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- CryptoPkg/Test: call ProcessLibraryConstructorList

Browse Source 
- EmbeddedPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob()
- MdePkg/BaseRngLib: Add a smoketest for RDRAND and check CPUID
- MdePkg/X86UnitTestHost: set rdrand cpuid bit
- NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45237
- NetworkPkg TcpDxe: Fixed system stuck on PXE boot flow in
 iPXE environment
- NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236
- OvmfPkg: wire up RngDxe
- SecurityPkg/RngDxe: add rng test
- StandaloneMmPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob()
This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2024-07-24 11:56:16 +03:00
parent 9e147b807c
commit fafa4b8c26
11 changed files with 3080 additions and 1 deletions
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36
SOURCES/edk2-CryptoPkg-Test-call-ProcessLibraryConstructorList.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From 94961b8817eec6f8d0434555ac50a7aa51c22201 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 11:45:49 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] CryptoPkg/Test: call ProcessLibraryConstructorList
Needed to properly initialize BaseRngLib.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
---
.../Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c b/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c
index d0c1c7a4f7e0..48d463b8ad49 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@
**/
#include "TestBaseCryptLib.h"
+VOID
+EFIAPI
+ProcessLibraryConstructorList (
+ VOID
+ );
+
/**
Initialize the unit test framework, suite, and unit tests for the
sample unit tests and run the unit tests.
@@ -76,5 +82,6 @@ main (
char *argv[]
)
{
+ ProcessLibraryConstructorList ();
return UefiTestMain ();
}

148
SOURCES/edk2-EmbeddedPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
From aeaee8944f0eaacbf4cdf39279785b9ba4836bb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 13:07:50 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] EmbeddedPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob()
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4166
Fix integer overflow in various CreateHob instances.
Fixes: CVE-2022-36765
The CreateHob() function aligns the requested size to 8
performing the following operation:
```
HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7));
```
No checks are performed to ensure this value doesn't
overflow, and could lead to CreateHob() returning a smaller
HOB than requested, which could lead to OOB HOB accesses.
Reported-by: Marc Beatove <mbeatove@google.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Abner Chang <abner.chang@amd.com>
Cc: John Mathew <john.mathews@intel.com>
Authored-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
---
EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c
index 8eb175aa96f9..cbc35152ccbc 100644
--- a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c
+++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c
@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ CreateHob (
HandOffHob = GetHobList ();
+ //
+ // Check Length to avoid data overflow.
+ //
+ if (HobLength > MAX_UINT16 - 0x7) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7));
FreeMemory = HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryTop - HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryBottom;
@@ -160,6 +167,9 @@ BuildResourceDescriptorHob (
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR, sizeof (EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR));
ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
Hob->ResourceType = ResourceType;
Hob->ResourceAttribute = ResourceAttribute;
@@ -401,6 +411,10 @@ BuildModuleHob (
);
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_MODULE));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
CopyGuid (&(Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.Name), &gEfiHobMemoryAllocModuleGuid);
Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.MemoryBaseAddress = MemoryAllocationModule;
@@ -449,6 +463,11 @@ BuildGuidHob (
ASSERT (DataLength <= (0xffff - sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE)));
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_GUID_EXTENSION, (UINT16)(sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE) + DataLength));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
CopyGuid (&Hob->Name, Guid);
return Hob + 1;
}
@@ -512,6 +531,10 @@ BuildFvHob (
EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME *Hob;
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress;
Hob->Length = Length;
@@ -543,6 +566,10 @@ BuildFv2Hob (
EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2 *Hob;
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV2, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress;
Hob->Length = Length;
@@ -584,6 +611,10 @@ BuildFv3Hob (
EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME3 *Hob;
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV3, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME3));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress;
Hob->Length = Length;
@@ -639,6 +670,10 @@ BuildCpuHob (
EFI_HOB_CPU *Hob;
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_CPU, sizeof (EFI_HOB_CPU));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
Hob->SizeOfMemorySpace = SizeOfMemorySpace;
Hob->SizeOfIoSpace = SizeOfIoSpace;
@@ -676,6 +711,10 @@ BuildStackHob (
);
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_STACK));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
CopyGuid (&(Hob->AllocDescriptor.Name), &gEfiHobMemoryAllocStackGuid);
Hob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress = BaseAddress;
@@ -756,6 +795,10 @@ BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
);
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
ZeroMem (&(Hob->AllocDescriptor.Name), sizeof (EFI_GUID));
Hob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress = BaseAddress;

191
SOURCES/edk2-MdePkg-BaseRngLib-Add-a-smoketest-for-RDRAND-and-check-CPUID.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
From c3a8ca7b54a9fd17acdf16c6282a92cc989fa92a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 22:31:03 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] MdePkg/BaseRngLib: Add a smoketest for RDRAND and check CPUID
RDRAND has notoriously been broken many times over its lifespan.
Add a smoketest to RDRAND, in order to better sniff out potential
security concerns.
Also add a proper CPUID test in order to support older CPUs which may
not have it; it was previously being tested but then promptly ignored.
Testing algorithm inspired by linux's arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c
:x86_init_rdrand() per commit 049f9ae9..
Many thanks to Jason Donenfeld for relicensing his linux RDRAND detection
code to MIT and the public domain.
>On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 2:21 PM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:
<..>
> I (re)wrote that function in Linux. I hereby relicense it as MIT, and
> also place it into public domain. Do with it what you will now.
>
> Jason
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4163
Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 91 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c b/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c
index 9bd68352f9f7..06d2a6f12d2e 100644
--- a/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c
+++ b/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
to provide high-quality random numbers.
Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2022, Pedro Falcato. All rights reserved.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2021, NUVIA Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
@@ -24,6 +25,88 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
STATIC BOOLEAN mRdRandSupported;
+//
+// Intel SDM says 10 tries is good enough for reliable RDRAND usage.
+//
+#define RDRAND_RETRIES 10
+
+#define RDRAND_TEST_SAMPLES 8
+
+#define RDRAND_MIN_CHANGE 5
+
+//
+// Add a define for native-word RDRAND, just for the test.
+//
+#ifdef MDE_CPU_X64
+#define ASM_RDRAND AsmRdRand64
+#else
+#define ASM_RDRAND AsmRdRand32
+#endif
+
+/**
+ Tests RDRAND for broken implementations.
+
+ @retval TRUE RDRAND is reliable (and hopefully safe).
+ @retval FALSE RDRAND is unreliable and should be disabled, despite CPUID.
+
+**/
+STATIC
+BOOLEAN
+TestRdRand (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ //
+ // Test for notoriously broken rdrand implementations that always return the same
+ // value, like the Zen 3 uarch (all-1s) or other several AMD families on suspend/resume (also all-1s).
+ // Note that this should be expanded to extensively test for other sorts of possible errata.
+ //
+
+ //
+ // Our algorithm samples rdrand $RDRAND_TEST_SAMPLES times and expects
+ // a different result $RDRAND_MIN_CHANGE times for reliable RDRAND usage.
+ //
+ UINTN Prev;
+ UINT8 Idx;
+ UINT8 TestIteration;
+ UINT32 Changed;
+
+ Changed = 0;
+
+ for (TestIteration = 0; TestIteration < RDRAND_TEST_SAMPLES; TestIteration++) {
+ UINTN Sample;
+ //
+ // Note: We use a retry loop for rdrand. Normal users get this in BaseRng.c
+ // Any failure to get a random number will assume RDRAND does not work.
+ //
+ for (Idx = 0; Idx < RDRAND_RETRIES; Idx++) {
+ if (ASM_RDRAND (&Sample)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (Idx == RDRAND_RETRIES) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "BaseRngLib/x86: CPU BUG: Failed to get an RDRAND random number - disabling\n"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (TestIteration != 0) {
+ Changed += Sample != Prev;
+ }
+
+ Prev = Sample;
+ }
+
+ if (Changed < RDRAND_MIN_CHANGE) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "BaseRngLib/x86: CPU BUG: RDRAND not reliable - disabling\n"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+#undef ASM_RDRAND
+
/**
The constructor function checks whether or not RDRAND instruction is supported
by the host hardware.
@@ -48,10 +131,13 @@ BaseRngLibConstructor (
// CPUID. A value of 1 indicates that processor support RDRAND instruction.
//
AsmCpuid (1, 0, 0, &RegEcx, 0);
- ASSERT ((RegEcx & RDRAND_MASK) == RDRAND_MASK);
mRdRandSupported = ((RegEcx & RDRAND_MASK) == RDRAND_MASK);
+ if (mRdRandSupported) {
+ mRdRandSupported = TestRdRand ();
+ }
+
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
@@ -70,6 +156,7 @@ ArchGetRandomNumber16 (
OUT UINT16 *Rand
)
{
+ ASSERT (mRdRandSupported);
return AsmRdRand16 (Rand);
}
@@ -88,6 +175,7 @@ ArchGetRandomNumber32 (
OUT UINT32 *Rand
)
{
+ ASSERT (mRdRandSupported);
return AsmRdRand32 (Rand);
}
@@ -106,6 +194,7 @@ ArchGetRandomNumber64 (
OUT UINT64 *Rand
)
{
+ ASSERT (mRdRandSupported);
return AsmRdRand64 (Rand);
}
@@ -122,13 +211,7 @@ ArchIsRngSupported (
VOID
)
{
- /*
- Existing software depends on this always returning TRUE, so for
- now hard-code it.
-
- return mRdRandSupported;
- */
- return TRUE;
+ return mRdRandSupported;
}
/**

42
SOURCES/edk2-MdePkg-X86UnitTestHost-set-rdrand-cpuid-bit.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From 5e776299a2604b336a947e68593012ab2cc16eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 11:45:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] MdePkg/X86UnitTestHost: set rdrand cpuid bit
Set the rdrand feature bit when faking cpuid for host test cases.
Needed to make the CryptoPkg test cases work.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
---
MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c b/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c
index 8ba4f54a385d..7f7276f7f4b8 100644
--- a/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c
+++ b/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c
@@ -66,6 +66,15 @@ UnitTestHostBaseLibAsmCpuid (
OUT UINT32 *Edx OPTIONAL
)
{
+ UINT32 RetEcx;
+
+ RetEcx = 0;
+ switch (Index) {
+ case 1:
+ RetEcx |= BIT30; /* RdRand */
+ break;
+ }
+
if (Eax != NULL) {
*Eax = 0;
}
@@ -75,7 +84,7 @@ UnitTestHostBaseLibAsmCpuid (
}
if (Ecx != NULL) {
- *Ecx = 0;
+ *Ecx = RetEcx;
}
if (Edx != NULL) {

1279
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45237.patch Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

53
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-TcpDxe-Fixed-system-stuck-on-PXE-boot-flow-in.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From ced13b93afea87a8a1fe6ddbb67240a84cb2e3d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sam <Sam_Tsai@wiwynn.com>
Date: Wed, 29 May 2024 07:46:03 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] NetworkPkg TcpDxe: Fixed system stuck on PXE boot flow in
iPXE environment
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This bug fix is based on the following commit "NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH"
REF: 1904a64
Issue Description:
An "Invalid handle" error was detected during runtime when attempting to destroy a child instance of the hashing protocol. The problematic code segment was:
NetworkPkg\TcpDxe\TcpDriver.c
Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild(Hash2ServiceBinding, ​&mHash2ServiceHandle);
Root Cause Analysis:
The root cause of the error was the passing of an incorrect parameter type, a pointer to an EFI_HANDLE instead of an EFI_HANDLE itself, to the DestroyChild function. This mismatch resulted in the function receiving an invalid handle.
Implemented Solution:
To resolve this issue, the function call was corrected to pass mHash2ServiceHandle directly:
NetworkPkg\TcpDxe\TcpDriver.c
Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild(Hash2ServiceBinding, mHash2ServiceHandle);
This modification ensures the correct handle type is used, effectively rectifying the "Invalid handle" error.
Verification:
Testing has been conducted, confirming the efficacy of the fix. Additionally, the BIOS can boot into the OS in an iPXE environment.
Cc: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sam Tsai [Wiwynn] <sam_tsai@wiwynn.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
---
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c
index 40bba4080c87..c6e7c0df540a 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ TcpDestroyService (
//
// Destroy the instance of the hashing protocol for this controller.
//
- Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, &mHash2ServiceHandle);
+ Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, mHash2ServiceHandle);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}

820
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-TcpDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45236.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,820 @@
From 1904a64bcc18199738e5be183d28887ac5d837d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Wed, 8 May 2024 22:56:29 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541
REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt
REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt
REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt
Bug Overview:
PixieFail Bug #8
CVE-2023-45236
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the
connection's identifying parameters and a secret key.
This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other
connection.
This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293.
RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection
A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock-
driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD
generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression:
ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey)
where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom
function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip,
localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey")
(SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or
an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used
for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a
cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection
parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of
a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data,
please see Section 3 of [42].
For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive
sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by
the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number
(IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure.
For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers
must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is
done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a
control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence
numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also
called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for
picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake
to exchange the ISNs.
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
---
NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 22 +++
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c | 92 ++++++++++++-
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf | 8 +-
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h | 23 ++--
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c | 13 +-
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h | 59 ++++++--
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c | 244 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c | 3 +-
8 files changed, 415 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
index 20a4555019d9..4305328425d0 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
+++ b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
@@ -122,6 +122,28 @@ CVE_2023_45235:
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
- http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
- https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
+CVE_2023_45236:
+ commit_titles:
+ - "NetworkPkg: TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 Patch"
+ cve: CVE-2023-45236
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
+ description: "Bug 08 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Predictable TCP Initial Sequence Numbers"
+ note:
+ files_impacted:
+ - NetworkPkg/Include/Library/NetLib.h
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c
+ links:
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45236
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
CVE_2023_45237:
commit_titles:
- "NetworkPkg:: SECURITY PATCH CVE 2023-45237"
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c
index 8fe6badd687c..40bba4080c87 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c
@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL gTcpServiceBinding = {
TcpServiceBindingDestroyChild
};
+//
+// This is the handle for the Hash2ServiceBinding Protocol instance this driver produces
+// if the platform does not provide one.
+//
+EFI_HANDLE mHash2ServiceHandle = NULL;
+
/**
Create and start the heartbeat timer for the TCP driver.
@@ -165,6 +171,23 @@ TcpDriverEntryPoint (
EFI_STATUS Status;
UINT32 Random;
+ //
+ // Initialize the Secret used for hashing TCP sequence numbers
+ //
+ // Normally this should be regenerated periodically, but since
+ // this is only used for UEFI networking and not a general purpose
+ // operating system, it is not necessary to regenerate it.
+ //
+ Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&mTcpGlobalSecret);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status));
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Get a random number used to generate a random port number
+ // Intentionally not linking this to mTcpGlobalSecret to avoid leaking information about the secret
+ //
Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&Random);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a Failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status));
@@ -207,9 +230,8 @@ TcpDriverEntryPoint (
}
//
- // Initialize ISS and random port.
+ // Initialize the random port.
//
- mTcpGlobalIss = Random % mTcpGlobalIss;
mTcp4RandomPort = (UINT16)(TCP_PORT_KNOWN + (Random % TCP_PORT_KNOWN));
mTcp6RandomPort = mTcp4RandomPort;
@@ -224,6 +246,8 @@ TcpDriverEntryPoint (
@param[in] IpVersion IP_VERSION_4 or IP_VERSION_6.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate some resources.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Service Binding Protocols are unavailable.
+ @retval EFI_ALREADY_STARTED The TCP driver is already started on the controller.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS A new IP6 service binding private was created.
**/
@@ -234,11 +258,13 @@ TcpCreateService (
IN UINT8 IpVersion
)
{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- EFI_GUID *IpServiceBindingGuid;
- EFI_GUID *TcpServiceBindingGuid;
- TCP_SERVICE_DATA *TcpServiceData;
- IP_IO_OPEN_DATA OpenData;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_GUID *IpServiceBindingGuid;
+ EFI_GUID *TcpServiceBindingGuid;
+ TCP_SERVICE_DATA *TcpServiceData;
+ IP_IO_OPEN_DATA OpenData;
+ EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *Hash2ServiceBinding;
+ EFI_HASH2_PROTOCOL *Hash2Protocol;
if (IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) {
IpServiceBindingGuid = &gEfiIp4ServiceBindingProtocolGuid;
@@ -272,6 +298,33 @@ TcpCreateService (
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiHash2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&Hash2Protocol);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // If we can't find the Hashing protocol, then we need to create one.
+ //
+
+ //
+ // Platform is expected to publish the hash service binding protocol to support TCP.
+ //
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (
+ &gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid,
+ NULL,
+ (VOID **)&Hash2ServiceBinding
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (Hash2ServiceBinding == NULL) || (Hash2ServiceBinding->CreateChild == NULL)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Create an instance of the hash protocol for this controller.
+ //
+ Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->CreateChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, &mHash2ServiceHandle);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+ }
+
//
// Create the TCP service data.
//
@@ -423,6 +476,7 @@ TcpDestroyService (
EFI_STATUS Status;
LIST_ENTRY *List;
TCP_DESTROY_CHILD_IN_HANDLE_BUF_CONTEXT Context;
+ EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *Hash2ServiceBinding;
ASSERT ((IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) || (IpVersion == IP_VERSION_6));
@@ -439,6 +493,30 @@ TcpDestroyService (
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+ //
+ // Destroy the Hash2ServiceBinding instance if it is created by Tcp driver.
+ //
+ if (mHash2ServiceHandle != NULL) {
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (
+ &gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid,
+ NULL,
+ (VOID **)&Hash2ServiceBinding
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (Hash2ServiceBinding == NULL) || (Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild == NULL)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Destroy the instance of the hashing protocol for this controller.
+ //
+ Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, &mHash2ServiceHandle);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ mHash2ServiceHandle = NULL;
+ }
+
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
NicHandle,
ServiceBindingGuid,
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf
index cf5423f4c537..76de4cf9ec3d 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
# stack has been loaded in system. This driver supports both IPv4 and IPv6 network stack.
#
# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#
@@ -68,7 +69,6 @@
NetLib
IpIoLib
-
[Protocols]
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES
@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@
gEfiIp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid ## TO_START
gEfiTcp6ProtocolGuid ## BY_START
gEfiTcp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid ## BY_START
+ gEfiHash2ProtocolGuid ## BY_START
+ gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid ## BY_START
+
+[Guids]
+ gEfiHashAlgorithmMD5Guid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiHashAlgorithmSha256Guid ## CONSUMES
[Depex]
gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h
index a7af01fff246..c707bee3e548 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Declaration of external functions shared in TCP driver.
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
@@ -36,8 +36,11 @@ VOID
@param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB of this TCP instance.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully
+ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation
+
**/
-VOID
+EFI_STATUS
TcpInitTcbLocal (
IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb
);
@@ -128,17 +131,6 @@ TcpCloneTcb (
IN TCP_CB *Tcb
);
-/**
- Compute an ISS to be used by a new connection.
-
- @return The result ISS.
-
-**/
-TCP_SEQNO
-TcpGetIss (
- VOID
- );
-
/**
Get the local mss.
@@ -202,8 +194,11 @@ TcpFormatNetbuf (
@param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB that wants to initiate a
connection.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully
+ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation
+
**/
-VOID
+EFI_STATUS
TcpOnAppConnect (
IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb
);
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c
index 97633a3908be..a5d575ccafeb 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ TcpInput (
TCP_SEQNO Urg;
UINT16 Checksum;
INT32 Usable;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
ASSERT ((Version == IP_VERSION_4) || (Version == IP_VERSION_6));
@@ -872,7 +873,17 @@ TcpInput (
Tcb->LocalEnd.Port = Head->DstPort;
Tcb->RemoteEnd.Port = Head->SrcPort;
- TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb);
+ Status = TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG (
+ (DEBUG_ERROR,
+ "TcpInput: discard a segment because failed to init local end for TCB %p\n",
+ Tcb)
+ );
+
+ goto DISCARD;
+ }
+
TcpInitTcbPeer (Tcb, Seg, &Option);
TcpSetState (Tcb, TCP_SYN_RCVD);
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h
index c0c9b7f46ebe..4d5566ab9379 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
It is the common head file for all Tcp*.c in TCP driver.
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2016, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <Protocol/ServiceBinding.h>
#include <Protocol/DriverBinding.h>
+#include <Protocol/Hash2.h>
#include <Library/IpIoLib.h>
#include <Library/DevicePathLib.h>
#include <Library/PrintLib.h>
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ extern EFI_UNICODE_STRING_TABLE *gTcpControllerNameTable;
extern LIST_ENTRY mTcpRunQue;
extern LIST_ENTRY mTcpListenQue;
-extern TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalIss;
+extern TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalSecret;
extern UINT32 mTcpTick;
///
@@ -45,14 +46,6 @@ extern UINT32 mTcpTick;
#define TCP_EXPIRE_TIME 65535
-///
-/// The implementation selects the initial send sequence number and the unit to
-/// be added when it is increased.
-///
-#define TCP_BASE_ISS 0x4d7e980b
-#define TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_1 2048
-#define TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_2 100
-
typedef union {
EFI_TCP4_CONFIG_DATA Tcp4CfgData;
EFI_TCP6_CONFIG_DATA Tcp6CfgData;
@@ -774,4 +767,50 @@ Tcp6Poll (
IN EFI_TCP6_PROTOCOL *This
);
+/**
+ Retrieves the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) for a TCP connection identified by local
+ and remote IP addresses and ports.
+
+ This method is based on https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9293#section-3.4.1
+ Where the ISN is computed as follows:
+ ISN = TimeStamp + MD5(LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Secret)
+
+ Otherwise:
+ ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey)
+
+ "Here M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the
+ connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport")
+ and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the
+ outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the
+ ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a
+ cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some
+ secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and
+ management of the secret key data."
+
+ @param[in] LocalIp A pointer to the local IP address of the TCP connection.
+ @param[in] LocalIpSize The size, in bytes, of the LocalIp buffer.
+ @param[in] LocalPort The local port number of the TCP connection.
+ @param[in] RemoteIp A pointer to the remote IP address of the TCP connection.
+ @param[in] RemoteIpSize The size, in bytes, of the RemoteIp buffer.
+ @param[in] RemotePort The remote port number of the TCP connection.
+ @param[out] Isn A pointer to the variable that will receive the Initial
+ Sequence Number (ISN).
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully, and the ISN was
+ retrieved.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the input parameters are invalid.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The operation is not supported.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+TcpGetIsn (
+ IN UINT8 *LocalIp,
+ IN UINTN LocalIpSize,
+ IN UINT16 LocalPort,
+ IN UINT8 *RemoteIp,
+ IN UINTN RemoteIpSize,
+ IN UINT16 RemotePort,
+ OUT TCP_SEQNO *Isn
+ );
+
#endif
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c
index c93212d47ded..3310306f639c 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
(C) Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
@@ -20,7 +20,34 @@ LIST_ENTRY mTcpListenQue = {
&mTcpListenQue
};
-TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalIss = TCP_BASE_ISS;
+//
+// The Session secret
+// This must be initialized to a random value at boot time
+//
+TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalSecret;
+
+//
+// Union to hold either an IPv4 or IPv6 address
+// This is used to simplify the ISN hash computation
+//
+typedef union {
+ UINT8 IPv4[4];
+ UINT8 IPv6[16];
+} NETWORK_ADDRESS;
+
+//
+// The ISN is computed by hashing this structure
+// It is initialized with the local and remote IP addresses and ports
+// and the secret
+//
+//
+typedef struct {
+ UINT16 LocalPort;
+ UINT16 RemotePort;
+ NETWORK_ADDRESS LocalAddress;
+ NETWORK_ADDRESS RemoteAddress;
+ TCP_SEQNO Secret;
+} ISN_HASH_CTX;
CHAR16 *mTcpStateName[] = {
L"TCP_CLOSED",
@@ -41,12 +68,18 @@ CHAR16 *mTcpStateName[] = {
@param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB of this TCP instance.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully
+ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation
+
**/
-VOID
+EFI_STATUS
TcpInitTcbLocal (
IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb
)
{
+ TCP_SEQNO Isn;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
//
// Compute the checksum of the fixed parts of pseudo header
//
@@ -57,6 +90,16 @@ TcpInitTcbLocal (
0x06,
0
);
+
+ Status = TcpGetIsn (
+ Tcb->LocalEnd.Ip.v4.Addr,
+ sizeof (IPv4_ADDRESS),
+ Tcb->LocalEnd.Port,
+ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Ip.v4.Addr,
+ sizeof (IPv4_ADDRESS),
+ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Port,
+ &Isn
+ );
} else {
Tcb->HeadSum = NetIp6PseudoHeadChecksum (
&Tcb->LocalEnd.Ip.v6,
@@ -64,9 +107,25 @@ TcpInitTcbLocal (
0x06,
0
);
+
+ Status = TcpGetIsn (
+ Tcb->LocalEnd.Ip.v6.Addr,
+ sizeof (IPv6_ADDRESS),
+ Tcb->LocalEnd.Port,
+ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Ip.v6.Addr,
+ sizeof (IPv6_ADDRESS),
+ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Port,
+ &Isn
+ );
+ }
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TcpInitTcbLocal: failed to get isn\n"));
+ ASSERT (FALSE);
+ return Status;
}
- Tcb->Iss = TcpGetIss ();
+ Tcb->Iss = Isn;
Tcb->SndUna = Tcb->Iss;
Tcb->SndNxt = Tcb->Iss;
@@ -82,6 +141,8 @@ TcpInitTcbLocal (
Tcb->RetxmitSeqMax = 0;
Tcb->ProbeTimerOn = FALSE;
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
/**
@@ -506,18 +567,162 @@ TcpCloneTcb (
}
/**
- Compute an ISS to be used by a new connection.
-
- @return The resulting ISS.
+ Retrieves the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) for a TCP connection identified by local
+ and remote IP addresses and ports.
+
+ This method is based on https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9293#section-3.4.1
+ Where the ISN is computed as follows:
+ ISN = TimeStamp + MD5(LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Secret)
+
+ Otherwise:
+ ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey)
+
+ "Here M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the
+ connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport")
+ and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the
+ outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the
+ ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a
+ cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some
+ secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and
+ management of the secret key data."
+
+ @param[in] LocalIp A pointer to the local IP address of the TCP connection.
+ @param[in] LocalIpSize The size, in bytes, of the LocalIp buffer.
+ @param[in] LocalPort The local port number of the TCP connection.
+ @param[in] RemoteIp A pointer to the remote IP address of the TCP connection.
+ @param[in] RemoteIpSize The size, in bytes, of the RemoteIp buffer.
+ @param[in] RemotePort The remote port number of the TCP connection.
+ @param[out] Isn A pointer to the variable that will receive the Initial
+ Sequence Number (ISN).
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully, and the ISN was
+ retrieved.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the input parameters are invalid.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The operation is not supported.
**/
-TCP_SEQNO
-TcpGetIss (
- VOID
+EFI_STATUS
+TcpGetIsn (
+ IN UINT8 *LocalIp,
+ IN UINTN LocalIpSize,
+ IN UINT16 LocalPort,
+ IN UINT8 *RemoteIp,
+ IN UINTN RemoteIpSize,
+ IN UINT16 RemotePort,
+ OUT TCP_SEQNO *Isn
)
{
- mTcpGlobalIss += TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_1;
- return mTcpGlobalIss;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_HASH2_PROTOCOL *Hash2Protocol;
+ EFI_HASH2_OUTPUT HashResult;
+ ISN_HASH_CTX IsnHashCtx;
+ EFI_TIME TimeStamp;
+
+ //
+ // Check that the ISN pointer is valid
+ //
+ if (Isn == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // The local ip may be a v4 or v6 address and may not be NULL
+ //
+ if ((LocalIp == NULL) || (LocalIpSize == 0) || (RemoteIp == NULL) || (RemoteIpSize == 0)) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // the local ip may be a v4 or v6 address
+ //
+ if ((LocalIpSize != sizeof (EFI_IPv4_ADDRESS)) && (LocalIpSize != sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS))) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Locate the Hash Protocol
+ //
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiHash2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&Hash2Protocol);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to locate Hash Protocol: %r\n", Status));
+
+ //
+ // TcpCreateService(..) is expected to be called prior to this function
+ //
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Initialize the hash algorithm
+ //
+ Status = Hash2Protocol->HashInit (Hash2Protocol, &gEfiHashAlgorithmSha256Guid);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to initialize sha256 hash algorithm: %r\n", Status));
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ IsnHashCtx.LocalPort = LocalPort;
+ IsnHashCtx.RemotePort = RemotePort;
+ IsnHashCtx.Secret = mTcpGlobalSecret;
+
+ //
+ // Check the IP address family and copy accordingly
+ //
+ if (LocalIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv4_ADDRESS)) {
+ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.LocalAddress.IPv4, LocalIp, LocalIpSize);
+ } else if (LocalIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)) {
+ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.LocalAddress.IPv6, LocalIp, LocalIpSize);
+ } else {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; // Unsupported address size
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Repeat the process for the remote IP address
+ //
+ if (RemoteIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv4_ADDRESS)) {
+ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.RemoteAddress.IPv4, RemoteIp, RemoteIpSize);
+ } else if (RemoteIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)) {
+ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.RemoteAddress.IPv6, RemoteIp, RemoteIpSize);
+ } else {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; // Unsupported address size
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Compute the hash
+ // Update the hash with the data
+ //
+ Status = Hash2Protocol->HashUpdate (Hash2Protocol, (UINT8 *)&IsnHashCtx, sizeof (IsnHashCtx));
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to update hash: %r\n", Status));
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Finalize the hash and retrieve the result
+ //
+ Status = Hash2Protocol->HashFinal (Hash2Protocol, &HashResult);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to finalize hash: %r\n", Status));
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->GetTime (&TimeStamp, NULL);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // copy the first 4 bytes of the hash result into the ISN
+ //
+ CopyMem (Isn, HashResult.Md5Hash, sizeof (*Isn));
+
+ //
+ // now add the timestamp to the ISN as 4 microseconds units (1000 / 4 = 250)
+ //
+ *Isn += (TCP_SEQNO)TimeStamp.Nanosecond * 250;
+
+ return Status;
}
/**
@@ -721,17 +926,28 @@ TcpFormatNetbuf (
@param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB that wants to initiate a
connection.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully
+ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation
+
**/
-VOID
+EFI_STATUS
TcpOnAppConnect (
IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb
)
{
- TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb);
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ Status = TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
TcpSetState (Tcb, TCP_SYN_SENT);
TcpSetTimer (Tcb, TCP_TIMER_CONNECT, Tcb->ConnectTimeout);
TcpToSendData (Tcb, 1);
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
/**
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c
index 5d2e124977d9..065b1bdf5feb 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
TCP timer related functions.
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2010, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
@@ -483,7 +483,6 @@ TcpTickingDpc (
INT16 Index;
mTcpTick++;
- mTcpGlobalIss += TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_2;
//
// Don't use LIST_FOR_EACH, which isn't delete safe.

307
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-wire-up-RngDxe.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
From 0aa96c512c689426838ec1cf4aa78ff088c03a1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 24 May 2024 12:51:17 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: wire up RngDxe
Add OvmfRng include snippets with the random number generator
configuration for OVMF. Include RngDxe, build with BaseRngLib,
so the rdrand instruction is used (if available).
Also move VirtioRng to the include snippets.
Use the new include snippets for OVMF builds.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 712797cf19acd292bf203522a79e40e7e13d268b)
---
OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 2 +-
OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf | 3 ++-
OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc | 9 +++++++++
OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc | 6 ++++++
OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc | 2 +-
OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf | 3 ++-
OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc | 2 +-
OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf | 3 ++-
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 2 +-
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf | 3 ++-
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 2 +-
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf | 3 ++-
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 2 +-
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 3 ++-
14 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
index cf1ad83e09..4edc2a9069 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
@@ -651,7 +651,6 @@
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
!endif
@@ -763,6 +762,7 @@
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
}
!endif
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf
OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf {
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf
index c56c98dc85..480837b0fa 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf
@@ -220,7 +220,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
!endif
@@ -316,6 +315,8 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
#
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
+
################################################################################
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..68839a0caa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+##
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+##
+
+ SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxe.inf {
+ <LibraryClasses>
+ RngLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/BaseRngLib.inf
+ }
+ OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..99cb4a32b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+##
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+##
+
+INF SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxe.inf
+INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc
index 9f49b60ff0..4b7e1596fc 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc
@@ -641,7 +641,6 @@
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
!endif
@@ -752,6 +751,7 @@
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
}
!endif
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf
index ce5d542048..88d0f75ae2 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf
@@ -285,7 +285,6 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
#
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
!endif
@@ -333,6 +332,8 @@ INF OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf
INF OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
+
################################################################################
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc
index fb73f2e089..9206f01816 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc
@@ -754,7 +754,6 @@
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
MdeModulePkg/Universal/WatchdogTimerDxe/WatchdogTimer.inf
MdeModulePkg/Universal/MonotonicCounterRuntimeDxe/MonotonicCounterRuntimeDxe.inf
@@ -880,6 +879,7 @@
gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
}
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf
index 055e659a35..c8268d7e8c 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf
@@ -204,7 +204,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
@@ -303,6 +302,8 @@ INF OvmfPkg/EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe/Fvb.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
+
################################################################################
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
index 65a866ae0c..b64c215585 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
@@ -804,7 +804,6 @@
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
@@ -942,6 +941,7 @@
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
}
!endif
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf
index 10eb6fe72b..c31276e4a3 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf
@@ -236,7 +236,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
@@ -367,6 +366,8 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
#
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
+
!if $(LOAD_X64_ON_IA32_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/CompatImageLoaderDxe/CompatImageLoaderDxe.inf
!endif
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
index 679e25501b..ececac3757 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
@@ -822,7 +822,6 @@
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
@@ -960,6 +959,7 @@
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
}
!endif
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf
index ff06bbfc6f..a7b4aeac08 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf
@@ -237,7 +237,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
@@ -374,6 +373,8 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
#
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
+
################################################################################
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
index d294fd4625..0ab4d3df06 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
@@ -890,7 +890,6 @@
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
@@ -1028,6 +1027,7 @@
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
}
!endif
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
index f3b787201f..ae08ac4fe9 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
@@ -262,7 +262,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
@@ -408,6 +407,8 @@ INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/TdTcg2Dxe/TdTcg2Dxe.inf
#
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
+
################################################################################
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]

42
SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-RngDxe-add-rng-test.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From a61bc0accb8a76edba4f073fdc7bafc908df045d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 09:49:13 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] SecurityPkg/RngDxe: add rng test
Check whenever RngLib actually returns random numbers, only return
a non-zero number of Algorithms if that is the case.
This has the effect that RndDxe loads and installs EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL
only in case it can actually deliver random numbers.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
---
SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c
index 5723ed695747..8b0742bab6c4 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <Library/RngLib.h>
#include "RngDxeInternals.h"
@@ -43,7 +44,12 @@ GetAvailableAlgorithms (
VOID
)
{
- mAvailableAlgoArrayCount = RNG_ALGORITHM_COUNT;
+ UINT64 RngTest;
+
+ if (GetRandomNumber64 (&RngTest)) {
+ mAvailableAlgoArrayCount = RNG_ALGORITHM_COUNT;
+ }
+
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}

126
SOURCES/edk2-StandaloneMmPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
From 9a75b030cf27d2530444e9a2f9f11867f79bf679 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 13:03:26 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] StandaloneMmPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob()
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4166
Fix integer overflow in various CreateHob instances.
Fixes: CVE-2022-36765
The CreateHob() function aligns the requested size to 8
performing the following operation:
```
HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7));
```
No checks are performed to ensure this value doesn't
overflow, and could lead to CreateHob() returning a smaller
HOB than requested, which could lead to OOB HOB accesses.
Reported-by: Marc Beatove <mbeatove@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: John Mathew <john.mathews@intel.com>
Authored-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
---
.../Arm/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
diff --git a/StandaloneMmPkg/Library/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib/Arm/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib.c b/StandaloneMmPkg/Library/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib/Arm/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib.c
index 1550e1babc83..59473e28fe59 100644
--- a/StandaloneMmPkg/Library/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib/Arm/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib.c
+++ b/StandaloneMmPkg/Library/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib/Arm/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib.c
@@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ CreateHob (
HandOffHob = GetHobList ();
+ //
+ // Check Length to avoid data overflow.
+ //
+ if (HobLength > MAX_UINT16 - 0x7) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7));
FreeMemory = HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryTop - HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryBottom;
@@ -89,6 +96,10 @@ BuildModuleHob (
);
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_MODULE));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
CopyGuid (&(Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.Name), &gEfiHobMemoryAllocModuleGuid);
Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.MemoryBaseAddress = MemoryAllocationModule;
@@ -129,6 +140,9 @@ BuildResourceDescriptorHob (
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR, sizeof (EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR));
ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
Hob->ResourceType = ResourceType;
Hob->ResourceAttribute = ResourceAttribute;
@@ -167,6 +181,11 @@ BuildGuidHob (
ASSERT (DataLength <= (0xffff - sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE)));
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_GUID_EXTENSION, (UINT16)(sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE) + DataLength));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
CopyGuid (&Hob->Name, Guid);
return Hob + 1;
}
@@ -226,6 +245,10 @@ BuildFvHob (
EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME *Hob;
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress;
Hob->Length = Length;
@@ -255,6 +278,10 @@ BuildFv2Hob (
EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2 *Hob;
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV2, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress;
Hob->Length = Length;
@@ -282,6 +309,10 @@ BuildCpuHob (
EFI_HOB_CPU *Hob;
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_CPU, sizeof (EFI_HOB_CPU));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
Hob->SizeOfMemorySpace = SizeOfMemorySpace;
Hob->SizeOfIoSpace = SizeOfIoSpace;
@@ -319,6 +350,10 @@ BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
);
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION));
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
ZeroMem (&(Hob->AllocDescriptor.Name), sizeof (EFI_GUID));
Hob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress = BaseAddress;

37
SPECS/edk2.spec
View File

@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64
Name: edk2
Version: %{GITDATE}
Release: 6%{?dist}
Release: 6%{?dist}.2.alma.1
Summary: UEFI firmware for 64-bit virtual machines
License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent and Apache-2.0 and MIT
URL: http://www.tianocore.org
@ -265,6 +265,28 @@ Patch69: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Packet-Length-is-not-updated-bef.patch
# For RHEL-21853 - TRIAGE CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-9]
Patch70: edk2-NetworkPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml.patch
# Patches were taken from:
# https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/aeaee8944f0eaacbf4cdf39279785b9ba4836bb6
Patch71: edk2-EmbeddedPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch
# https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/9a75b030cf27d2530444e9a2f9f11867f79bf679
Patch72: edk2-StandaloneMmPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch
# https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/4c4ceb2ceb80c42fd5545b2a4bd80321f07f4345
Patch73: edk2-NetworkPkg-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45237.patch
# https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/1904a64bcc18199738e5be183d28887ac5d837d7
Patch74: edk2-NetworkPkg-TcpDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45236.patch
# https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/ced13b93afea87a8a1fe6ddbb67240a84cb2e3d3
Patch75: edk2-NetworkPkg-TcpDxe-Fixed-system-stuck-on-PXE-boot-flow-in.patch
# https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/c3a8ca7b54a9fd17acdf16c6282a92cc989fa92a
Patch76: edk2-MdePkg-BaseRngLib-Add-a-smoketest-for-RDRAND-and-check-CPUID.patch
# https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/a61bc0accb8a76edba4f073fdc7bafc908df045d
Patch77: edk2-SecurityPkg-RngDxe-add-rng-test.patch
# https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/rpms/edk2/-/commit/5872fb18b4e645856614429dfffbb704858a9ea7
Patch78: edk2-OvmfPkg-wire-up-RngDxe.patch
# https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/94961b8817eec6f8d0434555ac50a7aa51c22201
Patch79: edk2-CryptoPkg-Test-call-ProcessLibraryConstructorList.patch
# https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/5e776299a2604b336a947e68593012ab2cc16eb4
Patch80: edk2-MdePkg-X86UnitTestHost-set-rdrand-cpuid-bit.patch
# python3-devel and libuuid-devel are required for building tools.
# python3-devel is also needed for varstore template generation and
# verification with "ovmf-vars-generator".
@ -597,6 +619,19 @@ install -m 0644 \
%changelog
* Wed Jul 24 2024 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 20231122-6.2.alma.1
- CryptoPkg/Test: call ProcessLibraryConstructorList
- EmbeddedPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob()
- MdePkg/BaseRngLib: Add a smoketest for RDRAND and check CPUID
- MdePkg/X86UnitTestHost: set rdrand cpuid bit
- NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45237
- NetworkPkg TcpDxe: Fixed system stuck on PXE boot flow in
iPXE environment
- NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236
- OvmfPkg: wire up RngDxe
- SecurityPkg/RngDxe: add rng test
- StandaloneMmPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob()
* Thu Feb 22 2024 Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com> - 20231122-6
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853]