diff --git a/edk2-MdePkg-ArchitecturalMsr.h-add-defines-for-MTRR-cache.patch b/edk2-MdePkg-ArchitecturalMsr.h-add-defines-for-MTRR-cache.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7d8f107 --- /dev/null +++ b/edk2-MdePkg-ArchitecturalMsr.h-add-defines-for-MTRR-cache.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 08fc72d06946ef3adebf110c097ed869ab0ed416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:04:39 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 7/9] MdePkg/ArchitecturalMsr.h: add #defines for MTRR cache + types + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 55: OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process. +RH-Jira: RHEL-21704 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [2/4] a568bc2793d677462a2971aae9566a9bbc64b063 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2) + +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Message-ID: <20240130130441.772484-3-kraxel@redhat.com> +--- + MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h b/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h +index 756e7c86ec..08ba949cf7 100644 +--- a/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h ++++ b/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h +@@ -2103,6 +2103,13 @@ typedef union { + #define MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE9 0x00000212 + /// @} + ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_UNCACHEABLE 0 ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_COMBINING 1 ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_THROUGH 4 ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_PROTECTED 5 ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK 6 ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_INVALID_TYPE 7 ++ + /** + MSR information returned for MSR indexes #MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE0 to + #MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE9 +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-Setup-MTRR-early-in-the-boot-process.patch b/edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-Setup-MTRR-early-in-the-boot-process.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a44211 --- /dev/null +++ b/edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-Setup-MTRR-early-in-the-boot-process.patch @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +From 7b1298045185749369115719317dc92f58af92d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:04:38 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 6/9] OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process. + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 55: OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process. +RH-Jira: RHEL-21704 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [1/4] c4061788d34f409944898b48642d610c259161f3 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2) + +Specifically before running lzma uncompress of the main firmware volume. +This is needed to make sure caching is enabled, otherwise the uncompress +can be extremely slow. + +Adapt the ASSERTs and MTRR setup in PlatformInitLib to the changes. + +Background: Depending on virtual machine configuration kvm may uses EPT +memory types to apply guest MTRR settings. In case MTRRs are disabled +kvm will use the uncachable memory type for all mappings. The +vmx_get_mt_mask() function in the linux kernel handles this and can be +found here: + +https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c?h=v6.7.1#n7580 + +In most VM configurations kvm uses MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK unconditionally. In +case the VM has a mdev device assigned that is not the case though. + +Before commit e8aa4c6546ad ("UefiCpuPkg/ResetVector: Cache Disable +should not be set by default in CR0") kvm also ended up using +MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK due to KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED. After that commit +kvm evaluates guest mtrr settings, which why setting up MTRRs early is +important now. + +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Message-ID: <20240130130441.772484-2-kraxel@redhat.com> + +[ kraxel: Downstream-only for now. Timely upstream merge is unlikely + due to chinese holidays and rhel-9.4 deadlines are close. + QE regression testing passed. So go with upstream posted + series v3 ] +--- + OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++ + OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c | 10 +++---- + OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c +index 42a587adfa..0daddac0a0 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c +@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + + #define SEC_IDT_ENTRY_COUNT 34 + +@@ -48,6 +50,31 @@ IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR mIdtEntryTemplate = { + } + }; + ++// ++// Enable MTRR early, set default type to write back. ++// Needed to make sure caching is enabled, ++// without this lzma decompress can be very slow. ++// ++STATIC ++VOID ++SecMtrrSetup ( ++ VOID ++ ) ++{ ++ CPUID_VERSION_INFO_EDX Edx; ++ MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_REGISTER DefType; ++ ++ AsmCpuid (CPUID_VERSION_INFO, NULL, NULL, NULL, &Edx.Uint32); ++ if (!Edx.Bits.MTRR) { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE); ++ DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */ ++ DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */ ++ AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64); ++} ++ + VOID + EFIAPI + SecCoreStartupWithStack ( +@@ -204,6 +231,11 @@ SecCoreStartupWithStack ( + InitializeApicTimer (0, MAX_UINT32, TRUE, 5); + DisableApicTimerInterrupt (); + ++ // ++ // Initialize MTRR ++ // ++ SecMtrrSetup (); ++ + PeilessStartup (&SecCoreData); + + ASSERT (FALSE); +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c +index 662e7e85bb..f8d7f5bf1c 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c +@@ -1035,18 +1035,18 @@ PlatformQemuInitializeRam ( + MtrrGetAllMtrrs (&MtrrSettings); + + // +- // MTRRs disabled, fixed MTRRs disabled, default type is uncached ++ // See SecMtrrSetup(), default type should be write back + // +- ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & BIT11) == 0); ++ ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & BIT11) != 0); + ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & BIT10) == 0); +- ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & 0xFF) == 0); ++ ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & 0xFF) == MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK); + + // + // flip default type to writeback + // +- SetMem (&MtrrSettings.Fixed, sizeof MtrrSettings.Fixed, 0x06); ++ SetMem (&MtrrSettings.Fixed, sizeof MtrrSettings.Fixed, MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK); + ZeroMem (&MtrrSettings.Variables, sizeof MtrrSettings.Variables); +- MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType |= BIT11 | BIT10 | 6; ++ MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType |= BIT10; + MtrrSetAllMtrrs (&MtrrSettings); + + // +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c +index 31da5d0ace..3b7dc7205d 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c +@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include "AmdSev.h" + + #define SEC_IDT_ENTRY_COUNT 34 +@@ -744,6 +746,31 @@ FindAndReportEntryPoints ( + return; + } + ++// ++// Enable MTRR early, set default type to write back. ++// Needed to make sure caching is enabled, ++// without this lzma decompress can be very slow. ++// ++STATIC ++VOID ++SecMtrrSetup ( ++ VOID ++ ) ++{ ++ CPUID_VERSION_INFO_EDX Edx; ++ MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_REGISTER DefType; ++ ++ AsmCpuid (CPUID_VERSION_INFO, NULL, NULL, NULL, &Edx.Uint32); ++ if (!Edx.Bits.MTRR) { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE); ++ DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */ ++ DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */ ++ AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64); ++} ++ + VOID + EFIAPI + SecCoreStartupWithStack ( +@@ -942,6 +969,11 @@ SecCoreStartupWithStack ( + InitializeApicTimer (0, MAX_UINT32, TRUE, 5); + DisableApicTimerInterrupt (); + ++ // ++ // Initialize MTRR ++ // ++ SecMtrrSetup (); ++ + // + // Initialize Debug Agent to support source level debug in SEC/PEI phases before memory ready. + // +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-use-cache-type-defines-from-Architectura.patch b/edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-use-cache-type-defines-from-Architectura.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b36b4a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-use-cache-type-defines-from-Architectura.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 0e2a3df10d784fd38ceee2f6a733032d1333281f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:04:41 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 9/9] OvmfPkg/Sec: use cache type #defines from + ArchitecturalMsr.h + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 55: OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process. +RH-Jira: RHEL-21704 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [4/4] 55f00e3e153ca945ca458e7abc26780a8d83ac85 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2) + +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Message-ID: <20240130130441.772484-5-kraxel@redhat.com> +--- + OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c +index 0daddac0a0..c00b852f0e 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c +@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ SecMtrrSetup ( + } + + DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE); +- DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */ ++ DefType.Bits.Type = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK; + DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */ + AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64); + } +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c +index 3b7dc7205d..aa0fa1b1ec 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c +@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ SecMtrrSetup ( + } + + DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE); +- DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */ ++ DefType.Bits.Type = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK; + DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */ + AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64); + } +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-2.patch b/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..863438e --- /dev/null +++ b/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +From 31ebaa021650c9b23c27f3a7954d33c1ef1e1502 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 3/9] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH + 4117/4118 symbol rename + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 53: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764 +RH-Jira: RHEL-21157 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Commit: [3/5] d18f14e0a7df36223dab179bf7e9556db43f4c55 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21157 +CVE: CVE-2022-36764 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 40adbb7f628dee79156c679fb0857968b61b7620 +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:20 2024 -0800 + + SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename + + Updates the sanitation function names to be lib unique names + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + Cc: Rahul Kumar + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Message-Id: <7b18434c8a8b561654efd40ced3becb8b378c8f1.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com> + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 8 +++--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 8 +++--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 8 +++--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 26 +++++++++---------- + 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +index 714cc8e03e..73719f3b96 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + BlockIo->Media->BlockSize, + (UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader + ); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) { ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + // + // Read the partition entry. + // +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; +@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + // + // Prepare Data for Measurement (CcProtocol and Tcg2Protocol) + // +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &TcgEventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &TcgEventSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + FreePool (EntryPtr); +@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + } + + FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath); +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +index 2a4d52c6d5..809a3bfd89 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo + ) +@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize + ) +@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize +@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize ( + IN UINT32 FilePathSize, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ) +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +index 8f72ba4240..8526bc7537 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo + ); +@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize + ); +@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize +@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize ( + IN UINT32 FilePathSize, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ); +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +index 820e99aeb9..50a68e1076 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -84,27 +84,27 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize); + + // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!"" + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; + + // Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!" + PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); + + // Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!" + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; + +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic +@@ -146,19 +146,19 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + // Test that an overflow is detected + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test the inverse + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test the worst case scenario + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + NumberOfPartition = 13; + + // that the primary event size is correct +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Calculate the existing logic event size +@@ -207,12 +207,12 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize); + + // Tests that the primary event size may not overflow +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + FilePathSize = 255; + + // Test that a normal PE image passes validation +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_SUCCESS); + + // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic +@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + } + + // Test that the event size may not overflow +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch b/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3fa4b3e --- /dev/null +++ b/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +From 808551c1cb2ac9dc9a6287cbc85b167aa9eb2d7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:43:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 1/9] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - + CVE 2022-36764 + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 53: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764 +RH-Jira: RHEL-21157 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Commit: [1/5] 50edfd997d089549ac41b9592131ac1212fc3431 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21157 +CVE: CVE-2022-36764 +Upstream: Merged + +commit c7b27944218130cca3bbb20314ba5b88b5de4aa4 +Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] +Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:04 2024 +0800 + + SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764 + + This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib + CVE 2022-36764. + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 12 ++-- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 46 +++++++++++++- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 28 ++++++++- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++--- + 4 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +index 0475103d6e..714cc8e03e 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +@@ -378,7 +378,6 @@ Exit: + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED ImageType is unsupported or PE image is mal-format. + @retval other error value +- + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +@@ -405,6 +404,7 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + ImageLoad = NULL; + EventPtr = NULL; ++ Tcg2Event = NULL; + + Tcg2Protocol = MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol; + CcProtocol = MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol; +@@ -420,18 +420,22 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + } + + FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath); ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } + + // + // Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy + // +- EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize; +- EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)); ++ // from a malicious GPT disk partition ++ EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize); + if (EventPtr == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + + Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr; +- Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event); ++ Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize; + Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER); + Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION; + ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *)Tcg2Event->Event; +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +index e2309655d3..2a4d52c6d5 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + } + + /** +- This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane ++ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane + It will check the following: + - AllocationSize does not overflow + +@@ -273,3 +273,47 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UINT32 FilePathSize, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize; ++ Status = SafeUint32Add (OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath), FilePathSize, EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event) ++ Status = SafeUint32Add (*EventSize, OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event), EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +index 048b738987..8f72ba4240 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ + Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse + partition data carefully. + ++ Tcg2MeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its ++ data structure within this image buffer before use. ++ + Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +@@ -110,4 +113,27 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ); + +-#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UINT32 FilePathSize, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ); ++ ++#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +index 3eb9763e3c..820e99aeb9 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -72,10 +72,10 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + PrimaryHeader.Header.Revision = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION; + PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); + PrimaryHeader.MyLBA = 1; +- PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 2; +- PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 3; +- PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 4; +- PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 2; ++ PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 3; ++ PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 4; ++ PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 5; + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; + PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryArrayCRC32 = 0; // Purposely invalid +@@ -187,11 +187,6 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; + UINTN NumberOfPartition; +- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; +- EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event; +- +- Tcg2Event = NULL; +- GptData = NULL; + + // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; +@@ -225,6 +220,52 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; + } + ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizePeImageEventSize function. ++ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a file path when generating a ++ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT structure will not cause an overflow when calculating ++ the event size when allocating space ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINTN ExistingLogicEventSize; ++ UINT32 FilePathSize; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ FilePathSize = 255; ++ ++ // Test that a normal PE image passes validation ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_SUCCESS); ++ ++ // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic ++ ExistingLogicEventSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath) + FilePathSize; ++ ExistingLogicEventSize += OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event); ++ ++ if (EventSize != ExistingLogicEventSize) { ++ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize returned an incorrect event size. Expected %u, got %u\n", ExistingLogicEventSize, EventSize); ++ return UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED; ++ } ++ ++ // Test that the event size may not overflow ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ + // *--------------------------------------------------------------------* + // * Unit Test Code Main Function + // *--------------------------------------------------------------------* +@@ -267,6 +308,7 @@ UefiTestMain ( + AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL); + AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); + AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests PE Image and FileSize checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePeImageEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework); + +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-3.patch b/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3eba4fa --- /dev/null +++ b/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,280 @@ +From bf371de652c1132667666a9534ec2d91f9ea111d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 4/9] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH + 4117/4118 symbol rename + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 53: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764 +RH-Jira: RHEL-21157 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Commit: [4/5] bf00b368887b50b1ff5578a4491550b5741e3e34 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21157 +CVE: CVE-2022-36764 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 326db0c9072004dea89427ea3a44393a84966f2b +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:21 2024 -0800 + + SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename + + Updates the sanitation function names to be lib unique names + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + Cc: Rahul Kumar + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Message-Id: <355aa846a99ca6ac0f7574cf5982661da0d9fea6.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com> + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 8 +++--- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 10 +++---- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 8 +++--- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 26 +++++++++---------- + 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +index a9fc440a09..ac855b8fbb 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable ( + BlockIo->Media->BlockSize, + (UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader + ); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) { ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable ( + // + // Read the partition entry. + // +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable ( + // + // Prepare Data for Measurement + // +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); + TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize); + if (TcgEvent == NULL) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); +@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage ( + + // Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy + // +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c +index c989851cec..070e4a2c1c 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /** @file +- The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot and ++ The library instance provides security service of TPM measure boot and + Confidential Computing (CC) measure boot. + + Caution: This file requires additional review when modified. +@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo + ) +@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize + ) +@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize +@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + IN UINT32 FilePathSize, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ) +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h +index 2248495813..db6e9c3752 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo + ); +@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize + ); +@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize +@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + IN UINT32 FilePathSize, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ); +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +index c41498be45..de1740af41 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -83,27 +83,27 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize); + + // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!"" + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; + + // Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!" + PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); + + // Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!" + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; + +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic +@@ -145,19 +145,19 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + // Test that an overflow is detected + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test the inverse + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test the worst case scenario + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + NumberOfPartition = 13; + + // that the primary event size is correct +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Calculate the existing logic event size +@@ -206,12 +206,12 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize); + + // Tests that the primary event size may not overflow +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + FilePathSize = 255; + + // Test that a normal PE image passes validation +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize failed with %r\n", Status); + goto Exit; +@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + } + + // Test that the event size may not overflow +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); + if (Status != EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE) { + UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize succeded when it was supposed to fail with %r\n", Status); + goto Exit; +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch b/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..73e23fd --- /dev/null +++ b/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +From c5580cd68acf14c9e8660f6ee2842654479089ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:43:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 2/9] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - + CVE 2022-36764 + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 53: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764 +RH-Jira: RHEL-21157 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Commit: [2/5] 3945cfd0838c822a3b2cc4b4e315c39a779a7344 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21157 +CVE: CVE-2022-36764 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 0d341c01eeabe0ab5e76693b36e728b8f538a40e +Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] +Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:05 2024 +0800 + + SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764 + + This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpmMeasureBootLib + CVE 2022-36764. + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 13 ++- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 44 +++++++++ + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 23 +++++ + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++-- + 4 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +index 669ab19134..a9fc440a09 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ + + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
+ + Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +@@ -345,18 +346,22 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage ( + ImageLoad = NULL; + SectionHeader = NULL; + Sha1Ctx = NULL; ++ TcgEvent = NULL; + FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath); + +- // + // Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy + // +- EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize; +- TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT)); ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } ++ ++ TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize); + if (TcgEvent == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + +- TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize; ++ TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize - sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR); + ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *)TcgEvent->Event; + + switch (ImageType) { +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c +index a3fa46f5e6..c989851cec 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -239,3 +239,47 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UINT32 FilePathSize, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize; ++ Status = SafeUint32Add (OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath), FilePathSize, EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR) ++ Status = SafeUint32Add (*EventSize, sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR), EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h +index 0d9d00c281..2248495813 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -111,4 +111,27 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ); + ++/** ++ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UINT32 FilePathSize, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ); ++ + #endif // DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +index eeb928cdb0..c41498be45 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ + /** @file +-This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c. ++ This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c. + +-Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
+-SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + **/ + + #include +@@ -186,9 +186,6 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; + UINTN NumberOfPartition; +- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; +- +- GptData = NULL; + + // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; +@@ -222,6 +219,94 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; + } + ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizePeImageEventSize function. ++ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a file path for an ++ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT structure will not cause an overflow when calculating ++ the event size when allocating space. ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINTN ExistingLogicEventSize; ++ UINT32 FilePathSize; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL DevicePath; ++ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoadEvent; ++ UNIT_TEST_STATUS TestStatus; ++ ++ TestStatus = UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED; ++ ++ // Generate EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL test data ++ DevicePath.Type = 0; ++ DevicePath.SubType = 0; ++ DevicePath.Length[0] = 0; ++ DevicePath.Length[1] = 0; ++ ++ // Generate EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT test data ++ ImageLoadEvent = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT) + sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL)); ++ if (ImageLoadEvent == NULL) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: AllocateZeroPool failed\n", __func__)); ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ ++ // Populate EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT54 test data ++ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLocationInMemory = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)0x12345678; ++ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLengthInMemory = 0x1000; ++ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLinkTimeAddress = (UINTN)ImageLoadEvent; ++ ImageLoadEvent->LengthOfDevicePath = sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL); ++ CopyMem (ImageLoadEvent->DevicePath, &DevicePath, sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL)); ++ ++ FilePathSize = 255; ++ ++ // Test that a normal PE image passes validation ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize failed with %r\n", Status); ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ ++ // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic ++ ExistingLogicEventSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath) + FilePathSize; ++ ExistingLogicEventSize += sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR); ++ ++ if (EventSize != ExistingLogicEventSize) { ++ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize returned an incorrect event size. Expected %u, got %u\n", ExistingLogicEventSize, EventSize); ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ ++ // Test that the event size may not overflow ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ if (Status != EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE) { ++ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize succeded when it was supposed to fail with %r\n", Status); ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ ++ TestStatus = UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++Exit: ++ ++ if (ImageLoadEvent != NULL) { ++ FreePool (ImageLoadEvent); ++ } ++ ++ if (TestStatus == UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Test failed\n", __func__)); ++ } else { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ } ++ ++ return TestStatus; ++} ++ + // *--------------------------------------------------------------------* + // * Unit Test Code Main Function + // *--------------------------------------------------------------------* +@@ -265,6 +350,7 @@ UefiTestMain ( + AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL); + AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); + AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests PE Image and FileSize checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePeImageEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework); + +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch b/edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2bc41c --- /dev/null +++ b/edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +From 95697612d2f1953c691b0914a1669e0fcf179767 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 5/9] SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol + rename + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 53: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764 +RH-Jira: RHEL-21157 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Commit: [5/5] 8e0c9c8c6b6ad05454f138397036954fe36c778c + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21157 +CVE: CVE-2022-36764 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 264636d8e6983e0f6dc6be2fca9d84ec81315954 +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:22 2024 -0800 + + SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename + + Adding the new commit titles for the symbol renames + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + Cc: Rahul Kumar + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Message-Id: <5e0e851e97459e183420178888d4fcdadc2f1ae1.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com> + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml +index f9e3e7be74..dc1bb83489 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml ++++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml +@@ -9,14 +9,35 @@ CVE_2022_36763: + - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2Measurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763" + - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763" + - "SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36763 to SecurityFixes.yaml" ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename" ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename" ++ - "SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename" + cve: CVE-2022-36763 + date_reported: 2022-10-25 11:31 UTC + description: (CVE-2022-36763) - Heap Buffer Overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() + note: This patch is related to and supersedes TCBZ2168 + files_impacted: +- - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +- - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++ - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++ - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c + links: +- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4117 +- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2168 +- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1990 ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4117 ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2168 ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1990 ++CVE_2022_36764: ++ commit_titles: ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764" ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764" ++ - "SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36764 to SecurityFixes.yaml" ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename" ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename" ++ - "SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename" ++ cve: CVE-2022-36764 ++ date_reported: 2022-10-25 12:23 UTC ++ description: Heap Buffer Overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() ++ note: ++ files_impacted: ++ - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++ - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++ links: ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4118 ++ +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MtrrLib.h-use-cache-type-defines-from-Arc.patch b/edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MtrrLib.h-use-cache-type-defines-from-Arc.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21649cf --- /dev/null +++ b/edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MtrrLib.h-use-cache-type-defines-from-Arc.patch @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +From 4d3ac0527ceb615a49214b0f7249d9198ddeb53a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:04:40 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 8/9] UefiCpuPkg/MtrrLib.h: use cache type #defines from + ArchitecturalMsr.h + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 55: OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process. +RH-Jira: RHEL-21704 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [3/4] 8b766c97b247a8665662697534455c19423ff23c (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2) + +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Message-ID: <20240130130441.772484-4-kraxel@redhat.com> +--- + UefiCpuPkg/Include/Library/MtrrLib.h | 26 ++++++++++++++------------ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Include/Library/MtrrLib.h b/UefiCpuPkg/Include/Library/MtrrLib.h +index 86cc1aab3b..287d249a99 100644 +--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Include/Library/MtrrLib.h ++++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Include/Library/MtrrLib.h +@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ + #ifndef _MTRR_LIB_H_ + #define _MTRR_LIB_H_ + ++#include ++ + // + // According to IA32 SDM, MTRRs number and MSR offset are always consistent + // for IA32 processor family +@@ -82,20 +84,20 @@ typedef struct _MTRR_SETTINGS_ { + // Memory cache types + // + typedef enum { +- CacheUncacheable = 0, +- CacheWriteCombining = 1, +- CacheWriteThrough = 4, +- CacheWriteProtected = 5, +- CacheWriteBack = 6, +- CacheInvalid = 7 ++ CacheUncacheable = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_UNCACHEABLE, ++ CacheWriteCombining = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_COMBINING, ++ CacheWriteThrough = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_THROUGH, ++ CacheWriteProtected = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_PROTECTED, ++ CacheWriteBack = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK, ++ CacheInvalid = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_INVALID_TYPE, + } MTRR_MEMORY_CACHE_TYPE; + +-#define MTRR_CACHE_UNCACHEABLE 0 +-#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_COMBINING 1 +-#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_THROUGH 4 +-#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_PROTECTED 5 +-#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK 6 +-#define MTRR_CACHE_INVALID_TYPE 7 ++#define MTRR_CACHE_UNCACHEABLE MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_UNCACHEABLE ++#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_COMBINING MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_COMBINING ++#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_THROUGH MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_THROUGH ++#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_PROTECTED MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_PROTECTED ++#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK ++#define MTRR_CACHE_INVALID_TYPE MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_INVALID_TYPE + + typedef struct { + UINT64 BaseAddress; +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/edk2.spec b/edk2.spec index ab79214..e949af0 100644 --- a/edk2.spec +++ b/edk2.spec @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64 Name: edk2 Version: %{GITDATE} -Release: 4%{?dist} +Release: 5%{?dist} Summary: UEFI firmware for 64-bit virtual machines License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent and Apache-2.0 and MIT URL: http://www.tianocore.org @@ -102,6 +102,24 @@ Patch41: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-allow-larger-writes-without-.patch Patch42: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-ValidateFvHeader-unwritten-s.patch # For RHEL-20963 - [rhel9] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error Patch43: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-move-DoErase-code-block-into.patch +# For RHEL-21157 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-9] +Patch44: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch +# For RHEL-21157 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-9] +Patch45: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch +# For RHEL-21157 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-9] +Patch46: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-2.patch +# For RHEL-21157 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-9] +Patch47: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-3.patch +# For RHEL-21157 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-9] +Patch48: edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch +# For RHEL-21704 - vGPU VM take several minutes to show tianocore logo if firmware is ovmf +Patch49: edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-Setup-MTRR-early-in-the-boot-process.patch +# For RHEL-21704 - vGPU VM take several minutes to show tianocore logo if firmware is ovmf +Patch50: edk2-MdePkg-ArchitecturalMsr.h-add-defines-for-MTRR-cache.patch +# For RHEL-21704 - vGPU VM take several minutes to show tianocore logo if firmware is ovmf +Patch51: edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MtrrLib.h-use-cache-type-defines-from-Arc.patch +# For RHEL-21704 - vGPU VM take several minutes to show tianocore logo if firmware is ovmf +Patch52: edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-use-cache-type-defines-from-Architectura.patch # python3-devel and libuuid-devel are required for building tools. # python3-devel is also needed for varstore template generation and @@ -435,6 +453,21 @@ install -m 0644 \ %changelog +* Mon Feb 19 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20231122-5 +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch [RHEL-21157] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch [RHEL-21157] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-2.patch [RHEL-21157] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-3.patch [RHEL-21157] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch [RHEL-21157] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-Setup-MTRR-early-in-the-boot-process.patch [RHEL-21704] +- edk2-MdePkg-ArchitecturalMsr.h-add-defines-for-MTRR-cache.patch [RHEL-21704] +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MtrrLib.h-use-cache-type-defines-from-Arc.patch [RHEL-21704] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-use-cache-type-defines-from-Architectura.patch [RHEL-21704] +- Resolves: RHEL-21157 + (CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21704 + (vGPU VM take several minutes to show tianocore logo if firmware is ovmf) + * Wed Jan 31 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20231122-4 - edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-casts-to-UINTN-and-UINT3.patch [RHEL-20963] - edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clarify-block-write-logic-fi.patch [RHEL-20963]