edk2/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-418.patch

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* Wed Feb 14 2024 Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-11 - edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-use-of-EFI_D_-to-DEBUG_.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-OPTIONAL-keyword-usage-style.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-MdePkg-Introduce-CcMeasurementProtocol-for-CC-Guest-.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpm2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpmM.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4117.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-SecurityPkg-Adding-CVE-2022-36763-to-SecurityFixes.y.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-418.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4118-2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4117-2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] - edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842] - edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842] - edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842] - edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Pa.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842] - Resolves: RHEL-21154 (CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]) - Resolves: RHEL-21156 (CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]) - Resolves: RHEL-21840 (CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]) - Resolves: RHEL-21842 (CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8])
2024-02-14 16:57:41 +00:00
From 7c3fefb0c857acb9e7e14b150c4c3131e78fbb63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:43:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 09/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118
- CVE 2022-36764
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RH-Commit: [9/13] c7890fc5c5d7fef2fc1daa931ea2d48f3a76b9e3 (jmaloy/jons_fork)
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
Upstream: Merged
commit c7b27944218130cca3bbb20314ba5b88b5de4aa4
Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:04 2024 +0800
SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764
This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib
CVE 2022-36764.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
---
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 15 +++--
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 46 +++++++++++++-
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 28 ++++++++-
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++---
4 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
index 476c8d543f..f06926e631 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ Exit:
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image.
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED ImageType is unsupported or PE image is mal-format.
@retval other error value
-
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
@@ -399,6 +398,7 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
ImageLoad = NULL;
EventPtr = NULL;
+ Tcg2Event = NULL;
Tcg2Protocol = MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol;
CcProtocol = MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol;
@@ -413,19 +413,24 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
- FilePathSize = (UINT32) GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
+ FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
//
// Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy
//
- EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
- EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event));
+ // from a malicious GPT disk partition
+ EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize);
if (EventPtr == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr;
- Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof(EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER);
+ Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize;
+ Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER);
Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION;
ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *) Tcg2Event->Event;
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
index e2309655d3..2a4d52c6d5 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
}
/**
- This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane
+ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane
It will check the following:
- AllocationSize does not overflow
@@ -273,3 +273,47 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+
+/**
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - EventSize does not overflow
+
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The event size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ Overflow would have occurred.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ // Replacing logic:
+ // sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath), FilePathSize, EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ // Replacing logic:
+ // EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (*EventSize, OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event), EventSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
index 048b738987..8f72ba4240 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse
partition data carefully.
+ Tcg2MeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its
+ data structure within this image buffer before use.
+
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
@@ -110,4 +113,27 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
);
-#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_
+/**
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
+ It will check the following:
+ - EventSize does not overflow
+
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
+ The event size is valid.
+
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
+ Overflow would have occurred.
+
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
+ );
+
+#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
index 3eb9763e3c..820e99aeb9 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
@@ -72,10 +72,10 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
PrimaryHeader.Header.Revision = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION;
PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER);
PrimaryHeader.MyLBA = 1;
- PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 2;
- PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 3;
- PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 4;
- PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 5;
+ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 2;
+ PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 3;
+ PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 4;
+ PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 5;
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES;
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryArrayCRC32 = 0; // Purposely invalid
@@ -187,11 +187,6 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
UINTN NumberOfPartition;
- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
- EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event;
-
- Tcg2Event = NULL;
- GptData = NULL;
// Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
@@ -225,6 +220,52 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
}
+/**
+ This function tests the SanitizePeImageEventSize function.
+ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a file path when generating a
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT structure will not cause an overflow when calculating
+ the event size when allocating space
+
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
+
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
+**/
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
+ )
+{
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ UINTN ExistingLogicEventSize;
+ UINT32 FilePathSize;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ FilePathSize = 255;
+
+ // Test that a normal PE image passes validation
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
+
+ // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic
+ ExistingLogicEventSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
+ ExistingLogicEventSize += OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event);
+
+ if (EventSize != ExistingLogicEventSize) {
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize returned an incorrect event size. Expected %u, got %u\n", ExistingLogicEventSize, EventSize);
+ return UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ // Test that the event size may not overflow
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
+
+ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
+}
+
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
// * Unit Test Code Main Function
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
@@ -267,6 +308,7 @@ UefiTestMain (
AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL);
AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests PE Image and FileSize checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePeImageEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework);
--
2.41.0