RHEL 9.0.0 ERRATUM

- rebase to 1.0.4
- added rpm_sha256_only option
- added trust.d directory
- allow file names with whitespace in trust files
- use full paths in trust files
Resolves: rhbz#2032408
- fix libc.so getting identified as application/x-executable
Resolves: rhbz#2015307
- fix selinux DSP module definition in spec file
Resolves: rhbz#2014449
This commit is contained in:
Zoltan Fridrich 2021-12-14 14:41:36 +01:00
parent 94d469413b
commit 2a6f4bfe17
11 changed files with 614 additions and 102 deletions

1
.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -17,3 +17,4 @@
/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4.tar.gz
/uthash-2.3.0.tar.gz
/fapolicyd-1.0.3.tar.gz
/fapolicyd-1.0.4.tar.gz

View File

@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
From 95ec2f9577abe98a73d8dcb9112043aa743fa7ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2021 18:15:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] cli do_manage_file function refactoring and fix
---
src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 89 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c b/src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c
index ee5d5bd..30b92be 100644
--- a/src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c
+++ b/src/cli/fapolicyd-cli.c
@@ -207,87 +207,106 @@ static int do_dump_db(void)
return rc;
}
-
-/*
- * This function always requires at least one option, the command. We can
- * guarantee that argv[2] is the command because getopt_long would have
- * printed an error otherwise. argv[3] would be an optional parameter based
- * on which command is being run. If argv[4] == "--trust-file" then argv[5]
- * specifies a trust file to operate on.
- *
- * The function returns 0 on success and 1 on failure
- */
-static int do_manage_files(int argc, char * const argv[])
+static int do_file_add(int argc, char * const argv[])
{
- int rc = 0;
+ char full_path[PATH_MAX] = { 0 };
- if (argc > 0) {
- if ( (strcmp("add", argv[0]) != 0)
- && (strcmp("delete", argv[0]) != 0)
- && (strcmp("update", argv[0]) != 0) ) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s is not valid option, choose from add|delete|update\n", argv[0]);
- goto args_err;
- }
+ if (argc == 1) {
+ if (!realpath(argv[0], full_path))
+ return 3;
+ return file_append(full_path, NULL);
}
+ if (argc == 3) {
+ if (!realpath(argv[0], full_path))
+ return 3;
+ if (strcmp("--trust-file", argv[1]))
+ return 2;
+ return file_append(full_path, argv[2]);
+ }
+ return 2;
+}
- if (argc < 2)
- goto args_err;
-
- char full_path[PATH_MAX] = {0};
+static int do_file_delete(int argc, char * const argv[])
+{
+ char full_path[PATH_MAX] = { 0 };
- if (realpath(argv[1], full_path) == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Cannot get realpath from: %s\n", argv[1]);
- perror("realpath");
- goto args_err;
+ if (argc == 1) {
+ if (!realpath(argv[0], full_path))
+ return 3;
+ return file_delete(full_path, NULL);
}
+ if (argc == 3) {
+ if (!realpath(argv[0], full_path))
+ return 3;
+ if (strcmp("--trust-file", argv[1]))
+ return 2;
+ return file_delete(full_path, argv[2]);
+ }
+ return 2;
+}
- if (strcmp("add", argv[0]) == 0) {
- switch (argc) {
- case 2:
- rc = file_append(full_path, NULL);
- break;
- case 4:
- if (strcmp("--trust-file", argv[2]))
- goto args_err;
- rc = file_append(full_path, argv[3]);
- break;
- default:
- goto args_err;
- }
- } else if (strcmp("delete", argv[0]) == 0) {
- switch (argc) {
- case 2:
- rc = file_delete(full_path, NULL);
- break;
- case 4:
- if (strcmp("--trust-file", argv[2]))
- goto args_err;
- rc = file_delete(full_path, argv[3]);
- break;
- default:
- goto args_err;
- }
- } else if (strcmp("update", argv[0]) == 0) {
- switch (argc) {
- case 2:
- rc = file_update(full_path, NULL);
- break;
- case 4:
- if (strcmp("--trust-file", argv[2]))
- goto args_err;
- rc = file_update(full_path, argv[3]);
- break;
- default:
- goto args_err;
- }
+static int do_file_update(int argc, char * const argv[])
+{
+ char full_path[PATH_MAX] = { 0 };
+
+ if (argc == 0)
+ return file_update("/", NULL);
+ if (argc == 1) {
+ if (!realpath(argv[0], full_path))
+ return 3;
+ return file_update(full_path, NULL);
+ }
+ if (argc == 2) {
+ if (strcmp("--trust-file", argv[0]))
+ return 2;
+ return file_update("/", argv[1]);
+ }
+ if (argc == 3) {
+ if (!realpath(argv[0], full_path))
+ return 3;
+ if (strcmp("--trust-file", argv[1]))
+ return 2;
+ return file_update(full_path, argv[2]);
}
+ return 2;
+}
- return rc ? 1 : 0;
+static int do_manage_files(int argc, char * const argv[])
+{
+ int rc = 0;
-args_err:
- fprintf(stderr, "Wrong number of arguments\n\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "%s", usage);
+ if (argc < 1 || argc > 4) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Wrong number of arguments\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n%s", usage);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp("add", argv[0]))
+ rc = do_file_add(argc - 1, argv + 1);
+ else if (!strcmp("delete", argv[0]))
+ rc = do_file_delete(argc - 1, argv + 1);
+ else if (!strcmp("update", argv[0]))
+ rc = do_file_update(argc - 1, argv + 1);
+ else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a valid option, choose one of add|delete|update\n", argv[0]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n%s", usage);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 0: // no error
+ return 0;
+ case 2: // args error
+ fprintf(stderr, "Wrong number of arguments\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n%s", usage);
+ break;
+ case 3: // realpath error
+ fprintf(stderr, "Can't obtain realpath from: %s\n", argv[1]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n%s", usage);
+ break;
+ default: // file function errors
+ break;
+ }
return 1;
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
diff --color -ru a/doc/fapolicyd.trust.5 b/doc/fapolicyd.trust.5
--- a/doc/fapolicyd.trust.5 2021-11-12 20:21:54.000000000 +0100
+++ b/doc/fapolicyd.trust.5 2021-12-07 13:28:18.358213561 +0100
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
contains list of trusted files/binaries for the application whitelisting daemon. You may add comments to the file by starting the line with a '#' character.
Each line has to contain three columns and space is a valid separator. The first column contains full path to the file, the second is size of the file in bytes
and the third is valid sha256 hash.
+.sp
+The directory \fI/etc/fapolicyd/trust\&.d\fR can be used to store multiple trust files\&.
+This way a privileged user can split the trust database into multiple files and manage them separately through \fBfapolicyd\-cli\fR\&.
+Functionally, the fapolicy daemon will behave the same way as if the whole trust database has been defined inside \fBfapolicyd\&.trust\fR file\&.
+Syntax and semantics of trust files inside \fBtrust\&.d\fR directory are the same as for \fBfapolicyd\&.trust\fR file (described above)\&.
+Trust files can either be created manually inside \fBtrust\&.d\fR directory or via \fBfapolicyd\-cli\fR\& (the latter option is recommended).
.SH EXAMPLE
.PP

View File

@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
diff --color -ru a/init/fapolicyd.trust b/init/fapolicyd.trust
--- a/init/fapolicyd.trust 2021-11-12 20:21:54.000000000 +0100
+++ b/init/fapolicyd.trust 2021-12-08 13:25:43.441187113 +0100
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+# AUTOGENERATED FILE VERSION 2
# This file contains a list of trusted files
#
# FULL PATH SIZE SHA256
diff --color -ru a/src/cli/file-cli.c b/src/cli/file-cli.c
--- a/src/cli/file-cli.c 2021-11-12 20:21:54.000000000 +0100
+++ b/src/cli/file-cli.c 2021-12-08 13:25:43.441187113 +0100
@@ -89,9 +89,6 @@
return 0;
}
-
-
-
int file_append(const char *path, const char *fname)
{
set_message_mode(MSG_STDERR, DBG_NO);
@@ -110,11 +107,14 @@
char *dest = fname ? fapolicyd_strcat(TRUST_DIR_PATH, fname) :
TRUST_FILE_PATH;
+
int rc = trust_file_append(dest, &add_list);
+ list_empty(&add_list);
+
if (fname)
free(dest);
- list_empty(&add_list);
+
return rc ? -1 : 0;
}
diff --color -ru a/src/library/trust-file.c b/src/library/trust-file.c
--- a/src/library/trust-file.c 2021-11-12 20:21:54.000000000 +0100
+++ b/src/library/trust-file.c 2021-12-08 15:42:15.787206923 +0100
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#define FTW_NOPENFD 1024
#define FTW_FLAGS (FTW_ACTIONRETVAL | FTW_PHYS)
+#define HEADER0 "# AUTOGENERATED FILE VERSION 2\n"
#define HEADER1 "# This file contains a list of trusted files\n"
#define HEADER2 "#\n"
#define HEADER3 "# FULL PATH SIZE SHA256\n"
@@ -137,12 +138,19 @@
return 1;
}
- size_t hlen = strlen(HEADER1);
+ size_t hlen;
+ hlen = strlen(HEADER0);
+ fwrite(HEADER0, hlen, 1, f);
+
+ hlen = strlen(HEADER1);
fwrite(HEADER1, hlen, 1, f);
+
hlen = strlen(HEADER2);
fwrite(HEADER2, hlen, 1, f);
+
hlen = strlen(HEADER3);
fwrite(HEADER3, hlen, 1, f);
+
hlen = strlen(HEADER4);
fwrite(HEADER4, hlen, 1, f);
@@ -163,50 +171,49 @@
return 0;
}
-
-
-int trust_file_append(const char *fpath, const list_t *list) {
- int fd = open(fpath, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_APPEND, 0600);
- if (fd == -1) {
- msg(LOG_ERR, "Cannot open %s", fpath);
+int trust_file_append(const char *fpath, list_t *list)
+{
+ list_t content;
+ list_init(&content);
+ int rc = trust_file_load(fpath, &content);
+ if (rc)
return 1;
- }
for (list_item_t *lptr = list->first; lptr; lptr = lptr->next) {
- int count = 1;
- char *line = make_path_string(lptr->index, &count);
- if (!line)
- continue;
-
- if (write(fd, line, count) == -1) {
- msg(LOG_ERR, "failed writing to %s\n", fpath);
- free(line);
- close(fd);
- return 2;
- }
- free(line);
+ int i = 0;
+ lptr->data = make_path_string(lptr->index, &i);
}
- close(fd);
- return 0;
+ list_merge(&content, list);
+ write_out_list(&content, fpath);
+ list_empty(&content);
+ return rc ? 1 : 0;
}
int trust_file_load(const char *fpath, list_t *list)
{
+ char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
+ int escaped = 0;
+ long line = 0;
+
FILE *file = fopen(fpath, "r");
if (!file) {
msg(LOG_ERR, "Cannot open %s", fpath);
return 1;
}
- char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
while (fgets(buffer, BUFFER_SIZE, file)) {
- char name[4097], sha[65], *index, *data;
+ char name[4097], sha[65], *index = NULL, *data = NULL;
unsigned long sz;
unsigned int tsource = SRC_FILE_DB;
- if (iscntrl(buffer[0]) || buffer[0] == '#')
+ line++;
+
+ if (iscntrl(buffer[0]) || buffer[0] == '#') {
+ if (line == 1 && strncmp(buffer, HEADER0, strlen(HEADER0)) == 0)
+ escaped = 1;
continue;
+ }
if (sscanf(buffer, FILE_READ_FORMAT, name, &sz, sha) != 3) {
msg(LOG_WARNING, "Can't parse %s", buffer);
@@ -217,7 +224,7 @@
if (asprintf(&data, DATA_FORMAT, tsource, sz, sha) == -1)
data = NULL;
- index = unescape(name);
+ index = escaped ? unescape(name) : strdup(name);
if (index == NULL) {
msg(LOG_ERR, "Could not unescape %s from %s", name, fpath);
free(data);
@@ -311,33 +318,22 @@
int trust_file_rm_duplicates(const char *fpath, list_t *list)
{
- FILE *file = fopen(fpath, "r");
- if (!file) {
- msg(LOG_ERR, "Cannot open %s", fpath);
- return 1;
- }
-
- char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
- while (fgets(buffer, BUFFER_SIZE, file)) {
- char thash[65], tpath[4097];
- long unsigned size;
+ list_t trust_file;
+ list_init(&trust_file);
- if (iscntrl(buffer[0]) || buffer[0] == '#')
- continue;
+ int rc = trust_file_load(fpath, &trust_file);
+ if (rc)
+ goto cleanup;
- if (sscanf(buffer, FILE_READ_FORMAT, tpath, &size, thash) != 3) {
- msg(LOG_WARNING, "Can't parse %s", buffer);
- fclose(file);
- return 2;
- }
-
- list_remove(list, tpath);
+ for (list_item_t *lptr = trust_file.first; lptr; lptr = lptr->next) {
+ list_remove(list, lptr->index);
if (list->count == 0)
break;
}
- fclose(file);
- return 0;
+cleanup:
+ list_empty(&trust_file);
+ return rc;
}
diff --color -ru a/src/library/trust-file.h b/src/library/trust-file.h
--- a/src/library/trust-file.h 2021-11-12 20:21:54.000000000 +0100
+++ b/src/library/trust-file.h 2021-12-08 13:25:43.441187113 +0100
@@ -30,8 +30,7 @@
#define TRUST_FILE_PATH "/etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.trust"
#define TRUST_DIR_PATH "/etc/fapolicyd/trust.d/"
-int trust_file_append(const char *fpath, const list_t *list);
-
+int trust_file_append(const char *fpath, list_t *list);
int trust_file_load(const char *fpath, list_t *list);
int trust_file_update_path(const char *fpath, const char *path);
int trust_file_delete_path(const char *fpath, const char *path);

View File

@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
From a1a9a59f93ebfe6d0c9d725ed0712210994e6d64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 2021 16:06:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Allow fapolicyd watch boot and home directories
The fapolicyd service needs watch_mount and watch_with_perm permissions
for fanotify/inotify/dnotify calls on the following directories:
- /boot and /boot/efi directories
- /home directories
Note the /boot/efi directory has the dosfs_t label.
---
fapolicyd.te | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
index f5d0052..c12f385 100644
--- a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
+++ b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
@@ -63,14 +63,20 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(fapolicyd_t)
files_mmap_usr_files(fapolicyd_t)
files_read_all_files(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_mount_boot_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_with_perm_boot_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_mount_generic_tmp_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_with_perm_generic_tmp_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_mount_home(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_with_perm_home(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_mount_root_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_with_perm_root_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(fapolicyd_t)
fs_watch_mount_tmpfs_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
fs_watch_with_perm_tmpfs_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+fs_watch_mount_dos_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+fs_watch_with_perm_dos_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(fapolicyd_t)
dbus_system_bus_client(fapolicyd_t)

View File

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
From 6a966a3ee89233a0a055712f39ca564ba91183bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2021 16:56:08 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Allow fapolicyd watch_mount/watch_with_perm all files and
directories
For the fanotify_mark() syscall, fapolicyd uses the FAN_MARK_MOUNT flag
to mark the file's mount point to monitor. As this can be any file or
directory on the filesystem, the SELinux watch_mount and watch_with_perm
permissions are allowed for the file_type attribute.
---
fapolicyd.te | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
index c12f385..582e03f 100644
--- a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
+++ b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ allow fapolicyd_t self:process { setcap setsched };
allow fapolicyd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow fapolicyd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+gen_require(`
+ attribute file_type;
+')
+allow fapolicyd_t file_type:dir { watch_mount watch_with_perm };
+allow fapolicyd_t file_type:file { watch_mount watch_with_perm };
+
manage_files_pattern(fapolicyd_t, fapolicyd_log_t, fapolicyd_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(fapolicyd_t, fapolicyd_log_t, file)

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
diff -up ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if.backport ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if
--- ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if.backport 2021-03-23 10:21:31.000000000 +0100
+++ ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if 2021-07-20 17:38:51.266053356 +0200
diff --color -ru a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if
--- a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if 2021-03-23 10:21:31.000000000 +0100
+++ b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if 2021-12-14 13:35:17.842430123 +0100
@@ -2,6 +2,122 @@
########################################
@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ diff -up ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.if.backport ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/f
## Execute fapolicyd_exec_t in the fapolicyd domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
diff -up ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te.backport ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
--- ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te.backport 2021-07-20 17:31:12.161166538 +0200
+++ ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te 2021-07-20 17:31:12.162166524 +0200
diff --color -ru a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te
--- a/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te 2021-03-23 10:21:31.000000000 +0100
+++ b/fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te 2021-12-14 13:35:17.842430123 +0100
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
policy_module(fapolicyd, 1.0.0)
@ -134,3 +134,37 @@ diff -up ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/fapolicyd.te.backport ./fapolicyd-selinux-0.4/f
########################################
#
# Declarations
@@ -36,6 +37,12 @@
allow fapolicyd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow fapolicyd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+gen_require(`
+ attribute file_type;
+')
+allow fapolicyd_t file_type:dir { watch_mount watch_with_perm };
+allow fapolicyd_t file_type:file { watch_mount watch_with_perm };
+
manage_files_pattern(fapolicyd_t, fapolicyd_log_t, fapolicyd_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(fapolicyd_t, fapolicyd_log_t, file)
@@ -63,14 +70,20 @@
files_mmap_usr_files(fapolicyd_t)
files_read_all_files(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_mount_boot_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_with_perm_boot_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_mount_generic_tmp_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_with_perm_generic_tmp_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_mount_home(fapolicyd_t)
+files_watch_with_perm_home(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_mount_root_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
files_watch_with_perm_root_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(fapolicyd_t)
fs_watch_mount_tmpfs_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
fs_watch_with_perm_tmpfs_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+fs_watch_mount_dos_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
+fs_watch_with_perm_dos_dirs(fapolicyd_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(fapolicyd_t)
dbus_system_bus_client(fapolicyd_t)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
diff --color -ru a/src/library/trust-file.c b/src/library/trust-file.c
--- a/src/library/trust-file.c 2021-12-13 09:37:56.633741747 +0100
+++ b/src/library/trust-file.c 2021-12-13 13:44:13.689151921 +0100
@@ -176,8 +176,11 @@
list_t content;
list_init(&content);
int rc = trust_file_load(fpath, &content);
- if (rc)
+ // if trust file does not exist, we ignore it as it will be created while writing
+ if (rc == 2) {
+ // exit on parse error, we dont want invalid entries to be removed
return 1;
+ }
for (list_item_t *lptr = list->first; lptr; lptr = lptr->next) {
int i = 0;
@@ -187,9 +190,16 @@
list_merge(&content, list);
write_out_list(&content, fpath);
list_empty(&content);
- return rc ? 1 : 0;
+ return 0;
}
+/**
+ * @brief Load trust file into list
+ *
+ * @param fpath Full path to trust file
+ * @param list Trust file will be loaded into this list
+ * @return 0 on success, 1 if file can't be open, 2 on parsing error
+ */
int trust_file_load(const char *fpath, list_t *list)
{
char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
@@ -197,10 +207,8 @@
long line = 0;
FILE *file = fopen(fpath, "r");
- if (!file) {
- msg(LOG_ERR, "Cannot open %s", fpath);
+ if (!file)
return 1;
- }
while (fgets(buffer, BUFFER_SIZE, file)) {
char name[4097], sha[65], *index = NULL, *data = NULL;
@@ -257,7 +265,17 @@
{
list_t list;
list_init(&list);
- trust_file_load(fpath, &list);
+ int rc = trust_file_load(fpath, &list);
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 1:
+ msg(LOG_ERR, "Cannot open %s", fpath);
+ return 0;
+ case 2:
+ list_empty(&list);
+ return -1;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
int count = 0;
size_t path_len = strlen(path);
@@ -295,7 +313,17 @@
{
list_t list;
list_init(&list);
- trust_file_load(fpath, &list);
+ int rc = trust_file_load(fpath, &list);
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 1:
+ msg(LOG_ERR, "Cannot open %s", fpath);
+ return 0;
+ case 2:
+ list_empty(&list);
+ return -1;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
int count = 0;
size_t path_len = strlen(path);
@@ -320,20 +348,26 @@
{
list_t trust_file;
list_init(&trust_file);
-
int rc = trust_file_load(fpath, &trust_file);
- if (rc)
- goto cleanup;
-
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 1:
+ msg(LOG_ERR, "Cannot open %s", fpath);
+ return -1;
+ case 2:
+ list_empty(&trust_file);
+ return -1;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
for (list_item_t *lptr = trust_file.first; lptr; lptr = lptr->next) {
list_remove(list, lptr->index);
if (list->count == 0)
break;
}
-cleanup:
list_empty(&trust_file);
- return rc;
+ return 0;
}

View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
diff -up ./configure.ac.uthash ./configure.ac
--- ./configure.ac.uthash 2021-03-25 22:12:48.164450403 +0100
+++ ./configure.ac 2021-03-25 22:13:01.067282788 +0100
@@ -67,10 +67,6 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADER(sys/fanotify.h, , [AC_MS
diff --color -ru a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
--- a/configure.ac 2021-11-12 20:21:54.000000000 +0100
+++ b/configure.ac 2021-12-14 13:47:11.890649552 +0100
@@ -67,10 +67,6 @@
["Couldn't find sys/fanotify.h...your kernel might not be new enough"] )])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(fexecve, [], [])
@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ diff -up ./configure.ac.uthash ./configure.ac
echo .
echo Checking for required libraries
AC_CHECK_LIB(udev, udev_device_get_devnode, , [AC_MSG_ERROR([libudev not found])], -ludev)
diff -up ./src/library/rpm-backend.c.uthash ./src/library/rpm-backend.c
--- ./src/library/rpm-backend.c.uthash 2021-01-05 16:27:53.000000000 +0100
+++ ./src/library/rpm-backend.c 2021-03-25 22:12:33.212644641 +0100
diff --color -ru a/src/library/rpm-backend.c b/src/library/rpm-backend.c
--- a/src/library/rpm-backend.c 2021-11-12 20:21:54.000000000 +0100
+++ b/src/library/rpm-backend.c 2021-12-14 13:47:26.833926203 +0100
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
#include <rpm/rpmdb.h>
#include <fnmatch.h>
@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ diff -up ./src/library/rpm-backend.c.uthash ./src/library/rpm-backend.c
+#include "uthash.h"
#include "message.h"
diff -up ./src/Makefile.am.uthash ./src/Makefile.am
--- ./src/Makefile.am.uthash 2021-01-05 16:27:53.000000000 +0100
+++ ./src/Makefile.am 2021-03-25 22:12:33.212644641 +0100
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS = \
#include "gcc-attributes.h"
diff --color -ru a/src/Makefile.am b/src/Makefile.am
--- a/src/Makefile.am 2021-11-12 20:21:54.000000000 +0100
+++ b/src/Makefile.am 2021-12-14 13:48:03.218599808 +0100
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
-I${top_srcdir} \
-I${top_srcdir}/src/library

View File

@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
Summary: Application Whitelisting Daemon
Name: fapolicyd
Version: 1.0.3
Release: 4%{?dist}
Version: 1.0.4
Release: 100%{?dist}
License: GPLv3+
URL: http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/fapolicyd
Source0: https://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/fapolicyd/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ Requires(preun): systemd-units
Requires(postun): systemd-units
Patch1: fapolicyd-uthash-bundle.patch
Patch2: fapolicyd-selinux-allow-boot-home.patch
Patch3: fapolicyd-selinux-watch-perm.patch
# hardcode missing selinux definitions from selinux-policy
Patch4: selinux-backport.patch
Patch2: fapolicyd-selinux.patch
Patch3: fapolicyd-do-manage-files.patch
Patch4: fapolicyd-documentation.patch
Patch5: fapolicyd-fix-escaping.patch
Patch6: fapolicyd-trust-file-append.patch
%description
Fapolicyd (File Access Policy Daemon) implements application whitelisting
@ -81,10 +81,11 @@ Don't use dnf and rpm plugin together.
%patch1 -p1 -b .uthash
%endif
%patch2 -p1 -b .home-boot
%patch3 -p1 -b .watch-perm
%patch4 -p1 -b .backport
%patch2 -p1 -b .selinux
%patch3 -p1 -b .do-manage-files
%patch4 -p1 -b .documentation
%patch5 -p1 -b .fix-escaping
%patch6 -p1 -b .trust-file-append
sed -i "s/%python2_path%/`readlink -f %{__python2} | sed 's/\//\\\\\//g'`/g" init/%{name}.rules.*
sed -i "s/%python3_path%/`readlink -f %{__python3} | sed 's/\//\\\\\//g'`/g" init/%{name}.rules.*
@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ install -p -m 644 -D init/%{name}-tmpfiles.conf %{buildroot}/%{_tmpfilesdir}/%{n
install -p -m 644 init/%{name}.rules.known-libs %{buildroot}/%{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules
mkdir -p %{buildroot}/%{_localstatedir}/lib/%{name}
mkdir -p %{buildroot}/run/%{name}
mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/trust.d
# selinux
install -d %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/selinux/packages/%{selinuxtype}
@ -170,6 +172,7 @@ end
%attr(755,root,%{name}) %dir %{_datadir}/%{name}
%attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_datadir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules.*
%attr(750,root,%{name}) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}
%attr(750,root,%{name}) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/trust.d
%config(noreplace) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.conf
%config(noreplace) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.trust
%config(noreplace) %attr(644,root,%{name}) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.rules
@ -190,7 +193,7 @@ end
%files selinux
%{_datadir}/selinux/packages/%{selinuxtype}/%{name}.pp.bz2
%ghost %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{name}
%ghost %verify(not md5 size mode mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{name}
%{_datadir}/selinux/devel/include/%{moduletype}/ipp-%{name}.if
%post selinux
@ -211,6 +214,19 @@ fi
%changelog
* Tue Dec 14 2021 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 1.0.4-100
RHEL 9.0.0 ERRATUM
- rebase to 1.0.4
- added rpm_sha256_only option
- added trust.d directory
- allow file names with whitespaces in trust files
- use full paths in trust files
Resolves: rhbz#2032408
- fix libc.so getting identified as application/x-executable
Resolves: rhbz#2015307
- fix selinux DSP module definition in spec file
Resolves: rhbz#2014449
* Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 1.0.3-4
- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
Related: rhbz#1991688

View File

@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
SHA512 (fapolicyd-1.0.3.tar.gz) = 5ec48d6c3ab6312c3ad4cc23e04fe03c5288baee9ee796ae944a539b082176f9fe03ad04edb8442af194d224b888e81addc5f84d4c1a368618a2a590a17c16a1
SHA512 (fapolicyd-1.0.4.tar.gz) = 08a8625b1ad9a383359435605595b17a537c7ca889ad0b8d6acdf5d27e98dc38f557187a54e5320d9eeb624999f19526cc29c2e43449033f4f086e0bef142d7b
SHA512 (fapolicyd-selinux-0.4.tar.gz) = afc74b9c55c71bec2039d112e8e16abc510b58bf794bd665f3128a63daa45572a6f18d1c4de1f63e45a01f8696aacfbf54ed2a07485d581f25446b7fe92307a2
SHA512 (uthash-2.3.0.tar.gz) = 3b01f1074790fb242900411cb16eb82c1a9afcf58e3196a0f4611d9d7ef94690ad38c0a500e7783d3efa20328aa8d6ab14f246be63b3b3d385502ba2b6b2a294