commit f5f788bd4ce8e88ec2657bec4486f68fe99f06d8
Author: CentOS Sources <bugs@centos.org>
Date:   Tue May 17 06:32:24 2022 -0400

    import expat-2.2.10-12.el9_0

diff --git a/.expat.metadata b/.expat.metadata
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb70785
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.expat.metadata
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+a2a0f172dd3346b520918331b7480d4d30557439 SOURCES/expat-2.2.10.tar.gz
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b5e40bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SOURCES/expat-2.2.10.tar.gz
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Add-missing-validation-of-encoding.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Add-missing-validation-of-encoding.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d526c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Add-missing-validation-of-encoding.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+From ee2a5b50e7d1940ba8745715b62ceb9efd3a96da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 17:37:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] lib: Drop unused macro UTF8_GET_NAMING
+
+---
+ expat/lib/xmltok.c | 5 -----
+ 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmltok.c b/lib/xmltok.c
+index a72200e8..3bddf125 100644
+--- a/lib/xmltok.c
++++ b/lib/xmltok.c
+@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@
+         + ((((byte)[1]) & 3) << 1) + ((((byte)[2]) >> 5) & 1)]                 \
+    & (1u << (((byte)[2]) & 0x1F)))
+ 
+-#define UTF8_GET_NAMING(pages, p, n)                                           \
+-  ((n) == 2                                                                    \
+-       ? UTF8_GET_NAMING2(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p))                   \
+-       : ((n) == 3 ? UTF8_GET_NAMING3(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p)) : 0))
+-
+ /* Detection of invalid UTF-8 sequences is based on Table 3.1B
+    of Unicode 3.2: http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr28/
+    with the additional restriction of not allowing the Unicode
+
+From 3f0a0cb644438d4d8e3294cd0b1245d0edb0c6c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 04:32:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] lib: Add missing validation of encoding (CVE-2022-25235)
+
+---
+ expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmltok_impl.c b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
+index 0430591b..64a3b2c1 100644
+--- a/lib/xmltok_impl.c
++++ b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
+@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
+   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
+     if (end - ptr < n)                                                         \
+       return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR;                                             \
+-    if (! IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {                                         \
++    if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {         \
+       *nextTokPtr = ptr;                                                       \
+       return XML_TOK_INVALID;                                                  \
+     }                                                                          \
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
+   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
+     if (end - ptr < n)                                                         \
+       return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR;                                             \
+-    if (! IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {                                       \
++    if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {       \
+       *nextTokPtr = ptr;                                                       \
+       return XML_TOK_INVALID;                                                  \
+     }                                                                          \
+@@ -1142,6 +1142,10 @@ PREFIX(prologTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
+   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
+     if (end - ptr < n)                                                         \
+       return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR;                                             \
++    if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {                                        \
++      *nextTokPtr = ptr;                                                       \
++      return XML_TOK_INVALID;                                                  \
++    }                                                                          \
+     if (IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {                                         \
+       ptr += n;                                                                \
+       tok = XML_TOK_NAME;                                                      \
+
+From c85a3025e7a1be086dc34e7559fbc543914d047f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 01:00:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] lib: Add comments to BT_LEAD* cases where encoding has
+ already been validated
+
+---
+ expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmltok_impl.c b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
+index 64a3b2c1..84ff35f9 100644
+--- a/lib/xmltok_impl.c
++++ b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
+@@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ PREFIX(attributeValueTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
+     switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
+ #  define LEAD_CASE(n)                                                         \
+   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
+-    ptr += n;                                                                  \
++    ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */             \
+     break;
+       LEAD_CASE(2)
+       LEAD_CASE(3)
+@@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@ PREFIX(entityValueTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
+     switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
+ #  define LEAD_CASE(n)                                                         \
+   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
+-    ptr += n;                                                                  \
++    ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */             \
+     break;
+       LEAD_CASE(2)
+       LEAD_CASE(3)
+@@ -1522,7 +1522,7 @@ PREFIX(getAtts)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, int attsMax,
+       state = inName;                                                          \
+     }
+ #  define LEAD_CASE(n)                                                         \
+-  case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
++  case BT_LEAD##n: /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */        \
+     START_NAME ptr += (n - MINBPC(enc));                                       \
+     break;
+       LEAD_CASE(2)
+@@ -1734,7 +1734,7 @@ PREFIX(nameLength)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr) {
+     switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
+ #  define LEAD_CASE(n)                                                         \
+   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
+-    ptr += n;                                                                  \
++    ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */             \
+     break;
+       LEAD_CASE(2)
+       LEAD_CASE(3)
+@@ -1779,7 +1779,7 @@ PREFIX(updatePosition)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
+     switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
+ #  define LEAD_CASE(n)                                                         \
+   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
+-    ptr += n;                                                                  \
++    ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */             \
+     pos->columnNumber++;                                                       \
+     break;
+       LEAD_CASE(2)
+
+From 6a5510bc6b7efe743356296724e0b38300f05379 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 04:06:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] tests: Cover missing validation of encoding
+ (CVE-2022-25235)
+
+---
+ expat/tests/runtests.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c
+index bc5344b1..9b155b82 100644
+--- a/tests/runtests.c
++++ b/tests/runtests.c
+@@ -5998,6 +5998,105 @@ START_TEST(test_utf8_in_cdata_section_2) {
+ }
+ END_TEST
+ 
++START_TEST(test_utf8_in_start_tags) {
++  struct test_case {
++    bool goodName;
++    bool goodNameStart;
++    const char *tagName;
++  };
++
++  // The idea with the tests below is this:
++  // We want to cover 1-, 2- and 3-byte sequences, 4-byte sequences
++  // go to isNever and are hence not a concern.
++  //
++  // We start with a character that is a valid name character
++  // (or even name-start character, see XML 1.0r4 spec) and then we flip
++  // single bits at places where (1) the result leaves the UTF-8 encoding space
++  // and (2) we stay in the same n-byte sequence family.
++  //
++  // The flipped bits are highlighted in angle brackets in comments,
++  // e.g. "[<1>011 1001]" means we had [0011 1001] but we now flipped
++  // the most significant bit to 1 to leave UTF-8 encoding space.
++  struct test_case cases[] = {
++      // 1-byte UTF-8: [0xxx xxxx]
++      {true, true, "\x3A"},   // [0011 1010] = ASCII colon ':'
++      {false, false, "\xBA"}, // [<1>011 1010]
++      {true, false, "\x39"},  // [0011 1001] = ASCII nine '9'
++      {false, false, "\xB9"}, // [<1>011 1001]
++
++      // 2-byte UTF-8: [110x xxxx] [10xx xxxx]
++      {true, true, "\xDB\xA5"},   // [1101 1011] [1010 0101] =
++                                  // Arabic small waw U+06E5
++      {false, false, "\x9B\xA5"}, // [1<0>01 1011] [1010 0101]
++      {false, false, "\xDB\x25"}, // [1101 1011] [<0>010 0101]
++      {false, false, "\xDB\xE5"}, // [1101 1011] [1<1>10 0101]
++      {true, false, "\xCC\x81"},  // [1100 1100] [1000 0001] =
++                                  // combining char U+0301
++      {false, false, "\x8C\x81"}, // [1<0>00 1100] [1000 0001]
++      {false, false, "\xCC\x01"}, // [1100 1100] [<0>000 0001]
++      {false, false, "\xCC\xC1"}, // [1100 1100] [1<1>00 0001]
++
++      // 3-byte UTF-8: [1110 xxxx] [10xx xxxx] [10xxxxxx]
++      {true, true, "\xE0\xA4\x85"},   // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0101] =
++                                      // Devanagari Letter A U+0905
++      {false, false, "\xA0\xA4\x85"}, // [1<0>10 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0101]
++      {false, false, "\xE0\x24\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [<0>010 0100] [1000 0101]
++      {false, false, "\xE0\xE4\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [1<1>10 0100] [1000 0101]
++      {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\x05"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [<0>000 0101]
++      {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\xC5"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1<1>00 0101]
++      {true, false, "\xE0\xA4\x81"},  // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0001] =
++                                      // combining char U+0901
++      {false, false, "\xA0\xA4\x81"}, // [1<0>10 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0001]
++      {false, false, "\xE0\x24\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [<0>010 0100] [1000 0001]
++      {false, false, "\xE0\xE4\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [1<1>10 0100] [1000 0001]
++      {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\x01"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [<0>000 0001]
++      {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\xC1"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1<1>00 0001]
++  };
++  const bool atNameStart[] = {true, false};
++
++  size_t i = 0;
++  char doc[1024];
++  size_t failCount = 0;
++
++  for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
++    size_t j = 0;
++    for (; j < sizeof(atNameStart) / sizeof(atNameStart[0]); j++) {
++      const bool expectedSuccess
++          = atNameStart[j] ? cases[i].goodNameStart : cases[i].goodName;
++      sprintf(doc, "<%s%s><!--", atNameStart[j] ? "" : "a", cases[i].tagName);
++      XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL);
++
++      const enum XML_Status status
++          = XML_Parse(parser, doc, (int)strlen(doc), /*isFinal=*/XML_FALSE);
++
++      bool success = true;
++      if ((status == XML_STATUS_OK) != expectedSuccess) {
++        success = false;
++      }
++      if ((status == XML_STATUS_ERROR)
++          && (XML_GetErrorCode(parser) != XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN)) {
++        success = false;
++      }
++
++      if (! success) {
++        fprintf(
++            stderr,
++            "FAIL case %2u (%sat name start, %u-byte sequence, error code %d)\n",
++            (unsigned)i + 1u, atNameStart[j] ? "    " : "not ",
++            (unsigned)strlen(cases[i].tagName), XML_GetErrorCode(parser));
++        failCount++;
++      }
++
++      XML_ParserFree(parser);
++    }
++  }
++
++  if (failCount > 0) {
++    fail("UTF-8 regression detected");
++  }
++}
++END_TEST
++
+ /* Test trailing spaces in elements are accepted */
+ static void XMLCALL
+ record_element_end_handler(void *userData, const XML_Char *name) {
+@@ -6175,6 +6274,14 @@ START_TEST(test_bad_doctype) {
+ }
+ END_TEST
+ 
++START_TEST(test_bad_doctype_utf8) {
++  const char *text = "<!DOCTYPE \xDB\x25"
++                     "doc><doc/>"; // [1101 1011] [<0>010 0101]
++  expect_failure(text, XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN,
++                 "Invalid UTF-8 in DOCTYPE not faulted");
++}
++END_TEST
++
+ START_TEST(test_bad_doctype_utf16) {
+   const char text[] =
+       /* <!DOCTYPE doc [ \x06f2 ]><doc/>
+@@ -11870,6 +11977,7 @@ make_suite(void) {
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_ext_entity_utf8_non_bom);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_cdata_section);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_cdata_section_2);
++  tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_start_tags);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_trailing_spaces_in_elements);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf16_attribute);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf16_second_attr);
+@@ -11878,6 +11986,7 @@ make_suite(void) {
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_attr_desc_keyword);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_attr_desc_keyword_utf16);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype);
++  tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_utf8);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_utf16);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_plus);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_star);
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58d9941
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index d54af683..5ce31402 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -2067,6 +2067,11 @@ XML_GetBuffer(XML_Parser parser, int len) {
+     keep = (int)EXPAT_SAFE_PTR_DIFF(parser->m_bufferPtr, parser->m_buffer);
+     if (keep > XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
+       keep = XML_CONTEXT_BYTES;
++    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++    if (keep > INT_MAX - neededSize) {
++      parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++      return NULL;
++    }
+     neededSize += keep;
+ #endif /* defined XML_CONTEXT_BYTES */
+     if (neededSize
+diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c
+index e89e8220..579dad1a 100644
+--- a/tests/runtests.c
++++ b/tests/runtests.c
+@@ -3847,6 +3847,30 @@ START_TEST(test_get_buffer_2) {
+ }
+ END_TEST
+ 
++/* Test for signed integer overflow CVE-2022-23852 */
++#if defined(XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
++START_TEST(test_get_buffer_3_overflow) {
++  XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL);
++  assert(parser != NULL);
++
++  const char *const text = "\n";
++  const int expectedKeepValue = (int)strlen(text);
++
++  // After this call, variable "keep" in XML_GetBuffer will
++  // have value expectedKeepValue
++  if (XML_Parse(parser, text, (int)strlen(text), XML_FALSE /* isFinal */)
++      == XML_STATUS_ERROR)
++    xml_failure(parser);
++
++  assert(expectedKeepValue > 0);
++  if (XML_GetBuffer(parser, INT_MAX - expectedKeepValue + 1) != NULL)
++    fail("enlarging buffer not failed");
++
++  XML_ParserFree(parser);
++}
++END_TEST
++#endif // defined(XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
++
+ /* Test position information macros */
+ START_TEST(test_byte_info_at_end) {
+   const char *text = "<doc></doc>";
+@@ -11731,6 +11755,9 @@ make_suite(void) {
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_empty_parse);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_get_buffer_1);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_get_buffer_2);
++#if defined(XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
++  tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_get_buffer_3_overflow);
++#endif
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_byte_info_at_end);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_byte_info_at_error);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_byte_info_at_cdata);
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ad6374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 0adcb34c49bee5b19bd29b16a578c510c23597ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2021 20:15:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: Detect and prevent troublesome left shifts in function
+ storeAtts (CVE-2021-45960)
+
+---
+ expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index d730f41c3..b47c31b05 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -3414,7 +3414,13 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
+   if (nPrefixes) {
+     int j; /* hash table index */
+     unsigned long version = parser->m_nsAttsVersion;
+-    int nsAttsSize = (int)1 << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
++
++    /* Detect and prevent invalid shift */
++    if (parser->m_nsAttsPower >= sizeof(unsigned int) * 8 /* bits per byte */) {
++      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++    }
++
++    unsigned int nsAttsSize = 1u << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
+     unsigned char oldNsAttsPower = parser->m_nsAttsPower;
+     /* size of hash table must be at least 2 * (# of prefixed attributes) */
+     if ((nPrefixes << 1)
+@@ -3425,7 +3431,28 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
+         ;
+       if (parser->m_nsAttsPower < 3)
+         parser->m_nsAttsPower = 3;
+-      nsAttsSize = (int)1 << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
++
++      /* Detect and prevent invalid shift */
++      if (parser->m_nsAttsPower >= sizeof(nsAttsSize) * 8 /* bits per byte */) {
++        /* Restore actual size of memory in m_nsAtts */
++        parser->m_nsAttsPower = oldNsAttsPower;
++        return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++      }
++
++      nsAttsSize = 1u << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
++
++      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
++       * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
++       * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
++       * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
++#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
++      if (nsAttsSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(NS_ATT)) {
++        /* Restore actual size of memory in m_nsAtts */
++        parser->m_nsAttsPower = oldNsAttsPower;
++        return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++      }
++#endif
++
+       temp = (NS_ATT *)REALLOC(parser, parser->m_nsAtts,
+                                nsAttsSize * sizeof(NS_ATT));
+       if (! temp) {
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-in-storeRawNames.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-in-storeRawNames.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31e35fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-in-storeRawNames.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+From eb0362808b4f9f1e2345a0cf203b8cc196d776d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
+Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:55:46 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Prevent integer overflow in storeRawNames
+
+It is possible to use an integer overflow in storeRawNames for out of
+boundary heap writes. Default configuration is affected. If compiled
+with XML_UNICODE then the attack does not work. Compiling with
+-fsanitize=address confirms the following proof of concept.
+
+The problem can be exploited by abusing the m_buffer expansion logic.
+Even though the initial size of m_buffer is a power of two, eventually
+it can end up a little bit lower, thus allowing allocations very close
+to INT_MAX (since INT_MAX/2 can be surpassed). This means that tag
+names can be parsed which are almost INT_MAX in size.
+
+Unfortunately (from an attacker point of view) INT_MAX/2 is also a
+limitation in string pools. Having a tag name of INT_MAX/2 characters
+or more is not possible.
+
+Expat can convert between different encodings. UTF-16 documents which
+contain only ASCII representable characters are twice as large as their
+ASCII encoded counter-parts.
+
+The proof of concept works by taking these three considerations into
+account:
+
+1. Move the m_buffer size slightly below a power of two by having a
+   short root node <a>. This allows the m_buffer to grow very close
+   to INT_MAX.
+2. The string pooling forbids tag names longer than or equal to
+   INT_MAX/2, so keep the attack tag name smaller than that.
+3. To be able to still overflow INT_MAX even though the name is
+   limited at INT_MAX/2-1 (nul byte) we use UTF-16 encoding and a tag
+   which only contains ASCII characters. UTF-16 always stores two
+   bytes per character while the tag name is converted to using only
+   one. Our attack node byte count must be a bit higher than
+   2/3 INT_MAX so the converted tag name is around INT_MAX/3 which
+   in sum can overflow INT_MAX.
+
+Thanks to our small root node, m_buffer can handle 2/3 INT_MAX bytes
+without running into INT_MAX boundary check. The string pooling is
+able to store INT_MAX/3 as tag name because the amount is below
+INT_MAX/2 limitation. And creating the sum of both eventually overflows
+in storeRawNames.
+
+Proof of Concept:
+
+1. Compile expat with -fsanitize=address.
+
+2. Create Proof of Concept binary which iterates through input
+   file 16 MB at once for better performance and easier integer
+   calculations:
+
+```
+cat > poc.c << EOF
+ #include <err.h>
+ #include <expat.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+
+ #define CHUNK (16 * 1024 * 1024)
+ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+   XML_Parser parser;
+   FILE *fp;
+   char *buf;
+   int i;
+
+   if (argc != 2)
+     errx(1, "usage: poc file.xml");
+   if ((parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL)) == NULL)
+     errx(1, "failed to create expat parser");
+   if ((fp = fopen(argv[1], "r")) == NULL) {
+     XML_ParserFree(parser);
+     err(1, "failed to open file");
+   }
+   if ((buf = malloc(CHUNK)) == NULL) {
+     fclose(fp);
+     XML_ParserFree(parser);
+     err(1, "failed to allocate buffer");
+   }
+   i = 0;
+   while (fread(buf, CHUNK, 1, fp) == 1) {
+     printf("iteration %d: XML_Parse returns %d\n", ++i,
+       XML_Parse(parser, buf, CHUNK, XML_FALSE));
+   }
+   free(buf);
+   fclose(fp);
+   XML_ParserFree(parser);
+   return 0;
+ }
+EOF
+gcc -fsanitize=address -lexpat -o poc poc.c
+```
+
+3. Construct specially prepared UTF-16 XML file:
+
+```
+dd if=/dev/zero bs=1024 count=794624 | tr '\0' 'a' > poc-utf8.xml
+echo -n '<a><' | dd conv=notrunc of=poc-utf8.xml
+echo -n '><' | dd conv=notrunc of=poc-utf8.xml bs=1 seek=805306368
+iconv -f UTF-8 -t UTF-16LE poc-utf8.xml > poc-utf16.xml
+```
+
+4. Run proof of concept:
+
+```
+./poc poc-utf16.xml
+```
+---
+ expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index 4b43e613..f34d6ab5 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -2563,6 +2563,7 @@ storeRawNames(XML_Parser parser) {
+   while (tag) {
+     int bufSize;
+     int nameLen = sizeof(XML_Char) * (tag->name.strLen + 1);
++    size_t rawNameLen;
+     char *rawNameBuf = tag->buf + nameLen;
+     /* Stop if already stored.  Since m_tagStack is a stack, we can stop
+        at the first entry that has already been copied; everything
+@@ -2574,7 +2575,11 @@ storeRawNames(XML_Parser parser) {
+     /* For re-use purposes we need to ensure that the
+        size of tag->buf is a multiple of sizeof(XML_Char).
+     */
+-    bufSize = nameLen + ROUND_UP(tag->rawNameLength, sizeof(XML_Char));
++    rawNameLen = ROUND_UP(tag->rawNameLength, sizeof(XML_Char));
++    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow. */
++    if (rawNameLen > (size_t)INT_MAX - nameLen)
++      return XML_FALSE;
++    bufSize = nameLen + (int)rawNameLen;
+     if (bufSize > tag->bufEnd - tag->buf) {
+       char *temp = (char *)REALLOC(parser, tag->buf, bufSize);
+       if (temp == NULL)
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..17d192f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 85ae9a2d7d0e9358f356b33977b842df8ebaec2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2021 20:52:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: Prevent integer overflow on m_groupSize in function
+ doProlog (CVE-2021-46143)
+
+---
+ expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index b47c31b0..8f243126 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -5046,6 +5046,11 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
+       if (parser->m_prologState.level >= parser->m_groupSize) {
+         if (parser->m_groupSize) {
+           {
++            /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++            if (parser->m_groupSize > (unsigned int)(-1) / 2u) {
++              return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++            }
++
+             char *const new_connector = (char *)REALLOC(
+                 parser, parser->m_groupConnector, parser->m_groupSize *= 2);
+             if (new_connector == NULL) {
+@@ -5056,6 +5061,16 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
+           }
+ 
+           if (dtd->scaffIndex) {
++            /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
++             * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
++             * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
++             * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
++#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
++            if (parser->m_groupSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(int)) {
++              return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++            }
++#endif
++
+             int *const new_scaff_index = (int *)REALLOC(
+                 parser, dtd->scaffIndex, parser->m_groupSize * sizeof(int));
+             if (new_scaff_index == NULL)
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-more-integer-overflows.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-more-integer-overflows.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63b5d2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-more-integer-overflows.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+From 9f93e8036e842329863bf20395b8fb8f73834d9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 22:46:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: Prevent integer overflow at multiple places
+ (CVE-2022-22822 to CVE-2022-22827)
+
+The involved functions are:
+- addBinding (CVE-2022-22822)
+- build_model (CVE-2022-22823)
+- defineAttribute (CVE-2022-22824)
+- lookup (CVE-2022-22825)
+- nextScaffoldPart (CVE-2022-22826)
+- storeAtts (CVE-2022-22827)
+---
+ expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 151 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index 8f243126..575e73ee 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -3261,13 +3261,38 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
+ 
+   /* get the attributes from the tokenizer */
+   n = XmlGetAttributes(enc, attStr, parser->m_attsSize, parser->m_atts);
++
++  /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++  if (n > INT_MAX - nDefaultAtts) {
++    return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++  }
++
+   if (n + nDefaultAtts > parser->m_attsSize) {
+     int oldAttsSize = parser->m_attsSize;
+     ATTRIBUTE *temp;
+ #ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
+     XML_AttrInfo *temp2;
+ #endif
++
++    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++    if ((nDefaultAtts > INT_MAX - INIT_ATTS_SIZE)
++        || (n > INT_MAX - (nDefaultAtts + INIT_ATTS_SIZE))) {
++      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++    }
++
+     parser->m_attsSize = n + nDefaultAtts + INIT_ATTS_SIZE;
++
++    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
++     * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
++     * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
++     * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
++#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
++    if ((unsigned)parser->m_attsSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(ATTRIBUTE)) {
++      parser->m_attsSize = oldAttsSize;
++      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     temp = (ATTRIBUTE *)REALLOC(parser, (void *)parser->m_atts,
+                                 parser->m_attsSize * sizeof(ATTRIBUTE));
+     if (temp == NULL) {
+@@ -3276,6 +3301,17 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
+     }
+     parser->m_atts = temp;
+ #ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
++    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
++     * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
++     * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
++     * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
++#  if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
++    if ((unsigned)parser->m_attsSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_AttrInfo)) {
++      parser->m_attsSize = oldAttsSize;
++      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++    }
++#  endif
++
+     temp2 = (XML_AttrInfo *)REALLOC(parser, (void *)parser->m_attInfo,
+                                     parser->m_attsSize * sizeof(XML_AttrInfo));
+     if (temp2 == NULL) {
+@@ -3610,9 +3646,31 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
+   tagNamePtr->prefixLen = prefixLen;
+   for (i = 0; localPart[i++];)
+     ; /* i includes null terminator */
++
++  /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++  if (binding->uriLen > INT_MAX - prefixLen
++      || i > INT_MAX - (binding->uriLen + prefixLen)) {
++    return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++  }
++
+   n = i + binding->uriLen + prefixLen;
+   if (n > binding->uriAlloc) {
+     TAG *p;
++
++    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++    if (n > INT_MAX - EXPAND_SPARE) {
++      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++    }
++    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
++     * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
++     * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
++     * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
++#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
++    if ((unsigned)(n + EXPAND_SPARE) > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
++      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     uri = (XML_Char *)MALLOC(parser, (n + EXPAND_SPARE) * sizeof(XML_Char));
+     if (! uri)
+       return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+@@ -3708,6 +3766,21 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
+   if (parser->m_freeBindingList) {
+     b = parser->m_freeBindingList;
+     if (len > b->uriAlloc) {
++      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++      if (len > INT_MAX - EXPAND_SPARE) {
++        return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++      }
++
++      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
++       * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
++       * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
++       * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
++#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
++      if ((unsigned)(len + EXPAND_SPARE) > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
++        return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++      }
++#endif
++
+       XML_Char *temp = (XML_Char *)REALLOC(
+           parser, b->uri, sizeof(XML_Char) * (len + EXPAND_SPARE));
+       if (temp == NULL)
+@@ -3720,6 +3793,21 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
+     b = (BINDING *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(BINDING));
+     if (! b)
+       return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++
++    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++    if (len > INT_MAX - EXPAND_SPARE) {
++      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++    }
++    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
++     * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
++     * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
++     * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
++#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
++    if ((unsigned)(len + EXPAND_SPARE) > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
++      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     b->uri
+         = (XML_Char *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(XML_Char) * (len + EXPAND_SPARE));
+     if (! b->uri) {
+@@ -6141,7 +6229,24 @@ defineAttribute(ELEMENT_TYPE *type, ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId, XML_Bool isCdata,
+       }
+     } else {
+       DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *temp;
++
++      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++      if (type->allocDefaultAtts > INT_MAX / 2) {
++        return 0;
++      }
++
+       int count = type->allocDefaultAtts * 2;
++
++      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
++       * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
++       * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
++       * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
++#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
++      if ((unsigned)count > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE)) {
++        return 0;
++      }
++#endif
++
+       temp = (DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *)REALLOC(parser, type->defaultAtts,
+                                           (count * sizeof(DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE)));
+       if (temp == NULL)
+@@ -6792,8 +6897,20 @@ lookup(XML_Parser parser, HASH_TABLE *table, KEY name, size_t createSize) {
+     /* check for overflow (table is half full) */
+     if (table->used >> (table->power - 1)) {
+       unsigned char newPower = table->power + 1;
++
++      /* Detect and prevent invalid shift */
++      if (newPower >= sizeof(unsigned long) * 8 /* bits per byte */) {
++        return NULL;
++      }
++
+       size_t newSize = (size_t)1 << newPower;
+       unsigned long newMask = (unsigned long)newSize - 1;
++
++      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++      if (newSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(NAMED *)) {
++        return NULL;
++      }
++
+       size_t tsize = newSize * sizeof(NAMED *);
+       NAMED **newV = (NAMED **)table->mem->malloc_fcn(tsize);
+       if (! newV)
+@@ -7143,6 +7260,20 @@ nextScaffoldPart(XML_Parser parser) {
+   if (dtd->scaffCount >= dtd->scaffSize) {
+     CONTENT_SCAFFOLD *temp;
+     if (dtd->scaffold) {
++      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++      if (dtd->scaffSize > UINT_MAX / 2u) {
++        return -1;
++      }
++      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
++       * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
++       * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
++       * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
++#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
++      if (dtd->scaffSize > (size_t)(-1) / 2u / sizeof(CONTENT_SCAFFOLD)) {
++        return -1;
++      }
++#endif
++
+       temp = (CONTENT_SCAFFOLD *)REALLOC(
+           parser, dtd->scaffold, dtd->scaffSize * 2 * sizeof(CONTENT_SCAFFOLD));
+       if (temp == NULL)
+@@ -7212,8 +7343,26 @@ build_model(XML_Parser parser) {
+   XML_Content *ret;
+   XML_Content *cpos;
+   XML_Char *str;
+-  int allocsize = (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
+-                   + (dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)));
++
++  /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
++   * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
++   * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
++   * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
++#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
++  if (dtd->scaffCount > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Content)) {
++    return NULL;
++  }
++  if (dtd->contentStringLen > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
++    return NULL;
++  }
++#endif
++  if (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
++      > (size_t)(-1) - dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)) {
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  const size_t allocsize = (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
++                            + (dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)));
+ 
+   ret = (XML_Content *)MALLOC(parser, allocsize);
+   if (! ret)
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Protect-against-malicious-namespace-declarations.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Protect-against-malicious-namespace-declarations.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f68836
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Protect-against-malicious-namespace-declarations.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+commit 5c47ae80738d0985babf06a023b3845169682064
+Author: Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon Mar 14 10:22:37 2022 +0100
+
+    Protect against malicious namespace declarations
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index 5c3f573..901abbf 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -638,8 +638,7 @@ XML_ParserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingName) {
+ 
+ XML_Parser XMLCALL
+ XML_ParserCreateNS(const XML_Char *encodingName, XML_Char nsSep) {
+-  XML_Char tmp[2];
+-  *tmp = nsSep;
++  XML_Char tmp[2] = {nsSep, 0};
+   return XML_ParserCreate_MM(encodingName, NULL, tmp);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1253,8 +1252,7 @@ XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate(XML_Parser oldParser, const XML_Char *context,
+      would be otherwise.
+   */
+   if (parser->m_ns) {
+-    XML_Char tmp[2];
+-    *tmp = parser->m_namespaceSeparator;
++    XML_Char tmp[2] = {parser->m_namespaceSeparator, 0};
+     parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, tmp, newDtd);
+   } else {
+     parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, NULL, newDtd);
+@@ -3526,6 +3524,117 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
+   return XML_ERROR_NONE;
+ }
+ 
++static XML_Bool
++is_rfc3986_uri_char(XML_Char candidate) {
++  // For the RFC 3986 ANBF grammar see
++  // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#appendix-A
++
++  switch (candidate) {
++  // From rule "ALPHA" (uppercase half)
++  case 'A':
++  case 'B':
++  case 'C':
++  case 'D':
++  case 'E':
++  case 'F':
++  case 'G':
++  case 'H':
++  case 'I':
++  case 'J':
++  case 'K':
++  case 'L':
++  case 'M':
++  case 'N':
++  case 'O':
++  case 'P':
++  case 'Q':
++  case 'R':
++  case 'S':
++  case 'T':
++  case 'U':
++  case 'V':
++  case 'W':
++  case 'X':
++  case 'Y':
++  case 'Z':
++
++  // From rule "ALPHA" (lowercase half)
++  case 'a':
++  case 'b':
++  case 'c':
++  case 'd':
++  case 'e':
++  case 'f':
++  case 'g':
++  case 'h':
++  case 'i':
++  case 'j':
++  case 'k':
++  case 'l':
++  case 'm':
++  case 'n':
++  case 'o':
++  case 'p':
++  case 'q':
++  case 'r':
++  case 's':
++  case 't':
++  case 'u':
++  case 'v':
++  case 'w':
++  case 'x':
++  case 'y':
++  case 'z':
++
++  // From rule "DIGIT"
++  case '0':
++  case '1':
++  case '2':
++  case '3':
++  case '4':
++  case '5':
++  case '6':
++  case '7':
++  case '8':
++  case '9':
++
++  // From rule "pct-encoded"
++  case '%':
++
++  // From rule "unreserved"
++  case '-':
++  case '.':
++  case '_':
++  case '~':
++
++  // From rule "gen-delims"
++  case ':':
++  case '/':
++  case '?':
++  case '#':
++  case '[':
++  case ']':
++  case '@':
++
++  // From rule "sub-delims"
++  case '!':
++  case '$':
++  case '&':
++  case '\'':
++  case '(':
++  case ')':
++  case '*':
++  case '+':
++  case ',':
++  case ';':
++  case '=':
++    return XML_TRUE;
++
++  default:
++    return XML_FALSE;
++  }
++}
++
+ /* addBinding() overwrites the value of prefix->binding without checking.
+    Therefore one must keep track of the old value outside of addBinding().
+ */
+@@ -3581,6 +3690,29 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
+     if (! mustBeXML && isXMLNS
+         && (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len]))
+       isXMLNS = XML_FALSE;
++
++    // NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986
++    //       today (and is not REQUIRED to do so with regard to the XML 1.0
++    //       namespaces specification) we have to at least make sure, that
++    //       the application on top of Expat (that is likely splitting expanded
++    //       element names ("qualified names") of form
++    //       "[uri sep] local [sep prefix] '\0'" back into 1, 2 or 3 pieces
++    //       in its element handler code) cannot be confused by an attacker
++    //       putting additional namespace separator characters into namespace
++    //       declarations.  That would be ambiguous and not to be expected.
++    //
++    //       While the HTML API docs of function XML_ParserCreateNS have been
++    //       advising against use of a namespace separator character that can
++    //       appear in a URI for >20 years now, some widespread applications
++    //       are using URI characters (':' (colon) in particular) for a
++    //       namespace separator, in practice.  To keep these applications
++    //       functional, we only reject namespaces URIs containing the
++    //       application-chosen namespace separator if the chosen separator
++    //       is a non-URI character with regard to RFC 3986.
++    if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator)
++        && ! is_rfc3986_uri_char(uri[len])) {
++      return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
++    }
+   }
+   isXML = isXML && len == xmlLen;
+   isXMLNS = isXMLNS && len == xmlnsLen;
+diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c
+index f03e008..40172d2 100644
+--- a/tests/runtests.c
++++ b/tests/runtests.c
+@@ -7233,6 +7233,37 @@ START_TEST(test_ns_double_colon_doctype) {
+ }
+ END_TEST
+ 
++START_TEST(test_ns_separator_in_uri) {
++  struct test_case {
++    enum XML_Status expectedStatus;
++    const char *doc;
++    XML_Char namesep;
++  };
++  struct test_case cases[] = {
++      {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one_two' />", XCS('\n')},
++      {XML_STATUS_ERROR, "<doc xmlns='one&#x0A;two' />", XCS('\n')},
++      {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one:two' />", XCS(':')},
++  };
++
++  size_t i = 0;
++  size_t failCount = 0;
++  for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
++    XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreateNS(NULL, cases[i].namesep);
++    XML_SetElementHandler(parser, dummy_start_element, dummy_end_element);
++    if (XML_Parse(parser, cases[i].doc, (int)strlen(cases[i].doc),
++                  /*isFinal*/ XML_TRUE)
++        != cases[i].expectedStatus) {
++      failCount++;
++    }
++    XML_ParserFree(parser);
++  }
++
++  if (failCount) {
++    fail("Namespace separator handling is broken");
++  }
++}
++END_TEST
++
+ /* Control variable; the number of times duff_allocator() will successfully
+  * allocate */
+ #define ALLOC_ALWAYS_SUCCEED (-1)
+@@ -11527,6 +11558,7 @@ make_suite(void) {
+   tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_utf16_doctype);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_invalid_doctype);
+   tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_double_colon_doctype);
++  tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_separator_in_uri);
+ 
+   suite_add_tcase(s, tc_misc);
+   tcase_add_checked_fixture(tc_misc, NULL, basic_teardown);
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-prevent-integer-overflow-in-doProlog.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-prevent-integer-overflow-in-doProlog.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af9c73c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-prevent-integer-overflow-in-doProlog.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From ede41d1e186ed2aba88a06e84cac839b770af3a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 02:36:43 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] lib: Prevent integer overflow in doProlog
+ (CVE-2022-23990)
+
+The change from "int nameLen" to "size_t nameLen"
+addresses the overflow on "nameLen++" in code
+"for (; name[nameLen++];)" right above the second
+change in the patch.
+---
+ expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index 5ce31402..d1d17005 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -5372,7 +5372,7 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
+       if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
+         ELEMENT_TYPE *el;
+         const XML_Char *name;
+-        int nameLen;
++        size_t nameLen;
+         const char *nxt
+             = (quant == XML_CQUANT_NONE ? next : next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
+         int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser);
+@@ -5388,7 +5388,13 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
+         nameLen = 0;
+         for (; name[nameLen++];)
+           ;
+-        dtd->contentStringLen += nameLen;
++
++        /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
++        if (nameLen > UINT_MAX - dtd->contentStringLen) {
++          return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++        }
++
++        dtd->contentStringLen += (unsigned)nameLen;
+         if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
+           handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
+       }
diff --git a/SPECS/expat.spec b/SPECS/expat.spec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d57f447
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SPECS/expat.spec
@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
+%global unversion 2_2_10
+
+Summary: An XML parser library
+Name: expat
+Version: %(echo %{unversion} | sed 's/_/./g')
+Release: 12%{?dist}
+Source: https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/archive/R_%{unversion}.tar.gz#/expat-%{version}.tar.gz
+URL: https://libexpat.github.io/
+License: MIT
+BuildRequires: autoconf, libtool, xmlto, gcc-c++
+BuildRequires: make
+Patch0:	expat-2.2.10-prevent-integer-overflow-in-doProlog.patch
+Patch1:	expat-2.2.10-Prevent-more-integer-overflows.patch
+Patch2:	expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch
+Patch3:	expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch
+Patch4:	expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch
+Patch5: expat-2.2.10-Protect-against-malicious-namespace-declarations.patch
+Patch6: expat-2.2.10-Add-missing-validation-of-encoding.patch
+Patch7: expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-in-storeRawNames.patch
+
+%description
+This is expat, the C library for parsing XML, written by James Clark. Expat
+is a stream oriented XML parser. This means that you register handlers with
+the parser prior to starting the parse. These handlers are called when the
+parser discovers the associated structures in the document being parsed. A
+start tag is an example of the kind of structures for which you may
+register handlers.
+
+%package devel
+Summary: Libraries and header files to develop applications using expat
+Requires: expat%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
+
+%description devel
+The expat-devel package contains the libraries, include files and documentation
+to develop XML applications with expat.
+
+%package static
+Summary: expat XML parser static library
+Requires: expat-devel%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
+
+%description static
+The expat-static package contains the static version of the expat library.
+Install it if you need to link statically with expat.
+
+%prep
+%setup -q -n libexpat-R_%{unversion}/expat
+%patch0 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-23990
+%patch1 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-22822-CVE-2022-22827
+%patch2 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46143
+%patch3 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-45960
+%patch4 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-23852
+%patch5 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-25236
+%patch6 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-25235
+%patch7 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-25315
+
+sed -i 's/install-data-hook/do-nothing-please/' lib/Makefile.am
+./buildconf.sh
+
+%build
+export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fPIC"
+export DOCBOOK_TO_MAN="xmlto man --skip-validation"
+%configure
+%make_build
+
+%install
+%make_install
+
+rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/*.la
+
+%check
+make check
+
+%ldconfig_scriptlets
+
+%files
+%doc AUTHORS Changes
+%license COPYING
+%{_bindir}/*
+%{_libdir}/lib*.so.*
+%{_mandir}/*/*
+
+%files devel
+%doc doc/reference.html doc/*.png doc/*.css examples/*.c
+%{_libdir}/lib*.so
+%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/*.pc
+%{_includedir}/*.h
+
+%files static
+%{_libdir}/lib*.a
+
+%changelog
+* Wed Mar 16 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> -  2.2.10-12
+- Build fix for CVE-2022-25236 in rhel-9.0.0
+- Related: CVE-2022-25236
+
+* Mon Mar 14 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> -  2.2.10-11
+- Improve fix for CVE-2022-25236
+- Related: CVE-2022-25236
+
+* Mon Feb 28 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> -  2.2.10-10
+- Fix multiple CVEs
+- CVE-2022-25236 expat: namespace-separator characters in "xmlns[:prefix]" attribute values can lead to arbitrary code execution
+- CVE-2022-25235 expat: malformed 2- and 3-byte UTF-8 sequences can lead to arbitrary code execution
+- CVE-2022-25315 expat: integer overflow in storeRawNames()
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-25236
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-25235
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-25315
+
+* Thu Feb 10 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> -  2.2.10-9
+- CVE-2022-23852 expat: integer overflow in function XML_GetBuffer
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-23852
+
+* Thu Feb 10 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> -  2.2.10-8
+- CVE-2021-45960 expat: Large number of prefixed XML attributes on a single tag can crash libexpat
+- Resolves: CVE-2021-45960
+
+* Wed Feb 09 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> -  2.2.10-7
+- CVE-2021-46143 expat: Integer overflow in doProlog in xmlparse.c
+- Resolves: CVE-2021-46143
+
+* Wed Feb 09 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> -  2.2.10-6
+- CVE-2022-22827 Integer overflow in storeAtts in xmlparse.c
+- CVE-2022-22826 Integer overflow in nextScaffoldPart in xmlparse.c
+- CVE-2022-22825 Integer overflow in lookup in xmlparse.c
+- CVE-2022-22824 Integer overflow in defineAttribute in xmlparse.c
+- CVE-2022-22823 Integer overflow in build_model in xmlparse.c
+- CVE-2022-22822 Integer overflow in addBinding in xmlparse.c
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-22827
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-22826
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-22825
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-22824
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-22823
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-22822
+
+* Mon Feb 07 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> -  2.2.10-5
+- CVE-2022-23990 expat: integer overflow in the doProlog function
+- Resolve: rhbz#2050503
+
+* Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-4
+- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
+  Related: rhbz#1991688
+
+* Thu Apr 15 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-3
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
+
+* Tue Jan 26 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.10-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Nov 13 2020 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-1
+- update to 2.2.10 (#1884940)
+
+* Mon Jul 27 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.8-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jan 28 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.8-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Sep 16 2019 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.2.8-1
+- update to 2.2.8 (#1752167)
+
+* Thu Jul 25 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.7-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Jun 27 2019 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.2.7-1
+- update to 2.2.7 (#1723724, #1722224)
+
+* Thu Jan 31 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.6-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Aug 15 2018 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.2.6-1
+- update to 2.2.6
+
+* Fri Jul 13 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.5-4
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Feb 07 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.5-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_28_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Feb 03 2018 Igor Gnatenko <ignatenkobrain@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.5-2
+- Switch to %%ldconfig_scriptlets
+
+* Thu Nov  2 2017 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.2.5-1
+- update to 2.2.5 (#1508667)
+
+* Mon Aug 21 2017 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.2.4-1
+- update to 2.2.4 (#1483359)
+
+* Fri Aug  4 2017 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.2.3-1
+- fix tests with unsigned char (upstream PR 109)
+- update to 2.2.3 (#1473266)
+
+* Wed Aug 02 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.2-4
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_27_Binutils_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Jul 26 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.2-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_27_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jul 14 2017 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.2.2-2
+- update to 2.2.2 (#1470891)
+
+* Fri Jul  7 2017 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.2.1-2
+- trim unnecessary doc, examples content
+
+* Mon Jun 19 2017 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.2.1-1
+- update to 2.2.1 (#1462474)
+
+* Fri Feb 10 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.0-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_26_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jun 21 2016 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.2.0-1
+- update to 2.2.0 (#1247348)
+
+* Thu Jun 16 2016 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.1.1-2
+- add security fixes for CVE-2016-0718, CVE-2012-6702, CVE-2016-5300,
+  CVE-2016-4472
+
+* Mon Apr 18 2016 David Tardon <dtardon@redhat.com> - 2.1.1-1
+- new upstream release
+
+* Wed Feb 03 2016 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.0-13
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_24_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Jun 17 2015 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.0-12
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_23_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Feb 21 2015 Till Maas <opensource@till.name> - 2.1.0-11
+- Rebuilt for Fedora 23 Change
+  https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Harden_all_packages_with_position-independent_code
+
+* Sat Aug 16 2014 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.0-10
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_22_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Jul 12 2014 Tom Callaway <spot@fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.0-9
+- fix license handling
+
+* Sat Jun 07 2014 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.0-8
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Aug 03 2013 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.0-7
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_20_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Jun 17 2013 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.1.0-6
+- fix "xmlwf -h" output (#948534)
+
+* Wed Feb 13 2013 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.0-5
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_19_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Jul 19 2012 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.0-4
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_18_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Apr 13 2012 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.1.0-3
+- add -static subpackage (#722647)
+
+* Fri Mar 30 2012 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.1.0-1
+- ship .pc file, move library back to libdir (#808399)
+
+* Mon Mar 26 2012 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.1.0-1
+- update to 2.1.0 (#806602)
+
+* Fri Jan 13 2012 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.0.1-12
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_17_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Feb 08 2011 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.0.1-11
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_15_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Feb  8 2010 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.0.1-10
+- revised fix for CVE-2009-3560 regression (#544996)
+
+* Sun Jan 31 2010 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.0.1-9
+- drop static libraries (#556046)
+- add fix for regression in CVE-2009-3560 patch (#544996)
+
+* Tue Dec  1 2009 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> - 2.0.1-8
+- add security fix for CVE-2009-3560 (#533174)
+- add security fix for CVE-2009-3720 (#531697)
+- run the test suite
+
+* Fri Jul 24 2009 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.0.1-7
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_12_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Feb 24 2009 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.0.1-6
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_11_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Feb 19 2008 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.0.1-5
+- Autorebuild for GCC 4.3
+
+* Wed Jan 23 2008 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> 2.0.1-4
+- chmod 644 even more documentation (#429806)
+
+* Tue Jan  8 2008 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> 2.0.1-3
+- chmod 644 the documentation (#427950)
+
+* Wed Aug 22 2007 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> 2.0.1-2
+- rebuild
+
+* Wed Aug  8 2007 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> 2.0.1-1
+- update to 2.0.1
+- fix the License tag
+- drop the .la file
+
+* Sun Feb  4 2007 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> 1.95.8-10
+- remove trailing dot in Summary (#225742)
+- use preferred BuildRoot per packaging guidelines (#225742)
+
+* Tue Jan 30 2007 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> 1.95.8-9
+- regenerate configure/libtool correctly (#199361)
+- strip DSP files from examples (#186889)
+- fix expat.h compilation with g++ -pedantic (#190244)
+
+* Wed Jul 12 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 1.95.8-8.2.1
+- rebuild
+
+* Fri Feb 10 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 1.95.8-8.2
+- bump again for double-long bug on ppc(64)
+
+* Tue Feb 07 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 1.95.8-8.1
+- rebuilt for new gcc4.1 snapshot and glibc changes
+
+* Tue Jan 31 2006 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> 1.95.8-8
+- restore .la file for apr-util
+
+* Mon Jan 30 2006 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> 1.95.8-7
+- move library to /lib (#178743)
+- omit .la file (#170031)
+
+* Fri Dec 09 2005 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Tue Mar  8 2005 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> 1.95.8-6
+- rebuild
+
+* Thu Nov 25 2004 Ivana Varekova <varekova@redhat.com> 1.95.8
+- update to 1.95.8
+
+* Wed Jun 16 2004 Jeff Johnson <jbj@jbj.org> 1.95.7-4
+- add -fPIC (#125586).
+
+* Tue Jun 15 2004 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Fri Jun 11 2004 Jeff Johnson <jbj@jbj.org> 1.95.7-2
+- fix: malloc failure from dbus test suite (#124747).
+
+* Tue Mar 02 2004 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Sun Feb 22 2004 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> 1.95.7-1
+- update to 1.95.7, include COPYING file in main package
+
+* Fri Feb 13 2004 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Wed Sep 17 2003 Matt Wilson <msw@redhat.com> 1.95.5-6
+- rebuild again for #91211
+
+* Tue Sep 16 2003 Matt Wilson <msw@redhat.com> 1.95.5-5
+- rebuild to fix gzip'ed file md5sums (#91211)
+
+* Tue Jun 17 2003 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com> 1.95.5-4
+- rebuilt because of crt breakage on ppc64.
+
+* Wed Jun 04 2003 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Wed Jan 22 2003 Tim Powers <timp@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Mon Nov 11 2002 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com> 1.95.5-1
+- update to 1.95.5.
+
+* Mon Aug 19 2002 Trond Eivind Glomsrød <teg@redhat.com> 1,95.4-1
+- 1.95.4. 1.95.3 was withdrawn by the expat developers.
+
+* Fri Jun 21 2002 Tim Powers <timp@redhat.com>
+- automated rebuild
+
+* Thu Jun  6 2002 Trond Eivind Glomsrød <teg@redhat.com> 1,95.3-1
+- 1.95.3
+
+* Thu May 23 2002 Tim Powers <timp@redhat.com>
+- automated rebuild
+
+* Fri Mar 22 2002 Trond Eivind Glomsrød <teg@redhat.com>
+- Change a prereq in -devel on main package to a req
+- License from MIT/X11 to BSD
+
+* Mon Mar 11 2002 Trond Eivind Glomsrød <teg@redhat.com>
+- 1.95.2
+
+* Sun Jun 24 2001 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- Bump release + rebuild.
+
+* Tue Oct 24 2000 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- update to 1.95.1
+
+* Sun Oct  8 2000 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- Create.