *path, const size_t path_len) MALLOCLIKE;
static char *path_to_hash(const char *path, const size_t path_len)
{
- gcry_md_hd_t h;
- unsigned int len;
- unsigned char *hptr;
+ unsigned char hptr[80];
char *digest;
- if (gcry_md_open(&h, GCRY_MD_SHA512, GCRY_MD_FLAG_SECURE))
+ if (path_len == 0)
return NULL;
- gcry_md_write(h, path, path_len);
- hptr = gcry_md_read(h, GCRY_MD_SHA512);
-
- len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA512) * sizeof(char);
- digest = malloc((2 * len) + 1);
- if (digest == NULL) {
- gcry_md_close(h);
+ SHA512((unsigned char *)path, path_len, (unsigned char *)&hptr);
+ digest = malloc((SHA512_LEN * 2) + 1);
+ if (digest == NULL)
return digest;
- }
- bytes2hex(digest, hptr, len);
- gcry_md_close(h);
+ bytes2hex(digest, hptr, SHA512_LEN);
return digest;
}
@@ -296,7 +288,7 @@ static int write_db(const char *idx, con
if (hash == NULL)
return 5;
key.mv_data = (void *)hash;
- key.mv_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA512) * 2 + 1;
+ key.mv_size = (SHA512_LEN * 2) + 1;
} else {
key.mv_data = (void *)idx;
key.mv_size = len;
@@ -416,7 +408,7 @@ static char *lt_read_db(const char *inde
if (hash == NULL)
return NULL;
key.mv_data = (void *)hash;
- key.mv_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA512) * 2 + 1;
+ key.mv_size = (SHA512_LEN * 2) + 1;
} else {
key.mv_data = (void *)index;
key.mv_size = len;
diff -up ./src/library/file.c.openssl ./src/library/file.c
--- ./src/library/file.c.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/library/file.c 2022-08-02 14:10:48.094466497 +0200
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <gcrypt.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <magic.h>
#include <libudev.h>
#include <elf.h>
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ static struct udev *udev;
magic_t magic_cookie;
struct cache { dev_t device; const char *devname; };
static struct cache c = { 0, NULL };
-static size_t hash_size = 32; // init so cli doesn't need to call file_init
// readelf -l path-to-app | grep 'Requesting' | cut -d':' -f2 | tr -d ' ]';
static const char *interpreters[] = {
@@ -96,12 +95,6 @@ void file_init(void)
msg(LOG_ERR, "Unable to load magic database");
exit(1);
}
-
- // Initialize libgcrypt
- gcry_check_version(NULL);
- gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);
- gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
- hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA256) * sizeof(char);
}
@@ -445,12 +438,12 @@ char *get_hash_from_fd2(int fd, size_t s
if (mapped != MAP_FAILED) {
unsigned char hptr[40];
- gcry_md_hash_buffer(GCRY_MD_SHA256, &hptr, mapped, size);
+ SHA256(mapped, size, (unsigned char *)&hptr);
munmap(mapped, size);
- digest = malloc(65);
+ digest = malloc((SHA256_LEN * 2) + 1);
// Convert to ASCII string
- bytes2hex(digest, hptr, hash_size);
+ bytes2hex(digest, hptr, SHA256_LEN);
}
return digest;
}
@@ -476,7 +469,7 @@ int get_ima_hash(int fd, char *sha)
}
// Looks like it what we want...
- bytes2hex(sha, &tmp[2], 32);
+ bytes2hex(sha, &tmp[2], SHA256_LEN);
return 1;
}
diff -up ./src/library/file.h.openssl ./src/library/file.h
--- ./src/library/file.h.openssl 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/library/file.h 2022-08-02 14:10:48.094466497 +0200
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ struct file_info
struct timespec time;
};
+#define SHA256_LEN 32
+#define SHA512_LEN 64
+
void file_init(void);
void file_close(void);
struct file_info *stat_file_entry(int fd) MALLOCLIKE;

30
SOURCES/fapolicyd-readme.patch
View File

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
From b4618d133f473b9bbc36f2a5e94b8b0f257ba3e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 14:49:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Add mention that using of names requires name resolution
- using of user and group names as uid and gid attributes
requires correct name resolution
Signed-off-by: Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com>
---
README.md | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index d932e00..abc5eee 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -131,6 +131,12 @@ You can similarly do this for trusted users that have to execute things in
the home dir. You can create a trusted_user group, add them the group,
and then write a rule allowing them to execute from their home dir.
+When you want to use user or group name (as a string). You have to guarantee
+that these names were correctly resolved. In case of systemd, you need to add
+a new after target 'After=nss-user-lookup.target'.
+To achieve that you can use `systemctl edit --full fapolicyd`,
+uncomment the respective line and save the change.
+
```
allow perm=any gid=trusted_user : ftype=%languages dir=/home
deny_audit perm=any all : ftype=%languages dir=/home

173
SOURCES/fapolicyd-selinux-1.patch
View File

@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if.selinux ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if
--- ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if.selinux 2021-03-23 10:21:31.000000000 +0100
+++ ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if 2022-06-30 10:52:05.112355159 +0200
@@ -2,6 +2,122 @@
########################################
## <summary>
+## Watch_mount directories in /boot.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+
+ifndef(`files_watch_mount_boot_dirs',`
+ interface(`files_watch_mount_boot_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type boot_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 boot_t:dir watch_mount_dir_perms;
+ ')
+')
+
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Watch_mount home directories.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+
+ifndef(`files_watch_mount_home',`
+ interface(`files_watch_mount_home',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type home_root_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 home_root_t:dir watch_mount_dir_perms;
+ ')
+')
+
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Watch_with_perm home directories.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+
+ifndef(`files_watch_with_perm_home',`
+interface(`files_watch_with_perm_home',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type home_root_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 home_root_t:dir watch_with_perm_dir_perms;
+')
+')
+
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Watch_mount dirs on a DOS filesystem.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+
+ifndef(`fs_watch_mount_dos_dirs',`
+interface(`fs_watch_mount_dos_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type dosfs_t;
+ ')
+
+ watch_mount_dirs_pattern($1, dosfs_t, dosfs_t)
+')
+')
+
+
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Watch_with_perm dirs on a DOS filesystem.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+
+ifndef(`fs_watch_with_perm_dos_dirs',`
+interface(`fs_watch_with_perm_dos_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type dosfs_t;
+ ')
+
+ watch_with_perm_dirs_pattern($1, dosfs_t, dosfs_t)
+')
+')
+
+
+###################################################################################################
+
+
+
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Execute fapolicyd_exec_t in the fapolicyd domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
diff -up ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te.selinux ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
--- ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te.selinux 2021-03-23 10:21:31.000000000 +0100
+++ ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te 2022-06-30 10:53:01.693055971 +0200
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
policy_module(fapolicyd, 1.0.0)
+
########################################
#
# Declarations
@@ -36,6 +37,12 @@ allow fapolicyd_t self:process { setcap
allow fapolicyd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow fapolicyd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+gen_require(`
+ attribute file_type;
+')
+allow fapolicyd_t file_type:dir { watch_mount watch_with_perm };
+allow fapolicyd_t file_type:file { watch_mount watch_with_perm };
+
manage_files_pattern(fapolicyd_t, fapolicyd_log_t, fapolicyd_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(fapolicyd_t, fapolicyd_log_t, file)
@@ -61,16 +68,22 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(fapolicyd_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(fapolicyd_t)
-files_mmap_usr_files(fapolicyd_t)
+files_mmap_all_files(fapolicyd_t)
files_read_all_files(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_mount_boot_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_with_perm_boot_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_mount_generic_tmp_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_with_perm_generic_tmp_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_mount_home(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_with_perm_home(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_mount_root_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_with_perm_root_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(fapolicyd_t)
fs_watch_mount_tmpfs_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
fs_watch_with_perm_tmpfs_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+fs_watch_mount_dos_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+fs_watch_with_perm_dos_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(fapolicyd_t)
dbus_system_bus_client(fapolicyd_t)

19
SOURCES/fapolicyd-selinux-2.patch
View File

@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te.selinux2 ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
--- ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te.selinux2 2022-11-11 10:46:51.016420807 +0100
+++ ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te 2022-11-11 10:47:25.161793205 +0100
@@ -39,10 +39,15 @@ allow fapolicyd_t self:unix_dgram_socket
gen_require(`
attribute file_type;
+ attribute filesystem_type;
+ attribute mountpoint;
')
allow fapolicyd_t file_type:dir { watch_mount watch_with_perm };
allow fapolicyd_t file_type:file { watch_mount watch_with_perm };
+allow fapolicyd_t filesystem_type : filesystem { watch };
+allow fapolicyd_t mountpoint : dir { watch_sb };
+
manage_files_pattern(fapolicyd_t, fapolicyd_log_t, fapolicyd_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(fapolicyd_t, fapolicyd_log_t, file)

23
SOURCES/fapolicyd-selinux-links.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
From 05780f9accae504440ffed0548bd3e4144cfb70e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 16:00:13 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Allow links
Signed-off-by: Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com>
---
fapolicyd.te | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.6/fapolicyd.te b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.6/fapolicyd.te
index daf31bd..5d6f9aa 100644
--- a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.6/fapolicyd.te
+++ b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.6/fapolicyd.te
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ ifdef(`fs_watch_all_fs',`
files_watch_sb_all_mountpoints(fapolicyd_t)
')
+allow fapolicyd_t file_type : lnk_file { getattr read };
+
manage_files_pattern(fapolicyd_t, fapolicyd_log_t, fapolicyd_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(fapolicyd_t, fapolicyd_log_t, file)

141
SOURCES/fapolicyd-sighup.patch
View File

@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c.sighup ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c
--- ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c.sighup 2022-06-21 16:55:47.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/daemon/fapolicyd.c 2022-08-04 11:07:10.245069443 +0200
@@ -527,6 +527,7 @@ int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
while (!stop) {
if (hup) {
hup = 0;
+ msg(LOG_INFO, "Got SIGHUP");
reconfigure();
}
rc = poll(pfd, 2, -1);
diff -up ./src/library/database.c.sighup ./src/library/database.c
--- ./src/library/database.c.sighup 2022-08-04 11:07:10.237069609 +0200
+++ ./src/library/database.c 2022-08-04 11:08:44.852057119 +0200
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int lib_symlink=0, lib64_symlink=
static struct pollfd ffd[1] = { {0, 0, 0} };
static const char *fifo_path = "/run/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.fifo";
static integrity_t integrity;
-static atomic_int db_operation;
+static atomic_int reload_db = 0;
static pthread_t update_thread;
static pthread_mutex_t update_lock;
@@ -1147,7 +1147,31 @@ static int handle_record(const char * bu
void update_trust_database(void)
{
- db_operation = RELOAD_DB;
+ reload_db = 1;
+}
+
+static void do_reload_db(conf_t* config)
+{
+ msg(LOG_INFO,"It looks like there was an update of the system... Syncing DB.");
+
+ int rc;
+ backend_close();
+ backend_init(config);
+ backend_load(config);
+
+ if ((rc = update_database(config))) {
+ msg(LOG_ERR,
+ "Cannot update trust database!");
+ close(ffd[0].fd);
+ backend_close();
+ unlink_fifo();
+ exit(rc);
+ }
+
+ msg(LOG_INFO, "Updated");
+
+ // Conserve memory
+ backend_close();
}
static void *update_thread_main(void *arg)
@@ -1158,6 +1182,8 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
char err_buff[BUFFER_SIZE];
conf_t *config = (conf_t *)arg;
+ int do_operation = DB_NO_OP;;
+
#ifdef DEBUG
msg(LOG_DEBUG, "Update thread main started");
#endif
@@ -1182,6 +1208,12 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
rc = poll(ffd, 1, 1000);
+ // got SIGHUP
+ if (reload_db) {
+ reload_db = 0;
+ do_reload_db(config);
+ }
+
#ifdef DEBUG
msg(LOG_DEBUG, "Update poll interrupted");
#endif
@@ -1228,17 +1260,17 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
// assume file name
// operation = 0
if (buff[i] == '/') {
- db_operation = ONE_FILE;
+ do_operation = ONE_FILE;
break;
}
if (buff[i] == '1') {
- db_operation = RELOAD_DB;
+ do_operation = RELOAD_DB;
break;
}
if (buff[i] == '2') {
- db_operation = FLUSH_CACHE;
+ do_operation = FLUSH_CACHE;
break;
}
@@ -1252,34 +1284,16 @@ static void *update_thread_main(void *ar
*end = '\n';
// got "1" -> reload db
- if (db_operation == RELOAD_DB) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
- msg(LOG_INFO,
- "It looks like there was an update of the system... Syncing DB.");
-
- backend_close();
- backend_init(config);
- backend_load(config);
-
- if ((rc = update_database(config))) {
- msg(LOG_ERR,
- "Cannot update trust database!");
- close(ffd[0].fd);
- backend_close();
- unlink_fifo();
- exit(rc);
- }
-
- msg(LOG_INFO, "Updated");
+ if (do_operation == RELOAD_DB) {
+ do_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ do_reload_db(config);
- // Conserve memory
- backend_close();
// got "2" -> flush cache
- } else if (db_operation == FLUSH_CACHE) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ } else if (do_operation == FLUSH_CACHE) {
+ do_operation = DB_NO_OP;
needs_flush = true;
- } else if (db_operation == ONE_FILE) {
- db_operation = DB_NO_OP;
+ } else if (do_operation == ONE_FILE) {
+ do_operation = DB_NO_OP;
if (handle_record(buff))
continue;
}

22
SOURCES/fapolicyd-static-app.patch
View File

@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
From 67c116d07ed4e73127392a2100a042882488585a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2022 10:32:28 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Detect trusted static apps running programs by ld.so
---
ChangeLog | 1 +
src/library/event.c | 1 -
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/library/event.c b/src/library/event.c
index cbb4292..4d79eb9 100644
--- a/src/library/event.c
+++ b/src/library/event.c
@@ -149,7 +149,6 @@ int new_event(const struct fanotify_event_metadata *m, event_t *e)
skip_path = 1;
}
evict = 0;
- skip_path = 1;
subject_reset(s, EXE);
subject_reset(s, COMM);
subject_reset(s, EXE_TYPE);

47
SOURCES/fapolicyd-user-group-doc.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From fb4c274f4857f2d652014b0189abafb1df4b001a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 12:18:18 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Add documentation describing support for user/group names
---
doc/fapolicyd.rules.5 | 6 +++---
init/fapolicyd.service | 2 ++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/fapolicyd.rules.5 b/doc/fapolicyd.rules.5
index aa77177..3b8ec09 100644
--- a/doc/fapolicyd.rules.5
+++ b/doc/fapolicyd.rules.5
@@ -35,13 +35,13 @@ The subject is the process that is performing actions on system resources. The f
This matches against any subject. When used, this must be the only subject in the rule.
.TP
.B auid
-This is the login uid that the audit system assigns users when they log in to the system. Daemons have a value of -1.
+This is the login uid that the audit system assigns users when they log in to the system. Daemons have a value of -1. The given value may be numeric or the account name.
.TP
.B uid
-This is the user id that the program is running under.
+This is the user id that the program is running under. The given value may be numeric or the account name.
.TP
.B gid
-This is the group id that the program is running under.
+This is the group id that the program is running under. The given value may be numeric or the group name.
.TP
.B sessionid
This is the numeric session id that the audit system assigns to users when they log in. Daemons have a value of -1.
diff --git a/init/fapolicyd.service b/init/fapolicyd.service
index 715de98..a5a6a3f 100644
--- a/init/fapolicyd.service
+++ b/init/fapolicyd.service
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ PIDFile=/run/fapolicyd.pid
ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/fagenrules
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/fapolicyd
Restart=on-abnormal
+# Uncomment the following line if rules need user/group name lookup
+#After=nss-user-lookup.target
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
--
2.37.1

26
SOURCES/fapolicyd-uthash-bundle.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
diff --color -ru a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
--- a/configure.ac 2021-11-12 20:21:54.000000000 +0100
+++ b/configure.ac 2021-12-14 13:47:11.890649552 +0100
@@ -67,10 +67,6 @@
diff -up ./configure.ac.uthash ./configure.ac
--- ./configure.ac.uthash 2023-06-15 16:45:13.000000000 +0200
+++ ./configure.ac 2023-06-16 14:32:53.112363230 +0200
@@ -96,10 +96,6 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADER(sys/fanotify.h, , [AC_MS
["Couldn't find sys/fanotify.h...your kernel might not be new enough"] )])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(fexecve, [], [])
@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ diff --color -ru a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
echo .
echo Checking for required libraries
AC_CHECK_LIB(udev, udev_device_get_devnode, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libudev not found])], -ludev)
diff --color -ru a/src/library/rpm-backend.c b/src/library/rpm-backend.c
--- a/src/library/rpm-backend.c 2021-11-12 20:21:54.000000000 +0100
+++ b/src/library/rpm-backend.c 2021-12-14 13:47:26.833926203 +0100
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
#include <rpm/rpmdb.h>
diff -up ./src/library/rpm-backend.c.uthash ./src/library/rpm-backend.c
--- ./src/library/rpm-backend.c.uthash 2023-06-16 14:32:53.112363230 +0200
+++ ./src/library/rpm-backend.c 2023-06-16 14:35:20.467338604 +0200
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
#include <rpm/rpmpgp.h>
#include <fnmatch.h>
-#include <uthash.h>
@ -24,10 +24,10 @@ diff --color -ru a/src/library/rpm-backend.c b/src/library/rpm-backend.c
#include "message.h"
#include "gcc-attributes.h"
diff --color -ru a/src/Makefile.am b/src/Makefile.am
--- a/src/Makefile.am 2021-11-12 20:21:54.000000000 +0100
+++ b/src/Makefile.am 2021-12-14 13:48:03.218599808 +0100
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
diff -up ./src/Makefile.am.uthash ./src/Makefile.am
--- ./src/Makefile.am.uthash 2023-06-15 16:45:13.000000000 +0200
+++ ./src/Makefile.am 2023-06-16 14:32:53.112363230 +0200
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS = \
-I${top_srcdir} \
-I${top_srcdir}/src/library

13
SOURCES/selinux.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
diff -up ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.6/fapolicyd.te.fix ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.6/fapolicyd.te
--- ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.6/fapolicyd.te.fix 2023-06-15 17:11:47.964646794 +0200
+++ ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.6/fapolicyd.te 2023-06-15 17:13:10.426477653 +0200
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ ifdef(`watch_mount_dirs_pattern',`
ifdef(`fs_watch_all_fs',`
fs_watch_all_fs(fapolicyd_t)
+')
+
+ifdef(`files_watch_sb_all_mountpoints',`
files_watch_sb_all_mountpoints(fapolicyd_t)
')

80
SPECS/fapolicyd.spec
View File

@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
%global selinuxtype targeted
%global moduletype contrib
%define semodule_version 0.4
%define semodule_version 0.6
Summary: Application Whitelisting Daemon
Name: fapolicyd
Version: 1.1.3
Release: 104%{?dist}
Version: 1.3.2
Release: 100%{?dist}
License: GPLv3+
URL: http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/fapolicyd
Source0: https://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/fapolicyd/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
@ -31,26 +31,9 @@ Requires(preun): systemd-units
Requires(postun): systemd-units
Patch1: fapolicyd-uthash-bundle.patch
Patch2: fapolicyd-selinux-1.patch
Patch3: fagenrules-group.patch
Patch4: fapolicyd-fgets-update-thread.patch
Patch5: fapolicyd-openssl.patch
Patch6: fapolicyd-user-group-doc.patch
Patch7: fapolicyd-cli-segfault.patch
Patch8: fapolicyd-sighup.patch
Patch9: fapolicyd-readme.patch
Patch10: fapolicyd-static-app.patch
Patch11: fapolicyd-markfs-1.patch
Patch12: fapolicyd-markfs-2.patch
Patch13: fapolicyd-markfs-3.patch
Patch14: fapolicyd-markfs-4.patch
Patch15: fapolicyd-selinux-2.patch
Patch16: fapolicyd-falcon-sensor.patch
Patch17: fapolicyd-exclude-list.patch
Patch18: fapolicyd-already-started.patch
Patch2: selinux.patch
Patch3: fapolicyd-leaks.patch
Patch4: fapolicyd-selinux-links.patch
%description
Fapolicyd (File Access Policy Daemon) implements application whitelisting
@ -80,29 +63,12 @@ The %{name}-selinux package contains selinux policy for the %{name} daemon.
%if 0%{?rhel} != 0
# uthash
%setup -q -D -T -a 2
%patch1 -p1 -b .uthash
%patch -P 1 -p1 -b .uthash
%endif
%patch2 -p1 -b .selinux1
%patch3 -p1 -b .group
%patch4 -p1 -b .update-thread
%patch5 -p1 -b .openssl
%patch6 -p1 -b .user-group-doc
%patch7 -p1 -b .cli-segfault
%patch8 -p1 -b .sighup
%patch9 -p1 -b .readme
%patch10 -p1 -b .static
%patch11 -p1 -b .markfs1
%patch12 -p1 -b .markfs2
%patch13 -p1 -b .markfs3
%patch14 -p1 -b .markfs4
%patch15 -p1 -b .selinux2
%patch16 -p1 -b .event
%patch17 -p1 -b .exclude
%patch18 -p1 -b .already-started
%patch -P 2 -p1 -b .selinux
%patch -P 3 -p1 -b .leaks
%patch -P 4 -p1 -b .links
# generate rules for python
sed -i "s|%python2_path%|`readlink -f %{__python2}`|g" rules.d/*.rules
@ -117,6 +83,7 @@ interpret=`readelf -e /usr/bin/bash \
sed -i "s|%ld_so_path%|`realpath $interpret`|g" rules.d/*.rules
%build
cp INSTALL INSTALL.tmp
./autogen.sh
%configure \
--with-audit \
@ -248,10 +215,11 @@ fi
%attr(750,root,%{name}) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}
%attr(750,root,%{name}) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/trust.d
%attr(750,root,%{name}) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d
%attr(644,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/bash_completion.d/*
%ghost %verify(not md5 size mtime) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rules.d/*
%ghost %verify(not md5 size mtime) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules
%config(noreplace) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.conf
%config(noreplace) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/rpm-filter.conf
%config(noreplace) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}-filter.conf
%config(noreplace) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.trust
%ghost %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/compiled.rules
%attr(644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/%{name}.service
@ -261,7 +229,6 @@ fi
%attr(755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/fagenrules
%attr(644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/*
%attr(644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/*
%attr(644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/*
%ghost %attr(440,%{name},%{name}) %verify(not md5 size mtime) %{_localstatedir}/log/%{name}-access.log
%attr(770,root,%{name}) %dir %{_localstatedir}/lib/%{name}
%attr(770,root,%{name}) %dir /run/%{name}
@ -288,6 +255,27 @@ fi
%selinux_relabel_post -s %{selinuxtype}
%changelog
* Wed Jul 19 2023 Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com> - 1.3.2-100
RHEL 9.3.0 ERRATUM
- Rebase fapolicyd to the latest stable version
Resolves: RHEL-430
- fapolicyd can leak FDs and never answer request, causing target process to hang forever
Resolves: RHEL-621
- RFE: send rule number to fanotify so it gets audited
Resolves: RHEL-624
- fapolicyd needs to make sure the FD limit is never reached
Resolves: RHEL-623
- fapolicyd still allows execution of a program after "untrusting" it
Resolves: RHEL-622
- Default q_size doesn't match manpage's one
Resolves: RHEL-627
- fapolicyd-cli --update then mount/umount twice causes fapolicyd daemon to block (state 'D')
Resolves: RHEL-817
- Fix broken backwards compatibility backend numbers
Resolves: RHEL-730
- SELinux prevents the fapolicyd from reading symlink (cert_t)
Resolves: RHEL-816
* Mon Jan 30 2023 Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com> - 1.1.3-104
RHEL 9.2.0 ERRATUM
- statically linked app can execute untrusted app