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9b84838ba3
Ensure extract_name stops whenever name is longer than 255 bytes. That is defined by RFC 1035 and MAXDNAME is derived from that length. Dnsmasq until now relied on upstream servers filtering similar responses to be filtered out. Stop immediately if the packet is big enough, but binary name length exceeds 255 bytes. That is prerequisite for escaped name to become longer than existing buffer long MAXDNAME. Introduce new MAXWNAME constant for on-wire length limit. MAXDNAME remains escaped "presentation" format limit, possibly containing IDN or escaping. Standard escaping is \ddd, where ddd are decadic value of that byte. Such escaping is not implemented by dnsmasq. MAXDNAME should be large enough for any escaped names as long as MAXWNAME cannot exceed defined length. Signed-off-by: Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> Resolves-Vulnerability: CVE-2026-2291 Resolves: RHEL-181041 |
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| .fmf | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| ci.fmf | ||
| dnsmasq-2.77-underflow.patch | ||
| dnsmasq-2.78-fips.patch | ||
| dnsmasq-2.81-configuration.patch | ||
| dnsmasq-2.86-build_server_array.patch | ||
| dnsmasq-CVE-2026-2291.patch | ||
| dnsmasq-systemd-sysusers.conf | ||
| dnsmasq.service | ||
| dnsmasq.spec | ||
| gating.yaml | ||
| nm.fmf | ||
| plans.fmf | ||
| rpminspect.yaml | ||
| sources | ||
| srkgpg.txt | ||
| test-release-public-key | ||
| tmpfiles-dnsmasq.conf | ||