edk2/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch
Jon Maloy a0d9f2d87e * Wed Feb 14 2024 Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-11
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-use-of-EFI_D_-to-DEBUG_.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-OPTIONAL-keyword-usage-style.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-MdePkg-Introduce-CcMeasurementProtocol-for-CC-Guest-.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpm2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpmM.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4117.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Adding-CVE-2022-36763-to-SecurityFixes.y.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-418.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4118-2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4117-2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Pa.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842]
- Resolves: RHEL-21154
  (CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8])
- Resolves: RHEL-21156
  (CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8])
- Resolves: RHEL-21840
  (CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8])
- Resolves: RHEL-21842
  (CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8])
2024-02-14 11:57:41 -05:00

308 lines
12 KiB
Diff

From f6f72373630d901f331df719a0fb55e8f1143c4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:43:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 10/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118
- CVE 2022-36764
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [10/13] 5ed702e16f390c79d1abb0ec0b04d886e0094c0b (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
Upstream: Merged
Conflicts: We get function definiton clash for the following three functions:
- SanitizePeImageEventSize()
This is defined both in
- SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitazion.c
and
- SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitazion.c
Closer investigation reveals that they are identical in functionality (although
not in comment style).
I chose to leave them as is now, meaning that this package will be
unbuildable until I add a commit renaming these symbols later in
this series.
commit 0d341c01eeabe0ab5e76693b36e728b8f538a40e
Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:05 2024 +0800
SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764
This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpmMeasureBootLib
CVE 2022-36764.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 17 ++--
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 44 +++++++++
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 23 +++++
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
index d44422dee8..1598015176 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
@@ -338,19 +339,23 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
ImageLoad = NULL;
SectionHeader = NULL;
Sha1Ctx = NULL;
- FilePathSize = (UINT32) GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
+ TcgEvent = NULL;
+ FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
- //
// Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy
//
- EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
- TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT));
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize);
if (TcgEvent == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
- TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize;
- ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *) TcgEvent->Event;
+ TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize - sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR);
+ ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *)TcgEvent->Event;
switch (ImageType) {
case EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION:
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
index 37cd3ed0ea..bcf8c6de6f 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
@@ -240,3 +240,47 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+/**
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - EventSize does not overflow
+
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The event size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ Overflow would have occurred.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ // Replacing logic:
+ // sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath), FilePathSize, EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ // Replacing logic:
+ // EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR)
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (*EventSize, sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR), EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
index 0d9d00c281..2248495813 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
@@ -111,4 +111,27 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
);
+/**
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - EventSize does not overflow
+
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The event size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ Overflow would have occurred.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
+ );
+
#endif // DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
index eeb928cdb0..c41498be45 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/** @file
-This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c.
+ This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c.
-Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
-SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
#include <Uefi.h>
@@ -186,9 +186,6 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
UINTN NumberOfPartition;
- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
-
- GptData = NULL;
// Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
@@ -222,6 +219,94 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
}
+/**
+ This function tests the SanitizePeImageEventSize function.
+ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a file path for an
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT structure will not cause an overflow when calculating
+ the event size when allocating space.
+
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
+
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
+**/
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
+ )
+{
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ UINTN ExistingLogicEventSize;
+ UINT32 FilePathSize;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL DevicePath;
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoadEvent;
+ UNIT_TEST_STATUS TestStatus;
+
+ TestStatus = UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED;
+
+ // Generate EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL test data
+ DevicePath.Type = 0;
+ DevicePath.SubType = 0;
+ DevicePath.Length[0] = 0;
+ DevicePath.Length[1] = 0;
+
+ // Generate EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT test data
+ ImageLoadEvent = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT) + sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL));
+ if (ImageLoadEvent == NULL) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: AllocateZeroPool failed\n", __func__));
+ goto Exit;
+ }
+
+ // Populate EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT54 test data
+ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLocationInMemory = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)0x12345678;
+ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLengthInMemory = 0x1000;
+ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLinkTimeAddress = (UINTN)ImageLoadEvent;
+ ImageLoadEvent->LengthOfDevicePath = sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL);
+ CopyMem (ImageLoadEvent->DevicePath, &DevicePath, sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL));
+
+ FilePathSize = 255;
+
+ // Test that a normal PE image passes validation
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize failed with %r\n", Status);
+ goto Exit;
+ }
+
+ // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic
+ ExistingLogicEventSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
+ ExistingLogicEventSize += sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR);
+
+ if (EventSize != ExistingLogicEventSize) {
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize returned an incorrect event size. Expected %u, got %u\n", ExistingLogicEventSize, EventSize);
+ goto Exit;
+ }
+
+ // Test that the event size may not overflow
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
+ if (Status != EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE) {
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize succeded when it was supposed to fail with %r\n", Status);
+ goto Exit;
+ }
+
+ TestStatus = UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
+Exit:
+
+ if (ImageLoadEvent != NULL) {
+ FreePool (ImageLoadEvent);
+ }
+
+ if (TestStatus == UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Test failed\n", __func__));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
+ }
+
+ return TestStatus;
+}
+
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
// * Unit Test Code Main Function
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
@@ -265,6 +350,7 @@ UefiTestMain (
AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL);
AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests PE Image and FileSize checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePeImageEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework);
--
2.41.0