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import CS edk2-20220126gitbb1bba3d77-12.el8

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eabdullin 2024-03-27 19:36:48 +00:00
parent 240ec490a7
commit 600e99fc80
56 changed files with 25931 additions and 4 deletions
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2
.edk2.metadata
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@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
ae830c7278f985cb25e90f4687b46c8b22316bef SOURCES/edk2-bb1bba3d77.tar.xz
df2e14a45d968b590194d82736fcbfe2be10d1b0 SOURCES/openssl-rhel-d00c3c5b8a9d6d3ea3dabfcafdf36afd61ba8bcc.tar.xz
85388ae6525650667302c6b553894430197d9e0d SOURCES/openssl-rhel-cf317b2bb227899cb2e761b9163210f62cab1b1e.tar.xz

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.gitignore vendored
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SOURCES/edk2-bb1bba3d77.tar.xz
SOURCES/openssl-rhel-d00c3c5b8a9d6d3ea3dabfcafdf36afd61ba8bcc.tar.xz
SOURCES/openssl-rhel-cf317b2bb227899cb2e761b9163210f62cab1b1e.tar.xz

1735
SOURCES/edk2-Apply-uncrustify-changes-to-.c-.h-files-in-the-Netwo.patch Normal file
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149
SOURCES/edk2-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-migrate-to-OVMF-s-VirtNorFlas.patch Normal file
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From 9ef10bbe9a03f22aa5c5ff659012794d37ef9839 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 18:41:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 17/18] ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu: migrate to OVMF's
VirtNorFlashDxe
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [19/20] 2160140b0ea566451ab723e941d2ab91e1ad874e
Switch to the virt specific NorFlashDxe driver implementation that was
added recently.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
(cherry picked from commit b92298af8218dd074c231947bc95f2be94af663c)
---
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 4 ++--
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc | 2 +-
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc | 4 ++--
ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.c | 12 ++++++------
.../Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf | 4 ++--
5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc
index e6fad9f066..2b23becf30 100644
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
ArmPlatformLib|ArmPlatformPkg/Library/ArmPlatformLibNull/ArmPlatformLibNull.inf
TimerLib|ArmPkg/Library/ArmArchTimerLib/ArmArchTimerLib.inf
- NorFlashPlatformLib|ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf
+ VirtNorFlashPlatformLib|ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf
CapsuleLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibNull/DxeCapsuleLibNull.inf
BootLogoLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/BootLogoLib/BootLogoLib.inf
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@
<LibraryClasses>
NULL|ArmVirtPkg/Library/ArmVirtTimerFdtClientLib/ArmVirtTimerFdtClientLib.inf
}
- ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashDxe.inf
+ OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
MdeModulePkg/Universal/WatchdogTimerDxe/WatchdogTimer.inf
#
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc
index f6a538df72..7c655d384d 100644
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
INF ArmPkg/Drivers/ArmGic/ArmGicDxe.inf
INF ArmPkg/Drivers/TimerDxe/TimerDxe.inf
- INF ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashDxe.inf
+ INF OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/WatchdogTimerDxe/WatchdogTimer.inf
#
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc
index 656c9d99a3..344e2c4ed9 100644
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
ArmVirtMemInfoLib|ArmVirtPkg/Library/QemuVirtMemInfoLib/QemuVirtMemInfoLib.inf
TimerLib|ArmPkg/Library/ArmArchTimerLib/ArmArchTimerLib.inf
- NorFlashPlatformLib|ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf
+ VirtNorFlashPlatformLib|ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf
CapsuleLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibNull/DxeCapsuleLibNull.inf
BootLogoLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/BootLogoLib/BootLogoLib.inf
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@
<LibraryClasses>
NULL|ArmVirtPkg/Library/ArmVirtTimerFdtClientLib/ArmVirtTimerFdtClientLib.inf
}
- ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashDxe.inf
+ OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
MdeModulePkg/Universal/WatchdogTimerDxe/WatchdogTimer.inf
#
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.c b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.c
index 271d7f0efb..93a2fed40f 100644
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.c
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.c
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
-#include <Library/NorFlashPlatformLib.h>
#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
+#include <Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h>
#include <Protocol/FdtClient.h>
@@ -18,19 +18,19 @@
#define MAX_FLASH_BANKS 4
EFI_STATUS
-NorFlashPlatformInitialization (
+VirtNorFlashPlatformInitialization (
VOID
)
{
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
-NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION mNorFlashDevices[MAX_FLASH_BANKS];
+STATIC VIRT_NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION mNorFlashDevices[MAX_FLASH_BANKS];
EFI_STATUS
-NorFlashPlatformGetDevices (
- OUT NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION **NorFlashDescriptions,
- OUT UINT32 *Count
+VirtNorFlashPlatformGetDevices (
+ OUT VIRT_NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION **NorFlashDescriptions,
+ OUT UINT32 *Count
)
{
FDT_CLIENT_PROTOCOL *FdtClient;
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf
index 4c3683bf5d..a6b5865be9 100644
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf
@@ -14,17 +14,17 @@
FILE_GUID = 339B7829-4C5F-4EFC-B2DD-5050E530DECE
MODULE_TYPE = DXE_DRIVER
VERSION_STRING = 1.0
- LIBRARY_CLASS = NorFlashPlatformLib
+ LIBRARY_CLASS = VirtNorFlashPlatformLib
[Sources.common]
NorFlashQemuLib.c
[Packages]
MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
- ArmPlatformPkg/ArmPlatformPkg.dec
ArmPkg/ArmPkg.dec
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtPkg.dec
EmbeddedPkg/EmbeddedPkg.dec
+ OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
[LibraryClasses]
BaseLib
--
2.41.0

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SOURCES/edk2-MdePkg-Introduce-CcMeasurementProtocol-for-CC-Guest-.patch Normal file
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From b8261ac422ba284249cd4f341d78d058e79960f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 11:56:37 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 03/17] MdePkg: Introduce CcMeasurementProtocol for CC Guest
firmware
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [3/13] 6bf304f8e3bc875024c8fb0a4cd5d2c944f69480 (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154
CVE: CVE-2022-36763
Upstream: Merged
commit e193584da60550008722498442c62ddb77bf27d5
Author: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Date: Sat Dec 11 21:08:40 2021 +0800
MdePkg: Introduce CcMeasurementProtocol for CC Guest firmware
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3625
CC guest is a Confidential Computing guest. If CC Guest firmware
supports measurement and an event is created, CC Guest firmware
is designed to report the event log with the same data structure
in TCG-Platform-Firmware-Profile specification with
EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2 format.
The CC Guest firmware supports measurement. It is designed to
produce EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL with new GUID
EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID to report event log and provides
hash capability.
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Ken Lu <ken.lu@intel.com>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h | 302 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
MdePkg/MdePkg.dec | 6 +
2 files changed, 308 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h
diff --git a/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h b/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..68029e977f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+/** @file
+ If CC Guest firmware supports measurement and an event is created,
+ CC Guest firmware is designed to report the event log with the same
+ data structure in TCG-Platform-Firmware-Profile specification with
+ EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2 format.
+
+ The CC Guest firmware supports measurement, the CC Guest Firmware is
+ designed to produce EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL with new GUID
+ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID to report event log and provides hash
+ capability.
+
+Copyright (c) 2020 - 2021, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_H_
+#define CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_H_
+
+#include <IndustryStandard/UefiTcgPlatform.h>
+
+#define EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID \
+ { 0x96751a3d, 0x72f4, 0x41a6, { 0xa7, 0x94, 0xed, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x67, 0xae, 0x6b }}
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid;
+
+typedef struct _EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL;
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINT8 Major;
+ UINT8 Minor;
+} EFI_CC_VERSION;
+
+//
+// EFI_CC Type/SubType definition
+//
+#define EFI_CC_TYPE_NONE 0
+#define EFI_CC_TYPE_SEV 1
+#define EFI_CC_TYPE_TDX 2
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINT8 Type;
+ UINT8 SubType;
+} EFI_CC_TYPE;
+
+typedef UINT32 EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_BITMAP;
+typedef UINT32 EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT;
+typedef UINT32 EFI_CC_EVENT_ALGORITHM_BITMAP;
+typedef UINT32 EFI_CC_MR_INDEX;
+
+//
+// Intel TDX measure register index
+//
+#define TDX_MR_INDEX_MRTD 0
+#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR0 1
+#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR1 2
+#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR2 3
+#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR3 4
+
+#define EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2 0x00000002
+#define EFI_CC_BOOT_HASH_ALG_SHA384 0x00000004
+
+//
+// This bit is shall be set when an event shall be extended but not logged.
+//
+#define EFI_CC_FLAG_EXTEND_ONLY 0x0000000000000001
+//
+// This bit shall be set when the intent is to measure a PE/COFF image.
+//
+#define EFI_CC_FLAG_PE_COFF_IMAGE 0x0000000000000010
+
+#pragma pack (1)
+
+#define EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION 1
+
+typedef struct {
+ //
+ // Size of the event header itself (sizeof(EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER)).
+ //
+ UINT32 HeaderSize;
+ //
+ // Header version. For this version of this specification, the value shall be 1.
+ //
+ UINT16 HeaderVersion;
+ //
+ // Index of the MR (measurement register) that shall be extended.
+ //
+ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex;
+ //
+ // Type of the event that shall be extended (and optionally logged).
+ //
+ UINT32 EventType;
+} EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER;
+
+typedef struct {
+ //
+ // Total size of the event including the Size component, the header and the Event data.
+ //
+ UINT32 Size;
+ EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER Header;
+ UINT8 Event[1];
+} EFI_CC_EVENT;
+
+#pragma pack()
+
+typedef struct {
+ //
+ // Allocated size of the structure
+ //
+ UINT8 Size;
+ //
+ // Version of the EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY structure itself.
+ // For this version of the protocol, the Major version shall be set to 1
+ // and the Minor version shall be set to 0.
+ //
+ EFI_CC_VERSION StructureVersion;
+ //
+ // Version of the EFI CC Measurement protocol.
+ // For this version of the protocol, the Major version shall be set to 1
+ // and the Minor version shall be set to 0.
+ //
+ EFI_CC_VERSION ProtocolVersion;
+ //
+ // Supported hash algorithms
+ //
+ EFI_CC_EVENT_ALGORITHM_BITMAP HashAlgorithmBitmap;
+ //
+ // Bitmap of supported event log formats
+ //
+ EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_BITMAP SupportedEventLogs;
+
+ //
+ // Indicates the CC type
+ //
+ EFI_CC_TYPE CcType;
+} EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY;
+
+/**
+ The EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL GetCapability function call provides protocol
+ capability information and state information.
+
+ @param[in] This Indicates the calling context
+ @param[in, out] ProtocolCapability The caller allocates memory for a EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY
+ structure and sets the size field to the size of the structure allocated.
+ The callee fills in the fields with the EFI CC BOOT Service capability
+ information and the current CC information.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation completed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The command was unsuccessful.
+ The ProtocolCapability variable will not be populated.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the parameters are incorrect.
+ The ProtocolCapability variable will not be populated.
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The ProtocolCapability variable is too small to hold the full response.
+ It will be partially populated (required Size field will be set).
+**/
+typedef
+EFI_STATUS
+(EFIAPI *EFI_CC_GET_CAPABILITY)(
+ IN EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN OUT EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY *ProtocolCapability
+ );
+
+/**
+ The EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL Get Event Log function call allows a caller to
+ retrieve the address of a given event log and its last entry.
+
+ @param[in] This Indicates the calling context
+ @param[in] EventLogFormat The type of the event log for which the information is requested.
+ @param[out] EventLogLocation A pointer to the memory address of the event log.
+ @param[out] EventLogLastEntry If the Event Log contains more than one entry, this is a pointer to the
+ address of the start of the last entry in the event log in memory.
+ @param[out] EventLogTruncated If the Event Log is missing at least one entry because an event would
+ have exceeded the area allocated for events, this value is set to TRUE.
+ Otherwise, the value will be FALSE and the Event Log will be complete.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation completed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the parameters are incorrect
+ (e.g. asking for an event log whose format is not supported).
+**/
+typedef
+EFI_STATUS
+(EFIAPI *EFI_CC_GET_EVENT_LOG)(
+ IN EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT EventLogFormat,
+ OUT EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *EventLogLocation,
+ OUT EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *EventLogLastEntry,
+ OUT BOOLEAN *EventLogTruncated
+ );
+
+/**
+ The EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL HashLogExtendEvent function call provides
+ callers with an opportunity to extend and optionally log events without requiring
+ knowledge of actual CC commands.
+ The extend operation will occur even if this function cannot create an event
+ log entry (e.g. due to the event log being full).
+
+ @param[in] This Indicates the calling context
+ @param[in] Flags Bitmap providing additional information.
+ @param[in] DataToHash Physical address of the start of the data buffer to be hashed.
+ @param[in] DataToHashLen The length in bytes of the buffer referenced by DataToHash.
+ @param[in] EfiCcEvent Pointer to data buffer containing information about the event.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation completed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The command was unsuccessful.
+ @retval EFI_VOLUME_FULL The extend operation occurred, but the event could not be written to one or more event logs.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the parameters are incorrect.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The PE/COFF image type is not supported.
+**/
+typedef
+EFI_STATUS
+(EFIAPI *EFI_CC_HASH_LOG_EXTEND_EVENT)(
+ IN EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN UINT64 Flags,
+ IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS DataToHash,
+ IN UINT64 DataToHashLen,
+ IN EFI_CC_EVENT *EfiCcEvent
+ );
+
+/**
+ The EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL MapPcrToMrIndex function call provides callers
+ the info on TPM PCR <-> CC MR mapping information.
+
+ @param[in] This Indicates the calling context
+ @param[in] PcrIndex TPM PCR index.
+ @param[out] MrIndex CC MR index.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The MrIndex is returned.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The MrIndex is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The PcrIndex is invalid.
+**/
+typedef
+EFI_STATUS
+(EFIAPI *EFI_CC_MAP_PCR_TO_MR_INDEX)(
+ IN EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN TCG_PCRINDEX PcrIndex,
+ OUT EFI_CC_MR_INDEX *MrIndex
+ );
+
+struct _EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL {
+ EFI_CC_GET_CAPABILITY GetCapability;
+ EFI_CC_GET_EVENT_LOG GetEventLog;
+ EFI_CC_HASH_LOG_EXTEND_EVENT HashLogExtendEvent;
+ EFI_CC_MAP_PCR_TO_MR_INDEX MapPcrToMrIndex;
+};
+
+//
+// CC event log
+//
+
+#pragma pack(1)
+
+//
+// Crypto Agile Log Entry Format.
+// It is similar with TCG_PCR_EVENT2 except the field of MrIndex and PCRIndex.
+//
+typedef struct {
+ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex;
+ UINT32 EventType;
+ TPML_DIGEST_VALUES Digests;
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ UINT8 Event[1];
+} CC_EVENT;
+
+//
+// EFI CC Event Header
+// It is similar with TCG_PCR_EVENT2_HDR except the field of MrIndex and PCRIndex
+//
+typedef struct {
+ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex;
+ UINT32 EventType;
+ TPML_DIGEST_VALUES Digests;
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+} CC_EVENT_HDR;
+
+#pragma pack()
+
+//
+// Log entries after Get Event Log service
+//
+
+#define EFI_CC_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE_VERSION 1
+
+typedef struct {
+ //
+ // The version of this structure. It shall be set to 1.
+ //
+ UINT64 Version;
+ //
+ // Number of events recorded after invocation of GetEventLog API
+ //
+ UINT64 NumberOfEvents;
+ //
+ // List of events of type CC_EVENT.
+ //
+ // CC_EVENT Event[1];
+} EFI_CC_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE;
+
+#define EFI_CC_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE_GUID \
+ {0xdd4a4648, 0x2de7, 0x4665, {0x96, 0x4d, 0x21, 0xd9, 0xef, 0x5f, 0xb4, 0x46}}
+
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCcFinalEventsTableGuid;
+
+#endif
diff --git a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
index 8b18415b10..6389a48338 100644
--- a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+++ b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
@@ -823,6 +823,9 @@
#
gLinuxEfiInitrdMediaGuid = {0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, {0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68}}
+ ## Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h
+ gEfiCcFinalEventsTableGuid = { 0xdd4a4648, 0x2de7, 0x4665, { 0x96, 0x4d, 0x21, 0xd9, 0xef, 0x5f, 0xb4, 0x46 }}
+
[Guids.IA32, Guids.X64]
## Include/Guid/Cper.h
gEfiIa32X64ErrorTypeCacheCheckGuid = { 0xA55701F5, 0xE3EF, 0x43de, { 0xAC, 0x72, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x3F, 0xAD, 0x2C }}
@@ -1011,6 +1014,9 @@
## Include/Protocol/PcdInfo.h
gGetPcdInfoProtocolGuid = { 0x5be40f57, 0xfa68, 0x4610, { 0xbb, 0xbf, 0xe9, 0xc5, 0xfc, 0xda, 0xd3, 0x65 } }
+ ## Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h
+ gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid = { 0x96751a3d, 0x72f4, 0x41a6, { 0xa7, 0x94, 0xed, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x67, 0xae, 0x6b }}
+
#
# Protocols defined in PI1.0.
#
--
2.41.0

169
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
From aa66757951e9880df4e21e191142400480aa3908 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 10:35:14 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 15/17] NetworkPkg: : Add Unit tests to CI and create Host Test
DSC
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 50: CVE-2023-45230 and CVE-2023-45229
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [2/4] 6669306e2dbb5aa3e7691d57f4a61685b7cd57b2 (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21842
CVE: CVE-2023-45230
Upstream: Merged
commit 8014ac2d7bbbc503f5562b51af46bb20ae3d22ff
Author: Doug Flick via groups.io <dougflick=microsoft.com@groups.io>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:44 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: : Add Unit tests to CI and create Host Test DSC
Adds Host Based testing to the NetworkPkg
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/NetworkPkg.ci.yaml | 7 +-
NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/NetworkPkg.ci.yaml b/NetworkPkg/NetworkPkg.ci.yaml
index 07dc7abd69..076424eb60 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/NetworkPkg.ci.yaml
+++ b/NetworkPkg/NetworkPkg.ci.yaml
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
"CompilerPlugin": {
"DscPath": "NetworkPkg.dsc"
},
+ "HostUnitTestCompilerPlugin": {
+ "DscPath": "Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc"
+ },
"CharEncodingCheck": {
"IgnoreFiles": []
},
@@ -35,7 +38,9 @@
"CryptoPkg/CryptoPkg.dec"
],
# For host based unit tests
- "AcceptableDependencies-HOST_APPLICATION":[],
+ "AcceptableDependencies-HOST_APPLICATION":[
+ UnitTestFrameworkPkg/UnitTestFrameworkPkg.dec
+ ],
# For UEFI shell based apps
"AcceptableDependencies-UEFI_APPLICATION":[
"ShellPkg/ShellPkg.dec"
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1aeca5c5b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+## @file
+# NetworkPkgHostTest DSC file used to build host-based unit tests.
+#
+# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+#
+##
+[Defines]
+ PLATFORM_NAME = NetworkPkgHostTest
+ PLATFORM_GUID = 3b68324e-fc07-4d49-9520-9347ede65879
+ PLATFORM_VERSION = 0.1
+ DSC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005
+ OUTPUT_DIRECTORY = Build/NetworkPkg/HostTest
+ SUPPORTED_ARCHITECTURES = IA32|X64|AARCH64
+ BUILD_TARGETS = NOOPT
+ SKUID_IDENTIFIER = DEFAULT
+
+!include UnitTestFrameworkPkg/UnitTestFrameworkPkgHost.dsc.inc
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+ UnitTestFrameworkPkg/UnitTestFrameworkPkg.dec
+
+[Components]
+ #
+ # Build HOST_APPLICATION that tests NetworkPkg
+ #
+
+# Despite these library classes being listed in [LibraryClasses] below, they are not needed for the host-based unit tests.
+[LibraryClasses]
+ NetLib|NetworkPkg/Library/DxeNetLib/DxeNetLib.inf
+ DebugLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseDebugLibNull/BaseDebugLibNull.inf
+ BaseLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/BaseLib.inf
+ BaseMemoryLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseMemoryLib/BaseMemoryLib.inf
+ DevicePathLib|MdePkg/Library/UefiDevicePathLib/UefiDevicePathLib.inf
+ HiiLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiHiiLib/UefiHiiLib.inf
+ MemoryAllocationLib|MdePkg/Library/UefiMemoryAllocationLib/UefiMemoryAllocationLib.inf
+ PcdLib|MdePkg/Library/BasePcdLibNull/BasePcdLibNull.inf
+ PrintLib|MdePkg/Library/BasePrintLib/BasePrintLib.inf
+ UefiDriverEntryPoint|MdePkg/Library/UefiDriverEntryPoint/UefiDriverEntryPoint.inf
+ UefiApplicationEntryPoint|MdePkg/Library/UefiApplicationEntryPoint/UefiApplicationEntryPoint.inf
+ UefiBootServicesTableLib|MdePkg/Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib/UefiBootServicesTableLib.inf
+ UefiLib|MdePkg/Library/UefiLib/UefiLib.inf
+ UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib|MdePkg/Library/UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib/UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.inf
+ UefiHiiServicesLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiHiiServicesLib/UefiHiiServicesLib.inf
+ UefiBootManagerLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/UefiBootManagerLib.inf
+ TimerLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseTimerLibNullTemplate/BaseTimerLibNullTemplate.inf
+ PerformanceLib|MdePkg/Library/BasePerformanceLibNull/BasePerformanceLibNull.inf
+ PeCoffGetEntryPointLib|MdePkg/Library/BasePeCoffGetEntryPointLib/BasePeCoffGetEntryPointLib.inf
+ DxeServicesLib|MdePkg/Library/DxeServicesLib/DxeServicesLib.inf
+ DxeServicesTableLib|MdePkg/Library/DxeServicesTableLib/DxeServicesTableLib.inf
+ SafeIntLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseSafeIntLib/BaseSafeIntLib.inf
+ RngLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/BaseRngLib.inf
+ VariablePolicyHelperLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/VariablePolicyHelperLib/VariablePolicyHelperLib.inf
+!ifdef CONTINUOUS_INTEGRATION
+ BaseCryptLib|CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLibNull/BaseCryptLibNull.inf
+ TlsLib|CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLibNull/TlsLibNull.inf
+!else
+ BaseCryptLib|CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/BaseCryptLib.inf
+ OpensslLib|CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf
+ TlsLib|CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsLib.inf
+!endif
+ DebugPrintErrorLevelLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseDebugPrintErrorLevelLib/BaseDebugPrintErrorLevelLib.inf
+ FileHandleLib|MdePkg/Library/UefiFileHandleLib/UefiFileHandleLib.inf
+ FileExplorerLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/FileExplorerLib/FileExplorerLib.inf
+ SortLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiSortLib/UefiSortLib.inf
+ IntrinsicLib|CryptoPkg/Library/IntrinsicLib/IntrinsicLib.inf
+
+!if $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) == VS2019 or $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) == VS2022
+[LibraryClasses.X64]
+ # Provide StackCookie support lib so that we can link to /GS exports for VS builds
+ RngLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/BaseRngLib.inf
+!endif
+
+[LibraryClasses.common.UEFI_DRIVER]
+ HobLib|MdePkg/Library/DxeHobLib/DxeHobLib.inf
+ ReportStatusCodeLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeReportStatusCodeLib/DxeReportStatusCodeLib.inf
+ DebugLib|MdePkg/Library/UefiDebugLibConOut/UefiDebugLibConOut.inf
+[LibraryClasses.common.UEFI_APPLICATION]
+ DebugLib|MdePkg/Library/UefiDebugLibStdErr/UefiDebugLibStdErr.inf
+ ShellLib|ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLib/UefiShellLib.inf
+[LibraryClasses.ARM, LibraryClasses.AARCH64]
+ #
+ # It is not possible to prevent ARM compiler calls to generic intrinsic functions.
+ # This library provides the instrinsic functions generated by a given compiler.
+ # [LibraryClasses.ARM] and NULL mean link this library into all ARM images.
+ #
+!if $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != VS2017 and $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != VS2015 and $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != VS2019
+ NULL|ArmPkg/Library/CompilerIntrinsicsLib/CompilerIntrinsicsLib.inf
+!endif
+ NULL|MdePkg/Library/BaseStackCheckLib/BaseStackCheckLib.inf
+[LibraryClasses.ARM]
+ RngLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLibTimerLib/BaseRngLibTimerLib.inf
+[LibraryClasses.RISCV64]
+ RngLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLibTimerLib/BaseRngLibTimerLib.inf
+
+[PcdsFixedAtBuild]
+ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPropertyMask|0x2
+ gEfiNetworkPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDhcp6UidType|0x4
--
2.41.0

170
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Adds-a-SecurityFix.yaml-file.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
From ffa1202da2f55c1f540240e8267db9a7ec8d6a60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 11/15] NetworkPkg: : Adds a SecurityFix.yaml file
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [11/15] 8a46b763887843d00293997bdd7d50ea120104d9
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21852
CVE: CVE-2022-45235
Upstream: Merged
commit 1d0b95f6457d225c5108302a9da74b4ed7aa5a38
Author: Doug Flick via groups.io <dougflick=microsoft.com@groups.io>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:57 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: : Adds a SecurityFix.yaml file
This creates / adds a security file that tracks the security fixes
found in this package and can be used to find the fixes that were
applied.
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 123 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7e900483fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+## @file
+# Security Fixes for SecurityPkg
+#
+# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+##
+CVE_2023_45229:
+ commit_titles:
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Patch"
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Unit Tests"
+ cve: CVE-2023-45229
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
+ description: "Bug 01 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Out-of-bounds read when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message"
+ note:
+ files_impacted:
+ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Io.c
+ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Impl.h
+ links:
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45229
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
+CVE_2023_45230:
+ commit_titles:
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch"
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Unit Tests"
+ cve: CVE-2023-45230
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
+ description: "Bug 02 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option"
+ note:
+ files_impacted:
+ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Io.c
+ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Impl.h
+ links:
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4535
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45230
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
+CVE_2023_45231:
+ commit_titles:
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Patch"
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Unit Tests"
+ cve: CVE-2023-45231
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
+ description: "Bug 03 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Out-of-bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options"
+ note:
+ files_impacted:
+ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
+ links:
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4536
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45231
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
+CVE_2023_45232:
+ commit_titles:
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch"
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit Tests"
+ cve: CVE-2023-45232
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
+ description: "Bug 04 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header"
+ note:
+ files_impacted:
+ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
+ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h
+ links:
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4537
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45232
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
+CVE_2023_45233:
+ commit_titles:
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch"
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit Tests"
+ cve: CVE-2023-45233
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
+ description: "Bug 05 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header "
+ note: This was fixed along with CVE-2023-45233
+ files_impacted:
+ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
+ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h
+ links:
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4538
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45233
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
+CVE_2023_45234:
+ commit_titles:
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 Patch"
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 Unit Tests"
+ cve: CVE-2023-45234
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
+ description: "Bug 06 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message"
+ note:
+ files_impacted:
+ - NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
+ links:
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4539
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45234
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
+CVE_2023_45235:
+ commit_titles:
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Patch"
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Unit Tests"
+ cve: CVE-2023-45235
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
+ description: "Bug 07 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message"
+ note:
+ files_impacted:
+ - NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
+ - NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h
+ links:
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4540
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45235
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
--
2.39.3

2054
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes-p2.patch Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

1937
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes.patch Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

69
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Packet-Length-is-not-updated-bef.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From 649fe647114ca5dee84b0c55106ee58a9703984f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 15/15] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Packet-Length is not updated
before appending
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [15/15] bc7ef287311bb3f757bc26f8921875566bcb5917
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21840
CVE: CVE-2023-45229
Upstream: Merged
commit 75deaf5c3c0d164c61653258c331151241bb69d8
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Tue Feb 13 10:46:02 2024 -0800
NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Packet-Length is not updated before appending
In order for Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption (..) to safely append the IA
Address option, the Packet-Length field must be updated before appending
the option.
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
index e172ffc2a2..c23eff8766 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
@@ -948,6 +948,11 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
*PacketCursor += sizeof (T2);
}
+ //
+ // Update the packet length
+ //
+ Packet->Length += BytesNeeded;
+
//
// Fill all the addresses belong to the Ia
//
@@ -959,11 +964,6 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
}
}
- //
- // Update the packet length
- //
- Packet->Length += BytesNeeded;
-
//
// Fill the value of Ia option length
//
--
2.39.3

161
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Removes-duplicate-check-and-repl.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
From 4bf844922a963cb20fb1e72ca11a65a673992ca2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 14/15] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Removes duplicate check and
replaces with macro
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [14/15] a943400f9267b219bf1fd202534500f82a2a4c56
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21840
CVE: CVE-2023-45229
Upstream: Merged
commit af3fad99d6088881562e50149f414f76a5be0140
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Tue Feb 13 10:46:01 2024 -0800
NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Removes duplicate check and replaces with macro
Removes duplicate check after merge
>
> //
> // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
> //
> if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
> || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size -
sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
> {
> return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> }
>
Converts the check to a macro and replaces all instances of the check
with the macro
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c | 43 +++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
index 484c360a96..e172ffc2a2 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
@@ -10,6 +10,15 @@
#include "Dhcp6Impl.h"
+//
+// Verifies the packet cursor is within the packet
+// otherwise it is invalid
+//
+#define IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR(PacketCursor, Packet) \
+ (((*PacketCursor) < (Packet)->Dhcp6.Option) || \
+ ((*PacketCursor) >= (Packet)->Dhcp6.Option + ((Packet)->Size - sizeof(EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))) \
+ ) \
+
/**
Generate client Duid in the format of Duid-llt.
@@ -662,9 +671,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendOption (
//
// Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
//
- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
- {
+ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
@@ -681,15 +688,6 @@ Dhcp6AppendOption (
return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
- //
- // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
- //
- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
- {
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, OptType);
*PacketCursor += DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE;
WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, OptLen);
@@ -768,9 +766,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption (
//
// Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
//
- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
- {
+ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
@@ -902,9 +898,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
//
// Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
//
- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
- {
+ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
@@ -966,14 +960,14 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
}
//
- // Fill the value of Ia option length
+ // Update the packet length
//
- *Len = HTONS ((UINT16)(*PacketCursor - (UINT8 *)Len - 2));
+ Packet->Length += BytesNeeded;
//
- // Update the packet length
+ // Fill the value of Ia option length
//
- Packet->Length += BytesNeeded;
+ *Len = HTONS ((UINT16)(*PacketCursor - (UINT8 *)Len - 2));
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
@@ -982,6 +976,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
Append the appointed Elapsed time option to Buf, and move Buf to the end.
@param[in, out] Packet A pointer to the packet, on success Packet->Length
+ will be updated.
@param[in, out] PacketCursor The pointer in the packet, on success PacketCursor
will be moved to the end of the option.
@param[in] Instance The pointer to the Dhcp6 instance.
@@ -1037,9 +1032,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendETOption (
//
// Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
//
- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
- {
+ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
--
2.39.3

621
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Pa.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,621 @@
From a115d0a66c3e73c60b74ec6d09e3759da89e919b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 17:57:07 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 17/17] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229
Patch
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 50: CVE-2023-45230 and CVE-2023-45229
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [4/4] 3daf69000f78416ee1f1bad0b6ceb01ed28a84a5 (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21840
CVE: CVE-2023-45229
Upstream: Merged
commit 1dbb10cc52dc8ef49bb700daa1cefc76b26d52e0
Author: Doug Flick via groups.io <dougflick=microsoft.com@groups.io>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:46 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Patch
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534
Bug Details:
PixieFail Bug #1
CVE-2023-45229
CVSS 6.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read
Change Overview:
Introduce Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe which performs checks before seeking
the Inner Option from a DHCP6 Option.
>
> EFI_STATUS
> Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
> IN UINT16 IaType,
> IN UINT8 *Option,
> IN UINT32 OptionLen,
> OUT UINT8 **IaInnerOpt,
> OUT UINT16 *IaInnerLen
> );
>
Lots of code cleanup to improve code readability.
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h | 138 ++++++++++++++++++---
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h
index ec0ed5d8f5..e759ab9a62 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h
@@ -47,6 +47,20 @@ typedef struct _DHCP6_INSTANCE DHCP6_INSTANCE;
#define DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('D', 'H', '6', 'S')
#define DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('D', 'H', '6', 'I')
+#define DHCP6_PACKET_ALL 0
+#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATEFUL 1
+#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATELESS 2
+
+#define DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE 1024
+
+#define DHCP6_PORT_CLIENT 546
+#define DHCP6_PORT_SERVER 547
+
+#define DHCP_CHECK_MEDIA_WAITING_TIME EFI_TIMER_PERIOD_SECONDS(20)
+
+#define DHCP6_INSTANCE_FROM_THIS(Instance) CR ((Instance), DHCP6_INSTANCE, Dhcp6, DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE)
+#define DHCP6_SERVICE_FROM_THIS(Service) CR ((Service), DHCP6_SERVICE, ServiceBinding, DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE)
+
//
// For more information on DHCP options see RFC 8415, Section 21.1
//
@@ -61,12 +75,10 @@ typedef struct _DHCP6_INSTANCE DHCP6_INSTANCE;
// | (option-len octets) |
// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
//
-#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE (sizeof(UINT16))
-#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN (sizeof(UINT16))
+#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpCode))
+#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpLen))
-//
// Combined size of Code and Length
-//
#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE + \
DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN)
@@ -75,34 +87,122 @@ STATIC_ASSERT (
"Combined size of Code and Length must be 4 per RFC 8415"
);
-//
// Offset to the length is just past the code
-//
-#define DHCP6_OPT_LEN_OFFSET(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE)
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE)
STATIC_ASSERT (
- DHCP6_OPT_LEN_OFFSET (0) == 2,
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (0) == 2,
"Offset of length is + 2 past start of option"
);
-#define DHCP6_OPT_DATA_OFFSET(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN)
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN)
STATIC_ASSERT (
- DHCP6_OPT_DATA_OFFSET (0) == 4,
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (0) == 4,
"Offset to option data should be +4 from start of option"
);
+//
+// Identity Association options (both NA (Non-Temporary) and TA (Temporary Association))
+// are defined in RFC 8415 and are a deriviation of a TLV stucture
+// For more information on IA_NA see Section 21.4
+// For more information on IA_TA see Section 21.5
+//
+//
+// The format of IA_NA and IA_TA option:
+//
+// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+// | OPTION_IA_NA | option-len |
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+// | IAID (4 octets) |
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+// | T1 (only for IA_NA) |
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+// | T2 (only for IA_NA) |
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+// | |
+// . IA_NA-options/IA_TA-options .
+// . .
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+//
+#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID (sizeof(UINT32))
+#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL (sizeof(UINT32))
-#define DHCP6_PACKET_ALL 0
-#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATEFUL 1
-#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATELESS 2
+// Combined size of IAID, T1, and T2
+#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2 (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID + \
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL + \
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL)
+STATIC_ASSERT (
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2 == 12,
+ "Combined size of IAID, T1, T2 must be 12 per RFC 8415"
+ );
-#define DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE 1024
+// This is the size of IA_TA without options
+#define DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID)
+STATIC_ASSERT (
+ DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA == 8,
+ "Minimum combined size of IA_TA per RFC 8415"
+ );
-#define DHCP6_PORT_CLIENT 546
-#define DHCP6_PORT_SERVER 547
+// Offset to a IA_TA inner option
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT(a) (a + DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA)
+STATIC_ASSERT (
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (0) == 8,
+ "Offset of IA_TA Inner option is + 8 past start of option"
+ );
-#define DHCP_CHECK_MEDIA_WAITING_TIME EFI_TIMER_PERIOD_SECONDS(20)
+// This is the size of IA_NA without options (16)
+#define DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2
+STATIC_ASSERT (
+ DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA == 16,
+ "Minimum combined size of IA_TA per RFC 8415"
+ );
-#define DHCP6_INSTANCE_FROM_THIS(Instance) CR ((Instance), DHCP6_INSTANCE, Dhcp6, DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE)
-#define DHCP6_SERVICE_FROM_THIS(Service) CR ((Service), DHCP6_SERVICE, ServiceBinding, DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE)
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT(a) (a + DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA)
+STATIC_ASSERT (
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (0) == 16,
+ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 16 past start of option"
+ );
+
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1(a) (a + \
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID)
+STATIC_ASSERT (
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1 (0) == 8,
+ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 8 past start of option"
+ );
+
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2(a) (a + \
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN +\
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID + \
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL)
+STATIC_ASSERT (
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2 (0) == 12,
+ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 12 past start of option"
+ );
+
+//
+// For more information see RFC 8415 Section 21.13
+//
+// The format of the Status Code Option:
+//
+// 0 1 2 3
+// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+// | OPTION_STATUS_CODE | option-len |
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+// | status-code | |
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
+// . .
+// . status-message .
+// . .
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+//
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN)
+STATIC_ASSERT (
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (0) == 4,
+ "Offset of status is + 4 past start of option"
+ );
extern EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS mAllDhcpRelayAndServersAddress;
extern EFI_DHCP6_PROTOCOL gDhcp6ProtocolTemplate;
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
index 2976684aba..d680febbf1 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
@@ -611,8 +611,8 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
// The inner options still start with 2 bytes option-code and 2 bytes option-len.
//
if (Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) {
- T1 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) (Option + 8)));
- T2 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) (Option + 12)));
+ T1 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1 (Option))));
+ T2 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2 (Option))));
//
// Refer to RFC3155 Chapter 22.4. If a client receives an IA_NA with T1 greater than T2,
// and both T1 and T2 are greater than 0, the client discards the IA_NA option and processes
@@ -621,13 +621,14 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
if (T1 > T2 && T2 > 0) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
- IaInnerOpt = Option + 16;
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16) (NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (Option + 2))) - 12);
+ IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option);
+ IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2);
} else {
T1 = 0;
T2 = 0;
- IaInnerOpt = Option + 8;
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16) (NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (Option + 2))) - 4);
+
+ IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option);
+ IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID);
}
//
@@ -653,7 +654,7 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode);
if (Option != NULL) {
- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (Option + 4)));
+ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option))));
if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
@@ -675,6 +676,87 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
+/**
+ Seeks the Inner Options from a DHCP6 Option
+
+ @param[in] IaType The type of the IA option.
+ @param[in] Option The pointer to the DHCP6 Option.
+ @param[in] OptionLen The length of the DHCP6 Option.
+ @param[out] IaInnerOpt The pointer to the IA inner option.
+ @param[out] IaInnerLen The length of the IA inner option.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Seek the inner option successfully.
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The OptionLen is invalid. On Error,
+ the pointers are not modified
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
+ IN UINT16 IaType,
+ IN UINT8 *Option,
+ IN UINT32 OptionLen,
+ OUT UINT8 **IaInnerOpt,
+ OUT UINT16 *IaInnerLen
+ )
+{
+ UINT16 IaInnerLenTmp;
+ UINT8 *IaInnerOptTmp;
+
+ if (Option == NULL) {
+ ASSERT (Option != NULL);
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (IaInnerOpt == NULL) {
+ ASSERT (IaInnerOpt != NULL);
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (IaInnerLen == NULL) {
+ ASSERT (IaInnerLen != NULL);
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIana) {
+ // Verify we have a fully formed IA_NA
+ if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA) {
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ //
+ IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option);
+
+ // Verify the IaInnerLen is valid.
+ IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)));
+ if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2) {
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ IaInnerLenTmp -= DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2;
+ } else if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIata) {
+ // Verify the OptionLen is valid.
+ if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA) {
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option);
+
+ // Verify the IaInnerLen is valid.
+ IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option))));
+ if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID) {
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ IaInnerLenTmp -= DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID;
+ } else {
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ *IaInnerOpt = IaInnerOptTmp;
+ *IaInnerLen = IaInnerLenTmp;
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
/**
Seek StatusCode Option in package. A Status Code option may appear in the
options field of a DHCP message and/or in the options field of another option.
@@ -695,9 +777,15 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
OUT UINT8 **Option
)
{
- UINT8 *IaInnerOpt;
- UINT16 IaInnerLen;
- UINT16 StsCode;
+ UINT8 *IaInnerOpt;
+ UINT16 IaInnerLen;
+ UINT16 StsCode;
+ UINT32 OptionLen;
+
+ // OptionLen is the length of the Options excluding the DHCP header.
+ // Length of the EFI_DHCP6_PACKET from the first byte of the Header field to the last
+ // byte of the Option[] field.
+ OptionLen = Packet->Length - sizeof (Packet->Dhcp6.Header);
//
// Seek StatusCode option directly in DHCP message body. That is, search in
@@ -705,12 +793,12 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
//
*Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
- Packet->Length - 4,
+ OptionLen,
Dhcp6OptStatusCode
);
if (*Option != NULL) {
- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (*Option + 4)));
+ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (*Option))));
if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
@@ -721,7 +809,7 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
//
*Option = Dhcp6SeekIaOption (
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
- Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
+ OptionLen,
&Instance->Config->IaDescriptor
);
if (*Option == NULL) {
@@ -729,52 +817,35 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
}
//
- // The format of the IA_NA option is:
+ // Calculate the distance from Packet->Dhcp6.Option to the IA option.
//
- // 0 1 2 3
- // 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- // | OPTION_IA_NA | option-len |
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- // | IAID (4 octets) |
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- // | T1 |
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- // | T2 |
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- // | |
- // . IA_NA-options .
- // . .
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ // Packet->Size and Packet->Length are both UINT32 type, and Packet->Size is
+ // the size of the whole packet, including the DHCP header, and Packet->Length
+ // is the length of the DHCP message body, excluding the DHCP header.
//
- // The format of the IA_TA option is:
+ // (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option) is the number of bytes from the start of
+ // DHCP6 option area to the start of the IA option.
//
- // 0 1 2 3
- // 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- // | OPTION_IA_TA | option-len |
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- // | IAID (4 octets) |
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
- // | |
- // . IA_TA-options .
- // . .
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ // Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe() is searching starting from the start of the
+ // IA option to the end of the DHCP6 option area, thus subtract the space
+ // up until this option
//
+ OptionLen = OptionLen - (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
//
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId) = 8
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1) = 12
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1 + T2) = 16
+ // Seek the inner option
//
- // The inner options still start with 2 bytes option-code and 2 bytes option-len.
- //
- if (Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) {
- IaInnerOpt = *Option + 16;
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16) (NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (*Option + 2))) - 12);
- } else {
- IaInnerOpt = *Option + 8;
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16) (NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (*Option + 2))) - 4);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (
+ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
+ Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type,
+ *Option,
+ OptionLen,
+ &IaInnerOpt,
+ &IaInnerLen
+ )
+ ))
+ {
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
//
@@ -798,7 +869,7 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
//
*Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode);
if (*Option != NULL) {
- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (*Option + 4)));
+ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)((DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (*Option)))));
if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
@@ -1123,7 +1194,7 @@ Dhcp6SendRequestMsg (
//
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
Instance->AdSelect->Dhcp6.Option,
- Instance->AdSelect->Length - 4,
+ Instance->AdSelect->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
Dhcp6OptServerId
);
if (Option == NULL) {
@@ -1309,7 +1380,7 @@ Dhcp6SendDeclineMsg (
//
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
LastReply->Dhcp6.Option,
- LastReply->Length - 4,
+ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
Dhcp6OptServerId
);
if (Option == NULL) {
@@ -1469,7 +1540,7 @@ Dhcp6SendReleaseMsg (
//
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
LastReply->Dhcp6.Option,
- LastReply->Length - 4,
+ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
Dhcp6OptServerId
);
if (Option == NULL) {
@@ -1695,7 +1766,7 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg (
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
LastReply->Dhcp6.Option,
- LastReply->Length - 4,
+ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
Dhcp6OptServerId
);
if (Option == NULL) {
@@ -2235,7 +2306,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg (
//
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
- Packet->Length - 4,
+ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
Dhcp6OptRapidCommit
);
@@ -2383,7 +2454,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg (
//
// Any error status code option is found.
//
- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (Option + 4)));
+ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)((DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (Option)))));
switch (StsCode) {
case Dhcp6StsUnspecFail:
//
@@ -2514,7 +2585,7 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg (
//
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption(
AdSelect->Dhcp6.Option,
- AdSelect->Length - 4,
+ AdSelect->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
Dhcp6OptServerUnicast
);
@@ -2526,7 +2597,7 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg (
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
- CopyMem (Instance->Unicast, Option + 4, sizeof(EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS));
+ CopyMem (Instance->Unicast, DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option), sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS));
}
//
@@ -2580,7 +2651,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg (
//
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption(
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
- Packet->Length - 4,
+ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
Dhcp6OptRapidCommit
);
@@ -2676,7 +2747,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg (
CopyMem (Instance->AdSelect, Packet, Packet->Size);
if (Option != NULL) {
- Instance->AdPref = *(Option + 4);
+ Instance->AdPref = *(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option));
}
} else {
//
@@ -2747,11 +2818,11 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateful (
//
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption(
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
- Packet->Length - 4,
+ Packet->Length - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN,
Dhcp6OptClientId
);
- if (Option == NULL || CompareMem (Option + 4, ClientId->Duid, ClientId->Length) != 0) {
+ if ((Option == NULL) || (CompareMem (DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option), ClientId->Duid, ClientId->Length) != 0)) {
goto ON_CONTINUE;
}
@@ -2760,7 +2831,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateful (
//
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption(
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
- Packet->Length - 4,
+ Packet->Length - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN,
Dhcp6OptServerId
);
@@ -2865,7 +2936,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateless (
//
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
- Packet->Length - 4,
+ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
Dhcp6OptServerId
);
--
2.41.0

257
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Re.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
From 1b58858f28a364a8f8fa897a78db7ced068719dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 13/15] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229
Related Patch
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [13/15] 904fd82592208d0ca42bbb64f437691a5bdfd0b6
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21840
CVE: CVE-2023-45229
Upstream: Merged
commit 1c440a5eceedc64e892877eeac0f1a4938f5abbb
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Tue Feb 13 10:46:00 2024 -0800
NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Related Patch
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4673
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534
This was not part of the Quarkslab bugs however the same pattern
as CVE-2023-45229 exists in Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo.
This patch replaces the code in question with the safe function
created to patch CVE-2023-45229
>
> if (EFI_ERROR (
> Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
> Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type,
> Option,
> OptionLen,
> &IaInnerOpt,
> &IaInnerLen
> )
> ))
> {
> return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
> }
>
Additionally corrects incorrect usage of macro to read the status
> - StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN
(Option)));
> + StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)
DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (Option));
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h | 22 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
index 3b8feb4a20..a9bffae353 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
@@ -528,13 +528,23 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
UINT8 *Option;
+ UINT32 OptionLen;
UINT8 *IaInnerOpt;
UINT16 IaInnerLen;
UINT16 StsCode;
UINT32 T1;
UINT32 T2;
+ T1 = 0;
+ T2 = 0;
+
ASSERT (Instance->Config != NULL);
+
+ // OptionLen is the length of the Options excluding the DHCP header.
+ // Length of the EFI_DHCP6_PACKET from the first byte of the Header field to the last
+ // byte of the Option[] field.
+ OptionLen = Packet->Length - sizeof (Packet->Dhcp6.Header);
+
//
// If the reply was received in response to a solicit with rapid commit option,
// request, renew or rebind message, the client updates the information it has
@@ -549,13 +559,29 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
//
Option = Dhcp6SeekIaOption (
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
- Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
+ OptionLen,
&Instance->Config->IaDescriptor
);
if (Option == NULL) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
+ //
+ // Calculate the distance from Packet->Dhcp6.Option to the IA option.
+ //
+ // Packet->Size and Packet->Length are both UINT32 type, and Packet->Size is
+ // the size of the whole packet, including the DHCP header, and Packet->Length
+ // is the length of the DHCP message body, excluding the DHCP header.
+ //
+ // (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option) is the number of bytes from the start of
+ // DHCP6 option area to the start of the IA option.
+ //
+ // Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe() is searching starting from the start of the
+ // IA option to the end of the DHCP6 option area, thus subtract the space
+ // up until this option
+ //
+ OptionLen = OptionLen - (UINT32)(Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
+
//
// The format of the IA_NA option is:
//
@@ -591,32 +617,32 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
//
//
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId) = 8
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1) = 12
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1 + T2) = 16
- //
- // The inner options still start with 2 bytes option-code and 2 bytes option-len.
+ // Seek the inner option
//
+ if (EFI_ERROR (
+ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
+ Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type,
+ Option,
+ OptionLen,
+ &IaInnerOpt,
+ &IaInnerLen
+ )
+ ))
+ {
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
if (Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) {
T1 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1 (Option))));
T2 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2 (Option))));
//
// Refer to RFC3155 Chapter 22.4. If a client receives an IA_NA with T1 greater than T2,
// and both T1 and T2 are greater than 0, the client discards the IA_NA option and processes
- // the remainder of the message as though the server had not included the invalid IA_NA option.
+ // the remainder of the message as though the server had not included the invalid IA_NA option.
//
if ((T1 > T2) && (T2 > 0)) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
-
- IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option);
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2);
- } else {
- T1 = 0;
- T2 = 0;
-
- IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option);
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID);
}
//
@@ -642,7 +668,7 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode);
if (Option != NULL) {
- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option))));
+ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (Option))));
if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
@@ -703,15 +729,21 @@ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
}
if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIana) {
+ //
// Verify we have a fully formed IA_NA
+ //
if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
+ //
+ // Get the IA Inner Option and Length
//
IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option);
+ //
// Verify the IaInnerLen is valid.
+ //
IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)));
if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
@@ -719,14 +751,18 @@ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
IaInnerLenTmp -= DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2;
} else if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIata) {
+ //
// Verify the OptionLen is valid.
+ //
if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option);
+ //
// Verify the IaInnerLen is valid.
+ //
IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option))));
if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h
index 554f0f5e5d..8c0d282bca 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h
@@ -218,4 +218,26 @@ Dhcp6OnTimerTick (
IN VOID *Context
);
+/**
+ Seeks the Inner Options from a DHCP6 Option
+
+ @param[in] IaType The type of the IA option.
+ @param[in] Option The pointer to the DHCP6 Option.
+ @param[in] OptionLen The length of the DHCP6 Option.
+ @param[out] IaInnerOpt The pointer to the IA inner option.
+ @param[out] IaInnerLen The length of the IA inner option.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Seek the inner option successfully.
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The OptionLen is invalid. On Error,
+ the pointers are not modified
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
+ IN UINT16 IaType,
+ IN UINT8 *Option,
+ IN UINT32 OptionLen,
+ OUT UINT8 **IaInnerOpt,
+ OUT UINT16 *IaInnerLen
+ );
+
#endif
--
2.39.3

1644
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

629
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,629 @@
From f5274b449181cb37efce0f08ed5d75a6bf6e54a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 10:35:14 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 16/17] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230
Unit Tests
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 50: CVE-2023-45230 and CVE-2023-45229
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [3/4] 43b8569c0586c7dbf66b19c5db335d0ce05829de (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21842
CVE: CVE-2023-45230
Upstream: Merged
commit 5f3658197bf29c83b3349b0ab1d99cdb0c3814bc
Author: Doug Flick via groups.io <dougflick=microsoft.com@groups.io>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:45 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Unit Tests
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4535
Confirms that reported issue...
"Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option"
..has been corrected by the provided patch.
Tests the following functions to ensure they appropriately handle
untrusted data (either too long or too small) to prevent a buffer
overflow:
Dhcp6AppendOption
Dhcp6AppendETOption
Dhcp6AppendIaOption
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.cpp | 20 +
.../GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf | 43 ++
.../Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp | 478 ++++++++++++++++++
NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 1 +
4 files changed, 542 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9aeced2f91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/** @file
+ Acts as the main entry point for the tests for the Dhcp6Dxe module.
+
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+**/
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Run the tests
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+int
+main (
+ int argc,
+ char *argv[]
+ )
+{
+ testing::InitGoogleTest (&argc, argv);
+ return RUN_ALL_TESTS ();
+}
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8e9119a371
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+## @file
+# Unit test suite for the Dhcp6Dxe using Google Test
+#
+# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+##
+[Defines]
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010017
+ BASE_NAME = Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest
+ FILE_GUID = 1D2A4C65-38C8-4C2F-BB60-B5FA49625AA9
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+ MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION
+#
+# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
+#
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 AARCH64
+#
+[Sources]
+ Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
+ Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp
+ ../Dhcp6Io.c
+ ../Dhcp6Utility.c
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+ UnitTestFrameworkPkg/UnitTestFrameworkPkg.dec
+ NetworkPkg/NetworkPkg.dec
+
+[LibraryClasses]
+ GoogleTestLib
+ DebugLib
+ NetLib
+ PcdLib
+
+[Protocols]
+ gEfiDhcp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid
+
+[Pcd]
+ gEfiNetworkPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDhcp6UidType
+
+[Guids]
+ gZeroGuid
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7ee40e4af4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
+/** @file
+ Tests for Dhcp6Io.c.
+
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+**/
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+ #include <Uefi.h>
+ #include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+ #include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+ #include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+ #include "../Dhcp6Impl.h"
+ #include "../Dhcp6Utility.h"
+}
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Defines
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+#define DHCP6_PACKET_MAX_LEN 1500
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Symbol Definitions
+// These functions are not directly under test - but required to compile
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This definition is used by this test but is also required to compile
+// by Dhcp6Io.c
+EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS mAllDhcpRelayAndServersAddress = {
+ { 0xFF, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 2 }
+};
+
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+UdpIoSendDatagram (
+ IN UDP_IO *UdpIo,
+ IN NET_BUF *Packet,
+ IN UDP_END_POINT *EndPoint OPTIONAL,
+ IN EFI_IP_ADDRESS *Gateway OPTIONAL,
+ IN UDP_IO_CALLBACK CallBack,
+ IN VOID *Context
+ )
+{
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+UdpIoRecvDatagram (
+ IN UDP_IO *UdpIo,
+ IN UDP_IO_CALLBACK CallBack,
+ IN VOID *Context,
+ IN UINT32 HeadLen
+ )
+{
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Dhcp6AppendOptionTest Tests
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+class Dhcp6AppendOptionTest : public ::testing::Test {
+public:
+ UINT8 *Buffer = NULL;
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet;
+
+protected:
+ // Add any setup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ SetUp (
+ )
+ {
+ // Initialize any resources or variables
+ Buffer = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DHCP6_PACKET_MAX_LEN);
+ ASSERT_NE (Buffer, (UINT8 *)NULL);
+
+ Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)Buffer;
+ Packet->Size = DHCP6_PACKET_MAX_LEN;
+ }
+
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ TearDown (
+ )
+ {
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
+ if (Buffer != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Buffer);
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+// Test Description:
+// Attempt to append an option to a packet that is too small by a duid that is too large
+TEST_F (Dhcp6AppendOptionTest, InvalidDataExpectBufferTooSmall) {
+ UINT8 *Cursor;
+ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *UntrustedDuid;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ UntrustedDuid = (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *)AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_DUID));
+ ASSERT_NE (UntrustedDuid, (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *)NULL);
+
+ UntrustedDuid->Length = NTOHS (0xFFFF);
+
+ Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option;
+
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption (
+ Dhcp6AppendOptionTest::Packet,
+ &Cursor,
+ HTONS (Dhcp6OptServerId),
+ UntrustedDuid->Length,
+ UntrustedDuid->Duid
+ );
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+}
+
+// Test Description:
+// Attempt to append an option to a packet that is large enough
+TEST_F (Dhcp6AppendOptionTest, ValidDataExpectSuccess) {
+ UINT8 *Cursor;
+ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *UntrustedDuid;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN OriginalLength;
+
+ UINT8 Duid[6] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05 };
+
+ Packet->Length = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER);
+ OriginalLength = Packet->Length;
+
+ UntrustedDuid = (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *)AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_DUID));
+ ASSERT_NE (UntrustedDuid, (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *)NULL);
+
+ UntrustedDuid->Length = NTOHS (sizeof (Duid));
+ CopyMem (UntrustedDuid->Duid, Duid, sizeof (Duid));
+
+ Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option;
+
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption (
+ Dhcp6AppendOptionTest::Packet,
+ &Cursor,
+ HTONS (Dhcp6OptServerId),
+ UntrustedDuid->Length,
+ UntrustedDuid->Duid
+ );
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
+
+ // verify that the pointer to cursor moved by the expected amount
+ ASSERT_EQ (Cursor, (UINT8 *)Dhcp6AppendOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option + sizeof (Duid) + 4);
+
+ // verify that the length of the packet is now the expected amount
+ ASSERT_EQ (Dhcp6AppendOptionTest::Packet->Length, OriginalLength + sizeof (Duid) + 4);
+}
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Dhcp6AppendETOption Tests
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+class Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest : public ::testing::Test {
+public:
+ UINT8 *Buffer = NULL;
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet;
+
+protected:
+ // Add any setup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ SetUp (
+ )
+ {
+ // Initialize any resources or variables
+ Buffer = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DHCP6_PACKET_MAX_LEN);
+ ASSERT_NE (Buffer, (UINT8 *)NULL);
+
+ Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)Buffer;
+ Packet->Size = DHCP6_PACKET_MAX_LEN;
+ Packet->Length = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER);
+ }
+
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ TearDown (
+ )
+ {
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
+ if (Buffer != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Buffer);
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+// Test Description:
+// Attempt to append an option to a packet that is too small by a duid that is too large
+TEST_F (Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest, InvalidDataExpectBufferTooSmall) {
+ UINT8 *Cursor;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ DHCP6_INSTANCE Instance;
+ UINT16 ElapsedTimeVal;
+ UINT16 *ElapsedTime;
+
+ Cursor = Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option;
+ ElapsedTime = &ElapsedTimeVal;
+
+ Packet->Length = Packet->Size - 2;
+
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendETOption (
+ Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest::Packet,
+ &Cursor,
+ &Instance, // Instance is not used in this function
+ &ElapsedTime
+ );
+
+ // verify that we error out because the packet is too small for the option header
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+
+ // reset the length
+ Packet->Length = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER);
+}
+
+// Test Description:
+// Attempt to append an option to a packet that is large enough
+TEST_F (Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest, ValidDataExpectSuccess) {
+ UINT8 *Cursor;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ DHCP6_INSTANCE Instance;
+ UINT16 ElapsedTimeVal;
+ UINT16 *ElapsedTime;
+ UINTN ExpectedSize;
+ UINTN OriginalLength;
+
+ Cursor = Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option;
+ ElapsedTime = &ElapsedTimeVal;
+ ExpectedSize = 6;
+ OriginalLength = Packet->Length;
+
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendETOption (
+ Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest::Packet,
+ &Cursor,
+ &Instance, // Instance is not used in this function
+ &ElapsedTime
+ );
+
+ // verify that the status is EFI_SUCCESS
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
+
+ // verify that the pointer to cursor moved by the expected amount
+ ASSERT_EQ (Cursor, (UINT8 *)Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option + ExpectedSize);
+
+ // verify that the length of the packet is now the expected amount
+ ASSERT_EQ (Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest::Packet->Length, OriginalLength + ExpectedSize);
+}
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Dhcp6AppendIaOption Tests
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+class Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest : public ::testing::Test {
+public:
+ UINT8 *Buffer = NULL;
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet;
+ EFI_DHCP6_IA *Ia;
+
+protected:
+ // Add any setup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ SetUp (
+ )
+ {
+ // Initialize any resources or variables
+ Buffer = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DHCP6_PACKET_MAX_LEN);
+ ASSERT_NE (Buffer, (UINT8 *)NULL);
+
+ Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)Buffer;
+ Packet->Size = DHCP6_PACKET_MAX_LEN;
+
+ Ia = (EFI_DHCP6_IA *)AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_IA) + sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS) * 2);
+ ASSERT_NE (Ia, (EFI_DHCP6_IA *)NULL);
+
+ CopyMem (Ia->IaAddress, mAllDhcpRelayAndServersAddress.Addr, sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS));
+ CopyMem (Ia->IaAddress + 1, mAllDhcpRelayAndServersAddress.Addr, sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS));
+
+ Ia->IaAddressCount = 2;
+ }
+
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ TearDown (
+ )
+ {
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
+ if (Buffer != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Buffer);
+ }
+
+ if (Ia != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Ia);
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+// Test Description:
+// Attempt to append an option to a packet that doesn't have enough space
+// for the option header
+TEST_F (Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest, IaNaInvalidDataExpectBufferTooSmall) {
+ UINT8 *Cursor;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ Packet->Length = Packet->Size - 2;
+
+ Ia->Descriptor.Type = Dhcp6OptIana;
+ Ia->Descriptor.IaId = 0x12345678;
+
+ Cursor = Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option;
+
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
+ Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet,
+ &Cursor,
+ Ia,
+ 0x12345678,
+ 0x11111111,
+ Dhcp6OptIana
+ );
+
+ // verify that we error out because the packet is too small for the option header
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+
+ // reset the length
+ Packet->Length = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER);
+}
+
+// Test Description:
+// Attempt to append an option to a packet that doesn't have enough space
+// for the option header
+TEST_F (Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest, IaTaInvalidDataExpectBufferTooSmall) {
+ UINT8 *Cursor;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ // Use up nearly all the space in the packet
+ Packet->Length = Packet->Size - 2;
+
+ Ia->Descriptor.Type = Dhcp6OptIata;
+ Ia->Descriptor.IaId = 0x12345678;
+
+ Cursor = Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option;
+
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
+ Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet,
+ &Cursor,
+ Ia,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ Dhcp6OptIata
+ );
+
+ // verify that we error out because the packet is too small for the option header
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+
+ // reset the length
+ Packet->Length = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER);
+}
+
+TEST_F (Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest, IaNaValidDataExpectSuccess) {
+ UINT8 *Cursor;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN ExpectedSize;
+ UINTN OriginalLength;
+
+ //
+ // 2 bytes for the option header type
+ //
+ ExpectedSize = 2;
+ //
+ // 2 bytes for the option header length
+ //
+ ExpectedSize += 2;
+ //
+ // 4 bytes for the IAID
+ //
+ ExpectedSize += 4;
+ //
+ // + 4 bytes for the T1
+ //
+ ExpectedSize += 4;
+ //
+ // + 4 bytes for the T2
+ //
+ ExpectedSize += 4;
+ //
+ // + (4 + sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS)) * 2;
+ // + 2 bytes for the option header type
+ // + 2 bytes for the option header length
+ // + sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS) for the IA Address
+ //
+ ExpectedSize += (4 + sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS)) * 2;
+
+ Cursor = Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option;
+
+ Packet->Length = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER);
+ OriginalLength = Packet->Length;
+
+ Ia->Descriptor.Type = Dhcp6OptIana;
+ Ia->Descriptor.IaId = 0x12345678;
+
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
+ Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet,
+ &Cursor,
+ Ia,
+ 0x12345678,
+ 0x12345678,
+ Dhcp6OptIana
+ );
+
+ // verify that the pointer to cursor moved by the expected amount
+ ASSERT_EQ (Cursor, (UINT8 *)Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option + ExpectedSize);
+
+ // verify that the length of the packet is now the expected amount
+ ASSERT_EQ (Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet->Length, OriginalLength + ExpectedSize);
+
+ // verify that the status is EFI_SUCCESS
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+TEST_F (Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest, IaTaValidDataExpectSuccess) {
+ UINT8 *Cursor;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN ExpectedSize;
+ UINTN OriginalLength;
+
+ //
+ // 2 bytes for the option header type
+ //
+ ExpectedSize = 2;
+ //
+ // 2 bytes for the option header length
+ //
+ ExpectedSize += 2;
+ //
+ // 4 bytes for the IAID
+ //
+ ExpectedSize += 4;
+ //
+ // + (4 + sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS)) * 2;
+ // + 2 bytes for the option header type
+ // + 2 bytes for the option header length
+ // + sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS) for the IA Address
+ //
+ ExpectedSize += (4 + sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS)) * 2;
+
+ Cursor = Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option;
+
+ Packet->Length = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER);
+ OriginalLength = Packet->Length;
+
+ Ia->Descriptor.Type = Dhcp6OptIata;
+ Ia->Descriptor.IaId = 0x12345678;
+
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
+ Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet,
+ &Cursor,
+ Ia,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ Dhcp6OptIata
+ );
+
+ // verify that the pointer to cursor moved by the expected amount
+ ASSERT_EQ (Cursor, (UINT8 *)Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option + ExpectedSize);
+
+ // verify that the length of the packet is now the expected amount
+ ASSERT_EQ (Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest::Packet->Length, OriginalLength + ExpectedSize);
+
+ // verify that the status is EFI_SUCCESS
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
+}
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
index 1aeca5c5b3..20bc90b172 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#
# Build HOST_APPLICATION that tests NetworkPkg
#
+ NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
# Despite these library classes being listed in [LibraryClasses] below, they are not needed for the host-based unit tests.
[LibraryClasses]
--
2.41.0

78
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@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From e3f153773bd2ca13ee4869187f1711840fc8afc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:51:09 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 02/15] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Patch
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [2/15] 61eaf6aac61b774c3a8ace54af8abd607651d2db
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21844
CVE: CVE-2022-45231
Upstream: Merged
commit bbfee34f4188ac00371abe1389ae9c9fb989a0cd
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:48 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Patch
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4536
Bug Overview:
PixieFail Bug #3
CVE-2023-45231
CVSS 6.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read
Out-of-bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated
options
Change Overview:
Adds a check to prevent truncated options from being parsed
+ //
+ // Cannot process truncated options.
+ // Cannot process options with a length of 0 as there is no Type
field.
+ //
+ if (OptionLen < sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
index 199eea124d..8718d5d875 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
@@ -137,6 +137,14 @@ Ip6IsNDOptionValid (
return FALSE;
}
+ //
+ // Cannot process truncated options.
+ // Cannot process options with a length of 0 as there is no Type field.
+ //
+ if (OptionLen < sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
Offset = 0;
//
--
2.39.3

277
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@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
From e8200dda7752d21794b2268efe9e957958ffef29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 12:24:44 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 03/15] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Unit
Tests
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [3/15] ca554677a3397423073d3bb4774f856b2329ae9c
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21844
CVE: CVE-2022-45231
Upstream: Merged
commit 6f77463d72807ec7f4ed6518c3dac29a1040df9f
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:49 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Unit Tests
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4536
Validates that the patch for...
Out-of-bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated
options
.. has been fixed
Tests the following function to ensure that an out of bounds read does
not occur
Ip6OptionValidation
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp | 20 +++
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf | 42 ++++++
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp | 129 ++++++++++++++++++
NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 1 +
4 files changed, 192 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6ebfd5fdfb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/** @file
+ Acts as the main entry point for the tests for the Ip6Dxe module.
+
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+**/
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Run the tests
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+int
+main (
+ int argc,
+ char *argv[]
+ )
+{
+ testing::InitGoogleTest (&argc, argv);
+ return RUN_ALL_TESTS ();
+}
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6e4de0745f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+## @file
+# Unit test suite for the Ip6Dxe using Google Test
+#
+# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+##
+[Defines]
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010017
+ BASE_NAME = Ip6DxeUnitTest
+ FILE_GUID = 4F05D17D-D3E7-4AAE-820C-576D46D2D34A
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+ MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION
+#
+# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
+#
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 AARCH64
+#
+[Sources]
+ Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
+ Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
+ ../Ip6Option.c
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+ UnitTestFrameworkPkg/UnitTestFrameworkPkg.dec
+ NetworkPkg/NetworkPkg.dec
+
+[LibraryClasses]
+ GoogleTestLib
+ DebugLib
+ NetLib
+ PcdLib
+
+[Protocols]
+ gEfiDhcp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid
+
+[Pcd]
+ gEfiNetworkPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDhcp6UidType
+
+[Guids]
+ gZeroGuid
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f2cd90e1a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+/** @file
+ Tests for Ip6Option.c.
+
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+**/
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+ #include <Uefi.h>
+ #include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+ #include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+ #include "../Ip6Impl.h"
+ #include "../Ip6Option.h"
+}
+
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Defines
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+#define IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION_DATA_LEN 32
+#define OPTION_HEADER_IP6_PREFIX_DATA_LEN (sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION_DATA_LEN)
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Symbol Definitions
+// These functions are not directly under test - but required to compile
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+UINT32 mIp6Id;
+
+EFI_STATUS
+Ip6SendIcmpError (
+ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb,
+ IN NET_BUF *Packet,
+ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *SourceAddress OPTIONAL,
+ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *DestinationAddress,
+ IN UINT8 Type,
+ IN UINT8 Code,
+ IN UINT32 *Pointer OPTIONAL
+ )
+{
+ // ..
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Ip6OptionValidation Tests
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// Define a fixture for your tests if needed
+class Ip6OptionValidationTest : public ::testing::Test {
+protected:
+ // Add any setup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ SetUp (
+ )
+ {
+ // Initialize any resources or variables
+ }
+
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ TearDown (
+ )
+ {
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
+ }
+};
+
+// Test Description:
+// Null option should return false
+TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, NullOptionShouldReturnFalse) {
+ UINT8 *option = nullptr;
+ UINT16 optionLen = 10; // Provide a suitable length
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen));
+}
+
+// Test Description:
+// Truncated option should return false
+TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, TruncatedOptionShouldReturnFalse) {
+ UINT8 option[] = { 0x01 }; // Provide a truncated option
+ UINT16 optionLen = 1;
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen));
+}
+
+// Test Description:
+// Ip6OptionPrefixInfo Option with zero length should return false
+TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, OptionWithZeroLengthShouldReturnFalse) {
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
+
+ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPrefixInfo;
+ optionHeader.Length = 0;
+ UINT8 option[sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)];
+
+ CopyMem (option, &optionHeader, sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER));
+ UINT16 optionLen = sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER);
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen));
+}
+
+// Test Description:
+// Ip6OptionPrefixInfo Option with valid length should return true
+TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, ValidPrefixInfoOptionShouldReturnTrue) {
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
+
+ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPrefixInfo;
+ optionHeader.Length = 4; // Length 4 * 8 = 32
+ UINT8 option[OPTION_HEADER_IP6_PREFIX_DATA_LEN];
+
+ CopyMem (option, &optionHeader, sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION_DATA_LEN));
+}
+
+// Test Description:
+// Ip6OptionPrefixInfo Option with invalid length should return false
+TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, InvalidPrefixInfoOptionLengthShouldReturnFalse) {
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
+
+ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPrefixInfo;
+ optionHeader.Length = 3; // Length 3 * 8 = 24 (Invalid)
+ UINT8 option[sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)];
+
+ CopyMem (option, &optionHeader, sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER));
+ UINT16 optionLen = sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER);
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen));
+}
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
index 20bc90b172..ab7c2857b6 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
# Build HOST_APPLICATION that tests NetworkPkg
#
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
+ NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
# Despite these library classes being listed in [LibraryClasses] below, they are not needed for the host-based unit tests.
[LibraryClasses]
--
2.39.3

377
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@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
From 23b31a16bbb789f4c251b1d2f23334210a9fb545 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:51:09 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 04/15] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [4/15] 48c273e43a6275c7eae3223c4ffa433f4d6531a4
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21846
CVE: CVE-2022-45232
Upstream: Merged
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21848
CVE: CVE-2022-45233
Upstream: Merged
commit 4df0229ef992d4f2721a8508787ebf9dc81fbd6e
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:50 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4537
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4538
Bug Details:
PixieFail Bug #4
CVE-2023-45232
CVSS 7.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options
header
PixieFail Bug #5
CVE-2023-45233
CVSS 7.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options
header
Change Overview:
Most importantly this change corrects the following incorrect math
and cleans up the code.
> // It is a PadN option
> //
> - Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1) + 2);
> + OptDataLen = ((EFI_IP6_OPTION *)(Option + Offset))->Length;
> + Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen);
> case Ip6OptionSkip:
> - Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1));
> OptDataLen = ((EFI_IP6_OPTION *)(Option + Offset))->Length;
> Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen);
Additionally, this change also corrects incorrect math where the calling
function was calculating the HDR EXT optionLen as a uint8 instead of a
uint16
> - OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 1) * 8 - 2);
> + OptionLen = IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (*Option) -
IP6_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_NEXT_HDR_AND_LEN;
Additionally this check adds additional logic to santize the incoming
data
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++
NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h
index 860934a167..bf64e9114e 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h
@@ -56,13 +56,48 @@ VOID
VOID *Context
);
+//
+// Per RFC8200 Section 4.2
+//
+// Two of the currently-defined extension headers -- the Hop-by-Hop
+// Options header and the Destination Options header -- carry a variable
+// number of type-length-value (TLV) encoded "options", of the following
+// format:
+//
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -
+// | Option Type | Opt Data Len | Option Data
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -
+//
+// Option Type 8-bit identifier of the type of option.
+//
+// Opt Data Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the Option
+// Data field of this option, in octets.
+//
+// Option Data Variable-length field. Option-Type-specific
+// data.
+//
typedef struct _IP6_OPTION_HEADER {
+ ///
+ /// identifier of the type of option.
+ ///
UINT8 Type;
+ ///
+ /// Length of the Option Data field of this option, in octets.
+ ///
UINT8 Length;
+ ///
+ /// Option-Type-specific data.
+ ///
} IP6_OPTION_HEADER;
STATIC_ASSERT (sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) == 2, "IP6_OPTION_HEADER is expected to be exactly 2 bytes long.");
+#define IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET(offset, length) (offset + sizeof(IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + length)
+STATIC_ASSERT (
+ IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (0, 0) == 2,
+ "The next option is minimally the combined size of the option tag and length"
+ );
+
typedef struct _IP6_ETHE_ADDR_OPTION {
UINT8 Type;
UINT8 Length;
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
index 8718d5d875..fd97ce116f 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@
@param[in] IpSb The IP6 service data.
@param[in] Packet The to be validated packet.
@param[in] Option The first byte of the option.
- @param[in] OptionLen The length of the whole option.
+ @param[in] OptionLen The length of all options, expressed in byte length of octets.
+ Maximum length is 2046 bytes or ((n + 1) * 8) - 2 where n is 255.
@param[in] Pointer Identifies the octet offset within
the invoking packet where the error was detected.
@@ -31,12 +32,33 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid (
IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb,
IN NET_BUF *Packet,
IN UINT8 *Option,
- IN UINT8 OptionLen,
+ IN UINT16 OptionLen,
IN UINT32 Pointer
)
{
- UINT8 Offset;
- UINT8 OptionType;
+ UINT16 Offset;
+ UINT8 OptionType;
+ UINT8 OptDataLen;
+
+ if (Option == NULL) {
+ ASSERT (Option != NULL);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if ((OptionLen <= 0) || (OptionLen > IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH)) {
+ ASSERT (OptionLen > 0 && OptionLen <= IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (Packet == NULL) {
+ ASSERT (Packet != NULL);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (IpSb == NULL) {
+ ASSERT (IpSb != NULL);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
Offset = 0;
@@ -54,7 +76,8 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid (
//
// It is a PadN option
//
- Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1) + 2);
+ OptDataLen = ((IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)(Option + Offset))->Length;
+ Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen);
break;
case Ip6OptionRouterAlert:
//
@@ -69,7 +92,8 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid (
//
switch (OptionType & Ip6OptionMask) {
case Ip6OptionSkip:
- Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1));
+ OptDataLen = ((IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)(Option + Offset))->Length;
+ Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen);
break;
case Ip6OptionDiscard:
return FALSE;
@@ -308,7 +332,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
UINT32 Pointer;
UINT32 Offset;
UINT8 *Option;
- UINT8 OptionLen;
+ UINT16 OptionLen;
BOOLEAN Flag;
UINT8 CountD;
UINT8 CountA;
@@ -385,6 +409,36 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
// Fall through
//
case IP6_DESTINATION:
+ //
+ // See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2460#section-4.2 page 23
+ //
+ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ // | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | |
+ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
+ // | |
+ // . .
+ // . Options .
+ // . .
+ // | |
+ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ //
+ //
+ // Next Header 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of header
+ // immediately following the Destination Options
+ // header. Uses the same values as the IPv4
+ // Protocol field [RFC-1700 et seq.].
+ //
+ // Hdr Ext Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the
+ // Destination Options header in 8-octet units, not
+ // including the first 8 octets.
+ //
+ // Options Variable-length field, of length such that the
+ // complete Destination Options header is an
+ // integer multiple of 8 octets long. Contains one
+ // or more TLV-encoded options, as described in
+ // section 4.2.
+ //
+
if (*NextHeader == IP6_DESTINATION) {
CountD++;
}
@@ -398,7 +452,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
Offset++;
Option = ExtHdrs + Offset;
- OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 1) * 8 - 2);
+ OptionLen = IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (*Option) - sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR);
Option++;
Offset++;
@@ -430,7 +484,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
//
// Ignore the routing header and proceed to process the next header.
//
- Offset = Offset + (RoutingHead->HeaderLen + 1) * 8;
+ Offset = Offset + IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (RoutingHead->HeaderLen);
if (UnFragmentLen != NULL) {
*UnFragmentLen = Offset;
@@ -441,7 +495,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
// to the packet's source address, pointing to the unrecognized routing
// type.
//
- Pointer = Offset + 2 + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER);
+ Pointer = Offset + sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR) + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER);
if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) &&
!IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress))
{
@@ -527,7 +581,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
//
// RFC2402, Payload length is specified in 32-bit words, minus "2".
//
- OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 2) * 4);
+ OptionLen = ((UINT16)(*Option + 2) * 4);
Offset = Offset + OptionLen;
break;
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h
index bd8e223c8a..fb07c28f5a 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h
@@ -12,6 +12,77 @@
#define IP6_FRAGMENT_OFFSET_MASK (~0x3)
+//
+// For more information see RFC 8200, Section 4.3, 4.4, and 4.6
+//
+// This example format is from section 4.6
+// This does not apply to fragment headers
+//
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+// | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | |
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
+// | |
+// . .
+// . Header-Specific Data .
+// . .
+// | |
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+//
+// Next Header 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of
+// header immediately following the extension
+// header. Uses the same values as the IPv4
+// Protocol field [IANA-PN].
+//
+// Hdr Ext Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the
+// Destination Options header in 8-octet units,
+// not including the first 8 octets.
+
+//
+// These defines apply to the following:
+// 1. Hop by Hop
+// 2. Routing
+// 3. Destination
+//
+typedef struct _IP6_EXT_HDR {
+ ///
+ /// The Next Header field identifies the type of header immediately
+ ///
+ UINT8 NextHeader;
+ ///
+ /// The Hdr Ext Len field specifies the length of the Hop-by-Hop Options
+ ///
+ UINT8 HdrExtLen;
+ ///
+ /// Header-Specific Data
+ ///
+} IP6_EXT_HDR;
+
+STATIC_ASSERT (
+ sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR) == 2,
+ "The combined size of Next Header and Len is two 8 bit fields"
+ );
+
+//
+// IPv6 extension headers contain an 8-bit length field which describes the size of
+// the header. However, the length field only includes the size of the extension
+// header options, not the size of the first 8 bytes of the header. Therefore, in
+// order to calculate the full size of the extension header, we add 1 (to account
+// for the first 8 bytes omitted by the length field reporting) and then multiply
+// by 8 (since the size is represented in 8-byte units).
+//
+// a is the length field of the extension header (UINT8)
+// The result may be up to 2046 octets (UINT16)
+//
+#define IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN(a) (((UINT16)((UINT8)(a)) + 1) * 8)
+
+// This is the maxmimum length permissible by a extension header
+// Length is UINT8 of 8 octets not including the first 8 octets
+#define IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH (IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (MAX_UINT8) - sizeof(IP6_EXT_HDR))
+STATIC_ASSERT (
+ IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH == 2046,
+ "Maximum data length is ((MAX_UINT8 + 1) * 8) - 2"
+ );
+
typedef struct _IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER {
UINT8 NextHeader;
UINT8 Reserved;
--
2.39.3

430
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Unit.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
From 2bd8bc051f6394f2ab3c22649c54ecbed5d636cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 20:25:29 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 05/15] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit
Tests
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [5/15] 624365d403df25927ab0514b0e25faea7376def8
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21846
CVE: CVE-2022-45232
Upstream: Merged
commit c9c87f08dd6ace36fa843424522c3558a8374cac
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:51 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit Tests
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4537
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4538
Unit tests to confirm that..
Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options
header
and
Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options
header
... have been patched
This patch tests the following functions:
Ip6IsOptionValid
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf | 10 +-
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp | 278 ++++++++++++++++++
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h | 40 +++
3 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
index 6e4de0745f..ba29dbabad 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
## @file
-# Unit test suite for the Ip6Dxe using Google Test
+# Unit test suite for the Ip6DxeGoogleTest using Google Test
#
# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
##
[Defines]
INF_VERSION = 0x00010017
- BASE_NAME = Ip6DxeUnitTest
- FILE_GUID = 4F05D17D-D3E7-4AAE-820C-576D46D2D34A
+ BASE_NAME = Ip6DxeGoogleTest
+ FILE_GUID = AE39981C-B7FE-41A8-A9C2-F41910477CA3
VERSION_STRING = 1.0
MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION
#
@@ -16,9 +16,11 @@
# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 AARCH64
#
[Sources]
+ ../Ip6Option.c
+ Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h
Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
- ../Ip6Option.c
+ Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h
[Packages]
MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
index f2cd90e1a9..29f8a4a96e 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ extern "C" {
#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
#include "../Ip6Impl.h"
#include "../Ip6Option.h"
+ #include "Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h"
}
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@@ -127,3 +128,280 @@ TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, InvalidPrefixInfoOptionLengthShouldReturnFalse)
EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen));
}
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Ip6IsOptionValid Tests
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// Define a fixture for your tests if needed
+class Ip6IsOptionValidTest : public ::testing::Test {
+protected:
+ // Add any setup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ SetUp (
+ )
+ {
+ // Initialize any resources or variables
+ }
+
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ TearDown (
+ )
+ {
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
+ }
+};
+
+// Test Description
+// Verify that a NULL option is Invalid
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, NullOptionShouldReturnTrue) {
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = NULL;
+
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
+
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, NULL, 0, 0));
+}
+
+// Test Description
+// Verify that an unknown option with a length of 0 and type of <unknown> does not cause an infinite loop
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyNoInfiniteLoopOnUnknownOptionLength0) {
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
+
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
+
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
+
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
+
+ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option
+ optionHeader.Length = 0; // This will cause an infinite loop if the function is not working correctly
+
+ // This should be a valid option even though the length is 0
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+}
+
+// Test Description
+// Verify that an unknown option with a length of 1 and type of <unknown> does not cause an infinite loop
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyNoInfiniteLoopOnUnknownOptionLength1) {
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
+
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
+
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
+
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
+
+ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option
+ optionHeader.Length = 1; // This will cause an infinite loop if the function is not working correctly
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+}
+
+// Test Description
+// Verify that an unknown option with a length of 2 and type of <unknown> does not cause an infinite loop
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyIpSkipUnknownOption) {
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
+
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
+
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
+
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
+
+ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option
+ optionHeader.Length = 2; // Valid length for an unknown option
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+}
+
+// Test Description
+// Verify that Ip6OptionPad1 is valid with a length of 0
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyIp6OptionPad1) {
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
+
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
+
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
+
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
+
+ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPad1;
+ optionHeader.Length = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+}
+
+// Test Description
+// Verify that Ip6OptionPadN doesn't overflow with various lengths
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyIp6OptionPadN) {
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
+
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
+
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
+
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
+
+ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPadN;
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFF;
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFE;
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFD;
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFC;
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+}
+
+// Test Description
+// Verify an unknown option doesn't cause an infinite loop with various lengths
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyNoInfiniteLoopOnUnknownOptionLengthAttemptOverflow) {
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
+
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
+
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
+
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
+
+ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFF;
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFE;
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFD;
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFC;
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
+}
+
+// Test Description
+// Verify that the function supports multiple options
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, MultiOptionSupport) {
+ UINT16 HdrLen;
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
+
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
+
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
+
+ UINT8 ExtHdr[1024] = { 0 };
+ UINT8 *Cursor = ExtHdr;
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER *Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)ExtHdr;
+
+ // Let's start chaining options
+
+ Option->Type = 23; // Unknown Option
+ Option->Length = 0xFC;
+
+ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 0xFC;
+
+ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor;
+ Option->Type = Ip6OptionPad1;
+
+ Cursor += sizeof (1);
+
+ // Type and length aren't processed, instead it just moves the pointer forward by 4 bytes
+ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor;
+ Option->Type = Ip6OptionRouterAlert;
+ Option->Length = 4;
+
+ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 4;
+
+ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor;
+ Option->Type = Ip6OptionPadN;
+ Option->Length = 0xFC;
+
+ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 0xFC;
+
+ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor;
+ Option->Type = Ip6OptionRouterAlert;
+ Option->Length = 4;
+
+ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 4;
+
+ // Total 524
+
+ HdrLen = (UINT16)(Cursor - ExtHdr);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, ExtHdr, HdrLen, 0));
+}
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0509b6ae30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/** @file
+ Exposes the functions needed to test the Ip6Option module.
+
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+**/
+
+#ifndef IP6_OPTION_HEADER_GOOGLE_TEST_H_
+#define IP6_OPTION_HEADER_GOOGLE_TEST_H_
+
+#include <Uefi.h>
+#include "../Ip6Impl.h"
+
+/**
+ Validate the IP6 option format for both the packets we received
+ and that we will transmit. It will compute the ICMPv6 error message fields
+ if the option is malformatted.
+
+ @param[in] IpSb The IP6 service data.
+ @param[in] Packet The to be validated packet.
+ @param[in] Option The first byte of the option.
+ @param[in] OptionLen The length of the whole option.
+ @param[in] Pointer Identifies the octet offset within
+ the invoking packet where the error was detected.
+
+
+ @retval TRUE The option is properly formatted.
+ @retval FALSE The option is malformatted.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+Ip6IsOptionValid (
+ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb,
+ IN NET_BUF *Packet,
+ IN UINT8 *Option,
+ IN UINT16 OptionLen,
+ IN UINT32 Pointer
+ );
+
+#endif // __IP6_OPTION_HEADER_GOOGLE_TEST_H__
--
2.39.3

168
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@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
From 38baf93892ec464490b6fe611c23b014f574344b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 07/15] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234
Patch
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [7/15] c1baa0b2facbf0b63a90a0bfd55264af9f893098
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21850
CVE: CVE-2022-45234
Upstream: Merged
commit 1b53515d53d303166b2bbd31e2cc7f16fd0aecd7
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:52 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 Patch
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4539
Bug Details:
PixieFail Bug #6
CVE-2023-45234
CVSS 8.3 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H
CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of
a Memory Buffer
Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6
Advertise message
Change Overview:
Introduces a function to cache the Dns Server and perform sanitizing
on the incoming DnsServerLen to ensure that the length is valid
> + EFI_STATUS
> + PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses (
> + IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
> + IN PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6
> + )
Additional code cleanup
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
index 425e0cf806..2b2d372889 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
(C) Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
@@ -1312,6 +1313,65 @@ PxeBcSelectDhcp6Offer (
}
}
+/**
+ Cache the DHCPv6 DNS Server addresses
+
+ @param[in] Private The pointer to PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA.
+ @param[in] Cache6 The pointer to PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Cache the DHCPv6 DNS Server address successfully.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate resources.
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The DNS Server Address Length provided by a untrusted
+ option is not a multiple of 16 bytes (sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)).
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses (
+ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
+ IN PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6
+ )
+{
+ UINT16 DnsServerLen;
+
+ DnsServerLen = NTOHS (Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpLen);
+ //
+ // Make sure that the number is nonzero
+ //
+ if (DnsServerLen == 0) {
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Make sure the DnsServerlen is a multiple of EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS (16)
+ //
+ if (DnsServerLen % sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS) != 0) {
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // This code is currently written to only support a single DNS Server instead
+ // of multiple such as is spec defined (RFC3646, Section 3). The proper behavior
+ // would be to allocate the full space requested, CopyMem all of the data,
+ // and then add a DnsServerCount field to Private and update additional code
+ // that depends on this.
+ //
+ // To support multiple DNS servers the `AllocationSize` would need to be changed to DnsServerLen
+ //
+ // This is tracked in https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1886
+ //
+ Private->DnsServer = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS));
+ if (Private->DnsServer == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Intentionally only copy over the first server address.
+ // To support multiple DNS servers, the `Length` would need to be changed to DnsServerLen
+ //
+ CopyMem (Private->DnsServer, Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->Data, sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS));
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
/**
Handle the DHCPv6 offer packet.
@@ -1335,6 +1395,7 @@ PxeBcHandleDhcp6Offer (
UINT32 SelectIndex;
UINT32 Index;
+ ASSERT (Private != NULL);
ASSERT (Private->SelectIndex > 0);
SelectIndex = (UINT32)(Private->SelectIndex - 1);
ASSERT (SelectIndex < PXEBC_OFFER_MAX_NUM);
@@ -1342,15 +1403,13 @@ PxeBcHandleDhcp6Offer (
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
//
- // First try to cache DNS server address if DHCP6 offer provides.
+ // First try to cache DNS server addresses if DHCP6 offer provides.
//
if (Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER] != NULL) {
- Private->DnsServer = AllocateZeroPool (NTOHS (Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpLen));
- if (Private->DnsServer == NULL) {
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ Status = PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses (Private, Cache6);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
}
-
- CopyMem (Private->DnsServer, Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->Data, sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS));
}
if (Cache6->OfferType == PxeOfferTypeDhcpBinl) {
--
2.39.3

511
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View File

@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
From fd1bc6ff10a45123b0ec7f9ae3354ad3713bc532 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 08/15] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234
Unit Tests
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [8/15] f88ebc7fa79ce4fe615dd79c42fedee0a0da7a0b
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21850
CVE: CVE-2022-45234
Upstream: Merged
commit 458c582685fc0e8057d2511c5a0394078d988c17
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:53 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 Unit Tests
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4539
Unit tests to that the bug..
Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise
message
..has been patched
This contains tests for the following functions:
PxeBcHandleDhcp6Offer
PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 1 +
.../GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp | 300 ++++++++++++++++++
.../GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h | 50 +++
.../GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.cpp | 19 ++
.../GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf | 48 +++
5 files changed, 418 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.cpp
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
index ab7c2857b6..c8a991e5c1 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
+ NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf
# Despite these library classes being listed in [LibraryClasses] below, they are not needed for the host-based unit tests.
[LibraryClasses]
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8260eeee50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+/** @file
+ Host based unit test for PxeBcDhcp6.c.
+
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+**/
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+ #include <Uefi.h>
+ #include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+ #include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+ #include "../PxeBcImpl.h"
+ #include "../PxeBcDhcp6.h"
+ #include "PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h"
+}
+
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Definitions
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+#define PACKET_SIZE (1500)
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINT16 OptionCode; // The option code for DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID (e.g., 0x03)
+ UINT16 OptionLen; // The length of the option (e.g., 16 bytes)
+ UINT8 ServerId[16]; // The 16-byte DHCPv6 Server Identifier
+} DHCP6_OPTION_SERVER_ID;
+
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+/// Symbol Definitions
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+EFI_STATUS
+MockUdpWrite (
+ IN EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN UINT16 OpFlags,
+ IN EFI_IP_ADDRESS *DestIp,
+ IN EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_PORT *DestPort,
+ IN EFI_IP_ADDRESS *GatewayIp OPTIONAL,
+ IN EFI_IP_ADDRESS *SrcIp OPTIONAL,
+ IN OUT EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_PORT *SrcPort OPTIONAL,
+ IN UINTN *HeaderSize OPTIONAL,
+ IN VOID *HeaderPtr OPTIONAL,
+ IN UINTN *BufferSize,
+ IN VOID *BufferPtr
+ )
+{
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+EFI_STATUS
+MockUdpRead (
+ IN EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN UINT16 OpFlags,
+ IN OUT EFI_IP_ADDRESS *DestIp OPTIONAL,
+ IN OUT EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_PORT *DestPort OPTIONAL,
+ IN OUT EFI_IP_ADDRESS *SrcIp OPTIONAL,
+ IN OUT EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_PORT *SrcPort OPTIONAL,
+ IN UINTN *HeaderSize OPTIONAL,
+ IN VOID *HeaderPtr OPTIONAL,
+ IN OUT UINTN *BufferSize,
+ IN VOID *BufferPtr
+ )
+{
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+EFI_STATUS
+MockConfigure (
+ IN EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN EFI_UDP6_CONFIG_DATA *UdpConfigData OPTIONAL
+ )
+{
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+// Needed by PxeBcSupport
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+QueueDpc (
+ IN EFI_TPL DpcTpl,
+ IN EFI_DPC_PROCEDURE DpcProcedure,
+ IN VOID *DpcContext OPTIONAL
+ )
+{
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// PxeBcHandleDhcp6OfferTest Tests
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+class PxeBcHandleDhcp6OfferTest : public ::testing::Test {
+public:
+ PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA Private = { 0 };
+ EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL Udp6Read;
+ EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_MODE Mode = { 0 };
+
+protected:
+ // Add any setup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ SetUp (
+ )
+ {
+ Private.Dhcp6Request = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)AllocateZeroPool (PACKET_SIZE);
+
+ // Need to setup the EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_PROTOCOL
+ // The function under test really only needs the following:
+ // UdpWrite
+ // UdpRead
+
+ Private.PxeBc.UdpWrite = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_WRITE)MockUdpWrite;
+ Private.PxeBc.UdpRead = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_READ)MockUdpRead;
+
+ // Need to setup EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL
+ // The function under test really only needs the following:
+ // Configure
+
+ Udp6Read.Configure = (EFI_UDP6_CONFIGURE)MockConfigure;
+ Private.Udp6Read = &Udp6Read;
+
+ // Need to setup the EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_MODE
+ Private.PxeBc.Mode = &Mode;
+
+ // for this test it doesn't really matter what the Dhcpv6 ack is set to
+ }
+
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ TearDown (
+ )
+ {
+ if (Private.Dhcp6Request != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Private.Dhcp6Request);
+ }
+
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
+ }
+};
+
+// Note:
+// Testing PxeBcHandleDhcp6Offer() is difficult because it depends on a
+// properly setup Private structure. Attempting to properly test this function
+// without a signficant refactor is a fools errand. Instead, we will test
+// that we can prevent an overflow in the function.
+TEST_F (PxeBcHandleDhcp6OfferTest, BasicUsageTest) {
+ PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6 = NULL;
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION Option = { 0 };
+
+ Private.SelectIndex = 1; // SelectIndex is 1-based
+ Cache6 = &Private.OfferBuffer[Private.SelectIndex - 1].Dhcp6;
+
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER] = &Option;
+ // Setup the DHCPv6 offer packet
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpCode = DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID;
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpLen = NTOHS (1337);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcHandleDhcp6Offer (&(PxeBcHandleDhcp6OfferTest::Private)), EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
+}
+
+class PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest : public ::testing::Test {
+public:
+ PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA Private = { 0 };
+
+protected:
+ // Add any setup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ SetUp (
+ )
+ {
+ }
+
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ TearDown (
+ )
+ {
+ }
+};
+
+// Test Description
+// Test that we cache the DNS server address from the DHCPv6 offer packet
+TEST_F (PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest, BasicUsageTest) {
+ UINT8 SearchPattern[16] = { 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF };
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *Option;
+ PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6 = NULL;
+
+ Option = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION) + sizeof (SearchPattern));
+ ASSERT_NE (Option, nullptr);
+
+ Option->OpCode = DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID;
+ Option->OpLen = NTOHS (sizeof (SearchPattern));
+ CopyMem (Option->Data, SearchPattern, sizeof (SearchPattern));
+
+ Private.SelectIndex = 1; // SelectIndex is 1-based
+ Cache6 = &Private.OfferBuffer[Private.SelectIndex - 1].Dhcp6;
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER] = Option;
+
+ Private.DnsServer = nullptr;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses (&(PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest::Private), Cache6), EFI_SUCCESS);
+ ASSERT_NE (Private.DnsServer, nullptr);
+ ASSERT_EQ (CompareMem (Private.DnsServer, SearchPattern, sizeof (SearchPattern)), 0);
+
+ if (Private.DnsServer) {
+ FreePool (Private.DnsServer);
+ }
+
+ if (Option) {
+ FreePool (Option);
+ }
+}
+// Test Description
+// Test that we can prevent an overflow in the function
+TEST_F (PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest, AttemptOverflowTest) {
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION Option = { 0 };
+ PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6 = NULL;
+
+ Private.SelectIndex = 1; // SelectIndex is 1-based
+ Cache6 = &Private.OfferBuffer[Private.SelectIndex - 1].Dhcp6;
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER] = &Option;
+ // Setup the DHCPv6 offer packet
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpCode = DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID;
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpLen = NTOHS (1337);
+
+ Private.DnsServer = NULL;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses (&(PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest::Private), Cache6), EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
+ ASSERT_EQ (Private.DnsServer, nullptr);
+
+ if (Private.DnsServer) {
+ FreePool (Private.DnsServer);
+ }
+}
+
+// Test Description
+// Test that we can prevent an underflow in the function
+TEST_F (PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest, AttemptUnderflowTest) {
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION Option = { 0 };
+ PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6 = NULL;
+
+ Private.SelectIndex = 1; // SelectIndex is 1-based
+ Cache6 = &Private.OfferBuffer[Private.SelectIndex - 1].Dhcp6;
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER] = &Option;
+ // Setup the DHCPv6 offer packet
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpCode = DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID;
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpLen = NTOHS (2);
+
+ Private.DnsServer = NULL;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses (&(PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest::Private), Cache6), EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
+ ASSERT_EQ (Private.DnsServer, nullptr);
+
+ if (Private.DnsServer) {
+ FreePool (Private.DnsServer);
+ }
+}
+
+// Test Description
+// Test that we can handle recursive dns (multiple dns entries)
+TEST_F (PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest, MultipleDnsEntries) {
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION Option = { 0 };
+ PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6 = NULL;
+
+ Private.SelectIndex = 1; // SelectIndex is 1-based
+ Cache6 = &Private.OfferBuffer[Private.SelectIndex - 1].Dhcp6;
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER] = &Option;
+ // Setup the DHCPv6 offer packet
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpCode = DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID;
+
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS addresses[2] = {
+ // 2001:db8:85a3::8a2e:370:7334
+ { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x85, 0xa3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x8a, 0x2e, 0x03, 0x70, 0x73, 0x34 },
+ // fe80::d478:91c3:ecd7:4ff9
+ { 0xfe, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xd4, 0x78, 0x91, 0xc3, 0xec, 0xd7, 0x4f, 0xf9 }
+ };
+
+ CopyMem (Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->Data, &addresses, sizeof (addresses));
+
+ Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpLen = NTOHS (sizeof (addresses));
+
+ Private.DnsServer = NULL;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses (&(PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest::Private), Cache6), EFI_SUCCESS);
+
+ ASSERT_NE (Private.DnsServer, nullptr);
+
+ //
+ // This is expected to fail until DnsServer supports multiple DNS servers
+ //
+ // This is tracked in https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1886
+ //
+ // Disabling:
+ // ASSERT_EQ (CompareMem(Private.DnsServer, &addresses, sizeof(addresses)), 0);
+
+ if (Private.DnsServer) {
+ FreePool (Private.DnsServer);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b17c314791
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/** @file
+ This file exposes the internal interfaces which may be unit tested
+ for the PxeBcDhcp6Dxe driver.
+
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+**/
+
+#ifndef PXE_BC_DHCP6_GOOGLE_TEST_H_
+#define PXE_BC_DHCP6_GOOGLE_TEST_H_
+
+//
+// Minimal includes needed to compile
+//
+#include <Uefi.h>
+#include "../PxeBcImpl.h"
+
+/**
+ Handle the DHCPv6 offer packet.
+
+ @param[in] Private The pointer to PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Handled the DHCPv6 offer packet successfully.
+ @retval EFI_NO_RESPONSE No response to the following request packet.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate resources.
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL Can't cache the offer pacet.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+PxeBcHandleDhcp6Offer (
+ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private
+ );
+
+/**
+ Cache the DHCPv6 Server address
+
+ @param[in] Private The pointer to PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA.
+ @param[in] Cache6 The pointer to PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Cache the DHCPv6 Server address successfully.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate resources.
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR Failed to cache the DHCPv6 Server address.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses (
+ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
+ IN PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6
+ );
+
+#endif // PXE_BC_DHCP6_GOOGLE_TEST_H_
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cc4fdf525b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/** @file
+ Acts as the main entry point for the tests for the UefiPxeBcDxe module.
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+**/
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Run the tests
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+int
+main (
+ int argc,
+ char *argv[]
+ )
+{
+ testing::InitGoogleTest (&argc, argv);
+ return RUN_ALL_TESTS ();
+}
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..301dcdf611
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+## @file
+# Unit test suite for the UefiPxeBcDxe using Google Test
+#
+# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+##
+[Defines]
+INF_VERSION = 0x00010005
+BASE_NAME = UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest
+FILE_GUID = 77D45C64-EC1E-4174-887B-886E89FD1EDF
+MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION
+VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+
+#
+# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
+#
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64
+#
+
+[Sources]
+ UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.cpp
+ PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp
+ PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h
+ ../PxeBcDhcp6.c
+ ../PxeBcSupport.c
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+ UnitTestFrameworkPkg/UnitTestFrameworkPkg.dec
+ NetworkPkg/NetworkPkg.dec
+
+[LibraryClasses]
+ GoogleTestLib
+ DebugLib
+ NetLib
+ PcdLib
+
+[Protocols]
+ gEfiDhcp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid
+ gEfiDns6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid
+ gEfiDns6ProtocolGuid
+
+[Pcd]
+ gEfiNetworkPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDhcp6UidType
+
+[Guids]
+ gZeroGuid
--
2.39.3

257
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View File

@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
From 0016db53099ba979617f376fe1104fefada4fa29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 09/15] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235
Patch
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [9/15] c48c060b87761537ee526e1f8a9e5993eb1a0381
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21852
CVE: CVE-2022-45235
Upstream: Merged
commit fac297724e6cc343430cd0104e55cd7a96d1151e
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:55 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Patch
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4540
Bug Details:
PixieFail Bug #7
CVE-2023-45235
CVSS 8.3 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H
CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of
a Memory Buffer
Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy
Advertise message
Change Overview:
Performs two checks
1. Checks that the length of the duid is accurate
> + //
> + // Check that the minimum and maximum requirements are met
> + //
> + if ((OpLen < PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID) ||
(OpLen > PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID)) {
> + Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> + goto ON_ERROR;
> + }
2. Ensures that the amount of data written to the buffer is tracked and
never exceeds that
> + //
> + // Check that the option length is valid.
> + //
> + if ((DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN)
> DiscoverLenNeeded) {
> + Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
> + goto ON_ERROR;
> + }
Additional code clean up and fix for memory leak in case Option was NULL
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h | 17 ++++++
2 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
index 2b2d372889..7fd1281c11 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
@@ -887,6 +887,7 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService (
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *IndexOffer;
UINT8 *Option;
+ UINTN DiscoverLenNeeded;
PxeBc = &Private->PxeBc;
Request = Private->Dhcp6Request;
@@ -899,7 +900,8 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService (
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
- Discover = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET));
+ DiscoverLenNeeded = sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET);
+ Discover = AllocateZeroPool (DiscoverLenNeeded);
if (Discover == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
@@ -924,16 +926,34 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService (
DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID
);
if (Option == NULL) {
- return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ goto ON_ERROR;
}
//
// Add Server ID Option.
//
OpLen = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)Option)->OpLen);
- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, Option, OpLen + 4);
- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4);
- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4);
+
+ //
+ // Check that the minimum and maximum requirements are met
+ //
+ if ((OpLen < PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID) || (OpLen > PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID)) {
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ goto ON_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check that the option length is valid.
+ //
+ if ((DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN) > DiscoverLenNeeded) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, Option, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
+ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
+ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
}
while (RequestLen < Request->Length) {
@@ -944,16 +964,24 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService (
(OpCode != DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID)
)
{
+ //
+ // Check that the option length is valid.
+ //
+ if (DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN > DiscoverLenNeeded) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_ERROR;
+ }
+
//
// Copy all the options except IA option and Server ID
//
- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + 4);
- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4);
- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4);
+ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
+ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
+ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
}
- RequestOpt += (OpLen + 4);
- RequestLen += (OpLen + 4);
+ RequestOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
+ RequestLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
}
//
@@ -2154,6 +2182,7 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover (
UINT16 OpLen;
UINT32 Xid;
EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN DiscoverLenNeeded;
PxeBc = &Private->PxeBc;
Mode = PxeBc->Mode;
@@ -2169,7 +2198,8 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover (
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
- Discover = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET));
+ DiscoverLenNeeded = sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET);
+ Discover = AllocateZeroPool (DiscoverLenNeeded);
if (Discover == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
@@ -2185,22 +2215,37 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover (
DiscoverLen = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER);
RequestLen = DiscoverLen;
+ //
+ // The request packet is generated by the UEFI network stack. In the DHCP4 DORA and DHCP6 SARR sequence,
+ // the first (discover in DHCP4 and solicit in DHCP6) and third (request in both DHCP4 and DHCP6) are
+ // generated by the DHCP client (the UEFI network stack in this case). By the time this function executes,
+ // the DHCP sequence already has been executed once (see UEFI Specification Figures 24.2 and 24.3), with
+ // Private->Dhcp6Request being a cached copy of the DHCP6 request packet that UEFI network stack previously
+ // generated and sent.
+ //
+ // Therefore while this code looks like it could overflow, in practice it's not possible.
+ //
while (RequestLen < Request->Length) {
OpCode = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)RequestOpt)->OpCode);
OpLen = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)RequestOpt)->OpLen);
if ((OpCode != EFI_DHCP6_IA_TYPE_NA) &&
(OpCode != EFI_DHCP6_IA_TYPE_TA))
{
+ if (DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN > DiscoverLenNeeded) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_ERROR;
+ }
+
//
// Copy all the options except IA option.
//
- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + 4);
- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4);
- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4);
+ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
+ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
+ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
}
- RequestOpt += (OpLen + 4);
- RequestLen += (OpLen + 4);
+ RequestOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
+ RequestLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
}
Status = PxeBc->UdpWrite (
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h
index ae4be775e8..47eb8cc0c0 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h
@@ -35,6 +35,23 @@
#define PXEBC_ADDR_START_DELIMITER '['
#define PXEBC_ADDR_END_DELIMITER ']'
+//
+// A DUID consists of a 2-octet type code represented in network byte
+// order, followed by a variable number of octets that make up the
+// actual identifier. The length of the DUID (not including the type
+// code) is at least 1 octet and at most 128 octets.
+//
+#define PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID (sizeof(UINT16) + 1)
+#define PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID (sizeof(UINT16) + 128)
+
+//
+// This define represents the combineds code and length field from
+// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3315#section-22.1
+//
+#define PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN \
+ (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpCode) + \
+ sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpLen))
+
#define GET_NEXT_DHCP6_OPTION(Opt) \
(EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *) ((UINT8 *) (Opt) + \
sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION) + (NTOHS ((Opt)->OpLen)) - 1)
--
2.39.3

409
SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p4.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
From 80b34c0f56228353c174f9ff739d0755c62d76cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 10/15] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235
Unit Tests
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package
RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [10/15] 5dbf3f771506ff9a0c28827c568d04e825572658
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21852
CVE: CVE-2022-45235
Upstream: Merged
commit ff2986358f75d8f58ef08a66fe673539c9c48f41
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:56 2024 +0800
NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Unit Tests
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4540
Unit tests to confirm that the bug..
Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy
Advertise message
..has been patched.
This patch contains unit tests for the following functions:
PxeBcRequestBootService
PxeBcDhcp6Discover
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 5 +-
.../GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp | 278 +++++++++++++++++-
.../GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h | 18 ++
3 files changed, 298 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
index c8a991e5c1..1010a80a15 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
@@ -26,7 +26,10 @@
#
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
- NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf
+ NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf {
+ <LibraryClasses>
+ UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib|MdePkg/Test/Mock/Library/GoogleTest/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.inf
+ }
# Despite these library classes being listed in [LibraryClasses] below, they are not needed for the host-based unit tests.
[LibraryClasses]
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp
index 8260eeee50..bd423ebadf 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
-#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <Library/GoogleTestLib.h>
+#include <GoogleTest/Library/MockUefiLib.h>
+#include <GoogleTest/Library/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.h>
extern "C" {
#include <Uefi.h>
@@ -19,7 +21,8 @@ extern "C" {
// Definitions
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-#define PACKET_SIZE (1500)
+#define PACKET_SIZE (1500)
+#define REQUEST_OPTION_LENGTH (120)
typedef struct {
UINT16 OptionCode; // The option code for DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID (e.g., 0x03)
@@ -76,6 +79,26 @@ MockConfigure (
}
// Needed by PxeBcSupport
+EFI_STATUS
+PxeBcDns6 (
+ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
+ IN CHAR16 *HostName,
+ OUT EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *IpAddress
+ )
+{
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+UINT32
+PxeBcBuildDhcp6Options (
+ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
+ OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION **OptList,
+ IN UINT8 *Buffer
+ )
+{
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
QueueDpc (
@@ -159,6 +182,10 @@ TEST_F (PxeBcHandleDhcp6OfferTest, BasicUsageTest) {
ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcHandleDhcp6Offer (&(PxeBcHandleDhcp6OfferTest::Private)), EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
}
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses Tests
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
class PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest : public ::testing::Test {
public:
PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA Private = { 0 };
@@ -298,3 +325,250 @@ TEST_F (PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest, MultipleDnsEntries) {
FreePool (Private.DnsServer);
}
}
+
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest Test Cases
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+class PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest : public ::testing::Test {
+public:
+ PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA Private = { 0 };
+ EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL Udp6Read;
+
+protected:
+ // Add any setup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ SetUp (
+ )
+ {
+ Private.Dhcp6Request = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)AllocateZeroPool (PACKET_SIZE);
+
+ // Need to setup the EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_PROTOCOL
+ // The function under test really only needs the following:
+ // UdpWrite
+ // UdpRead
+
+ Private.PxeBc.UdpWrite = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_WRITE)MockUdpWrite;
+ Private.PxeBc.UdpRead = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_READ)MockUdpRead;
+
+ // Need to setup EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL
+ // The function under test really only needs the following:
+ // Configure
+
+ Udp6Read.Configure = (EFI_UDP6_CONFIGURE)MockConfigure;
+ Private.Udp6Read = &Udp6Read;
+ }
+
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ TearDown (
+ )
+ {
+ if (Private.Dhcp6Request != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Private.Dhcp6Request);
+ }
+
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
+ }
+};
+
+TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, ServerDiscoverBasicUsageTest) {
+ PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private.OfferBuffer[0].Dhcp6.OfferType = PxeOfferTypeProxyBinl;
+
+ DHCP6_OPTION_SERVER_ID Server = { 0 };
+
+ Server.OptionCode = HTONS (DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID);
+ Server.OptionLen = HTONS (16); // valid length
+ UINT8 Index = 0;
+
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.OfferBuffer[Index].Dhcp6.Packet.Offer;
+
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
+
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &Server, sizeof (Server));
+ Cursor += sizeof (Server);
+
+ // Update the packet length
+ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet);
+ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, AttemptDiscoverOverFlowExpectFailure) {
+ PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private.OfferBuffer[0].Dhcp6.OfferType = PxeOfferTypeProxyBinl;
+
+ DHCP6_OPTION_SERVER_ID Server = { 0 };
+
+ Server.OptionCode = HTONS (DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID);
+ Server.OptionLen = HTONS (1500); // This length would overflow without a check
+ UINT8 Index = 0;
+
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.OfferBuffer[Index].Dhcp6.Packet.Offer;
+
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
+
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &Server, sizeof (Server));
+ Cursor += sizeof (Server);
+
+ // Update the packet length
+ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet);
+ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE;
+
+ // This is going to be stopped by the duid overflow check
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+}
+
+TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, RequestBasicUsageTest) {
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter
+
+ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337);
+ RequestOpt.OpLen = 0; // valid length
+
+ UINT8 Index = 0;
+
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.Dhcp6Request[Index];
+
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
+
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt));
+ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt);
+
+ // Update the packet length
+ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet);
+ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, AttemptRequestOverFlowExpectFailure) {
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter
+
+ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337);
+ RequestOpt.OpLen = 1500; // this length would overflow without a check
+
+ UINT8 Index = 0;
+
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.Dhcp6Request[Index];
+
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
+
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt));
+ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt);
+
+ // Update the packet length
+ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet);
+ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES);
+}
+
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// PxeBcDhcp6Discover Test
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+class PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest : public ::testing::Test {
+public:
+ PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA Private = { 0 };
+ EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL Udp6Read;
+
+protected:
+ MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib RtServicesMock;
+
+ // Add any setup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ SetUp (
+ )
+ {
+ Private.Dhcp6Request = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)AllocateZeroPool (PACKET_SIZE);
+
+ // Need to setup the EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_PROTOCOL
+ // The function under test really only needs the following:
+ // UdpWrite
+ // UdpRead
+
+ Private.PxeBc.UdpWrite = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_WRITE)MockUdpWrite;
+ Private.PxeBc.UdpRead = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_READ)MockUdpRead;
+
+ // Need to setup EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL
+ // The function under test really only needs the following:
+ // Configure
+
+ Udp6Read.Configure = (EFI_UDP6_CONFIGURE)MockConfigure;
+ Private.Udp6Read = &Udp6Read;
+ }
+
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
+ virtual void
+ TearDown (
+ )
+ {
+ if (Private.Dhcp6Request != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Private.Dhcp6Request);
+ }
+
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
+ }
+};
+
+// Test Description
+// This will cause an overflow by an untrusted packet during the option parsing
+TEST_F (PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest, BasicOverflowTest) {
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestIp = { 0 };
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter
+
+ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337);
+ RequestOpt.OpLen = HTONS (0xFFFF); // overflow
+
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Private.Dhcp6Request->Dhcp6.Option);
+
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt));
+ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt);
+
+ Private.Dhcp6Request->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Private.Dhcp6Request);
+
+ EXPECT_CALL (RtServicesMock, gRT_GetTime)
+ .WillOnce (::testing::Return (0));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (
+ PxeBcDhcp6Discover (
+ &(PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest::Private),
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+ FALSE,
+ (EFI_IP_ADDRESS *)&DestIp
+ ),
+ EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ );
+}
+
+// Test Description
+// This will test that we can handle a packet with a valid option length
+TEST_F (PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest, BasicUsageTest) {
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestIp = { 0 };
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter
+
+ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337);
+ RequestOpt.OpLen = HTONS (0x30);
+
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Private.Dhcp6Request->Dhcp6.Option);
+
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt));
+ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt);
+
+ Private.Dhcp6Request->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Private.Dhcp6Request);
+
+ EXPECT_CALL (RtServicesMock, gRT_GetTime)
+ .WillOnce (::testing::Return (0));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ (
+ PxeBcDhcp6Discover (
+ &(PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest::Private),
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+ FALSE,
+ (EFI_IP_ADDRESS *)&DestIp
+ ),
+ EFI_SUCCESS
+ );
+}
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h
index b17c314791..0d825e4425 100644
--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h
@@ -47,4 +47,22 @@ PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses (
IN PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6
);
+/**
+ Build and send out the request packet for the bootfile, and parse the reply.
+
+ @param[in] Private The pointer to PxeBc private data.
+ @param[in] Index PxeBc option boot item type.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully discovered the boot file.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate resources.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't get the PXE reply packet.
+ @retval Others Failed to discover the boot file.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+PxeBcRequestBootService (
+ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
+ IN UINT32 Index
+ );
+
#endif // PXE_BC_DHCP6_GOOGLE_TEST_H_
--
2.39.3

47
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-ValidateFvHeader-unwritten-s.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From f2aeff31924f6d070d7f8b87550dc6d9820531ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:04 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 15/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: ValidateFvHeader: unwritten
state is EOL too
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [17/20] 37220c700ea816c815e0612031e10b7d466b71a2
It is possible to find variable entries with State being 0xff, i.e. not
updated since flash block erase. This indicates the variable driver
could not complete the header write while appending a new entry, and
therefore State was not set to VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY.
This can only happen at the end of the variable list, so treat this as
additional "end of variable list" condition.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-6-kraxel@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 735d0a5e2e25c1577bf9bea7826da937ca38169d)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
index acc4a413ee..f8e71f88c1 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
@@ -302,6 +302,11 @@ ValidateFvHeader (
break;
}
+ if (VarHeader->State == 0xff) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: end of var list (unwritten state)\n", __func__));
+ break;
+ }
+
VarName = NULL;
switch (VarHeader->State) {
// usage: State = VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY
--
2.41.0

73
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-a-loop-for-NorFlashWrite.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
From 00d9e2d6cb03afeef5a1110d6f1fae1389a06f7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 13/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: add a loop for
NorFlashWriteBuffer calls.
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [15/20] 72004a196ea61d627ab528573db657dd7db16de2
Replace the two NorFlashWriteBuffer() calls with a loop containing a
single NorFlashWriteBuffer() call.
With the changes in place the code is able to handle updates larger
than two P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES blocks, even though the patch
does not actually change the size limit.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-4-kraxel@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 28ffd726894f11a587a6ac7f71a4c4af341e24d2)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 21 ++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
index 88a4d2c23f..3d1343b381 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
UINTN BlockAddress;
UINT8 *OrigData;
UINTN Start, End;
+ UINT32 Index, Count;
DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer));
@@ -621,23 +622,17 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
goto Exit;
}
- Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer (
- Instance,
- BlockAddress + Start,
- P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
- Instance->ShadowBuffer
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- goto Exit;
- }
-
- if ((End - Start) > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) {
+ Count = (End - Start) / P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < Count; Index++) {
Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer (
Instance,
- BlockAddress + Start + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
+ BlockAddress + Start + Index * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
- Instance->ShadowBuffer + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES
+ Instance->ShadowBuffer + Index * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES
);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto Exit;
+ }
}
Exit:
--
2.41.0

55
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-casts-to-UINTN-and-UINT3.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From e8150ee7fdf1421d2e2801c901e0196496ef599e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:00 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 11/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: add casts to UINTN and UINT32
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [13/20] fa695acadb9d693242b5221d2bc1958b929718e7
This is needed to avoid bit operations being applied to signed integers.
Suggested-by: László Érsek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-2-kraxel@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0395045ae307c43a41f72ca9a8bf4eb8f16b2fe0)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 2 +-
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
index 1afd60ce66..7f4743b003 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
// contents, while checking whether the old version had any bits cleared
// that we want to set. In that case, we will need to erase the block first.
for (CurOffset = 0; CurOffset < *NumBytes; CurOffset++) {
- if (~OrigData[CurOffset] & Buffer[CurOffset]) {
+ if (~(UINT32)OrigData[CurOffset] & (UINT32)Buffer[CurOffset]) {
goto DoErase;
}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
index b7f5d208b2..455eafacc2 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
#define P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES ((UINTN)128)
#define P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_WORDS (P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES/((UINTN)4))
#define MAX_BUFFERED_PROG_ITERATIONS 10000000
-#define BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS 0x7F
+#define BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS ((UINTN)0x7F)
// CFI Addresses
#define P30_CFI_ADDR_QUERY_UNIQUE_QRY 0x10
--
2.41.0

65
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-allow-larger-writes-without-.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
From 0193a89b0db837da31301bc1edb8382927842978 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 14/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: allow larger writes without
block erase
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [16/20] 27ac63b90eb5e6fdc00cbc5a9105c3178ee559cd
Raise the limit for writes without block erase from two to four
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES blocks. With this in place almost all efi
variable updates are handled without block erase. With the old limit
some variable updates (with device paths) took the block erase code
path.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-5-kraxel@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b25733c97442513890ae6bb8e10fd340f13844a7)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
index 3d1343b381..3d1d20daa1 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
@@ -550,13 +550,15 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
}
- // Pick P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES (== 128 bytes) as a good start for word
- // operations as opposed to erasing the block and writing the data regardless
- // if an erase is really needed. It looks like most individual NV variable
- // writes are smaller than 128 bytes.
- // To avoid pathological cases were a 2 byte write is disregarded because it
- // occurs right at a 128 byte buffered write alignment boundary, permit up to
- // twice the max buffer size, and perform two writes if needed.
+ // Pick 4 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES (== 512 bytes) as a good
+ // start for word operations as opposed to erasing the block and
+ // writing the data regardless if an erase is really needed.
+ //
+ // Many NV variable updates are small enough for a a single
+ // P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES block write. In case the update is
+ // larger than a single block, or the update crosses a
+ // P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES boundary (as shown in the diagram
+ // below), or both, we might have to write two or more blocks.
//
// 0 128 256
// [----------------|----------------]
@@ -578,7 +580,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
Start = Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS;
End = ALIGN_VALUE (Offset + *NumBytes, P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
- if ((End - Start) <= (2 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) {
+ if ((End - Start) <= (4 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) {
// Check to see if we need to erase before programming the data into NOR.
// If the destination bits are only changing from 1s to 0s we can just write.
// After a block is erased all bits in the block is set to 1.
--
2.41.0

89
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-array-mode-switch-afte.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
From 20ba071dabad6b0f5663083a017799b7a6e684c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 17:34:09 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 05/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: avoid array mode switch after
each word write
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [7/20] 274f2ed71a6d5d3f6497129ee3c62f494cc2f067
NorFlashWriteSingleWord() switches into programming mode and back into
array mode for every single word that it writes. Under KVM, this
involves tearing down the read-only memslot, and setting it up again,
which is costly and unnecessary.
Instead, move the array mode switch into the callers, and only make the
switch when the writing is done.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
(cherry picked from commit ca01e6216a8d1a26c69018e216d1dc3f88a819a4)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 12 +++---------
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
index f41d9d372f..0a5c5d48c7 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
@@ -205,9 +205,6 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleWord (
SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_CLEAR_STATUS_REGISTER);
}
- // Put device back into Read Array mode
- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
-
return Status;
}
@@ -286,8 +283,7 @@ NorFlashWriteBuffer (
// The buffer was not available for writing
if (WaitForBuffer == 0) {
- Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
- goto EXIT;
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
// From now on we work in 32-bit words
@@ -337,10 +333,6 @@ NorFlashWriteBuffer (
SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_CLEAR_STATUS_REGISTER);
}
-EXIT:
- // Put device back into Read Array mode
- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
-
return Status;
}
@@ -739,6 +731,8 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
}
TempStatus = NorFlashWriteSingleWord (Instance, WordAddr, WordToWrite);
+ // Put device back into Read Array mode
+ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
index 2ceda22635..f9a41f6aab 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
@@ -280,6 +280,9 @@ NorFlashWriteFullBlock (
}
EXIT:
+ // Put device back into Read Array mode
+ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
+
if (!EfiAtRuntime ()) {
// Interruptions can resume.
gBS->RestoreTPL (OriginalTPL);
--
2.41.0

303
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-switching-between-mode.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
From 67e26db39c0ec90c164634251da761f649546529 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 17:58:07 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 06/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: avoid switching between modes
in a tight loop
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [8/20] 4923b0fb1586d7955be466b90dce5f790da704ff
Currently, when dealing with small updates that can be written out
directly (i.e., if they only involve clearing bits and not setting bits,
as the latter requires a block level erase), we iterate over the data
one word at a time, read the old value, compare it, write the new value,
and repeat, unless we encountered a value that we cannot write (0->1
transition), in which case we fall back to a block level operation.
This is inefficient for two reasons:
- reading and writing a word at a time involves switching between array
and programming mode for every word of data, which is
disproportionately costly when running under KVM;
- we end up writing some data twice, as we may not notice that a block
erase is needed until after some data has been written to flash.
So replace this sequence with a single read of up to twice the buffered
write maximum size, followed by one or two buffered writes if the data
can be written directly. Otherwise, fall back to the existing block
level sequence, but without writing out part of the data twice.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
(cherry picked from commit 25589c4a76e7e3668fd6f794dd1827e958b6719c)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 214 +++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 138 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
index 0a5c5d48c7..0343131a54 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
@@ -576,23 +576,20 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
IN UINT8 *Buffer
)
{
- EFI_STATUS TempStatus;
- UINT32 Tmp;
- UINT32 TmpBuf;
- UINT32 WordToWrite;
- UINT32 Mask;
- BOOLEAN DoErase;
- UINTN BytesToWrite;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
UINTN CurOffset;
- UINTN WordAddr;
UINTN BlockSize;
UINTN BlockAddress;
- UINTN PrevBlockAddress;
-
- PrevBlockAddress = 0;
+ UINT8 *OrigData;
DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer));
+ // Check we did get some memory. Buffer is BlockSize.
+ if (Instance->ShadowBuffer == NULL) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbWrite: ERROR - Buffer not ready\n"));
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
// Cache the block size to avoid de-referencing pointers all the time
BlockSize = Instance->BlockSize;
@@ -612,148 +609,89 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
}
- // Pick 128bytes as a good start for word operations as opposed to erasing the
- // block and writing the data regardless if an erase is really needed.
- // It looks like most individual NV variable writes are smaller than 128bytes.
- if (*NumBytes <= 128) {
+ // Pick P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES (== 128 bytes) as a good start for word
+ // operations as opposed to erasing the block and writing the data regardless
+ // if an erase is really needed. It looks like most individual NV variable
+ // writes are smaller than 128 bytes.
+ // To avoid pathological cases were a 2 byte write is disregarded because it
+ // occurs right at a 128 byte buffered write alignment boundary, permit up to
+ // twice the max buffer size, and perform two writes if needed.
+ if ((*NumBytes + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS)) <= (2 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) {
// Check to see if we need to erase before programming the data into NOR.
// If the destination bits are only changing from 1s to 0s we can just write.
// After a block is erased all bits in the block is set to 1.
// If any byte requires us to erase we just give up and rewrite all of it.
- DoErase = FALSE;
- BytesToWrite = *NumBytes;
- CurOffset = Offset;
-
- while (BytesToWrite > 0) {
- // Read full word from NOR, splice as required. A word is the smallest
- // unit we can write.
- TempStatus = NorFlashRead (Instance, Lba, CurOffset & ~(0x3), sizeof (Tmp), &Tmp);
- if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) {
- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
- }
- // Physical address of word in NOR to write.
- WordAddr = (CurOffset & ~(0x3)) + GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS (
- Instance->RegionBaseAddress,
- Lba,
- BlockSize
- );
- // The word of data that is to be written.
- TmpBuf = *((UINT32 *)(Buffer + (*NumBytes - BytesToWrite)));
-
- // First do word aligned chunks.
- if ((CurOffset & 0x3) == 0) {
- if (BytesToWrite >= 4) {
- // Is the destination still in 'erased' state?
- if (~Tmp != 0) {
- // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero.
- if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) {
- DoErase = TRUE;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- // Write this word to NOR
- WordToWrite = TmpBuf;
- CurOffset += sizeof (TmpBuf);
- BytesToWrite -= sizeof (TmpBuf);
- } else {
- // BytesToWrite < 4. Do small writes and left-overs
- Mask = ~((~0) << (BytesToWrite * 8));
- // Mask out the bytes we want.
- TmpBuf &= Mask;
- // Is the destination still in 'erased' state?
- if ((Tmp & Mask) != Mask) {
- // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero.
- if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) {
- DoErase = TRUE;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- // Merge old and new data. Write merged word to NOR
- WordToWrite = (Tmp & ~Mask) | TmpBuf;
- CurOffset += BytesToWrite;
- BytesToWrite = 0;
- }
- } else {
- // Do multiple words, but starting unaligned.
- if (BytesToWrite > (4 - (CurOffset & 0x3))) {
- Mask = ((~0) << ((CurOffset & 0x3) * 8));
- // Mask out the bytes we want.
- TmpBuf &= Mask;
- // Is the destination still in 'erased' state?
- if ((Tmp & Mask) != Mask) {
- // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero.
- if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) {
- DoErase = TRUE;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- // Merge old and new data. Write merged word to NOR
- WordToWrite = (Tmp & ~Mask) | TmpBuf;
- BytesToWrite -= (4 - (CurOffset & 0x3));
- CurOffset += (4 - (CurOffset & 0x3));
- } else {
- // Unaligned and fits in one word.
- Mask = (~((~0) << (BytesToWrite * 8))) << ((CurOffset & 0x3) * 8);
- // Mask out the bytes we want.
- TmpBuf = (TmpBuf << ((CurOffset & 0x3) * 8)) & Mask;
- // Is the destination still in 'erased' state?
- if ((Tmp & Mask) != Mask) {
- // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero.
- if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) {
- DoErase = TRUE;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- // Merge old and new data. Write merged word to NOR
- WordToWrite = (Tmp & ~Mask) | TmpBuf;
- CurOffset += BytesToWrite;
- BytesToWrite = 0;
- }
+ // Read the old version of the data into the shadow buffer
+ Status = NorFlashRead (
+ Instance,
+ Lba,
+ Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS,
+ (*NumBytes | BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS) + 1,
+ Instance->ShadowBuffer
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ // Make OrigData point to the start of the old version of the data inside
+ // the word aligned buffer
+ OrigData = Instance->ShadowBuffer + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS);
+
+ // Update the buffer containing the old version of the data with the new
+ // contents, while checking whether the old version had any bits cleared
+ // that we want to set. In that case, we will need to erase the block first.
+ for (CurOffset = 0; CurOffset < *NumBytes; CurOffset++) {
+ if (~OrigData[CurOffset] & Buffer[CurOffset]) {
+ goto DoErase;
}
- //
- // Write the word to NOR.
- //
+ OrigData[CurOffset] = Buffer[CurOffset];
+ }
- BlockAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS (Instance->RegionBaseAddress, Lba, BlockSize);
- if (BlockAddress != PrevBlockAddress) {
- TempStatus = NorFlashUnlockSingleBlockIfNecessary (Instance, BlockAddress);
- if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) {
- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
- }
+ //
+ // Write the updated buffer to NOR.
+ //
+ BlockAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS (Instance->RegionBaseAddress, Lba, BlockSize);
- PrevBlockAddress = BlockAddress;
- }
+ // Unlock the block if we have to
+ Status = NorFlashUnlockSingleBlockIfNecessary (Instance, BlockAddress);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto Exit;
+ }
- TempStatus = NorFlashWriteSingleWord (Instance, WordAddr, WordToWrite);
- // Put device back into Read Array mode
- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
- if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) {
- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
- }
+ Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer (
+ Instance,
+ BlockAddress + (Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS),
+ P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
+ Instance->ShadowBuffer
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto Exit;
}
- // Exit if we got here and could write all the data. Otherwise do the
- // Erase-Write cycle.
- if (!DoErase) {
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ if ((*NumBytes + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS)) > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) {
+ BlockAddress += P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
+
+ Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer (
+ Instance,
+ BlockAddress + (Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS),
+ P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
+ Instance->ShadowBuffer + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES
+ );
}
- }
- // Check we did get some memory. Buffer is BlockSize.
- if (Instance->ShadowBuffer == NULL) {
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbWrite: ERROR - Buffer not ready\n"));
- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+Exit:
+ // Put device back into Read Array mode
+ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
+
+ return Status;
}
+DoErase:
// Read NOR Flash data into shadow buffer
- TempStatus = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
- if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) {
+ Status = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
// Return one of the pre-approved error statuses
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
@@ -762,8 +700,8 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
CopyMem ((VOID *)((UINTN)Instance->ShadowBuffer + Offset), Buffer, *NumBytes);
// Write the modified buffer back to the NorFlash
- TempStatus = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
- if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) {
+ Status = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
// Return one of the pre-approved error statuses
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
--
2.41.0

110
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clarify-block-write-logic-fi.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
From f136d4895b1477a56b916a76448ba76e67b08163 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 12/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: clarify block write logic &
fix shadowbuffer reads
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [14/20] 38009625e5f189166f7a93e236576140a7ccb393
Introduce 'Start' and 'End' variables to make it easier to follow the
logic and code flow. Also add a ascii art diagram (based on a
suggestion by Laszlo).
This also fixes the 'Size' calculation for the NorFlashRead() call.
Without this patch the code will read only one instead of two
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES blocks in case '*NumBytes' is smaller than
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES but 'Offset + *NumBytes' is not, i.e. the
update range crosses a P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES boundary.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-3-kraxel@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 35d8ea8097794b522149688b5cfaf8364bc44d54)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
index 7f4743b003..88a4d2c23f 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
UINTN BlockSize;
UINTN BlockAddress;
UINT8 *OrigData;
+ UINTN Start, End;
DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer));
@@ -555,7 +556,28 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
// To avoid pathological cases were a 2 byte write is disregarded because it
// occurs right at a 128 byte buffered write alignment boundary, permit up to
// twice the max buffer size, and perform two writes if needed.
- if ((*NumBytes + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS)) <= (2 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) {
+ //
+ // 0 128 256
+ // [----------------|----------------]
+ // ^ ^ ^ ^
+ // | | | |
+ // | | | End, the next "word" boundary beyond
+ // | | | the (logical) update
+ // | | |
+ // | | (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS) + NumBytes;
+ // | | i.e., the relative offset inside (or just past)
+ // | | the *double-word* such that it is the
+ // | | *exclusive* end of the (logical) update.
+ // | |
+ // | Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS; i.e., Offset within the "word";
+ // | this is where the (logical) update is supposed to start
+ // |
+ // Start = Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS; i.e., Offset truncated to "word" boundary
+
+ Start = Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS;
+ End = ALIGN_VALUE (Offset + *NumBytes, P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
+
+ if ((End - Start) <= (2 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) {
// Check to see if we need to erase before programming the data into NOR.
// If the destination bits are only changing from 1s to 0s we can just write.
// After a block is erased all bits in the block is set to 1.
@@ -565,8 +587,8 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
Status = NorFlashRead (
Instance,
Lba,
- Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS,
- (*NumBytes | BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS) + 1,
+ Start,
+ End - Start,
Instance->ShadowBuffer
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
@@ -601,7 +623,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer (
Instance,
- BlockAddress + (Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS),
+ BlockAddress + Start,
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
Instance->ShadowBuffer
);
@@ -609,12 +631,10 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
goto Exit;
}
- if ((*NumBytes + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS)) > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) {
- BlockAddress += P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
-
+ if ((End - Start) > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) {
Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer (
Instance,
- BlockAddress + (Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS),
+ BlockAddress + Start + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
Instance->ShadowBuffer + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES
);
--
2.41.0

2973
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clone-ArmPlatformPkg-s-NOR-f.patch Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

504
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-drop-block-I-O-protocol-impl.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,504 @@
From 8cf16599ade30de07c9b51f90d2208046f74fee6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 17:12:08 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 04/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: drop block I/O protocol
implementation
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [6/20] 6843078997a30c2818e0d53a90fb7f6accb89aaf
We never boot from NOR flash, and generally rely on the firmware volume
PI protocols to expose the contents. So drop the block I/O protocol
implementation from VirtNorFlashDxe.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
(cherry picked from commit 83f11f957240ead9b135a778316330762b0a3acb)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 49 ++++++------------
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h | 54 ++------------------
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c | 40 +++------------
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf | 1 -
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 55 ++++++++-------------
5 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
index 1094d48f7d..f41d9d372f 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
@@ -366,10 +366,6 @@ NorFlashWriteBlocks (
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
- if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly == TRUE) {
- return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
- }
-
// We must have some bytes to read
DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: BufferSizeInBytes=0x%x\n", BufferSizeInBytes));
if (BufferSizeInBytes == 0) {
@@ -377,22 +373,22 @@ NorFlashWriteBlocks (
}
// The size of the buffer must be a multiple of the block size
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: BlockSize in bytes =0x%x\n", Instance->Media.BlockSize));
- if ((BufferSizeInBytes % Instance->Media.BlockSize) != 0) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: BlockSize in bytes =0x%x\n", Instance->BlockSize));
+ if ((BufferSizeInBytes % Instance->BlockSize) != 0) {
return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
}
// All blocks must be within the device
- NumBlocks = ((UINT32)BufferSizeInBytes) / Instance->Media.BlockSize;
+ NumBlocks = ((UINT32)BufferSizeInBytes) / Instance->BlockSize;
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: NumBlocks=%d, LastBlock=%ld, Lba=%ld.\n", NumBlocks, Instance->Media.LastBlock, Lba));
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: NumBlocks=%d, LastBlock=%ld, Lba=%ld.\n", NumBlocks, Instance->LastBlock, Lba));
- if ((Lba + NumBlocks) > (Instance->Media.LastBlock + 1)) {
+ if ((Lba + NumBlocks) > (Instance->LastBlock + 1)) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: ERROR - Write will exceed last block.\n"));
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
- BlockSizeInWords = Instance->Media.BlockSize / 4;
+ BlockSizeInWords = Instance->BlockSize / 4;
// Because the target *Buffer is a pointer to VOID, we must put all the data into a pointer
// to a proper data type, so use *ReadBuffer
@@ -489,8 +485,8 @@ NorFlashReadBlocks (
DEBUG_BLKIO,
"NorFlashReadBlocks: BufferSize=0x%xB BlockSize=0x%xB LastBlock=%ld, Lba=%ld.\n",
BufferSizeInBytes,
- Instance->Media.BlockSize,
- Instance->Media.LastBlock,
+ Instance->BlockSize,
+ Instance->LastBlock,
Lba
));
@@ -505,14 +501,14 @@ NorFlashReadBlocks (
}
// The size of the buffer must be a multiple of the block size
- if ((BufferSizeInBytes % Instance->Media.BlockSize) != 0) {
+ if ((BufferSizeInBytes % Instance->BlockSize) != 0) {
return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
}
// All blocks must be within the device
- NumBlocks = ((UINT32)BufferSizeInBytes) / Instance->Media.BlockSize;
+ NumBlocks = ((UINT32)BufferSizeInBytes) / Instance->BlockSize;
- if ((Lba + NumBlocks) > (Instance->Media.LastBlock + 1)) {
+ if ((Lba + NumBlocks) > (Instance->LastBlock + 1)) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashReadBlocks: ERROR - Read will exceed last block\n"));
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
@@ -521,7 +517,7 @@ NorFlashReadBlocks (
StartAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS (
Instance->RegionBaseAddress,
Lba,
- Instance->Media.BlockSize
+ Instance->BlockSize
);
// Put the device into Read Array mode
@@ -554,7 +550,7 @@ NorFlashRead (
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
- if (((Lba * Instance->Media.BlockSize) + Offset + BufferSizeInBytes) > Instance->Size) {
+ if (((Lba * Instance->BlockSize) + Offset + BufferSizeInBytes) > Instance->Size) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashRead: ERROR - Read will exceed device size.\n"));
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
@@ -563,7 +559,7 @@ NorFlashRead (
StartAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS (
Instance->RegionBaseAddress,
Lba,
- Instance->Media.BlockSize
+ Instance->BlockSize
);
// Put the device into Read Array mode
@@ -577,7 +573,7 @@ NorFlashRead (
/*
Write a full or portion of a block. It must not span block boundaries; that is,
- Offset + *NumBytes <= Instance->Media.BlockSize.
+ Offset + *NumBytes <= Instance->BlockSize.
*/
EFI_STATUS
NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
@@ -605,15 +601,8 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer));
- // Detect WriteDisabled state
- if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly == TRUE) {
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock: ERROR - Can not write: Device is in WriteDisabled state.\n"));
- // It is in WriteDisabled state, return an error right away
- return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- }
-
// Cache the block size to avoid de-referencing pointers all the time
- BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize;
+ BlockSize = Instance->BlockSize;
// The write must not span block boundaries.
// We need to check each variable individually because adding two large values together overflows.
@@ -819,12 +808,6 @@ NorFlashVirtualNotifyEvent (
EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->DeviceBaseAddress);
EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->RegionBaseAddress);
- // Convert BlockIo protocol
- EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.FlushBlocks);
- EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.ReadBlocks);
- EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.Reset);
- EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.WriteBlocks);
-
// Convert Fvb
EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->FvbProtocol.EraseBlocks);
EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->FvbProtocol.GetAttributes);
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
index 7733ee02ee..b7f5d208b2 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
#include <Guid/EventGroup.h>
-#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
#include <Protocol/FirmwareVolumeBlock.h>
#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
@@ -108,8 +107,7 @@
#define P30_CMD_READ_CONFIGURATION_REGISTER 0x0003
#define NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32('n', 'o', 'r', '0')
-#define INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, FvbProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE)
-#define INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, BlockIoProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE)
+#define INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, FvbProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE)
typedef struct _NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE;
@@ -129,9 +127,8 @@ struct _NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE {
UINTN RegionBaseAddress;
UINTN Size;
EFI_LBA StartLba;
-
- EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL BlockIoProtocol;
- EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA Media;
+ EFI_LBA LastBlock;
+ UINT32 BlockSize;
EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL FvbProtocol;
VOID *ShadowBuffer;
@@ -155,51 +152,6 @@ NorFlashWriteBuffer (
IN UINT32 *Buffer
);
-//
-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.Reset
-//
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashBlockIoReset (
- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN BOOLEAN ExtendedVerification
- );
-
-//
-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.ReadBlocks
-//
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks (
- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN UINT32 MediaId,
- IN EFI_LBA Lba,
- IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes,
- OUT VOID *Buffer
- );
-
-//
-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.WriteBlocks
-//
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks (
- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN UINT32 MediaId,
- IN EFI_LBA Lba,
- IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes,
- IN VOID *Buffer
- );
-
-//
-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.FlushBlocks
-//
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks (
- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This
- );
-
//
// NorFlashFvbDxe.c
//
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
index 4875b057d5..2ceda22635 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
@@ -34,29 +34,8 @@ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE mNorFlashInstanceTemplate = {
0, // RegionBaseAddress ... NEED TO BE FILLED
0, // Size ... NEED TO BE FILLED
0, // StartLba
-
- {
- EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL_REVISION2, // Revision
- NULL, // Media ... NEED TO BE FILLED
- NorFlashBlockIoReset, // Reset;
- NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks, // ReadBlocks
- NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks, // WriteBlocks
- NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks // FlushBlocks
- }, // BlockIoProtocol
-
- {
- 0, // MediaId ... NEED TO BE FILLED
- FALSE, // RemovableMedia
- TRUE, // MediaPresent
- FALSE, // LogicalPartition
- FALSE, // ReadOnly
- FALSE, // WriteCaching;
- 0, // BlockSize ... NEED TO BE FILLED
- 4, // IoAlign
- 0, // LastBlock ... NEED TO BE FILLED
- 0, // LowestAlignedLba
- 1, // LogicalBlocksPerPhysicalBlock
- }, // Media;
+ 0, // LastBlock
+ 0, // BlockSize
{
FvbGetAttributes, // GetAttributes
@@ -115,11 +94,8 @@ NorFlashCreateInstance (
Instance->DeviceBaseAddress = NorFlashDeviceBase;
Instance->RegionBaseAddress = NorFlashRegionBase;
Instance->Size = NorFlashSize;
-
- Instance->BlockIoProtocol.Media = &Instance->Media;
- Instance->Media.MediaId = Index;
- Instance->Media.BlockSize = BlockSize;
- Instance->Media.LastBlock = (NorFlashSize / BlockSize)-1;
+ Instance->BlockSize = BlockSize;
+ Instance->LastBlock = (NorFlashSize / BlockSize) - 1;
CopyGuid (&Instance->DevicePath.Vendor.Guid, &gEfiCallerIdGuid);
Instance->DevicePath.Index = (UINT8)Index;
@@ -136,8 +112,6 @@ NorFlashCreateInstance (
&Instance->Handle,
&gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,
&Instance->DevicePath,
- &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
- &Instance->BlockIoProtocol,
&gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid,
&Instance->FvbProtocol,
NULL
@@ -151,8 +125,6 @@ NorFlashCreateInstance (
&Instance->Handle,
&gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,
&Instance->DevicePath,
- &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
- &Instance->BlockIoProtocol,
NULL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
@@ -434,7 +406,7 @@ NorFlashFvbInitialize (
PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64) : PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase);
// Set the index of the first LBA for the FVB
- Instance->StartLba = (mFlashNvStorageVariableBase - Instance->RegionBaseAddress) / Instance->Media.BlockSize;
+ Instance->StartLba = (mFlashNvStorageVariableBase - Instance->RegionBaseAddress) / Instance->BlockSize;
BootMode = GetBootModeHob ();
if (BootMode == BOOT_WITH_DEFAULT_SETTINGS) {
@@ -455,7 +427,7 @@ NorFlashFvbInitialize (
));
// Erase all the NorFlash that is reserved for variable storage
- FvbNumLba = (PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingSize) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize)) / Instance->Media.BlockSize;
+ FvbNumLba = (PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingSize) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize)) / Instance->BlockSize;
Status = FvbEraseBlocks (&Instance->FvbProtocol, (EFI_LBA)0, FvbNumLba, EFI_LBA_LIST_TERMINATOR);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
index 53e9d58204..2a3d4a218e 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
[Sources.common]
VirtNorFlash.c
VirtNorFlash.h
- VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c
VirtNorFlashDxe.c
VirtNorFlashFvb.c
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
index c824e0a0fb..cc5eefaaf3 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders (
}
// Check if the size of the area is at least one block size
- if ((NvStorageVariableSize <= 0) || (NvStorageVariableSize / Instance->Media.BlockSize <= 0)) {
+ if ((NvStorageVariableSize <= 0) || (NvStorageVariableSize / Instance->BlockSize <= 0)) {
DEBUG ((
DEBUG_ERROR,
"%a: NvStorageVariableSize is 0x%x, should be atleast one block size\n",
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders (
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
- if ((NvStorageFtwWorkingSize <= 0) || (NvStorageFtwWorkingSize / Instance->Media.BlockSize <= 0)) {
+ if ((NvStorageFtwWorkingSize <= 0) || (NvStorageFtwWorkingSize / Instance->BlockSize <= 0)) {
DEBUG ((
DEBUG_ERROR,
"%a: NvStorageFtwWorkingSize is 0x%x, should be atleast one block size\n",
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders (
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
- if ((NvStorageFtwSpareSize <= 0) || (NvStorageFtwSpareSize / Instance->Media.BlockSize <= 0)) {
+ if ((NvStorageFtwSpareSize <= 0) || (NvStorageFtwSpareSize / Instance->BlockSize <= 0)) {
DEBUG ((
DEBUG_ERROR,
"%a: NvStorageFtwSpareSize is 0x%x, should be atleast one block size\n",
@@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders (
}
// Ensure the Variable area Base Addresses are aligned on a block size boundaries
- if ((NvStorageVariableBase % Instance->Media.BlockSize != 0) ||
- (NvStorageFtwWorkingBase % Instance->Media.BlockSize != 0) ||
- (NvStorageFtwSpareBase % Instance->Media.BlockSize != 0))
+ if ((NvStorageVariableBase % Instance->BlockSize != 0) ||
+ (NvStorageFtwWorkingBase % Instance->BlockSize != 0) ||
+ (NvStorageFtwSpareBase % Instance->BlockSize != 0))
{
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: NvStorage Base addresses must be aligned to block size boundaries", __FUNCTION__));
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders (
);
FirmwareVolumeHeader->HeaderLength = sizeof (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER) + sizeof (EFI_FV_BLOCK_MAP_ENTRY);
FirmwareVolumeHeader->Revision = EFI_FVH_REVISION;
- FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[0].NumBlocks = Instance->Media.LastBlock + 1;
- FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[0].Length = Instance->Media.BlockSize;
+ FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[0].NumBlocks = Instance->LastBlock + 1;
+ FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[0].Length = Instance->BlockSize;
FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[1].NumBlocks = 0;
FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[1].Length = 0;
FirmwareVolumeHeader->Checksum = CalculateCheckSum16 ((UINT16 *)FirmwareVolumeHeader, FirmwareVolumeHeader->HeaderLength);
@@ -284,9 +284,6 @@ FvbGetAttributes (
)
{
EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2 FlashFvbAttributes;
- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance;
-
- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS (This);
FlashFvbAttributes = (EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2)(
@@ -294,17 +291,12 @@ FvbGetAttributes (
EFI_FVB2_READ_STATUS | // Reads are currently enabled
EFI_FVB2_STICKY_WRITE | // A block erase is required to flip bits into EFI_FVB2_ERASE_POLARITY
EFI_FVB2_MEMORY_MAPPED | // It is memory mapped
- EFI_FVB2_ERASE_POLARITY // After erasure all bits take this value (i.e. '1')
+ EFI_FVB2_ERASE_POLARITY | // After erasure all bits take this value (i.e. '1')
+ EFI_FVB2_WRITE_STATUS | // Writes are currently enabled
+ EFI_FVB2_WRITE_ENABLED_CAP // Writes may be enabled
);
- // Check if it is write protected
- if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly != TRUE) {
- FlashFvbAttributes = FlashFvbAttributes |
- EFI_FVB2_WRITE_STATUS | // Writes are currently enabled
- EFI_FVB2_WRITE_ENABLED_CAP; // Writes may be enabled
- }
-
*Attributes = FlashFvbAttributes;
DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetAttributes(0x%X)\n", *Attributes));
@@ -418,15 +410,15 @@ FvbGetBlockSize (
Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS (This);
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetBlockSize(Lba=%ld, BlockSize=0x%x, LastBlock=%ld)\n", Lba, Instance->Media.BlockSize, Instance->Media.LastBlock));
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetBlockSize(Lba=%ld, BlockSize=0x%x, LastBlock=%ld)\n", Lba, Instance->BlockSize, Instance->LastBlock));
- if (Lba > Instance->Media.LastBlock) {
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbGetBlockSize: ERROR - Parameter LBA %ld is beyond the last Lba (%ld).\n", Lba, Instance->Media.LastBlock));
+ if (Lba > Instance->LastBlock) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbGetBlockSize: ERROR - Parameter LBA %ld is beyond the last Lba (%ld).\n", Lba, Instance->LastBlock));
Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
} else {
// This is easy because in this platform each NorFlash device has equal sized blocks.
- *BlockSize = (UINTN)Instance->Media.BlockSize;
- *NumberOfBlocks = (UINTN)(Instance->Media.LastBlock - Lba + 1);
+ *BlockSize = (UINTN)Instance->BlockSize;
+ *NumberOfBlocks = (UINTN)(Instance->LastBlock - Lba + 1);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetBlockSize: *BlockSize=0x%x, *NumberOfBlocks=0x%x.\n", *BlockSize, *NumberOfBlocks));
@@ -498,7 +490,7 @@ FvbRead (
TempStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;
// Cache the block size to avoid de-referencing pointers all the time
- BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize;
+ BlockSize = Instance->BlockSize;
DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbRead: Check if (Offset=0x%x + NumBytes=0x%x) <= BlockSize=0x%x\n", Offset, *NumBytes, BlockSize));
@@ -669,13 +661,6 @@ FvbEraseBlocks (
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
- // Detect WriteDisabled state
- if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly == TRUE) {
- // Firmware volume is in WriteDisabled state
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbEraseBlocks: ERROR - Device is in WriteDisabled state.\n"));
- return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- }
-
// Before erasing, check the entire list of parameters to ensure all specified blocks are valid
VA_START (Args, This);
@@ -698,9 +683,9 @@ FvbEraseBlocks (
"FvbEraseBlocks: Check if: ( StartingLba=%ld + NumOfLba=%Lu - 1 ) > LastBlock=%ld.\n",
Instance->StartLba + StartingLba,
(UINT64)NumOfLba,
- Instance->Media.LastBlock
+ Instance->LastBlock
));
- if ((NumOfLba == 0) || ((Instance->StartLba + StartingLba + NumOfLba - 1) > Instance->Media.LastBlock)) {
+ if ((NumOfLba == 0) || ((Instance->StartLba + StartingLba + NumOfLba - 1) > Instance->LastBlock)) {
VA_END (Args);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbEraseBlocks: ERROR - Lba range goes past the last Lba.\n"));
Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
@@ -733,7 +718,7 @@ FvbEraseBlocks (
BlockAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS (
Instance->RegionBaseAddress,
Instance->StartLba + StartingLba,
- Instance->Media.BlockSize
+ Instance->BlockSize
);
// Erase it
--
2.41.0

67
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-map-flash-memory-as-uncachea.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
From 15415de9a228e74ff1847777a29f1531754b03b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 19:00:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: map flash memory as
uncacheable
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [10/20] 40ca967bead9ec5c98c528bfe0757f75f3d3352f
Switching from the ArmPlatformPkg/NorFlashDxe driver to the
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe driver had the side effect that flash address
space got registered as EFI_MEMORY_WC instead of EFI_MEMORY_UC.
That confuses the linux kernel's numa code, seems this makes kernel
consider the flash being node memory. "lsmem" changes from ...
RANGE SIZE STATE REMOVABLE BLOCK
0x0000000040000000-0x000000013fffffff 4G online yes 8-39
... to ...
RANGE SIZE STATE REMOVABLE BLOCK
0x0000000000000000-0x0000000007ffffff 128M online yes 0
0x0000000040000000-0x000000013fffffff 4G online yes 8-39
... and in the kernel log got new error lines:
NUMA: Warning: invalid memblk node 512 [mem 0x0000000004000000-0x0000000007ffffff]
NUMA: Faking a node at [mem 0x0000000004000000-0x000000013fffffff]
Changing the attributes back to EFI_MEMORY_UC fixes this.
Fixes: b92298af8218 ("ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu: migrate to OVMF's VirtNorFlashDxe")
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit e5ec3ba409b5baa9cf429cc25fdf3c8d1b8dcef0)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
index ff3121af2a..f9a41f6aab 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
@@ -394,14 +394,14 @@ NorFlashFvbInitialize (
EfiGcdMemoryTypeMemoryMappedIo,
Instance->DeviceBaseAddress,
RuntimeMmioRegionSize,
- EFI_MEMORY_WC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
+ EFI_MEMORY_UC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
Status = gDS->SetMemorySpaceAttributes (
Instance->DeviceBaseAddress,
RuntimeMmioRegionSize,
- EFI_MEMORY_WC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
+ EFI_MEMORY_UC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
--
2.41.0

131
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-move-DoErase-code-block-into.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
From 791c26a4a172b4a609a708db8018411ab653de4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: move DoErase code block into
new function
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [18/20] 10f4685bfcb0c5423e392b4cf0e8633cd25b46b4
Move the DoErase code block into a separate function, call the function
instead of jumping around with goto.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-7-kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b481b00f593ef37695ee14271453320ed02a1256)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
index 3d1d20daa1..e6aaed27ce 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
@@ -502,6 +502,38 @@ NorFlashRead (
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+STATIC
+EFI_STATUS
+NorFlashWriteSingleBlockWithErase (
+ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance,
+ IN EFI_LBA Lba,
+ IN UINTN Offset,
+ IN OUT UINTN *NumBytes,
+ IN UINT8 *Buffer
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ // Read NOR Flash data into shadow buffer
+ Status = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, Instance->BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ // Put the data at the appropriate location inside the buffer area
+ CopyMem ((VOID *)((UINTN)Instance->ShadowBuffer + Offset), Buffer, *NumBytes);
+
+ // Write the modified buffer back to the NorFlash
+ Status = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, Instance->BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
/*
Write a full or portion of a block. It must not span block boundaries; that is,
Offset + *NumBytes <= Instance->BlockSize.
@@ -607,7 +639,14 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
// that we want to set. In that case, we will need to erase the block first.
for (CurOffset = 0; CurOffset < *NumBytes; CurOffset++) {
if (~(UINT32)OrigData[CurOffset] & (UINT32)Buffer[CurOffset]) {
- goto DoErase;
+ Status = NorFlashWriteSingleBlockWithErase (
+ Instance,
+ Lba,
+ Offset,
+ NumBytes,
+ Buffer
+ );
+ return Status;
}
OrigData[CurOffset] = Buffer[CurOffset];
@@ -636,33 +675,22 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
goto Exit;
}
}
-
-Exit:
- // Put device back into Read Array mode
- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
-
+ } else {
+ Status = NorFlashWriteSingleBlockWithErase (
+ Instance,
+ Lba,
+ Offset,
+ NumBytes,
+ Buffer
+ );
return Status;
}
-DoErase:
- // Read NOR Flash data into shadow buffer
- Status = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses
- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
- }
-
- // Put the data at the appropriate location inside the buffer area
- CopyMem ((VOID *)((UINTN)Instance->ShadowBuffer + Offset), Buffer, *NumBytes);
-
- // Write the modified buffer back to the NorFlash
- Status = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses
- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
- }
+Exit:
+ // Put device back into Read Array mode
+ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ return Status;
}
EFI_STATUS
--
2.41.0

94
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-CheckBlockLocked-feat.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
From 03e0a729a5c3ebcab8806d136cd8908627bd91c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 16:45:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 02/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: remove CheckBlockLocked
feature
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [4/20] 990bdf373801df8107d8a6ec4db3fb93e5a6ad68
We inherited a feature from the ArmPlatformPkg version of this driver
that never gets enabled. Let's remove it.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0a64106c566273ff8ef951d56ddfa972fe65bd6c)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 35 +++++----------------
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf | 3 --
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
index 12fa720dad..59a562efdf 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
@@ -65,35 +65,16 @@ NorFlashUnlockSingleBlock (
// Raise the Task Priority Level to TPL_NOTIFY to serialise all its operations
// and to protect shared data structures.
- if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdNorFlashCheckBlockLocked) == TRUE) {
- do {
- // Request a lock setup
- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_LOCK_BLOCK_SETUP);
+ // Request a lock setup
+ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_LOCK_BLOCK_SETUP);
- // Request an unlock
- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_UNLOCK_BLOCK);
+ // Request an unlock
+ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_UNLOCK_BLOCK);
- // Send command for reading device id
- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 2, P30_CMD_READ_DEVICE_ID);
-
- // Read block lock status
- LockStatus = MmioRead32 (CREATE_NOR_ADDRESS (BlockAddress, 2));
-
- // Decode block lock status
- LockStatus = FOLD_32BIT_INTO_16BIT (LockStatus);
- } while ((LockStatus & 0x1) == 1);
- } else {
- // Request a lock setup
- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_LOCK_BLOCK_SETUP);
-
- // Request an unlock
- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_UNLOCK_BLOCK);
-
- // Wait until the status register gives us the all clear
- do {
- LockStatus = NorFlashReadStatusRegister (Instance, BlockAddress);
- } while ((LockStatus & P30_SR_BIT_WRITE) != P30_SR_BIT_WRITE);
- }
+ // Wait until the status register gives us the all clear
+ do {
+ LockStatus = NorFlashReadStatusRegister (Instance, BlockAddress);
+ } while ((LockStatus & P30_SR_BIT_WRITE) != P30_SR_BIT_WRITE);
// Put device back into Read Array mode
SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
index 1bf50e4823..53e9d58204 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
VirtNorFlashFvb.c
[Packages]
- ArmPlatformPkg/ArmPlatformPkg.dec
EmbeddedPkg/EmbeddedPkg.dec
MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
@@ -66,7 +65,5 @@
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize
- gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdNorFlashCheckBlockLocked
-
[Depex]
gEfiCpuArchProtocolGuid
--
2.41.0

386
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-disk-I-O-protocol-imp.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
From 56041232238e4e4d3c8d703b27f51b0bc70fd5c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 16:50:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 03/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: remove disk I/O protocol
implementation
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [5/20] 0551c3f56f43396cfdc380127565e89d69eb29a3
We only use NOR flash for firmware volumes, either for executable images
or for the variable store. So we have no need for exposing disk I/O on
top of the NOR flash partitions so let's remove it.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
(cherry picked from commit 68d234989b2d6bd8f255577e08bf8be0b1d197bb)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 129 ------------------
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h | 29 ----
.../VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c | 123 -----------------
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c | 8 --
4 files changed, 289 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
index 59a562efdf..1094d48f7d 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
@@ -788,135 +788,6 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
-/*
- Although DiskIoDxe will automatically install the DiskIO protocol whenever
- we install the BlockIO protocol, its implementation is sub-optimal as it reads
- and writes entire blocks using the BlockIO protocol. In fact we can access
- NOR flash with a finer granularity than that, so we can improve performance
- by directly producing the DiskIO protocol.
-*/
-
-/**
- Read BufferSize bytes from Offset into Buffer.
-
- @param This Protocol instance pointer.
- @param MediaId Id of the media, changes every time the media is replaced.
- @param Offset The starting byte offset to read from
- @param BufferSize Size of Buffer
- @param Buffer Buffer containing read data
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The data was read correctly from the device.
- @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The device reported an error while performing the read.
- @retval EFI_NO_MEDIA There is no media in the device.
- @retval EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED The MediaId does not match the current device.
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The read request contains device addresses that are not
- valid for the device.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashDiskIoReadDisk (
- IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN UINT32 MediaId,
- IN UINT64 DiskOffset,
- IN UINTN BufferSize,
- OUT VOID *Buffer
- )
-{
- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance;
- UINT32 BlockSize;
- UINT32 BlockOffset;
- EFI_LBA Lba;
-
- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_DISKIO_THIS (This);
-
- if (MediaId != Instance->Media.MediaId) {
- return EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED;
- }
-
- BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize;
- Lba = (EFI_LBA)DivU64x32Remainder (DiskOffset, BlockSize, &BlockOffset);
-
- return NorFlashRead (Instance, Lba, BlockOffset, BufferSize, Buffer);
-}
-
-/**
- Writes a specified number of bytes to a device.
-
- @param This Indicates a pointer to the calling context.
- @param MediaId ID of the medium to be written.
- @param Offset The starting byte offset on the logical block I/O device to write.
- @param BufferSize The size in bytes of Buffer. The number of bytes to write to the device.
- @param Buffer A pointer to the buffer containing the data to be written.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The data was written correctly to the device.
- @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED The device can not be written to.
- @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The device reported an error while performing the write.
- @retval EFI_NO_MEDIA There is no media in the device.
- @retval EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED The MediaId does not match the current device.
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The write request contains device addresses that are not
- valid for the device.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashDiskIoWriteDisk (
- IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN UINT32 MediaId,
- IN UINT64 DiskOffset,
- IN UINTN BufferSize,
- IN VOID *Buffer
- )
-{
- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance;
- UINT32 BlockSize;
- UINT32 BlockOffset;
- EFI_LBA Lba;
- UINTN RemainingBytes;
- UINTN WriteSize;
- EFI_STATUS Status;
-
- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_DISKIO_THIS (This);
-
- if (MediaId != Instance->Media.MediaId) {
- return EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED;
- }
-
- BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize;
- Lba = (EFI_LBA)DivU64x32Remainder (DiskOffset, BlockSize, &BlockOffset);
-
- RemainingBytes = BufferSize;
-
- // Write either all the remaining bytes, or the number of bytes that bring
- // us up to a block boundary, whichever is less.
- // (DiskOffset | (BlockSize - 1)) + 1) rounds DiskOffset up to the next
- // block boundary (even if it is already on one).
- WriteSize = MIN (RemainingBytes, ((DiskOffset | (BlockSize - 1)) + 1) - DiskOffset);
-
- do {
- if (WriteSize == BlockSize) {
- // Write a full block
- Status = NorFlashWriteFullBlock (Instance, Lba, Buffer, BlockSize / sizeof (UINT32));
- } else {
- // Write a partial block
- Status = NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (Instance, Lba, BlockOffset, &WriteSize, Buffer);
- }
-
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
-
- // Now continue writing either all the remaining bytes or single blocks.
- RemainingBytes -= WriteSize;
- Buffer = (UINT8 *)Buffer + WriteSize;
- Lba++;
- BlockOffset = 0;
- WriteSize = MIN (RemainingBytes, BlockSize);
- } while (RemainingBytes);
-
- return Status;
-}
-
EFI_STATUS
NorFlashReset (
IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
index e46522a198..7733ee02ee 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
#include <Guid/EventGroup.h>
#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
-#include <Protocol/DiskIo.h>
#include <Protocol/FirmwareVolumeBlock.h>
#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
@@ -111,7 +110,6 @@
#define NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32('n', 'o', 'r', '0')
#define INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, FvbProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE)
#define INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, BlockIoProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE)
-#define INSTANCE_FROM_DISKIO_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, DiskIoProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE)
typedef struct _NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE;
@@ -134,7 +132,6 @@ struct _NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE {
EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL BlockIoProtocol;
EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA Media;
- EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL DiskIoProtocol;
EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL FvbProtocol;
VOID *ShadowBuffer;
@@ -203,32 +200,6 @@ NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks (
IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This
);
-//
-// DiskIO Protocol function EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL.ReadDisk
-//
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashDiskIoReadDisk (
- IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN UINT32 MediaId,
- IN UINT64 Offset,
- IN UINTN BufferSize,
- OUT VOID *Buffer
- );
-
-//
-// DiskIO Protocol function EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL.WriteDisk
-//
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashDiskIoWriteDisk (
- IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN UINT32 MediaId,
- IN UINT64 Offset,
- IN UINTN BufferSize,
- IN VOID *Buffer
- );
-
//
// NorFlashFvbDxe.c
//
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c
deleted file mode 100644
index ecf152e355..0000000000
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-/** @file NorFlashBlockIoDxe.c
-
- Copyright (c) 2011-2013, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.<BR>
-
- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
-
-**/
-
-#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
-#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
-
-#include "VirtNorFlash.h"
-
-//
-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.Reset
-//
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashBlockIoReset (
- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN BOOLEAN ExtendedVerification
- )
-{
- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance;
-
- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS (This);
-
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoReset(MediaId=0x%x)\n", This->Media->MediaId));
-
- return NorFlashReset (Instance);
-}
-
-//
-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.ReadBlocks
-//
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks (
- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN UINT32 MediaId,
- IN EFI_LBA Lba,
- IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes,
- OUT VOID *Buffer
- )
-{
- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance;
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA *Media;
-
- if (This == NULL) {
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS (This);
- Media = This->Media;
-
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks(MediaId=0x%x, Lba=%ld, BufferSize=0x%x bytes (%d kB), BufferPtr @ 0x%08x)\n", MediaId, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer));
-
- if (!Media) {
- Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- } else if (!Media->MediaPresent) {
- Status = EFI_NO_MEDIA;
- } else if (Media->MediaId != MediaId) {
- Status = EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED;
- } else if ((Media->IoAlign > 2) && (((UINTN)Buffer & (Media->IoAlign - 1)) != 0)) {
- Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- } else {
- Status = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer);
- }
-
- return Status;
-}
-
-//
-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.WriteBlocks
-//
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks (
- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN UINT32 MediaId,
- IN EFI_LBA Lba,
- IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes,
- IN VOID *Buffer
- )
-{
- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance;
- EFI_STATUS Status;
-
- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS (This);
-
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks(MediaId=0x%x, Lba=%ld, BufferSize=0x%x bytes, BufferPtr @ 0x%08x)\n", MediaId, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer));
-
- if ( !This->Media->MediaPresent ) {
- Status = EFI_NO_MEDIA;
- } else if ( This->Media->MediaId != MediaId ) {
- Status = EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED;
- } else if ( This->Media->ReadOnly ) {
- Status = EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
- } else {
- Status = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer);
- }
-
- return Status;
-}
-
-//
-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.FlushBlocks
-//
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks (
- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This
- )
-{
- // No Flush required for the NOR Flash driver
- // because cache operations are not permitted.
-
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks: Function NOT IMPLEMENTED (not required).\n"));
-
- // Nothing to do so just return without error
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
-}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
index 819425545e..4875b057d5 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
@@ -58,12 +58,6 @@ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE mNorFlashInstanceTemplate = {
1, // LogicalBlocksPerPhysicalBlock
}, // Media;
- {
- EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL_REVISION, // Revision
- NorFlashDiskIoReadDisk, // ReadDisk
- NorFlashDiskIoWriteDisk // WriteDisk
- },
-
{
FvbGetAttributes, // GetAttributes
FvbSetAttributes, // SetAttributes
@@ -159,8 +153,6 @@ NorFlashCreateInstance (
&Instance->DevicePath,
&gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
&Instance->BlockIoProtocol,
- &gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid,
- &Instance->DiskIoProtocol,
NULL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
--
2.41.0

216
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variable2.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
From c4d2144caff4eddb7021752fce6c2dec6d5e1632 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:29:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: sanity-check variables
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [12/20] 2ad3957478b82a4ca29249ceb9620f97c591a1fe
Extend the ValidateFvHeader function, additionally to the header checks
walk over the list of variables and sanity check them.
In case we find inconsistencies indicating variable store corruption
return EFI_NOT_FOUND so the variable store will be re-initialized.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240109112902.30002-4-kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: fix StartId initialization/assignment coding style]
(cherry picked from commit 4a443f73fd67ca8caaf0a3e1a01f8231b330d2e0)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf | 1 +
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 149 +++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
index 2a3d4a218e..f549400280 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
DxeServicesTableLib
HobLib
IoLib
+ SafeIntLib
UefiBootServicesTableLib
UefiDriverEntryPoint
UefiLib
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
index c503272a2b..acc4a413ee 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
+#include <Library/SafeIntLib.h>
#include <Library/UefiLib.h>
#include <Guid/NvVarStoreFormatted.h>
@@ -185,11 +186,12 @@ ValidateFvHeader (
IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance
)
{
- UINT16 Checksum;
- EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *FwVolHeader;
- VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *VariableStoreHeader;
- UINTN VariableStoreLength;
- UINTN FvLength;
+ UINT16 Checksum;
+ CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *FwVolHeader;
+ CONST VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *VariableStoreHeader;
+ UINTN VarOffset;
+ UINTN VariableStoreLength;
+ UINTN FvLength;
FwVolHeader = (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *)Instance->RegionBaseAddress;
@@ -258,6 +260,143 @@ ValidateFvHeader (
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
}
+ //
+ // check variables
+ //
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: checking variables\n", __func__));
+ VarOffset = sizeof (*VariableStoreHeader);
+ for ( ; ;) {
+ UINTN VarHeaderEnd;
+ UINTN VarNameEnd;
+ UINTN VarEnd;
+ UINTN VarPadding;
+ CONST AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER *VarHeader;
+ CONST CHAR16 *VarName;
+ CONST CHAR8 *VarState;
+ RETURN_STATUS Status;
+
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarOffset, sizeof (*VarHeader), &VarHeaderEnd);
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (VarHeaderEnd >= VariableStoreHeader->Size) {
+ if (VarOffset <= VariableStoreHeader->Size - sizeof (UINT16)) {
+ CONST UINT16 *StartId;
+
+ StartId = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarOffset);
+ if (*StartId == 0x55aa) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: startid at invalid location\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ }
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: end of var list (no space left)\n", __func__));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ VarHeader = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarOffset);
+ if (VarHeader->StartId != 0x55aa) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: end of var list (no startid)\n", __func__));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ VarName = NULL;
+ switch (VarHeader->State) {
+ // usage: State = VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY
+ case VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY:
+ VarState = "header-ok";
+ VarName = L"<unknown>";
+ break;
+
+ // usage: State = VAR_ADDED
+ case VAR_ADDED:
+ VarState = "ok";
+ break;
+
+ // usage: State &= VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION
+ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION:
+ VarState = "del-in-transition";
+ break;
+
+ // usage: State &= VAR_DELETED
+ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_DELETED:
+ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_DELETED &VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION:
+ VarState = "deleted";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ DEBUG ((
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
+ "%a: invalid variable state: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__,
+ VarHeader->State
+ ));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarHeaderEnd, VarHeader->NameSize, &VarNameEnd);
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarNameEnd, VarHeader->DataSize, &VarEnd);
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (VarEnd > VariableStoreHeader->Size) {
+ DEBUG ((
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
+ "%a: invalid variable size: 0x%Lx + 0x%Lx + 0x%x + 0x%x > 0x%x\n",
+ __func__,
+ (UINT64)VarOffset,
+ (UINT64)(sizeof (*VarHeader)),
+ VarHeader->NameSize,
+ VarHeader->DataSize,
+ VariableStoreHeader->Size
+ ));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (((VarHeader->NameSize & 1) != 0) ||
+ (VarHeader->NameSize < 4))
+ {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: invalid name size\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (VarName == NULL) {
+ VarName = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarHeaderEnd);
+ if (VarName[VarHeader->NameSize / 2 - 1] != L'\0') {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: name is not null terminated\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ }
+
+ DEBUG ((
+ DEBUG_VERBOSE,
+ "%a: +0x%04Lx: name=0x%x data=0x%x guid=%g '%s' (%a)\n",
+ __func__,
+ (UINT64)VarOffset,
+ VarHeader->NameSize,
+ VarHeader->DataSize,
+ &VarHeader->VendorGuid,
+ VarName,
+ VarState
+ ));
+
+ VarPadding = (4 - (VarEnd & 3)) & 3;
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarEnd, VarPadding, &VarOffset);
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ }
+
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
--
2.41.0

216
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variables.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
From c4eef747624d41aaa09dc64ccafdb84bf1fe656e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:29:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: sanity-check variables
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 42: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: sanity-check variables
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [2/2] 56ff961f754d517c0e27ccf46a95b228efe7ab4b
Extend the ValidateFvHeader function, additionally to the header checks
walk over the list of variables and sanity check them.
In case we find inconsistencies indicating variable store corruption
return EFI_NOT_FOUND so the variable store will be re-initialized.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240109112902.30002-4-kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: fix StartId initialization/assignment coding style]
(cherry picked from commit 4a443f73fd67ca8caaf0a3e1a01f8231b330d2e0)
---
.../Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashDxe.inf | 1 +
.../Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashFvb.c | 149 +++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashDxe.inf b/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashDxe.inf
index f8d4c27031..10388880a1 100644
--- a/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashDxe.inf
+++ b/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashDxe.inf
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
DebugLib
HobLib
NorFlashPlatformLib
+ SafeIntLib
UefiLib
UefiDriverEntryPoint
UefiBootServicesTableLib
diff --git a/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashFvb.c b/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashFvb.c
index 904605cbbc..2a166c94a6 100644
--- a/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashFvb.c
+++ b/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashFvb.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <Library/UefiLib.h>
#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
+#include <Library/SafeIntLib.h>
#include <Guid/VariableFormat.h>
#include <Guid/SystemNvDataGuid.h>
@@ -166,11 +167,12 @@ ValidateFvHeader (
IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance
)
{
- UINT16 Checksum;
- EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *FwVolHeader;
- VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *VariableStoreHeader;
- UINTN VariableStoreLength;
- UINTN FvLength;
+ UINT16 Checksum;
+ CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *FwVolHeader;
+ CONST VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *VariableStoreHeader;
+ UINTN VarOffset;
+ UINTN VariableStoreLength;
+ UINTN FvLength;
FwVolHeader = (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER*)Instance->RegionBaseAddress;
@@ -223,6 +225,143 @@ ValidateFvHeader (
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
}
+ //
+ // check variables
+ //
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: checking variables\n", __func__));
+ VarOffset = sizeof (*VariableStoreHeader);
+ for ( ; ;) {
+ UINTN VarHeaderEnd;
+ UINTN VarNameEnd;
+ UINTN VarEnd;
+ UINTN VarPadding;
+ CONST AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER *VarHeader;
+ CONST CHAR16 *VarName;
+ CONST CHAR8 *VarState;
+ RETURN_STATUS Status;
+
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarOffset, sizeof (*VarHeader), &VarHeaderEnd);
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (VarHeaderEnd >= VariableStoreHeader->Size) {
+ if (VarOffset <= VariableStoreHeader->Size - sizeof (UINT16)) {
+ CONST UINT16 *StartId;
+
+ StartId = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarOffset);
+ if (*StartId == 0x55aa) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: startid at invalid location\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ }
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: end of var list (no space left)\n", __func__));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ VarHeader = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarOffset);
+ if (VarHeader->StartId != 0x55aa) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: end of var list (no startid)\n", __func__));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ VarName = NULL;
+ switch (VarHeader->State) {
+ // usage: State = VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY
+ case VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY:
+ VarState = "header-ok";
+ VarName = L"<unknown>";
+ break;
+
+ // usage: State = VAR_ADDED
+ case VAR_ADDED:
+ VarState = "ok";
+ break;
+
+ // usage: State &= VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION
+ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION:
+ VarState = "del-in-transition";
+ break;
+
+ // usage: State &= VAR_DELETED
+ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_DELETED:
+ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_DELETED &VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION:
+ VarState = "deleted";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ DEBUG ((
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
+ "%a: invalid variable state: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__,
+ VarHeader->State
+ ));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarHeaderEnd, VarHeader->NameSize, &VarNameEnd);
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarNameEnd, VarHeader->DataSize, &VarEnd);
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (VarEnd > VariableStoreHeader->Size) {
+ DEBUG ((
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
+ "%a: invalid variable size: 0x%Lx + 0x%Lx + 0x%x + 0x%x > 0x%x\n",
+ __func__,
+ (UINT64)VarOffset,
+ (UINT64)(sizeof (*VarHeader)),
+ VarHeader->NameSize,
+ VarHeader->DataSize,
+ VariableStoreHeader->Size
+ ));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (((VarHeader->NameSize & 1) != 0) ||
+ (VarHeader->NameSize < 4))
+ {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: invalid name size\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (VarName == NULL) {
+ VarName = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarHeaderEnd);
+ if (VarName[VarHeader->NameSize / 2 - 1] != L'\0') {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: name is not null terminated\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ }
+
+ DEBUG ((
+ DEBUG_VERBOSE,
+ "%a: +0x%04Lx: name=0x%x data=0x%x guid=%g '%s' (%a)\n",
+ __func__,
+ (UINT64)VarOffset,
+ VarHeader->NameSize,
+ VarHeader->DataSize,
+ &VarHeader->VendorGuid,
+ VarName,
+ VarState
+ ));
+
+ VarPadding = (4 - (VarEnd & 3)) & 3;
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarEnd, VarPadding, &VarOffset);
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ }
+
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
--
2.41.0

49
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariable2.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
From 1444157aad1b98ce9c1193ef109011b084113890 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:29:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: stop accepting
gEfiVariableGuid
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [11/20] c7b9cd1b716e1b8163b8094fbea8117241901815
Only accept gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid when checking the variable
store header in ValidateFvHeader().
The edk2 code base has been switched to use the authenticated varstore
format unconditionally (even in case secure boot is not used or
supported) a few years ago.
Suggested-by: László Érsek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240109112902.30002-3-kraxel@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ae22b2f136bcbd27135a5f4dd76d3a68a172d00e)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 4 +---
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
index cc5eefaaf3..c503272a2b 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
@@ -239,9 +239,7 @@ ValidateFvHeader (
VariableStoreHeader = (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *)((UINTN)FwVolHeader + FwVolHeader->HeaderLength);
// Check the Variable Store Guid
- if (!CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiVariableGuid) &&
- !CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid))
- {
+ if (!CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid)) {
DEBUG ((
DEBUG_INFO,
"%a: Variable Store Guid non-compatible\n",
--
2.41.0

47
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariableG.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From abe5b633eaae333190fb742af3fa15968f02a92e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:29:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: stop accepting gEfiVariableGuid
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 42: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: sanity-check variables
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [1/2] 790f895bd180bc2c4b957a7a3c7d07e9107dd74b
Only accept gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid when checking the variable
store header in ValidateFvHeader().
The edk2 code base has been switched to use the authenticated varstore
format unconditionally (even in case secure boot is not used or
supported) a few years ago.
Suggested-by: László Érsek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240109112902.30002-3-kraxel@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ae22b2f136bcbd27135a5f4dd76d3a68a172d00e)
---
ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashFvb.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashFvb.c b/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashFvb.c
index db8eb595f4..904605cbbc 100644
--- a/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashFvb.c
+++ b/ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashFvb.c
@@ -210,8 +210,7 @@ ValidateFvHeader (
VariableStoreHeader = (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER*)((UINTN)FwVolHeader + FwVolHeader->HeaderLength);
// Check the Variable Store Guid
- if (!CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiVariableGuid) &&
- !CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid)) {
+ if (!CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid)) {
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "%a: Variable Store Guid non-compatible\n",
__FUNCTION__));
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
--
2.41.0

150
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-use-EFI_MEMORY_WC-and-drop-A.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
From e65da48afdabc9a5cba1c212b4323898b91ef2a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 18:16:18 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 07/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: use EFI_MEMORY_WC and drop
AlignedCopyMem()
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [9/20] 0c01619eff8282d08e05fae8c37175b944449f59
NOR flash emulation under KVM involves switching between two modes,
where array mode is backed by a read-only memslot, and programming mode
is fully emulated, i.e., the memory region is not backed by anything,
and the faulting accesses are forwarded to the VMM by the hypervisor,
which translates them into NOR flash programming commands.
Normally, we are limited to the use of device attributes when mapping
such regions, given that the programming mode has MMIO semantics.
However, when running under KVM, the chosen memory attributes only take
effect when in array mode, since no memory mapping exists otherwise.
This means we can tune the memory mapping so it behaves a bit more like
a ROM, by switching to EFI_MEMORY_WC attributes. This means we no longer
need a special CopyMem() implementation that avoids unaligned accesses
at all cost.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
(cherry picked from commit 789a723285533f35652ebd6029976e2ddc955655)
---
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 65 +----------------------
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c | 4 +-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
index 0343131a54..1afd60ce66 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
@@ -401,67 +401,6 @@ NorFlashWriteBlocks (
return Status;
}
-#define BOTH_ALIGNED(a, b, align) ((((UINTN)(a) | (UINTN)(b)) & ((align) - 1)) == 0)
-
-/**
- Copy Length bytes from Source to Destination, using aligned accesses only.
- Note that this implementation uses memcpy() semantics rather then memmove()
- semantics, i.e., SourceBuffer and DestinationBuffer should not overlap.
-
- @param DestinationBuffer The target of the copy request.
- @param SourceBuffer The place to copy from.
- @param Length The number of bytes to copy.
-
- @return Destination
-
-**/
-STATIC
-VOID *
-AlignedCopyMem (
- OUT VOID *DestinationBuffer,
- IN CONST VOID *SourceBuffer,
- IN UINTN Length
- )
-{
- UINT8 *Destination8;
- CONST UINT8 *Source8;
- UINT32 *Destination32;
- CONST UINT32 *Source32;
- UINT64 *Destination64;
- CONST UINT64 *Source64;
-
- if (BOTH_ALIGNED (DestinationBuffer, SourceBuffer, 8) && (Length >= 8)) {
- Destination64 = DestinationBuffer;
- Source64 = SourceBuffer;
- while (Length >= 8) {
- *Destination64++ = *Source64++;
- Length -= 8;
- }
-
- Destination8 = (UINT8 *)Destination64;
- Source8 = (CONST UINT8 *)Source64;
- } else if (BOTH_ALIGNED (DestinationBuffer, SourceBuffer, 4) && (Length >= 4)) {
- Destination32 = DestinationBuffer;
- Source32 = SourceBuffer;
- while (Length >= 4) {
- *Destination32++ = *Source32++;
- Length -= 4;
- }
-
- Destination8 = (UINT8 *)Destination32;
- Source8 = (CONST UINT8 *)Source32;
- } else {
- Destination8 = DestinationBuffer;
- Source8 = SourceBuffer;
- }
-
- while (Length-- != 0) {
- *Destination8++ = *Source8++;
- }
-
- return DestinationBuffer;
-}
-
EFI_STATUS
NorFlashReadBlocks (
IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance,
@@ -516,7 +455,7 @@ NorFlashReadBlocks (
SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
// Readout the data
- AlignedCopyMem (Buffer, (VOID *)StartAddress, BufferSizeInBytes);
+ CopyMem (Buffer, (VOID *)StartAddress, BufferSizeInBytes);
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
@@ -558,7 +497,7 @@ NorFlashRead (
SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
// Readout the data
- AlignedCopyMem (Buffer, (VOID *)(StartAddress + Offset), BufferSizeInBytes);
+ CopyMem (Buffer, (VOID *)(StartAddress + Offset), BufferSizeInBytes);
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
index f9a41f6aab..ff3121af2a 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c
@@ -394,14 +394,14 @@ NorFlashFvbInitialize (
EfiGcdMemoryTypeMemoryMappedIo,
Instance->DeviceBaseAddress,
RuntimeMmioRegionSize,
- EFI_MEMORY_UC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
+ EFI_MEMORY_WC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
Status = gDS->SetMemorySpaceAttributes (
Instance->DeviceBaseAddress,
RuntimeMmioRegionSize,
- EFI_MEMORY_UC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
+ EFI_MEMORY_WC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
--
2.41.0

80
SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-clone-NorFlashPlatformLib-into-VirtNorFlashP.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
From 59fb955aa77b75345f7828bf9f83764adf4bed46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 18:35:10 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 18/18] OvmfPkg: clone NorFlashPlatformLib into
VirtNorFlashPlatformLib
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport
RH-Jira: RHEL-17587
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [20/20] 50ea104b99a997d7d08c1fdef617df1d930ffae6
Create a new library class in Ovmf that duplicates the existing
NorFlashPlatformLib, but which will be tied to the VirtNorFlashDxe
driver that will be introduced in a subsequent patch. This allows us to
retire the original from ArmPlatformPkg.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
(cherry picked from commit 16bf588b604a9f190accb71ada715b81756c94e2)
---
.../Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 4 +++
2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h b/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8f5b5e972d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/** @file
+
+ Copyright (c) 2011-2012, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.<BR>
+
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+ **/
+
+#ifndef __VIRT_NOR_FLASH_PLATFORM_LIB__
+#define __VIRT_NOR_FLASH_PLATFORM_LIB__
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINTN DeviceBaseAddress; // Start address of the Device Base Address (DBA)
+ UINTN RegionBaseAddress; // Start address of one single region
+ UINTN Size;
+ UINTN BlockSize;
+} VIRT_NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION;
+
+EFI_STATUS
+VirtNorFlashPlatformInitialization (
+ VOID
+ );
+
+EFI_STATUS
+VirtNorFlashPlatformGetDevices (
+ OUT VIRT_NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION **NorFlashDescriptions,
+ OUT UINT32 *Count
+ );
+
+#endif /* __VIRT_NOR_FLASH_PLATFORM_LIB__ */
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
index 340d83f794..e65ebd81c8 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@
# transports.
VirtioMmioDeviceLib|Include/Library/VirtioMmioDeviceLib.h
+ ## @libraryclass Provides a Nor flash interface.
+ #
+ VirtNorFlashPlatformLib|Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h
+
## @libraryclass Invoke Xen hypercalls
#
XenHypercallLib|Include/Library/XenHypercallLib.h
--
2.41.0

68
SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Adding-CVE-2022-36763-to-SecurityFixes.y.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
From 2794a967f43f2bbdfcd2cb5197ac8cad4b13c3de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:20:52 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 08/17] SecurityPkg: Adding CVE 2022-36763 to
SecurityFixes.yaml
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [8/13] 74117caf760e403566f6511332b2c0f41483f28c (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154
Upstream: Merged
CVE: CVE-2022-36763
commit 1ddcb9fc6b4164e882687b031e8beacfcf7df29e
Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:03 2024 +0800
SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36763 to SecurityFixes.yaml
This creates / adds a security file that tracks the security fixes
found in this package and can be used to find the fixes that were
applied.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f9e3e7be74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+## @file
+# Security Fixes for SecurityPkg
+#
+# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+##
+CVE_2022_36763:
+ commit_titles:
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2Measurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763"
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763"
+ - "SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36763 to SecurityFixes.yaml"
+ cve: CVE-2022-36763
+ date_reported: 2022-10-25 11:31 UTC
+ description: (CVE-2022-36763) - Heap Buffer Overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
+ note: This patch is related to and supersedes TCBZ2168
+ files_impacted:
+ - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
+ - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
+ links:
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4117
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2168
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1990
--
2.41.0

403
SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-OPTIONAL-keyword-usage-style.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
From e2ccaef3baa2eb045019558c325bb94cabf65e1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 11:56:37 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 02/17] SecurityPkg: Change OPTIONAL keyword usage style
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [2/13] 6a2141d871e3efc3aeea1994ab9c325614ddce57 (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154
CVE: CVE-2022-36763
Upstream: Merged
commit 948f4003ee399241a40dc147a738f05ad2e37375
Author: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Date: Thu Dec 2 18:00:56 2021 -0800
SecurityPkg: Change OPTIONAL keyword usage style
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3760
Update all use of ', OPTIONAL' to ' OPTIONAL,' for function params.
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Michael Kubacki <michael.kubacki@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h | 2 +-
SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h | 14 +++++++-------
SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c | 6 +++---
.../DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib.c | 2 +-
.../DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 2 +-
.../DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c | 2 +-
.../DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c | 4 ++--
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 2 +-
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 2 +-
.../PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c | 2 +-
.../Tcg2PpVendorLibNull/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull.c | 2 +-
.../Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c | 2 +-
SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c | 2 +-
SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c | 2 +-
SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c | 2 +-
SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c | 6 +++---
.../RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/AArch64/RngDxe.c | 2 +-
.../RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c | 2 +-
.../RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxeInternals.h | 2 +-
SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigImpl.c | 2 +-
20 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h b/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h
index 569eba6874..914517f034 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
UINT32
EFIAPI
Tcg2PpVendorLibExecutePendingRequest (
- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL,
IN UINT32 OperationRequest,
IN OUT UINT32 *ManagementFlags,
OUT BOOLEAN *ResetRequired
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h b/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h
index ee8eb62295..ad3b982d48 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tpm2ClearControl (
IN TPMI_RH_CLEAR AuthHandle,
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL,
IN TPMI_YES_NO Disable
);
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tpm2NvDefineSpace (
IN TPMI_RH_PROVISION AuthHandle,
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL,
IN TPM2B_AUTH *Auth,
IN TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *NvPublic
);
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ EFIAPI
Tpm2NvRead (
IN TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH AuthHandle,
IN TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX NvIndex,
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL,
IN UINT16 Size,
IN UINT16 Offset,
IN OUT TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *OutData
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ EFIAPI
Tpm2NvWrite (
IN TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH AuthHandle,
IN TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX NvIndex,
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL,
IN TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *InData,
IN UINT16 Offset
);
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ Tpm2PcrAllocate (
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tpm2PcrAllocateBanks (
- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL,
IN UINT32 SupportedPCRBanks,
IN UINT32 PCRBanks
);
@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ EFIAPI
Tpm2PolicySecret (
IN TPMI_DH_ENTITY AuthHandle,
IN TPMI_SH_POLICY PolicySession,
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL,
IN TPM2B_NONCE *NonceTPM,
IN TPM2B_DIGEST *CpHashA,
IN TPM2B_NONCE *PolicyRef,
@@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ Tpm2ReadPublic (
UINT32
EFIAPI
CopyAuthSessionCommand (
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSessionIn, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSessionIn OPTIONAL,
OUT UINT8 *AuthSessionOut
);
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
index aa9ebaf3be..3059e5d256 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
@@ -1183,9 +1183,9 @@ FindCertsFromDb (
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
IN UINT8 *Data,
IN UINTN DataSize,
- OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL
- OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL
- OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL
+ OUT UINT32 *CertOffset OPTIONAL,
+ OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize OPTIONAL,
+ OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset OPTIONAL,
OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL
)
{
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib.c
index ec77151c9c..9acff2ae7d 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
DxeImageAuthenticationStatusHandler (
IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File, OPTIONAL
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File OPTIONAL,
IN VOID *FileBuffer,
IN UINTN FileSize,
IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index 1252927664..0a12692454 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -1636,7 +1636,7 @@ EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
DxeImageVerificationHandler (
IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File, OPTIONAL
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File OPTIONAL,
IN VOID *FileBuffer,
IN UINTN FileSize,
IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c
index 28807d4d98..5124b884c9 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ EFIAPI
Rsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionHandler (
IN CONST VOID *InputSection,
OUT VOID **OutputBuffer,
- IN VOID *ScratchBuffer, OPTIONAL
+ IN VOID *ScratchBuffer OPTIONAL,
OUT UINT32 *AuthenticationStatus
)
{
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c
index fce5c0af50..d92658f80d 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ Tpm2CommandChangeEps (
**/
UINT32
Tcg2ExecutePhysicalPresence (
- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL,
IN UINT32 CommandCode,
IN UINT32 CommandParameter,
IN OUT EFI_TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS *PpiFlags
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ Tcg2HaveValidTpmRequest (
**/
VOID
Tcg2ExecutePendingTpmRequest (
- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL,
IN OUT EFI_TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE *TcgPpData,
IN OUT EFI_TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS *Flags
)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
index a531385f81..95682ac567 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler (
IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File, OPTIONAL
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File OPTIONAL,
IN VOID *FileBuffer,
IN UINTN FileSize,
IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
index 4e74cd9db6..27c0ea48ca 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler (
IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File, OPTIONAL
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File OPTIONAL,
IN VOID *FileBuffer,
IN UINTN FileSize,
IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c
index a759183d20..96638e26aa 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ EFIAPI
Rsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionHandler (
IN CONST VOID *InputSection,
OUT VOID **OutputBuffer,
- IN VOID *ScratchBuffer, OPTIONAL
+ IN VOID *ScratchBuffer OPTIONAL,
OUT UINT32 *AuthenticationStatus
)
{
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull.c
index 895d05a28d..aa3dcb6beb 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
UINT32
EFIAPI
Tcg2PpVendorLibExecutePendingRequest (
- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL,
IN UINT32 OperationRequest,
IN OUT UINT32 *ManagementFlags,
OUT BOOLEAN *ResetRequired
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c
index 0404c0f321..53983d745b 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ EFIAPI
Tpm2PolicySecret (
IN TPMI_DH_ENTITY AuthHandle,
IN TPMI_SH_POLICY PolicySession,
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL,
IN TPM2B_NONCE *NonceTPM,
IN TPM2B_DIGEST *CpHashA,
IN TPM2B_NONCE *PolicyRef,
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c
index 13eeb6ec18..44115cded3 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ GetHashMaskFromAlgo (
UINT32
EFIAPI
CopyAuthSessionCommand (
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSessionIn, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSessionIn OPTIONAL,
OUT UINT8 *AuthSessionOut
)
{
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c
index 043d358a06..957d694431 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tpm2ClearControl (
IN TPMI_RH_CLEAR AuthHandle,
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL,
IN TPMI_YES_NO Disable
)
{
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c
index 8c87de0b0c..d232fe725d 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ Done:
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tpm2PcrAllocateBanks (
- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL,
IN UINT32 SupportedPCRBanks,
IN UINT32 PCRBanks
)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c
index fb46af0fed..d9171fb9a0 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tpm2NvDefineSpace (
IN TPMI_RH_PROVISION AuthHandle,
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL,
IN TPM2B_AUTH *Auth,
IN TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *NvPublic
)
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ EFIAPI
Tpm2NvRead (
IN TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH AuthHandle,
IN TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX NvIndex,
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL,
IN UINT16 Size,
IN UINT16 Offset,
IN OUT TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *OutData
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ EFIAPI
Tpm2NvWrite (
IN TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH AuthHandle,
IN TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX NvIndex,
- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL
+ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL,
IN TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *InData,
IN UINT16 Offset
)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/AArch64/RngDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/AArch64/RngDxe.c
index 282fdca9d3..1cdc842966 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/AArch64/RngDxe.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/AArch64/RngDxe.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
RngGetRNG (
IN EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm, OPTIONAL
+ IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm OPTIONAL,
IN UINTN RNGValueLength,
OUT UINT8 *RNGValue
)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c
index d0e6b7de06..834123b945 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
RngGetRNG (
IN EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm, OPTIONAL
+ IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm OPTIONAL,
IN UINTN RNGValueLength,
OUT UINT8 *RNGValue
)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxeInternals.h b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxeInternals.h
index 2660ed5875..25cccbe92c 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxeInternals.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxeInternals.h
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
RngGetRNG (
IN EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL *This,
- IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm, OPTIONAL
+ IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm OPTIONAL,
IN UINTN RNGValueLength,
OUT UINT8 *RNGValue
);
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigImpl.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigImpl.c
index 68cd62307c..09cb4b0ee9 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigImpl.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigImpl.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ HII_VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH mTcgHiiVendorDevicePath = {
EFI_STATUS
GetTpmState (
IN EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol,
- OUT BOOLEAN *TpmEnable, OPTIONAL
+ OUT BOOLEAN *TpmEnable OPTIONAL,
OUT BOOLEAN *TpmActivate OPTIONAL
)
{
--
2.41.0

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@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
From 7b5040e857f1a16bed935f7944bda8bc6f6999ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 11/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH
4117/4118 symbol rename
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [11/13] 45fc2658aaa726b57219789bb1af64f5c4e2cfdc (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
Upstream: Merged
commit 40adbb7f628dee79156c679fb0857968b61b7620
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:20 2024 -0800
SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename
Updates the sanitation function names to be lib unique names
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <7b18434c8a8b561654efd40ced3becb8b378c8f1.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 8 +++---
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 8 +++---
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 8 +++---
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 26 +++++++++----------
4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
index f06926e631..8f8bef1d0b 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
BlockIo->Media->BlockSize,
(UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader
);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) {
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n"));
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
//
// Read the partition entry.
//
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
//
// Prepare Data for Measurement (CcProtocol and Tcg2Protocol)
//
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &TcgEventSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &TcgEventSize);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
FreePool (EntryPtr);
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
}
FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
index 2a4d52c6d5..809a3bfd89 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
+Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
)
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
+Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
)
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
**/
EFI_STATUS
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
+Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
**/
EFI_STATUS
-SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (
IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
index 8f72ba4240..8526bc7537 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
+Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
);
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
+Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
);
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
**/
EFI_STATUS
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
+Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
**/
EFI_STATUS
-SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (
IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
);
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
index 820e99aeb9..50a68e1076 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
@@ -84,27 +84,27 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize);
// Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
// Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
// Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!""
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0;
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
// Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
// Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!"
PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0;
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER);
// Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
// should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!"
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1;
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
// Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic
@@ -146,19 +146,19 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
// Test that an overflow is detected
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5;
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
// Test the inverse
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
// Test the worst case scenario
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
NumberOfPartition = 13;
// that the primary event size is correct
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
// Calculate the existing logic event size
@@ -207,12 +207,12 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize);
// Tests that the primary event size may not overflow
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
// Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
FilePathSize = 255;
// Test that a normal PE image passes validation
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
// Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
}
// Test that the event size may not overflow
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
--
2.41.0

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From 7c3fefb0c857acb9e7e14b150c4c3131e78fbb63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:43:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 09/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118
- CVE 2022-36764
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [9/13] c7890fc5c5d7fef2fc1daa931ea2d48f3a76b9e3 (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
Upstream: Merged
commit c7b27944218130cca3bbb20314ba5b88b5de4aa4
Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:04 2024 +0800
SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764
This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib
CVE 2022-36764.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 15 +++--
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 46 +++++++++++++-
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 28 ++++++++-
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++---
4 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
index 476c8d543f..f06926e631 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ Exit:
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image.
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED ImageType is unsupported or PE image is mal-format.
@retval other error value
-
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
@@ -399,6 +398,7 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
ImageLoad = NULL;
EventPtr = NULL;
+ Tcg2Event = NULL;
Tcg2Protocol = MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol;
CcProtocol = MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol;
@@ -413,19 +413,24 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
- FilePathSize = (UINT32) GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
+ FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
//
// Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy
//
- EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
- EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event));
+ // from a malicious GPT disk partition
+ EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize);
if (EventPtr == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr;
- Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof(EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER);
+ Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize;
+ Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER);
Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION;
ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *) Tcg2Event->Event;
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
index e2309655d3..2a4d52c6d5 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
}
/**
- This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane
+ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane
It will check the following:
- AllocationSize does not overflow
@@ -273,3 +273,47 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+
+/**
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - EventSize does not overflow
+
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The event size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ Overflow would have occurred.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ // Replacing logic:
+ // sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath), FilePathSize, EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ // Replacing logic:
+ // EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (*EventSize, OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event), EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
index 048b738987..8f72ba4240 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse
partition data carefully.
+ Tcg2MeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its
+ data structure within this image buffer before use.
+
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
@@ -110,4 +113,27 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
);
-#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_
+/**
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - EventSize does not overflow
+
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The event size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ Overflow would have occurred.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
+ );
+
+#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
index 3eb9763e3c..820e99aeb9 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
@@ -72,10 +72,10 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
PrimaryHeader.Header.Revision = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION;
PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER);
PrimaryHeader.MyLBA = 1;
- PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 2;
- PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 3;
- PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 4;
- PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 5;
+ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 2;
+ PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 3;
+ PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 4;
+ PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 5;
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES;
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryArrayCRC32 = 0; // Purposely invalid
@@ -187,11 +187,6 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
UINTN NumberOfPartition;
- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
- EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event;
-
- Tcg2Event = NULL;
- GptData = NULL;
// Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
@@ -225,6 +220,52 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
}
+/**
+ This function tests the SanitizePeImageEventSize function.
+ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a file path when generating a
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT structure will not cause an overflow when calculating
+ the event size when allocating space
+
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
+
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
+**/
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
+ )
+{
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ UINTN ExistingLogicEventSize;
+ UINT32 FilePathSize;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ FilePathSize = 255;
+
+ // Test that a normal PE image passes validation
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
+
+ // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic
+ ExistingLogicEventSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
+ ExistingLogicEventSize += OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event);
+
+ if (EventSize != ExistingLogicEventSize) {
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize returned an incorrect event size. Expected %u, got %u\n", ExistingLogicEventSize, EventSize);
+ return UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ // Test that the event size may not overflow
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
+
+ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
+}
+
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
// * Unit Test Code Main Function
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
@@ -267,6 +308,7 @@ UefiTestMain (
AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL);
AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests PE Image and FileSize checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePeImageEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework);
--
2.41.0

279
SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4117-2.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
From ac25c501c8d97c7520a7c75ae708fb4c43bae035 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 12/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH
4117/4118 symbol rename
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [12/13] 6ef41050fb68f984a5ae6104ccc102afb5290f9f (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
Upstream: Merged
commit 326db0c9072004dea89427ea3a44393a84966f2b
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:21 2024 -0800
SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename
Updates the sanitation function names to be lib unique names
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <355aa846a99ca6ac0f7574cf5982661da0d9fea6.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 8 +++---
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 10 +++----
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 8 +++---
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 26 +++++++++----------
4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
index 1598015176..c39018d7e4 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
BlockIo->Media->BlockSize,
(UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader
);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) {
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n"));
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
//
// Read the partition entry.
//
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
//
// Prepare Data for Measurement
//
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize);
if (TcgEvent == NULL) {
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
// Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy
//
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
index bcf8c6de6f..7f17af56cd 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/** @file
- The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot and
+ The library instance provides security service of TPM measure boot and
Confidential Computing (CC) measure boot.
Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
+TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
)
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
+TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
)
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
**/
EFI_STATUS
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
+TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
**/
EFI_STATUS
-SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (
IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
index 2248495813..db6e9c3752 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
+TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
);
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
+TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
);
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
**/
EFI_STATUS
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
+TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
**/
EFI_STATUS
-SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (
IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
);
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
index c41498be45..de1740af41 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
@@ -83,27 +83,27 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize);
// Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
// Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
// Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!""
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0;
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
// Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
// Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!"
PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0;
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER);
// Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
// should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!"
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1;
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
// Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic
@@ -145,19 +145,19 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
// Test that an overflow is detected
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5;
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
// Test the inverse
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
// Test the worst case scenario
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
NumberOfPartition = 13;
// that the primary event size is correct
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
// Calculate the existing logic event size
@@ -206,12 +206,12 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize);
// Tests that the primary event size may not overflow
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
// Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
FilePathSize = 255;
// Test that a normal PE image passes validation
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize failed with %r\n", Status);
goto Exit;
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
}
// Test that the event size may not overflow
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
+ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
if (Status != EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE) {
UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize succeded when it was supposed to fail with %r\n", Status);
goto Exit;
--
2.41.0

960
SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4117.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,960 @@
From cb36d95002013ae8d4e5120383cd756a2a6c4124 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:20:52 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 07/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117
- CVE 2022-36763
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [7/13] f5a5d2b0a33dc1efdb83e501eda2716df0e904a0 (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154
CVE: CVE-2022-36763
Upstream: Merged
Conflicts: We get function definiton clash for the following three functions:
- SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader()
- SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize()
- SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize()
Those are are defined both in
- SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitazion.c
and
- SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitazion.c
Closer investigation reveals that they are identical in functionality (although
not in comment style).
I chose to leave them as is now, meaning that this package will be
unbuildable until I add a commit renaming these symbols later in
this series.
commit 4776a1b39ee08fc45c70c1eab5a0195f325000d3
Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:02 2024 +0800
SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763
This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpmMeasureBootLib
CVE 2022-36763.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 74 +++--
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf | 4 +-
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 242 ++++++++++++++
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 114 +++++++
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 301 ++++++++++++++++++
...eTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf | 28 ++
SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml | 1 +
SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc | 1 +
8 files changed, 734 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
index 27c0ea48ca..d44422dee8 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
#include <PiDxe.h>
@@ -40,6 +42,8 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>
#include <Library/HobLib.h>
+#include "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h"
+
//
// Flag to check GPT partition. It only need be measured once.
//
@@ -123,19 +127,22 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
IN EFI_HANDLE GptHandle
)
{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;
- EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *DiskIo;
- EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader;
- EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *PartitionEntry;
- UINT8 *EntryPtr;
- UINTN NumberOfPartition;
- UINT32 Index;
- TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent;
- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
- UINT32 EventSize;
- UINT32 EventNumber;
- EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;
+ EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *DiskIo;
+ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader;
+ EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *PartitionEntry;
+ UINT8 *EntryPtr;
+ UINTN NumberOfPartition;
+ UINT32 Index;
+ TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent;
+ EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ UINT32 EventNumber;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;
+ UINT32 AllocSize;
+
+ GptData = NULL;
if (mMeasureGptCount > 0) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
@@ -163,15 +170,21 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
BlockIo->Media->BlockSize,
(UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader
);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n"));
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n"));
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
//
// Read the partition entry.
//
- EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (AllocSize);
if (EntryPtr == NULL) {
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
@@ -179,8 +192,8 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
Status = DiskIo->ReadDisk (
DiskIo,
BlockIo->Media->MediaId,
- MultU64x32(PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize),
- PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry,
+ MultU64x32 (PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize),
+ AllocSize,
EntryPtr
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
@@ -204,19 +217,18 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
//
// Prepare Data for Measurement
//
- EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions)
- + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);
- TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *) AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR));
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
+ TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize);
if (TcgEvent == NULL) {
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
FreePool (EntryPtr);
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
- TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 5;
- TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT;
- TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize;
- GptData = (EFI_GPT_DATA *) TcgEvent->Event;
+ TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 5;
+ TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT;
+ TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize - sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR);
+ GptData = (EFI_GPT_DATA *)TcgEvent->Event;
//
// Copy the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER and NumberOfPartition
@@ -354,11 +366,13 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 2;
break;
default:
- DEBUG ((
- DEBUG_ERROR,
- "TcgMeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d",
- ImageType
- ));
+ DEBUG (
+ (
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
+ "TcgMeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d",
+ ImageType
+ )
+ );
goto Finish;
}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf
index ebab6f7c1e..414c654d15 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
[Sources]
DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
[Packages]
MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
@@ -41,6 +43,7 @@
[LibraryClasses]
BaseMemoryLib
+ SafeIntLib
DebugLib
MemoryAllocationLib
DevicePathLib
@@ -59,4 +62,3 @@
gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
-
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..37cd3ed0ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/** @file
+ The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot and
+ Confidential Computing (CC) measure boot.
+
+ Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.
+ This library will have external input - PE/COFF image and GPT partition.
+ This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like
+ buffer overflow, integer overflow.
+
+ This file will pull out the validation logic from the following functions, in an
+ attempt to validate the untrusted input in the form of unit tests
+
+ These are those functions:
+
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
+ read is within the image buffer.
+
+ Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse
+ partition data carefully.
+
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+**/
+#include <Uefi.h>
+#include <Uefi/UefiSpec.h>
+#include <Library/SafeIntLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiLib.h>
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+#include <IndustryStandard/UefiTcgPlatform.h>
+#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
+#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
+
+#include "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h"
+
+#define GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1 0x00010000
+
+/**
+ This function will validate the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is safe to parse
+ However this function will not attempt to verify the validity of the GPT partition
+ It will check the following:
+ - Signature
+ - Revision
+ - AlternateLBA
+ - FirstUsableLBA
+ - LastUsableLBA
+ - PartitionEntryLBA
+ - NumberOfPartitionEntries
+ - SizeOfPartitionEntry
+ - BlockIo
+
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader
+ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
+
+ @param[in] BlockIo
+ Pointer to the EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL structure.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
+ IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
+ )
+{
+ // Verify that the input parameters are safe to use
+ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header!\n"));
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if ((BlockIo == NULL) || (BlockIo->Media == NULL)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid BlockIo!\n"));
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ // The signature must be EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID ("EFI PART" in ASCII)
+ if (PrimaryHeader->Header.Signature != EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header!\n"));
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ // The version must be GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1 (0x00010000)
+ if (PrimaryHeader->Header.Revision != GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header Revision!\n"));
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ // The HeaderSize must be greater than or equal to 92 and must be less than or equal to the logical block size
+ if ((PrimaryHeader->Header.HeaderSize < sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER)) || (PrimaryHeader->Header.HeaderSize > BlockIo->Media->BlockSize)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header HeaderSize!\n"));
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ // check that the PartitionEntryLBA greater than the Max LBA
+ // This will be used later for multiplication
+ if (PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA > DivU64x32 (MAX_UINT64, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header PartitionEntryLBA!\n"));
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ // Check that the number of partition entries is greater than zero
+ if (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries == 0) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!\n"));
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ // SizeOfPartitionEntry must be 128, 256, 512... improper size may lead to accessing uninitialized memory
+ if ((PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry < 128) || ((PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry & (PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry - 1)) != 0)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!\n"));
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ // This check is to prevent overflow when calculating the allocation size for the partition entries
+ // This check will be used later for multiplication
+ if (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries > DivU64x32 (MAX_UINT64, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!\n"));
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - AllocationSize does not overflow
+
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader
+ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
+
+ @param[out] AllocationSize
+ Pointer to the allocation size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The allocation size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ The allocation size is invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
+ OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if (AllocationSize == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ // Replacing logic:
+ // PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry;
+ Status = SafeUint32Mult (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, AllocationSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Allocation Size would have overflowed!\n"));
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function will validate that the Gpt Event Size calculated from the primary header is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - EventSize does not overflow
+
+ Important: This function includes the entire length of the allocated space, including the
+ TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR. When hashing the buffer allocated with this size, the caller must subtract
+ the size of the TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR from the size of the buffer before hashing.
+
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader - Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
+ @param[in] NumberOfPartition - Number of partitions.
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The event size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ Overflow would have occurred.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
+ IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT32 SafeNumberOfPartitions;
+
+ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if (EventSize == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ // We shouldn't even attempt to perform the multiplication if the number of partitions is greater than the maximum value of UINT32
+ Status = SafeUintnToUint32 (NumberOfPartition, &SafeNumberOfPartitions);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NumberOfPartition would have overflowed!\n"));
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ // Replacing logic:
+ // (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions) + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR));
+ Status = SafeUint32Mult (SafeNumberOfPartitions, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Event Size would have overflowed!\n"));
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (
+ sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR) +
+ OFFSET_OF (EFI_GPT_DATA, Partitions),
+ *EventSize,
+ EventSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Event Size would have overflowed because of GPTData!\n"));
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0d9d00c281
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/** @file
+ This file includes the function prototypes for the sanitization functions.
+
+ These are those functions:
+
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
+ read is within the image buffer.
+
+ TcgMeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its
+ data structure within this image buffer before use.
+
+ TcgMeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse
+ partition data carefully.
+
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
+#define DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
+
+#include <Uefi.h>
+#include <Uefi/UefiSpec.h>
+#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
+#include <IndustryStandard/UefiTcgPlatform.h>
+
+/**
+ This function will validate the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is safe to parse
+ However this function will not attempt to verify the validity of the GPT partition
+ It will check the following:
+ - Signature
+ - Revision
+ - AlternateLBA
+ - FirstUsableLBA
+ - LastUsableLBA
+ - PartitionEntryLBA
+ - NumberOfPartitionEntries
+ - SizeOfPartitionEntry
+ - BlockIo
+
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader
+ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
+
+ @param[in] BlockIo
+ Pointer to the EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL structure.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
+ IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
+ );
+
+/**
+ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - AllocationSize does not overflow
+
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader
+ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
+
+ @param[out] AllocationSize
+ Pointer to the allocation size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The allocation size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ The allocation size is invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
+ OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
+ );
+
+/**
+ This function will validate that the Gpt Event Size calculated from the primary header is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - EventSize does not overflow
+
+ Important: This function includes the entire length of the allocated space, including the
+ TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR. When hashing the buffer allocated with this size, the caller must subtract
+ the size of the TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR from the size of the buffer before hashing.
+
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader - Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
+ @param[in] NumberOfPartition - Number of partitions.
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The event size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ Overflow would have occurred.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
+ IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
+ );
+
+#endif // DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eeb928cdb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+/** @file
+This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c.
+
+Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+**/
+
+#include <Uefi.h>
+#include <Library/UefiLib.h>
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+#include <Library/UnitTestLib.h>
+#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
+#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <IndustryStandard/UefiTcgPlatform.h>
+
+#include "../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h"
+
+#define UNIT_TEST_NAME "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest"
+#define UNIT_TEST_VERSION "1.0"
+
+#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION 0x00010000
+#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES 1
+#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY 128
+
+/**
+ This function tests the SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader function.
+ It's intent is to test that a malicious EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER
+ structure will not cause undefined or unexpected behavior.
+
+ In general the TPM should still be able to measure the data, but
+ be the header should be sanitized to prevent any unexpected behavior.
+
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
+
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
+**/
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
+ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL BlockIo;
+ EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA BlockMedia;
+
+ // Generate EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA test data
+ BlockMedia.MediaId = 1;
+ BlockMedia.RemovableMedia = FALSE;
+ BlockMedia.MediaPresent = TRUE;
+ BlockMedia.LogicalPartition = FALSE;
+ BlockMedia.ReadOnly = FALSE;
+ BlockMedia.WriteCaching = FALSE;
+ BlockMedia.BlockSize = 512;
+ BlockMedia.IoAlign = 1;
+ BlockMedia.LastBlock = 0;
+
+ // Generate EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL test data
+ BlockIo.Revision = 1;
+ BlockIo.Media = &BlockMedia;
+ BlockIo.Reset = NULL;
+ BlockIo.ReadBlocks = NULL;
+ BlockIo.WriteBlocks = NULL;
+ BlockIo.FlushBlocks = NULL;
+
+ // Geneate EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER test data
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.Signature = EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID;
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.Revision = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION;
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER);
+ PrimaryHeader.MyLBA = 1;
+ PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 2;
+ PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 3;
+ PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 4;
+ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 5;
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES;
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
+ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryArrayCRC32 = 0; // Purposely invalid
+
+ // Calculate the CRC32 of the PrimaryHeader
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize);
+
+ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
+ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+
+ // Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
+ // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!""
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0;
+ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
+
+ // Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
+ // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!"
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0;
+ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER);
+
+ // Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
+ // should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!"
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1;
+ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
+
+ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function tests the SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize function.
+ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER
+ structure will not cause an overflow when calculating the allocation size.
+
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
+
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
+**/
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
+ )
+{
+ UINT32 AllocationSize;
+
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
+
+ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
+
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+
+ // Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (AllocationSize, PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry);
+
+ // Test that an overflow is detected
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5;
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
+
+ // Test the inverse
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
+
+ // Test the worst case scenario
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
+
+ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function tests the SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize function.
+ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a EFI_GPT_DATA structure
+ will not cause an overflow when calculating the event size.
+
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
+
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
+**/
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
+ )
+{
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ UINT32 ExistingLogicEventSize;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
+ UINTN NumberOfPartition;
+ EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
+
+ GptData = NULL;
+
+ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
+
+ // set the number of partitions
+ NumberOfPartition = 13;
+
+ // that the primary event size is correct
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
+ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+
+ // Calculate the existing logic event size
+ ExistingLogicEventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR) + OFFSET_OF (EFI_GPT_DATA, Partitions)
+ + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry);
+
+ // Check that the event size is correct
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize);
+
+ // Tests that the primary event size may not overflow
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
+
+ // Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
+
+ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
+}
+
+// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
+// * Unit Test Code Main Function
+// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
+
+/**
+ This function acts as the entry point for the unit tests.
+
+ @param argc - The number of command line arguments
+ @param argv - The command line arguments
+
+ @return int - The status of the test
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+UefiTestMain (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UNIT_TEST_FRAMEWORK_HANDLE Framework;
+ UNIT_TEST_SUITE_HANDLE TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite;
+
+ Framework = NULL;
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: TestMain() - Start\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME));
+
+ Status = InitUnitTestFramework (&Framework, UNIT_TEST_NAME, gEfiCallerBaseName, UNIT_TEST_VERSION);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Failed in InitUnitTestFramework. Status = %r\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME, Status));
+ goto EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = CreateUnitTestSuite (&TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, Framework, "TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", NULL, NULL);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%s: Failed in CreateUnitTestSuite for TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME));
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto EXIT;
+ }
+
+ // -----------Suite---------------------------------Description----------------------------Class----------------------------------Test Function------------------------Pre---Clean-Context
+ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+ Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework);
+
+EXIT:
+ if (Framework != NULL) {
+ FreeUnitTestFramework (Framework);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: TestMain() - End\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME));
+ return Status;
+}
+
+///
+/// Avoid ECC error for function name that starts with lower case letter
+///
+#define DxeTpmMeasureBootLibUnitTestMain main
+
+/**
+ Standard POSIX C entry point for host based unit test execution.
+
+ @param[in] Argc Number of arguments
+ @param[in] Argv Array of pointers to arguments
+
+ @retval 0 Success
+ @retval other Error
+**/
+INT32
+DxeTpmMeasureBootLibUnitTestMain (
+ IN INT32 Argc,
+ IN CHAR8 *Argv[]
+ )
+{
+ return (INT32)UefiTestMain ();
+}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..47b0811b00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+## @file
+# This file builds the unit tests for DxeTpmMeasureBootLib
+#
+# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+##
+
+[Defines]
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010006
+ BASE_NAME = DxeTpmMeasuredBootLibTest
+ FILE_GUID = eb01bc38-309c-4d3e-967e-9f078c90772f
+ MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+ ENTRY_POINT = main
+
+[Sources]
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
+ ../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+
+[LibraryClasses]
+ BaseLib
+ DebugLib
+ UnitTestLib
+ PrintLib
+ SafeIntLib
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml
index aa8496d6d9..26865cb15a 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml
+++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
"ExceptionList": [
"8005", "gRT",
"8001", "DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibUnitTestMain",
+ "8001", "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibUnitTestMain"
],
## Both file path and directory path are accepted.
"IgnoreFiles": [
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc b/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc
index 788c1ab6fe..1655e573ea 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/UnitTest/MockUefiLib.inf
SecurityPkg/Test/Mock/Library/GoogleTest/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib.inf
SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf
+ SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf
#
# Build SecurityPkg HOST_APPLICATION Tests
--
2.41.0

307
SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
From f6f72373630d901f331df719a0fb55e8f1143c4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:43:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 10/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118
- CVE 2022-36764
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [10/13] 5ed702e16f390c79d1abb0ec0b04d886e0094c0b (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
Upstream: Merged
Conflicts: We get function definiton clash for the following three functions:
- SanitizePeImageEventSize()
This is defined both in
- SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitazion.c
and
- SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitazion.c
Closer investigation reveals that they are identical in functionality (although
not in comment style).
I chose to leave them as is now, meaning that this package will be
unbuildable until I add a commit renaming these symbols later in
this series.
commit 0d341c01eeabe0ab5e76693b36e728b8f538a40e
Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:05 2024 +0800
SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764
This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpmMeasureBootLib
CVE 2022-36764.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 17 ++--
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 44 +++++++++
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 23 +++++
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
index d44422dee8..1598015176 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
@@ -338,19 +339,23 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
ImageLoad = NULL;
SectionHeader = NULL;
Sha1Ctx = NULL;
- FilePathSize = (UINT32) GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
+ TcgEvent = NULL;
+ FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
- //
// Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy
//
- EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
- TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT));
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize);
if (TcgEvent == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
- TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize;
- ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *) TcgEvent->Event;
+ TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize - sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR);
+ ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *)TcgEvent->Event;
switch (ImageType) {
case EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION:
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
index 37cd3ed0ea..bcf8c6de6f 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
@@ -240,3 +240,47 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+/**
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - EventSize does not overflow
+
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The event size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ Overflow would have occurred.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ // Replacing logic:
+ // sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath), FilePathSize, EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ // Replacing logic:
+ // EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR)
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (*EventSize, sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR), EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
index 0d9d00c281..2248495813 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
@@ -111,4 +111,27 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
);
+/**
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - EventSize does not overflow
+
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The event size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ Overflow would have occurred.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
+ );
+
#endif // DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
index eeb928cdb0..c41498be45 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/** @file
-This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c.
+ This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c.
-Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
-SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
#include <Uefi.h>
@@ -186,9 +186,6 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
UINTN NumberOfPartition;
- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
-
- GptData = NULL;
// Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
@@ -222,6 +219,94 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
}
+/**
+ This function tests the SanitizePeImageEventSize function.
+ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a file path for an
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT structure will not cause an overflow when calculating
+ the event size when allocating space.
+
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
+
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
+**/
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
+ )
+{
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ UINTN ExistingLogicEventSize;
+ UINT32 FilePathSize;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL DevicePath;
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoadEvent;
+ UNIT_TEST_STATUS TestStatus;
+
+ TestStatus = UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED;
+
+ // Generate EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL test data
+ DevicePath.Type = 0;
+ DevicePath.SubType = 0;
+ DevicePath.Length[0] = 0;
+ DevicePath.Length[1] = 0;
+
+ // Generate EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT test data
+ ImageLoadEvent = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT) + sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL));
+ if (ImageLoadEvent == NULL) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: AllocateZeroPool failed\n", __func__));
+ goto Exit;
+ }
+
+ // Populate EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT54 test data
+ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLocationInMemory = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)0x12345678;
+ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLengthInMemory = 0x1000;
+ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLinkTimeAddress = (UINTN)ImageLoadEvent;
+ ImageLoadEvent->LengthOfDevicePath = sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL);
+ CopyMem (ImageLoadEvent->DevicePath, &DevicePath, sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL));
+
+ FilePathSize = 255;
+
+ // Test that a normal PE image passes validation
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize failed with %r\n", Status);
+ goto Exit;
+ }
+
+ // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic
+ ExistingLogicEventSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
+ ExistingLogicEventSize += sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR);
+
+ if (EventSize != ExistingLogicEventSize) {
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize returned an incorrect event size. Expected %u, got %u\n", ExistingLogicEventSize, EventSize);
+ goto Exit;
+ }
+
+ // Test that the event size may not overflow
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
+ if (Status != EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE) {
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize succeded when it was supposed to fail with %r\n", Status);
+ goto Exit;
+ }
+
+ TestStatus = UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
+Exit:
+
+ if (ImageLoadEvent != NULL) {
+ FreePool (ImageLoadEvent);
+ }
+
+ if (TestStatus == UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Test failed\n", __func__));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
+ }
+
+ return TestStatus;
+}
+
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
// * Unit Test Code Main Function
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
@@ -265,6 +350,7 @@ UefiTestMain (
AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL);
AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests PE Image and FileSize checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePeImageEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework);
--
2.41.0

584
SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpm2.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,584 @@
From e138f66708415704ad1133938c0dce5243795656 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 04/17] SecurityPkg: Support CcMeasurementProtocol in
DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [4/13] 8038fb605dbdaccfd40cb9d9d56db559ee9df639 (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154
CVE: CVE-2022-36763
Upstream: Merged
Conflicts: Only cosmetic, due to the uncrustify changes made
in the newer version.
commit a124cd4ef92a349a6c823ea6701fcfd3a17db255
Author: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Date: Sat Dec 11 21:08:41 2021 +0800
SecurityPkg: Support CcMeasurementProtocol in DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3625
DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib supports TPM2 based measure boot. After
CcMeasurementProtocol is introduced, CC based measure boot needs to
be supported in DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib as well.
There are 2 major changes in this commit.
1. A platform should have only one RTS/RTR. Only one of (virtual)TPM1.2,
(virtual)TPM2.0 and CC MR exists. Then only one TCG_SERVICE_PROTOCOL,
TCG2_PROTOCOL, CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL is exposed. In this library when
do measure boot only one of TCG2_PROTOCOL / CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL
will be called. MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS is defined to store the instances
of TCG2 protocol and CC Measurement protocol.
2. CcEvent is similar to Tcg2Event except the MrIndex and PcrIndex.
So in the code Tcg2Event will be first created and intialized. If
CcMeasurementProtocol is called to do the measure boot, then CcEvent
points to Tcg2Event and the MrIndex is adjusted.
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 347 ++++++++++++++----
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf | 3 +-
2 files changed, 271 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
index 95682ac567..7abacdbc0a 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/** @file
- The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot.
+ The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot and
+ Confidential Computing (CC) measure boot.
Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.
This library will have external input - PE/COFF image and GPT partition.
@@ -41,6 +42,12 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#include <Library/PeCoffLib.h>
#include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>
#include <Library/HobLib.h>
+#include <Protocol/CcMeasurement.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+ EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol;
+ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol;
+} MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS;
//
// Flag to check GPT partition. It only need be measured once.
@@ -109,7 +116,7 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibImageRead (
Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
The GPT partition table is external input, so this function should parse partition data carefully.
- @param Tcg2Protocol Pointer to the located TCG2 protocol instance.
+ @param MeasureBootProtocols Pointer to the located MeasureBoot protocol instances (i.e. TCG2/CC protocol).
@param GptHandle Handle that GPT partition was installed.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully measure GPT table.
@@ -121,26 +128,48 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibImageRead (
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
- IN EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol,
- IN EFI_HANDLE GptHandle
+ IN MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS *MeasureBootProtocols,
+ IN EFI_HANDLE GptHandle
)
{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;
- EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *DiskIo;
- EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader;
- EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *PartitionEntry;
- UINT8 *EntryPtr;
- UINTN NumberOfPartition;
- UINT32 Index;
- EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event;
- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
- UINT32 EventSize;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;
+ EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *DiskIo;
+ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader;
+ EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *PartitionEntry;
+ UINT8 *EntryPtr;
+ UINTN NumberOfPartition;
+ UINT32 Index;
+ UINT8 *EventPtr;
+ EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event;
+ EFI_CC_EVENT *CcEvent;
+ EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol;
+ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol;
+ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex;
if (mTcg2MeasureGptCount > 0) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+ PrimaryHeader = NULL;
+ EntryPtr = NULL;
+ EventPtr = NULL;
+
+ Tcg2Protocol = MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol;
+ CcProtocol = MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol;
+
+ if ((Tcg2Protocol == NULL) && (CcProtocol == NULL)) {
+ ASSERT (FALSE);
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ if (sizeof (EFI_CC_EVENT) != sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT)) {
+ ASSERT (FALSE);
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (GptHandle, &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid, (VOID**)&BlockIo);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
@@ -168,6 +197,16 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
+
+ //
+ // PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry should not be zero
+ //
+ if (PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry == 0) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SizeOfPartitionEntry should not be zero!\n"));
+ FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
//
// Read the partition entry.
//
@@ -202,11 +241,17 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
}
//
- // Prepare Data for Measurement
+ // Prepare Data for Measurement (CcProtocol and Tcg2Protocol)
//
EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions)
+ NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);
- Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *) AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof(Tcg2Event->Event));
+ EventPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event));
+ if (EventPtr == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto Exit;
+ }
+
+ Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr;
if (Tcg2Event == NULL) {
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
FreePool (EntryPtr);
@@ -243,22 +288,66 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
}
//
- // Measure the GPT data
+ // Only one of TCG2_PROTOCOL or CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL is exposed.
+ // So Measure the GPT data with one of the protocol.
//
- Status = Tcg2Protocol->HashLogExtendEvent (
- Tcg2Protocol,
- 0,
- (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) (VOID *) GptData,
- (UINT64) EventSize,
- Tcg2Event
- );
- if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- mTcg2MeasureGptCount++;
+ if (CcProtocol != NULL) {
+ //
+ // EFI_CC_EVENT share the same data structure with EFI_TCG2_EVENT
+ // except the MrIndex and PCRIndex in Header.
+ // Tcg2Event has been created and initialized before. So only the MrIndex need
+ // be adjusted.
+ //
+ Status = CcProtocol->MapPcrToMrIndex (CcProtocol, Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex, &MrIndex);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot map PcrIndex(%d) to MrIndex\n", Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex));
+ goto Exit;
+ }
+
+ CcEvent = (EFI_CC_EVENT *)EventPtr;
+ CcEvent->Header.MrIndex = MrIndex;
+ Status = CcProtocol->HashLogExtendEvent (
+ CcProtocol,
+ 0,
+ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)(VOID *)GptData,
+ (UINT64)EventSize,
+ CcEvent
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ mTcg2MeasureGptCount++;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Cc MeasureGptTable - %r\n", Status));
+ } else if (Tcg2Protocol != NULL) {
+ //
+ // If Tcg2Protocol is installed, then Measure GPT data with this protocol.
+ //
+ Status = Tcg2Protocol->HashLogExtendEvent (
+ Tcg2Protocol,
+ 0,
+ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)(VOID *)GptData,
+ (UINT64)EventSize,
+ Tcg2Event
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ mTcg2MeasureGptCount++;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2 MeasureGptTable - %r\n", Status));
}
- FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
- FreePool (EntryPtr);
- FreePool (Tcg2Event);
+Exit:
+ if (PrimaryHeader != NULL) {
+ FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
+ }
+
+ if (EntryPtr != NULL) {
+ FreePool (EntryPtr);
+ }
+
+ if (EventPtr != NULL) {
+ FreePool (EventPtr);
+ }
return Status;
}
@@ -271,12 +360,12 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
within this image buffer before use.
- @param[in] Tcg2Protocol Pointer to the located TCG2 protocol instance.
- @param[in] ImageAddress Start address of image buffer.
- @param[in] ImageSize Image size
- @param[in] LinkTimeBase Address that the image is loaded into memory.
- @param[in] ImageType Image subsystem type.
- @param[in] FilePath File path is corresponding to the input image.
+ @param[in] MeasureBootProtocols Pointer to the located MeasureBoot protocol instances.
+ @param[in] ImageAddress Start address of image buffer.
+ @param[in] ImageSize Image size
+ @param[in] LinkTimeBase Address that the image is loaded into memory.
+ @param[in] ImageType Image subsystem type.
+ @param[in] FilePath File path is corresponding to the input image.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully measure image.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image.
@@ -287,7 +376,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
- IN EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol,
+ IN MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS *MeasureBootProtocols,
IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS ImageAddress,
IN UINTN ImageSize,
IN UINTN LinkTimeBase,
@@ -295,26 +384,46 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *FilePath
)
{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event;
- EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoad;
- UINT32 FilePathSize;
- UINT32 EventSize;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event;
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoad;
+ UINT32 FilePathSize;
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ EFI_CC_EVENT *CcEvent;
+ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol;
+ EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol;
+ UINT8 *EventPtr;
+ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex;
+
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ ImageLoad = NULL;
+ EventPtr = NULL;
+
+ Tcg2Protocol = MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol;
+ CcProtocol = MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol;
+
+ if ((Tcg2Protocol == NULL) && (CcProtocol == NULL)) {
+ ASSERT (FALSE);
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ if (sizeof (EFI_CC_EVENT) != sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT)) {
+ ASSERT (FALSE);
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
- Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
- ImageLoad = NULL;
FilePathSize = (UINT32) GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
//
// Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy
//
EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
- Tcg2Event = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof(Tcg2Event->Event));
- if (Tcg2Event == NULL) {
+ EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event));
+ if (EventPtr == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
- Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof(Tcg2Event->Event);
+ Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr;
Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof(EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER);
Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION;
ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *) Tcg2Event->Event;
@@ -352,13 +461,35 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
//
// Log the PE data
//
- Status = Tcg2Protocol->HashLogExtendEvent (
- Tcg2Protocol,
- PE_COFF_IMAGE,
- ImageAddress,
- ImageSize,
- Tcg2Event
- );
+ if (CcProtocol != NULL) {
+ Status = CcProtocol->MapPcrToMrIndex (CcProtocol, Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex, &MrIndex);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot map PcrIndex(%d) to MrIndex\n", Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex));
+ goto Finish;
+ }
+
+ CcEvent = (EFI_CC_EVENT *)EventPtr;
+ CcEvent->Header.MrIndex = MrIndex;
+
+ Status = CcProtocol->HashLogExtendEvent (
+ CcProtocol,
+ PE_COFF_IMAGE,
+ ImageAddress,
+ ImageSize,
+ CcEvent
+ );
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Cc MeasurePeImage - %r\n", Status));
+ } else if (Tcg2Protocol != NULL) {
+ Status = Tcg2Protocol->HashLogExtendEvent (
+ Tcg2Protocol,
+ PE_COFF_IMAGE,
+ ImageAddress,
+ ImageSize,
+ Tcg2Event
+ );
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2 MeasurePeImage - %r\n", Status));
+ }
+
if (Status == EFI_VOLUME_FULL) {
//
// Volume full here means the image is hashed and its result is extended to PCR.
@@ -369,11 +500,77 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
}
Finish:
- FreePool (Tcg2Event);
+ if (EventPtr != NULL) {
+ FreePool (EventPtr);
+ }
return Status;
}
+/**
+ Get the measure boot protocols.
+
+ There are 2 measure boot, TCG2 protocol based and Cc measurement protocol based.
+
+ @param MeasureBootProtocols Pointer to the located measure boot protocol instances.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Sucessfully locate the measure boot protocol instances (at least one instance).
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Measure boot is not supported.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+GetMeasureBootProtocols (
+ MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS *MeasureBootProtocols
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol;
+ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol;
+ EFI_TCG2_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY Tcg2ProtocolCapability;
+ EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY CcProtocolCapability;
+
+ CcProtocol = NULL;
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&CcProtocol);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // Cc Measurement protocol is not installed.
+ //
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "CcMeasurementProtocol is not installed. - %r\n", Status));
+ } else {
+ ZeroMem (&CcProtocolCapability, sizeof (CcProtocolCapability));
+ CcProtocolCapability.Size = sizeof (CcProtocolCapability);
+ Status = CcProtocol->GetCapability (CcProtocol, &CcProtocolCapability);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (CcProtocolCapability.CcType.Type == EFI_CC_TYPE_NONE)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CcProtocol->GetCapability returns : %x, %r\n", CcProtocolCapability.CcType.Type, Status));
+ CcProtocol = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ Tcg2Protocol = NULL;
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiTcg2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&Tcg2Protocol);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // Tcg2 protocol is not installed. So, TPM2 is not present.
+ //
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Tcg2Protocol is not installed. - %r\n", Status));
+ } else {
+ Tcg2ProtocolCapability.Size = (UINT8)sizeof (Tcg2ProtocolCapability);
+ Status = Tcg2Protocol->GetCapability (Tcg2Protocol, &Tcg2ProtocolCapability);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (!Tcg2ProtocolCapability.TPMPresentFlag)) {
+ //
+ // TPM device doesn't work or activate.
+ //
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPMPresentFlag=FALSE %r\n", Status));
+ Tcg2Protocol = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol = Tcg2Protocol;
+ MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol = CcProtocol;
+
+ return (Tcg2Protocol == NULL && CcProtocol == NULL) ? EFI_UNSUPPORTED : EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
/**
The security handler is used to abstract platform-specific policy
from the DXE core response to an attempt to use a file that returns a
@@ -422,9 +619,8 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler (
IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
)
{
- EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol;
+ MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS MeasureBootProtocols;
EFI_STATUS Status;
- EFI_TCG2_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY ProtocolCapability;
EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePathNode;
EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *OrigDevicePathNode;
EFI_HANDLE Handle;
@@ -435,29 +631,25 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler (
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS FvAddress;
UINT32 Index;
- Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiTcg2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **) &Tcg2Protocol);
+ MeasureBootProtocols.Tcg2Protocol = NULL;
+ MeasureBootProtocols.CcProtocol = NULL;
+
+ Status = GetMeasureBootProtocols (&MeasureBootProtocols);
+
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
- // Tcg2 protocol is not installed. So, TPM2 is not present.
+ // None of Measured boot protocols (Tcg2, Cc) is installed.
// Don't do any measurement, and directly return EFI_SUCCESS.
//
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2 - %r\n", Status));
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "None of Tcg2Protocol/CcMeasurementProtocol is installed.\n"));
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
-
- ProtocolCapability.Size = (UINT8) sizeof (ProtocolCapability);
- Status = Tcg2Protocol->GetCapability (
- Tcg2Protocol,
- &ProtocolCapability
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (!ProtocolCapability.TPMPresentFlag)) {
- //
- // TPM device doesn't work or activate.
- //
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler (%r) - TPMPresentFlag - %x\n", Status, ProtocolCapability.TPMPresentFlag));
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
- }
-
+ DEBUG ((
+ DEBUG_INFO,
+ "Tcg2Protocol = %p, CcMeasurementProtocol = %p\n",
+ MeasureBootProtocols.Tcg2Protocol,
+ MeasureBootProtocols.CcProtocol
+ ));
//
// Copy File Device Path
//
@@ -502,8 +694,8 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler (
//
// Measure GPT disk.
//
- Status = Tcg2MeasureGptTable (Tcg2Protocol, Handle);
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2MeasureGptTable - %r\n", Status));
+ Status = Tcg2MeasureGptTable (&MeasureBootProtocols, Handle);
+
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
// GPT disk check done.
@@ -647,14 +839,13 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler (
// Measure PE image into TPM log.
//
Status = Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
- Tcg2Protocol,
+ &MeasureBootProtocols,
(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) FileBuffer,
FileSize,
(UINTN) ImageContext.ImageAddress,
ImageContext.ImageType,
DevicePathNode
);
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2MeasurePeImage - %r\n", Status));
}
//
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf
index 2506abbe7c..6dca79a20c 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
## @file
-# Provides security service for TPM 2.0 measured boot
+# Provides security service for TPM 2.0 measured boot and Confidential Computing measure boot.
#
# Spec Compliance Info:
# "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification for TPM Family 2.0 Level 00 Revision 1.03 v51"
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
[Protocols]
gEfiTcg2ProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
+ gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
--
2.41.0

255
SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpmM.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
From a35a08c5c8d9308ba2b63a15a40e4ddc3e265dbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 05/17] SecurityPkg: Support CcMeasurementProtocol in
DxeTpmMeasurementLib
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [5/13] fa844740ca589cabb52ae7dfa0dd329315dc168f (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154
CVE: CVE-2022-36763
Upstream: Merged
Conflicts: Only cosmetic, due to the uncrustify changes made
in the newer version.
commit 314ff1dc8c9a9597280b50e44a5c861cb6a58517 (HEAD -> CVE-2022-36763_RHEL-21154_rhel-8.10.0)
Author: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Date: Sat Dec 11 21:08:42 2021 +0800
SecurityPkg: Support CcMeasurementProtocol in DxeTpmMeasurementLib
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3625
DxeTpmMeasurementLib supports TPM based measurement in DXE phase.
After CcMeasurementProtocol is introduced, CC based measurement needs
to be supported in DxeTpmMeasurementLib as well.
A platform should have only one RTS/RTR. Only one of (virtual)TPM1.2,
(virtual)TPM2.0 and CC MR exists. Then only one TCG_SERVICE_PROTOCOL,
TCG2_PROTOCOL, CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL is exposed.
In this library when do measurement only one of above 3 protocols will
be called.
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../DxeTpmMeasurementLib.c | 122 +++++++++++++++---
.../DxeTpmMeasurementLib.inf | 9 +-
2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.c
index 061136ee78..802bc3c3cd 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/** @file
- This library is used by other modules to measure data to TPM.
+ This library is used by other modules to measure data to TPM and Confidential
+ Computing (CC) measure registers.
Copyright (c) 2012 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. <BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#include <Guid/Acpi.h>
#include <IndustryStandard/Acpi.h>
+#include <Protocol/CcMeasurement.h>
@@ -37,6 +39,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Out of memory.
@retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The operation was unsuccessful.
**/
+STATIC
EFI_STATUS
Tpm12MeasureAndLogData (
IN UINT32 PcrIndex,
@@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ Tpm12MeasureAndLogData (
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Out of memory.
@retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The operation was unsuccessful.
**/
+STATIC
EFI_STATUS
Tpm20MeasureAndLogData (
IN UINT32 PcrIndex,
@@ -149,6 +153,73 @@ Tpm20MeasureAndLogData (
return Status;
}
+/**
+ Cc measure and log data, and extend the measurement result into a
+ specific CC MR.
+
+ @param[in] CcProtocol Instance of CC measurement protocol
+ @param[in] PcrIndex PCR Index.
+ @param[in] EventType Event type.
+ @param[in] EventLog Measurement event log.
+ @param[in] LogLen Event log length in bytes.
+ @param[in] HashData The start of the data buffer to be hashed, extended.
+ @param[in] HashDataLen The length, in bytes, of the buffer referenced by HashData
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation completed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED CC guest not available.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Out of memory.
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The operation was unsuccessful.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The input parameter is invalid.
+**/
+STATIC
+EFI_STATUS
+CcMeasureAndLogData (
+ IN EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol,
+ IN UINT32 PcrIndex,
+ IN UINT32 EventType,
+ IN VOID *EventLog,
+ IN UINT32 LogLen,
+ IN VOID *HashData,
+ IN UINT64 HashDataLen
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_CC_EVENT *EfiCcEvent;
+ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex;
+
+ if (CcProtocol == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ Status = CcProtocol->MapPcrToMrIndex (CcProtocol, PcrIndex, &MrIndex);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ EfiCcEvent = (EFI_CC_EVENT *)AllocateZeroPool (LogLen + sizeof (EFI_CC_EVENT));
+ if (EfiCcEvent == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ EfiCcEvent->Size = (UINT32)LogLen + sizeof (EFI_CC_EVENT) - sizeof (EfiCcEvent->Event);
+ EfiCcEvent->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER);
+ EfiCcEvent->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION;
+ EfiCcEvent->Header.MrIndex = MrIndex;
+ EfiCcEvent->Header.EventType = EventType;
+ CopyMem (&EfiCcEvent->Event[0], EventLog, LogLen);
+
+ Status = CcProtocol->HashLogExtendEvent (
+ CcProtocol,
+ 0,
+ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)HashData,
+ HashDataLen,
+ EfiCcEvent
+ );
+ FreePool (EfiCcEvent);
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
/**
Tpm measure and log data, and extend the measurement result into a specific PCR.
@@ -175,25 +246,16 @@ TpmMeasureAndLogData (
IN UINT64 HashDataLen
)
{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
-
- //
- // Try to measure using Tpm20 protocol
- //
- Status = Tpm20MeasureAndLogData(
- PcrIndex,
- EventType,
- EventLog,
- LogLen,
- HashData,
- HashDataLen
- );
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol;
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&CcProtocol);
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
- // Try to measure using Tpm1.2 protocol
+ // Try to measure using Cc measurement protocol
//
- Status = Tpm12MeasureAndLogData(
+ Status = CcMeasureAndLogData (
+ CcProtocol,
PcrIndex,
EventType,
EventLog,
@@ -201,6 +263,32 @@ TpmMeasureAndLogData (
HashData,
HashDataLen
);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Try to measure using Tpm20 protocol
+ //
+ Status = Tpm20MeasureAndLogData (
+ PcrIndex,
+ EventType,
+ EventLog,
+ LogLen,
+ HashData,
+ HashDataLen
+ );
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // Try to measure using Tpm1.2 protocol
+ //
+ Status = Tpm12MeasureAndLogData (
+ PcrIndex,
+ EventType,
+ EventLog,
+ LogLen,
+ HashData,
+ HashDataLen
+ );
+ }
}
return Status;
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.inf
index 7d41bc41f9..3af3d4e33b 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.inf
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.inf
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
## @file
-# Provides TPM measurement functions for TPM1.2 and TPM 2.0
+# Provides below measurement functions:
+# 1. TPM measurement functions for TPM1.2 and TPM 2.0
+# 2. Confidential Computing (CC) measurement functions
#
# This library provides TpmMeasureAndLogData() to measure and log data, and
# extend the measurement result into a specific PCR.
@@ -40,5 +42,6 @@
UefiBootServicesTableLib
[Protocols]
- gEfiTcgProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
- gEfiTcg2ProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
+ gEfiTcgProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
+ gEfiTcg2ProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
+ gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
--
2.41.0

84
SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
From fa892c7112cfb5aa742f358544da3788a831e431 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 13/17] SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol
rename
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [13/13] 3bf59dbb583b67eddb54361781054cc650398309 (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
Upstream: Merged
commit 264636d8e6983e0f6dc6be2fca9d84ec81315954
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:22 2024 -0800
SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename
Adding the new commit titles for the symbol renames
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <5e0e851e97459e183420178888d4fcdadc2f1ae1.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
index f9e3e7be74..dc1bb83489 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
+++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
@@ -9,14 +9,35 @@ CVE_2022_36763:
- "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2Measurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763"
- "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763"
- "SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36763 to SecurityFixes.yaml"
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename"
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename"
+ - "SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename"
cve: CVE-2022-36763
date_reported: 2022-10-25 11:31 UTC
description: (CVE-2022-36763) - Heap Buffer Overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
note: This patch is related to and supersedes TCBZ2168
files_impacted:
- - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
- - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
+ - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
+ - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
links:
- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4117
- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2168
- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1990
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4117
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2168
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1990
+CVE_2022_36764:
+ commit_titles:
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764"
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764"
+ - "SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36764 to SecurityFixes.yaml"
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename"
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename"
+ - "SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename"
+ cve: CVE-2022-36764
+ date_reported: 2022-10-25 12:23 UTC
+ description: Heap Buffer Overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage()
+ note:
+ files_impacted:
+ - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
+ - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
+ links:
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4118
+
--
2.41.0

1
SOURCES/edk2-ovmf-cc.json
View File

@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
{
"architecture": "x86_64",
"machines": [
"pc-q35-rhel8.6.0",
"pc-q35-rhel8.5.0"
]
}

296
SPECS/edk2.spec
View File

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64
Name: edk2
Version: %{GITDATE}git%{GITCOMMIT}
Release: 6%{?dist}
Release: 12%{?dist}
Summary: UEFI firmware for 64-bit virtual machines
Group: Applications/Emulators
License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent and OpenSSL and MIT
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ URL: http://www.tianocore.org
# | xz -9ev >/tmp/edk2-$COMMIT.tar.xz
Source0: http://batcave.lab.eng.brq.redhat.com/www/edk2-%{GITCOMMIT}.tar.xz
Source1: ovmf-whitepaper-c770f8c.txt
Source2: openssl-rhel-d00c3c5b8a9d6d3ea3dabfcafdf36afd61ba8bcc.tar.xz
Source2: openssl-rhel-cf317b2bb227899cb2e761b9163210f62cab1b1e.tar.xz
Source3: ovmf-vars-generator
Source4: LICENSE.qosb
Source5: RedHatSecureBootPkKek1.pem
@ -60,6 +60,202 @@ Patch28: edk2-rh-openssl-add-crypto-bn-rsa_sup_mul.c-to-file-list.patch
Patch29: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationLib-Check-result-of-.patch
# For bz#2150267 - ovmf must consider max cpu count not boot cpu count for apic mode [rhel-8]
Patch30: edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-fix-apic-mode-for-cpu-hotplug.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch31: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariableG.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch32: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variables.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch33: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clone-ArmPlatformPkg-s-NOR-f.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch34: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-CheckBlockLocked-feat.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch35: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-disk-I-O-protocol-imp.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch36: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-drop-block-I-O-protocol-impl.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch37: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-array-mode-switch-afte.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch38: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-switching-between-mode.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch39: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-use-EFI_MEMORY_WC-and-drop-A.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch40: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-map-flash-memory-as-uncachea.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch41: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariable2.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch42: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variable2.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch43: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-casts-to-UINTN-and-UINT3.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch44: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clarify-block-write-logic-fi.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch45: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-a-loop-for-NorFlashWrite.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch46: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-allow-larger-writes-without-.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch47: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-ValidateFvHeader-unwritten-s.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch48: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-move-DoErase-code-block-into.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch49: edk2-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-migrate-to-OVMF-s-VirtNorFlas.patch
# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error
Patch50: edk2-OvmfPkg-clone-NorFlashPlatformLib-into-VirtNorFlashP.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch51: edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-use-of-EFI_D_-to-DEBUG_.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch52: edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-OPTIONAL-keyword-usage-style.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch53: edk2-MdePkg-Introduce-CcMeasurementProtocol-for-CC-Guest-.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch54: edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpm2.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch55: edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpmM.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch56: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch57: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4117.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch58: edk2-SecurityPkg-Adding-CVE-2022-36763-to-SecurityFixes.y.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch59: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-418.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch60: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch61: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4118-2.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch62: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4117-2.patch
# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]
Patch63: edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21842 - CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8]
Patch64: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21842 - CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8]
Patch65: edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21842 - CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8]
Patch66: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21842 - CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8]
Patch67: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Pa.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch68: edk2-Apply-uncrustify-changes-to-.c-.h-files-in-the-Netwo.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch69: edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Patc.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch70: edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Unit.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch71: edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Patc.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch72: edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Unit.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch73: edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch74: edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch75: edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p2.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch76: edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p3.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch77: edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p4.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch78: edk2-NetworkPkg-Adds-a-SecurityFix.yaml-file.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch79: edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes-p2.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch80: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Re.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch81: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Removes-duplicate-check-and-repl.patch
# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]
# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]
Patch82: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Packet-Length-is-not-updated-bef.patch
# python3-devel and libuuid-devel are required for building tools.
@ -206,6 +402,8 @@ sed \
%{SOURCE5} \
> PkKek1.oemstr
# Hack to ensure git lock is removed before chmod starts to not fail
sleep 5
# Done by %setup, but we do not use it for the auxiliary tarballs
chmod -Rf a+rX,u+w,g-w,o-w .
@ -504,6 +702,100 @@ true
%endif
%changelog
* Tue Feb 27 2024 Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com> - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-12
- edk2-Apply-uncrustify-changes-to-.c-.h-files-in-the-Netwo.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Patc.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Unit.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Patc.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Unit.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p2.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p3.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p4.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Adds-a-SecurityFix.yaml-file.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes-p2.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Re.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Removes-duplicate-check-and-repl.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Packet-Length-is-not-updated-bef.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852]
- Resolves: RHEL-21840
(CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8])
- Resolves: RHEL-21844
(CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8])
- Resolves: RHEL-21846
(CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8])
- Resolves: RHEL-21848
(CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8])
- Resolves: RHEL-21850
(CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8])
- Resolves: RHEL-21852
(CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8])
* Wed Feb 14 2024 Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-11
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-use-of-EFI_D_-to-DEBUG_.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-OPTIONAL-keyword-usage-style.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-MdePkg-Introduce-CcMeasurementProtocol-for-CC-Guest-.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpm2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpmM.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4117.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Adding-CVE-2022-36763-to-SecurityFixes.y.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-418.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4118-2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4117-2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842]
- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Pa.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842]
- Resolves: RHEL-21154
(CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8])
- Resolves: RHEL-21156
(CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8])
- Resolves: RHEL-21840
(CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8])
- Resolves: RHEL-21842
(CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8])
* Sat Feb 03 2024 Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-10
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clone-ArmPlatformPkg-s-NOR-f.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-CheckBlockLocked-feat.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-disk-I-O-protocol-imp.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-drop-block-I-O-protocol-impl.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-array-mode-switch-afte.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-switching-between-mode.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-use-EFI_MEMORY_WC-and-drop-A.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-map-flash-memory-as-uncachea.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariable2.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variable2.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-casts-to-UINTN-and-UINT3.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clarify-block-write-logic-fi.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-a-loop-for-NorFlashWrite.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-allow-larger-writes-without-.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-ValidateFvHeader-unwritten-s.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-move-DoErase-code-block-into.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-migrate-to-OVMF-s-VirtNorFlas.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-clone-NorFlashPlatformLib-into-VirtNorFlashP.patch [RHEL-17587]
- Resolves: RHEL-17587
([rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error)
* Wed Jan 24 2024 Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-9
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariableG.patch [RHEL-17587]
- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variables.patch [RHEL-17587]
- Resolves: RHEL-17587
([rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error)
* Fri Jan 05 2024 Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-8
- edk2-Bumped-openssl-submodule-version-to-cf317b2bb227.patch [RHEL-7560]
- Resolves: RHEL-7560
(CVE-2023-3446 edk2: openssl: Excessive time spent checking DH keys and parameters [rhel-8])
* Wed Nov 22 2023 Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com> - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-7
- edk2-add-8.6-machine-type-to-edk2-ovmf-cc.json.patch [RHEL-12626]
- Resolves: RHEL-12626
(Missing firmware descriptor with secureboot disabled in RHEL 8)
* Fri Aug 04 2023 Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-6
- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-fix-apic-mode-for-cpu-hotplug.patch [bz#2150267]
- Resolves: bz#2150267